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DeliberativeDemocracyandMulticulturalism
MoniqueDeveaux
InTheOxfordHandbookofDeliberativeDemocracyeds.A.Bächtinger,J.Dryzek,J.
Mansbridge,andM.Warren(OUP,forthcoming2017),
Abstractandkeywords
Deliberativedemocracyiswidelyassociatedwithapublicspherethatismoreinclusiveof
culturalandreligiousminoritygroupsthanthatestablishedbyamodelofpoliticsas
interestaggregation.Butithasalsobeencriticizedforstipulatingunjusttermsforthis
politicalinclusion,andforbeinginsufficientlyresponsivetoidentitygroup-basedclaims.
Suchchallengeshavepromptedmuchinternaldebateaboutthevalidityandthepractical
consequencesofdifferentnormsandmechanismsofdeliberativedemocracy.Modelsof
publicdeliberationlessbeholdentoHabermasiandiscourseethics,Iargue,offeramore
promisingresponsetothesesmulticulturalchallenges.
Keywords:multiculturalism,publicdeliberation,culturalrecognition,democratic
inclusion,exclusion
Thereismuchindeliberativedemocracythatconducestoaninclusiveanddiversepublic
sphere.Thetheory’sgroundingincommunicativeasopposedtostrategicandinstrumental
action(Habermas1984)requiresthatwerespectcitizens’moraldifferencesandnotseek
tobracketthesefromdemocraticpoliticallife.Therequirementthatpoliticaldecision-
makingbebasedonpublicdeliberationandtherespectfulexchangeofsharedreasons—
ratherthanonmereinterestsorsheerpower—wouldseemtoencouragediversecitizens
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tosharetheirdifferentvaluesandseekmutuallyacceptableagreements.Deliberative
democracy’scorecommitmentstopoliticalequalityandmutualrespectinpublicdiscourse,
andtotheprinciplethatlegitimateoutcomesareonesthatallparticipantstodeliberation
canaccept,arguablyhelpstoenfranchisepeoplewhohailfromdisempowered
communities—includingracializedand(some)culturalminorities.Finally,deliberative
democracytheory’sacknowledgementofaninformalpublicsphereinadditiontothe
formalpublicsphereofconstitutionaldemocraticpolitics(Habermas1996)hasthe
potentialtoopenupadditionalpathwaysfordemocraticparticipationformarginalized
socialgroups(Williams1998;Young1990,2000).
1.Multiculturalismandproblemsofdeliberativeinjusticeandexclusion
Despiteitsseemingadvantages,criticshavearguedthatdeliberativedemocracymaythrow
upobstaclestothepoliticalparticipationofsomesocialgroups,thushamperingeffortsto
deependemocraticinclusioninmulticulturalliberalsocieties.Theseconcerns,whichhave
promptednumerousproposedamendmentstodeliberativedemocracy,canbedistilled
intofourclustersofproblems.
i) Deliberativeinequalities
Proponentsofdeliberativedemocracyhavelongacknowledgedthatsocialandeconomic
inequalitiesnegativelyimpactpeople’sdeliberativecapacitiesandstanding(Bohman2000;
Young1990).Justaslowincomeandsocioeconomicstandingarewidelyunderstoodto
tracklowpoliticalparticipationratesinmanydemocracies,soissocialdisadvantage
thoughttoimpactcitizens’capacitiesandopportunitiestodeliberateinpoliticallife—
theirdeliberative“capabilities”.Thisleadstoaconditionof“politicalpoverty”—i.e.,“a
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group-relatedinabilitytomakeeffectiveuseofopportunitiestoinfluencethedeliberative
process”(Bohman2000,125)—derivingfromthefactthat“thematerialprerequisitesfor
deliberationareunequallydistributed”(Sanders1997,349).Wheresocioeconomically
disadvantagedstatustracksracialorethnicorracialminoritystatus,deliberative
inequalitiesarecompounded.Totheextentthatsociallydisadvantagedracialandcultural
minoritygroupshavelessaccesstoeducationalandpoliticalresources,theirmembersmay
lackthedeliberativeskillsofmoreprivilegedcitizenstoengageinreasonedpublic
deliberation(Bohman2000;Sanders1997;Young1990),aswellasopportunitiestodoso.
Group-basedstructuralinequalitiesreflectinghistoricalinjusticeslikecolonialism
andslaveryalsogiverisetocontemporarystatusdifferentialsthataffectwhosevoice
carriesindeliberation,andwhosedoesnot(Williams1998).Thissecondaspectofthe
problemofdeliberativeinequalities—howone’ssocialstatusorstandingenhances,or
decreases,one’sdeliberativeinclusionandimpact—isboundupwithongoingpractices
andstructuresofracialandgenderdiscrimination.Youngarguesthatstatusdifferentials
andaccompanying“inequalitiesofpowerandresources”(Young2000,54)giverisetoboth
externalandinternalformsofexclusion.Deliberativedemocracyhasarguablytriedto
addressthemostvisibleformsofexternalexclusionaffectingaggregativedemocracy,
which“concernhowpeoplearekeptoutsidetheprocessofdiscussionanddecision-
making”(Young2000,55).Butmanymodelsofdeliberationmayfailtopreventinternal
exclusion,manifesting,forexample,asanattitudeofdismissalanddisrespecttowards
thosewithlessersocialandeconomicpowerandstatus(55).Whilethereisevidencethat
specialeffortsaremadetoincludelinguisticminoritiesinsomeformaldeliberativesettings
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bymakingfrequentreferencetotheirinterestsandconcerns(Pedrini,Bächtiger,and
Steenbergen,2013),thesamecannotbesaidforracializedandsubordinatedminorities.
