DeliberativeDemocracyandMulticulturalism

MoniqueDeveaux

InTheOxfordHandbookofDeliberativeDemocracyeds.A.Bächtinger,J.Dryzek,J.

Mansbridge,andM.Warren(OUP,forthcoming2017),

Abstractandkeywords

Deliberativedemocracyiswidelyassociatedwithapublicspherethatismoreinclusiveof

culturalandreligiousminoritygroupsthanthatestablishedbyamodelofpoliticsas

interestaggregation.Butithasalsobeencriticizedforstipulatingunjusttermsforthis

politicalinclusion,andforbeinginsufficientlyresponsivetoidentitygroup-basedclaims.

Suchchallengeshavepromptedmuchinternaldebateaboutthevalidityandthepractical

consequencesofdifferentnormsandmechanismsofdeliberativedemocracy.Modelsof

publicdeliberationlessbeholdentoHabermasiandiscourseethics,Iargue,offeramore

promisingresponsetothesesmulticulturalchallenges.

Keywords:multiculturalism,publicdeliberation,culturalrecognition,democratic

inclusion,exclusion

Thereismuchindeliberativedemocracythatconducestoaninclusiveanddiversepublic

sphere.Thetheory’sgroundingincommunicativeasopposedtostrategicandinstrumental

action(Habermas1984)requiresthatwerespectcitizens’moraldifferencesandnotseek

tobracketthesefromdemocraticpoliticallife.Therequirementthatpoliticaldecision-

makingbebasedonpublicdeliberationandtherespectfulexchangeofsharedreasons—

ratherthanonmereinterestsorsheerpower—wouldseemtoencouragediversecitizens

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tosharetheirdifferentvaluesandseekmutuallyacceptableagreements.Deliberative

democracy’scorecommitmentstopoliticalequalityandmutualrespectinpublicdiscourse,

andtotheprinciplethatlegitimateoutcomesareonesthatallparticipantstodeliberation

canaccept,arguablyhelpstoenfranchisepeoplewhohailfromdisempowered

communities—includingracializedand(some)culturalminorities.Finally,deliberative

democracytheory’sacknowledgementofaninformalpublicsphereinadditiontothe

formalpublicsphereofconstitutionaldemocraticpolitics(Habermas1996)hasthe

potentialtoopenupadditionalpathwaysfordemocraticparticipationformarginalized

socialgroups(Williams1998;Young1990,2000).

1.Multiculturalismandproblemsofdeliberativeinjusticeandexclusion

Despiteitsseemingadvantages,criticshavearguedthatdeliberativedemocracymaythrow

upobstaclestothepoliticalparticipationofsomesocialgroups,thushamperingeffortsto

deependemocraticinclusioninmulticulturalliberalsocieties.Theseconcerns,whichhave

promptednumerousproposedamendmentstodeliberativedemocracy,canbedistilled

intofourclustersofproblems.

i) Deliberativeinequalities

Proponentsofdeliberativedemocracyhavelongacknowledgedthatsocialandeconomic

inequalitiesnegativelyimpactpeople’sdeliberativecapacitiesandstanding(Bohman2000;

Young1990).Justaslowincomeandsocioeconomicstandingarewidelyunderstoodto

tracklowpoliticalparticipationratesinmanydemocracies,soissocialdisadvantage

thoughttoimpactcitizens’capacitiesandopportunitiestodeliberateinpoliticallife—

theirdeliberative“capabilities”.Thisleadstoaconditionof“politicalpoverty”—i.e.,“a

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group-relatedinabilitytomakeeffectiveuseofopportunitiestoinfluencethedeliberative

process”(Bohman2000,125)—derivingfromthefactthat“thematerialprerequisitesfor

deliberationareunequallydistributed”(Sanders1997,349).Wheresocioeconomically

disadvantagedstatustracksracialorethnicorracialminoritystatus,deliberative

inequalitiesarecompounded.Totheextentthatsociallydisadvantagedracialandcultural

minoritygroupshavelessaccesstoeducationalandpoliticalresources,theirmembersmay

lackthedeliberativeskillsofmoreprivilegedcitizenstoengageinreasonedpublic

deliberation(Bohman2000;Sanders1997;Young1990),aswellasopportunitiestodoso.

Group-basedstructuralinequalitiesreflectinghistoricalinjusticeslikecolonialism

andslaveryalsogiverisetocontemporarystatusdifferentialsthataffectwhosevoice

carriesindeliberation,andwhosedoesnot(Williams1998).Thissecondaspectofthe

problemofdeliberativeinequalities—howone’ssocialstatusorstandingenhances,or

decreases,one’sdeliberativeinclusionandimpact—isboundupwithongoingpractices

andstructuresofracialandgenderdiscrimination.Youngarguesthatstatusdifferentials

andaccompanying“inequalitiesofpowerandresources”(Young2000,54)giverisetoboth

externalandinternalformsofexclusion.Deliberativedemocracyhasarguablytriedto

addressthemostvisibleformsofexternalexclusionaffectingaggregativedemocracy,

which“concernhowpeoplearekeptoutsidetheprocessofdiscussionanddecision-

making”(Young2000,55).Butmanymodelsofdeliberationmayfailtopreventinternal

exclusion,manifesting,forexample,asanattitudeofdismissalanddisrespecttowards

thosewithlessersocialandeconomicpowerandstatus(55).Whilethereisevidencethat

specialeffortsaremadetoincludelinguisticminoritiesinsomeformaldeliberativesettings

