30176. 6937

S E C O N D S U P P L E M E N TTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the Wth of JULY, 1917.

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TUESDAY, 10 JULY, 1917.

Way Office,10th July, 1917.

The Secretary of State for War has receivedthe following despatch addressed to the Chiefof the General Staff, India, by Lieut.-GeneralSir Stanley Maude, K.C.B., C'ommander-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force: —

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

10th April, 1917.SIR,—

1. I have the honour to submit herewith areport on the operations carried out by theMesopotamian Expeditionary Force for theperiod extending from August 28th, 1916, thedate upon which I assumed command of theArmy, until March 31st, 1917, three weeksafter the fall of Baghdad.

2. The area over which the responsibilitiesof the Army extended was a wide one, em-bracing Falahiyeh, on the Tigris; Ispahan (ex-clusive), in Persia; 'Bushire, on the PersianGulf; and Nasariyeh, on the Euphrates.

Briefly put, the enemy's plan appeared to beto contain our main forces on the Tigris, whilsta vigorous canfpaign, which would directlythreaten India, was being developed in Persia.There were indications, too, of an impendingmove down the Euphrates towards Nasariyeh.To disseminate our trpops in order to safeguardthe various conflicting interests involvedwould have relegated us to a passive defensiveeverywhere, and it seemed clear from the out-set that the true solution of the problem was aresolute offensive, with concentrated forces, onthe Tigris, thus effectively threateningBaghdad, the centre from which the enemy'scolumns were operating. Such a stroke pur-sued with energy and success would, it wasfelt, automatically relieve the pressure inPersia and on the Euphrates, and preservequiet in all districts with the security of whichwe were charged.

This then was the principle which guided thesubsequent operations, which may be con-veniently grouped into phases as follows: —

First: Preliminary preparations, fromAugust 28th to December 12th.

6938 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917.Second: The consolidation of our position on

the Hai, from December 13th toJanuary 4th.

Third: The operations in the Khadairi Bend,from January 5th to 19th.

Fourth: The operations against the Haisalient, from January 20th to February5th.

Fifth: The operations in the Dahra Bend,from February 6th to 16th.

Sixth: The capture of Sannaiyat and pas-sage of the Tigris, from February 17thto 24th.

Seventh: The advance on Baghdad, fromFebruary 25th to March llth.

Eighth: The operations subsequent to thefall of Baghdad, from March 12th to31st.

PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS : AUGUST 28TH TODECEMBER 12TH.

3. It was of paramount importance, in viewof the approach of the rainy season, that noundue delay should take place in regard to theresumption of active operations, but beforethese could be undertaken witlj .reasonableprospect of success it was necessary: —

(a) To improve the health and training ofthe troops, who had suffered severely fromthe intense heat during the summer months.

(b) To perfect our somewhat precariouslines of communications.

(c) To develop our resources.(d) To amass reserves of supplies, ammu-

nition and stores at the front.It was therefore considered desirable to re-

tain General Headquarters at Basrah till theend of October, in order to systematise, co-ordinate and expand (b) and (c), whilst (a)and (d) continued concurrently and subse-quently.

4. Steady progress was made on the lines socarefully designed and developed by mypredecessor, Lieut.-General Sir PercyLake, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., to whom mywarm thanks are due for the firm foun-dations which had been laid for theensuing winter campaign. Th growth ofBasrah as a military port and base continued,and the laying of railways was«completed. Thesubsidence of the floods and the organisationof local and imported labour removed obstacleswhich had hitherto hindered development,although conversely the lack of water in therivers and consequent groundings of rivercraftgave rise to anxiety from time to time. TheDirectorate of Inland Water Transport wascreated, and accessions of men and materialarrived from overseas, as well as additionalrivercraft; whilst the influx of adequate andexperienced personnel for the Directorates ofPort Administration and Conservancy, Works,Eailways, Supply and Transport and Ord-nance enabled these services to cope moreadequately with their responsibilities in main-taining the field Army. Hospital accomnao-dstion was reviewed and still further expanded,whilst the B>emount and Veterinary Serviceswere overhauled and reconstituted. Changeswere also made in the organisation of theArmy, the grouping of formations and unitswas readjusted, and alterations were made inthe system of command. The line of communi-cation defences were recast and additional linesof communication units for administrative pur-

poses were provided. Establishments for allunits, whether on the various fronts or on theL. of C., were fixed, whilst the provision ofmechanical transport and an increase in animalsand vehicles enabled the land transport withthe Force to be reconstituted.

5. During the latter part of October theArmy was fortunate in receiving a visit fromthe incoming Commander-in-Chief in India,General Sir Charles Monro, G.C.M.G.,K.C.B. His Excellency made an extended tourof the theatre of operations, and his advice andcomments on various matters were of thegreatest value to myself personally, whilst the-Army hailed his visit with the liveliest satis-faction, feeling that he would assume his officewith first-hand and sympathetic knowledge ofour needs and difficulties.

6. Matters had by this time developed sosatisfactorily that during His Excellency'svisit General Headquarters were moved to thefront at Arab Village. Before joining theremyself I carried out short tours of inspectionon the Karun front at Ahwaz, proceeding' asfar as the Oilfields, so as to make further pro-vision for their local security, and on theEuphrates front at Nasariyeh. At both placessatisfactory conditions, prevailed.

By the end of November preliminary pre-parations were well advanced. A steady streamof reinforcements had been moving up theTigris for some weeks, and drafts were joiningtheir units, making good the wastage of thesummer. The troops had shaken off the ill-effects of the hot weather, and their war train-ing had improved. Stores, ammunition, andsupplies were accumulating rapidly at thefront, our communications were assured, andit seemed clear that it was only a matter ofdays before offensive operations could be justi-fiably undertaken. Training camps which hadbeen formed at Amarah were broken up, andthe general concentration upstream of SheikhSa'ad was completed.

7. At the beginning of December the enemystill occupied the same positions on the Tigrisfront which he had occupied during thesummer. On the left bank of the Tigris heheld the Sannaiyat position, flanked on oneside by the Suwaikieh Marsh and on the otherby the river. In this position he had with-stood our attacks on three occasions during theprevious April. Since then he hadstrengthened and elaborated this trenchsystem, and a series of successive positions ex-tended back as far as Kut, fifteen miles in therear. The river bank from Sannaiyat to Kutwas also entrenched.

On the right bank of the Tigris the enemyheld the line to which he had withdrawn inMay when he evacuated the Sinn position.This line extended from a point on the Tigristhree miles north-east of Kut in a south-westerly direction across the Khadairi Bend tothe River Hai, ,two miles below its exit fromthe Tigris, and thence across the Hai to thenorth-west. There was a pontoon bridge acrossthe Hai near its junction with the Tigris whichwas protected by the trench system in thatvicinity. These defences also covered the ap-proaches from the east and south to anotherpontoon bridge which the Turks had con-structed across the Tigris on the eastern sideof the Shumran peninsula. The enemy occu-pied the line of the Hai for several miles belowthe bridgehead position with posts and mountedArab auxiliaries.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JUL?, 1917. 6939On the left bank of the Tigris our trenches

were within 120 yards of the Turkish front lineat Sannaiyat. On the right bank our troopswere established some eleven miles upstreamof Sannaiyat, with advanced posts about twomiles from those of the Turks opposite the Kha-dairi Bend, and some five miles from his posi-tion on the Hai.

In the positions outlined above desultorywarfare, with intermittent artillery and aerialactivity, had continued for some months.

Strategically we were better, situated thanthe enemy. The withdrawal of the bulk of histroops from the right bank of the Tigris lefthim with bis communications in prolongation•of his battle front. If we established ourselveson the Hai it would mean that we should beable to strike at those communications, or atleast at the point of junction between his fieldunits and his communications. On the other.hand, we were exposed to no such danger. TheSuwaikieh Marsh, although it protected thenorthern flank of the Sannaiyat position, alsoformed an obstacle which necessitated a widedetour through a district at times marshy, atothers waterless; to reach the river line behindus. Again, our troops were suitably disposedto meet any attempt from the Hai to turn ourleft flank, and thus strike our communications—a movement which would have involved longmarches, with difficulties as regards water and•supplies.

