information age transformation - ccrp - command and control

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About the CCRP

The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP)has the mission of improving DoD’s understanding ofthe national security implications of the Information Age.Focusing upon improving both the state of the art andthe state of the practice of command and control, theCCRP helps DoD take full advantage of the opportunitiesafforded by emerging technologies. The CCRP pursuesa broad program of research and analysis in informationsuperiority, information operations, command andcontrol theory, and associated operational concepts thatenable us to leverage shared awareness to improve theeffectiveness and efficiency of assigned missions. Animportant aspect of the CCRP program is its ability toserve as a bridge between the operational, technical,analytical, and educational communities. The CCRPprovides leadership for the command and controlresearch community by:

n articulating critical research issues;n working to strengthen command and control

research infrastructure;n sponsoring a series of workshops and symposia;n serving as a clearing house for command and

control related research funding; andn disseminating outreach initiatives that include the

CCRP Publication Series.

This is a continuation in the series of publicationsproduced by the Center for Advanced Concepts andTechnology (ACT), which was created as a “skunkworks” with funding provided by the CCRP underthe auspices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense(C3I). This program has demonstrated theimportance of having a research program focusedon the national security implications of theInformation Age. It develops the theoreticalfoundations to provide DoD with informationsuperiority and highlights the importance of activeoutreach and dissemination initiatives designed toacquaint senior military personnel and civilians withthese emerging issues. The CCRP Publication Seriesis a key element of this effort.

Check our Web site for the latest CCRP activities and publications.

www.dodccrp.org

DoD Command and Control Research ProgramASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

&CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

Mr. John P. Stenbit

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

Dr. Linton Wells, II

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASD(C3I)&

DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

Dr. David S. Alberts

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or impliedwithin are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S.Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted withoutfurther permission, with credit to the DoD Command and ControlResearch Program, Washington, D.C. Courtesy copies of reviewswould be appreciated.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Information age transformation: getting to a 21st century military / David S. Alberts. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-893723-06-2 (pbk.) 1. Electronics in military engineering--United States. 2. Information technology.I. Alberts, David S. (David Stephen), 1942-UG485 .A42 1996358--dc20 96-14441

First printing, April 1996Second printing, October 1996Revision, June 2002

Information AgeInformation AgeTransformationTransformation

David S. Alberts

Getting to aGetting to a

21st Century Military21st Century Military

i

Table of ContentsList of Figures ........................................... iii

Acknowledgments ..................................... v

Preface ...................................................... vii

Chapter 1—Introduction ............................ 1

Chapter 2—Background and Purpose ..... 7

Chapter 3—Reflections ........................... 13

Chapter 4—Dealing with the Challengesof Change ............................................. 25

Chapter 5—Information TechnologyImpacts on the Warfighter .................. 31

Chapter 6—Nature of Future War ........... 39

Chapter 7—Information Age Militaries.... 47

Chapter 8—Adverse Consequences ...... 53

Chapter 9—Strategy forTransformation ..................................73

Chapter 10—Measuring TransformationProgress and Value............................. 79

ii

Chapter 11—TransformationRoadmap.......................................... 111

Chapter 12—The Way Ahead ................ 121

Chapter 13—Research .......................... 131

Chapter 14—Concluding Thoughts ..... 145

iii

List of FiguresFigure 1. The New Environment ............. 34

Figure 2. Fog, Friction, and MilitaryEffectiveness ....................................... 54

Figure 3. Characteristics of anInformation Age DoD .......................... 55

Figure 4. Mission Capability PackageCoevolution.......................................... 76

Figure 5. Attributes of Agility ................. 83

Figure 6. NCW Levels of Maturity........... 86

Figure 7. NCW Migration Path ................ 88

Figure 8. NCW Value Chain..................... 91

Figure 9. Measure of NetworkCapabilities .......................................... 94

Figure 10. Elements ofTransformation............................... 112

v

Acknowledgments

M any individuals have contributed to thedevelopment of the ideas contained in this book

and helped in this undertaking. The research whichultimately formed the basis for the original manuscriptwas suggested by Vice Admiral Cebrowski (Ret.) whenhe was the J6. This updated and expanded versionwas supported by him in his current role as Director,Force Transformation. This book could not have beenwritten without the active support provided to me bythe senior leadership at OASD(C3I). To the currentand recent Assistant Secretaries of Defense (C3I), Mr.John Stenbit, Dr. Linton Wells, II, and Mr. ArthurMoney, I owe many thanks for the opportunity theyhave given me to be a part of the transformation ofthe DoD. In the years since the UnintendedConsequences of Information Age Technologies waswritten, I have written or contributed to a number ofother publications dealing with Information Agewarfare. Working with me on many of these booksand DoD reports and publications has been Mr. JohnGarstka, Dr. Richard Hayes, and Dr. David Signori.They, among others, have been involved in thedevelopment of many of the ideas expressed hereinand have been active in their dissemination. Dr. Hayeshas also worked with me to sharpen my argumentsand clarify my thoughts.

I would also like to thank Ms. Priscilla Guthrie, Dr.Margaret Myers, and Mr. Owen Wormser, who tooktime from their hectic schedules to provide very helpfulcomments and suggestions. A lot of effort was involved

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in turning my manuscript into a CCRP publication. Iowe a huge debt to Joseph Lewis and Alison Learyfor editing this document, Margita Rushing fororchestrating the process and designing the layout,and to Bernie Pineau for designing the cover andmaking the graphics convey the intended message.

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Preface

T ransformation is a process of renewal, anadaptation to environment. Its pace and progress

depend on the nature of the entity being transformed,its environment, and the drivers of the transformation.The object of a transformation may be an individual, asmall organization, a large institution, an industry, agroup of related entities, or even an entire society.Important aspects of the environment relate to thecontinued viability of the entity and the constraints onits ability to adapt. Change and human adaptation arealways the essential ingredients in transformation.Change provides the stimulus needed to overcomethe inertia associated with the status quo, “old”equilibrium, which was reached to accommodate aset of conditions that no longer apply. Transformationsmay or may not be managed. In fact, the degree towhich a transformation of a large institution can bemanaged is a central question.

The national security environment and the nature ofthreats and challenges have been evolving since thecollapse of the Soviet Union. The relative importanceof a spectrum of traditional and nontraditional threatsand the urgency of dealing with emerging threats havebeen vigorously debated. Recently, the DoD hasmoved from a threat-based strategy to a capabilities-based strategy and the debate has shifted accordingly.The events of September 11, 2001, have focusedincreasing attention on the need to transform theDepartment’s organization from one finely-tuned foraccomplishing traditional military missions to one that

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is capable of deterring, preventing, and if necessary,defeating a diverse set of nontraditional adversaries.

The enormity of the changes that we have experiencedin the geopolitical and national security environmentsare equaled, if not exceeded, by the changes broughtabout by the advances in technology associated withthe Information Age. Much has been written1 aboutthe impacts of information and telecommunicationstechnologies on individuals, organizations, andsocieties. A profound connection exists among thecapabilities associated with the Information Age, thegeopolitical landscape, and national security.

This book is the first in a new series of CCRP booksthat will focus on the Information Age transformationof the Department of Defense. Accordingly, it dealswith the issues associated with a very largegovernmental institution, a set of formidableimpediments, both internal and external, and thenature of the changes being brought about byInformation Age concepts and technologies. This bookis not intended to deal with all of the issues associatedwith the DoD’s adaptation to meet 21st-centurychallenges. Rather, it focuses its attention on the keydimension of change associated with Information Agetechnology—the quality and distribution of informationwithin the organization—its richness, its reach, andthe quality of the interactions.2

In 1995, I began work on a book entitled theUnintended Consequences of Information AgeTechnologies.3 The first printing “sold out,” and within6 months a second, larger printing was made and has,subsequently, sold out as well. Over the years theideas discussed in the book about the nature of futuremissions, freeing information from the chain of

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command, mission capability packages, and the needfor their coevolution have taken root. They now arepart and parcel of the emerging strategy for DoDtransformation. With the acceptance of these ideas,interest in this book has been revived. In reviewingthe manuscript with an eye towards a third printing, Icame to the conclusion that it needed updating andstarted to edit the manuscript. As I became more andmore immersed in the book, I realized that I had twochoices. The first was to simply update the book,putting it into current language and context so that itcould provide some background for those engaged intransformation. The second was to use the originalbook as the kernel for a new one, transporting,modifying, and adding text to incorporate ideas thathave been developing since the book’s initialpublication. I have chosen the second approach inthe hopes that it will provide a better point of departurefor the urgent task of transforming the DoD to meetthe challenges ahead. I have also tried to keep thebook short and succinct to serve as an introductionrather than a comprehensive treatment of the subject.Thus, this new book supercedes the now out-of-print1995 manuscript, which will now provide historicalcontext for the development of these ideas.

1As a point of departure, please see: Alberts, David S. and DanielS. Papp, eds., Information Age Anthology. Washington, DC:National Defense University and CCRP. June 1997-March 2001.Vols 1-3.2This concept and its origins are discussed more fully in: Alberts,David S., John J. Gartska, Richard E. Hayes, and David A.Signori. Understanding Information Age Warfare. Washington,DC: CCRP. August 2001. p. 46.3Alberts, David S. The Unintended Consequences of InformationAge Technologies: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Seizing the Initiative.Washington, DC: National Defense University. April 1996.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

M ilitary organizations are, by their very nature,resistant to change. This is in no small part due

to the fact that the cost of error is exceedingly high.Change, particularly change that may affect therelationships among organizations and betweencommanders and their subordinates, presentssignificant risks and therefore generates considerableconcern. The explosion of information technologieshas set in motion a virtual tidal wave of change that isin the process of profoundly affecting bothorganizations and individuals in multiple dimensions.The military is no exception. At the very beginning ofthe Information Age, technological advances made itpossible to provide more complete, more accurate,and more timely information to decisionmakers. Asthe costs of processing and communications powertumbled, it became cost-effective for organizations toadopt and utilize information technologies in more andmore situations.

Information and Military Organizations

Military organizations have traditionally providedinformation to forces in three ways:

1. Commands (directives and guidance);

2 Information Age Transformation

2. Intelligence (information about the adversary and the environment); and

3. Doctrine (how you are going to do it).

Commands serve to define the specific task at hand.Intelligence provides information about theenvironment in which the task is to be carried out.Doctrine provides the rules of the game or standardoperating procedures. Doctrine, unlike commands andintelligence, is not provided in real-time, but serves toshape the culture and mindsets of the individualsinvolved. Thus, information has, until recently, beeninseparable from commanders, command structures,and command systems.

Each of these three ways of communicatinginformation about what is expected of subordinateorganizations and individuals has evolved over timeto be mutually supportive of an overall commandconcept or approach matched to the nature of theconflict and the capabilities of the forces. Thesuccess of military operations depends to a largeextent upon the ability to coordinate activities toachieve synchronized effects.1 Ensuring thatindividuals behave as intended or as expected inthe face of uncertainty (the fog of war) and understress is a key to achieving coordinated activities.The selective dissemination of information hastraditionally been used as a tool to define and shapethe environment in which soldiers operate and toensure conforming behavior.

The military is now on the road to becoming anInformation Age organization. This book explores whatthis means in terms of the nature of the information

3Chapter 1

that will be available to participants in a mission, howthis information is disseminated, how it is used, andthe implications for command and control,organization, and doctrine. This Information Agetransformation is fraught with risks as well asopportunities. Both are a direct consequence of thechanges in the nature of available information, itspattern of dissemination, and the resultantorganizational adaptation.

Organization of this Book

This book begins by noting contemporary thinking andvocabulary as embodied in recent DoD publications,and moves on to provide context for the discussion ofan Information Age transformation of DoD. Thiscontemporary thinking is juxtaposed with the lingeringquestions that stimulated the original version of thisbook. The result is a book that highlights the historictension between risks and opportunities. To set thestage for the discussion about the nature of the DoD’sInformation Age transformation, a set of Reflectionsis offered in the Chapter 3. This section contains anassessment of where we are now (Taking Stock), thenature of the effort that will be involved (Engineeringvs. Innovation), and what this transformation is reallyall about (Transformation and Value).

A set of observations about the nature of change andthe challenges in dealing with change follows. Thecase is made for an aggressive approach, one that isnot constrained by current notions and practices andone that is not overly preoccupied with avoiding pitfalls.


The examination of the nature of an Information Agetransformation begins with a review of the impact thatinformation technologies are having or could have onthe warfighter. This discussion extends into aconsideration of the nature of future warfare and thecharacteristics of an Information Age military.

The identification of concerns related to theintroduction of information technologies and theidentification of a set of remedies to address thecauses of these concerns provides the basis for thearticulation of a prudent and effective strategy foreffecting an Information Age transformation. Thisstrategy for transformation is built aroundexperimentation with network-centric conceptsdesigned to leverage the power of Information Agetechnologies and the coevolution of mission capabilitypackages, a process designed to minimize the risksand seize the opportunities associated with theapplication of these technologies to military operations.The iterative and inclusive nature of a process ofcoevolution helps to expose and deal with the kindsof disconnects that are the root cause of the adverseconsequences that have been associated withinsertions of information technologies. As a result, risksare reduced and the ability to recognize and takeadvantage of opportunities is increased.

This discussion is followed by a proposed strategy fortransformation, one that is believed to address theissues associated with anticipated and unanticipated,intended and unintended consequences. Next is anexamination of how to measure progress towardtransformation and assess the value associated withthis progress. Some of the key characteristicsassociated with transformation, suggested milestones

5Chapter 1

along the way, and metrics that are related to progressand value are provided for the reader’s consideration.

The next section discusses what is required in aTransformation Roadmap. A section that identifiescritical research areas that are not receiving adequateattention follows.

The book concludes with the thought that whileadverse unintended consequences are an inevitableby-product of transformation, this fact should not deterus from encouraging and embracing change.

1The original text was synchronized operations. The change toeffects recognizes the work that has been done since 1995 oneffects-based operations. The CCRP is preparing to release abook on EBO by Dr. Edward A. Smith: From Network-Centric toEffects-Based Operations.

7

CHAPTER 2

Background andPurpose

DoD is fully committed to taking advantage ofInformation Age concepts and technologies.1 2

Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 specifically focus on thepower of information as an enabler of combat power.Network Centric Warfare3 (NCW) translates thesebroad vision statements into a way ahead. NCW is aset of warfighting concepts4 designed to create andleverage information. Network Centric Warfare is, asthe opening line of the NCW Report to the Congressstates, “no less than the embodiment of anInformation Age transformation of the DoD.”5 NCWhas been called “the emerging theory of war” and is,in any number of its various manifestations, beingadopted by organizations throughout the DoD. NCWis the organizing principle that guides the military’sadoption of information technologies and itsadaptation to these technologies.

The tenets of NCW are:6

1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing.


2. Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness.

3. Shared situational awareness enables self- synchronization.

4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.

Thus, NCW involves both:

• The provision of vastly increased access toinformation at all echelons, and

• A redefinition of the relationships amongparticipants in a mission and betweencommanders and subordinates.

The full implications and consequences of achievinga robustly networked force and of adopting network-centric concepts of operation will, of course, not beclear for years to come.

The analysis that formed the kernel of this book wasinitiated in 1995 as a result of concerns expressed bythe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff7 regardingthe unintended consequences of providing broaderand deeper access to information. Implicit in thoseconcerns are uncertainties about the impact ofseparating information flows from the commandstructure and the effects of almost unlimited amountsof information upon decisionmaking. Questions wereraised regarding exactly how much information shouldbe provided to each echelon. It is interesting to notethat this question (articulated in 1995) assumes a

9Chapter 2

“push” paradigm that is now out of step8 with currentthinking about information dissemination.

The appropriate command concepts for a robustlynetworked force and an information-rich battlefieldhave, as yet, not been fully determined, nor will theybe for some time to come. Concerns have been raisedregarding the potential adverse effects of increasedvisibility into operations at all levels, including theincreased potential for information overload, secondguessing, micro-management, stifling of initiatives,and distraction.

A separate but related set of concerns involves themanner in which our potential adversaries adopt andutil ize Information Age technologies and thecapabilities that result. A final set of concerns involvesour ability to protect information and information assetsfor our own use and to deny our enemies the sameadvantage and to deal with failures of anddegradations in the systems that provide informationto decisionmakers, shooters, and others with crucialroles. There has been a tendency to focus on thecommander as the sole decisionmaker in bothcommand and control analyses and in developingrequirements for command and control systems. NCWinherently involves decisions taken across thebattlespace in support of command intent, wheredecisions are characterized by a greater degree offreedom than is normally associated with a traditionalapproach to command and control. Therefore, it is nowrecognized that there are many decisionmakers in thebattlespace that need to be explicitly considered inorder to understand the behavior of the force.


The purpose of this book is to articulate a strategy forintroducing and using Information Age technologiesthat accomplishes two things:

1. The identification and avoidance of adverse unintended consequences; and

2. The ability to recognize and capitalize on unexpected opportunities.

The DoD’s experimentation with informationtechnologies and NCW concepts has shown that bothpitfalls and opportunities are present. Experience todate with emerging technologies and experience inapplying the principles of NCW highlight the need andthe importance of being able to rapidly andsystematically identify and avoid pitfalls, seizeopportunities that result from vastly improvedinformation, and the ability to get it to the right people,at the right times, in the right forms.9

Given that potential adversaries have access tovirtually the same information and informationtechnologies that we have,10 the margin for victory willbe determined by our success in effecting DoD’sInformation Age transformation. Our ability to integratea wide variety of systems into a true system ofsystems11 will depend not only upon our technical skills,but also upon how well we adapt our processes,doctrine, organizations, and culture to take advantageof the opportunities that technology affords. Oursuccess will depend not upon our technical prowess,but on our ability to adapt and leverage the capabilitiesprovided by technology.

11Chapter 2

This book addresses not only the nature of theadaptation that is thought to be required, but also theprocess of transformation itself. Transformation is notan endstate, but a process; a process that is drivenby changes in environment (threats and opportunities)¸fueled by innovation, and paced by institutional andcultural constraints. Transformation is not aboutsomething that will happen sometime in the future(beyond the Five-Year Defense Program).Transformation can and should be about what we donow and in the future. There is much we can do withthe means at our disposal if we can change ourmindsets, attitudes, and relationships. As time goesby, more and more variables will become controllableand we will have more means to apply to the task oftransformation. Nevertheless, we all need to begin byfacing the first step, thinking about what transformationreally means and how we can advance the causetoday, tomorrow, and beyond. The aim is to helpprepare us for the journey ahead.

1“Message of the Secretary of Defense.” Annual Report to thePresident and the Congress. Defense Secretary William S.Cohen. 2001.2Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report toCongress. July 2001. p. 2-1.3Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein.Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging InformationSuperiority. Washington, DC: CCRP. August 1999. p. 2.4Although expressed in warfighting terms, the basic concepts ofNCW apply more broadly to all manners of military operations.The term network-centric operations has been used in this regard.5Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report toCongress. July 2001. p. i.6Ibid. p. i.7The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time was GeneralJohn Shalikashvili.


8It is now widely accepted that a “pull” paradigm is moreappropriate for reasons that are discussed later in this book.9Information Superiority has many definitions. A popular one is“getting the right information to the right people, at the right times,and in the right forms, while denying adversaries the ability to dothe same.” This has been taken by some to imply (mistakenly) apush orientation. It is an end to be sought.10During the operations in Afghanistan, there was concern thatcommercial imagery of the AOR would compromise U.S. Forcesand operations. This imagery was kept out of adversary handsby an arrangement that provided the DoD with exclusive rightsto this imagery. While this stopgap measure may have workedin this case, it is certain that in the future, more and moreinformation will flow to potential adversaries.11I prefer the term federation of systems. See: Krygiel, AnnetteJ. Behind the Wizard’s Curtain: An Integration Environment for aSystem of Systems. Washington, DC: CCRP. July 1999. p. 40.

