developing a state-level approach

LLNL-PRES-559656This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract

DE-AC52-07NA27344. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLCThis work was supported by the NNSA Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security’s Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)

Developing a State-level ApproachInternational Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis Course

Celia Reynolds and George Anzelon

Monterey, California, 4-8 June 2012

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LLNL-PRES-5596562

Safeguards implementation under the State level concept

(As depicted in recent IAEA presentations to Member State safeguards support programs)


Acquisition path analysis Coverage considerations Formulating safeguards technical

objectives Identifying and selecting applicable

safeguards measures Working through a concrete example

Outline


Routes by which the State could, from a technical point of view, obtain weapon-usable nuclear material outside safeguards control, whether through diversion of declared material, misuse of declared facilities, construction and operation of undeclared facilities, or combinations of these strategies

What are acquisition paths?


Plausible acquisition paths• In principle, any State could pursue any acquisition path

• Resource constraints make it impractical for the IAEA to assess all possible acquisition paths for all States

• Thus, the IAEA focuses on identifying and assessing the….

• Plausibility of acquisition paths for any given State

• Plausibility ≈ How well equipped a State is to a pursue a particular path given its technical capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle and related technologies

Very plausible

Not very plausible


Evaluating a State’s technical capabilities is not limited only to its declared nuclear program

It also takes into account: • A State’s professed future plans for its nuclear

program• A State’s latent ability to develop and deploy nuclear

capabilities that it is not known to possess currently. This is based on assessments of:

– A State’s knowledge base and experience– A State’s ability to acquire necessary equipment through trade or

indigenous manufacturing

Unpacking the assessment of acquisition path plausibility further…


Covering acquisition paths


Dynamics of acquisition path coverage

Assessed technical capability to execute the path

Shortness of time to complete path

Uncertainties, information gaps

Indications of pathway use; inconsistencies

Measures to detect/deter diversion of declared NM

IAEA response to credible third-party leads

Measures to detect/deter misuse of declared facilities

IAEA measures to detect indications of undeclared activities

Priority for coverage Means of coverage

Maintain and refine a consistent model of State’s nuclear program


For each plausible path, identify what must be detected to achieve use of the path

Paths may be able to be covered at multiple points along the path• Some path segments may be common to several important pathways,

increasing the overall safeguards value of detecting or deterring their use

• May not be necessary to cover every step• Maintain meaningful detection probabilities for credible diversion paths

One overarching objective, not specific to any one path, is to maintain a model of the State’s nuclear-related activities and investigate inconsistencies in all available information

Formulating safeguards technical objectives


Identify in detail what has to be verified, looked for, monitored or investigated, and if possible where

Where applicable, outline performance measures for meeting the objectives• Especially for undeclared activities, what are the

analogues to timeliness and quantity goals – even “ballpark” performance measures can help assess the viability of various candidate measures

Safeguards technical objectives should be described in specific terms


What are the indicators and signatures of what you want to verify, monitor, looked for, or investigate?

What safeguards tools are available, under what safeguards legal authority?

Try to identify flexible options for meeting objectives

Try to estimate the likely effectiveness of measures in accomplishing the objectives

Identifying applicable safeguards measures


For detection of diversion and misuse, applicable measures and their effectiveness as a function of intensity are reasonably understood and tractable

By contrast, for objectives related to detection of undeclared nuclear activities and facilities, the relationship between safeguards measures and their detection effectiveness is more uncertain• For undeclared activities at sites and other declared locations, or cued

by specific actionable leads, the value of IAEA in-field activities can be high

• For detecting undeclared activities at unknown locations, realistically affordable IAEA efforts might not be able to increase State’s detection risk meaningfully beyond the already-extant risk of detection by third-parties

Safeguards measures should be assessed for their estimated effectiveness


Concrete Example: Developing a State-level Safeguards Approach for Brazil*

* This is example is for illustrative purposes only to demonstrate how one might work through the IAEA’s specified steps for developing a SLA. Thus,, it does not presume to suggest what the IAEA’s safeguards approach for Brazil would look like under the SLC.


Establishing Knowledge about Brazil (1): Its Nuclear Fuel Cycle at a Glance

Caetité Mine& Mill

•Produces U3O8•~ 400 MT/yr capacity

Exports U3O8for conversion

to NUF6

Resende Gas Centrifuge Enrichment

Plant

•Produces LEUF6 up to ~ 3.5% U235•~ 120 MTSWU/yr capacity

Resende Fuel Fabrication Plant

•Converts LEUF6 to LEUO2 powder & produces LEUO2 fuel elements•~ 240 t HM/yr capacity

Angra 1 and Angra 2 PWR NPPs

•657 MW and 1350 MW generating capacity respectively•Angra 3 is under construction; similar specs as Angra 2

This flow diagram depicts elements of Brazil’s nuclear fuel cycle that are dedicated to producing the fuel for its nuclear power plants (NPPs)