It was decided therefore to operate asfollows:—First, to-secure possession of theHai; secondly, to clear the Turkish trenchsystems still remaining on the right bank ofthe Tigris; thirdly, to sap the enemy's strengthl)y constant attacks, and give him no rest;fourthly, to compel him to give up the San-naiyat position, or in default of that, to extendliis attenuated forces more and more to counterour strokes against Jus communications; andlastly, to cross the Tigris at the weakest part ofhis line as far west as possible, and so sever hiscommunications. In carrying out this pro-gramme our extended line offered good oppor-tunities for making successful feints to coverour real intention.'THE CONSOLIDATION OF OUR POSITION ON THE

HAI : FROM DECEMBER 13ra TO JANUARY 4TH.8. By the 12th the concentration of our

troops upstream of Sheikh Sa'ad was complete.To the force under Lieut.-General A. S. Cobbe,V.C., K.C.B., D.S.O., was assigned the task•of holding the enemy to his positions on theleft bank of the Tigris and of piqueting thexight bank as far as Sinn Banks, while thecavalry and the force under Lieut.-GeneralW. R. Marshall, K.C.B., were, by a surprisemarch, to secure and entrench a position onthe Hai.

During the night of the 12th-13th Lieut. -'General Marshall's force completed its concen-tration in the forward area on the right bank.On the 13th General Headquarters movedforward to Sinn, whilst Lieut.-General Cobbe"bombarded the Turkish trenches on the left"bank, so as to give the impression that anattack on Sannaiyat was intended.

On the night of the 13th-14th the cavalryand Lieut.-General Marshall's force marchedwestward to the Hai, and at 6 a.m. crossedthat river at Basrugiyeh and Atab respectively.The enemy was surprised, and the force, pivot-ing on its right, moved up the left (or eastern)Tjank of the Hai, whilst the cavalry cleared the

right (or western) bank, driving the enemy'sadvanced troops back on to the Hai bridge-head position, which was strongly held. Twopontoon bridges were thrown across the Haiat Atab, the right .flank of the force" underLieut.-General Marshall was secured by linkingup its old front line defences with its ne_w posi-tion on the Hai, and Lieut.-General Cobbe con-tinued to demonstrate against Sannaiyat.

During the night of the 14th-15th our aero-planes, flying by moonlight, bombed theTurkish bridge over the Tigris east of theShumran peninsula, which the enemy was en-deavouring to move further upstream, and thepontoons, breaking adrift, were scattered. Bythe 18th the enemy succeeded in re-establish-ing this bridge'to the west of Shumran.

Between tine 15th and 18th Lieut.-GeneralMarshall extended his hold northwards andwestwards, and pressure against the enemy'sHai bridgehead position was continued, whilstbombardments destroyed his bridge and sunkseveral of his pontoon ferries. Except for somepatrolling and sniping, the enemy showed nooffensive enterprise; but he worked hard at hisdefences every night.

On the 18th we interposed between the twoTurkish trench systems on the right bank of theTigris opposite Kut, thus severing the enemy'slateral communications on this bank, and givingus command of the river upstream of the Kha-dairi Bend. The extent of river line to bewatched by Lieut.-General Cobbe was now ex-tended up to this point.

9. The remainder of the month and the firstpart of January were devoted to consolidatingour position on the Hai. Communications wereimproved by making additional bridges and bythe construction of roads, and the light railwaywas pushed forward to the Hai. Operationswere hampered^by heavy rain which fell duringthe last week in December and the first week inJanuary, flooding large tracts of country, andby a sudden rise in the river which occurredearly in the new year. The single-line lightrailway and the land transport were materiallyaffected, and only sheer determination on thepart of those concerned enabled them to carryon their functions under these trying condi-tions.

Where the ground was not too sodden by rainand floods our cavalry was constantly engagedduring this period in reconnaissance®, in haras-sing the enemy's communications west of theHai, and in raids, capturing stock and grain.For example, on the 18th the cavalry, with adetachment of infantry, operating west ofShumran, drove the enemy from his trenches

'and shelled his bridge and shipping, and on the20th, while a similar raid was being madeagainst the Shumran bridge area and bombard-ments were being carried out around Kut andat Sannaiyat, a column of all arms essayed tobridge the Tigris four miles west of Shumran.But as our arrival there had been anticipatedby the enemy, and the further bank was foundto be strongly entrenched, the troops wereordered to withdraw after some gallant at-tempts to launch pontoons had been made, andafter some Turks found on the right bank hadbeen taken prisoners

As the result of our occupation of the Hai, wehad: —

(a) Secured a position whence we couldcontrol that waterway and directly threatenthe enemy's communications west of Slium-ran;

6940 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917.(b) Rendered Nasariyeh safe against a hos-

tile movement from the Tigris down the Hai;(c) Increased the possibility of obtaining

supplies from the prosperous districts on themiddle Hai, and rendered it correspondinglydifficult for the enemy to supply himself fromthere;

(d) Interposed between the Turks and theiradherents at Shattra.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE KHADAIRI BEND :JANUARY 5ra TO 19TH.

10. It was evident that the enemy intendedto maintain his hold on the right bank of theTigris, and preparations were accordingly madeto reduce these trench systems. His position inthe Khadairi Bend was a menace to our com-munications with the Hai, for in the event of ahigh flood he could inundate portions of ourline by opening the river bunds. It wastherefore decided to clear the Khadairi Bend inthe first instance, and this operation was as-signed to the force under Ldeut.-General Cobbe.The enemy held a well-prepared line some 2,600yards long, 'facing east. The ground in frontwas flat and Bare, except for a belt of lowbrushwood along the river bank on the northernflank, At the southern end, 200 yards fromthe river and parallel to it, was a double rowof sandhills, on wEich the enemy had con-structed a strong point with covered-in machinegun emplacements. The front of the positionwas swept by fire from both flanks from the leftbank of the river. There was a second line inthe rear, at distances varying from 500 to1,000 yards from the front line, whilst betweenthe two were trenches and nalas prepared fordefence. The southern portion of the secondline, and some sandhills 400 yards behind it,formed a last position, and the garrison hadcommunication with the left bank by means offerries, which, owing to the conformation ofthe river bend, were protected from direct rifleand machine-gun fire so long as this retiredposition was held.

Our troops drove in the Turkish advancedposts, but progress was slow, as many of thetrenches had to be made by sapping. On the7th our trenches were within 200 to 350 yardsof the enemy, the rain had ceased, and as theground was beginning to dry, preparations forthe assault were made. This preliminary stagehad involved digging some 25,000 yards oftrench under trying conditions—constant rainand exposure to enfilade, as well as direct fire.

On the 7th and 8th bombardments were car-ried out. On the 9th a successful assault wasdelivered with small loss on a front of 600yards against the southern end of the Turkishline, but a thick mist hindered further artillerysupport and facilitated counter-attack by theenemy. Severe hand-to-hand fighting ensued,but the Gurkhas and Mahrattas on the leftreached the river bend, having inflicted severecasualties on the enemy. On the right ourtroops continued to gain ground along thetrenches and nalas, until a heavy counter-attack, made under cover of the mist, tem-porarily checked its progress. This counter-attack was defeated with heavy loss by theresolute resistance of the Manchesters, a fron-tier Rifle Regiment, and a detachment of SikhPioneers. The ground gained was consolidatedduring the night.

Prior to the attack on the 9th, raids had beenmade into the enemy's front line at Sannaiyat.Simultaneously a diversion was carried out by

Lieut.-General Marshall against the Haibridge-head, whilst other intended operations,west of the Hai by the cavalry and a detach-ment of Lieut.-General Marshall's force werenecessarily abandoned on account of the mist.

12. On the 10th the a€fcack was resumed infoggy weath'er, and the enemy was pressed backtrench by trench till, by nightfall, he had fallenback to his last position.

Ori the llth an unsuccessful attack wasmade on this position. Our troops reachedtheir objective, but were driven back by astrong counter-attack. & further counter-attack, which attempted to recover trencheswhich we. had taken on the previous day, sufferedheavily from our artillery and machine -gunsduring its retirement. On this occasion a bat-talion of Sikhs specially distinguished them-selves.

On the same day the cavalry occupied HaiTown and remained there several days. Aconsiderable quantity of arms, ammunition andsupplies was captured, and on our withdrawalan attack made on our troops as they retiredreceived well-merited punishment, a Jat LancerRegiment executing a brilliant charge.

13. Owing to the open nature of the groundnow confronting our troops, and in view ofthe fact that it was commanded at close rangefrom both flanks from across the river, it was.decided to construct covered approaches andtrenches in which to assemble the troops undercover prior to the assault.

By the 17th the forward trench system wascompleted, and one by one the enemy's ad-vanced posts had been captured. A strongpoint, which would enfilade the attack, only-remained. On the night of the 17th/18th ourtroops captured and lost this redoubt twice.They retook it again on the 18th and held it.

The final assault was fixed for the 19th, butduring the nigKt of the 18th/19th the enemy,under cover of rifle and machine-gun fire/re-tired across t"ne river.