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CHAPTER 3

Reflections

S ince 1995, many of the ideas contained in theUnintended Consequences of Information Age

Technologies have taken root or at least have beenwidely discussed. The current leadership of DoD hasdone much to signal their interest and commitment totransformation. The need for vastly increasedinformation sharing and collaboration is beingrecognized. The need to move (and move quickly) toa “post before use” paradigm and from a push- to apull-oriented approach to information access hasbecome a top priority of this administration. Indeed,the need for a secure, robust, and interoperableinfostructure to support NCW and the transformationof our business processes is increasingly accepted.

As evidence of this growing recognition of theimportance of information to emerging warfightingconcepts and capabilities, the recent budgets reflecta significantly increased emphasis on C4ISRcapabilities. Experimentation activities are beginningto move beyond an exercise mentality. NCW proofsof concept are beginning to accumulate and convinceeven some of the diehard skeptics. The war onterrorism has added a sense of urgency and loweredbarriers to innovation. Experiences in Bosnia,Kosovo, and Afghanistan have provided real-world


laboratories where important learning and proofs ofconcepts have occurred.

Taking Stock

Despite this demonstrable progress, there is muchmore that needs to be done to prepare DoD for thechanges that will come. A lack of understanding ofwhat transformation really means remains fairlywidespread. All too often, transformation is confusedwith modernization. All too often, transformation effortsare inwardly focused. Organizations claim that theycan transform themselves in isolation. The focus ison how we operate rather than on how we can workwith others to create opportunities for synergy. Therecognition that transformation is inherently joint andcoalition has not yet reached critical mass. In theInformation Age, jointness is not an applique but aninherent property of everything we do. In manyquarters, there is still much resistance to sharinginformation, to increasing the reach of collaboration,and to greater integration.

Unfortunately, innovation is currently stifled as muchas it is rewarded. This needs to change. A look at thetalent that leaves the military because of a perceived(and often real) lack of opportunity needs to beundertaken. Corrective measures to address this braindrain need to be expedited. Promotions based uponold core competencies do not provide the DoD withthe talent it needs in the Information Age. Moreover, itdiscourages those with the talents the DoD needs.

In the wake of September 11th, there has been arenewed sense of national pride and a desire to

15Chapter 3

serve. If we are to capitalize upon this opportunity totap a new pool of talent, we need to address theabove and other personnel-related issues (education,training, role redefinition, etc.) promptly. Being partof an historic transformation is a rare and rewardingopportunity. We need to make sure that it is this realitythat our brave and dedicated men and womenexperience rather than frustrating bouts withentrenched bureaucrats.

Many DoD processes are consensual by custom.Disruptive innovation and consensual change are notoften compatible. When it comes to any significantchange, there will be groups of advocates, earlyadopters, late adopters, and resisters to the end.Unpleasant as it is, leadership needs to root out theresisters and prod the late adopters, while supportingand protecting the advocates and early adopters.

It has been often been pointed out that peacetimemilitaries and wartime militaries behave verydifferently. Increasingly, the types of warfare that weare experiencing and can expect in the future blur thedistinctions between war and peace. Since September11th, we have been at war. We need to make thisrealization widespread and tie transformation to oursuccess in this war effort.

Engineering vs. Innovation

Increasingly, I see evidence of a belief by some thatwe can engineer everything, even innovation, whichis heavily cultural. Engineering involves the“application of scientific principles to practical ends.”1

Hence, engineering is an applied science. The basic


assumption is that there is a body of laws, knowledge,experience, and tools that the engineer can apply.Innovation is something “new and unusual.”2 Thusthere is, as yet, no established body of knowledge,laws, or experience to apply. Yet there are many whostill approach innovation in the same way that theywould engineer a system. The result is, at best,incremental improvements that fail to fully realize thepotential of Information Age technologies.

Our requirements processes have this engineeringflavor. They assume we know what the requirementsare and can state them with the necessary precisionneeded for an engineered solution.3 There is still avery important role for engineering in thetransformation. This role is to turn the systemcapabilities called for in a coevolved military capabilitypackage concept into a fielded reality. The focus ofour engineering talents needs to be directed to thedevelopment of prototyping environments and waysto turn engineering prototypes into operationalprototypes, and then into products.

Even on their home turf (systems), engineers willincreasingly be up against the limits of their art andtheir practice. This is because, in a robustly networkedworld, the environments in which systems need tooperate are more and more outside of the control ofany organization and its engineers. “Systems ofsystems” is a description of this reality. However, somehave understood this to mean that we can engineer asystem of systems. This is not the reality of theInformation Age. The collection of systems we use toaccomplish our tasks are far from a neatly engineeredsystem of systems, rather they are a federation of

17Chapter 3

systems. That is, we are really looking at a collection ofsystems where individual systems have equal, peer-to-peer relationships with one another, but are unitedfor mutual benefit.

Engineers are not the only ones who like and demandspecifications upfront. Almost everyone in the long listof decisionmakers that are involved in creating andmanaging a DoD activity or program wants to know,with far more precision than is possible, what they arebuying, approving, managing, and testing. They havebeen raised to focus on the product. It is difficult forpeople whose entire careers have been centeredaround the specification of a product to refocus theirattention instead on the process that produces theproduct. However, this change in perspective is keyto DoD transformation. Instead of investing in a longlist of products (programs), the DoD must reorientmindsets and existing processes to focus on thepeople and the processes that can and will producetransformational capabilities.

Transformation and Value

The move from the Industrial Age to the InformationAge has changed the relative values associated withthe sources of wealth: land, labor, and capital. In theInformation Age, land has relatively less value4 than itdid before, continuing a trend that began with thetransition from an agrarian to an industrial society. Thevalue of labor has remained high, but it is a differentkind of labor that is in demand. Physical labor hasbeen greatly devalued, but the value of intellectuallabor, or what we call intellectual capital, has greatly


increased. The relative value of capital has, like land,been diminished because it now requires less capitalto enter into Information Age markets, developinformation-related products, and distribute them. Inmany ways, the Information Age has brought equalopportunity to the marketplace by lowering thepreviously high barriers to entry that resulted from theneed to have enough land and capital to make aventure successful. Not only have cost-related barriersbeen lowered, but geographic barriers as well. Onecan now participate in, for example, the software sectorof the economy from literally anywhere on earth.

It stands to reason that the values associated with themilitary equivalents of land, labor, and capital are alsoin flux. Hence, the Information Age has not onlyaffected the relative importance of the sources ofwealth, changing the dynamics of wealth creation andmaintenance, but it has also altered the relativeimportance of the sources of combat power.

The move to Network Centric Warfare, the militaryembodiment of Information Age concepts andtechnologies, is redefining the basic sources ofcombat power, enhancing the value of some things,and devaluing others. Maneuver, mass, surprise,firepower, and logistics have for centuries been thecoins of the military realm. Surprise remains a keyasset. But in the Information Age, information istransforming both the concepts of mass andmaneuver, redefining firepower, and greatlysimplifying logistics. Information can, in effect, bedirectly substituted in the “manufacture” of each ofthese capabilities.

19Chapter 3

The massing of forces is being transformed into amassing of effects (without the physical movement).Maneuver is less and less about being able to get asizable amount of men and material somewhere in ahurry and more and more about either being pre-positioned correctly or about being able to have smallgroups move successfully on a nonlinear battlefield.The mass previously associated with firepower is beingincreasingly replaced with precision, made possibleby information. Logistics has been greatly simplifiedby the de-massing of the force and by increasinglycurrent and complete information.

Just as the dramatically changed relative values ofland, labor, and capital have affected business modelsand organizations and the values they place on variouscorporate capabilities, NCW is changing the valuesassociated with DoD investment choices. Somecapabilities (and the processes and assets associatedwith these capabilities) are increasing in relative valuewhile other aspects of a mission capability packageare decreasing in relative value.

These changes are all about the marginal return oninvestment (ROI). For example, given that the DoDhas a certain mix of assets in the inventory, what futureinvestment strategy will result in the greatest overallreturn? In the Information Age, the answer (withincreasing frequency) is increased investment ininformation-related capabilities. Depending on thesituation, this investment could be in collecting,processing, displaying, or disseminating, or anycombination of these.


A critic might ask, “Given that information has alwaysbeen important in warfare, why suddenly does it makesense to invest relatively more in information than othermilitary assets?” The answer is very simple. TheInformation Age has changed the economics ofinformation, making it far less expensive to attaingreater richness and reach for a given investment.This change in the economics of information makes itrelatively cheaper than platforms or personnel. This,in turn, then makes the ROI for a dollar spent oninformation greater than it was before.

But, it is imperative that we remember that aninvestment in information will not realize its potentialvalue without corresponding changes in organization,doctrine, materiel, and approaches to command andcontrol. The need to change the way we do business(to take advantage of the opportunities that InformationAge technologies afford) is often given lip service, butall too often these necessary changes in otherelements of the mission capability packages arestrongly resisted in practice. The changes that areresisted the most are changes to command approachand organizational arrangements. These changes arethe ones that have the most profound effects on ROI.The result is that the potential value of investments ininformation are not recognized and if they are, theyare not fully realized.

Traditions die hard. It needs to be remembered thatour traditional approach to organizations, doctrine, andcommand and control have evolved in the marketplaceas a function of the economics of warfare. Now thatthe economics have changed, we need to let themarketplace, not tradition, dictate how we fight,

21Chapter 3

command, organize, equip, and train. We need tojudge traditions dispassionately. Not all traditions areworth keeping.

Thus, changes in the economics of warfare will resultin a reordering of the returns on investment associatedwith different defense capabilities. The investmentchoices that are being devalued, as a result of theInformation Age, include: non-networked, non-interoperable platforms, sensors, systems, commandorganizations, facilities, personal assets that representhigh-value targets to an adversary,5 massive liftcapabilities, heavy units, traditional doctrine, exercises,traditional planning processes, the push paradigm, andsome core competencies.

One could argue that the primary source of oppositionto transformation comes from those organizations andindividuals that find that their current capabilities arebeing devalued. They mistakenly think that they arebeing devalued. These individuals and organizationscould increase their value by developing and adoptingnew capabilities and core competencies that are abetter response to the emerging national securityenvironment and that support the conduct of NCW.

Stand-alone platforms will become less and lessimportant because the value of platforms in NCW isnot determined by their ability to operate independently,but by their ability to operate as part of a team.Therefore, to stay relevant, today’s platforms will needto become fully “net ready,” sharing the information theycollect with others, and self-synchronizing their actionswith other network nodes based upon command6 intent.Platforms will no longer belong to a particular


organization, but be fully joint, with their assets beingtasked collaboratively.

New platforms will need to be designed to be betteradapted to the emerging threat environment. Astoday’s platforms become vulnerable, high-valuetargets, tomorrow’s platforms will need to be smaller,more stealthy, and less costly so that they can beproliferated in large numbers and usefully deployedin swarms.

Doctrine now significantly lags behind developmentson the battlefield. Exploring new network-centricconcepts with existing doctrine as a point of departureconstrains the imagination. Why? Experiments andactual operations must be the source of emergingdoctrine, not the recipients of its wisdom. Institutionswhose bureaucratic raison d’être is to produce doctrineneed to re-examine how they can best contribute tothe transformation.

Everyone needs to take a fresh look at what theyshould consider to be their core competencies. Manywill find that some of their traditional competenciesare no longer as valuable as they once were and thatthey need to develop new competencies. In addition,everyone will need to master new competencies thatare essential to Information Age organizations. Theseinclude sharing of information, quickly and efficientlypulling information from a federation of systems,collaboration, and self-synchronization.

1Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary. New York: HoughtonMifflin Company. 1996.2Ibid.

23Chapter 3

3AFCEA Study Team. Evolutionary Acquisition Study. Fairfax,VA: AFCEA, June 7, 1993.4The term relatively less value is easily misunderstood. It shouldnot be taken to mean that land, as a commodity, is worth lessthan before in absolute terms. Rather this expression meansthat, as a determination of wealth, land has lost its relativeinfluence, that is, it is less important than before as a source ofwealth.5Many have foreseen the day when no one will be able to affordto field high-value targets because they will be too difficult toconceal and defend given the proliferation of Information Agecapabilities.6NCW involves a shift in focus from the idea of commander’sintent to a concept of command intent. This reflects the verynotion of NCW and a recognition that today’s missions areinherently coalition and so complex that the very sense of whatthe mission is all about is derived from more than any singleindividual, but rather the congruent intent of a variety ofdecisionmakers.

25

CHAPTER 4

Dealing with theChallenges of Change

There is always an upside and a downside tochange. Often there is no real choice; an

individual or organization must change to prosper oreven to survive. Clearly, the first order of business isto recognize that change is needed. The second isto understand in broad terms the nature of the changethat is required. Finally, there is the task ofundertaking change.

For over a decade, there has been a fairly widespreadrecognition that DoD needs to change. But, of course,there has been a vigorous debate regarding the degreeand nature of the change required. In recent years,there has been a growing recognition of the need toshift our focus from traditional combat to other partsof the mission spectrum. Also in recent years, thetheory of NCW was developed, and in a relatively shorttime, has captured the imagination of many throughoutthe DoD and, indeed, the world. Thus, to some extent,the step of understanding the nature of the changerequired has been taken.

The DoD has begun, with joint and Serviceexperimentation,1 to take the third step. However,review of these activities2 3 reveals that all too often,


new information capabilities are examined withexisting, minimally modified concepts of operation andprocesses, or at best paired with someone’s a prioriidea of the solution. What are not fully recognized orappreciated are the enormous gains that can beachieved through exploration and discovery of newways of doing business, particularly if they are notconstrained by tradition or prevailing wisdom. Whilethe results of NCW-related experimentation to datehave been impressive (100 percent or more increasesin measures associated with combat power4), theybarely scratch the surface of what is possible.

Some argue that the problems and risks associatedwith change (certainly change in something as timetested as command and control) can be addressedsimply by avoiding significant changes. Othersadvocate that any changes should be introducedslowly and systematically, thoroughly testing proposedalterations until the probability of error is acceptablylow. In many circumstances, these very conservativeapproaches may be appropriate. Given that our newadversaries have not remained static and aredisplaying a capacity to think asymmetrically with greatinnovation to circumvent our strengths and attack ourweaknesses, a conservative approach to change willnot adequately prepare us for the challenges ahead.

The events of September 11, 2001, have clearlyfocused attention on the need to deal with the fullmission spectrum and have moved us from spiriteddebate to spirited action. These events demonstratedconclusively that, despite considerable investmentsover the years in collection and intelligence assets,we were not able to develop sufficient situation

27Chapter 4

awareness. A part of the problem is that we neednew kinds of collectors. But perhaps moreimportantly, we need a way to ensure that we bring agreater variety of expertise, experience, andperspective to the information that we have.Information technologies, most notably those relatedto information sharing, collaboration, and visualizationenable the kinds of network-centric organizations thatcan improve our ability to bring all of our informationand all of our knowledge and experience to bear. Aswe will face more and more situations that areunfamiliar to us, our ability to do this becomes moreand more important.

Prior to September 11th, we seemed preoccupied withthe risks associated with change. Since September11th, there has been increased recognition that afailure to embrace change carries with it its own set ofrisks and that these risks are significant. Thus, we arefaced with the task of balancing different kinds of risks.

Preoccupation with the problem of avoiding ormitigating any adverse unintended consequencesinherent in the adoption of information technologies isas harmful as proceeding with a disregard forunintended consequences. Care must be taken toadopt an approach to transformational change that isenabling, rather than limiting. The DoD is not in aposition to take the apparently safe and comfortableslow road to the introduction of change. Theenvironment in which we must operate is beingtransformed in a number of critical dimensions.Consequently, business as usual (the default decision)carries with it significant adverse consequences of its


own. Thus, doing little or nothing turns out to be neitherconservative nor safe.

The low cost of obtaining Information Age technologieswill help potential adversaries improve their militarycapabilit ies as they learn to leverage thesetechnologies effectively. Thus, inaction will lead downa path that exposes us to new and improved adversarycapabilities that we may not be able to countereffectively without changes of our own. In addition, afailure to take advantage of opportunities to improvecost effectiveness translates into less capability nomatter what increases are likely in the defense budget.

The pace of the advances in information technologiesand their adoption make it imperative that our approachto change must be capable of keeping pace or it isdoomed to failure from the start. In addition, we mustrecognize that there are two kinds of risks associatedwith the selection of an approach to change. In additionto the widely recognized risks associated with adverseconsequences, there are the risks associated with thefailure to recognize and capitalize on unexpectedopportunities to do things more effectively andefficiently. Thus, risk management becomes the nameof the game because risk avoidance is not possible.

Since we cannot stop, slow down, or control the paceof innovation in the information domain or totallyprevent the unintended consequences associated withthese innovations, we must introduce and adapt toinformation technologies using a strategy that:

• Identifies and anticipates negative repercussionsand enables us to avoid those repercussions orminimize their impacts;

29Chapter 4

• Recognizes and takes advantage of unexpectedopportunities; and

• Balances the risks associated with the failure toachieve these two objectives.

This strategy must also be capable of facilitatingchange fast enough to keep pace with exogenousforces impacting technologies and technologies’adoption by potential adversaries.

A transformation strategy designed to fully leverageinformation and information technologies requiresalterations in our concepts of operation, doctrine,organizations, and force structure. Associatedchanges in logistics, education, and training will alsobe required. Without the coevolution—meaningconcurrent changes in each of these elementsnecessary to field a real capability—we will only obtainincremental5 improvements in effectiveness andefficiency while foreclosing opportunities for the orderof magnitude improvements necessary to maintain thewinning edge.

1It should be noted that JFCOM’s experimentation organizationwas only stood up 2 years ago.2Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes, and DavidA. Signori. Understanding Information Age Warfare. Washington,DC: CCRP. August 2001. p. 285.3Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report toCongress. July 2001. p. 7-1.4Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report toCongress. July 2001. p. 8-1.5Actually, in some cases organizations may become dysfunctionalbecause a mismatch between the person best equipped to makea decision by virtue of information availability is not the persondoctrinally vested with the authority.

31

CHAPTER 5

Information TechnologyImpacts on the

Warfighter

Information technologies, for the purposes of thisanalysis, include collection, processing, display, and

communications technologies. Processing technologiesinclude data fusion and analysis, as well as support fordecisionmaking and sensemaking, such as knowledge-based expert systems and systems that supportcognition. Display technologies include visualizationtools and techniques.

Advances in these technologies have resulted in anenormous amount of near real-time information beingpotentially available to individuals anywhere at anytime.The intelligence level of systems and our confidence intheir ability has also increased dramatically to the pointwhere life-and-death decisions are now routinely beingmade automatically by computers, albeit with varyingdegrees of human supervision.

Even at this early point in the Information Age, thebattlefield is awash with vastly improved quality andincreased amounts of information. The dynamics ofinformation dissemination have changed considerably


in the latter half of the 20th century, from flowingprimarily through organizational hierarchies orcommand structures to the point where significantamounts of information are obtained outside of thesevertical flows and increasingly from non-DoD sources.Thus, what was once predominantly a highlyconstrained and vertical information flow has evolvedinto a mix of vertical and horizontal flows that extendsbeyond the DoD.

And more, much more is still to come. Networking andwireless technologies have untethered us bothorganizationally and geographically. We are on theverge of “Internet 3.0,”1 which incorporates a set ofdistributed capabilities (processing, storage, networkservices, and collaborative environments) that enablepeer-to-peer (P2P) and dynamically reconfigurablesmall group interactions (collaborations).

