AUGUST 2007

COMPARATIVE URBAN STUDIES PROJECT AND BRAZIL INSTITUTE

While unable to solve all of a country’s problems, progressive urban policy can be an effectivetool to address poverty and inequality. Brazil, a country notorious for its spatially segregatedcities and concentration of money and power, not only offers important lessons for improvingthe quality of life of city dwellers through urban policy and planning but also illustrates howsuch instruments can backfire or cause unintended consequences. On May 17, 2007, theComparative Urban Studies Project and the Brazil Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Centercosponsored a conference on urban development in Brazil, focusing on how participatoryrequirements in Brazil’s urban law have reshaped the city. Director of the Brazil Institute PauloSotero set out the terms of the debate, acknowledging the salience of democracy at the locallevel—where citizens have been directly affected by these policies.

Reflecting upon the new generation of urban policies in Brazil, Teresa Caldeira, professor ofcity and regional planning at the University of California at Berkeley, presented her researchon citizen participation in urban planning required by Brazil’s Estatuto da Cidade (Law of theCity) and São Paulo’s Master Plan. Urban policy is significant for Brazil, she contended,because it represents the country’s efforts over the last twenty years to make democracywork and to combat entrenched social inequality. Furthermore, this new, participatorymethod of urban policy formulation and implementation engenders and expresses anew vision for the ordering of urban space; a new way to see the state’s role in devel-opment, and a new role for the newly empowered citizenry. However, initial datafrom São Paulo suggests that popular participation has not brought about socialjustice, as was expected, but has instead legalized spatial inequality.

The Estatuto da Cidade is a federal law mandated by Brazil’s 1988 constitu-tion, requiring over 1,600 cities, or approximately 40 percent of Brazilianmunicipalities, to reformulate their Master Plans (MP) by October 2006 inaccordance with the principle of popular participation in urban reform andmunicipal administration.The original objectives of the Estatuto da Cidadehave been quite democratic.The center-left groups decided to use theMP and the fact that it was obligatory as a way to combat urbaninequality and injustice to enforce the radical objectives of the Estatutoda Cidade.They did this in spite of the fact that they were in princi-ple critical of MPs as instruments of democratic planning. For

Written by

Daniel Nogueira BudnyBrazil Institute, ProgramAssistant (2005–2007)PhD Program, ComparativePolitics, University of Texas at Austin.

Teresa Caldeira, Professor, Department of City and Regional Planning at theUniversity of California at Berkeley

Democracy and The City: Assessing Urban Policy in Brazil

them, MPs represented a nationalistic and authori-tarian style of planning that democratic planningwas supposed to replace. Even so, Caldeira’s find-ings in this research developed in collaborationwith James Holston, show that to a significantextent the progressive reformation of cities MPshas complicated the fight for social justice.

Within the section on urban policy in theConstitution, Caldeira mentioned two notewor-thy articles that have transformed the character ofurban policy in Brazil by subordinating propertyrights to the collective interest.Article 182 estab-lishes that urban property has a social functionwhile article 183 creates usucapião urbano (akin toadverse possession). Article 182 establishes theprinciple of the social function and creates instru-ments for the state to tax or force the utilizationof properties that are not inhabited and thereforedo not fulfill the social function. Usucapião urbanocreates the ability to establish uncontestable titleof ownership for residents who have squattedcontinuously for five years on small lots of urbanland, given no legitimate opposition to thechange in title.

The Estatuto da Cidade aims to promote sus-tainable development and combat inequalitythrough proper regulation and democratic man-agement.To this end, it stipulates popular partic-ipation along with the state’s cooperation andpartnership with private initiatives and civil soci-ety associations. Popular participation in man-agement takes the form of debates, public hear-ing, conferences, a system of popular amend-ment, and participatory budgeting. Far fromdevelopmentalist’s implicit assumption of the cit-izenry as ignorant and in need of enlightenedleadership to bring about modernization, theEstatuto da Cidade both assumes and requires anactive and engaged citizenry. It presupposes thatcitizen engagement with urban affairs—theexercise of citizenship—is the path to social jus-

tice and equality. Caldeira explains that, whilesociety’s needs were once unilaterally scriptedfrom above to mean modernization, progress,and development; now they are fashioned bysociety itself, with today’s needs encompassingcitizenship, rights, participation, and equality.

