defying the laws of physics- risks & exposures for financial institutions raymond decarlo-...
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Defying the Defying the Laws of Physics-Laws of Physics-
Risks & Exposures forRisks & Exposures forFinancial InstitutionsFinancial Institutions
Raymond DeCarlo- Raymond DeCarlo- ModeratorModeratorAIG - National UnionAIG - National Union
R. Damian BrewR. Damian BrewMarsh FINPROMarsh FINPRO
Dr. Frederick C. DunbarDr. Frederick C. DunbarNERA Economic ConsultingNERA Economic Consulting
David KistenbrokerDavid KistenbrokerKatten Muchin ZavisKatten Muchin Zavis
Thomas WilkinsonThomas WilkinsonCozen O'ConnorCozen O'Connor
Frederick C. Dunbar, Ph.D.
Senior Vice President
19th Annual PLUS International ConferenceHosted by the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS)Chicago, Illinois
November 10, 2006
Defying the Laws of Physics—Risks & Exposures for Financial Institutions
3
Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Financial Institutions
94111
84
144
97
57
84
128
8972
364
120
83
5134
17
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20061
1991 through 2006
Year
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
Notes and Sources:1 2006 filings are projected based upon actual data through July 15, 2006. Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data.
4
7247 63 46
30 32 17
310
3
54
2017
12 2
7
9
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20061
Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Financial Institutions
Other Laddering Analyst Market Timing Contingent Commission
2000 through 2006 (Projected)
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Notes and Sources:1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data.
Year
5
16
Federal Filings by Year of Class Action Lawsuits Involving Financial Institutions
15 1737
20 24 13 19 11 11 11 117
2420 18
7 6 10 15 9
5
321 21
18 6 11 1229
49
50
2820
331
6727
1
5 65 6
3
4 13
10
83
6
25
3319 17
34 2216
6144
10 82014
29 56
44
83
42
5
7
1111
5 7
Other Insurance Mutual Fund Bank Investment Bank and UnderwriterNotes and Sources:
1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20061
1991 through 2006
Year
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
6
Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Banks
25
6
3
1211
8
6
18
10
5
3
1111
14
20
Notes and Sources:1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/2006.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20061
1991 through 2006
Year
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
7
Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Insurance Companies
6
9
15
10
67
18
20
24
7
5
14
65
16
7
Notes and Sources:1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/2006.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20061
1991 through 2006
Year
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
8
Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Mutual Funds
1
2121
16
433
56
5
8
10
4
Notes and Sources:1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/2006.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20061
0
5
10
15
20
25
1991 through 2006
Year
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
9
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20061
Federal Filings by Year of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Investment Banks and Underwriters
71
27
67
331
2028
504929
42
83
4456
29
Notes and Sources:1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/2006.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1991 through 2006
Year
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
10
Filings by Circuit of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Financial Institutions Excluding Laddering Cases
6 10
88
37
184
22 18 14
35
8207
91
3
1
2
45
3
15
1
7
CircuitOther Underwriter NamedNotes and Sources:
1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/2006.
DC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 110
20
100
120
140
160
180
80
200
60
40
Total for 2000 through 2006
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
11
Filings by Circuit of Securities Class Action Cases Involving Financial Institutions
1
7
2
3
2
14
4
1
4
2
66
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2005 20061Notes and Sources:1 Data is projected by multiplying the actual number of filings by the ratio of days in 2006 to days in 2006 included in the filings data. Data is estimated based upon filings through 7/15/2006.
DC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
For 2005 and 2006
Nu
mb
er
of
Fil
ing
s
Circuit
12
Dismissal Rates by Circuit Within Two Years of Filing
June 15, 1999–June 15, 2006
.08%
1.3%
.06%.06%.09%
5%
.03%
.07%.08%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
DC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Circuit
Dis
mis
sa
l R
ate
13
$9.05 $9.88 $10.66 $8.84 $14.03 $12.53 $8.73
$42.38
$23.22 $18.58 $11.78
$43.79
$7.83 $13.44
$378.65
$248.66
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
$400
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Average Settlement ValueS
ett
lem
en
t V
alu
e (
$M
M)
Year
14
Median Settlement Value
$3.83 $4.15 $4.90 $4.53 $4.60 $4.78 $5.00$6.80
$4.63 $5.00 $5.81
$16.00
$4.00$6.04
$7.50
$39.90
$0
$5
$10
$15
$20
$25
$30
$35
$40
$45
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Se
ttle
me
nt
Va
lue
($
MM
)
15
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
35.29 70.81 42.73 37.89 93.78 71.81 113.06 60.18 56.19142.78 170.79
469.89
99.06
328.36 260.98
4326.05
4.14%
4.73%
6.07%
9.22%
5.21%
7.63%
4.32%
7.85%
5.79%
4.27%3.86%
2.93%
5.69%
2.71%
3.94%
10.37%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20060%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
Me
dia
n I
nv
es
tor
Lo
ss
es
Me
dia
n R
ati
o o
f S
ett
lem
en
t to
In
ve
sto
r L
os
se
s (
%)
Investor Losses and Settlements
Contact Us
Frederick C. Dunbar, Ph.D.
Senior Vice PresidentNERA—New York+1 212 345 [email protected]
© Copyright 2006National Economic Research Associates, Inc.