ii)Culturalgroupdifferencesanddeliberativestyles
Deliberativeinequalitiesaffectingethno-culturalandracialminoritiesdonotonlyariseasa
resultofsocioeconomicdisadvantageperse.Membersofcommunitieswithsocial
experiences,worldviews,and/orvaluesfarfromthemainstream—includingindigenous
peoples,somecultural(includingimmigrant)identitygroups,andracializedminorities—
mayfindtheirviewssimplydismissedor“discounted”(Young2000,55)inseemingly
democraticforums.Quasi-deliberativepublichearingsorconsultationssometimesblock
moreradicalperspectivesonsocialproblemsbydeemingcertainconcernsoutsidethe
scopeoftheirmandate.InQuébec,theTaylor-BouchardCommissionon“reasonable
accommodation”insistedthatitssolefocuswasthechallengesposedbyreligiousand
ethno-culturaldiversitytointegrationintoQuébecsocietyanddemocraticpoliticallife;
accordingly,itexcludedjusticeclaimsrelatingtoaboriginalidentityandstatus,and
sidelinedthosepertainingtoracismandracialization(BouchardandTaylor2008).Such
boundary-settingmovesarguablyleadtoafailureofdemocraticlegitimacyinsofarasthose
groupsthatareexcludedormarginalizedfrompoliticaldeliberationarenonetheless
impactedbytheoutcome:“theyarethelegaladdressesofthedeliberativeagreementsover
whichtheyhavenorealinfluenceorpublicinput”(Bohman2000,125-6).
Membersofculturalandreligiousminoritiesmayalsohavestylesofpolitical
communicationthatcontrastsharplywiththemodesofcommunicationassumedor
stipulatedbynormsofdeliberativedemocracy.Theseincludeengaginginformalpublic
dialogueanddeliberation,andprovidingpubliclyaccessibleand(insomesense)impartial
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reasons.Someethno-culturalminoritiesandAboriginalpeoplesbalkattherequirement
thatthey‘translate’theirclaimsintotermsdemandedbyidealizedmodelsofmoral
dialogue,expressingasenseofalienationinresponsetodemandsthattheygivereasons
thatareuniversalizable(Coulthard2010;Deveaux2000;Young2000).Indeed,such
demandsarearguablyunjustinsofarastheyrequire“onepartytosetasideitsculturally
specificways,whiletheotherpartyhastheluxurynotonlyofhavingitsstyleofconflict
prevailbutofbelievingthatitsstyleisculturallyunmarkedanduniversallyapplicable”
(Kahane2004,42).Racializedandculturalminoritygroupswithstylesofpoliticalspeech
andargumentationmaythereforefacesignificantdisadvantages.Thishasledsome
deliberativedemocratstoproposethatcommunicationindeliberativecontextsshouldbe
expandedtoincludelessformalmodesofspeech,suchasstorytelling,narrative,and
testimony(Sanders1997;Young2000).Yetithasbecomeclearthattofullyrespondto
group-baseddeliberativeinequalitiesandthejusticeclaimsofethno-culturalandreligious
communities,corenormsofdeliberativedemocracywillneedtobecriticallyrethoughtand
revised.Forexample,threecategoriesofvalidityclaimssetoutbyHabermas(1984,
1996)—thoserelatingtotruth/facts;norms;sincerityorself-expression—donotcapture
thefullrangeofspeechthatshouldbeconsideredprimafacievalidinmoralandpolitical
discourse(Bohman2004;Deveaux2000;Young2000).Traditionalandindigenous
societiesinparticularmakeclaimsthatinterweavemyth,storytelling,andoralhistories,
andmanyofwhichdonotreadilyfitintoanyoftheseexistingcategoriesofvalidityclaims
(Young2000;Hemmingsen2016).Onsomeinterpretations,thepublicitydemandrequires
thatcitizenstreattheiridentitiesasconstructedandcontestable,therebydisadvantaging
indigenouspeoples(Coulthard2010,2014).Criticalinterventionsbythoseconcerned
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aboutsecuringdemocraticjusticeforethno-culturalandracializedgroupshavethusled
sometheoriststomoveawayfromorthodoxversionofdiscourseethicsandtowardswhat
Urbanitihascalled“anagonisticformofdeliberativedemocracy”(2000,774).