The FY03 DoD Budget provides for a major increasein C4ISR-related capabilities that will, in about adecade when combined with progress in the privatesector, effectively eliminate bandwidth as a constraint.As our ability to share information increases, eachparticipant in a military mission will gain more and moreaccess to information.

Solutions to dealing with today’s information flowswill not necessarily work with tomorrow’s vastlyincreased flows. The amount, quality, and dynamicsof information dissemination have already begun toimpact the ways decisions are allocated (delegation)and the manner in which those decisions are made.NCW is all about changing decisionmaking processesand topologies. It involves moving from an Industrial

33Chapter 5

Age model, where information is collected at theedges and moved to the center for decisionmaking,to an Information Age model, where the edge isempowered to make decisions based upon commandintent and high quality situation awareness. Theeffectiveness of an Industrial Age organizationdepends upon the decisionmaking ability of oneperson (or a small number of persons) at the centerand the ability to parse and communicate decisions,in the form of guidance, to subordinates such thattheir actions are synchronized. Thus, centralizeddeliberate planning has been the traditional focus ofcommand and control systems. Early in theInformation Age, information technologies wereemployed to incrementally improve this traditionalcommand and control process. With NCW, there hasbeen a focus on replacing the traditional commandmodel with a new one—one based upon self-synchronization enabled by shared awareness.2 3

Thus (as shown in Figure 1), advances in informationtechnologies provide us with significant opportunitiesboth to improve our ability to command and controlour forces and to improve our force capabilities.

34Inform

ation Age T

ransformation

Figure 1. The New Environment

35Chapter 5

Our information-related vulnerabilities have alsoincreased. Increased reliance on high-tech systemsfor information collection, interpretation, processing,analysis, communication, and display has madefailures in these systems more disruptive. Theubiquitous nature of these technologies provides ourpotential adversaries with capabilities that help themunderstand how to attack our information assets andgive them the tools to do so. Our command and controlsystems can no longer be evaluated using measuresof merit (MOMs) related solely to the production ofquality information in a timely manner. It is nowimportant to consider such attributes as availability,integrity, and authenticity of the information, its easeof use, and its value-added for decisionmaking.

Command and control has long been a recognizedforce multiplier,4 and improvements in informationtechnologies offer tremendous opportunities to perfectexisting approaches and explore new ones. Quicker,better decisions will allow us to operate moreeffectively within the enemy’s decision cycle, providingus with an opportunity to control engagements. Thisis referred to as the speed of command. Improvementsin information technologies also enhance thecapabilities of our weapons, providing them withincreased standoff capability and accuracy.Experiences in Afghanistan have shown that whenforces can interoperate in new and innovative ways,good things happen. The key battle of Mazar-e-Sharifwas, in the words of the Secretary of Defense, acombination “of the ingenuity of the U.S. SpecialForces, the most advanced, precision-guidedmunitions in the U.S. arsenal delivered by U.S. Navy,


Air Force, and Marine Corps crews, and the courageof valiant one-legged Afghan fighters on horseback.”5

But the opportunities that new, improved, andinteroperable weapons and command and controlsystems offer cannot be successfully exploited unlesswe rethink our concepts of operations and our approachto command and control, change processes, doctrine,and organizational structures, and provide the requiredpersonnel the education, training, and experiences theyneed. This theme was stressed in a speech thatSecretary Rumsfeld gave to students at the NationalDefense University in which he said, “A revolution inmilitary affairs is about more than building new high-tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It’s alsoabout new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting.”6

Dealing with disruptive innovation7 8 is, to many, adaunting prospect. But, as the remainder of this bookwill show, we have no alternative but to treat theadoption of new information-related capabilitiesholistically, that is, to consider them in a missioncapability package context.

A major issue is the pace of change expressed, forexample, by Moore’s Law.9 With new capabilitiesbeing available so quickly, how can we possibly learnto effectively use these capabilities before they, inturn, become obsolete? The answer lies in atransformation strategy that anticipates technology,rather than trails technology. This approach isconcept-driven rather than technology-driven. We donot have to wait for improvements in technology toactually occur before considering new approachesto command and control, concepts of operation,doctrine, or organizational arrangements. Quite the

37Chapter 5

contrary, if we wait, the inertia associated withdeveloping and implementing these changes willkeep us permanently behind the power curve. Thisdoes not imply that changes in command and controlor force capabilities must necessarily precedealterations to concepts of operation or doctrine.

In reality, these elements (e.g., concept of operations,doctrine, technology, etc.) constitute a package that,taken as a whole, provides real operational capabilitythat can be applied in a specific mission. A mission-specific perspective is important because noorganizational structure or approach to command andcontrol is going to be well-suited for the range of likelymissions; missions as diverse as traditional majortheater wars (MTWs), small-scale contingencies,counter-terrorism, and peace operations. Newmeasures of merit (MOMs) will be required that mustbe mission-related. For example, classic measures,such as attrition or taking and holding territory, arenot relevant in many mission contexts. In addition tothe need to employ metrics that reflect success innontraditional missions (e.g., normalcy indicators forOOTW), the very broad spectrum of missions that themilitary may be called upon to undertake and theuncertainties associated with them give rise to a needfor metrics that reflect agility.10

1Fagin, Robert and Chris Kwak. Internet Infrastructure andServices. Bear Stearns, May 2001.2Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein.Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging InformationSuperiority. Washington, DC: CCRP. August 1999. pp. 6, 36,66.


3Alberts, David S. The Unintended Consequences of InformationAge Technologies: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Seizing the Initiative.Washington, DC: National Defense University. April 1996. p. 40.4Ibid. p. 279.5Jim Garamone. “Flexibility, Adaptability at Heart of MilitaryTransformation.” American Forces Press Service. Jan 31, 2002.6CNN: http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/31/rumsfeld.speech/index.html. January 31, 2002.7Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report toCongress. July 2001. pp. 12-14.8Alberts, David S. The Unintended Consequences of InformationAge Technologies: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Seizing the Initiative.Washington, DC: National Defense University. April 1996. pp.63-4.9The observation that the logic density of silicon integrated circuitshas closely followed the curve (bits per square inch) = 2^(t - 1962)where t is time in years; that is, the amount of information storableon a given amount of silicon has roughly doubled every year sincethe technology was invented. This relation, first uttered in 1964 bysemiconductor engineer Gordon Moore (who co-founded Intel 4years later) held until the late 1970s, at which point the doublingperiod slowed to 18 months.10See discussion “Measuring Agility” in Chapter 10, MeasuringTransformation Progress and Value.

39

CHAPTER 6

Nature of Future War

Future war can be envisioned as consisting of threegeneral classes of activities. First, there is the

perfection of traditional combat. Second, there is theevolution of what has been called nontraditionalmissions, a very mixed bag of activities includinghumanitarian assistance, SOLIC (Special Operationsand Low Intensity Conflict) operations, counter-drugoperations, peace operations, and counter-proliferation. Third, there is the birth of a form of warunique to the Information Age.

Information technology will not only change the natureof what we know today as war and operations otherthan war (OOTW), but also will spawn a new set ofactivities that will become familiar to future generationsas constituting warfare in the 21st century. Today wemight have some difficulty in viewing this set ofactivities as war or as the concern or responsibility ofmilitaries. Current planning and budgeting approaches,as well as research and development activities, find itdifficult to address these aspects of the future sincethey are not extensions of existing military missionsand responsibilities. However, in each of these threecases, information technologies and the adaptationsto the capabilities they provide will shape thebattlespace and redefine the possibilities.


Future Traditional Combat

The future conventional battlespace will be neithercontiguous nor orderly. Tempo will be extraordinarilyhigh by today’s standards. Given expectedimprovements in weapons and command and control,if a target can be seen, it can be destroyed. It shouldbe noted that, more than ever, simply being able todestroy a target does not mean that one should doso. A variety of other considerations will determinethe appropriate action to take. Some of theseconsiderations will be the possibility of collateraldamage, the link between the target and the effectsdesired, and the availability of non-lethal means.Survival of targets will depend upon organic defensivecapabilities, suppression, and stealth. Concepts ofoperation will center around massing effects1 ratherthan forces.

Command and control involves dynamic tradeoffsbetween ensuring that Rules of Engagement (ROE)are followed, prioritizing targets, and minimizing thetime required for shooters to pull the information theyneed.2 While commanders will have the ability to exertmore direct influence on shaping the battlespace, theymay wish to not exercise this option. NCW theoryargues that, in certain kinds of situations, it is moreeffective to opt for a network-centric or self-synchronizing approach with the commander focusedon influencing the initial conditions of the engagementrather than micromanaging it. If the experience of otherorganizations holds, staffs (as we now know them)will be significantly reduced (and decentralized) asorganizational structures flatten. Many commands willbe automatically disseminated and incorporated in

41Chapter 6

decision aids. Many decisions will be fully automated.Virtually all information will be distributed horizontally.In short, many significant changes will need to be madein the way we think about command and control torespond to the challenges of the Information Age. Withthis much change foreseen down the road, care mustbe exercised to ensure success, even for the set ofmissions that we know best.

Evolution of Nontraditional Missions

Since the end of the Cold War, the nation has lookedto the DoD not only to reduce overall spending,3 butalso to undertake a more diverse set of roles, both athome and around the globe. The unique capabilitiesdeveloped by the U.S. military to meet the globalchallenge posed by the Soviet Union and maintainedto protect U.S. interests around the world are seenas national assets that can be employed beyond theirtraditional combat and combat service support roles.Global air- and sea-lift are important for disaster relief,crisis intervention, humanitarian assistance, andsupport to peace operations. Similarly, the secureglobal communications capacity of the U.S. militaryis a crucial asset in a wide range of situations. Thecapability of the military to surge from its trainingbases and to react rapidly when dangerous situationsarise far exceeds the capacities of most civilianagencies for whom surge capacity is a slow andcumbersome process and crisis response is an alienpractice.4 These unique capabilities, combined withthe absence of an urgent, traditional military threathave, until September 11, 2001, caused the nationto expect greater involvement by the DoD in


nontraditional missions such as humanitarianassistance, maintaining law and order when local andstate authorities cannot, disaster relief, as well ascountering drug smuggling and the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction. The events ofSeptember 11, 2001, have shifted the priority fromtraditional combat to terrorism and dealing withnations that host and support terrorists. The DoD, asits first priority, must focus on the nexus of terror andWMD. Clearly, this is very different from a focus ontraditional combat and will require changes that gowell beyond those that are involved in anyadaptations to Information Age technologies.

The international environment has also changed inways that make nontraditional missions more likelyand more diverse. Coalition operations are now theaccepted norm rather than the exception. Internationalorganizations, particularly the United Nations, havebecome increasingly assertive and have pressed avision of global interests in peace and cooperation.As the only remaining global superpower, the UnitedStates is expected to respond whenever internationalpeace and harmony are threatened and the nationsof the world feel action is needed. This has beeninterpreted to mean that the U.S. must lead when thepeace is threatened, international crimes arecommitted, or human tragedy looms.

Parochial clashes and conflicts undercut this growinginternationalism. Freed from the smotheringconstraints of communist governments, nationalmovements in Eastern Europe and the formerU.S.S.R. have proven willing to challenge the peaceto seek independence. Clans and tribes in Africa have

43Chapter 6

reasserted their interests, sometimes violently. Asiais the site of arms races and uncertain relationsbetween nations. Domestic and internationalstruggles for the long-term control of the Middle Eastoil wealth and the worldwide resurgence offundamentalist Islam add to the dangerousinternational situation. Drug traffickers present afrustrating cross-border challenge. Recent attentionhas also focused on confl icts arising fromenvironmental issues, particularly disputes over waterrights, ocean areas, and transnational air pollution.

Perhaps most important, media coverage and recentsuccesses have led to very high expectations aboutthe performance of the U.S. military. Minimizingcasualties, among both combat forces and civilians,is widely perceived as an important and achievablegoal. At the same time, the military is expected tobe effective by accomplishing missions preciselyand quickly.

Warfare in the Information Domain

As the global society enters the Information Age,military operations are inevitably impacted andtransformed. Satellite communications, videoteleconferencing, battlefield facsimile machines, digitalcommunications systems, personal computers, theGlobal Positioning System, and dozens of othertransforming tools are already commonplace.

At the same time that the DoD has infused thesetechnological advances into operations at an ever-increasing rate, the DoD has gone from being thedriving force in information technology to being a


specialty user. The DoD, by policy and by necessity,f inds i tse l f in a new s i tuat ion, re ly ing oncommercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology inorder to acquire and field cost-effective systems.The widespread proliferation of Information Agetechnology, as well as the DoD’s increased relianceon COTS products, has contributed to a significantincrease in our vulnerability.

The implications of warfare in the information arena(cyberspace) are enormous.5 First, national homelandsare no longer sanctuaries by virtue of convention,distance, geography, or terrain. Physical borders aremeaningless in cyberspace. Homelands and citizenscan be attacked directly and even anonymously byforeign powers, criminal organizations, or non-nationalactors such as ethnic groups, renegade corporations,or zealots. Traditional military weapons cannot beinterposed between the information warfare threat andsociety. Even where traditional combat conditions exist(hostile military forces face one another in a terrain-defined battlespace), kinetic weapons are now onlyone part of the arsenal available to the adversaries.Indeed, electronic espionage and sabotage,psychological warfare attacks delivered via massmedia,6 7 digital deception, and hacker attacks on theadversaries’ command and control systems have beenused and will increasingly be used to neutralizetraditional forces and contribute in their own right to aconcentration of effects at the crucial time and placein the battlespace.

Warfare in the Information Age will require enormouslycomplex planning and coordination, very near real-time, vastly improved situation awareness, and the

45Chapter 6

ability to share this awareness. Decision supportsystems will be required to filter and fuse8 informationvery rapidly to provide common operational pictures(COPs)9 and perform simple plan extensions andrevisions almost automatically. Massive database andinformation exchange capabilities will be needed totrack both friendly and enemy situations as well asrehearse and forecast battlespace dynamics.

Accordingly, our dependence on information and thesystems that produce it, carry it, and provide accessto it will continue to grow. This reality of an ever-increasing dependence on information means that theU.S. military must be able to:

1. Protect its own information systems;

2. Attack and influence the information systems of its adversaries; and

3. Leverage U.S. information advantages to gain a competitive advantage in the domain of national security.

1The word fires was used in the original text. The word effectshas been substituted here to reflect current thinking re: effects-based operations. It can no longer be assumed that thedestruction of targets is an end unto itself.2The original manuscript called for “minimizing the time requiredto pass information from sensor to shooter.” I have changed thisbecause of the inherent shortcomings of a push-orientation. In anetwork-centric environment, a pull philosophy works better.3Since the events of 9/11, the budget climate has changedconsiderably. But then, so too have the challenges. It could beargued that even with significantly more funds, the DoD will behard pressed to prepare for and meet all of the challenges ahead.4Hayes, Margaret Daly and Gary F. Wheatley, eds. Interagencyand Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A


Case Study. Washington, DC: National Defense University.February 1996.5Alberts, David S. Defensive Information Warfare. Washington,DC: National Defense University. August 1996.6Combelles Siegel, Pascale. Target Bosnia: IntegratingInformation Activities in Peace Operations. Washington, DC:CCRP and National Defense University. January 1998.7Wentz, Larry, ed. Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience.Washington, DC: CCRP and National Defense University. April1998. pp. 167-187.8In many instances, and perhaps the rule rather than theexception, the push philosophy implied by “filter and fuse” willnot work as effectively as a “post and pull” mechanism. For themoment the reader should consider the filter and fuse functionto be performed at the behest of the user of the information—asubcontractor value-added service—rather than a hierarchicalconstruct.9COPs are not really a common picture, rather they are all aboutthe consistency of the underlying data information, and the abilityto have “views” that can be tailored by participants to supporttheir different roles and responsibilities.

47

CHAPTER 7

Information AgeMilitaries

M ilitary operations in the future will be conductedby Information Age organizations. Unlike today’s

military organizations that would be reasonably familiarand comfortable to 19th-century warriors, InformationAge militaries will be more of a reflection ofcontemporary private sector organizations. InformationAge militaries will differ from 20th-century militarieswith respect to their (1) strategy, (2) degree ofintegration, and (3) approach to command and control.

Strategy

Military strategy has, until recently, been basicallysymmetric with the aim of degrading and/or defeatingan adversary’s military forces. To some extent, militaryoperations have been a separate phase in a conflictthat begins when the political leadership turns to amilitary organization and expects it to undertake andaccomplish a given military mission. Upon theconclusion of this mission (e.g., surrender of theenemy), the military retires and the political leadershiptakes over. This is not to say that civilian leadership isnot engaged during the entire military phase, but thatthe role of civilian leadership during the conduct of


military operations is more of an oversight role, not anoperational one.

Conflicts in the Information Age will not have distinctmilitary phases to the same extent as before. Militaryobjectives will need, more than ever before, to bedynamically balanced with a set of nonmilitaryobjectives and subject to a complex set of constraints.Hence, military strategy will need to adjust to being apart of a larger operation and switch to an effects-based strategy (as opposed to an attrition-basedstrategy). The term effects-based operations (EBO)is relatively recent, although one would hope thatwarfare has always been about creating effects.However, in the Industrial Age, attrition effects becamean automatic substitute for the ultimate objectives ofmilitary operations. As nontraditional military missionsbecame more commonplace, it became obvious thatnew measures of effectiveness for military operationsneeded to be developed. Enemy attrition and loss-exchange ratios were no longer useful. EBO is simplya recognition of this. Its proponents are arguing for anexplicit enunciation of the objectives of a militaryoperation, how these military objectives relate tooverall U.S. or coalition objectives, and the cause-effect relationships that link military actions to effectsto military objectives to mission objectives. Normalcyindicators, for example, may be used to ascertain whena peacekeeping mission achieves the desired effects.In these cases, military actions (e.g., patrols, weaponsconfiscation) need to be related to normalcy. Killingpeople and breaking things may, in fact, be part andparcel of an effects-based strategy, but this connectionshould not be casually assumed. Much has been

49Chapter 7

written on this change in the relationship of the militaryto conflict.1

Command and Control: Integrated Operations

While the Information Age will complicate militarystrategy, it will revolutionize military organizations andthe approach to command and control. Command andcontrol is a military term for leadership andmanagement.2 Improvements in Information Agetechnologies have changed the economics ofinformation and hence, have altered its practicalrichness, reach, and the quality of the interactionsamong individuals and groups. As a result,3 4 the natureof the fog and friction of war are being radically altered.This will enable us to move beyond the pursuit ofblunder avoidance and deconfliction to achievingsynergy on a routine basis in military operations.

Curiously, the term integration is not part of thedictionary definition of management, although itseems to me that a key component of managementlies in its ability to integrate the actions of anorganization. Information Age militaries will be ableto generate synergy because they will be betterintegrated in a number of dimensions. Thesedimensions include echelon, coalition/joint, function,time, and geography.5 The infinitive to integrate iscommonly defined6 as “to make a whole by bringingall parts together.” Military operations traditionallybreak each of the dimensions mentioned above intoparts that have for the most part not been broughttogether very well. This approach creates seams onthe battlefield that an adversary can exploit. Military


tactics recognize that the seam between units(particularly if the seam separates troops fromdifferent countries as they often did in World War II7)is a good place to attack. Information and opportunityfind the cracks in the seams irresistible.