This novel approach to urban policy comesabout through the repertoire of neoliberalism, theinstitutionalization of which coincided with the“invention” of democracy in Brazil in the 1980s.Caldeira explained that it was this two-prongedapproach that dismantled the corporatist, devel-opmentalist, authoritarian state in which the lawwas used to create inequality: significant segmentsof the population were excluded from propertyownership. Neoliberalism re-conceptualizes andrationalizes the role of the state and the citizen,with the state utilizing the entrepreneurial initia-tives and freedom of its citizens to govern. Just asneoliberalism cannot exist without citizenengagement, so democracy cannot exist withoutpopular participation.To be sure, these two formsof participation coexist in a tense environment:democracy strives for social justice while neolib-eralism’s primary concern lies with the disman-tling of the interventionalist state.

Caldeira argued that popular participationwithin urban policy and planning did not neces-sarily result in greater equality. In fact, São Paulo’sMP, written to fulfill the requirements of theEstatuto da Cidade, ironically has proven an obsta-cle to the implementation of social justice. Thetwo basic tenets of São Paulo’s MP were to useurban policy to address urban sprawl and socio-spatial inequality by encouraging densificationwhere infrastructure already exists and discourag-ing the growth of illegal settlements in theperiphery. For the illegal settlements already inexistence the MP provides measures to legalizeholdings, set standards of urbanization, andimprove infrastructure. In line with the progres-

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sive requirements and democratic ideals of theEstatuto da Cidade, São Paulo’s MP stipulates thatthe planning, implementation, and control ofurban policy be done in a participatory mannerand through active engagement and partnershipwith the third sector, non-governmental entitiesof civil society. São Paulo’s citizenry have activelyparticipated in more than thirty public hearings todebate the process of formulation of the MP, itszoning codes and regional plans. However,Caldeira found that while popular participation inurban policy planning enforced the principle ofsocial justice, in practice, popular participationactually contested social justice.

Three main coalitions articulated theirdemands in these participatory debates.The Frentepela Cidadania (Front for Citizenship) representedpowerful real estate developers; the Frente Popularpelo Plano Diretor (Popular Front for the MasterPlan) represented popular movements, consult-ants, and university-based researchers; and, theMovimento Defenda São Paulo (Defend São PauloMovement) represented the interests of affluentupper-middle class neighborhoods. As can beexpected, the two coalitions representing the richand powerful (Frente pela Cidadania and theMovimento Defenda São Paulo) were most success-ful in making their interests known and in influ-encing policy making. Real estate developersfocused their efforts on convincing the MP toabandon its designs to unify rules for constructionthat made it necessary to purchase authorizationto build larger than the total area of the lot (i.e.vertically), known as solo criado (created soil).Theupper-middle class lobbied against changes inzoning regulations that would dismantle the priv-ileges of the exclusive residential areas (the neigh-borhoods that they represent).

While the Frente Popular opted not to partici-pate in these two debates, it did successfully advo-cate the establishment of Zonas Especiais de Interesse

Social (Special Zones of Social Interest – ZEIS).ZEIS are low income areas targeted for state inter-vention to promote their re-qualification, legaliza-tion, and urbanization according to Plans ofUrbanization approved by the executive and for-mulated with participation of the populationinvolved.The objective of this initiative is to pro-tect areas from real estate speculation by establish-ing them as areas devoted to low-income housing.Likewise, it also subjects low-income neighbor-hoods and favelas—a type of low income settle-ment in which residents do not have clams ofownership to the land—to rules of occupationthat differ from those of the rest of the city. Forinstance, ZEIS authorities may grant exemptionsin land use standards in the name and interest ofpromoting low-income housing development.