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bymakingfrequentreferencetotheirinterestsandconcerns(Pedrini,Bächtiger,and

Steenbergen,2013),thesamecannotbesaidforracializedandsubordinatedminorities.

ii)Culturalgroupdifferencesanddeliberativestyles

Deliberativeinequalitiesaffectingethno-culturalandracialminoritiesdonotonlyariseasa

resultofsocioeconomicdisadvantageperse.Membersofcommunitieswithsocial

experiences,worldviews,and/orvaluesfarfromthemainstream—includingindigenous

peoples,somecultural(includingimmigrant)identitygroups,andracializedminorities—

mayfindtheirviewssimplydismissedor“discounted”(Young2000,55)inseemingly

democraticforums.Quasi-deliberativepublichearingsorconsultationssometimesblock

moreradicalperspectivesonsocialproblemsbydeemingcertainconcernsoutsidethe

scopeoftheirmandate.InQuébec,theTaylor-BouchardCommissionon“reasonable

accommodation”insistedthatitssolefocuswasthechallengesposedbyreligiousand

ethno-culturaldiversitytointegrationintoQuébecsocietyanddemocraticpoliticallife;

accordingly,itexcludedjusticeclaimsrelatingtoaboriginalidentityandstatus,and

sidelinedthosepertainingtoracismandracialization(BouchardandTaylor2008).Such

boundary-settingmovesarguablyleadtoafailureofdemocraticlegitimacyinsofarasthose

groupsthatareexcludedormarginalizedfrompoliticaldeliberationarenonetheless

impactedbytheoutcome:“theyarethelegaladdressesofthedeliberativeagreementsover

whichtheyhavenorealinfluenceorpublicinput”(Bohman2000,125-6).

Membersofculturalandreligiousminoritiesmayalsohavestylesofpolitical

communicationthatcontrastsharplywiththemodesofcommunicationassumedor

stipulatedbynormsofdeliberativedemocracy.Theseincludeengaginginformalpublic

dialogueanddeliberation,andprovidingpubliclyaccessibleand(insomesense)impartial

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reasons.Someethno-culturalminoritiesandAboriginalpeoplesbalkattherequirement

thatthey‘translate’theirclaimsintotermsdemandedbyidealizedmodelsofmoral

dialogue,expressingasenseofalienationinresponsetodemandsthattheygivereasons

thatareuniversalizable(Coulthard2010;Deveaux2000;Young2000).Indeed,such

demandsarearguablyunjustinsofarastheyrequire“onepartytosetasideitsculturally

specificways,whiletheotherpartyhastheluxurynotonlyofhavingitsstyleofconflict

prevailbutofbelievingthatitsstyleisculturallyunmarkedanduniversallyapplicable”

(Kahane2004,42).Racializedandculturalminoritygroupswithstylesofpoliticalspeech

andargumentationmaythereforefacesignificantdisadvantages.Thishasledsome

deliberativedemocratstoproposethatcommunicationindeliberativecontextsshouldbe

expandedtoincludelessformalmodesofspeech,suchasstorytelling,narrative,and

testimony(Sanders1997;Young2000).Yetithasbecomeclearthattofullyrespondto

group-baseddeliberativeinequalitiesandthejusticeclaimsofethno-culturalandreligious

communities,corenormsofdeliberativedemocracywillneedtobecriticallyrethoughtand

revised.Forexample,threecategoriesofvalidityclaimssetoutbyHabermas(1984,

1996)—thoserelatingtotruth/facts;norms;sincerityorself-expression—donotcapture

thefullrangeofspeechthatshouldbeconsideredprimafacievalidinmoralandpolitical

discourse(Bohman2004;Deveaux2000;Young2000).Traditionalandindigenous

societiesinparticularmakeclaimsthatinterweavemyth,storytelling,andoralhistories,

andmanyofwhichdonotreadilyfitintoanyoftheseexistingcategoriesofvalidityclaims

(Young2000;Hemmingsen2016).Onsomeinterpretations,thepublicitydemandrequires

thatcitizenstreattheiridentitiesasconstructedandcontestable,therebydisadvantaging

indigenouspeoples(Coulthard2010,2014).Criticalinterventionsbythoseconcerned

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aboutsecuringdemocraticjusticeforethno-culturalandracializedgroupshavethusled

sometheoriststomoveawayfromorthodoxversionofdiscourseethicsandtowardswhat

Urbanitihascalled“anagonisticformofdeliberativedemocracy”(2000,774).