All rights reserved.
19th Annual Plus International Conference
Primary Liability for Secondary Actors
David H. KistenbrokerKatten Muchin Rosenman, LLP525 West Monroe StreetSuite 1900Chicago, Illinois 60661312.902.5200
18
Primary Liability for Secondary Actors Civil liability for banks, issuers, broker-
dealers and other “secondary” actors.
– Primary liability under the evolving theory of “scheme” liability.
Liability under SEC enforcement provisions
– Primary liability under securities laws
– Secondary liability under traditional theories of aiding and abetting and “causing” primary violations.
– Liability under the USA Patriot Act
19
Primary Liability for Secondary Actors Civil liability under § 10b for financial
institutions and other secondary actors
– Traditional Rule 10b-5 claim requires a material misstatement or omission
– “Speaker” faces primary liability for a primary violation
Historically, financial institutions faced only secondary liability – aiding and abetting the fraudulent
statements of others
20
Primary Liability for Secondary Actors Central Bank of Denver (1994)
– No private action for aiding and abetting– A financial institution may still face potential
liability as a “primary violator”
The Battle Line: Primary liability versus non-actionable secondary actions
– Courts have utilized three tests•“Bright Line” test – secondary actor must
directly or indirectly make fraudulent statement: Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP (2d Cir. 1998)
•“Substantial Participation” test – significant role in preparing fraudulent statements: In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig. (9th Cir. 1994)
21
Primary Liability for Secondary Actors
“Creation of Misrepresentation” test
– First advocated by SEC in 1998 in amicus brief in Klein v. Boyd (3d Cir. 1998)
– Focus is on secondary actors’ conduct rather than actual misstatements
– Relies on 10(b)-5(a) and (c)
•“device, scheme or artifice to defraud”
– First adopted in In Re Enron Corp. (2002)
•Lawyers drafted/approved false SEC filings
•intimate involvement with transactions supported allegation they “created” the misstatements
22
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability “Scheme” liability and the courts
Appellate courts reject “scheme” liability:
– 8th Circuit – In re Charter Communications, Inc.
– 9th Circuit – In re Homestore.com, Inc.•Third party vendors/arm’s length transactions – no other role
•Primary defendants failed to properly account for transactions
•No misstatements, “deceptive” device or “manipulative” conduct
23
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability District courts mixed on “scheme” liability
– In re Dynegy (S.D. Texas 2004) - claim rejected•Bank set up, executed two loans disguised as
investment and cash flow
•No role in accounting/reporting transactions
•No allegations deceptive acts “coincided with sales of Dynegy securities.”
– Quaak v. Dexia, S.A. (D.Mass 2005) – claim survives•Bank financed “sham” entities used to record
fictitious revenue
•“Substantial participation” -- bank a ‘primary architect’ of the scheme.
•Plaintiff subsequently filed amended complaint alleging direct liability; First Circuit vacated leave to appeal
24
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability District courts mixed on “scheme” liability
– In re Parmalat (SDNY 2005) – mixed outcome•Sham versus legitimate transactions
– The securitization and factoring of duplicate invoices for same goods was “deceptive device”
– Loans disguised as investments; deception resulted from company’s description, therefore Citigroup/BoA’s conduct not actionable
– No showing of reliance required in actionable transaction – no direct reliance is needed
25
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability District courts mixed on “scheme”
liability
– In re Mutual Fund Investment Litig. (D. Md. 2005) – mixed outcome
•Broker-dealers facilitated market-timed transactions
•No liability for knowingly financing or clearing late trading
•Liability for providing after-hours trading system, disabling time-stamp function
26
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability Line between primary and secondary
liability remains undefined– Legitimacy of underlying transaction
•Transaction has true business purpose
•Fraud is in accounting/reporting
– Direct or substantial participation in deceptive acts
• “substantial participation” in Quaak
•“orchestrating” in Mutual Fund Litig.
– SEC Liability for “aiding and abetting” remains
27
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability 31 C.F.R. 103.122 Implements § 326 of the
USA PATRIOT Act
– Final rule took effect on June 9, 2003, although broker-dealers had until October 1, 2003, to implement
– The rules seek to protect the U.S. financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing.
– Parallel rules exist for banks under § 103.121 and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers under § 103.123.
28
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability
Requires Customer Identification Program (CIP) that, at a minimum, includes:
– Identity verification procedures
– Recordkeeping
– Comparison with government lists
– Customer notice
– Reliance on another financial institution
29
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability On May 22, 2006, the SEC announced its first-ever
enforcement action under the USA PATRIOT Act
– Action was brought against Crowell, Weedon, a broker-dealer.
• From 10/03 to 4/04, Crowell opened approximately 2,900 accounts.
• In verifying customer’s identities, Crowell relied on its registered reps’ attestations that they had personal knowledge of the customers opening the accounts
• The practice not documented in the firm’s written customer identification program (CIP).
• Rather, the CIP stated the firm would verify the identity of new customers using certain non-documentary and documentary procedures, such as public data base searches and reviewing government issued identification.
30
Developments in Secondary Actor Liability
Violation– By failing to accurately document its CIP, Crowell
violated the record-keeping and record retention requirements under the rule.
– Crowell consented to the issuance of an order that it cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 17a-8 thereunder.