The real challenge in command and control isintegration.8 It is about getting a number of things towork toward a common purpose in a way thatmaximizes the totality of the resources available. Thisraises an interesting point about integration. Isintegration about the means employed, or is it onlyabout the effects produced? Can an organization beintegrated without achieving integrated effects? If anorganization achieves integrated effects, is itintegrated? Take the idea that is central to InformationAge command and control, self-synchronization. Areself-synchronizing forces integrated? Thesequestions are important because they help us focusattention in the right places. I would argue that self-synchronizing forces (e.g., those that achievesynchronized results by emergent behavior9) areindeed integrated10 because, in the final analysis, theyachieve integrated effects by enabling individuals todevelop synergistic behaviors. Synchronizedbehavior can also be a product of centralized planningand execution, or of centralized planning anddecentralized execution. The way command andcontrol should be exercised in the Information Agedepends upon what actually works best in the set ofcircumstances and challenges we associate withtoday’s and tomorrow’s military missions.11

Information Age missions will be characterized by alarge degree of unfamiliarity and complexity, and by

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exacting time pressures and constraints. They willrequire rapid,12 decisive, and precise responses. Theability to rapidly respond is limited by physics unlessone shifts to an approach involving the massing ofthe desired effects rather than the massing of forces.This, in turn, means that forces can be geographicallydispersed. Dispersion of forces may result from eitherthe inability to mass physically in time or a desire tomaintain separation to avoid being an attractivetarget. Being decisive involves, among other things,being able to select the right effects and develop afeasible approach for achieving them. This requiresa high level of understanding of the situation. Precisemeans that each element or part of the force knowsif, when, and how to act and has the capability toachieve the desired effects. Rapid, decisive, andprecise responses can only be accomplished if weare able to bring all of the available information wehave to bear and all available assets to bear in atimely manner. Thus, the conditions necessary forsuccess in the Information Age revolve around anorganization characterized by information flows thatare not unduly constrained, where the key parts ofthe organization share awareness, and where actsof individual parts can be self-synchronized. Theseare characteristics that are associated with integratedprocesses. This can only be achieved by adopting anetwork-centric approach and command philosophy.

1Alberts, David S. and Daniel S. Papp, eds., Information AgeAnthology. Washington, DC: National Defense University andCCRP. June 1997-March 2001. Vols 1-3.2Alberts, David S. and Richard E. Hayes. CommandArrangements for Peace Operations. Washington, DC: NationalDefense University. May 1995. pp. 5-13.


3Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein.Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging InformationSuperiority. Washington, DC: CCRP. August 1999.4Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes, and DavidA. Signori. Understanding Information Age Warfare. Washington,DC: CCRP. August 2001.5Ibid. pp.148-157.6Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary. New York:Riverdale Publishing Company. 1984.7October 23 to November 3, 1942—Superior British armor andair forces assaulted a combined Italian-German line in Egyptcommanded by Marshal Rommel. The British succeeded indevastating several inferior Italian units, thus allowing the Britisharmor to penetrate the line of defense, destroy the entire Italiandivision, and force the German Panzer division to retreat.8Motivation, as well as process, is part of it.9The concept of emergent behavior comes from the field ofcomplex adaptive systems.10A similar argument can be made for the meaning of joint.11Although a robustly networked force is expected to significantlyenhance shared situational awareness and thus enable self-synchronization to occur, it would be a mistake to conclude thatself-synchronization is therefore the answer to all command andcontrol challenges. Instead, moving to NCW enables self-synchronization and hence, provides the commander and theorganization with an option that is certain to prove effective inmany situations.12Rapidity is not an end in itself. The objective is to be able toreact as quickly as possible to provide a commander with a choiceregarding the pace of battle and the time and place for decisiveengagement.

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Adverse Consequences

NCW, as a manifestation of an Information Agetransformation of the DoD, will bring about a

series of changes that will profoundly affect both thenature of the information available to participants ina mission and how this information wil l bedisseminated and used. The nature of an InformationAge transformation of the military can be understoodby comparing the nature of information flows,decisions, and command and control processes thathave evolved from the Industrial Age to those whichare characteristic of the Information Age. IndustrialAge militaries have organizations, commandstructures, and sets of processes that have beenadapted to the fog and friction of war.1 Thesemilitaries are optimized for dealing with pervasive fog,a lack of information about the situation, and systemicfrict ion, in part due to a lack of real-t imecommunications and reliable equipment. Hence,Industrial Age military command decisions focusmore on what is unknown or uncertain rather thanwhat is known and understood. In Industrial Agemilitaries, decisions are most often driven by a desireto minimize regret rather than maximize expectedvalue. Their concepts of operations are designed tobe robust above all else. Their primary goal is to avoidblunders. In other words, in legacy mil i taryorganizations, a strategy of risk avoidance prevails.


Figure 2 depicts the relationship between militaryeffectiveness and the fog and friction of war. Theshaded area depicts the region in which Industrial Agemilitaries operate.

Figure 2. Fog, Friction, and Military Effectiveness

Information Age technologies have provided anopportunity to change this basic paradigm. Vastlyimproved battlespace information has, to a significantextent, lifted the fog of war.2 And further improvementscan be expected. Vastly improved communications,particularly a move from analog to digital and a movefrom point to point and broadcast to networking, allowsus to share information in new ways, simultaneouslyincreasing both its richness and reach.3 The resultantincrease that can be achieved in shared awarenesswill significantly reduce a major source of friction.Together, improvements in information quality andinformation dissemination have provided a firmfoundation upon which network-centric operations canbe built.

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Figure 3 contrasts the nature of an Information AgeDoD with that of an Industrial Age one. The prospectof the profound changes that would accompany atransformation from an Industrial Age military to anInformation Age one has given rise to a number ofconcerns. Specifically, concerns have been voicedregarding the impacts of new and increasedinformation flows on decisionmakers and changes tocommand processes. Other concerns focus on thenew or increased vulnerabilities associated withreliance on Information Age systems and processes.Finally, a set of concerns centers on our ability todesign and acquire secure, robust, reliable, coherentsystems given the Information Age realities ofincreased reliance on COTS hardware and softwareand the ever-shrinking technology life cycle.

Figure 3. Characteristics of an Information Age DoD


The remainder of this chapter is devoted to adiscussion of these concerns and their remedies,organized in the following manner:

• Information overload;

• Dynamics of information dissemination;

• Impact on military decisionmaking;

• Vulnerabilities arising from the informationsystems themselves; and

• Command and control design and acquisitionissues.

Information Overload

A major concern that is frequently expressed andclearly needs to be addressed is that of nonessentialinformation swamping critical information. Theargument goes that the sheer volume of informationreceived could frustrate a person’s or organization’sability to quickly identify critical information for thedecision at hand. This concern is founded upon anassumption that the push philosophy of informationmanagement will continue to prevail. A shift to a pullapproach, where users get to shape their informationspace, clearly reduces the probability that users willget swamped with information of little or no relevance.Users must, in order to avoid situations in which moreinformation than can be processed is presented, makedecisions about what information is really needed,what is nice to have, what is irrelevant, and what ispotentially distracting or confusing. Furthermore, theymust determine when to stop collecting and waiting

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for information and when to take action. This decisionis a function of residual uncertainty and the risksassociated with the available options as a function oftime. The user is clearly in a better position to makethese decisions than some other party or parties. Butmoving to a pull approach is not a panacea. Thequestion, however, shifts from “how does one sortthrough a pile of information to find out what is useful?”to “how does one know what information is availableso that it can be pulled?”

The requirement for information clearly dependsupon both the mission and the situation. Unlessindividuals are given an opportunity to think throughwhat they really need, when they need it, and havean opportunity to practice (perhaps at “decisionranges”), expressed requirements for informationwill always be incomplete on the one hand andinflated on the other hand. There will be a tendencytoward overkill in areas that we grasp and a lack ofstated requirements for the unknown unknowns.Individuals with appropriate military experience mustbe placed in realistic situations and must be allowedto experiment with different amounts and types ofinformation. The lessons learned from theseexperiments can be used as inputs to doctrinedevelopment, requirements, system designanalyses, and the design of training. Theseexperiments and training activities can be used,initially, to educate users regarding what informationis available, how to locate it, and how to use it.Shifting from a push to a pull orientation shifts thefocus from an ultimately losing strategy to a winningstrategy. This is because it is simply impossible fora producer of information to know all of the people


who may need this information and what they aregoing to do with it. It is not, however, impossible tohave users learn what types of information areavailable from which sources and, eventually, tomake good judgments about the reliability of varioussources under various circumstances.

Better education and training devoted to informationprocessing under stress and in environmentscharacterized by uncertainty are needed to developthe necessary skills to handle these information-richsituations. Practice is key to perfecting and maintainingthe skills necessary to function in a fast-paced,information-intensive environment. Therefore,exercises, on-the-job training, and continuingprofessional education need to be added to completethe necessary set of remedies for increases in theamounts of information that will be provided.

Sophisticated presentations can also obscure vitalinformation and/or mask poor quality or incompletedata. Designing presentations that illuminate issuesand facilitate decisionmaking involves tradeoffs andchoices between raw (or unprocessed) data andinformation that contains a mixture of fact andinference. Often, fusion algorithms or decision aids fillin the blanks and provide users with inferences fromavailable data. In some cases, valuable information islost in the process. Thus, processing information candestroy information as it creates information. Giventhat producers of information cannot possibly knowall of the uses of the information they collect, nor theimportance of various details or lack of details, thecurrent approach of guessing what users need shouldbe re-examined. The remedies to address this concern

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include shifting to a paradigm of posting beforeprocessing,4 in addition to the development of bettervisualization techniques to enable individuals tounderstand better the nature of the underlying datafor a given presentation.

Uncertainty regarding the quality or integrity of theinformation being presented could lead to a lack ofconfidence that inhibits use of information orintelligence systems. Decisionmakers clearly needconfidence in the reliability, currency, and accuracyof data in order to act on it. In the Information Age, theintegrity and authenticity of data are increasingly ofconcern and the attributes of information5 should beconsidered as part of any requirements analyses,acquisition processes, and training regiments.

In addition to the remedies discussed above, effectivedefensive protection measures and decision aids needto be developed that can permit decisionmakers todevelop confidence and to rely on the authenticity andintegrity of the data. Presentation techniques thatconvey the quality of the underlying data are animportant issue in their own right.

Dynamics of Dissemination

Not only is the amount of information availabledramatically increasing as the Information Age unfolds,but our ability to widely disseminate this informationis keeping pace. As information sources proliferate,individuals are increasingly receiving inputs frommultiple sources in a less-than-coordinated manner.This raises a number of issues. The first is associatedwith the separation of information flows from the chain


of command. The second addresses disorderly andunpredictable flows.

Freeing information flows from the command chainmeans that commanders cannot control whatsubordinates see or know. Without appropriatechanges to the way that military missions areconducted, this could create more fog and friction asa result of the disconnects among participants atdifferent echelons. Behaviors might become lesspredictable, operations less synchronized, and risksmade more difficult to manage. The command andcontrol concepts and processes inherent in NCW serveto remedy this concern. This is because NCW is basedupon a new model of command and control, one thatfeatures sharing of information (synchronization in theinformation domain6) and the collaborative processesto achieve a high degree of shared situationalawareness. Thus, despite the variety of sources ofinformation, the sharing of information and thecollaboration enabled by the networked force combineto reduce the number and severity of the disconnectsthat might otherwise occur. An additional benefit isthe increase in the richness of the awareness created.This increase in richness occurs as a result of theefforts to reconcile differences in fact and/orperspective that result from (1) more sources ofinformation, (2) increased sharing of information, and(3) collaboration.

But other problems still remain. Asynchronous arrivalof information has been found to confuse and distractdecisionmakers. Studies have also shown that theweight individuals place upon information may berelated to the order in which that information is

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received. This is potentially dangerous because it canlead to differences in individuals’ perceptions of asituation, even if all of the participants have exactlythe same information.

NCW virtually ensures that individuals will be receivingdifferent information in different sequences. To avoidthe potential pitfalls associated with this phenomenon,education, training, and practice are needed toheighten awareness of these issues and helpindividuals assimilate new data into their informationdomains. A sufficiently common perception ofcommand intent is needed to ensure that behavior isconsistent across the organization. Collaborativeenvironments and tools will contribute to a group’sability to reconcile different perceptions. In addition,display techniques can facilitate information collectionand analysis, and decision aids can help synthesizeand fuse information on a continuing basis.

As with many of the concerns raised, practice is a keyelement of a remedy. In this case, practice is neededto ensure that individuals develop and maintainproficiencies in dealing with the potentially confusingphenomenon of asynchronous information flows.

Given the capabilities that will be coming online in thecoming years, there will be an enormous increase inthe amount of information coursing throughcommunication pipes. A mix of information push andpull, with an increasing emphasis on pull, will improveour ability to anticipate and control requests forinformation. If this less orderly behavior is notaccommodated, it could result in system degradation,particularly in times of great stress. In these situations,


vital as well as nonvital information flow may beaffected. To avoid this potentially crippling scenario,appropriate policy, doctrine, and procedures7

regarding the use of information retrieval mechanismsneed to be developed and instituted. Again, education,training, and practice are required to raise awarenessof the problem and to develop the skills needed tooperate in a degraded information environment.Network tools are also needed to provide warningswhen the limits of the distribution system are beingapproached and to help bring the situation undercontrol. Finally, the design of our informationdistribution infrastructure needs to maximizerobustness and flexibility. The only certainty is thatsystems will not be used exactly as intended or underprecisely the conditions assumed in their design,development, and testing.

Decisionmaking

The linkages between information quality, distribution,communications patterns, and decisionmaking arecomplex and diverse. This was true when ourapproach focused upon a small number ofdecisionmakers and a large number of executors. Areview of organization theory, group dynamics,information theory, and past research on commandand control offers key insights into these linkages andhow they might function if current command concepts,organization, doctrine, and processes are not altered.

First, when information is freely available, role overlaptends to be commonplace. Superiors have a tendency(or are at least tempted) to micromanage, particularly

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when the stakes are high; and there are no higherstakes than combat. Subordinates, however, whenprovided with the larger picture historically availableonly to senior commanders, are also likely to second-guess decisions made at higher levels and (in richlyconnected systems) have the information requiredto undertake initiatives that their superiors may findsurprising and perhaps inappropriate. Avoiding thisset of counterproductive behaviors and managementpractices requires rethinking processes andorganizational structures, as well as self-disciplineand training.

Second, decisionmaking in an information richenvironment increasingly means media attention. Thepressures of a fish bowl environment affectperformance in a variety of adverse ways.Tendencies to overreact, to act quickly, to appeardecisive despite limited information, or to posture forthe media can only be overcome through realistictraining and experience.

When decisionmaking becomes a collective process,which tends to occur when several principals haveeasy access to one another in a situation that they allconsider important, decisions tend to converge onoptions that meet group consensus. This collectivewisdom has been demonstrated in both theoretical andempirical analyses to tend strongly toward risk adverseoptions or poorly developed group-think alternatives.The brilliant alternative or innovative approachforeseen by one individual is unlikely to survive thisdeliberative process. The potential strength of thiscollective process, which has excelled at solvingcomplex problems such as those at operational and


strategic combat levels, can only be achieved by anopen approach to decisionmaking and a commandapproach that stresses individual innovation andleadership at all levels.

Fully connected systems also reduce the need fordetailed action coordination by commanders becausethey make available information that would have tobe requested from other elements in a classic militaryinformation structure. For example, rather than havingto request information about the availability oftransportation assets or ammunition needed for acombat operation, a line commander will be able tocheck stock levels directly. This can lead to insufficientor ineffective coordination because subject matterexperts are not consulted or because more than onecommander makes plans to use the same asset, butnone has a clear commitment of asset availability.

Industry experience with richly connected systemshas shown that collaborative planning and decisionaids (which automatically perform coordination tasksand/or pass information between nodes indecisionmaking structures) are needed to avoidthese problems. In addition, red team proceduresto cross-check decisions can help to ensureadequate, timely coordination.

As generations of military commanders who havebecome accustomed to the availability of high densityand high quality data about the battlefield mature andmove into senior command positions, the expectationof near perfect information and the willingness to delaydecisions in the expectation of better information maygrow. However, the very rapid pace of future battles,

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as well as the imperatives of turning inside adversarydecision loops, will punish procrastination and inactionseverely. The commander who waits for near perfectinformation will be defeated by one who acts on “goodenough” information.

Future commanders must develop the judgementrequired to differentiate between sufficient anddesirable information. Because of the increased paceof battle and the high lethality expected in futurebattlespace, more and more decisions will be assignedto expert systems. This will include not only sensor-to-shooter linkages where the identification,assignment, and engagement of targets must be sorapid that unaided human decisionmaking cannot keeppace, but also other complex domains characterizedby rapid developments in logistics planning, air taskingorder development, and medivac helicopter routing.However, development, testing, and training are, inand of themselves, currently inadequate to ensureconfidence in these systems. Testing is particularlyimportant. Technology demonstrations are a good,cost effective way to gain user feedback and todevelop positive attitudes toward these systems, butoperational testing in realistic field conditions is alsonecessary to avoid system failures or lack of use inthe field. Failure during early field experience willpoison attitudes that can only be overcome slowly andat great expense. Thus, care must be taken to involveusers early on in the design process.

Finally, by their very nature as automatons, computersystems have no inherent ability to recognize their ownlimitations. When applied in inappropriatecircumstances, they will produce answers that may


be logical, but incorrect. The entire process, fromconcept through design, testing, and doctrinedevelopment, must include a recognition of thisinherent problem. Ultimately, humans must makesound decisions about when and under whatcircumstances to rely on automated systems.

This discussion has been focused on the logicalevolution of traditional combat. The military isfamiliar and comfortable with traditional combat andit is not hard to envision how military organizationsand decisionmaking behavior need to adapt in thefuture. However, the situations we are most likelyto face are far less familiar. This exacerbates theproblems that have been raised and significantlyincreases the challenges associated with managinginformation and decisionmaking.

Vulnerabilities

As the sophistication of the military informationsystems support structure grows over time, theinherent vulnerabilities will become more important.Planning and practice can minimize thesevulnerabilities, but they cannot be safely ignored. First,all military equipment is in danger of capture. Evenrear areas are raided to capture or destroy vitalelements of important systems. Hence, steps mustbe taken to prevent equipment loss, to ensure thatlosses are known, and to frustrate enemy exploitationof captured systems. Unique keys that identify andauthorize users on particular systems, devices thatreport current locations on key hardware items viasatellite, authentication procedures, and security

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codes will be important defensive systems. Doctrineand training necessary to ensure their proper use willalso be necessary.

As the Global Information Grid and its capabilitiesproliferate in the battlespace, vulnerabilities willincrease because: (a) the number of valid users withaccess to the system rises, magnifying the insiderthreat; (b) the number of nodes and connection pointsgrows, providing adversaries with more opportunitiesto penetrate the system from the outside; and (c) if acompromise does occur, the perpetrator will haveaccess to more information than would have beenavailable in the past.

Indeed, as the force becomes increasingly networked,the mere task of noticing a penetration or penetrationattempt becomes ever more difficult. Often systemproblems cannot be readily diagnosed as either naturalor the product of information warfare attacks. Even asingle penetration can be extremely damaging,particularly in a richly connected information system.

Obviously, some data (such as concepts ofoperations, planning documents, and orders) areextremely sensit ive. A well-crafted worm orcomputer virus can spread literally at the speed oflight once inside a complex system. Moreover, theknowledge that databases have been penetratedand may be corrupted can greatly inhibit decisiveand effective decisionmaking. New types ofdefensive decision aids will be needed to detect,assess, and counter such attacks.