Because of popular participation requirements,urban policy in São Paulo is now made throughdemocratic debate and negotiation. However, classdifferences defined the terms of the debate and theoutcome was far from egalitarian, observedCaldeira. The upper and lower classes both suc-cessfully pursued their own specific interests, how-ever, the result has been the legalization of inequali-ty.The more affluent areas of the city are markedby higher land use standards, while poorer areas aremarked by the low standards set forth throughZEIS formulation. Whereas inequality was for-merly expressed through illegality—the poorperipheries were informal and thus illegal; now,inequality is expressed in legality.The very legisla-tion of popular participation, intended to reverseurban illegality, has unintentionally legalized spatialinequality between the center and periphery, andtherefore has set back social justice in São Paulo.

Such findings question common knowledgeand widespread assumptions about both democ-racy and social movements.The unintended con-sequences of participatory urban policies andplanning demonstrate the contradictory claims

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of democracy and neoliberalism. The redefinedstate proves less able to act as an impartial andegalitarian orchestrator between the city’s vari-ous interests groups—many of whom are neces-sarily antagonistic, focused primarily on self-preservation and personal gain, and thereforegenerators of unequal distribution of stateresources. Popular participation and partnershipdoes not necessarily bring about social justice ifand when those groups that are most coherentlyand effectively represented are the ones withwealth and power (as is often the case).Additionally, social movements are no longerdominated by the working classes, as was the casein the 1970s and 1980s. Most of the citizensCaldeira found shaping the debate on urban pol-icy in São Paulo were from the upper-middleclasses and represented elite interest groups.Thus, in a way, these innovative urban laws haveunintentionally created a form of participatorycitizenship of the rich. Caldeira finds these trans-formations not only surprising but also ironic:this discourse of participatory democracy wasembraced by center-left political parties (partic-ularly the Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) andsocial groups advocating social justice, while theresult of their efforts has been new forms ofprivilege and social inequality.

While the Estatuto da Cidade, São Paulo’s MP,and ZEIS formulation have contributed to thisre-invention of social inequality, they have alsoprovided powerful instruments to help fostersocial justice and improved quality of life withinthe poor periphery.Additionally, requirements forpopular participation have forced powerful inter-est groups to take part in the democratic processif they wish to influence public policy.While realestate developers were still able to exact the con-cessions they wanted, at least now they are forcedto do so openly and through the democraticprocess of negotiation, as opposed to closed-door,

unilateral imposition of demands. Furthermore,Caldeira was quick to acknowledge that laws arenow being implemented with the aim of improv-ing the quality of life of low-income citizensrather than expelling them from their illegal set-tlements to construct roads or high-income hous-ing developments. Furthermore, she offered con-crete proof that the usucapião urbano of the Estatutoda Cidade has helped neighborhood associationsmake and win claims of adverse possession inperipheral neighborhoods of São Paulo, in partic-ular Jardim das Camélias.

Numerous positive developments have comeabout from this growing trend of participationand the subsequent formalization of the ZEIS.Marcia Leite Arieira, senior social developmentspecialist at the Inter-American DevelopmentBank (IDB), observed that, in many ways, Brazilhas set the stage for progressive urban develop-ment strategies—a trend that has been spreadingto other countries in Latin America. In the pasttwenty years, urban policies targeting these zoneshave undergone a significant transformation, par-ticularly in São Paulo.The traditional approach tofavelas was to declare them special zones (ZEIS)and target them with traditional physical infra-structure improvements: streets were paved andsewage systems were installed. However, theneeds and wants of ZEIS residents were not takeninto account. Later on, the slum-upgradingapproach gave coherence to these improvements,with the concept of transforming the favela into aregular neighborhood.

According to Arieira, this new approach toZEIS should be seen as a step in the right direc-tion for two reasons. First, by focusing solely onpublic works, the state failed to tackle the keyproblem with low-income neighborhoods: lack ofgeographical and legislative representation. Theseinformal neighborhoods did not officially exist.Their inhabitants (and needs) were in effect invis-

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ible to the state. For this reason, the emphasis thatsocial groups have placed on legalizing and for-malizing ZEIS through participatory governanceis a positive gain as the state now acknowledgesthe existence of favelas.To acknowledge their exis-tence means also to acknowledge their needs forinfrastructure and social services. While the stan-dards applied to such neighborhoods are unfortu-nately not on par with the standards that apply towealthier neighborhoods, as Caldeira pointed out,the fact that standards now actually exist isnonetheless an improvement.