Establishing Knowledge about Brazil (2): Its Nuclear Fuel Cycle at a Glance

BRW conversion pilot plant under

construction

•Produces NUF6•~ 40 MTU/yr capacity

Imported NUF6

Gas centrifuge enrichment pilot

plant

•Produces LEUF6 up to 5% U235•~ 4 MTSWU/yr capacity

Gas centrifuge enrichment laboratory

•Produces LEUF6 up to 19.9% U235•~ 5 MTSWU/year

BRQ fuel fabrication laboratory

•Converts LEUF6 to LEUO2 pellets•2.55 tHM/yr capacity

Depicts major elements of Brazil’s nuclear fuel cycle that are dedicated to research and development (research reactors not shown separately)

BRTG fuel fabrication laboratory

•Assembles LEUO2 fuel elements for the IPEN-MB01 Research Reactor

Production facilities at the Aramar Research Center in Ipero (owned and

operated by the Brazilian Navy)

Fuel fabrication pilot plant at IPEN in Sao

Paulo

•Produces U-silicide plate type fuel elements for research reactors•Converts imported LEUF6 to U3Si2 powder

CELESTE-1 reprocessing

laboratory at IPEN in Sao Paulo

• No longer operating• Awaiting decommissioning

U-AVLIS laboratory at the Advanced Studies

Institute

•Part of the Air Force’s Aerospace Technology Center•Technology still in the development stage

PIE hot cells at the Navy Technology

Center in Sao Paulo

Research facilities dispersed across multiple locations


Information about Brazil that might help us identify technically plausible paths for it: It has a declared nuclear program with the necessary knowledge, experience, and manufacturing capabilities to indigenously produce HEU from uranium ore, if it so desired.

It currently operates declared facilities for all necessary elements of an HEU acquisition path, with the exception of UF6 production.

It has a naval nuclear program that includes navy-operated enrichment facilities and a prototype reactor for nuclear propulsion that are under IAEA safeguards.

Has some additional military-managed nuclear research beyond the naval nuclear program—research to date has not involved nuclear material

It had a past reprocessing research program, including a shutdown and soon-to-be decommissioned reprocessing laboratory that remains under Agency safeguards.

It has stocks of spent fuel that it could reprocess to separate plutonium.

It has large reserves of readily accessible uranium ore.

Establishing knowledge about Brazil (3)


Brazil has a large number of plausible acquisition paths available to it

Breaking them into groups that share a common characteristic or two may help facilitate analysis across many paths

Identifying plausible acquisition paths for Brazil (1)


Plausible acquisition paths could be grouped into distinct families where Brazil: • Acquires HEU through indigenous gas centrifuge

enrichment• Acquires HEU through U-AVLIS enrichment • Acquires Pu by diverting declared spent fuel for

subsequent undeclared reprocessing• Acquires Pu by irradiating undeclared targets in a

misused declared reactor• Acquires Pu by irradiating undeclared targets in an

undeclared reactor

Identifying plausible acquisition paths for Brazil (2)


Overt UOC production

Purifi-cation

Conv to U Ox

Conv toUF6

Covert UOC production

LWRNPP

• Multiple paths are depicted at once, but not even all of the plausible acquisition paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment that Brazil could pursue, in principle, are depicted here.

• For simplicity, this diagram does not depict paths that:• Begin with the diversion of declared nuclear material that was imported• Begin with importing undeclared nuclear material, including direct use unirradiated material • Involve diversion of nuclear material from its laboratory or pilot plant scale fuel fabrication facilities at the Aramar

Research Center or IPEN• Involve the misuse of the fuel fabrication pilot plant at IPEN to convert any HEUF6 it produces to HEU-metal• Involve the introduction of undeclared UF6 produced at a clandestine facility into Brazil’s declared enrichment

facilities

Noncompliant undeclared activities

Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to

be reported in the absence of an Additional Protocol

Undeclared purification & conversion to UF6

Undec GC enrichment

Weaponization, including any necessary

conversion

Fuel fabUF6UO2

for LWR NPP

GC enrichment

Diversion of declared materials or misuse of declared facilities

HEU paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment



Purifi-cation

Conv to U Ox

Conv toUF6


LWRNPP

Example 1: Paths that allow Brazil to circumvent all IAEA safeguards that would be implemented on declared nuclear material and at declared facilities


Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an

Additional Protocol


Undec GC enrichment


conversion

Fuel fabUF6UO2

for LWR NPP

GC enrichment


Disaggregating paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment



Purifi-cation

Conv to U Ox

Conv toUF6


Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an Additional

Protocol

Undec GC enrichment


conversion

GC enrichment


HEUF6

Disaggregating paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment

Example 2: Paths that begin with the diversion of UF6. They involve either diversion of declared LEUF6 to an undeclared gas centrifuge facility for further enrichment or the

undeclared production of HEUF6 in a declared facility whose design specifications indicate it only produces LEUF6.