Although not a new phenomenon, misinformation,even a small amount of it, can negate the benefits of


increased quantity and quality of information. Before,it could be reasonably (although not without some risk)assumed that the information received through thechain of command was not misleading (or at leastpurposefully so). With the freeing of the informationflows from the chain of command and the introductionof many new and perhaps unproven sources ofinformation, this benign information environment canno longer be assumed. Again, NCW principlescontribute to an ability to spot, question, and hopefullydeal with misinformation. Bringing more brains to bearincreases the likelihood that the wheat gets separatedfrom the chaff and that the razor blades (sources ofdanger) are harmlessly removed.

Command and Control Design and Acquisition

Because the inventory of information systems willinevitably continue to undergo rapid developmentand replacement, the design and acquisition ofthese systems become crucial in the defenseagainst many vulnerabilities.

As they focus on definitive, exhaustive testing againsttechnical and often arcane specifications, traditionaltest and evaluation procedures have developed a badreputation in the operational community for oftenpreventing the adoption of an imperfect but acceptablesystem. Technology demonstrations have emergedas a way of exposing new systems to operators andoperational conditions without having to addressarcane testing standards. Reliance on demonstrationsalone can be equally unhealthy because it encouragesadoption of systems that have not really been tested

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at all. More robust, integrated, and operationally-oriented processes of user assessment, as well asrealistic applications (including baselines andbenchmarks to ensure new systems add measurablecapability), are needed.

The DoD’s increasing reliance on COTS hardware andsoftware increases vulnerabilities by making militarysystems familiar to sophisticated adversaries and byexposing them to software developers and technicianswho are not subject to security regulations. Hence,design and acquisition procedures need to considersecurity and minimize exposure. Indeed, somesystems may be too sensitive to rely on COTS designsor procurements.

The DoD’s increasing reliance on COTS products isalso having a deleterious impact on the U.S.Government’s in-house capability to maintain theexpertise required to adapt COTS systems and createcapabilities not needed by the commercial sector. Theengineering base required to meet military standardsis an essential element of COTS product reliancestrategy. A coherent program designed to maintainand exercise this capacity is needed. At least part ofthis program could be devoted to the post-deploymentsupport of information systems. In many cases, thesesystems will need to be revised in order to maintaininteroperability with new systems, a process thatnecessitates the linkage of COTS systems with militaryrequirements. This means not only building linkagesbetween systems, but also having the capacity toreengineer the systems and the processes that thesystems support.


Because command and control systems are nevercomplete and will be continuously undergoingtransitions, the ability to maintain mission capabilitywhile upgrading or integrating systems also remainscrucial. This capability requires planning and creativity.The Army’s concept of selecting one unit as a livingtest bed for new ideas and equipment and fieldingonly what is successful in the chosen environmentrepresents one approach to this problem. Otherapproaches, such as parallel operation of new andold systems during a test period, may be attractive insome circumstances.

Finally, COTS product reliance in military systemsis very different from relying on commercial systems.Plans for the DoD to rely on commercial satellitecommunications systems must recognize that otherclients can make demands on these systems andmay limit the DoD’s access to them in times of crisis.Moreover, commercial services are not alwaysdesigned for graceful degradation or fully backedup in the event of system failure. Hence, basicavailabil ity will be an issue when relying oncommercial systems, particularly in times of crisis,and needs to be addressed (a) when contractualarrangements are made and (b) when contingencyplanning is done for crises.

1Clausewitz, Carl von. Trans. By Peter Paret. On War. New York:Knopf. 1993.2This is not to say that we will have anything approaching “totalsituational awareness,” but to say that we can move from amindset preoccupied with what we do not know to one where wecan focus on leveraging what we do know.

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3Magretta, Joan. “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interviewwith Dell Computer’s Michael Dell.” Harvard Business Review.76:2 (March-April 1998), pp. 72-84.4The use of the term processing has generated a considerableamount of discussion centered on the issue of what basicprocessing is necessary to make the information useful. Theintent of this policy is to make the information available in astimely a way as possible and not to destroy information thatsomeone else would find useful by too much processing/aggregation.5The attributes of information are discussed in: Alberts, DavidS., John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes, and David A. Signori.Understanding Information Age Warfare. Washington, DC:CCRP. August 2001. pp. 108-115.6A discussion of the information domain and the other domainsof war can be found in: Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, RichardE. Hayes, and David A. Signori. Understanding Information AgeWarfare. Washington, DC: CCRP. August 2001. pp. 10-15.7While one can expect that network management (centralizedand distributed) tools and techniques will improve, it would notbe prudent to rely solely on technology alone to solve thisproblem.

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CHAPTER 9

Strategy forTransformation

The concerns identified and discussed in the lastchapter are serious ones. Considering the

enormous benefits that are associated with NCW,these potential pitfalls are not valid or sufficient reasonsfor deferring, delaying, or half-heartedly embracingInformation Age concepts and technologies,particularly since the potential disruptions, dysfunction,and varied other problems associated with InformationAge concepts and technologies can be avoided orsuccessfully contained while significant benefits canbe harvested.

Looking at the remedies identified to address each ofthese specific concerns, one finds a unifying theme—the danger of failing to recognize that existingmindsets, practices, and processes must give way tonew mindsets, practices, and processes that are intune with the new characteristics of information andits dissemination. That is, a recognition that exposureto new information technologies and their capabilitiesis potentially dangerous1 unless it is accompanied bychanges in a number of key dimensions. Further, arecognition that the changes that are required areinterrelated and hence, need to be considered in aholistic manner. They need to be coevolved.


A review of the discussion of concerns indicates thatchanges need to occur in all of the following:

• Concepts of operation;

• Command and control approach and processes;

• Organization and doctrine;

• Battlespace entities;

• Systems; and

• Education, training, and exercises.

Mission Capability Packages

In order to accomplish a mission or task, a set ofinterrelated capabilities2 are needed. This collectionof the required capabilities can be thought of as amission capability package.3 The dimensions listedabove constitute key elements of a mission capabilitypackage. A mission capability package thus consistsof an operational concept and associated commandapproach, organization and doctrine, battlespaceentities4 and systems, education, training, andexercises. When one of these elements changes, itstands to reason that this will impact the organization’scapability, for better or worse, to perform the missionat hand. The mission capability package approachmoves the DoD away from a narrow focus ontechnology and systems5—what some have called thefocus on “M” in DOTMLPF.6

Information technology helps us move beyond thecurrent physical manifestations of systems andtechnology (platforms and headquarters) to a fullconsideration of all of the aspects of the militarymission(s) to be supported. Mission capabilitypackages encompass the full range of tools by which

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problems can be addressed or managed (fromtechnical requirements to training) and as such holdthe key to success in efforts to transform the force.The mission capability package approach moves usfrom an emphasis on what we buy to what we do. Inthe Information Age, what we buy and what we do areinexorably intertwined as never before.

The transformation of the DoD will involve missioncapability packages that are characterized by theirinherent jointness and by their network-centricity. Thetransformation of the DoD will also involve atransformation of the processes that give rise to thesemission capability packages including budgeting andplanning processes, acquisition and testing processes(particularly those involved in providing theinfostructure7 8), logistics, and personnel management.The next chapter discusses the new process neededto conceive, mature, test, and implement missioncapability packages.

Coevolving Mission Capability Packages

The mission capability package approach (depictedin Figure 4) begins with a clearly defined mission orset of missions and seeks to understand, withoutpreconceived notions or solutions, (a) what is requiredto complete the mission(s) successfully and (b) howthose requirements may differ from current forcestructure, command and control arrangements,organizations, doctrine, and technologies. Potentialsolutions, or initial mission capability packageconcepts, are developed in the concept developmentphase based on prior research, lessons learned,expert judgment, and most importantly, discoveryexperiments. Their strength lies in their thoroughnessand coherence.

76Inform

ation Age T

ransformation

Figure 4. Mission Capability Package Coevolution

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The mission capability package approach calls forexposing an initial mission capability package conceptto review and critique by the operational communityand domain experts early and often in order to refineand improve the concept. This review may take theform of demonstrations, experiments, exercises,simulations, modeling, or expert criticism. All of thesewill be needed for major initiatives. What matters isthat as the concept matures, the process becomesincreasingly focused and the mission capabilitypackage concept is refined based upon empiricalevidence. As consensus and supporting evidenceemerge, the refinement process is transformed intoan evolutionary process characterized by a build-a-little, test-a-little philosophy that embodies theprinciples of evolutionary acquisition.9

Finally, the mission capability package moves into itsimplementation phase. This implementation phase isalso comprehensive in nature. Systems may be built,but not in isolation. Doctrine development, commandreorganization, relevant professional military educationand training, as well as the technical systemsthemselves are all specified. This process has thecomprehensiveness, coherence, and orientationnecessary to transform ideas and technologies intoreal operational capabilities while avoiding adverseunintended consequences. Hence, mission capabilitypackages are the recommended vehicle to ensureeffective remedies and minimize risk.

1Prior to 1995, the prevailing opinion was that it was desirablethat the introduction of new IT capabilities be accompanied bychanges in processes because these changes would enhancethe return on investment. The 1995 analysis recognized that the


problem was more than giving up potential ROI and that, in fact,changes were needed to prevent dysfunctional behaviors thatcould adversely affect performance.2One might find it strange to refer to a concept or an organizationas a capability. In fact, a concept represents the glue that holdsthe other capabilities together and an organization possesses anumber of characteristics that enable it to accomplish varioustasks that individually and collectivity represent capabilities.3Joint Vision 2020 and other DoD publications utilize the termDOTMLPF to refer to a mission capability package. To some,this term serves to reenforce the stovepiped nature of thesecommunities, and does not adequately emphasize the need fora new concept of operations, new command approach, and newprocesses.4Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein.Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging InformationSuperiority. Washington, DC: CCRP. August 1999. p. 125.5It has become increasingly recognized that our planning,investment, and acquisition processes focus almost exclusivelyon the big “M” in DOTMLPF. There are various proposals foraddressing this imbalance—Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS StrategicPlan. February 20, 2002. (For Official Use Only).6Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,Personnel, and Facilities.7Information Superiority—Making the Joint Vision Happen.Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 2000.8Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report toCongress. July 2001. pp. 5-12.9AFCEA Study Team. Command and Control SystemsAcquisition Study Final Report. Falls Church, VA: AFCEA.November 8, 1982.

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CHAPTER 10

MeasuringTransformation

Progress and Value

T his section begins by looking at the basiccharacteristics of an Information Age organization,

characteristics that could be used to measure progresstoward a transformed organization. It continues witha discussion of the nature of the journey to atransformed organization, identifies specific milestonesalong the way, and suggests metrics that can be usedto measure progress and value.

Characteristics of an Information Age Organization

An Information Age military will differ in many respectsfrom its Industrial Age counterpart. These changesare primarily concentrated in four dimensions—mission space (what the military is called upon to do),environment (the conditions, constraints, and valuesthat govern military operations), concept (the militarybusiness model), and the way the organizationprovides and supports value creation (the businessside of the DoD). This book is focused primarily onthe third of these dimensions, leaving discussions ofmission space and environment to political-military


experts. The focus on this third dimension is justifiedbecause it is how we create value in the competitivespace of national security and because of theuncertainty that surrounds future threats andgeopolitical environments. This change in emphasisis being reflected in a change in the basis for U.S.strategy defense planning—a move from a threat-based to a capabilities-based model.

The ability of an organization to develop and utilizeinformation is clearly one of the most importantdeterminants of success. Quality information, thewidespread sharing of this information, and commandapproaches that enable self-synchronization contributeto agility. In times when there is so much uncertaintyabout the mission space and the environment, agilityis a highly desirable attribute. One could argue thatincreased agility is an attribute of the force that shouldbe sought even if it means sacrificing some specificfunctionality. Given what is increasingly referred to asan “uncertain future,” does it make sense to becomeextremely well-versed in one particular set of tasks,only to find that we are actually needed to perform adifferent set of tasks?

It is worth repeating the initial line from the 2000 NCWReport to Congress, “Network Centric Warfare is noless than the embodiment of an Information Agetransformation of DoD.”1 There is a direct connectionbetween an organization’s agility and its ability to bringall of its information to bear in developing anunderstanding of a situation and all of its assets tobear in responding to a situation. For this reason, abusiness model based on these characteristics is idealfor an Information Age military. Network Centric

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Warfare is a military business model (a way to createa competitive advantage and value) that has thesedesirable characteristics. Thus, the transformation toan Information Age business model is inseparable fromprogress toward network-centric operations.

Network-centric concepts need not only to be appliedto warfighting (or more generally to the variousmissions and tasks the DoD will be called upon todo), but they also need to be applied to the businessside of the DoD. The DoD must be viewed andanalyzed holistically. A mission capability packageapproach to each mission or task is the only way toensure that capabilities can properly coevolve and thatall of our information and assets can be rapidly broughtto bear as we undertake the wide range of tasks thatlie ahead. Hence, the value calculus for the DoD needsto include a synthesis of what was formerly known as“tooth and tail” and have mission capability packagesas their basic unit.

Previous distinctions between “tooth and tail” no longerserve their original purpose and have become adistraction in a network-centric world. Infrastructureas something that intrinsically needs to be minimizedis also an outdated concept. The notions of “tooth totail” ratios and the association of infrastructure withoverhead need to be replaced with the concept of avalue chain. In a network-centric world, a robustlynetworked force is not infrastructure (or tail) to bereduced, but an enabler of the Information Agebusiness model. A robustly networked force is anenabler whose value cannot be considered in isolationfrom the other links in the value chain. Its absolutesize (cost) is not relevant. Rather, it is the return on


investment (ROI) and how this return compares toother potential investments that matter. In theInformation Age, investments in information, itscollection, distribution, and related investments inanalysis, presentation, and protection can only bejudged in a mission capability context.

Measuring Agility

Agility was defined as a key characteristic of anInformation Age organization; a characteristic to besought even at the sacrifice of seeking to perfectcapabilities associated with specific missions or tasks.Agility is, of course, of paramount importance in anuncertain world. Given that the focus of this book hasbeen on the ability to conduct military operations, itstands to reason that agile command and controlwould be a fundamental force capability and ascenario-independent measure that is directly relatedto NCW capability.

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Figure 5. Attributes of Agility


Agility (see Figure 5) is a property of an individualor organization that has a synergistic combinationof the following attributes: robustness, flexibility,innovativeness, adaptiveness, and responsiveness.These relate to the variety of circumstances underwhich an organization can be effective. Robustnessis the ability to maintain effectiveness across a rangeof missions or tasks, circumstances, and conditions.It includes the ability to maintain effectiveness underattack and when damaged and/or degraded, as wellas across the spectrum of conflict. Flexibility is theability to envision multiple ways of accomplishing atask and/or conceiving of different paths to anobjective. This means the ability to switch betweenalternatives as appropriate. Adaptiveness isinwardly focused. It is the ability to change the wayone does business in an effort to improveperformance in the face of changes in theenvironment. Innovativeness is the ability to learnabout missions and operating environments andcreate novel approaches to create and maintaincompetitive advantages. Responsiveness is theability to react appropriately in a timely manner.These definitions are only preliminary. Efforts arecurrently underway to settle on definitions for theseterms and develop measures and/or indicants thatcould be used.2

Agile command and control focuses upon anorganization’s ability to provide dynamic commandintent and direction at an appropriate level of detail tosynchronize effects. This begins with the ability toassemble and deploy a needed command and control

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capability and make modifications to this capability asrequired. Command and control capabilities includethe dimensions of richness, reach, and richness ofinteraction. Richness relates to information sourcesand the attributes of information related to theinformation provided by these sources.3 Reachincludes network topology, performancecharacteristics, robustness of the network, andsecurity. The richness of the interactions refers to thenature of the communications (information transfers)supported, and the measures of the ability toassemble, deploy, and adjust command and controlcapabilities including speed of initial deployment,speed and quality of adjustment, and the ability tomaintain robustness. The second dimensionaddresses the level of interoperability (integration) thatcan be achieved. The third dimension deals with thecharacteristics of the command approach. The samemeasures that would apply to the force as a wholeare put into a command and control context. Forexample, instead of addressing the ability of the forceto be responsive in unfamiliar situations, agilecommand and control involves the ability to provideintent and direction in unfamiliar situations.

The use of agility as a prime measure of forceeffectiveness moves the discussion from a threat-based focus to a capabilities-based focus. Instead ofbeing assessed on how well a unit does on a scriptedexercise, units will be assessed on their overallreadiness to respond in an uncertain world.


The Journey to a Transformed Organization

The journey to a transformed organization requiresdevelopment of (1) the ability to conduct NCW (bydeploying network-centric mission capabilitypackages) and (2) supporting processes that provideand support the development and deployment ofnetwork-centric mission capability packages.

The ability to conduct NCW is not an all or nothingproposition; it comes in varying degrees. A capabilitymodel for NCW that specifies five levels thatrepresent increasing capability to conduct NCW wasdeveloped for Understanding Information AgeWarfare and has been incorporated in the DoD’sNCW Report to Congress.4 This capability model isprovided in Figure 6.

Figure 6. NCW Levels of Maturity

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This capability model is based upon the two pillars ofNCW: the development of shared awareness and theability to capitalize on the shared awareness by movingto a command and control approach based upon self-synchronization. Five capability levels are depictedbeginning with Level 0. Level 0 represents a traditionalor hierarchical approach to command and controlwhich, for the most part, is based upon informationfrom organic sensors and systems. Organic here refersto a unit’s or community’s assets. Thus, in Level 0,information is not shared outside of pre-existingstovepipes and point-to-point flows. Moving to Level1 involves a “post before use” strategy and a shift frompush to pull that makes information far more widelyavailable.5 Moving to Level 2 involves moving from apassive sharing of information to a collaborativeprocess focused on understanding the information(putting it into context) and the situation to develop ahigher quality of awareness. Moving to Level 3 involvesdiscussions (collaborations) that go beyond what theinformation is and means to what should be doneabout the situation. In other words, the beginnings ofcollaborative action. Finally, a move to Level 4 entailsthe adoption of a command approach rooted in theconcept of self-synchronization.

Imbedded in this model is a logical migration path fordeveloping network-centric mission capabilitypackages. Once a move to Level 1 has been made,human nature, combined with the requirement toaccomplish the mission, will drive organizationalbehavior to higher levels of capability when it isappropriate (as a function of the situation and themission). Figure 7 depicts the migration path.


Figure 7. NCW Migration Path

Transformation Metrics

Given that the transformation of the DoD to anInformation Age organizat ion wi l l take aconsiderable amount of time and effort,6 i t isimperative that we understand the nature andamount of progress that is being made and the typesof investments that are paying dividends. Thissection discusses metrics that will be useful, bothin measuring progress and in measuring the valueto be associated with this progress.

Progress in transforming to an Information Age militaryis intimately associated with the nature of the network-centric mission capability packages being developedand fielded. Therefore, it stands to reason that the (1)NCW capability model, (2) NCW value chain,7 and (3)inherent characteristics of Information Ageorganizations could serve as a basis for thedevelopment of transformation metrics.

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The NCW capability model can be used to provide asnapshot, at any point in time, of where we are on theroad to NCW capability. In addition, the capabilitymodel can also provide a leading indicator thatpresages the transformation of the force. For example,the attainment of a given level of capability in onemission area can signal the ability of the Departmentto achieve the same level of capability in other missionareas with similar characteristics and complexity.