iii)Identitygroupclaimsanddeliberativevirtues

Tobetterunderstandcallsforashifttowardsanagonisticformofdeliberativedemocracy,it

isusefultoconsiderwhichdeliberativevirtuesarerequiredbymoretraditionalapproaches

todiscourseethics,andhowthesemightbeexpectedtodisadvantagedifferentsocialgroups

inmulticulturalandraciallydiversesocieties.MelissaWilliams(1998)hasarguedthatthe

requirementthatdeliberativeparticipantsrefrainfromappealingtoself-interestaffects

membersofculturalminoritygroupsasymmetricallyandunjustly.Thisdemand,which

stemsfromacommitmenttodeliberativevirtuesofimpartialityanduniversalizability,

“hamper(s)marginalizedgrouprepresentatives’capacitytoconformtothestandardsof

publicdiscoursewhilealsoeffectivelyrepresentingtheirconstituents’perspectivesand

interests.Indeed,thestatusofmarginalizedgroupsasmarginalizedreflects,bydefinition,

thefactthatsomeoftheirfundamentalinterestsarenowsystematicallyandunjustifiably

neglected”(Williams1998,144).ThisleadsWilliamstoconclude,rightlyinmyview,that

“anydiscursiveprocessinwhichthatneglectcancometolightmustmakespaceforthe

expressionofgroup-specificinterests”(144).

Thevalidintereststhatsomeculturalminoritiesmaypotentiallyseektointroduce

intodeliberationmayincludeclaimsaboutthevalueoftheirgroupidentityandparticular

traditionsandpractices;abouttheimportanceofaspecificterritory(e.g.,inthecaseof

Aboriginalpeoples);andabouttheneedforspecialgrouprepresentation,orotherspecial

politicalarrangementsuptoandincludingsovereignty,inlightoftheirhistoricalexclusion.

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Indeed,thevalidityofrangeofculturalgroup-basedjusticeclaimsinmulticulturalsocieties

hasbeenpersuasivelydefendedby(non-deliberative)democratictheoristsonthegrounds

ofequalityandindividualautonomy(seeespeciallyKymlicka1995).Itisnothardtosee

howthepresentationanddefenseoftheseculturalgroupclaimsishamperedbya

prohibitiononappealsto(individualorgroup)self-interest.Therequirementthatcultural

identityanditspreservationbetreatedasfullycontestableinthecontextofdeliberation—

asdemandedbyBenhabib’sdeliberativedemocraticapproach,forexample—alsoflows

fromnormsofuniversalizabilityandimpartiality(Benhabib1996,2000).Coulthardhas

suggested(2014)thatthisrequirementmaydisadvantageAboriginalparticipantsto

deliberation,giventhecentralimportanceofidentityclaimsintheirjusticestruggles.

Arelateddeliberativevirtuethathascomeunderscrutinyinlightofculturalgroup-

basedinterestsandjusticeclaimsisthatofreciprocity.Pedrini,BächtigerandSteenbergen

(2013)arguethatthe“burdenofreciprocity”oughtnottobedemandedequallyof

linguisticminoritiesandmajorities:“itislegitimateforminoritiestobelessresponsiveto

majoritiesanddopoliticsinaslightlymoreadversarialandpassionatewaywhentheir

vitalinterestsareaffected”(508).TheirresearchontheSwisspoliticalsystemalso

suggeststhatatleastinsomepoliticalcontexts,whenlinguisticmajoritiesreference

linguisticminorities’groupinterestsfrequently,thismayleadtogreaterdeliberative

inclusionandinteractionacrosslinguisticcleavages.Themoreagonistic,contestatory

approachtodeliberativedemocracyadvocatedbyUrbinati(2000),Deveaux(2006),and

otherspermitsappealstogroup-basedinterestsandadvocacywithinpoliticaldeliberation

morereadilythandomodelsofdeliberationthatequateanyreferencetointerestswith

aggregativepolitics.

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iv)Theidealofacommongood

Amuch-toutedadvantageofHabermas’smodelofdiscourseethicsoverRawls’sconception

ofpoliticaldeliberationisthatitdoesnotseektolimitthescopeofcitizens’contributions

inadvanceofactualdeliberation.Thoseliberaltheoriesofjusticeinwhichcitizens’

deliberationsfigureprominently—includingRawls’slaterwriting—appealtounrevised

normsofimpartialityandpublicreasonthatarguablyposebarrierstheinclusionof

culturalminoritycitizensinpoliticaldeliberationontermsthatareacceptabletothem;

thesemodelsrequirethatcitizensbracketortranslatetheiridentity-relatedinterestsinthe

courseofmakingjusticeclaims.Relatedly,Young(1990,1996,2000)arguesthatsome

deliberativedemocraticnormscontributetoanidealofthepublicspherethatdemandsan

implausibleandunnecessaryunity.Appealstounityortoanotionofthecommongood

mayrequireparticipantsinpublicdialoguetosetasidetheiridentity-baseddifferencesand

treats“differenceitself[as]somethingtobetranscended,becauseitispartialanddivisive”

(Young2000,42).Whiletheideaofacommongoodisreflectedinsomecommunitarian

approachestodeliberativedemocracy,ithasbeenwidelyrejectedbymanydeliberative

democratsasincompatiblewithrespectforconcrete(asopposedtoabstract)pluralism

(Bohman1995,2000,2010;Deveaux2000,2006;Festenstein2005;Mansbridge2012;

Parekh2006;Young2000).