iii)Identitygroupclaimsanddeliberativevirtues
Tobetterunderstandcallsforashifttowardsanagonisticformofdeliberativedemocracy,it
isusefultoconsiderwhichdeliberativevirtuesarerequiredbymoretraditionalapproaches
todiscourseethics,andhowthesemightbeexpectedtodisadvantagedifferentsocialgroups
inmulticulturalandraciallydiversesocieties.MelissaWilliams(1998)hasarguedthatthe
requirementthatdeliberativeparticipantsrefrainfromappealingtoself-interestaffects
membersofculturalminoritygroupsasymmetricallyandunjustly.Thisdemand,which
stemsfromacommitmenttodeliberativevirtuesofimpartialityanduniversalizability,
“hamper(s)marginalizedgrouprepresentatives’capacitytoconformtothestandardsof
publicdiscoursewhilealsoeffectivelyrepresentingtheirconstituents’perspectivesand
interests.Indeed,thestatusofmarginalizedgroupsasmarginalizedreflects,bydefinition,
thefactthatsomeoftheirfundamentalinterestsarenowsystematicallyandunjustifiably
neglected”(Williams1998,144).ThisleadsWilliamstoconclude,rightlyinmyview,that
“anydiscursiveprocessinwhichthatneglectcancometolightmustmakespaceforthe
expressionofgroup-specificinterests”(144).
Thevalidintereststhatsomeculturalminoritiesmaypotentiallyseektointroduce
intodeliberationmayincludeclaimsaboutthevalueoftheirgroupidentityandparticular
traditionsandpractices;abouttheimportanceofaspecificterritory(e.g.,inthecaseof
Aboriginalpeoples);andabouttheneedforspecialgrouprepresentation,orotherspecial
politicalarrangementsuptoandincludingsovereignty,inlightoftheirhistoricalexclusion.
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Indeed,thevalidityofrangeofculturalgroup-basedjusticeclaimsinmulticulturalsocieties
hasbeenpersuasivelydefendedby(non-deliberative)democratictheoristsonthegrounds
ofequalityandindividualautonomy(seeespeciallyKymlicka1995).Itisnothardtosee
howthepresentationanddefenseoftheseculturalgroupclaimsishamperedbya
prohibitiononappealsto(individualorgroup)self-interest.Therequirementthatcultural
identityanditspreservationbetreatedasfullycontestableinthecontextofdeliberation—
asdemandedbyBenhabib’sdeliberativedemocraticapproach,forexample—alsoflows
fromnormsofuniversalizabilityandimpartiality(Benhabib1996,2000).Coulthardhas
suggested(2014)thatthisrequirementmaydisadvantageAboriginalparticipantsto
deliberation,giventhecentralimportanceofidentityclaimsintheirjusticestruggles.
Arelateddeliberativevirtuethathascomeunderscrutinyinlightofculturalgroup-
basedinterestsandjusticeclaimsisthatofreciprocity.Pedrini,BächtigerandSteenbergen
(2013)arguethatthe“burdenofreciprocity”oughtnottobedemandedequallyof
linguisticminoritiesandmajorities:“itislegitimateforminoritiestobelessresponsiveto
majoritiesanddopoliticsinaslightlymoreadversarialandpassionatewaywhentheir
vitalinterestsareaffected”(508).TheirresearchontheSwisspoliticalsystemalso
suggeststhatatleastinsomepoliticalcontexts,whenlinguisticmajoritiesreference
linguisticminorities’groupinterestsfrequently,thismayleadtogreaterdeliberative
inclusionandinteractionacrosslinguisticcleavages.Themoreagonistic,contestatory
approachtodeliberativedemocracyadvocatedbyUrbinati(2000),Deveaux(2006),and
otherspermitsappealstogroup-basedinterestsandadvocacywithinpoliticaldeliberation
morereadilythandomodelsofdeliberationthatequateanyreferencetointerestswith
aggregativepolitics.
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iv)Theidealofacommongood
Amuch-toutedadvantageofHabermas’smodelofdiscourseethicsoverRawls’sconception
ofpoliticaldeliberationisthatitdoesnotseektolimitthescopeofcitizens’contributions
inadvanceofactualdeliberation.Thoseliberaltheoriesofjusticeinwhichcitizens’
deliberationsfigureprominently—includingRawls’slaterwriting—appealtounrevised
normsofimpartialityandpublicreasonthatarguablyposebarrierstheinclusionof
culturalminoritycitizensinpoliticaldeliberationontermsthatareacceptabletothem;
thesemodelsrequirethatcitizensbracketortranslatetheiridentity-relatedinterestsinthe
courseofmakingjusticeclaims.Relatedly,Young(1990,1996,2000)arguesthatsome
deliberativedemocraticnormscontributetoanidealofthepublicspherethatdemandsan
implausibleandunnecessaryunity.Appealstounityortoanotionofthecommongood
mayrequireparticipantsinpublicdialoguetosetasidetheiridentity-baseddifferencesand
treats“differenceitself[as]somethingtobetranscended,becauseitispartialanddivisive”
(Young2000,42).Whiletheideaofacommongoodisreflectedinsomecommunitarian
approachestodeliberativedemocracy,ithasbeenwidelyrejectedbymanydeliberative
democratsasincompatiblewithrespectforconcrete(asopposedtoabstract)pluralism
(Bohman1995,2000,2010;Deveaux2000,2006;Festenstein2005;Mansbridge2012;
Parekh2006;Young2000).