Another way to measure progress is to employ theNCW value chain (Figure 8). The NCW value chainbegins with a robustly networked force. The degreeto which the force is clearly networked is related tothe ability of the force to share information (extend itsreach) and to its ability to collaborate. Both informationsharing and collaborative capabilities contribute to thequality of the information (its richness), which in turnis related to the ability of the “mission organization”8

to generate awareness. Information richness, reach,and the quality of interaction are related to the abilityof the mission organization to achieve a high degreeof shared awareness among the participants. Sharedawareness is linked to the ability of the force tosynchronize their effects, which is related to missionsuccess. Hence, the NCW value chain incorporates aset of testable linkage hypotheses that can be exploredand calibrated in experiments and analyses. In termsof the domains of warfare, a robustly networked forcecoupled with an ability to do both defensive andoffensive information operations contributes to aforce’s capabilities in the information domain. Whenthese are related to information needs (a property ofthe concepts of operations and command approach)and compared to the corresponding capabilities of our


adversaries, the extent to which Information Superiorityor an advantage in the information domain is achievedcan be determined. A similar calculus in the cognitivedomain (where awareness and decisionmaking areconsidered, rather than information) determines theparty that has an advantage in the cognitive domain(decision superiority). The ability to turn advantagesin the information and cognitive domains, the abilityto leverage information and understanding to achievean execution advantage, depends upon the conceptsof operation, command approach, and weapons, orother means as appropriate.

Each of these links in the value chain can be measuredand the degree to which they are related ascertained.Given that there are bound to be time lags betweenprogress on one link and its reflection in later links,the NCW value chain, like the maturity model, can beused as both a snapshot measure and as a leadingindicator of value.

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Figure 8. NCW Value Chain


It will be important to measure progress in a numberof related areas. These include:

• Achievement of NCW capability;

• Putting the enablers of NCW in place;

• Understanding NCW;

• Realizing the value of NCW; and

• Transforming DoD processes to supporttransformation.

Achievement of NCW Capability

The Department is a very large and very complexorganization with a wide variety of tasks and missionsto accomplish. The metrics discussed above are rathereasy to understand in the context of a particular taskor mission. For example, it is somewhat straightforwardto determine whether we can bring a network-centriccapability to the task or mission at hand, and itsmaturity level. Thus, as time goes by, we can see ifwe are making progress as measured by increasinglevels of maturity. But it is considerably more difficultto go from a task or mission context to the DoD as awhole. Clearly we will, at any given point in time, beable to perform some selected tasks at higher levelsof maturity, but not others.

All tasks are not equal. The development of anaggregate measure for NCW maturity is feasible,but will involve either explicit or implicit assumptionsabout (1) the relative merits of achieving each levelof maturity and (2) the relative importance of eachof our tasks and missions. One approach is to take

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key missions and tasks (perhaps those specified inthe Defense Planning Guidance as beingtransformation goals) and concentrate on movingthese to a given level of maturity by some certaindates. One could also specify some minimum level(perhaps Level 1) and set a goal of achieving thisfor all DoD efforts by a certain date or simplymeasure what percent of a list of tasks and missionshave achieved the various levels.

Putting the Enablers in Place

The most basic enabler of NCW is the “net” itself.The degree to which we have (or will have in placeat some time in the future) an information networkthat enables NCW can be measured. Deploying afull set of network services throughout the DoD andextending this “net,” or more accurately, a necessarysubset of network services to others that the DoDneeds to interact with, will take some time. In fact, itis probable that there will always be differences inthe nature of the services afforded to networkedentities. In order to understand the best strategy touse in deploying the “net,” and in allocating resourcesamong networked entities, we need to be able tocharacterize and value the connectivity and servicesavailable at any given point in time. Ultimately, weneed a DoD-wide measure to reflect the potentialvalue of the “net” to the DoD. This is because thevalue of the “net” to the DoD is more than the sum ofthe value of the “net” for a given set of missions.

However, we need to start with a mission-orientedmeasure.9 Such a measure begins with thespecification of the set of mission participants. Hence,


the network will extend beyond our own forces toinclude non-U.S. military nodes, individuals, ororganizations (e.g., other USG and coalition partners)that are key participants in a mission. A networkconsists of links and nodes. For a node to be “on thenet” there must be an appropriate link available andthe node must be “net ready.”10 For two or more nodesto interact, appropriate network services must also beavailable. These services include not only thoseneeded to exchange information, for example, but alsothe services necessary to ensure that only legitimateexchanges take place in a protected environment.Hence, information assurance is fully integrated intothe concept of network services. A simple but usefultwo-dimensional mission-oriented measure of theextent to which an “enabling network” is in place isprovided in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Measure of Network Capabilities

The first dimension corresponds to the reach of thenetwork while the second dimension relates to thenature of the interchange supported (the richness ofnodal interactions). In Figure 9, each bar represents

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the percentage of mission participants that aresupported. In this case, everyone can have a voiceconversation with each other, 80 percent of the missionparticipants can exchange digital information, 60percent have access to the COP, but only 40 percentcan participate in a collaborative environment.Developing a baseline for selected missions would notbe very difficult and various experiments and analysescould be used to estimate the relationship betweenthe provision of network services, the development ofawareness and shared awareness, and othermeasures of mission performance and effectiveness.Thresholds could be empirically established (e.g., 60percent of participants must be able to collaborate if auseful level of shared awareness is to be achieved)and used to map progress on the provision of networkservices to enable each of the levels of NCW maturity.

Please note that this is not a traditional measure of anetwork. Traditional measures focus on things likethroughput and availability and do not take intoconsideration the nature of the behaviors that thenetwork is supposed to support. This measure focuseson the information and NCW process-related capabilitythat the network provides in the context of theparticipants of the mission.

In theory, the same measure could apply to the forceas a whole. In practice, however, this would entailmaking some assumptions about the nature of thenon-U.S. military participants that should be includedin the calculation. Moreover, the mapping from thismeasure to overall force effectiveness could not bedirectly accomplished. The last link would need tobe an extrapolation from a representative set ofmissions and circumstances.


Understanding Network Centric Warfare

Some have argued that we need not measure theprogress we are making in understanding NCWbecause the only thing that matters is whether or notour ability to conduct missions is being improved. Theyargue that if we are getting value from our networkand the adaptations of military operations that takeadvantage of Information Age concepts andtechnologies, then we clearly have a sufficientunderstanding of NCW.

However, we can derive real value from measuringprogress. This is because the rate of progress that wecan make depends, not on our ability to understandwhether something works, but on why it works (or forthat, matter why it does not work). If we try somethingand it works, we can implement it. To improve upon it,we would need to try something else and see if it works.This trial and error approach may eventually succeed,but it is not very efficient. Efficiency comes about aswe increase our ability to understand the connectionsso we can try something we have good reason tobelieve will be an improvement. As our understandinggrows, we are able to predict not only what will improvethings, but by how much, and thus we are in a positionto explore options theoretically before actually testingthem empirically.

Therefore, we would greatly benefit by working on anNCW model while simultaneously developing andexperimenting with NCW mission capability packages.The NCW model would embody our understanding ofthe relationships hypothesized by NCW theory. First,it will be necessary to establish that, in fact, these

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relationships exist in reality. Second, we need tounderstand the conditions under which therelationships hold. Third, we need to be able tocalibrate (quantitatively) the relationships. Progresson an NCW model is synonymous with progress onour understanding.

How can one measure progress on a model of NCW?The following approach could be used to representthe degree of understanding we have achieved. Thetenets of NCW could be used to define the majorcomponents of the model. Each tenet stipulates oneor more cause-effect relationships (e.g., higher sharedawareness leads to higher degree of synchronization).Associated with each of these relationships is animplied set of conditions (e.g., the command andcontrol approach capitalized on shared awareness).These conditions are, in effect, a set of independentvariables, some of which are controllable. Ourunderstanding of a particular tenet is most directlyreflected in the amount of variation that we canexplain.11 This value is determined empirically. Thehigher the value, the greater our understanding of therelationships (under the conditions that have beenobserved). The NCW tenets are themselves linked andtheir collective ability to predict the degree to whicheffects can be synchronized as a function of the keyconcepts of NCW can be used as a measure of thedegree to which we understand NCW.

Please note that I have not tried to link the tenets ofNCW to mission success or outcomes. That isbecause there are a great many variables that havenothing to do with a network-centric approach thatcan have a significant bearing on whether or not a


mission is successful. Thus, adopting NCW principlesdoes not guarantee success. Rather, it allows one touse the available information and the available assetsmore effectively.

If one wants to link NCW tenets to measures ofmission success in order to determine value, then itneeds to be a comparative analysis as discussed inthe next section.

Realizing the Value of NCW

Making progress toward a Network Centric Warfarecapability is important only if the achievement of thiscapability is accompanied by an increased ability toaccomplish the myriad of tasks and missions that areassigned to the DoD. Assuming such a connectionto value exists, measuring progress on thefundamental enabler of NCW, the “net,” provides aleading indicator for the level of NCW maturity, whichin turn provides a leading indicator of the value thatwill be realized by NCW.

Thus, the establishment of a definitive link betweenthe achievement of network-centric capabilities andmission value is necessary if we are to rely upon theleading indicators to guide DoD policy andinvestments. This requires that we extend our NCWmodel by adding a set of metrics that allows us tovalidate and calibrate the last link in the NCW valuechain. The NCW model provides us with metrics thatreflect all but the last tenet of NCW (specifically, thequality of awareness, the degree to which it is shared,and the level of synchronization achieved). Whetheror not these translate into mission success is

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dependent on many things. These include the meansat our disposal to deal with the situation, thecapabilities of our adversaries, environmentalconditions, and among a long list of other factors,political constraints. To ascertain the actual value thatcan be attributed to these key NCW capabilities (e.g.,the abil i ty to share awareness), a series ofcomparative analyses or experiments that control forthese numerous other factors needs to be performed.A set of metrics that reflect mission success need tobe developed and a baseline case needs to becompared with one or more cases that differ withrespect to one or more of the key NCW capabilities.Over the years, there have been a number of metricsthat have emerged that serve as generally acceptedmeasures for traditional combat missions (e.g., lossexchange ratios, time to accomplish a mission12).However, given the significant number of the missionswe will be called upon to accomplish for whichtraditional combat effectiveness measures make nosense, we will need to develop new sets of missionmeasures (e.g., for peacekeeping, a normalcyindicator system might be useful13).

Over time, if we make the effort, we will be able toaccumulate evidence of the nature of the relationshipsamong key NCW model variables and measures ofmission effectiveness for a variety of missions underdiffering circumstances. From this continuing streamof data, we can establish linkages to value.

Given that we conduct relatively few real experiments,the bulk of this evidence is bound to come from combatmodels. Unfortunately, most of the models in use todaysimply do not have the ability to deal with the kinds of


changes in command and control, organization, andinformation flows that make NCW different.Furthermore, most do not adequately representintelligent, adaptive behavior. These shortcomings,when added to a virtual lack of models that go beyondtraditional combat to asymmetric situations or that canrepresent coalition operations, do not provide us witha good foundation upon which to build. Hence, unlesswe embark on a serious effort to develop the missionmodels we need, we will not be able to populate thedatabases needed to link the NCW model to measuresof mission effectiveness.

Models alone, however, are not the answer. No onemodel can be expected to satisfy the needs of allanalyses. There will always be factors that are notrepresented well in a particular model. Hence, anystudy team must rely upon a number of models andexperimental results, synthesize them, andsupplement them with sensitivity analyses. Thus, ourability to establish the links between NCW and valuewill ultimately depend upon the nature of the empiricalanalyses and experiments we undertake and uponour ability to conduct high quality analysis.

Transforming DoD Processes to SupportTransformation

In any assessment of progress, we need to considermore than just a snapshot of where we are. We haveonly to look at the adverse consequences ofmaintaining too great a focus on the next quarter inbusiness to see that we need to measure anticipatedfuture performance in addition to measuring where we

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are. Thus, the set of transformation measures shouldcontain a set of leading indicators as well as a set ofsnapshot measures. The “net” as an enabler of NCWis, in effect, a precursor of future NCW capability andthus, is a leading indicator. Progress in our ability tounderstand NCW is also a leading indicator. Both ofthese can be directly related to the development ofNCW applications. But perhaps the most importantinfluence on our future ability to transform is the stateof our business processes.

The current requirements and acquisition processesand their relationships to experimentation are relicsof a previous era. The advent of software and itsincreasing importance in command and controlsystems brought about a new reality—complexadaptive systems. In 1993, a DoD-Industry TaskForce14 concluded that the basic assumptions thatunderpin our requirements, acquisition, and PPBSprocesses were, in fact, incorrect. Specifically, theassumption that we could actually specify requirements(and estimate schedules and costs accurately) beforea system was designed and built is simply untenable.One of the main reasons for this is the inability ofpeople to fully understand a new technology and itsimplications without any experience. Thus, it isimpossible to expect that before the system is built (oradequately prototyped) that its requirements can befully specified. Given the nature of complex adaptivesystems, all systems will need to evolve continuously.Hence, development as a phase in a system life cyclecannot be brought to a conclusion. Our PPBS andacquisition processes with their unrealistic desire foran upfront, fixed set of requirements, costs, andschedule and the distinctions they make between


development, operations, and maintenance actuallycontribute to the cost overruns and schedule slippagethey are trying to minimize. This DoD-Industry TaskForce recommended the use of EvolutionaryAcquisition (EA) and associated changes in the PPBSprocess. Acquisition reform efforts have madeprogress in giving program managers more flexibility,but progress in acquisition reform has not been enoughto keep pace with rapidly advancing informationtechnologies and commercial services. Nor have theybegun to address the issue of the acquisition of amission capability package. Instead, the currentacquisition process still focuses on programs.

Bureaucracies are the butts of many a joke. We makefun of their mindlessness and inflexibility. They arethe archenemies of change. As such, bureaucraciesclearly are obstacles to transformation. Can we createa bureaucracy for change? The problems posed by aset of business practices tuned to the Industrial Ageand the Cold War are formidable. The pace oftransformation will not only depend upon our ability togenerate innovative ideas, but on our ability to bringthem to fruition. We need to address the impedimentspresented by our current approaches to four keyprocesses—requirements, PPBS, acquisition, andexperimentation. By identifying the characteristics ofthese processes that need to change, we can developmeasures (or at least indicants) that reflect progress.

Reforms in the requirements process have also takenplace, but it is still far too focused on the materiel (the big“M” in DOTMLPF) and not organized and focused aroundmission capability packages. The relationship betweenexperimentation and requirements determination iscurrently tenuous at best. Requirements exist and can

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be specified at different levels. At the mission level, thereis currently ample guidance provided by the DefensePlanning Guidance. The DPG also provides direction withrespect to the nature and focus of the Department’sexperimentation activities. Experimentation should takeover from where the DPG leaves off. Requirementsshould be a product of experimentation rather than aninput to a separate requirements process that adds yearsto the process and almost guarantees that innovationwill take the slowest track to our forces. A transformationof the DoD processes would therefore include:

• A move from a program-centric approach to amission capability package approach in ourPPBS, acquisition, and requirementsprocesses. This will provide us with anincreased ability to understand in whichcapabilities we are investing, ascertain theirexpected value, and more realistically assessprogress. It will also provide an improved basisfor making program tradeoffs both within andamong mission capability packages.

• Letting the DPG drive experimentation andexperimentation drive requirements. Giventhe intrinsically joint nature of a network-centricmission capability package, an increasedemphasis needs to be placed on joint andcoalition experiments at all DoD experimentationvenues.

• Developing a fast track from experimentalvalidation of a mission capability package tothe fielding of the mission capabilitypackage. This fast track process should not bean exception to current processes, but should


replace current processes as the normal way todo business.

• Eliminating the distinctions we make betweendevelopment and O&M for systems, shiftinginstead to a life cycle model that allocates acertain amount of resources to coverevolution and provide more flexibility tomanagers. Managers need to be judged on theirability to get the most out of these resources, noton their ability to hit preconceived (often totallyunrealistic) levels of performance and schedulesthat, in fact, cause dysfunctional behaviors andconstrain the ability of systems to adapt.

• Shifting the focus of our experimentationactivities from a preoccupation with mega-events to a balanced approach. This balancedapproach would entail a large number ofdiscovery-oriented events, followed by a smallernumber of hypothesis testing experiments,followed by a few demonstrations and promptadoptions. Currently, there are far too fewdiscovery and hypothesis testing events toadequately support the more visible and well-publicized mega-events.15

Metrics that reflect progress in each of these five areasare discussed below.

Measuring Progress Toward a MissionCapability Package Approach

Progress in moving away from a program-centric to amission capability package approach can bemeasured by the establishment of a baseline and the

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use of simple ratios. The baseline consists of all big“M” programs. The sum of the costs of these programsbecomes the denominator of the ratio while the costsof the programs that will be accounted for andmanaged as part of a mission capability package formsthe numerator. We should expect this ratio to increaseas mission capability packages are formed,accountability is established, and processes are setup to manage these programs.

Measuring Progress To Experiment-DrivenRequirements

As we make progress in integrating experimentationinto mainstream processes that establish priorities,allocate resources, and shape programs (hopefullycollections of activities that are associated with missioncapability packages), we can expect to see fewer andfewer requirements documents that are not a directoutput of experimentation. Again, a baseline ratio, withthe denominator being the number of CRDs andORDs16 approved and the numerator reflecting thosethat were based upon the results of experimentation,should be used.

Measuring Progress in Closing the GapBetween Concept Development and Fielding

There have been a number of initiatives, most notablyACTDs (Advanced Concept and TechnologyDemonstrations), that are designed to insert newtechnology into the force on an accelerated basis.However, many ACTDs have not resulted in adeployable product in a timely manner. Furthermore,


ACTDs represent a very small fraction of theinvestments in technology we make on an annualbasis. Thus, even if ACTDs were all very successfuland resulted in deployed capabilities in timeframescomparable to industry, the vast majority of ourcapability would remain on a very slow track.

The bottom line is, of course, the time it takes fromthe point when we have demonstrated the viability ofa concept to its initial operational capability (IOC). Weneed a valid benchmark of timeliness in order to havea meaningful measure of fast track capability. Whileindustry differs from the DoD in significant ways, anindustry benchmark still provides the most meaningfulpoint of comparison we have at this time. Hence, wewill need to establish, for different types of capabilities,a corresponding industrial capability to use as ayardstick to measure how well we are doing. Once abenchmark is established, a ratio can be constructed—the denominator being the total number ofdevelopments or mission capability packagesdelivered (IOC) and the numerator being those thataccomplished this in a time comparable to industry.

Measuring Progress to a Life Cycle Model

Moving to a true life cycle model will, in all likelihood,require significant changes in traditional ways ofthinking and law. Therefore, progress in this area willbe manifested in changes in process for some time tocome. The DoD needs to develop a long-term strategyto move to a life cycle process that provides flexibilityto program (or mission capability package) managers.This plan needs to establish a set of milestones thatcan be used to measure progress. When progress is

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sufficient to result in mission capability packages andmajor programs that have life cycle funding andmanagement processes in place, we will be able tomore directly measure progress.

Measuring Progress To Balanced Experimentation

A balanced experimentation program will have adifferent distribution of activities and expendituresthan our current efforts. Obviously, no one knowsexact ly what th is d ist r ibut ion should be. 17

Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the currentdistribution is greatly out of balance. Currently,large-scale events dominate the experimentationcalendar. A disproportionate amount of time andresources is devoted to just a few events. However,a single 2-week experiment is not sufficient to settlethe way a headquarters should be designed. Nosingle experiment can adequately test a particularhypothesis. Given the totality of pressures that arecurrent ly being brought to bear on theexperimentation community, I think it is unlikely thatwe will go too far in the near term in allocating moretime and resources to discovery and hypothesisexperiments instead of the mega-events. Thus, wecan measure progress toward a balanced approachto experimentation by the changes in the currentdistribution, specifically the ratios of the “eventdays” devoted annually to each of these three kindsof events.