Anadjacentideal,sharedpublicreason,is,however,stillwidelyendorsedby

deliberativedemocracytheorists.Butaswiththenotionofacommongood,thisnormmay

betakentorequirethatmembersofculturalminoritiestreattheiridentity-relatedclaims

ascontestableandnegotiableindeliberation(thusrenderingtheirclaimsconsistentwith

commitmentstonormsofimpartialityandsharedpublicreason).Thisseemingly

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reasonablenormmaythereforeunwittinglycompoundexistingcolonialstructuresof

powerandprivilege(Coulthard2010,2014).Forsimilarreasons,adeepcommitmentto

respectforculturalpluralismmayrequirethatwerevisitstrongmoralconsensus

(GutmannandThomspon1996,2004)asagoalofdemocraticcommunication;andindeed,

therearegoodgroundstoabandonconsensusinfavourofanethicoridealofcompromise

(Bohman2000;Deveaux2006).Theadvantagesofcompromiseoverconsensusfordeep

moralconflictsareobvious:compromiseallowscitizenswithsignificantlydisparate

viewpointsorworldviewstoreachsomeformofagreementwithoutresortingto(unjust)

coercion.Whereprocessesofmoralargumentationandpublicdiscourseareexpectedto

culminateinmoralconsensus,deliberativeparticipantsmaybepressuredtosetaside

identity-basedclaimsordemandsthatchallengethepoliticalstatusquo.

2.Revisingdeliberativedemocracyinresponsetomulticulturalchallenges

Shiftingawayfromconsensusandtowardscompromise—andpossiblyamoreagonistic

modelofdeliberation—maymakedeliberativedemocracymorereceptivetothejustice

claimsofindigenousandculturalminoritygroups.Deepculturalconflictsinparticularmay

bemorereadilyacknowledgedthroughsuchshifts:itmaybethat“inthemoredifficult

casesofinterculturaldisagreement,itwillsufficethatparticipantsbelievetheyhave

equitablyinfluencedthedeliberativeprocessandagreetocontinuetocooperateingood

faithinfuturedeliberations”(Valadez2001,5).Forsomedeliberativedemocrats,

compromiseisstillprimarilyconstruedasamoralprocess,ratherthanasastrategic

processakintobargaining(Festenstein2005;Bohman2010).Presentingpublicreasonsis

essentialonthisaccountofdeliberativecompromise,whichmaybeeitherprocedural

(relatingtoproposedchangestodeliberationordecisionmakingitself)orelsesubstantive

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innature(Bohman2010,99).Yetthereisalsoreasontothinkthatdeliberativedemocracy

oughttoembracenegotiation(Mansbridgeetal.2010;Mansbridge2012;Warrenand

Mansbridge2016)andevenbargaining(Deveaux2006;Habermas1996;James2004),

despitetheassociationofthesemechanismswithwhatMansbridge(1996)referstoas

“adversarytradition”ofdemocracy.Negotiationandbargainingcouldinsome

circumstancesrequireparticipantstomakemoretransparent(andsotoconfront)their

strategicinterests,includinginthecontextofintra-culturaldisputes(Deveaux2003,2006).

Amorepoliticalconceptionofcompromiserecognizesthatdeepdisagreementsareoftenof

apoliticalratherthanmoralnature,asinthecaseoftheconflictsarisinginthe

reconciliationprocessbetweenaboriginalpeoplesandsettlersinAustralia(Ivison2010,

133).

Importantly,moremoralizedconceptionsofdiscourseethics,suchasthat

representedbyHabermas’s(1984)earliestelaborationofcommunicativeethics,aremore

vulnerabletothemulticulturalchallengessetoutabovethanaremorepoliticalaccountsof

deliberativedemocracy.HelpfulhereisBächtingeretal.’s(2010)distinctionbetweentwo

typesofdeliberation,onefaithfultoHabermas’stheoryofcommunicativeaction—withits

emphasisonproceduralismandrationaldiscourse—andtheotherencompassing“more

flexibleformsofdiscourse,moreemphasisonoutcomesversusprocess,andmore

attentiontoovercoming‘realworld’constraintsonrealizingnormativeideals”(Bächtinger

etal.2010,33).Alongwithanumberofotherdeliberativedemocrats,Ihavearguedthat

deliberativedemocracyconceivedofasapolitical(andmoral)dialoguebetweencitizensof

diverseculturalandreligiouscommunitiesiscrucialtotheconstructionofamorejust,

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democraticpolity(Benhabib1996,2002;Bohman2000;Deveaux2000,2006;Mansbridge

1999,2010;Tully1996;Williams1995,1998;Young1990,2000).

Inresponsetoconcernsabouttheconsequencesofdiscourse-ethicalnormsof

publicityandimpartialityfortheinclusionofdiverseculturalcommunities,anumberof

deliberativedemocracytheoristshaveurgedashifttoamore“pluralisticidealof

deliberation”(Bohman2010,110)consistinginamoreinclusiveorpluralconceptionof

publicreason.TheorizinginthisveincorrespondstoBächtigeretal.’sTypeIIdeliberation

inthatitemphasizes“outcomesversusprocess”and“incorporatesalternativeformsof

communication,suchasrhetoricorstory-telling”(2010,33-34).Amoreexpansivepublic

sphere,withawiderviewofwhatcancountaspotentiallyacceptablepolitical

communication—movingbeyonddiscourseethics’existingcategoriesofvalidityclaims

andforms/stylesofdiscourse—arguablyopenspoliticsuptothediscursivestylesofsome

culturalandreligiousminoritycitizens.Noristhisopeninglimitedtothedomainof

politics;law,too,canbedeployedineffortstoconstructmoreinclusivediscursivenorms.