Anadjacentideal,sharedpublicreason,is,however,stillwidelyendorsedby
deliberativedemocracytheorists.Butaswiththenotionofacommongood,thisnormmay
betakentorequirethatmembersofculturalminoritiestreattheiridentity-relatedclaims
ascontestableandnegotiableindeliberation(thusrenderingtheirclaimsconsistentwith
commitmentstonormsofimpartialityandsharedpublicreason).Thisseemingly
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reasonablenormmaythereforeunwittinglycompoundexistingcolonialstructuresof
powerandprivilege(Coulthard2010,2014).Forsimilarreasons,adeepcommitmentto
respectforculturalpluralismmayrequirethatwerevisitstrongmoralconsensus
(GutmannandThomspon1996,2004)asagoalofdemocraticcommunication;andindeed,
therearegoodgroundstoabandonconsensusinfavourofanethicoridealofcompromise
(Bohman2000;Deveaux2006).Theadvantagesofcompromiseoverconsensusfordeep
moralconflictsareobvious:compromiseallowscitizenswithsignificantlydisparate
viewpointsorworldviewstoreachsomeformofagreementwithoutresortingto(unjust)
coercion.Whereprocessesofmoralargumentationandpublicdiscourseareexpectedto
culminateinmoralconsensus,deliberativeparticipantsmaybepressuredtosetaside
identity-basedclaimsordemandsthatchallengethepoliticalstatusquo.
2.Revisingdeliberativedemocracyinresponsetomulticulturalchallenges
Shiftingawayfromconsensusandtowardscompromise—andpossiblyamoreagonistic
modelofdeliberation—maymakedeliberativedemocracymorereceptivetothejustice
claimsofindigenousandculturalminoritygroups.Deepculturalconflictsinparticularmay
bemorereadilyacknowledgedthroughsuchshifts:itmaybethat“inthemoredifficult
casesofinterculturaldisagreement,itwillsufficethatparticipantsbelievetheyhave
equitablyinfluencedthedeliberativeprocessandagreetocontinuetocooperateingood
faithinfuturedeliberations”(Valadez2001,5).Forsomedeliberativedemocrats,
compromiseisstillprimarilyconstruedasamoralprocess,ratherthanasastrategic
processakintobargaining(Festenstein2005;Bohman2010).Presentingpublicreasonsis
essentialonthisaccountofdeliberativecompromise,whichmaybeeitherprocedural
(relatingtoproposedchangestodeliberationordecisionmakingitself)orelsesubstantive
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innature(Bohman2010,99).Yetthereisalsoreasontothinkthatdeliberativedemocracy
oughttoembracenegotiation(Mansbridgeetal.2010;Mansbridge2012;Warrenand
Mansbridge2016)andevenbargaining(Deveaux2006;Habermas1996;James2004),
despitetheassociationofthesemechanismswithwhatMansbridge(1996)referstoas
“adversarytradition”ofdemocracy.Negotiationandbargainingcouldinsome
circumstancesrequireparticipantstomakemoretransparent(andsotoconfront)their
strategicinterests,includinginthecontextofintra-culturaldisputes(Deveaux2003,2006).
Amorepoliticalconceptionofcompromiserecognizesthatdeepdisagreementsareoftenof
apoliticalratherthanmoralnature,asinthecaseoftheconflictsarisinginthe
reconciliationprocessbetweenaboriginalpeoplesandsettlersinAustralia(Ivison2010,
133).
Importantly,moremoralizedconceptionsofdiscourseethics,suchasthat
representedbyHabermas’s(1984)earliestelaborationofcommunicativeethics,aremore
vulnerabletothemulticulturalchallengessetoutabovethanaremorepoliticalaccountsof
deliberativedemocracy.HelpfulhereisBächtingeretal.’s(2010)distinctionbetweentwo
typesofdeliberation,onefaithfultoHabermas’stheoryofcommunicativeaction—withits
emphasisonproceduralismandrationaldiscourse—andtheotherencompassing“more
flexibleformsofdiscourse,moreemphasisonoutcomesversusprocess,andmore
attentiontoovercoming‘realworld’constraintsonrealizingnormativeideals”(Bächtinger
etal.2010,33).Alongwithanumberofotherdeliberativedemocrats,Ihavearguedthat
deliberativedemocracyconceivedofasapolitical(andmoral)dialoguebetweencitizensof
diverseculturalandreligiouscommunitiesiscrucialtotheconstructionofamorejust,
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democraticpolity(Benhabib1996,2002;Bohman2000;Deveaux2000,2006;Mansbridge
1999,2010;Tully1996;Williams1995,1998;Young1990,2000).
Inresponsetoconcernsabouttheconsequencesofdiscourse-ethicalnormsof
publicityandimpartialityfortheinclusionofdiverseculturalcommunities,anumberof
deliberativedemocracytheoristshaveurgedashifttoamore“pluralisticidealof
deliberation”(Bohman2010,110)consistinginamoreinclusiveorpluralconceptionof
publicreason.TheorizinginthisveincorrespondstoBächtigeretal.’sTypeIIdeliberation
inthatitemphasizes“outcomesversusprocess”and“incorporatesalternativeformsof
communication,suchasrhetoricorstory-telling”(2010,33-34).Amoreexpansivepublic
sphere,withawiderviewofwhatcancountaspotentiallyacceptablepolitical
communication—movingbeyonddiscourseethics’existingcategoriesofvalidityclaims
andforms/stylesofdiscourse—arguablyopenspoliticsuptothediscursivestylesofsome
culturalandreligiousminoritycitizens.Noristhisopeninglimitedtothedomainof
politics;law,too,canbedeployedineffortstoconstructmoreinclusivediscursivenorms.