During these operations the fighting had beensevere, and mainly hand-to-hand, but theenemy, in spite of his tenacity, had more thanmet his match in the dash and resolution ofour troops, and had learnt a lesson which was-to become more deeply ingrained on subsequentoccasions. The enemy's losses, judging fromthe number of dead found by us, were veryheavy, and we captured many prisoners and aconsiderable quantity of war stores.

THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HAI SALIENT :FROM JANUARY 20ra TO FEBRUARY STH.

14. On the llth, while Lieut.-General Cobbewas still engaged in clearing the KhadairiBend, Lieut.-General Marshall commencedpreparations for the reduction of the Haisalient—the extensive trench system which theTurks held astride the Hai river near its junc-tion with the Tigris, and for a fortnight wegained ground steadily in face of strong opposi-tion, until on the 24th our trenches were with-in 400 yards of the enemy's front line.

15. On -the 25th the enemy's front lineastride the Hai was captured on a frontage ofabout 1,800 yards. On the eastern (or left)bank our troops extended their success to theTurkish second line, and consolidated and heldall ground won in spite of counter-attacksduring the day and following night. The-enemy lost heavily, both from our bombard-ment and in violent hancl-to-hand encounters.On the western (or right) bank, the task was &

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDOJS GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917. 6941severe one. The trench system attacked waselaborate and offered facilities for counter-attack. The enemy was in considerablestrength on this bank, and guns and machineguns in skilfully concealed positions enfiladedour advance. Our objective was secured, butthe Turks made four counter-attacks. Thefirst was repulsed; the second reached the cap-tured line, and was about to recapture it whena gallant charge across the open by the RoyalWarwicks restored the situation; the third wasbroken up by our artillery fire; the fourth,supported by artillery and trench mortars,forced our infantry .back to .their owntrenches. As it was now late, further attackwas postponed till the following morning.

On the 26th the assault was renewed by twoPunjabi battalions with complete success, andthe captured trenches were at once consolidated.Subsequently our gains were increased bybombing attacks and with the bayonet in faceof stubborn opposition, and a counter-attack inthe afternoon was repulsed by our artillery.Meanwhile our troops had considerably in-creased their hold on the enemy's position eastof the Hai by bombing attacks, though theirprogress was hampered by the battered con*dition of the trenches and by the numbers ofTurkish dead lying in them. On this bank thefirst and second lines, on a frontage of 2,000yards, were captured by the 27th, and on thefollowing day the whole of the front line hadbeen secured on a frontage of two miles and toa depth varying from 300 to 700 yards, theenemy withdrawing to an inner line.

On the 27th and 28th" our troops penetratedfurther into the Turkish defences west of theHai by bombing, attacks supported byartillery barrage, and consolidated their posi-tion in the first four lines of trenches on afrontage of 600 yards. On the 29th theysecured more trenches by means of infantryraids supported by artillery.

16. The movements of the cavalry hadmeanwhile been restricted by the waterloggedstate of the ground. It had been intended tomove the Division via Bedrah and Jessanagainst the enemy's rear, so as to synchronizewith Lieut.-General Marshall's attack, and re-connaissance showed that the proposal wasfeasible, but soon after the movement had com-menced a heavy thunderstorm burst over thedistrict, and the flooding of the Marsh ofJessan and its neighbourhood rendered pro-gress impracticable, and the attempt wasabandoned. The work done by the cavalryin man-handling guns and vehicles on thisoccasion was especially commendable.

17. After a short pause to readjust our dis-positions, the centre of the enemy's third line•on the eastern (or IP ft) bank of the Hai wassuccessfully assaulted by the Cheshires onFebruary 1st. Bombers pushed rapidly eastand west until the whole trench had beensecured from the Tigris to the Hai on a frontof about 2,100 yards, and an attemptedcounter-attack was broken by our artillery.The enemy's casualties were heavy, and manyprisoners were taken. On the western (or right)bank the two Sikh Battalions captured theenemy's position on a front of 500 yards1, butour troops—especially the left of the attack—were subjected to artillery and machine gunfire in enfilade. The trench system was com-plicated and difficult to consolidate, and it wasnot long before the Turks delivered a counter-attack in strength. The most advanced parties

of our infantry met the enemy's charge in bril-liant styje by a counter charge.in the open, andcasualties on both sides were severe. The pre-ponderance of weight was, however, with theenemy, and our troops, in spite of great gal-lantry, were forced back by sheer weight ofnumbers to their original front line.

Owing to foggy weather on the 2nd, whichhampered artillery registration, a renewal ofthe attack was deferred until the 3rd, but mean-while Lieut.-General Marshall extended hisleft north-westwards towards the Tigris atYusufiyah, with a view to enclosing the DahraBend ultimately.

18. On the 3rd the Devons and a GurkhaBattalion carried the enemy's first and secondlines, and a series of counter-attacks by theTurks, which continued up till dark, witheredaway under our shrapnel and machine gun fire.Our troops east of the Hai co-operated withmachine gun and rifle fire, and two counter-attacks by the enemy on the left bank of theHai during the day were satisfactorily dis-posed of. In"the evening there were indica-tions that he was contemplating withdrawal tothe right bank, and by daybreak on the 4th,the whole of the left bank had passed into ourpossession. That night there was heavy riflefire on our front ug to midnight, when it gradu-ally died away. Patrols before dawnencountered little opposition, and the enemywas found to have fallen back to the LiquoriceFactory and a line east and west across theDahra Bend.

During this period the splendid fightingqualities of the infantry were well secondedby the bold support rendered by the artillery,and by the ceaseless1 work carried out by theRoyal Flying Corps. These operations hadagain resulted in heavy losses to the enemy, astestified to by the dead found, -and many pris-oners—besides arms, ammunition, equipmentand stores—had been taken, whilst the Turksnow only retained a fast vanishing hold onthe right bank of the Tigris.

THE OPEBATIONS IN THE^ DAHRA BEND :FEBRUARY 6in TO 16TH.

19. The 6th to the 8th were days of prepara-tion, but continuous pressure on the enemy wasmaintained day and night by vigorous patrol-ling and intermittent bombardment, and manyminor enterprises were undertaken wherebylosses were inflicted and advanced posts wrestedfrom him. An assault on the Liquorice Factorywould have been costly; therefore it was decidedto deal with it by howitzer and machine gunfire, so as to render it untenable—or at leastprevent the garrison from enfilading our troopsas they moved north. '

On the 9th the Liquorice Factory was bom-barded and simultaneously the King's Owneffected a lodgment in the centre of the enemy'sline, thereafter gaming ground rapidly forwardand to both flanks. Repeated attacks by theenemy's bombers met with no success, and twoattempted counter-attacks were quickly sup-pressed by our artillery. Further west theWoroesters, working towards Yusufiyah andwest of that place, captured some advancedposts, trenches and prisoners, and established aline within 2,500 yards of the Tigris at thesouthern end of the Shumran Bend.

On the 10£h our infantry in the trencheswest of the Liquorice Factory, who had beensubjected all night to repeated bombing attacks,began early to extend our hold on the enemy's

6942 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917.

front line. This movement was followed by abombardment directed against machine gunslocated at Kut and along the left bank of theTigris, which were bringing a galling fire tobear against our right. During this, The Buffsand a Gurkha Battalion dashed forward and,joining hands with the King's Own on theirleft, the whole line advanced northwards. Ascommunication trenches did not exist, anymovement was necessarily across the open, andwas subject to a hot fire from concealedmachine guns on the left bank, but in spite ofthis, progress was made all along th© front todepths varying from 300 to 2,000 yards, oursuccess compelling the enemy to evacuate theLiquorice Factory. Artillery observation wasmuch hindered by a high wind and dust storm.

20. The operations of the 10th and the in-formation obtained by'patrols during the nightof the 10th/ llth made it clear that the enemyhad withdrawn to an inner line, approximatelytwo and a half miles- long, across the DahraBend, with advanced posts strongly -held.Weather conditions rendered aerial reconnais-sance impracticable, and some re-adjustment ofour front was necessary before further attackupon his trenches could be justified, but on thellth our infantry established a post on theTigris south-east of the Shumran peninsula,and on the Following day extended our hold onthe right bank. The enemy was finally en-closed in the Dahra Bend by the 13th.

An attack against the enemy's right centreoffered the best prospects of success, and thisinvolved the construction of trenches andapproaches for the accommodation of troopsdestined for the assault. The foreground washowever occupied by the enemy's piquets, andthe dispersal of these necessitated a series ofminor combats between our patrols and theenemy's covering troops, as well as somesevere fighting on the 12th. Opposite ourright an importantjjoint was brilliantly cap-tured iby assault across the open on the 12thby an Indian Grenadier Battalion, and re-tained, in spite ofjieavy fire during the advanceand two counter-attacks launched subsequently.This success not only deprived the enemy of apoint from which he could enfilade most of hisown front, but enabled us to force the with-drawal of his advanced gosts in the easternsection of his position.'