Forexample,somedemocratictheoristspointtoSupremeCourtofCanada’sdecisionin

Delgamuukwv.BritishColumbia(Benhabib2002,140-41;Bohman2010),which

establishedthelegalvalidityofindigenousoraltraditionalandhistoryasevidenceincourt

cases,asanexampleofhowlegalchangestoevidentiarynormscanpropelbroadernorms

ofpublicdiscourseinamoredemocraticdirection(thoughforamorepessimisticand

criticalviewofthiscase,seeCoulthard2007,451).

Butsignificantchallengesremain.Mighttheworldviewsanddiscursivemodesof

somecommunitieswithinliberaldemocracies,suchastraditionalreligiousgroups,beso

incommensurablethatnotevendemocraticprocessesguidedbyapluralisticaccountof

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publicreasonwillsufficetoenfranchisethesegroups?Whatofsituationsinwhichthereis

nocommoncommitmenttonormsofdemocraticlegitimacyanduniversalpolitical

equality?Thenthereisthematterofsocialandpoliticalinequality:howdoentrenched

disadvantagesthattrackethno-cultural,racialized,and/orrecentimmigrantstatusin

liberaldemocraciespreventmembersofsuchgroupsfromparticipatingindemocratic

deliberation(Bohman2000,105;Valadez2001;Young2000)?Andhowmightthese

injusticesbereversed?OnewayforwardissuggestedbyYoung’sideaoftreatinggroup

baseddifferencesasaresourceindemocraticcommunicationanddeliberation(Young

1999,2000).Focusingonthenon-idealcontextthatactuallyexistsinliberalconstitutional

democraciesratherthanthatsupposedbydiscourseethics’idealspeechsituationorideal

liberalandrepublicantheories,Youngarguesthatbackgroundsocial-structuralinjustices

existthatpowerfullyshapetheopportunitiesandperspectivesofsocialgroups(2000,97).

These“structuralgroupssometimesbuildonoroverlapwithculturalgroups,asinmost

structuresofracializeddifferentiationorethnic-basedprivilege”(Young2000,98).Rather

thanviewing“situatedknowledges”(Young2000,114)asanimpedimenttopublic

deliberation,weshouldtreatthemasapowerfuldeliberativeresourceindemocratic

communication.Byincludingthesesocially-situatedperspectivesindemocratic

deliberationanddecisionmakingapluralityofperspectives—especiallythoseofsocially

marginalizedpersonsandculturalandracialminorities—wecanhelptocounterthe

impositionofthestatus-quoviewsofthosewithsocialprivilege(Young1999,399).

Theintertwiningofsocialinequalitywithculturalorreligiousminoritystatusmay

demandmoreradicalrevisionstodeliberativedemocracytheoryandpracticethanYoung

envisaged,however.Socialinequalityanddisadvantageneedstoborninmindwhenasking

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whatdeliberativemechanismscouldhelptomorefully(andauthentically)include

minoritycitizensinpublicdialogue,andhowdiversecitizens’deliberativecapacitiesmight

bedevelopedinamulticulturalandmultiracialcontext(Song2007,70).Togenuinely

ensuretheinclusionofcitizensthatarenotonlycultural,racialorreligiousminorities,but

alsodisadvantagedinsocio-economicterms,wewillneedtomovepastwell-meaning

visionsofdifference-friendlydialogue.Inparticular,itwillrequiretangiblemeasuresto

equalizeaccesstotheresourcesandcapacitiesthatcitizensneedtoparticipateeffectively

indeliberativeforums:Valadez,forexample,proposesanumberofconcretestepsthat

statescouldtaketoensurewhathecalls“epistemologicalegalitarianism”indeliberation

(Valadez2001,7).Andassuggestedabove,itmaybethatshiftingawayfromconsensus

andtowardscompromisemightbetterservethegoalofincludingculturalandreligious

minoritycitizens,regardlessofthequestionofsocioeconomicdisadvantage.Similarly,as

wesaw,weoughtarguablytoincludeinterestswithindeliberation,ratherthanbracketing

them,solongastheseareconstrainedby“idealsofmutualrespect,equality,reciprocity,

mutualjustification,thesearchforfairness,andtheabsenceofcoercivepower”

(Mansbridgeetal.2010,94;Mansbridge1996).

Developingmoredeeplydemocraticandinclusiveformsofpublicdeliberation

depends,atleastinpart,onadeeperwelcomingofdiversecitizens’values,perspectives,

interestsandstylesofpoliticalcommunication.Thedemandthatculturalminoritycitizens

brackettheiridentity-relatedinterestsinordertomakenormativeclaimsconsistentwith

publicreasonandimpartialityis,insomecontextsatleast,problematicandevenunjust.