Forexample,somedemocratictheoristspointtoSupremeCourtofCanada’sdecisionin
Delgamuukwv.BritishColumbia(Benhabib2002,140-41;Bohman2010),which
establishedthelegalvalidityofindigenousoraltraditionalandhistoryasevidenceincourt
cases,asanexampleofhowlegalchangestoevidentiarynormscanpropelbroadernorms
ofpublicdiscourseinamoredemocraticdirection(thoughforamorepessimisticand
criticalviewofthiscase,seeCoulthard2007,451).
Butsignificantchallengesremain.Mighttheworldviewsanddiscursivemodesof
somecommunitieswithinliberaldemocracies,suchastraditionalreligiousgroups,beso
incommensurablethatnotevendemocraticprocessesguidedbyapluralisticaccountof
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publicreasonwillsufficetoenfranchisethesegroups?Whatofsituationsinwhichthereis
nocommoncommitmenttonormsofdemocraticlegitimacyanduniversalpolitical
equality?Thenthereisthematterofsocialandpoliticalinequality:howdoentrenched
disadvantagesthattrackethno-cultural,racialized,and/orrecentimmigrantstatusin
liberaldemocraciespreventmembersofsuchgroupsfromparticipatingindemocratic
deliberation(Bohman2000,105;Valadez2001;Young2000)?Andhowmightthese
injusticesbereversed?OnewayforwardissuggestedbyYoung’sideaoftreatinggroup
baseddifferencesasaresourceindemocraticcommunicationanddeliberation(Young
1999,2000).Focusingonthenon-idealcontextthatactuallyexistsinliberalconstitutional
democraciesratherthanthatsupposedbydiscourseethics’idealspeechsituationorideal
liberalandrepublicantheories,Youngarguesthatbackgroundsocial-structuralinjustices
existthatpowerfullyshapetheopportunitiesandperspectivesofsocialgroups(2000,97).
These“structuralgroupssometimesbuildonoroverlapwithculturalgroups,asinmost
structuresofracializeddifferentiationorethnic-basedprivilege”(Young2000,98).Rather
thanviewing“situatedknowledges”(Young2000,114)asanimpedimenttopublic
deliberation,weshouldtreatthemasapowerfuldeliberativeresourceindemocratic
communication.Byincludingthesesocially-situatedperspectivesindemocratic
deliberationanddecisionmakingapluralityofperspectives—especiallythoseofsocially
marginalizedpersonsandculturalandracialminorities—wecanhelptocounterthe
impositionofthestatus-quoviewsofthosewithsocialprivilege(Young1999,399).
Theintertwiningofsocialinequalitywithculturalorreligiousminoritystatusmay
demandmoreradicalrevisionstodeliberativedemocracytheoryandpracticethanYoung
envisaged,however.Socialinequalityanddisadvantageneedstoborninmindwhenasking
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whatdeliberativemechanismscouldhelptomorefully(andauthentically)include
minoritycitizensinpublicdialogue,andhowdiversecitizens’deliberativecapacitiesmight
bedevelopedinamulticulturalandmultiracialcontext(Song2007,70).Togenuinely
ensuretheinclusionofcitizensthatarenotonlycultural,racialorreligiousminorities,but
alsodisadvantagedinsocio-economicterms,wewillneedtomovepastwell-meaning
visionsofdifference-friendlydialogue.Inparticular,itwillrequiretangiblemeasuresto
equalizeaccesstotheresourcesandcapacitiesthatcitizensneedtoparticipateeffectively
indeliberativeforums:Valadez,forexample,proposesanumberofconcretestepsthat
statescouldtaketoensurewhathecalls“epistemologicalegalitarianism”indeliberation
(Valadez2001,7).Andassuggestedabove,itmaybethatshiftingawayfromconsensus
andtowardscompromisemightbetterservethegoalofincludingculturalandreligious
minoritycitizens,regardlessofthequestionofsocioeconomicdisadvantage.Similarly,as
wesaw,weoughtarguablytoincludeinterestswithindeliberation,ratherthanbracketing
them,solongastheseareconstrainedby“idealsofmutualrespect,equality,reciprocity,
mutualjustification,thesearchforfairness,andtheabsenceofcoercivepower”
(Mansbridgeetal.2010,94;Mansbridge1996).
Developingmoredeeplydemocraticandinclusiveformsofpublicdeliberation
depends,atleastinpart,onadeeperwelcomingofdiversecitizens’values,perspectives,
interestsandstylesofpoliticalcommunication.Thedemandthatculturalminoritycitizens
brackettheiridentity-relatedinterestsinordertomakenormativeclaimsconsistentwith
publicreasonandimpartialityis,insomecontextsatleast,problematicandevenunjust.