-During the four days of preparation,although there were indications that the enemyintended to stand and fight, the most likelyferry points were bombarded every night lesttransfers of men and stores across the Tigrismight be in progress.

21. E'arly on the 15th the Loyal NorthLancashires captured a strong point oppositeour left, which enfiladed the approaches to theenemy's right and centre, the retiring Turkslosing heavily from our machine-gun fire. Anhour later the enemy's extreme left was sub-jected to a short bombardment and feint attack.This caused the enemy to disclose his barragein front of our right, and indicated that ourconstant activity on this part of his front hadbeen successful in making him believe that ourmain attack would be made against that partof his line.

Shortly after the Royal Welsh Fusiliers andSouth Wales Borderers carried the enemy'sright centre in dashing style on a front of 700yards, and extended their success by bombingto a depth of 500 yards on a frontage of 1,000yards, taking many prisoners. Several half-

hearted counter-attacks ensued, which werecrushed by our artillery and machine guns, andit became evident that the enemy hadstrengthened his left and could not transfertroops back to his centre on account of ourbarrage. A little later the enemy'sleft centre was captured by The Buffsand Dogras, and pushing on in a north-easterlydirection to the bank of the Tigris theyisolated the enemy's extreme left, where about1,000 Turks surrendered. By nightfall the-only resistance was from some trenches in theright rear of the position, covering about amile of the Tigris bank, from which the enemywere trying to escape across the river, and ithad been intended to clear these remaining,trenches by a combined operation during thenight, but two companies of a Gurkha bat-talion, acting on their own initiative, obtaineda footing in them and took 98 prisoners. Bythe morning of the 16th they had completedtheir task, having* taken 264 more prisoners.The total number of prisoners taken on* the15th and 16th was 2,005, and the Dahra Bendwas cleared of the enemy..Thus terminated a phase of severe fighting,

brilliantly carried out. To eject the enemyfrom this horsehoe bend, bristling withtrenches and commanded from across the riveron three sides by hostile batteries and machineguns, called for offensive- qualities, of a high-standard on the part of the troops. That suchgood results were achieved was due to theheroism and determination of the infantry, andto the close and ever-present support renderedby the artillery, whose accurate fire wasassisted by efficient aeroplane observation.Very heavy rain fell on the,night of the 15th/"16th, and torrential rain during the afternoonand night of the 16th, bivouacs and trenches--being flooded out.

22. The enemy had now, after two months ofstrenuous fighting, been driven entirely fromthe right bank of the Tigris in the neighbour-hood of Kut. He still held, however, a very-strong position defensively, in that it was pro-tected from Sannaiyat to Shumran by the-Tigris, which also afforded security to his com-munications running along the left bank of thatriver. The successive lines al Sannaiyat, whicbhad been consistently strengthened for nearlya year, barred the way on a narrow front to anadvance on our part along the left bank, whilstnorth of Sannaiyat the Suwaikieh Marsh andthe Marsh of Jessan rendered the Turks im-mune from attack from t'he north. On the-other hand we had, by the application of con-stant pressure to the vicinity of Shumran,where the enemy's battle line and communica-tions met, compelled him so to weaken andexpand his front that his attenuated forceswere found to present vulnerable points ifthese could be ascertained. The moment thenseemed ripe to cross the river and commenceconclusions wvtii the enemy on the left bank.To effect this il was important that his atten-tion should be engaged about Sannaiyat andalong the river lino between Sannaiyat andKut, whilst the main stroke was being preparedand delivered as far west as possible.

X

THE CAPTURE OF SANNAIYAT AND PASSAGE OFTHE TIGRIS : FROM FEBRUARY I?TH TO 24TH.23. While Lieut.-General Marshall's force*

was engaged in ttie Dahra Bend, Lieut.-GeneralObbbe maintained constant activity along theSannaiyat front, and as soon as the right bank

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917, 6943had been cleared orders were issued for Sannai-yat to be attacked on the 17th.

The sodden condition of the ground, conse-quent on heavy rain during the preceding dayand night, hampered final preparations, butthe first and second lines, on a frontage ofabout 400 yards, were captured by a surpriseassault with little loss. Before the capturedtrenches, However, could be consolidated, theywere subjected to heavy fire from artillery andtrench morlars, and were strongly counter-attacked by the enemy. The first counter-attack was dispersed, but the second regainedfor the enemy his lost ground, except on theriver bank, where a party of Gurkhas main-tained themselves until dusk, and were thenwithdrawn. Although we had failed to holdthe trenches won, considerable loss had been in-flicted on the enemy, especially during thecounter-attacks, and the operations had servedtheir purpose in attracting the enemy to theSannaiyat front.

The waterlogged state of the country and ahigh flood on the Tigris now necessitated apause, but the time was usefully employed inmethodical preparation for the passage of theTigris about Shumran. Positions for gunsand machine guns to support the crossing wereselected, approaches and ramps were made, andcrews were trained to man the pontoons. Inorder to keep our intentions concealed it wasnecessary that most of the details, includingthe movement of guns, should be carried outunder cover of night. Opposite Sannaiyat,where it was intended to renew the assault,artillery barrages were carried out daily, inorder to induce the enemy to expect such bar-rages unaccompanied by an assault as part ofthe daily routine. Minor diversions were alsoplanned to deceive the enemy as to the pointat which it was intended to cross the river.

On the 22nd the Seaforths and a Punjabibattalion assaulted Sannaiyat, with the sameobjective as on the 17th. The enemy wereagain taken by surprise, and our losses wereslight. A series of counter-attacksi followed,and the first three were repulsed without diffi-culty. The fourth drove back our left, butthe Punjabis, reinforced by an Indian Riflebattalion and assisted by the fire of the Sea-forths, who were still holding the Turkishtrenches on the right front, re-established theirposition. Two more counter-attacks whichfollowed were defeated. As soon as the cap-tured position had been consolidated two fron-tier force regiments assaulted the trenches stillheld by the enemy in prolongation of and tothe north of those already occupied by us. Acounter-attack forced our right back tempor-arily, but the situation was restored by thearrival of reinforcements, and by nightfall wewere in secure occupation of the first two linesof Sannaiyat. The brilliant tenacity of theSeaforths throughout this day deserves specialmention.

Feints in connection'with the passage of theTigris were made on the nights' of the 22nd/23rd opposite Kut and at Magasis respectively.Opposite Kut preparations for bridging theTigris opposite the Liquorice Factory, undercover of a bombardment of Kut, were madefurtively in daylight, and every detail, downto the erection of observation ladders, was pro-vided for. The result was, as afterwards ascer-tained, that the enemy moved infantry andguns into the Kut peninsula, and these couldnot be re-transferred to the actual point of

crossing in time to be of any use. The feint atMagasis consisted of a raid across the river,made by a detachment of Punjabis, assisted byparties of Sappers and Miners and of the SikliPioneers. This bold raid was successfullycarried out with trifling loss, and the detach-ment returned with a captured trench mortar.

The site selected for the passage of the Tigriswas at the south end of the Shumran Bend,where the bridge was to be thrown, and threeferrying places were located immediately down-stream of this point. Just before daybreak on'the 23rd the three ferries began to work. Thefirst trip at the ferry immediately below thebridge site, where the Norfolks crossed, was acomplete surprise, and five machine guns andsome 300 prisoners were captured. Twobattalions of Gurkhas, who were using the twolower ferries, were met by a staggering firebefore they reached the left bank, but in spiteof losses in men and pontoons, they pressed ongallantly and effected a landing. The twodown-stream ferries were soon under such heavymachine-gun fire that they had to be closed,and all ferrying was subsequently carried onby means of the up-stream ferry. By 7.30a.m. about three companies of the Norfolksand some 150 of the Gurkhas were on the leftbank. The enemy's artillery became in-creasingly active, but was vigorously engagedby ours, and the construction of the bridgecommenced. The Norfolks pushed rapidly up-stream on the left bank, taking many prisoners,whilst our machine guns on the right bank,west of the Shumran Bend, inflicted casualtieson those Turks who tried to escape. TheGurkha battalions on the right and centre weremeeting with more opposition and their progresswas slower. By 3 p.m. all three battalionswere established on an east and west line onemile north of the bridge site, and a fourthbattalion was being ferried over. The enemyattempted to counter-attack down the centre oithe peninsula, and to reinforce along its westernedge, but both attempts were foiled by thequickness and accuracy of our artillery. At4.30 p.m. the bridge was ready for traffic.