Thesediverseandsituatedperspectivesarevaluableforpublicdeliberation—aresource

fordemocraticcommunication,andultimately,democraticjustice(Young1999,2000;

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Tully1996).Legitimateinterestsevolvefromthesituatedperspectivesofthosewho

experiencedisadvantageandevenoppression,andthesemayneedtobeassertedinorder

tochallengeone’sverymarginalization.Animportanttaskfordeliberativedemocracy

theory,then,isto“[parse]outtheappropriatenormativeandpracticalrelationships

betweenapoliticsaimedatforgingacommongoodandapoliticsaimedatlegitimately

pursuingandnegotiatingconflictingself-interests”(Mansbridge2012,790).

Includinginterestswithinthedomainofpublicdeliberationopensupthepossibility

ofusingsomeofthecomponentsassociatedwithadversarialpolitics.Negotiationandeven

bargainingmay,insomecontexts,servetomakedeliberativedemocracymoreinclusiveof

thediverseworldviewsandreasoningofculturalminoritycitizensisofcoursea

controversialone.DespiteHabermas’sownacknowledgmentthatcontextsofdeep

pluralismmaywarranttheuseofbargainingandcompromise(Habermas1996:165-66),

somedeliberativedemocratsseesuchmechanismsasatoddswiththeprocessofpublic

reasoning.Theyworrythatnegotiationandbargaining,andindeedpoliticalcompromisein

general,denytheauthorityofmoralargumentationandsohavemoreincommonwith

coercivepoliticsthandiscourse(Benhabib1996,79).Butitisnotclearthatthisisso.

Arguably,reasonscanandshouldbegiventosupportandjustifyidentity-relatedreasons

forwantingparticularculturalrightsoraccesstoresources,forexample(Eisenberg2009).

Butthesereasonsneednotnecessarilyrefertodeepmoraldifferences,suchas

fundamentalethicalconflicts;rather,reasonscouldspeaktoarangeofwhatpolitical

scientistsrefertoas‘ideational’factorsaswellaspractical,real-worldinterests.

Wherenegotiation,bargaining,andcompromiseareusedinpoliticaldeliberation,it

isimportantthatagreementsbetreatedasrevisable.Thisisespeciallyimportantincases

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wheredeliberativedecision-makingisusedtomediateintra-culturalconflicts(Deveaux

2003,2006)—forexample,aroundthestatusofreligiouspersonalorfamilylawfor

settlinglegaldisputeswithinareligiousminoritycommunity.Revisabilityallowsthe

positionsofmembersofcommunitiestochangeovertime,anddoesnotholdmembers

beholdentoaparticularagreementorcompromiseinperpetuity—especiallyto

agreementswhichmaylaterberejectedasunsuitableorunjust.

TheshiftswithindeliberativedemocracytheorythatIhavedescribedanddefended

herehavelargelybeenpropelledbydemandsforculturalrecognitionandinclusion.They

moveustowardsamorepolitical,lessprocedurallyorthodoxapproachtopublic

deliberation(Bächtingeretal2010)thatpermitsawidervarietyofstylesandformsof

politicaldiscourse;acknowledgesabroaderrangeofvalidityclaimsthanHabermas’s

modeldoes;replacesstrongmoralconsensuswithcompromise(asthegoalof

deliberation);andadmitsthelegitimaterolethat(self-)interestsmayplayindialogueand

decision-making—includingbargainingandnegotiationinrelationtothese.Crucially,this

revisedversionofdeliberativedemocracyrecognizesthefrequentintertwiningofcultural

minoritystatus,socio-economicdisadvantage,andrelativepoliticalpowerlessness.

Thesechanges,whicharemorecharacteristicoftheorizingthatcorrespondsto

Bächtingeretal.’sTypeIIdeliberation,mayappeartopushdeliberativedemocracycloser

tothepoliticalapproachesofitsmainrivals—aggregativeinterest-basedandadversarial

modelsofpolitics—thansomewouldlike.Explicitlypoliticalconceptionsofpublic

deliberationdo,afterall,incorporatemechanisms—bargaining,negotiation,polling,and

voting—thatearlyiterationsofdiscourseethicseschewedasatoddswithmoral

argumentation.Butitmaywellbethatincorporating“bothdeliberativeandaggregative

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characteristics”makessensefromthevantagepointofconcernsaboutculturalpluralism,

forallofthereasonsdiscussedabove,andbecause“bargainingandvoting[etc.]maybe

neededtoreachcollectivedecisionsinapluralpolity”(James2004,51-52).

Notsurprisingly,theaffinitiesbetweendeliberativedemocracyandagonistic

theoriesofpolitics(Chambers2003)becomemoreapparentwhenweconsiderthese

proposedrevisionstopublicdeliberationasdrivenbymulticulturalchallenges.Itremains

thecase,ofcourse,thatevenaccountsofpoliticaldeliberationthatforegroundinterests,

bargaining,andnegotiationremaincommittedtotheuseofnormativereasonandthe

principleofcommunicative(asopposedtostrategic)actioninpolitics.Butonthemore

politicalconceptionofdeliberativedemocracyIhaveoutlinedhere,conflict—including

interest-basedconflict—isnolongertreatedassomething(necessarily)tobesidestepped,

sublimatedorevennecessarilytranscended.Rather,conflictisseenaspartandparcelof

anunderstandingofdemocracyasaprocessthatincludesstruggle(Young2000,50).