The metrics discussed in this section provide only aninitial starting point. However, imperfect as they are, ifused, they will give us a better picture than we havetoday. They will allow us to focus attention on how


well we are doing in our efforts to transform the DoDand what areas require more attention. In the process,we will be able to improve these metrics and improveour efforts in transformation.

1Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report toCongress. “Executive Summary.” July 2001. p. i.2The definition of agility in terms of these four attributes wasdeveloped during an ad hoc U.S./UK meeting to discuss NCWand transformation. Work on the definition of agile command andcontrol is currently in progress.3Alberts, David S. The Unintended Consequences of InformationAge Technologies. Washington, DC: National Defense University.April 1996. p. 115.4Note that in this report, this is referred to as a “maturity model.”Upon further reflection, I believe the term “capability model” ismore appropriate.5Widely is not meant to imply a disregard for information security.6In fact, the transformation is best viewed as a journey ratherthan a destination, with each waypoint along the path havingvalue.7Information Superiority—Making the Joint Vision Happen.Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 2000. pp.11-12.8A mission organization is the totality of people that are neededto participate in a given mission and the manner in which theyare related to one another.9A mission-oriented measure that is easy to understandultimately gives credibility to a more abstract DoD-level measure.10Alberts, David S. The Unintended Consequences of InformationAge Technologies. Washington, DC: National Defense University.April 1996. p. 295.11A statistical parameter, the coefficient of variation, reflects theamount of variance explained by a regression (formula that mapsthe values of a set of independent variables into a value of thedependent variable).12There is a wealth of material regarding measures of missioneffectiveness. See: the NATO COBP for Command and ControlAssessment. Washington, DC: CCRP. 1998.13The NATO COBP for C2 Assessment is currently being revised.The revised version, currently in draft form contains a discussionof other mission measures: http://www.dodccrp.org/nato_supp/nato.htm. April 2002.

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14AFCEA Study Team. Evolutionary Acquisition Study. Fairfax,VA: AFCEA. June 7, 1993.15JFCOM Millennium Challenge—http://www.jfcom.mil/About/experiments/mc02.htm. April 2002.16CRDs—capstone requirements documents; ORDs—operational requirements documents.17I will, however, offer the opinion that a better allocation in thenumber of event days (discovery, hypothesis, mega-demonstration) should be on a ratio of 100–20–1. Given thatdiscovery and hypothesis experiments cost far less per day thana mega-event, we would still be spending the bulk of ourexperimental dollars on mega-events.

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CHAPTER 11

TransformationRoadmap

T he development of a DoD TransformationRoadmap is a prerequisite for being able to

manage the large set of diverse tasks that need to beundertaken to transform the DoD into an InformationAge organization. Work on such a roadmap hasrecently begun as the Services and Agencies areengaged in the development of their ownTransformation Roadmaps.1 This section addressesthe question: “What should a good TransformationRoadmap contain?”

While different people will conjure up different visionswhen they hear the word roadmap, most would agreethat a roadmap lays out a path from where we are towhere we want to go. In this case, the path is moreakin to a critical path2 than a road. And the destinationis not an end, but really a beginning. WhileInformation Age mission capability packages are themost visible and immediate products of atransformation effort and their deployments will surelyrepresent milestones along the way, thetransformation of the DoD (the destination) will notbe complete until the organization is capable ofefficient, timely, and continuous adaptation.


Hence, the set of tasks needed to turn out the first setof network-centric mission capability packages will onlyform a subset of the network of interrelated tasks thatare to be included in a Transformation Roadmap. Foras we work on this first set of mission capabilitypackages, we also need to work on the basicprocesses of the DoD. Thus, a TransformationRoadmap needs to identify not only the tasks directlyrelated to the development of innovations, but alsothe tasks needed to facilitate innovation, matureconcepts, and translate these concepts into realoperational capabilities.

Figure 10 depicts the elements of transformationthat need to be expl ic i t ly addressed in aTransformation Roadmap.

Figure 10. Elements of Transformation

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Vision

A Transformation Roadmap should begin with a visionof what the transformed organization would be like.Given that the transformation process is a voyage ofdiscovery, it would be hard to imagine that we could,with any precision, describe what the transformedorganization would look like. Hence the vision of thefuture needs to be expressed in terms of thecharacteristics that are sought.3

The vision provided by the Department’s leadershipneeds to emphasize a determination to harness andleverage information technologies as an essentialpart of the requirement to maintain the militarystrength of the United States in the global arena andto protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities arisingfrom foreign exploitation of information technologies.Moreover, this vision should stress the need to tailorsystems to missions and to focus attention on missioncapabil i ty packages as the vehicle for thedevelopment and delivery of capabilities in acapabilities-based defense strategy.

Joint Vision 2020, Quadrennial Defense Review,Defense Planning Guidance, Network Centric WarfareReport to Congress, and various Service and Agencydocuments each offer a perspective on where we wantto go. These official policy documents have drawnupon and are augmented by a body of visionarywritings by current and former DoD personnel,contractors, and academics. A sense of the future isemerging. The DoD’s Transformation Roadmap willbe incomplete if it neglects to provide a simplearticulation of the nature of a transformed DoD. Given


that such a roadmap will be a living document, it shouldbe expected that this articulation would evolve both incontent and in its expression.

The vision of DoD transformation provided in aTransformation Roadmap will contribute to developinga broad consensus and understanding of the directionin which our leadership seeks to move. The processof transformation to an Information Age organizationneeds to be network-centric. It will involve widespreadsharing of information and collaboration, and be bestaccomplished with a management style that seeks tofoster self-synchronization. Hence, the roadmap’svision serves as the basis for developing the sharedawareness (of the desired future) necessary to achievethe desired emergent behaviors.

Innovation

Following the articulation of the vision, aTransformation Roadmap needs to address howinnovation will be fostered. A distinction needs to bemade between sustaining and disruptive innovations.4

Transformation is all about nurturing and maturingdisruptive innovations. There should be recognitionthat current reward and incentive structures andprocesses favor sustaining innovations at the expenseof disruptive ones. The right climate needs to becreated for disruptive innovation. Impediments todisruptive innovation need to be removed. TheTransformation Roadmap therefore needs to spell outthe specific steps that will be taken to foster innovativethinking and protect its producers and products.

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Coevolution of Transformational MissionCapability Packages

The Transformation Roadmap needs to identify the initialset of missions for which network-centric missioncapability packages will be developed and specify theprocesses that will be used to coevolve them.Experimentation is central to the coevolution of missioncapability packages. A balanced experimentationprogram of discovery, hypothesis testing, anddemonstration events needs to be laid out as part of acampaign. The campaign must be designed to takeinnovative ideas for accomplishing missions, test andrefine them, demonstrate their value, and finally developdeployable capabilities. Research, experimentation, anddemonstration processes are not sufficiently well-coupled to the processes that acquire and fieldoperational capabilities.

Infostructure

Achieving a transformed force depends upon puttingin place a robust, secure, and interoperable network,populating it with quality information and services, andprotecting it. The Transformation Roadmap needs tocontain a plan to migrate our legacy capabilities tothis vision of an integrated infostructure. Furthermore,as indicated elsewhere in this book, current ideasabout information dissemination and “informationmanagement” need to be replaced with newer notions.Systems and processes that rely on push need to bereoriented to rely on pull. A post-before-use paradigmneeds to replace the current sense of informationownership. The Transformation Roadmap also needs


to address how these changes in philosophy andapproach will be incorporated into system design andacquisition activities.

Investment Strategy

Naturally, a roadmap would not be very useful if it didnot contain an investment strategy that provided thedetails of how resources will be allocated (orreallocated) to achieve the desired results.Requirements drive (or should drive) investmentpriorities by allowing us to identify the deltas betweenwhere we are and where we want to go. For example,we already possess a great deal of equipment and alarge number of systems. NCW requires that we havea robustly networked force. It follows that we shouldplace a high priority on making the battlespace entitieswe have “net ready” and building out the infostructurenecessary to provide the links and the informationservices needed (e.g., collaborative environments). Italso stands to reason that we take the necessary stepsto ensure that we secure our network and information.

But we will not be able to do this in a year or even inthe Five-Year Defense Program. Priorities need to beestablished and related to achieving time-phasedcapabilities. A roadmap needs to clearly illuminate themigration strategy chosen, identifying the phasesinvolved in making the network robust and connectingbattlespace entities to it. A strategy based uponselected mission capability packages and the networkimprovements, the platform retrofits, and the newcapabilities needed to make these mission capabilitypackages operational will increase the chances thatinvestments will be coordinated and focused.

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Warfighters can and should help shape therequirements for information and networks andinfluence the DoD’s investments in these by playingan active role in the mission capability packagecoevolution process. The technical and operationalcommunities need to work much more closelytogether to develop new mission capability packageconcepts and to refine these concepts. Given theinstitutional inertia involved in some components ofa mission capability package, these concepts needto be incubated and nurtured long before thetechnology reaches the marketplace. Defenseplanners and budgeters need to think more in termsof mission capability packages than in terms ofindividual programs, using mission capabilitypackages to link the programmatic activities neededto implement or maintain a mission capabilitypackage. This would help ensure that all of thenecessary components are adequately funded andproperly synchronized, thus eliminating onesignificant cause for a mission capability package’slack of completeness or coherence.

Research, Science, and Technology

Private sector efforts, particularly in Information Agetechnologies, will surely drive what products andinformation services will be available in the future. TheDoD conducts and sponsors a great deal of researchto explore areas that are not expected to be adequatelyaddressed by private sector R&D. Nevertheless, someavenues of research central to DoD Transformationare not receiving adequate attention either in the DoDor the private sector. The DoD Transformation


Roadmap needs to identify these key areas andcontain a plan for addressing them. Included shouldbe increased attention to military sensemaking (at theindividual, team, distributed team, organizational, andsocietal levels), command and control approaches thatcan effectively shape the behavior of complex adaptivesystems, techniques and technologies that effectivelydeal with variations in perception, and a variety oftopics related to the integration and testing offederations of heterogeneous systems. These arediscussed in more detail in Chapter 13, Research.

Another area of weakness is our ability to represent(model) and analyze key NCW concepts andrelationships. Given the empirical imperative of suchresearch, the relationship between research,modeling, analysis activities, and experimentationneeds to be explicitly addressed.

People

However often it is said that people are our mostvaluable asset, it is not said often enough.5 AnInformation Age transformation of the DoD requires aworkforce that has been properly educated, trained,motivated, rewarded, and empowered. Our people willneed the right sets of skills and experiences. NoTransformation Roadmap would be complete withoutattention to acquiring and retaining the skills, expertise,and experience needed in an Information Ageorganization. No Transformation Roadmap would becomplete without addressing the steps that will betaken to provide a stimulating and rewardingenvironment for our people.

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DoD Policies and Business Processes

It merits repeating. Current DoD policies andprocesses create major impediments to progress. Ifsuccess depends upon our ability to coevolve missioncapability packages, then it stands to reason that weneed to manage progress, not by function or program,but by mission capabilities. Our planning andbudgeting processes need to be organized aroundmission capabilities. Oversight and managementneed to “matrix” with the primary focus not oncollections of similar programs, but on missioncapability packages. Only then will we be able to putthe needed resources, performance, and scheduletradeoffs in their proper context. In addition todeveloping friendly mission capability packageplanning, budgeting, and acquisition processes,these network-centric, inherently joint missioncapability packages need a secure, robust, andinteroperable infostructure, much of which will consistof COTS technology and shrink-wrapped software.The collection of systems we have today will not meldinto a coherent infostructure without a great deal ofattention and effort. Making this happen will requirechanges in processes and behaviors that serve toput the needs of enterprise f irst and localorganizations second in decisions regarding thedesign and acquisition of the disparate pieces thatcollectively form the infostructure. There are seriousdiscussions underway in each of the Services andAgencies about changes that would make it easierfor them to provide the infostructure that they needand to coevolve mission capability packages. ATransformation Roadmap would not be complete


without addressing the nature of the changes neededto remove or significantly reduce the existingimpediments to progress.

Navigation Aids for the Transformation Journey

A roadmap needs to be able to give a sense of wherewe are relative to where we came from and where wewant to go. If we stray off course, a roadmap shouldshow it. Thus, a roadmap needs to have a locatorsystem and milestones that represent progress.

1Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, DC:Department of Defense. September 30, 2001. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.2The critical path is “the longest path through the network in termsof the total duration of tasks.” http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~ornar/MSD/slides/pert.ppt. April 2002.3That is why the tenets of NCW are framed as they are, not interms of what a NCW solution looks like, but in terms of thecharacteristics (e.g., shared awareness) that it possesses.4Network Centric Warfare Department of Defense Report toCongress. July 2001. pp. 5-1 to 5-12.5The Secretary of Defense has developed a set of 13 principlesfor the DoD. Number 3 says, in part, “Nothing is more importantthan the men and women who work in this Department—theyare its heart and soul and its future.” Memorandum datedFebruary 27, 2002.

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The Way Ahead

A long with the development of a TransformationRoadmap, attention needs to be paid to the way

we think about doctrine, education, training, and theway we approach test and evaluation.

Doctrine

Historically, doctrine has been a distillation of bestpractice and lessons learned, which over time wereclearly documented to form the basis for the initiationof new recruits. It is predicated on the fact that there isa best way to do things and that we know what thatbest way is. Today we are in a period of transition.The old ways of doing business are in the process ofbeing replaced with new ways. This would notnecessitate a fundamental change in the process ofdoctrine creation if it were not for the fact that thedynamics of change are such that we will forevermorebe in a transition. That is, change will not be episodic,but continual. A new way of doing business will notremain the best way for very long. Thus, the entirenotion of doctrine needs to be changed from one ofpublishing “the way” it should be done to a dynamicprocess of learning and sharing best practice.


The various doctrine communities should be involved atthe beginning of the mission capability package conceptdevelopment process and stay involved throughout thisprocess. In NCW, one should not make distinctionsbetween joint and Service doctrine, for doing socontributes to the probability that there will be disconnectsand conflicts that will adversely affect missionperformance. Only by making NCW precepts thefoundation of all doctrine can we ensure that informationwill be properly shared, appropriate collaborations willtake place, and that forces can self-synchronize.

Traditional doctrine is currently an obstacle to progress.Organizations and individuals feel bound to honor itand thus create a mindset and environment notconducive to disruptive innovation. This is becausewhen the nature and distribution of informationchanges, radical new ways of doing business andcomplications in the old ways of doing businessemerge. In many cases, new or modified doctrine canease newly created frictions or simplify the changesnecessary to adapt. Changes in doctrine are oftenessential if the benefits of new information systemsare to be realized and inconsistencies betweencapacity and doctrine avoided. Doctrine should beviewed as fluid and helpful, not static and restrictive.

Involving the doctrine community early will alsofacilitate the key process of embedding doctrine in newsystems. It should be recognized that doctrine is beingwritten or changed when decisions are made aboutwho can receive some class of information, who hasthe workstations from which a database can beupdated, or who is able to access and use someclasses of data. This process needs to be consciously

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and carefully monitored. Unless the doctrinecommunity is involved, technical personnel respondingto technical criteria and standards will be, in effect,making doctrine by default. If, however, the doctrinecommunity is involved, new systems being fielded willcontain and help support the evolution of doctrine.

Education and Training

Professional Military Education (PME) must serve asa change agent for the military grappling with theInformation Age. Raising awareness of the threat,opportunities, and vulnerabilities inherent in thechanges underway can best be done through the PMEstructure. A “teaching hospital” model should beadopted so that this new information is conveyed inthe context of real-world experience and actions, andits impact can be direct and effective.

While some progress has been made toward bringingPME into the Information Age, the process needs tobe accelerated. This involves significant changes inthe curriculum so that all students (not just the onesthat are in technical specialties) become current ininformation technologies (including their advantages,vulnerabilities, limits, and applications) and familiar withtheir likely impact on military affairs. PME institutionsneed to develop methods of teaching that enable (andrequire) students to become computer literate andknowledgeable of how to obtain informationelectronically. Connectivity within and among PMEinstitutions should be routine as well as connectivitybetween PME institutions and the DoD and industry


simulation and training centers with which they havenatural synergy.

Training is perhaps the arena of military affairs whereinformation technology has already had its mostprofound effect, but also remains an arena where muchmore can and should be done. While educated militaryprofessionals are already trained on specificinformation systems, these systems must be masteredand their practical limits learned in the more realistictraining environments. In addition, the emphasis needsto shift from a focus on individual systems to a focuson the network. Moreover, improvements in virtualreality technologies and connectivity are needed toprovide options for diverse mission rehearsal andtraining at a fraction of the cost of field exercises.Defining when and where these lower cost trainingopportunities exist and taking advantage of them mustremain a priority. The most cost-effective systems willbe those that possess embedded training packagesand provide near real-time feedback, easing thecomprehension and retention of lessons learned.

Test and Evaluation

The transformation strategy described in this bookwill result in significant changes in the way we willemploy, acquire, and field systems. These changespose signif icant challenges for the test andevaluation community.1

NCW involves a historic shift in the center of gravityfrom platforms to the network. In NCW, the singlegreatest contributor to combat power is the networkitself. The value of platforms, headquarters, and other

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assets derive their value (in NCW) from their ability tocontribute to the overall effort by virtue of their beingconnected to the net. The marginal value of anunconnected platform pales in comparison to the valueit can generate if it is networked. For example, theinformation generated by a networked sensor servesto enhance the value of all of the other nodes on thenet rather than only a few nodes. Given this shift invalue, the focus of test and evaluation needs to shiftfrom a focus on the performance of individualbattlespace entities to their ability to add to the valueof the networked force.

The ASD(C3I) (who is dually hatted as theDepartment’s CIO) is working to provide theinfostructure needed to support network-centricoperations and the transformation of DoD businessprocesses.2 His organization is committed to:

• Making information available on a network thatpeople depend on and trust;

• Populating the network with new, dynamicsources of information to defeat the enemy; and

• Denying the enemy information advantages andexploiting their weaknesses.

Toward these ends, the OASD(C3I) is working todeploy a ubiquitous, secure, and robust networkeliminating bandwidth, frequency, and computingcapacity limitations. To enhance their ability to makesense out of the available information, they are workingto deploy collaborative environments and otherperformance support tools. At the same time, they are


working to ensure that the DoD network and itsinformation is secure and assured.

Network Centric Warfare is about the sharing ofinformation. This will require policies and programsthat ensure that the net is populated and continuouslyrefreshed with quality data including intelligence,nonintelligence, raw, and processed. Information noton the net has very limited value. It is recognized thatall users of information are also suppliers and that assuppliers they have a responsibility to post informationbefore they use it, thereby ensuring that all theinformation is available to those who need it. This moveaway from a “supplier push” mentality is simply arecognition of the fact that no one can possibly knoweveryone who can put the information to good use,appreciate the tolerance for ambiguity of others, orunderstand how the information could be effectivelyused. A move from push to pull shifts the burden forfinding the information they need to the users.

Awareness, a touchstone of NCW, is not a property ofa system but an attribute to be found in the cognitivedomain. Measuring what information is available in asystem is not an adequate measure of the level ofawareness achieved. We would be remiss if we didnot address the myriad issues related to the ability ofour forces to make sense out of the informationavailable on the net.

Information is not always easy to get. Our ability topopulate the net with quality information will depend,in part, upon our ability to develop new ways to gainaccess to information. We seek to surprise the enemywith the information we are using by collectingpersistent, responsive, exquisite intelligence. An

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important aspect of the transformation involves a shiftin the nature of the missions we are able to perform.For the most part, these nontraditional missionsrequire new types of information that, in turn, involvenew sources.