By nightfall, as a result of the day's opera-tions, our troops had, by their unconquerablevalour and determination, forced a passageacross a river in flood, 340 yards wide, in faceof strong opposition, and had secured a posi-tion 2,000 yards in depth, covering the bridge-head, -while ahead of this line our patrols wereacting vigorously against the enemy's advanceddetachments, who had suffered heavy losses-,including about 700 prisoners taken in all. Theinfantry of one division were across andanother division was ready to follow.

25. While the crossing at Shumran was pro-ceeding, Lieut.-General Cbbbe had secured thethird and fourth lines at Sannaiyat. Bombingparties occupied the fifth line later, and «workwas carried on all night making roads acrossthe maze of trenches for the passage of artilleryand transport.

26. Early on the 24th our troops in theShumran Bend resumed the advance supportedby machine guns and artillery from the rightbank. The enemy held on tenaciously at thenorth-east corner of the peninsula, where thereis a series of nalas in which a number of machineguns were concealed, but after a strenuousfight lasting for four or five hours, he wasforced back, and two field and two machineguns and many prisoners fell into our posses-sion. Further west our troops were engaged

6944 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917,with strong enemy forces in the intricate massof ruins, mounds and nalas which lie to thenorth-west of Shumran, and rapid progress wasimpossible, but towards evening the enemy hadbeen pushed back to a depth of 1,000 yards,although he still resisted stubbornly. Whilethis fighting was in progress, the cavalry, theartillery, and another division crossed thebridge. The cavalry attempted to breakthrough at the northern end of theShumran Bend to operate against theenemy's rear along the Baghdad road,by which aeroplanes reported hostilecolumns to be retreating, but strongTurkish rearguards entrenched in nalas pre-vented them from issuing from the peninsula.That evening the troops closed up rea'dy toadvance early next morning. There was everyindication that the enemy was in full retreatand that the force which had opposed us all daywas a strong and very resolute rearguard, whichwould probably withdraw by night. Duringthis day's fighting at Shumran heavy losses hadbeen inflicted on the enemy, and our captureshad been increased in all to 4 field guns, 8machine guns, some 1,650 prisoners, anda large quantity of rifles, ammunition,equipment and war stores. The gunboats werenow ordered up-stream from Falahiyeh, andreached Kut the same evening.

27. While these events were happening atShumran, Lieut.-General C'obbe cleared theenemy's sixth line at Sannaiyat, the Nakhailatand Suwada positions, and the left bank as faras Kut without much opposition.

The capture of the Sannaiyat position, whichthe Turks believed to be impregnable, tad onlybeen accomplished after a fierce struggle, inwhich our infantry, closely supported by ourartillery, displayed great gallantry and endur-ance against a brave and determined enemy.The latter had again suffered severely. Manytrenches were choked with corpses, and theopen ground where counter-attacks had takenplace was strewn with them.

Tks ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD: FROM FEBRUARY25TH TO MARCH HTH.

28. Early in the morning on the 25th, thecavalry and Lieut.-General Marshall's forcemoved north-west in pursuit of the enemy,whose rearguards had retired in the night. Thegunboats also proceeded up-stream. Our troopscame in contact with the enemy about eightmiles from Shumran, and drove him back, inspite of stubborn resistance, to his main posi-tion two miles further west, where the Turks,strong in artillery, were disposed in trenchesand nalas. Our guns, handled with dash, gavevaluable support, but were handicapped in thisflat country by being in the open, whilst theTurkish guns were concealed in gun pits. Aftera severe fight, our infantry gained a footing inthe enemy's position and took about 400prisoners. The cavalry on ihe northern flankhad been checked by entrenched infantry, andwere unable to envelope the Turkish rear-guard. The Royal Navy on our left flank co-operated with excellent effect in the bombard-ment of the enemy's position during the day.

On the 26th, one column, following the bendof the river, advanced to force any positionwhich the enemy might be holding on the leftbank of the Tigris, whilst another column ofall arms marched direct to the Sumar Bend inorder to intercept him. His retreat proved,however, to be too rapid. Stripping them-

selves of guns and other encumbrances, theTurks just evaded our troops, who had made a•forced march across some eighteen miles of aridplain. Our cavalry came up with the enemy'srear parties and shelled his rearguard,entrenched near -Nahr Kellak.

29. The gunboat flotilla, proceeding up-stream full speed ahead, came under very heavyfire at the closest range from guns, machineguns and rifles, to which it replied vigorously.In spite of casualties and damage to the vesselsthe flotilla held on its course past the rear-guard position, and did considerable executionamong the enemy's retreating columns.Further up-stream many of the enemy's craftwere struggling to get away, and the R-oyalNavy pressed forward in pursuit. The hostilevessels were soon within easy range, and severalsurrendered, including the armed tug" Sumana," which had been captured at Kutwhen that place fell. The Turkish steamer" Basra," full of troops and wounded, sur-rendered when brought to by a shell whichkilled and wounded some German machinegunners. H.M.S. "Firefly," captured fromus during the retreat from Ctesiphon, in 1915.kept up a running fight, but after being hitseveral times she fell into our hands, theenemy making an unsuccessful attempt to setfire to her magazine. The " Pioneer," badlyhit by our fire, was also taken, as well as somebarges laden with munitions. Our gunboatswere in touch with and shelled the retreatingenemy during most of the 27th, and his retire-ment was harassed by the cavalry until afterdark, when his troops were streaming throughAziziyeh in great confusion.

30. The pursuit was broken off at Aziziyeh(50 miles from Kut and half-way to Baghdad),where the gunboats, cavalry and Lieut.-GeneralMarshall's infantry were concentrated duringthe pause necessary to reorganise our extendedline of communication preparatory to a furtheradvance. Lieut. -General Cbbbe's force closed tothe front, clearing the battlefields and protect-ing the line of march. Immense quantities ofequipment, ammunition, rifles, vehicles andstores of all kinds lay scattered throughout the80 miles over which the enemy had retreatedunder pressure, and marauders on looting in-tent did not hesitate to attack small partieswho stood in their way.

Since crossing the Tigris we had capturedsome 4,000 prisoners, of whom 188 wereofficers, 39 guns, 22 trench mortars, 11machine guns, H.M.S. "Firefly," "Sumana"(recaptured), "Pioneer," "Basra," andseveral smaller vessels, besides ten barges, pon-toons, and other bridging material, quantitiesof rifles, bayonets, equipment, ammunitionand explosives, vehicles and miscellaneous storesof all kinds. In addition, the enemy threwinto the river or otherwise destroyed severalguns and much war material.

31. On the 5th, the supply situation havingbeen rapidly, re-adjusted, Lieut.-GeneralMarshall marched to Zeur (eighteen miles),preceded by the cavalry, which moved severmiles further to Lajj. Here the Turkishrearguard was found in an entrenchedposition, ^ very difficult to locate by reasonof a dense dust storm that was blowingand of a network of nalas, with which thecountry is intersected. The cavalry was hotlyengaged with the enemy in this loqalitythroughout the day, and took some prisoners.A noticeable feature of the day's work was a

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917. 6945brilliant charge made, mounted, by the Hussarsstraight into the Turkish trenches. Theenemy retreated during the night.

The dust storm continued on the 6th, whenthe cavalry, carrying out some useful recon-naissances, got within three miles of the Dialah.river, and picked up some prisoners. TheCtesiphon position, strongly entrenched, wasfound unoccupied. There was evidence thatthe enemy had intended to hold it, but thexapidity of our advance had evidently pre-vented him from doing so. Lieut.-GeneralMarshall followed the cavalry to Bustan

••(seventeen miles), and the head of Lieut. -General Cobbe's column reached Zeur.

On the 7th our advanced guard came in con-tact with the enemy on the line of the Dialah

-river, which joins the Tigris on its left bank,about eight miles below Baghdad. As theground was absolutely flat and devoid of cover-it was decided to make no further advancetill after sunset. Our gunboats and artillery,however, "came into action against the hostileguns.

32. Measures for driving the enemy's infan-try from the Dialah were initiated on the nightof the 7th/8th. It appeared as though theenemy had retired, but when the first pontoonwas launched it was riddled by rifle' andmachine-gun fire. A second attempt was madewith artillery and machine-gun co-operation.Five pontoons were launched, but they wereall stopped by withering fire from concealedmachine guns.. They floated down-stream, andwere afterwards recovered in the Tigris riverwith a few wounded survivors on board, and•further ferrying enterprises were for the timebeing deemed impracticable. It now becameevident that, although the line of the Dialahwas not held strongly, it was well defended bynumerous guns and machine guns skilfullysited, and the bright moonlight favoured thedefence. To assist in forcing the passage asmall column from the force under Lieut. -General Marshall was ferried across the Tigrisin order to enfilade the enemy's position withits guns from the right bank of that river.