Thesediverseandsituatedperspectivesarevaluableforpublicdeliberation—aresource
fordemocraticcommunication,andultimately,democraticjustice(Young1999,2000;
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Tully1996).Legitimateinterestsevolvefromthesituatedperspectivesofthosewho
experiencedisadvantageandevenoppression,andthesemayneedtobeassertedinorder
tochallengeone’sverymarginalization.Animportanttaskfordeliberativedemocracy
theory,then,isto“[parse]outtheappropriatenormativeandpracticalrelationships
betweenapoliticsaimedatforgingacommongoodandapoliticsaimedatlegitimately
pursuingandnegotiatingconflictingself-interests”(Mansbridge2012,790).
Includinginterestswithinthedomainofpublicdeliberationopensupthepossibility
ofusingsomeofthecomponentsassociatedwithadversarialpolitics.Negotiationandeven
bargainingmay,insomecontexts,servetomakedeliberativedemocracymoreinclusiveof
thediverseworldviewsandreasoningofculturalminoritycitizensisofcoursea
controversialone.DespiteHabermas’sownacknowledgmentthatcontextsofdeep
pluralismmaywarranttheuseofbargainingandcompromise(Habermas1996:165-66),
somedeliberativedemocratsseesuchmechanismsasatoddswiththeprocessofpublic
reasoning.Theyworrythatnegotiationandbargaining,andindeedpoliticalcompromisein
general,denytheauthorityofmoralargumentationandsohavemoreincommonwith
coercivepoliticsthandiscourse(Benhabib1996,79).Butitisnotclearthatthisisso.
Arguably,reasonscanandshouldbegiventosupportandjustifyidentity-relatedreasons
forwantingparticularculturalrightsoraccesstoresources,forexample(Eisenberg2009).
Butthesereasonsneednotnecessarilyrefertodeepmoraldifferences,suchas
fundamentalethicalconflicts;rather,reasonscouldspeaktoarangeofwhatpolitical
scientistsrefertoas‘ideational’factorsaswellaspractical,real-worldinterests.
Wherenegotiation,bargaining,andcompromiseareusedinpoliticaldeliberation,it
isimportantthatagreementsbetreatedasrevisable.Thisisespeciallyimportantincases
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wheredeliberativedecision-makingisusedtomediateintra-culturalconflicts(Deveaux
2003,2006)—forexample,aroundthestatusofreligiouspersonalorfamilylawfor
settlinglegaldisputeswithinareligiousminoritycommunity.Revisabilityallowsthe
positionsofmembersofcommunitiestochangeovertime,anddoesnotholdmembers
beholdentoaparticularagreementorcompromiseinperpetuity—especiallyto
agreementswhichmaylaterberejectedasunsuitableorunjust.
TheshiftswithindeliberativedemocracytheorythatIhavedescribedanddefended
herehavelargelybeenpropelledbydemandsforculturalrecognitionandinclusion.They
moveustowardsamorepolitical,lessprocedurallyorthodoxapproachtopublic
deliberation(Bächtingeretal2010)thatpermitsawidervarietyofstylesandformsof
politicaldiscourse;acknowledgesabroaderrangeofvalidityclaimsthanHabermas’s
modeldoes;replacesstrongmoralconsensuswithcompromise(asthegoalof
deliberation);andadmitsthelegitimaterolethat(self-)interestsmayplayindialogueand
decision-making—includingbargainingandnegotiationinrelationtothese.Crucially,this
revisedversionofdeliberativedemocracyrecognizesthefrequentintertwiningofcultural
minoritystatus,socio-economicdisadvantage,andrelativepoliticalpowerlessness.
Thesechanges,whicharemorecharacteristicoftheorizingthatcorrespondsto
Bächtingeretal.’sTypeIIdeliberation,mayappeartopushdeliberativedemocracycloser
tothepoliticalapproachesofitsmainrivals—aggregativeinterest-basedandadversarial
modelsofpolitics—thansomewouldlike.Explicitlypoliticalconceptionsofpublic
deliberationdo,afterall,incorporatemechanisms—bargaining,negotiation,polling,and
voting—thatearlyiterationsofdiscourseethicseschewedasatoddswithmoral
argumentation.Butitmaywellbethatincorporating“bothdeliberativeandaggregative
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characteristics”makessensefromthevantagepointofconcernsaboutculturalpluralism,
forallofthereasonsdiscussedabove,andbecause“bargainingandvoting[etc.]maybe
neededtoreachcollectivedecisionsinapluralpolity”(James2004,51-52).
Notsurprisingly,theaffinitiesbetweendeliberativedemocracyandagonistic
theoriesofpolitics(Chambers2003)becomemoreapparentwhenweconsiderthese
proposedrevisionstopublicdeliberationasdrivenbymulticulturalchallenges.Itremains
thecase,ofcourse,thatevenaccountsofpoliticaldeliberationthatforegroundinterests,
bargaining,andnegotiationremaincommittedtotheuseofnormativereasonandthe
principleofcommunicative(asopposedtostrategic)actioninpolitics.Butonthemore
politicalconceptionofdeliberativedemocracyIhaveoutlinedhere,conflict—including
interest-basedconflict—isnolongertreatedassomething(necessarily)tobesidestepped,
sublimatedorevennecessarilytranscended.Rather,conflictisseenaspartandparcelof
anunderstandingofdemocracyasaprocessthatincludesstruggle(Young2000,50).
