Did NATO Win the Media War?&

Does this matter for C2 research?

Pascale Combelles SiegelIndependent Consultant

CCRP symposium, Monterey, 27 June 2000

The Dilemma

“No matter how brilliantly you fight, what matters is the actual packaging”

Why repeat the same mistakes? Why haven’t we fully integrated PA into C2

research?

For Democracies

in wartime,

the media are

An Essential Battlefield

Popular support is key

• Democracy rules by popular consent

• Erosion of support may end mission Potential vulnerability

• Asymmetrical warfare

• Easy and cheap to manipulate

A Difficult Battlefield Who are “the media”?

• Neither partner nor opponent• Multiplying types — not unitary

Some fundamental media rules• The cycle of news• The cycle of punditry• The speed of media reporting

An Understudied Battlefield

Large literature on “military-media relations” (Hotel Warrior, etc…)

Little on the critical importance of media reporting for the conduct of operations

What is there on the role of Public Affairs in operational C2?

NATO Public Affairsand

The Kosovo Campaign

A brief overview

NATO Public Affairs

Jamie Shae, the “anti Winston Churchill”

• “Total engagement,”

• Limited transparency Isolated

• Victim of erroneous assumptions

• PA dissociated from ops and intel Some improvement at mid-course

Yugoslav Approach ...

Undermine NATO’s will to fight

• Thwart NATO’s rationale

• Exploit “mistakes” and civilian damage A multi-media campaign

• Pictures

• Speakers

• Internet

The Bottom Line NATO able to maintain support

• Majority supported strikes until the end

• Mass deportations strengthened resolve Demonization of Milosevic worked Collateral damage had limited impact on

popular support By end of May: use diplomacy, not bombs

However, some reasons for concern Faulty planning process Lack of operational information

• Fueled debate and controversy• Credibility on the line

National coordination deficient• Different policies/viewpoints

Problems adapting to speed of media reporting — reactive

Some thoughts for the future PA/Media issues frequently require command

attention — resource eater (time) Some PA C2 issues from Allied Force

• Relationship between PA and Operations• Centralized v. decentralized PA operations• Interoperability• Planning process• Military v. media reporting speed

Fig1. Public Support for Allied Force

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

21Feb.

21Mar.

25Mar.

31Mar.

7Apr.

14Apr.

21Apr.

27Apr.

2May

9May

24May

Favor

Oppose

Don't know

Fig 2. Responsibility for Refugees

Whose actions are more responsible for the large number of ethnic Albanian refugees now leaving Kosovo:

The Serbian government 67%

The NATO alliance 19%

Both equally 4%

Neither 1%

Don’t know 9%

“Special Report: Kosovo: The data,” The Gallup Poll Monthly, nº 402, March 1999, p17.

Fig 3. Demonization of MilosevicMilosevic

Positive16%

Negative 84%

Positive

Negative

Fig 4. Evaluation of US policy after Chinese Embassy Incident

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

24 Mar-6 May 7 May- 25 May

Positive

Negative

Fig 5. Diplomacy and Bombs Which of the following approaches to

reaching a peace agreement in Yugoslavia would you prefer to see the US take? • continue the current military action: 48%• stop the military action and focus on diplomacy:

48%• Neither (vol.) 3%• No opinion: 1%

Fig 5. Diplomacy and Bombs (2) Please say whether you would approve or

disapprove if NATO and the US were to temporarily suspend the strikes and attempt to resolve the matter through negotiations and other means?

• Approve: 82%

• Disapprove: 15%

• No opinion: 3%