During the night of the 8th/9th, after an in-tense bombardment of the opposite bank, anattempt was made to ferry troops across theDialah river from four separate points. Themain enterprise achieved a qualified success,tihe most northern ferry being able to work fornearly an hour before it was stopped by verydeadly rifle and machine-gun fire, and weestablished a small post on the right bank.When day broke this party of seventyof the Loyal North Lancashires haddriven off two determined counter-attacks,and were still maintaining themselves ina small loop of the river bund. Forthe next twenty-two hours, until the passageof the river had been completely forced, thedetachment held on gallantly in its isolatedposition, under constant close fire from the sur-rounding buildings, trenches and gardens, be-ing subjected to reverse as well as enfilade firefrom distant points along the right bank.

33. On the 8th a bridge was constructedacross the Tigris, half a mile below Bawi, andthe cavalry, followed by a portion ef Lieut. -General Cbbbe's force, crossed to the right bankin order to drive the enemy from positionswhich our aeroplanes reported that he hadoccupied about Shawa Khan, and north-west ofthat place, covering Baghdad from the south 'and south-west. The advance of our troops

was much impeded by numerous nalas andwater-cuts, which had to be ramped to renderthem passable. During the forenoon of the9th Shawa Khan was occupied without muchopposition, and aeroplanes reported anotherposition one and a half miles to the north-west,and some six miles south of Baghdad, asstrongly held. Our attack against thisdeveloped later from the south and south-west in an endeavour to turn theenemy's right flank. The cavalry, whichat first had been operating on our leftflank, withdrew later, as the horses neededwater, but our infantry were still engaged be-fore this position when darkness fell, touchwith the enemy being kept up by means ofpatrols, and the advance was resumed as soonas indications of his withdrawal were noticed.

On the morning of the 10th our troops wereagain engaged with the Turkish rearguard with-in three miles of Baghdad, and our cavalrypatrols reached a point two miles west ofBaghdad Railway Station, where they werechecked by the enemy's fire. A gale and blind-ing dust storm limited vision to a few yards,and under these conditions reconnaissance andco-ordination of movements became difficult.The dry wind and dust and the absence ofwater away from the river added greatly to thediscomfort of the troops and animals. Aboutmidnight patrols reported the enemy to be re-tiring. The dust storm was still raging, butfollowing the Decauville railway as a guide ourtroops occupied Baghdad Railway Station at5.55 a.m., and it was ascertained that theenemy on the right bank had retired up-streamof Baghdad. Troops detailed in advance occu-pied the city, and the cavalry moved on Kadhi-main, some four miles north-west of Baghdad,where they secured some prisoners-

34. On the left bank of the Tigris Lieut. -General Marshall had, during the 9th, elabor-ated preparations for forcing the passage of theDialah. At £ a.m., on the 10th, the crossingbegan at two points a mile apart and met withconsiderable opposition, but by 7 a.m. theEast Lancashires and Wiltshires were acrossand had linked up with the detachment ofLoyal North Lancashires which had so hero-ically held its ground there. Motor lighterscarrying infantry to attack the enemy's rightflank above the mouth of the Dialah groundedlower down the river, and took no part in theoperation. The bridge across the Dialah wascompleted by noon, and our troops pushingsteadily on drove the enemy from the riversidevillages of Saidah, Dibaiyi and Qararah—thelatter strongly defended with machine guns—and finally faced the enemy's last positioncovering Baghdad along the Tel MuhammadRddge. These operations had resulted in thecapture of 300 prisoners and a large quantityof arms, ammunition and equipment, whilstsevere loss had been inflicted on the enemy inkilled and wounded, over 300 of his dead beingfound by our troops.,

During the night of the 10th/llth closetouch with the enemy was maintained bypatrols, and at 1.30 a.m. on the llth it wasreported that the Turks were retiring. TheTel Muhammad position was at once occupied,and patrols pushed beyond it, but contact withthe enemy was lost in the dust storm. Earlyon the llth Lieut.-General Marshall advancedrapidly on Baghdad and entered the city amidmanifestations of satisfaction on the part ofthe inhabitants. A state of anarchy had ex-

6946 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917.isted for some hours, Kurds and Arabs looting1

the bazaars and setting fire indiscriminately atvarious points. Infantry guards provided forin advance were, however, soon on the spot,order was restored without difficulty, and theBritish flag hoisted over the city. In theafternoon the gunboat flotilla proceeding up-stream in line ahead formation anchored offthe British Residency, and the two forcesunder Lieut.-Generals Marshall and Cobbe pro-vided for the security of the approaches to thecity, being disposed one on either bank of theriver. For over a fortnight before we enteredBaghdad the enemy had been removing storesand articles of military value, and destroyingproperty which he could not remove, but animmense quantity' of -booty, part damaged,part undamaged, remained. This includedguns, machine guns, rifles, ammunition,machinery, railway workshops, railway mate-rial, rolling stock, ice and soda water plant,pipes, pumps, cranes, winches, signal and tele-graph equipment, and hospital accessories. Inthe Arsenal were found among some cannonof considerable antiquity all the gains' (ren-dered useless by General Townshend) whichfell into the enemy's hands at the capitulationof Kut in April, 1916.

THE OPERATIONS, SUBSEQUENT TO THE FALL orBAGHDAD: FROM MARCH 12ra TO SlST.

35. With the near approach of the floodseason it was now necessary to obtain controlof the river bunds upstream of the city, andYahudie and Kasirin on the left bank of theTigris, 20 and 28 miles respectively aboveBaghdad, were consequently occupied on the13th and 14th. On the right bank of theTigris the retreating enemy had entrenched astrong position south of Mushaidie RailwayStation some 20 miles north of Baghdad.Lieut.-General Cobbe was entrusted with themission of securing the bunds on this bank,and on the night of the 13th/14th a columnmarched from Baghdad and reached TadjiyeStation by daybreak on the 14th. The Turk-ish position was some seven miles in extent, ex-tending from the river in a north-easterlydirection towards the railway which runs duenorth and south. The western flank rested onsuccessive lines of sandhills, which lie on bothsides of the railway line, whilst east of therailway the defensive system centred in twodominant heights, linked to each other and tothe river by a series of trenches, nalas andirrigation cuts. In front lay a bare flat plain,whilst undulating ground behind gave theenemy concealment for manoeuvre and coverfor reserves. It was decided to attack theTurkish right flank with the whole force, assuch a movement aimed directly at the enemy'srailhead and general reserve would turn themain position east of the railway.

Our troops advanced on both sides of therailway supported by artillery barrage, whilstthe Cavalry operating on the western flank tookthe enemy's position in enfilade and in reversewith rifle and machine gun fire. Communica-tion was maintained with our gunboats, whichco-operated by shelling points in the Turkishline. Ridge after ridge was captured in spiteof infantry and artillery fire, which was some-times intense, until the Black Watch andGurkhas by a brilliant charge carried the mainposition, inflicting severe casualties on theenemy. Fighting continued after nightfall,

t and at Mushaidie Station the enemy made hislast stand, but the Black Watch and Gurkhasrushed the station at midnight and pursuedthe enemy for half a mile beyond.

The enemy's flight was now so rapid thattouch was not obtained again, and on the 16thour aeroplanes reported stragglers over a depthof 20 miles, the nearest being 25 miles north ofMushaidie. These operations had involvedcontinuous marching1 and stiff fighting, almostwithout a break, for two nights and a day, inwhich our troops displayed fine endurance and.determination.

36. On the 14th a post was established onthe right bank of the Dialah, oppositeBaqubah, 30 miles north-east of Baghdad,which was held by the enemy. On the nightof the 17th/18th a column effected a surprisecrossing over the Dialah five miles belowBaqubah, and our troops entered the town thefollowing morning, inflicting some casualties onthe Turkish detachment, and capturing someprisoners and stores. Baqubah is the-centre ofa district rich in supplies, and its occupationwas essential as a preliminary to further opera-tions to assist our Russian Allies, who wereadvancing through Persia by way ofKermansnah and Kasr-i-Shirin, with the 13thTurkish Corps falling back on Kifri beforethem.

37. On the 19th our troops occupied Feluja,35 miles west of Baghdad, on the Euphrates,driving out the Turkish garrison, which retiredup the right bank of the Euphrates. Theoccupation of Feluja, with Nasariyeh alreadyin our possession, gave us control over themiddle Euphrates from both ends.