Second, ZEIS are now treated as integral partsof greater São Paulo, and concerns of their resi-dents related to quality of life trump city planningfor physical infrastructure.With the formalizationof illegal neighborhoods, the parameters are set forsustainable growth with an eye to the needs andwants of the low-income residents. In the 1960sand 1970s, favelas were often demolished and resi-dents displaced in the name of rational planningand in order to accommodate upper-class resi-dences. Now, ZEIS are treated more like actualneighborhoods and urban policy heeds the quali-ty of life of all citizens, not just those withresources and strategic influence. Much remains tobe done to tackle issues of urban inequality andpoverty; however, Arieira concluded, these newtrends in urban policy and planning bring benefitsand are here to stay.

Such success is less evident in Rio de Janeiro,according to Bryan McCann, associate professor ofhistory at Georgetown University. As with manyother urban policy initiatives, Rio’s Estatuto daCidade has not performed as planned. Even thebest of laws are insufficient at engendering socialchange without the necessary political transition.For instance, solo criado was designed to restrictthe right of owners to construct multi-level unitson their property through tax disincentives. Theobjective was to promote social justice: tax the

wealthy (those able to build high-rises) and usethe resulting revenue on government services forthe poor. However, in reality, the law has led toan increase in the number of low-density, upper-class properties in Rio de Janeiro: an unintendedconsequence predicted by the scholar MartinSmolka. Similar to what Caldeira witnessed inSão Paulo, progressive urban policies in Rio haveled to surprising transformations as well as sub-optimal developments.

Regarding usucapião urbano, mitigating circum-stances have prevented cariocas—residents of Riode Janeiro—with informal or illegal livingarrangements from legitimizing ownership oftheir residencies, even though many qualify.Although guaranteed by the 1988 constitutionand strengthened by the 2001 Estatuto da Cidade,the law has been used sparingly to formalize the30 percent of housing in Rio de Janeiro consid-ered informal. This lies in sharp contrast to thecase of São Paulo, where the instrument has suc-cessfully established uncontestable titles of owner-ship to people who bought their land but couldnot get their deeds either because they boughtthe land from swindlers or because there areirregularities in the subdivsion of lots. Informalurban dwellers in Rio are not taking advantage ofthe opportunity to legalize their residence,McCann explained, because neighborhood asso-ciations have an incentive to retain informalityand thus prevent residents from pursuing titling.Organizations linked to the drug trade and themafia benefit from informality because they areable to take advantage of the power vacuum andlawlessness, and thus discourage their residentsfrom pursuing land titles. Favela leaders andMafíosi, elected to help rewrite Rio's new MP,saw to it that their low-income neighborhoodseither remained outside the realm of legality or ina form of legalized inequality such as the low landuse standards of the ZEIS described by Caldeira.

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Democracy and The City: Assessing Urban Policy in Brazil

COMPARATIVE URBAN STUDIES PROJECT AND BRAZIL INSTITUTE

The COMPARATIVE URBAN STUDIES PROJECT (CUSP) of theWoodrow Wilson Center was established in 1991 in aneffort to bring together U.S. policymakers and urbanresearchers in a substantive discussion about how to buildthe viable urban governance structures and strong demo-cratic civic culture that are essential for sustaining cities.Research priorities for CUSP include urban health, povertyalleviation, youth populations and conflict, and immigrantcommunities in cities.

The BRAZIL INSTITUTE was created out of the conviction thatBrazil and the U.S.–Brazilian relationship deserve greaterattention within the Washington policy community. Brazil’spopulation, size, and economy, as well as its unique positionas a regional leader and global player, justify this attention.In keeping with the Center’s mission to bridge the worlds ofscholarship and policymaking, the Brazil Institute sponsorsactivities on a broad range of key policy issues designed tocreate a Brazil “presence” in Washington.

For more information about the Comparative Urban StudiesProject and the Brazil Institute, please visit www.wilson center.org

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