LEUF6

LEUF6

HEUF6


Assessing acquisition path plausibility





Consider the following:

Use HEU paths involving gas centrifuge enrichment as an example

• Brazil can design, construct, and operate a gas centrifuge facility

• Has done so at multiple scales of production

• This is not a new technology that Brazil is still trying to master

• It can also manufacture gas centrifuges indigenously

• Technical barrier to producing HEU via gas centrifuge enrichment is probably relatively low

• Would likely require some experimentation with different cascade arrangements to determine how to scale up from producing LEUF6 with an enrichment level of up to 20% 235U to HEU








• What is Brazil’s scale of production for manufacturing gas centrifuges?

• Can Brazil also manufacture the necessary components for its gas centrifuges?

• Does it have to import key material from abroad?

• If so, who is/are Brazil’s supplier(s)?• If not, where does this material

production occur? • Does it outsource any of its component

manufacturing? • If it has to acquire necessary materials or

components through trade, is Brazil actively trying to develop an indigenous capability to overcome this vulnerability in its supply chain or does it seem content to rely on the international market?









• Information about Brazil’s R&D efforts in topics related to gas centrifuge enrichment technology loses some of its potential as an indicator of pathway use since this technology is part of Brazil’s declared nuclear program

• Potential inconsistencies that might be meaningful:

• A significant mismatch between Brazil’s centrifuge manufacturing capacity and the production scale of its current GCEPs (including any planned expansions)





Shortness to time to complete path




• Can vary significantly from path to path• Example: The time it would take to

produce a significant quantity of HEU by misusing the Resende GCEP would be shorter than the time it would take to do so in an undeclared GCEP. The




Purifi-cation

Conv to U Ox

Conv toUF6


LWRNPP

Example: A path where Brazil would draw from its established uranium mining and milling installations to feed a set of entirely clandestine nuclear facilities to produce HEU


Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an

Additional Protocol


Undec GC enrichment


conversion

Fuel fabUF6UO2

for LWR NPP

GC enrichment


Formulating technical objectives for a single path (1)

Steps Brazil would take to fulfill the highlighted path: 1. Divert uranium ore or ore concentrate (UOC) from the Catetité mine and co-located concentration plant2. Design, construct, equip, and operate an undeclared conversion facility with process lines dedicated to

converting UOC to NUF6

3. Design, construct, equip, and operate an undeclared gas centrifuge enrichment facility with a cascade configuration that enriches NUF6 up to levels suitable for weaponization (enrichment level of ~90% 235U)

4. Convert HEUF6 to highly enriched uranium metal that is suitable for weaponizationNOTE: Any of these steps could be disaggregated further.


Corresponding to step 2 from previous slide

What: Detect the design, construction, equipping, and operation of an undeclared UOC to UF6 conversion facility

Notional quantity & timeliness goals: A facility capable of producing on the order of 10 tons of natural uranium as UF6 would be sufficient for producing 1 SQ of weapons-grade material in a year

Formulating safeguards technical objectives for a single path (2)

Corresponding to step 1 from previous slideWhat: Detect the removal of uranium ore or UOC from the Caetité uranium mining and

milling installation

Notional quantity and timeliness goals: ~10 metric tons within a year; this is ~0.01% of

Caetité’s uranium reserves and ~2.5% of its annual UOC production capacity

Corresponding to step 4 from previous slideWhat: Detect the conversion of HEUF6 to HEU-metal that is suitable for weaponization

Notional quantity and timeliness goals: Less relevant at this point since the game is basically up once Brazil has acquired HEUF6?

Corresponding to step 3 from previous slideWhat: Detect the design, construction, equipping, and operation of an undeclared GCEP configured to enrich NUF6 to levels suitable for weaponization

Notional quantity and timeliness goals: A GCEP with a ~5000 SWU/year capacity would be sufficient to produce 1 SQ of weapons-grade material in a year



Purifi-cation

Conv to U Ox

Conv toUF6


LWRNPP

Example: Enrichment in an undeclared gas centrifuge enrichment facility is a critical node for many paths within this family, thus it warrants careful consideration by the IAEA when it comes to identifying applicable safeguards measures and allocating resources across paths within Brazil.


Activities involving pre-34(c) material that do not have to be reported in the absence of an Additional

Protocol


Undec GC enrichment


conversion

Fuel fabUF6UO2

for LWR NPP

GC enrichment


Identifying applicable safeguards measures


Detecting the design, construction, equipping and operation of an undeclared gas centrifuge enrichment plant Environmental sampling

• Where to sample? • Under what authority?

Satellite imagery analysis• Where to look?

Information analysis• What to look for?• What sort of approach—trolling or directed to follow up on cues?

Identifying applicable safeguards measures for…


Information that might influence how the IAEA decides to cover plausible acquisition paths: It only has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force, has not signed the Additional Protocol, and shows no indications of doing so in the near future

• IAEA does not have complementary access rights, but it can still request access to any place or information that it deems necessary for fulfilling is verification duties

It is a member of a Regional System of Accounting and Control of nuclear material (RSAC)—the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC)

Returning to knowledge about Brazil

developing a state-level approach

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