38. T!he arrival of our Allies at Khanikinwas now momentarily expected, and a columnwas concentrated at Baqubah with the objectof holding the enemy's retreating columns totheir ground till such time as the Russianscould come up, or alternatively of inflicting losson them should they weaken their front andendeavour to cross the Dialah. This columnmoved out on the 20th and occupied Shah-raban on the 23rd, the enemy having retired onthe previous night. A few prisoners and largesupplies of grain were captured. Five miles to•the north-east of Shahraban lies a commandingridge of Jebel Hamrin, where the enemy helda strong position covering Kizil Robat and theroad to Khanikin, and here our troops wereactively engaged with him from the 24th untilthe end of the month.

On the right bank of the Dialah the enemyalso held a position along the Jebel Hamrinabout Deli Abbas and Lambaral covering theapproaches to the Kifri road. The cavalrywas instructed to work up the right bank of theDialah, so as to co-operate with our troops onthe left bank in obstructing the retirement ofthe Turkish forces.

On the left bank of the Dialah our progresswas slow, owing to the difficult nature of thecountry, which is intersected by canals anddeep nalas, some of them full of water, but onthe night of the 24th/25th part of the forcemoved 'forward .to (test the strength of theenemy in our front. By daybreak our infantryhad established itself in the foothills, and theadvance to the main ridge began. Hostilepiquets were driven in, and the lower crest ofthe hills was gained, but beyond this anothercrest rose 2,500 yards away, and the in-tervening country was much broken with

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917. 6947hillocks and ravines. The advance continuedtowards the line held by the enemy about1,000 yards north of the captured crest, but ashe now began to show considerable strength, itwas deemed inadvisable to press the advancefurther. The subsequent withdrawal of .thecolumn was followed up closely by the enemy,but several strong attacks were beaten off, andan attempted cha-rge against our right flank byhis cavalry was dispersed by rifle and gun fire.During the withdrawal the enemy, who neces-sarily came out into tihe open, suffered heavily,and the offensive enterprise of his infantryslackened visibly as the day wore on. TheManchesters specially distinguished themselvesby their gallantry and steadirress on thisoccasion.

The advance of our Allies had been delayedin a difficult pass east of Khanikin, mainlyowing to weather conditions, and in conse-quence up to (the close of the period underreview we had not gained touch with them, butour column still maintained its position,harassing the Turkish retreat and securing anumber of prisoners.

39. About the 26th there were indicationsthat a converging movement was being madeby part of the 13th Corps down the right bankof the iDialah from Deli Abbas,'and by the18th Corps along the left bank of the Tigrisfrom Shatt El Adhaim against our troops inthe vicinity of Deltawa, apparently with theintention of assisting the withdrawal of the13th Corps from before the Russians. Acolumn was accordingly concentrated at KhanNahrwan to deal with the* Shatt El Adhaimforce, whilst the cavalry contained the DeliAbbas force. On the 27th the enemy made adetermined attempt to move down the rightbank of the Dialah towards Deltawa, but ourcavalry, skilfully handled in some difficultground, resisted the enemy's advance from suc-cessive positions, inflicting severe losses, andfinally checked the forward movement thatevening. Next day the enemy fell back to-wards Deli Abbas followed up by our cavalry.

The Turkish force from Shatt El Adhaimheld an entrenched position between Dogamehand Himma, and during the night- of the28th/29th our troops deployed for attack insuitable positions. The attack was well pressedfrom the east and north till about midday,when the mirage became so bad that artillerysupport was impracticable. Later in theevening it was renewed, and in spite of fiercecounter-attacks we secured the greater part ofthe enemy's position, although he still held afew trenches when darkness fell. His losseshad evidently been severe, as we buried over190 bodies, and we took many prisoners, whilstthe enemy retired during the night behind theShatt El Adhaim.

The total number of prisoners taken duringthe period December 13th to March 31st was7,921.

OPERATIONS ON OTHER FRONTS : AUGUST 28THTO MARCH 31 ST.

40. The period with which this despatchdeals was devoid of important incidents onthe Karun and Bushire fronts. On theEuphrates front in the early part of Septem-ber guerilla warfare was commenced againstour camps and patrols round As Sahilan.Immediate steps were taken to crush this hos-tile concentration before it became formidable,

and on September llth a column moved outfrom Nasariyeh which destroyed the towersand fortifications of As Sahilan. Our com-paratively small column was opposed by some5,000 enemy irregulars, who fought boldly,but the steady behaviour of our troops gavethem no opening, and before mid-day theenemy withdrew, having lost, as it was after-wards ascertained, 436 killed and some 800wounded. This prompt lesson had an excel-lent effect round Nasariyeh, and no furtherhostilities of any importance occurred duringthe period under review. The only TurkishRegular detachment on the Euphrates was asmall one at Samawa, and when Baghdad fellthis detachment retreated to Feluja, whenceit was subsequently ejected by our troops fromBaghdad.

41. On the lines of communications duringthe same period the daily routine of ourdefence troops was only occasionally broken byraids, which were suitably dealt with by ourposts and mobile columns.

42. Owing to the attention drawn to theTigris front by the severe fighting in progressthere, the situation had remained compara:tively quiet. Considerable progress, however,was made in many ways. This was especiallythe case at Nasariyeh, where much was done todevelop the administration of the town andthe surrounding country, whilst at Ahwazvarious projects were carried into effect whichplaced our position in that neighbourhood on amore satisfactory basis. Considerable creditis .due to the commanders on the Euphrates,Karun and Bushire fronts and on the lines ofcommunication defences for the manner inwhich they maintained peaceful conditions intheir neighbourhood and the efficiency of theirtroops.

SUMMARY.43. The above is a brief record of the opera-

tions carried out during seven months by thearmy in Mesopotamia—the first three and ahalf months a period of preparation, the lastthree and a half months one of action. Duringthe latter the fighting has been strenuous andcontinuous, and the strain imposed upon allranks, both at the front and on the lines ofcommunication, severe. But they haveresponded whole-heartedly to every call thathas been made upon them, and their rewardhas been the measure of their success. Thenature of the operations has been as varied asit has been complex, and the training of thetroops has been tested,^ first in the fierce hand-to-hand fighting in trench warfare round Kutand Sannaiyat, and later in the more openbattles which characterised the operations inthe D'ahra Bend, the passage of the Tigris, theadvance on Baghdad, and the subsequentactions. From this ordeal they have emergedwith a proud record, and have dealt the enemya series of stinging blows, the full significanceof which will not be easily effaced. Britishand Indian troops working side by side havevied with each other in their efforts to closewith the enemy, and all ranks have beenimbued throughout with that offensive spiritwhich is the soldier's finest jewel.

The operations have involved long hours andstrenuous work, as well as great responsi-bilities, for commanders and their staffs, butby sheer hard work and a determination tosucceed they have risen superior to everyobstacle and compelled success.

6948 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917.

As regards the regimental Commanders andthe regimental Officers, Warrant and Non-commissioned Officers and men, it is not easy 'to-do justice to their sterling performances.In spite of the youth and consequent lack oftraining and experience among some of theirofficers and non-commissioned officers, leader-ship has never faltered, whilst all ranks, bytheir heroism, endurance and devotion to duty,have almost daily affirmed their superiorityover their opponents in the bitterest struggles.Each difficulty encountered seemed but to steelthe determination to overcome it. It may,then, be truly said that not only have thetraditions of these ancient British and Indianregiments been in safe keeping in the hands oftheir present representatives, but that thesehave even added fresh lustre to the records ontheir time-honoured scrolls. Where fightingwas almost daily in progress it is difficult toparticularise, but the fierce encounters west ofthe Hai, the passages of the Tigris and Dialah,,and the final storming of the Sannaiyat posi-tion may perhaps be mentioned as typical ofall that is best in the British and Indiansoldier.

For the success achieved the fighting spirit ofthe troops has been mainly responsible, but thedash and gallantry of- individuals and unitshave been welded into a powerful weapon bythat absolute sympathy which has existed be-tween both services and all branches?^

To the Royal Navy the thanks of the Armyare due for the thorough way in which theycarried out somewhat restricted but none theless important duties during the earlier partof this period. The fact that the enemy barredthe way at Sannaiyat necessitated their workbeing at first limited to assisting in the pro-tection of our water communications, co-operating with our detachment- on theEuphrates front and occasionally shelling theenemy's position at Sannaiyat, where theNaval Kite Balloon Section rendered good ser-vice in observation work. Their opportunitycame later, when after the passage of the Tigristhey pressed forward in pursuit and renderedthe brilliant and substantial services describedabove.