3.Theusesofpublicdeliberationforresolvinginterculturaldisputes
Concretepoliticalpracticeshaveevolvedthatexemplifytheapplicationofdeliberative
mechanismstoconflictsordisagreementsinvolvingculturaland/orreligiousminority
communities.Therearethreemaindomainsinwhichdeliberativedemocracyhasbeen
appliedtoconcreteissuesculturalaccommodationorinterculturaldisputes.
(i)Theemergenceofindigenousculturaldisputeresolutionmodels,whichcombine
indigenousemphasesonmutualdecision-makingandconsensuswithelementsof
deliberativedemocracy(KahaneandBell2004).InCanada,theseindigenousapproaches
haveinfluenceddisputeresolutionprocessesinvolvingindigenouslandclaims,andhave
alsocontributedtotheshapingoftheTruthandReconciliationCommissionconcerningthe
17
legacyofCanada’sresidentialschoolsystemforaboriginalchildren.(ii)Deliberative
democraticprincipleshavebeenproposedasawayofreconcilingdifferencesinliberalyet
deeplydividedsocieties,inwhichnationalreligiousorlinguisticminoritieshaveadeep
historicalmistrustofoneanotherand/orthestate.Examplesofsuchsocietiesinclude
countrieswithdifferentnationallinguisticcommunities,suchasBelgium,andthosewith
significantreligiouscleavages,suchasNorthernIrelandandLebanon(Dembinskaand
Montambeault2015;Dryzek2005;Luskinetal.2014;O’Flynn2006).Formorediscussion
oftheapplicationofdeliberativemechanismstodividedsocieties,seethechapterinthis
volumebyIanO’FlynnandDidierCaluwaertson‘DeliberationinDeeplyDividedSocieties’.
(iii)Deliberativedemocracymechanismshavebeenproposedasameansofaddressing
policydisagreementsconcerningthestatus(orpermissibility)ofsocial/culturalpractices
orarrangementsinculturallypluraldemocraticsocieties;Ielaborateonthisbelow.
Itiseasytoseetheappealofadeliberativedemocraticapproachtoresolving
conflictsbetweenculturalorreligiousminoritygroupsandthestate.Ratherthanissuing
anultimatumtogroupswhosesocialpracticesorarrangementsrunafouloftheliberal
state’snormsandlaws,adeliberativedemocraticapproachmakespossiblearespectful
dialoguebasedontheexchangeofmutuallysharedreasons.Democraticlegitimacyand
respectforculturalgroups’ownprocessesofinternalreformalsopointinfavourof
resolvingdisputesthroughdialogicalanddeliberativeprocesses.Deliberative
consultations—suchasgovernmentandpara-governmentaldeliberativehearingsand
consultationsonpolicymattersaffectingculturalandreligiouscommunities—and
intercultural,dialogue-basedlegaldisputeresolutionsareafewexamplesofmechanisms
thathavebeenadvancedand(insomejurisdictions)implemented.
18
Adialogicalinterculturalapproachtoamendingandnegotiatingcontemporary
constitutionsinmultinationandpluralsocietiesisdefendedbyTully(1996)asaninfinitely
morejustprocessofconstitution-buildingthannon-dialogicalones.Songhasalsoargued
forabroadlydeliberativeapproachtomediatinginter-andintraculturaljusticeconflicts;
situatedontheliberalendofthespectrumofdeliberativedemocracyproponents,Song
insiststhatdeliberationinallcasesmustbeboundbyastrongcommitmenttoliberal
principlesof(substantive)politicalequalityandindividualfreedom(2007,69).Sheurgesa
strongroleforgovernmentinensuringthattherightsandotherrequirementsassociated
withtheseprinciplesaremet,andurgesagainstleavingsuchmattersuptogroups
themselves.Thepropensityofsomeculturalandreligiousgroupstosubordinateor
discriminateagainsttheirownmembersisSong’sprimaryconcernhere;shealsocontends
thatthelackofpoliticalequalityinadeliberativeprocessnecessarilyunderminesits
democraticlegitimacy.Concernsaboutwhetherwomen’svoicesinparticularare
adequatelyincludedindeliberativeprocesseshavebeenraisedbyanumberoftheorists:
Mahajan(2005,109),forexample,warnsthatinIndia,“theinclusionofwomeninthe
deliberativeprocessisbynomeansenoughforalteringexistingcommunitypracticesand
makingPersonalLawsmorejusttowomen.”
Isharetheseconcernsaboutwhetherwomenandother“minorities-within-
minorities”(suchasreligiousminoritiesandLGBTpersons)mayfacediscriminationand
obstaclestoparticipationindeliberativedemocraticprocesses.Yetitisnotclearthat
merelyinsistingthatcoreliberalprinciplesbeappliedtodeliberativedesignssolvesthese
difficultproblems.Theinsistenceonseeminglyuncontroversialliberalnorms,suchasthat
ofgenderequality—theprecisemeaningofwhichishighlycontested—isunlikelytobe
19
effectiveifstipulatedinadvanceofmeaningfulconsultationswiththecommunityin
question.Deliberativeprocessesthatpaynoheedtoprocessesinternaltoculturalor
religiouscommunitiesfordecidingonmattersrelatedtothereformofsocialpracticesand
arrangementsalsofailtoaccordthemequalrespect.