3.Theusesofpublicdeliberationforresolvinginterculturaldisputes

Concretepoliticalpracticeshaveevolvedthatexemplifytheapplicationofdeliberative

mechanismstoconflictsordisagreementsinvolvingculturaland/orreligiousminority

communities.Therearethreemaindomainsinwhichdeliberativedemocracyhasbeen

appliedtoconcreteissuesculturalaccommodationorinterculturaldisputes.

(i)Theemergenceofindigenousculturaldisputeresolutionmodels,whichcombine

indigenousemphasesonmutualdecision-makingandconsensuswithelementsof

deliberativedemocracy(KahaneandBell2004).InCanada,theseindigenousapproaches

haveinfluenceddisputeresolutionprocessesinvolvingindigenouslandclaims,andhave

alsocontributedtotheshapingoftheTruthandReconciliationCommissionconcerningthe

17

legacyofCanada’sresidentialschoolsystemforaboriginalchildren.(ii)Deliberative

democraticprincipleshavebeenproposedasawayofreconcilingdifferencesinliberalyet

deeplydividedsocieties,inwhichnationalreligiousorlinguisticminoritieshaveadeep

historicalmistrustofoneanotherand/orthestate.Examplesofsuchsocietiesinclude

countrieswithdifferentnationallinguisticcommunities,suchasBelgium,andthosewith

significantreligiouscleavages,suchasNorthernIrelandandLebanon(Dembinskaand

Montambeault2015;Dryzek2005;Luskinetal.2014;O’Flynn2006).Formorediscussion

oftheapplicationofdeliberativemechanismstodividedsocieties,seethechapterinthis

volumebyIanO’FlynnandDidierCaluwaertson‘DeliberationinDeeplyDividedSocieties’.

(iii)Deliberativedemocracymechanismshavebeenproposedasameansofaddressing

policydisagreementsconcerningthestatus(orpermissibility)ofsocial/culturalpractices

orarrangementsinculturallypluraldemocraticsocieties;Ielaborateonthisbelow.

Itiseasytoseetheappealofadeliberativedemocraticapproachtoresolving

conflictsbetweenculturalorreligiousminoritygroupsandthestate.Ratherthanissuing

anultimatumtogroupswhosesocialpracticesorarrangementsrunafouloftheliberal

state’snormsandlaws,adeliberativedemocraticapproachmakespossiblearespectful

dialoguebasedontheexchangeofmutuallysharedreasons.Democraticlegitimacyand

respectforculturalgroups’ownprocessesofinternalreformalsopointinfavourof

resolvingdisputesthroughdialogicalanddeliberativeprocesses.Deliberative

consultations—suchasgovernmentandpara-governmentaldeliberativehearingsand

consultationsonpolicymattersaffectingculturalandreligiouscommunities—and

intercultural,dialogue-basedlegaldisputeresolutionsareafewexamplesofmechanisms

thathavebeenadvancedand(insomejurisdictions)implemented.

18

Adialogicalinterculturalapproachtoamendingandnegotiatingcontemporary

constitutionsinmultinationandpluralsocietiesisdefendedbyTully(1996)asaninfinitely

morejustprocessofconstitution-buildingthannon-dialogicalones.Songhasalsoargued

forabroadlydeliberativeapproachtomediatinginter-andintraculturaljusticeconflicts;

situatedontheliberalendofthespectrumofdeliberativedemocracyproponents,Song

insiststhatdeliberationinallcasesmustbeboundbyastrongcommitmenttoliberal

principlesof(substantive)politicalequalityandindividualfreedom(2007,69).Sheurgesa

strongroleforgovernmentinensuringthattherightsandotherrequirementsassociated

withtheseprinciplesaremet,andurgesagainstleavingsuchmattersuptogroups

themselves.Thepropensityofsomeculturalandreligiousgroupstosubordinateor

discriminateagainsttheirownmembersisSong’sprimaryconcernhere;shealsocontends

thatthelackofpoliticalequalityinadeliberativeprocessnecessarilyunderminesits

democraticlegitimacy.Concernsaboutwhetherwomen’svoicesinparticularare

adequatelyincludedindeliberativeprocesseshavebeenraisedbyanumberoftheorists:

Mahajan(2005,109),forexample,warnsthatinIndia,“theinclusionofwomeninthe

deliberativeprocessisbynomeansenoughforalteringexistingcommunitypracticesand

makingPersonalLawsmorejusttowomen.”

Isharetheseconcernsaboutwhetherwomenandother“minorities-within-

minorities”(suchasreligiousminoritiesandLGBTpersons)mayfacediscriminationand

obstaclestoparticipationindeliberativedemocraticprocesses.Yetitisnotclearthat

merelyinsistingthatcoreliberalprinciplesbeappliedtodeliberativedesignssolvesthese

difficultproblems.Theinsistenceonseeminglyuncontroversialliberalnorms,suchasthat

ofgenderequality—theprecisemeaningofwhichishighlycontested—isunlikelytobe

19

effectiveifstipulatedinadvanceofmeaningfulconsultationswiththecommunityin

question.Deliberativeprocessesthatpaynoheedtoprocessesinternaltoculturalor

religiouscommunitiesfordecidingonmattersrelatedtothereformofsocialpracticesand

arrangementsalsofailtoaccordthemequalrespect.