The work of the Cavalry has been difficult.The flat terrain intersected' with nalas ob-structed movement without providing cover,and the state of the country after heavy rainsmade progress even for short distanceslaborious. The absence of water, too, awayfrom the river limited its radius of action.Nevertheless its reconnaissance work and theblows delivered against the enemy's communi-cations helped in no small way to bring aboutthat dissipation of his forces which was so essen-tial to our success, and the pressure appliedafter the passage of the Tigris to the retreatingenemy was instrumental in completing his finalrout.

The unison in which Artillery, Infantry,Machine-Gun Corps and Air Service workedhas been admirable. The combination of irre-sistible gallantry and devotion to duty evincedby the Infantry and Machine-Gun Corps wasequalled by the determination of the Artilleryto render their comrades the closest support.Batteries were pushed forward to points withineffective range of the enemy's riflemen, and theforward observing offitoers1 and their detach-ments, in order to obtain the best results fortheir guns in this flat and difficult country, werealways to be found with the leading lines of

infantry. The intense but methodical fire ofour guns formed a screen of shells under whichour infantry advanced boldly, whilst the ac-curacy of our gun fire was largely assisted bythe excellent observation work done by theRoyal Flying Corps. The activity of the latterthroughout the operations was unbounded inco-operation with artillery, air combats, recon-naissance, raiding, bombing, and photography.The R.F.C. at the outset wrested the commandof the air from the enemy, and subsequently byskill and ceaseless energy maintained its supe-riority, in spite of the heavy strain thrown onpersonnel and machines.

Closely allied to the Infantry throughoutthe fighting 'and especially during the periodof trench warfare were the Field companies,Sapper and Miner companies and Pioneer bat-talions. Their work was as daring as it wastireless and was of inestimable value in plan-ning, supplementing and improving by theirtechnical knowledge the work done by theInfantry.

Owing to the conditions under which fightinghas taken place a heavy strain has been placedupon the Signal Service and Telegraph Depart-ment, and especially during the rapid advanceafter the passage of the Tigris. That the com-munications. of the Army were so well main-tained testified to the efficiency and high senseof duty among all ranks in both branches.Their work, especially in the case of those withadvanced formations, was frequently carriedout under conditions of considerable danger, inwhich conspicuous gallantry was frequentlyneeded and displayed.

The zeal and scientific knowledge evinced bythe Field Survey Department is best exempli-fied by the fact that since the commencementof the campaign accurate surveys of an area ofover 13,000 square miles of country have beenproduced, which have been of the greatest valueto the Army.

44. One of the features peculiar to thiscampaign is the length of the lines of communi-cations which we have necessarily had to adopt.In consequence the difficulties by which theAdministrative Services and Departments, bothin the field and on the lines of communications,have been confronted have been exceptional.The success or failure of the operations has solargely depended upon their efficiency that asubstantial measure of credit is due to theDirectors and their Assistants and all ranks ofthose Services and Departments who by capablemethods and unwearied energy have sur-mounted all obstacles and regularly met theneeds of the fighting troops with ample supplies,munitions and stores, and have been the meansof providing every comfort obtainable for thesick and wounded.

As in the case of the fighting troops, theinterdependence of these Services and Depart-ments has necessitated the closest co-operation,and equally successful has been the result. Wehave relied upon three classes of transport—river, rail and road, the latter being furthersub-divided into motor and animal transport.The work in all cases has been peculiarly heavy.The newly formed Inland Water TransportDirectorate had first to fill its ranks and thendevelop its organisation and provide for itsmany indispensable requirements, but the per-sonnel, making light of these very real obstaclesto rapid progress, worked unceasingly, with theresult that night and day an endless chain ofrivercraft passed up and down the river,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917. 6949thereby assuring the maintenance of the troopsat the front.

The rainy season was one of continuousanxiety for the railways (especially as regardsthe light line between Sheikh Sa'ad and Atab)and the road transport. Every ingenuity pos-sible was, however, brought to bear on the prob-lem, and vigour and determination on the partof all concerned once more carried the day.

To the Directorate of Port Administrationand Conservancy much credit is due for thedevelopment of the Port of Basrah on an effi-cient basis and for the method and smoothnesswith which the vast fleet of steamers whichhas served this expedition has been handled,as well as for the provision of many facilitiesin connection therewith. The monthly statis-tics bear eloquent testimony to the efficiency ofthis Department.

The excellent work done by the Director ofSea Transport and his assistants also deservesmore than passing recognition in view of theamount of shipping involved.

Our long line of communications has compli-cated the delivery of supplies and ordnancestores at the front considerably. Althoughlarge stocks of foodstuffs, munitions and storeswere available at the Base early in the autumn,accurate calculations and ceaseless activity onthe part of all ranks were required to ensuretheir delivery to the troops punctually and indue proportion. Difficult as the problem waswhilst the Army was sedentary in the vicinityof Sannaiyat and Kut, it became more andmore complex as the advance proceeded. Thestrain on the personnel was increasingly severe,and the fact that throughout this period thetroops at the front were well maintained in allrespects constitutes a fine record for the SupplyService and Ordnance Department.

In dealing with the problems at the* Base andon the Lines of Communication, the responsi-bilities of the Works Directorate have beenvery heavy, but the many problems have beenresolutely handled with that resourcefulnessand success which are so characteristic of theRoyal Engineers. Road-making, water supply,and building and reclamation work at the Basealone have reached vast dimensions, and havedemanded constant attention and thoroughorganisation.

Since the termination of the hot weather thehealth of the troops has been uniformly good,and our well-equipped hospitals have been morethan adequate to meet the calls made uponthem by sick patients. Throughout the opera-tions the evacuation of the wounded wascarried out on model lines, and the arrange-ments made for the comfort and rapid transferof patients from the field units to the hospitalson the Lines of Communication reflect muchcredit on those concerned. Whilst those onthe Lines of Communication have done theirshare efficiently, the work of the Medical Ser-vices at the front has maintained its high repu-tation. During the operations the strainthrown upon all has been heavy, and thecourage and devotion to duty displayed by thepersonnel on the battlefield has only beenequalled by the zeal and energy of those in thefield units. In*this connection the valuableservices rendered by the consulting surgeonsand physicians demand special mention, whilstthe thanks of the Army are due to the NursingSisters for their indefatigable services in tend-ing the sick and wounded. These ladies haveby their devoted work under difficult conditions

of climate and surroundings set an example ofwhich they may well be proud.

The wastage of horses during continuousoperations under trying conditions has neces-sarily been large, but the Remount Departmenthas, though assisted by few facilities and facedby many obstacles, by practical methods, fore-sight and adaptability, successfully met thedemands made upon it.

Sickness and battle casualties have placed astrain upon the resources of the VeterinaryDepartment which has been met by wise antici-pation and considerable efficiency.

The chaplains—always to the fore wheredanger calls—have been untiring in their atten-tion to the spiritual needs of the troops andin their ministrations to the sick and wounded,not only in the field ambulances and hospitals,but also on the battlefield.

The Postal Service has been handicapped bythe long distances to be covered and by the factthat other articles requiring carriage claimedprecedence in order of urgency. It has hadheavy mails to deal with and its duties havebeen well carried out.

45. I should like further to express mythanks to those individuals and organisationswhich, though not strictly military, have ren-dered valuable services to the Army. Fore-most among these I would mention the BritishRed Cross Society, which has worthily main-tained its splendid record throughout thiscampaign. The sterling work performed byits personnel, and its bountiful provision ofmotor launches, motor ambulances and gifts,have been the means of alleviating much suf-fering.

The ceaseless labours of the organisers andcommittees of the various war-gift societies,both in England and India, and the liberalityof the subscribers to these funds, have contri-buted largely to the comfort and well-being ofthe troops, especially in regard to their recrea-tions, and our heartfelt gratitude is due tothem all.

The officials and personnel of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have displayed courtesyand willingness to assist, and have given usfacilities which have beefrof great value .to ourtroops.

The Young Men's Christian Association hasbeen indefatigable in its exertions to enlivenand improve the surroundings of the troops,and has with my approval opened additionalbranches throughout the country, which havebeen immensely appreciated.

46. The thanks of the Army are due for theprompt manner in which our necessarily largedemands have been sent overseas from Eng-land, India and Egypt. This factor has con-tributed in no small measure to the successesachieved.

47. During the operations the Commandershave had great responsibility, and have jus-tified fully their selection for the posts theyhold.

Lieut.-General W. R. Marshall, K.C.B.,has commanded his troops with determinationand judgment. His quiet, imperturbablemanner, his coolness and decision inspire con-fidence among his subordinates, whilst his boldmethods and intelligent appreciation and rapidexecution of orders have been of the greatestvalue.

Lieut.-General A. S. Cobbe, V.C., K.C.B.,D.S.O., has commanded with marked ability.Always methodical and thorough in his plans,