Arguably,moreminimalistnorms—thoseofnondomination,politicalinclusion,
andrevisability—aremorerelevantandjustnormstoguidebothinter-andintra-cultural
democraticdeliberation(Deveaux2006,114-117).Theadvantagesofthesenorms(unlike
“thicker”deliberativenormslikesharedpublicreasonandimpartiality)isthatthey
demandthatdeliberativeprocessesthatimpactculturalcommunitiesmeetahighstandard
ofdemocraticlegitimacy—whethertheseconcerninterculturalorintra-culturalmatters.
UnlikedeliberativeliberalslikeSong,Icontendthatdeliberativeoutcomesmaystillbe
democraticallylegitimateeveniftheyaffirmpoliciesorpractices/arrangementsthatstand
insometensionwithsomeofthenormativeprinciplesofliberalism.Icametothis
conclusionthroughstudyingthe(partial)successofdeliberativedemocraticprocesses
directedatthelegalreformofcertainculturalpractices.Oneoftheseconcernedthe
deliberativeconsultationsandnegotiationsorganizedbytheSouthAfricanLaw
Commissionin1998regardinghowbesttoreformcustomarymarriageinthecountry.The
consultations,whichincludeddiversestakeholdersfromdifferentnationalcommunities,
ultimatelyyieldedlegalreformsthatimprovedyetstillpermittedthecontinuationof
customarymarriageunderAfricancustomarylaw(Deveaux2003,2006).Thecountry’s
1996Constitution,whichaccordedprotectiontowomen’ssexualequalityrightyetalso
recognizedthevalidityofAfricancustomarylawinmattersofmarriageandinheritance,
couldnotresolvethecleartensionbetweenthetwo.Negotiation,bargaining,compromise,
20
andrevisabilitywerecrucialtotheamendedformofdeliberationthatIidentifiedatwork
there,andmadepossiblewideagreementonnewlawsgoverningcustomarymarriage.
Whenthinkingaboutthepromiseandperilsofdeliberativeapproachestoconflict
resolutionwithinculturalcommunitiesandbetweenthosecommunitiesandthestate,itis
ofcourseessentialtoaskhardquestionsaboutwhosevoicesareheardandhowdecisions
areultimatelymade.Butequally,itisimportanttorememberthatpublicdeliberationneed
notbeconfinedtothetraditionalpoliticalforumsconceivedbydeliberativedemocrats,and
thatthisbroaderscopeofdemocraticactivitybodeswellforlesspowerfulgroupmembers.
Inotedattheoutsetofthisarticlethatactivityintheinformalpublicspheremayserveto
advancedemocraticinclusion.Forinstance,thepoliticalactivitiesofcivilsocietygroups,
culturalgroup-targetedmedia,andcanalsohelptofostergreaterparticipationofcultural
andreligiousminoritycitizens(Deveaux2006;Song2007).However,asinthecaseofthe
formalpublicsphere,thereexisttangiblebarrierstotheparticipationofmarginalized
groupsininformalpoliticaldeliberation.Resourcesarerequiredinordertoenhancethe
deliberativecapacitiesofminoritycommunitiesinparticular,aswellastohelpensurethat
democraticactivitiesintheinformalspherecontributetopoliticaldecision-making.
4:Conclusion
Themodificationsproposedinresponsetothechallengesofmulticulturalismhavenot
satisfiedallcritics,ordefenders,ofdeliberativedemocracytheory.Thosewhorejectthe
theory’sframingofmulticulturalpoliticsaschieflyproblemsofmisrecognitionandlackof
inclusion—ratherthanofcolonialpoweranddomination—areunlikelytobesatisfiedby
thesechanges(Coulthard2014).Ontheothersideofthespectrum,someseeabasic
tensionbetweendeliberativedemocracy’scoreaspirationsandapoliticsdrivenbycultural
21
groupclaims(James2004).Accordingtothisview,amodelofdemocraticinclusionwhich
viewsrecognitionintermsoftheacknowledgementofso-called‘authentic’groupidentities
risksexcludingmanyvoiceswithinminoritycommunities,foritdemandsdeferencefrom
bothmembersandnonmembers(McBride2005).
Despitetheseandothervalidconcerns,therearegoodreasonstothinkthat
deliberativedemocratictheoryandpracticewillcontinuetoinformdebatesabouthowto
makeliberalconstitutionaldemocraciesmoreopenandinclusiveofethno-culturaland
religiousminorities.Noristhisjustamatterofapplyingdeliberativedemocratictools
developedwithinaWesternphilosophicalframeworktoconflictswithinliberalsocieties.
Deliberationinnon-Westernsocietiesisbecominganimportantsubjectofstudy,as
democrattheoristsattempttounderstandtheextenttowhichpoliticaldeliberationis
universalandtheparticularformsittakesindiversesocieties(DryzekandSass2014;see
alsothechapterbySassinthisvolume).Justasthechallengefrommulticulturalgroups
withinliberaldemocraciespushedtheboundariesofdeliberativedemocracyinthepast,it
seemslikelythatalternativedeliberativeformsoutsideinotherpartsoftheworldwill
stretchthefrontiersofthistheorystillfurther—perhapsevenextendingitsrelevance
outsideoftherealmofdemocracy,asconventionallyunderstood.
22
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