Arguably,moreminimalistnorms—thoseofnondomination,politicalinclusion,

andrevisability—aremorerelevantandjustnormstoguidebothinter-andintra-cultural

democraticdeliberation(Deveaux2006,114-117).Theadvantagesofthesenorms(unlike

“thicker”deliberativenormslikesharedpublicreasonandimpartiality)isthatthey

demandthatdeliberativeprocessesthatimpactculturalcommunitiesmeetahighstandard

ofdemocraticlegitimacy—whethertheseconcerninterculturalorintra-culturalmatters.

UnlikedeliberativeliberalslikeSong,Icontendthatdeliberativeoutcomesmaystillbe

democraticallylegitimateeveniftheyaffirmpoliciesorpractices/arrangementsthatstand

insometensionwithsomeofthenormativeprinciplesofliberalism.Icametothis

conclusionthroughstudyingthe(partial)successofdeliberativedemocraticprocesses

directedatthelegalreformofcertainculturalpractices.Oneoftheseconcernedthe

deliberativeconsultationsandnegotiationsorganizedbytheSouthAfricanLaw

Commissionin1998regardinghowbesttoreformcustomarymarriageinthecountry.The

consultations,whichincludeddiversestakeholdersfromdifferentnationalcommunities,

ultimatelyyieldedlegalreformsthatimprovedyetstillpermittedthecontinuationof

customarymarriageunderAfricancustomarylaw(Deveaux2003,2006).Thecountry’s

1996Constitution,whichaccordedprotectiontowomen’ssexualequalityrightyetalso

recognizedthevalidityofAfricancustomarylawinmattersofmarriageandinheritance,

couldnotresolvethecleartensionbetweenthetwo.Negotiation,bargaining,compromise,

20

andrevisabilitywerecrucialtotheamendedformofdeliberationthatIidentifiedatwork

there,andmadepossiblewideagreementonnewlawsgoverningcustomarymarriage.

Whenthinkingaboutthepromiseandperilsofdeliberativeapproachestoconflict

resolutionwithinculturalcommunitiesandbetweenthosecommunitiesandthestate,itis

ofcourseessentialtoaskhardquestionsaboutwhosevoicesareheardandhowdecisions

areultimatelymade.Butequally,itisimportanttorememberthatpublicdeliberationneed

notbeconfinedtothetraditionalpoliticalforumsconceivedbydeliberativedemocrats,and

thatthisbroaderscopeofdemocraticactivitybodeswellforlesspowerfulgroupmembers.

Inotedattheoutsetofthisarticlethatactivityintheinformalpublicspheremayserveto

advancedemocraticinclusion.Forinstance,thepoliticalactivitiesofcivilsocietygroups,

culturalgroup-targetedmedia,andcanalsohelptofostergreaterparticipationofcultural

andreligiousminoritycitizens(Deveaux2006;Song2007).However,asinthecaseofthe

formalpublicsphere,thereexisttangiblebarrierstotheparticipationofmarginalized

groupsininformalpoliticaldeliberation.Resourcesarerequiredinordertoenhancethe

deliberativecapacitiesofminoritycommunitiesinparticular,aswellastohelpensurethat

democraticactivitiesintheinformalspherecontributetopoliticaldecision-making.

4:Conclusion

Themodificationsproposedinresponsetothechallengesofmulticulturalismhavenot

satisfiedallcritics,ordefenders,ofdeliberativedemocracytheory.Thosewhorejectthe

theory’sframingofmulticulturalpoliticsaschieflyproblemsofmisrecognitionandlackof

inclusion—ratherthanofcolonialpoweranddomination—areunlikelytobesatisfiedby

thesechanges(Coulthard2014).Ontheothersideofthespectrum,someseeabasic

tensionbetweendeliberativedemocracy’scoreaspirationsandapoliticsdrivenbycultural

21

groupclaims(James2004).Accordingtothisview,amodelofdemocraticinclusionwhich

viewsrecognitionintermsoftheacknowledgementofso-called‘authentic’groupidentities

risksexcludingmanyvoiceswithinminoritycommunities,foritdemandsdeferencefrom

bothmembersandnonmembers(McBride2005).

Despitetheseandothervalidconcerns,therearegoodreasonstothinkthat

deliberativedemocratictheoryandpracticewillcontinuetoinformdebatesabouthowto

makeliberalconstitutionaldemocraciesmoreopenandinclusiveofethno-culturaland

religiousminorities.Noristhisjustamatterofapplyingdeliberativedemocratictools

developedwithinaWesternphilosophicalframeworktoconflictswithinliberalsocieties.

Deliberationinnon-Westernsocietiesisbecominganimportantsubjectofstudy,as

democrattheoristsattempttounderstandtheextenttowhichpoliticaldeliberationis

universalandtheparticularformsittakesindiversesocieties(DryzekandSass2014;see

alsothechapterbySassinthisvolume).Justasthechallengefrommulticulturalgroups

withinliberaldemocraciespushedtheboundariesofdeliberativedemocracyinthepast,it

seemslikelythatalternativedeliberativeformsoutsideinotherpartsoftheworldwill

stretchthefrontiersofthistheorystillfurther—perhapsevenextendingitsrelevance

outsideoftherealmofdemocracy,asconventionallyunderstood.

22

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