At the same time that we are enhancing our owninformation-related capabilities, we must seek to denythese advantages to others. Therefore, our ability toconduct offensive information operations is essential.As adversaries will seek to do the same to us, we mustimplement full spectrum security.

It is clear that the properties that we seek to achieveare not properties of a system but properties of anetwork, a network that is dynamic in a number ofdimensions. It is also clear that the DoD’s effortscannot be confined to the physical and informationdomains, but need to extend to the cognitive domain.We must move beyond the current focus ofsupporting individual commanders or units to abroader focus of supporting groups of distributedindividuals working collaboratively.

The challenges for both the development and T&Ecommunities are considerable. New ways toinstrument, analyze, and evaluate federations ofsystems and distributed teams operating in anetworked environment are needed. Reality is the only“test environment” that will allow us to adequately testnew systems along with coevolved processes. We willtherefore need to find ways to add and subtractsystems and capabilities to the current baseline,without destroying the integrity/security of theoperational system, assessing proposed incrementsboth in situ and on the fly. Perhaps our greatest


challenge will be to assess our ability to deal withvarious types of attacks on our system while ensuringthat vital operations are not harmed or degraded.

We also need measures that reflect more than systemperformance or indeed the performance of a federationof systems. We need to be able to assess all of thelinks in the NCW value chain. But the transformationof test and evaluation will be about more than what ismeasured and how it is measured, it will also be abouthow test and evaluation activities relate to theorganizations and processes that develop newconcepts and coevolve mission capability packages.Central to this coevolution process is experimentation.One cannot say in advance exactly what level ofperformance is needed, nor the consequencesassociated with higher or lower levels of performance.Hence, it makes no sense to try to establish pass/failstandards in advance. In fact, it is just these thingsthat concept-based experimentation is supposed todetermine. The partnership between developers andoperators that is developing in experimentation settingsneeds to extend to the test and evaluation communityas well. We need to work toward achieving a processin which all the participants lend their expertise andexperience to first innovate, and then refine andimprove a capability over time.

There is an imperfect yet telling analogy that can bedrawn involving the changes that have taken place inthe business world between producers and suppliers.Once there existed an arm’s length, almost adversarial,relationship between producers and suppliers. Neitherwould share information with the other for fear that itwould be used against them. Today you see producers

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and suppliers working closely together to achievegreater levels of quality and efficiency. Suppliers nowhave a much better idea of what the needs ofproducers are, and producers now better understandwhat it takes to supply them with what they need. Thenet result has been greater stability, dramaticimprovements in cost structures, and higher quality,resulting in improved value to customers and moreprofit all around. A closer working relationship betweenT&E and the operational and technical communitiespromises analogous gains.

What We Need to Measure

Network Centric Warfare is predicated upon the abilityto create and share a high level of awareness and touse this shared awareness to rapidly self-synchronizeeffects. This will allow us to bring all the availableinformation and all of our assets to bear, greatlyincreasing combat power. Of course, NCW requiresthat we think about information differently, particularlythe way we disseminate it. Peer-to-peer relationshipsand information exchanges will predominate. The edgeof the organization will be empowered. Command willoften involve choosing from a set of alternativespresented from the edge, rather than guiding acentralized planning process. This in turn affects theattributes of information systems that are mostimportant to us and hence has profound implicationsfor test and evaluation.

The T&E community has a lot to offer, but itscontribution to the transformation will depend upon itsown transformation. An independent, highly


1This section is based upon a draft of a guest editorial by-lineJohn Stenbit, the ASD(C3I), prepared for the ITEA Journal’sJune issue.2For a discussion of the ASD(C3I)’s vision and priorities, seewww.c3i.osd.mil.

professional test and evaluation community is neededmore than ever to ensure that the capabilities beingdeveloped and deployed are thoroughly tested andaccurately assessed. It will, however, take a concertedeffort for the operational, experimentation, and varioustest and evaluation communities to come together toachieve this goal.

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CHAPTER 13

Research

To support the transformation of the DoD, moreresearch is needed in at least the following six

specific areas:

1. Performance characteristics of federations of Information Age systems;

2. Cognitive processes;

3. Behaviors of distributed teams;

4. Collaboration;

5. Sensemaking; and

6. New command concepts.

Performance Characteristics of Federations ofInformation Age Systems

The systems environment in which we will operate inthe Information Age will differ in a number of significantways from the systems environment we becameaccustomed to in the last decades of the 20th century.A major assumption that is at the heart of traditionalapproaches to modeling is that we can understandthe complexity of our systems by decomposing themand getting a handle on the pieces. This bottom-upapproach was never able to keep up with the growing


complexity of the systems we were building, nor theincreasing lack of control we could exercise over thebehavior of the collection of systems we use. A bruteforce approach, one based upon identifying all of thethreads through a system and systematically testingeach one, quickly becomes intractable by virtue of thefact that the performance of the system as a whole isdependent on the distribution of active threads. Hence,they could not be tested in isolation. The combinatorialchallenge simply proved too great. We currently lackthe science and technology for building networks thatbehave like complex adaptive systems. Therefore, anew approach to understanding the dynamics ofcomplex systems behavior (the ecology of systems)is needed to help us understand and predictperformance in all of the dimensions of interest.Included among these dimensions are systemresponse times, availability, repeatability, security, andperformance under stresses of various kinds. Thesestresses can be a result of nonmalicious degradationscaused by the dynamics of the battlefield anddisruptions caused by component and/orcommunications failures. But they can also be causedby deliberate, orchestrated, malicious acts of anadversary. The basics of system engineering (design,protocols, and approaches to hardware and softwaredevelopment and testing) need to be reviewed andnew approaches better suited to federated systemsin a hostile environment need to be developed. Newmodels that reflect the reality of federations of systemsand a hostile environment need to be developed aswell so that we can do a better job of predictinginfostructure performance (system scalability),identifying and understanding our vulnerabilities,developing better methods to recognize and manage

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anomalies and their consequences, and developingstrategies to deny adversaries the use of effectiveinformation systems.

In addition to developing an ability to understand thebehavior of complex adaptive systems, we need todevelop better approaches to engineering federationsof systems. There will always be a crippling legacyproblem if we do not develop new approaches toscalable “plug and play” approaches that involvedynamically negotiated protocols that give a collectionof systems the ability to accept new players and tomigrate itself to newer and better protocols. A numberof “end to end” capabilities need to emerge from acollection of systems for the collection to be useful inmilitary operations. These “end to end” propertiesinclude assured delivery, authentication, security, andinteroperability (both technical and semantic).

A shift from information push to information pull isnecessary to achieve the level of information sharingneeded to support NCW. How this shift will affect thefederation of systems is not clear. We need theoriesand models that help us understand the implicationsof this shift and to predict behaviors. We also need todevelop the “announcements,”1 browsers, and agentsneeded to recognize new sources of information asthey emerge and incorporate them into anticipatorypull arrangements.

The DoD requires collaboration environments thatadequately support the full range of collaborativebehaviors needed for NCW. The ability to support manyindependent groups simultaneously puts an enormousstress on a federation of systems. As if on cue, theconcepts and technologies that constitute what is


known as Internet 3.02 are beginning to emerge fromcorporate R&D into the marketplace. The implicationsof these technologies, and the way in which they arelikely to develop, need to be better understood.

Cognitive Processes

Higher levels of NCW maturity rely heavily upon theachievement of shared awareness. Awareness is nota system property of a human-machine interfacing,but a property of human cognition. Among thedeterminants of the level of awareness achieved andthe degree to which it is shared are perceptions, apriori knowledge, familiarity with the situation, the mixof information and misinformation present, the orderin which information is received, and trust relationships.The degree to which awareness is shared dependsupon many of these same factors as well as differencesamong the team members in knowledge, skills,experience, and culture. How these all play togetheris an area that we do not sufficiently understand.Answering questions related to how cognitiveprocesses and the independent variables that influencethese processes affect awareness and sharedawareness in military situations needs to be a topresearch priority.

Humans have trouble in dealing with uncertainty andrisk. Yet uncertainty and risk are an inherent part ofmilitary operations. We need to focus some researchon these areas so that we can better understand notonly how to improve an individual’s ability to deal withthem, but to understand how differences that exist fromindividual to individual affect their interactions.

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Behaviors of Distributed Teams

As NCW becomes a reality, more of the tasks thatmilitaries undertake will be performed by distributedteams. How teams work is a subject that has receivedsome attention, but little of it has been focused inmilitary domains with the pressures inherent in thesesituations. The interactions that have been possiblehave, of course been limited to the capabilities ofour information and telecommunications systems.The enormous improvements in the “richness ofinteraction” (the third dimension, after richness andreach, of the economics of information) that are inthe pipeline are sure to affect the behavior ofdistributed teams. We need to know far more thanwe currently do about this behavior so that we canbetter focus our experiments and determine theranges of expected team performance.

Collaboration

Collaboration is also a key component of matureapplications of NCW principles. Collaborativeprocesses in military organizations, particularlycollaboration across echelons and horizontal functionalcollaboration, are relatively new and untested. Thereis a limited body of knowledge in this area—a body ofknowledge that needs to be significantly expandedand applied to the military domain. Work needs to bedone to identify the various forms of collaboration,understand their characteristics, and relate them tomilitary tasks and situations. Coalitions will be ofparticular importance in future military operations.Cross-cultural collaborations present a unique set ofchallenges that must be better understood.


Sensemaking

Our current view of military decisionmaking is fartoo simplistic. Recent research has demonstratedthat the rational decisionmaking process taught inmany business schools is not the one that is actuallyused by experts in highly stressful situations. Thedeliberate planning process used by militaryheadquarters is currently based upon the rationalmodel of option generation and evaluation.Research in both U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Armycommand centers has shown that the deliberatecourse of action and planning processes are seldomused. The dominant alternative, naturalist icdecisionmaking, depends on the commander ordecisionmaker perceiving the situation as “familiar”or within their expertise. When this condition doesnot apply, they are likely to first seek a dominantcourse of action (one they perceive wil l besuccessful regardless of what the adversary doesor how the situation develops). Failing to find adominant course of action, military decisionmakerscan be expected to apply a “minimax” approach,seeking to minimize the likelihood of an undesirableoutcome first, then seeking to maximize their ownexpected utility within the remaining decision space.Only when al l these approaches fai l wi l lcommanders apply the formal logic of multi-attributeutility theory (MAUT) that underlies deliberatecourse of action analysis and planning. This processmay not be the best way to make sense out of asituation. A review of past failures3 indicates thatthe errors that were made were a result, not of alack of the proper information, but of the inability tomake sense out of it. Sensemaking encompasses

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the range of cognitive activities undertaken byindividuals, teams, organizations, and indeedsocieties to develop awareness and understandingand to relate this understanding to a feasible actionspace. A major research effort is needed to explorethe issues in sensemaking, the factors that influenceour sensemaking abilities, and how it relates tomilitary situations, both familiar and unfamiliar.

The improvement of sensemaking4 within a network-centric organizational construct requires anunderstanding of individual and collective processesby which tacit knowledge (e.g., experience, expertise,culture) is combined with real-time information toidentify, form, and articulate appropriate decisionpoints in an ongoing military operation. Theseprocesses can be described in terms of four generalcapabilities involved in the transformation of real-timebattlespace information into appropriate decisionevents and command intent:

1. Shared Situation Awareness—the capability to extract meaningful activities and patterns from the battlespace picture and to share this awareness across the network with appropriate participants.

2. Congruent Understanding and Prediction—the capability to temporally project these activities and patterns into alternative futures so as to identify emerging opportunities and threats.

3. Effective Decisionmaking—the capability to form focused and timely decisions that proactively and accurately respond to these


emerging opportunities and threats with available means and capabilities.

4. Clear and Consistent Command Intent—the capability to articulate decisions in terms of desired goals/effects, constraints, and priorities that are functionally aligned across the network and with other participating organizations.

Sensemaking extends from the cognitive domain intothe information domain inasmuch as it is built upon areal-time battlespace picture created by the fusion anddisplay of data and information from a variety ofelectronic and human sources available to the network.

Sensemaking also relies upon hardware/softwarecapabilities within the information domain to supportcollaboration and synchronization through theexchange of information, issues, perspectives, andcommand intent among network participants. As such,research within the fields of computer science,information science, and cognitive science is neededto make meaningful contributions to an understandingof individual and organizational sensemaking throughimproved visualization methods, decision supporttools, and collaboration support tools. As part of this,research should also focus on the degree to whichexisting information system technology represents anobstacle to maintaining organizational agility andsensemaking reliability under conditions of high stressand situational novelty.

However, the bulk of sensemaking performance at theindividual, team, and organization levels falls largelywithin the cognitive domain. Sensemaking in militaryoperations involves streams of decision events that

139Chapter 13

occur simultaneously over different functional areas.Here, it is expected that the fields of cognitivepsychology, group/team dynamics, organizationalpsychology, management science, sociology, politicalscience, history, and complexity theory will makesubstantial contributions in addressing the followingclusters of research issues:

Structural Issues—How is tacit knowledge formed,organized, shared, reconciled, and used within theorganization? What are the specific knowledgestructures most often used in capturing militaryexperience, expertise, and culture within anorganization (e.g., idioms, paradigms, theories ofaction, third-order controls, stories)? How commonlyheld are these structures and what are themechanisms for identifying and reconciling importantdifferences? To what degree can these structuresbe explicitly captured and documented in the form ofgoals, effects, constraints, templates, procedures,and policy? How is tacit knowledge distributed withinan organization in comparison to the availability ofreal-time information? How is tacit knowledge alignedor misaligned with decision authority within anorganization? To what degree can tacit knowledgebe explicitly codified and made available throughtraining for improving the cohesiveness of commandand staff operations?

Process Issues—How are these various knowledgestructures employed to reduce situational ambiguityor to cope with information overload? In what wayscan the sensemaking process collapse through theemergence of nonlinearity or novelty? How doindividuals and expert teams exchange and reconciletacit knowledge differences across different domains


of expertise? How does leadership style affect themanagement of the sensemaking process within theorganization? In what ways are windows of decisionopportunity identified and formed (e.g., decisionparameters, constraints, objectives) within an ongoingoperation? What conditions dictate the use of aparticular decision modality (e.g., formal analytic,recognition primed, risk management)? How doindividuals, teams, and organizations cope withstreams of simultaneous decision windows (i.e., avoidattention fixation, misuse of expertise, etc)?

Adjustment Issues—How do individuals and teamsrapidly acquire new tacit knowledge in novel situationswhere previous experience, expertise, and culture areno longer relevant? As organizations face complex andnovel operational environments, what are the variousstructural, cognitive, and procedural mechanisms foradjusting the sensemaking process and maintainingdecisionmaking reliability? In what ways do fixedorganizational structures, procedures, and authoritypatterns present obstacles to maintainingorganizational agility and reliability under conditionsof high stress and environmental novelty?

A major research effort is needed to address theseissues. Given the important influence of culturaldifferences on the effectiveness of sensemakingactivities, this research needs to be conducted not onlyfrom a joint perspective, but also from a coalition oneas well.

New Command Concepts

Most of what we call command and control researchis focused upon the technologies and systems that

141Chapter 13

support command and control. Some is focused uponstaff processes. Almost no research is focused on thenature of command and control itself. NCW, in its mostmature form, involves profound changes in the role ofa commander and the relationships between acommander, a commander’s staff, subordinates, andsuperiors. NCW impacts who has what information,how well the situation is understood, and the degreeto which this understanding is shared. As a result, theinformation environment in which our forces willoperate differs considerably from the informationenvironment that prevailed when our current approachto command and control was developed. It took a verylong time for our current notions about command andcontrol to evolve. We can not afford the time it willtake to naturally adapt to changes in the informationenvironment.

Although we have some experiences with neworganizational forms and management approaches inother domains, we have only limited experience anda very limited amount of experimentation dataregarding the effectiveness of new approaches tocommand and control. What we have is promising,but not nearly enough to understand how best toexercise command and control in this new informationenvironment.

Therefore, we need to undertake a major researcheffort to understand the command and controlimplications of an Information Age environment. Weneed to test and verify the tenets of NCW. Forexample, we need to find answers to the followingquestions. Under what circumstances does self-synchronization work? How can command intent be


best articulated? What sorts of command interventionsare needed to maintain control?

Coalition command and control is an area that meritsspecial attention. Experience with coalition operationsover the last decade shows that our preconceivednotions of how this should work do not pan out inpractice. Instead of having one objective function tomaximize, as in the case where someone is clearly incharge, coalition operations involve multiple objectivefunctions in a state of tension. This research is neededto help focus and guide our growing experimentationactivities. A small amount of well-directed researchwill result in a far more effective and efficient programof experimentation, paying for itself in short order.

In fact, I think that the time has come to reconsiderthe use of the term “command and control,” particularlyin the coalition context. Any reconsideration ofIndustrial Age command and control is bound to makemany commanders uncomfortable. However,consideration of new command concepts is an inherentpart of the transformation to an Information Ageorganization. “Command” implies that there issomeone in charge. In a coalition environment (in factit could be argued, in most circumstances), no singleentity is in charge. Rather, the goals of an operationare derived from a consultative process. The same istrue when it comes to carrying out intent. No one entityis in charge. Progress is made by virtue of a series ofcollaborations. Finally, the very notion of control is hardto reconcile with the complexity of today’senvironments and operations. Convergence seemslike a more realistic goal. Hence, I would think that C3should now stand for Consultation, Collaboration, andConvergence. At any rate, a research effort in this area

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will eventually show us the limits of command andcontrol, or if you will, C3.

1Announcements are needed to let the users (pullers) ofinformation aware of the new source.2Fagin, Robert and Chris Kwak. Internet Infrastructure andServices. Bear Stearns. May 2001.3The CCRP Sensemaking Report—http://www.dodccrp.org/Sm_Symposium/docs/FinalReport/Sensemaking_Final_Report.htm.April 2002.4This discussion of sensemaking borrows heavily uponconversations with and material prepared by Dr. Richard Hayesand Dr. Dennis Leedom of Evidence Based Research, Inc.

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Concluding Thoughts

U nintended consequences wil l naturallyaccompany the introduction of Information Age

concepts and technologies as individuals andorganizations adapt their behaviors and processes.Some of these unintended consequences will, if notproperly recognized and managed, cause significantproblems that could affect the success of militaryoperations. Other unintended consequences, ifproperly recognized, offer opportunities for dramaticincreases in military effectiveness and efficiency.Thus, there is potential for both the benefits as wellas the dangers. By working to create the properenvironment to foster innovation and by adopting anapproach to change based upon the coevolution ofmission capability packages, the risks can beeffectively managed while we increase the probabilitythat opportunities will be recognized and seized.

Recent experiences in Afghanistan have shown thatwe have certainly not lost our ability to innovate underfire. We must all work hard to make this spirit ofinnovation not a wartime-only event, but part and parcelof everyday life.

1994 - PresentTitle Author(s) Year

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Coalition Command and Control Maurer 1994

Command, Control, and the Common Defense Allard 1996

Command and Control in Peace Operations Alberts & Hayes 1995

Command Arrangements for Peace Operations Alberts & Hayes 1995

Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security Alberts & Czerwinski 1997

Coping with the Bounds Czerwinski 1998

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND INFORMATION WARFARE

Behind the Wizard's Curtain Krygiel 1999

Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors Libicki 1997

Defensive Information Warfare Alberts 1996

Dominant Battlespace Knowledge Johnson & Libicki 1996

From Network-Centric to Effects-Based Operations Smith 2002

Information Age Anthology Vol. I Alberts & Papp 1997

Information Age Anthology Vol. II Alberts & Papp 2000

Information Age Anthology Vol. III Alberts & Papp 2001

Information Age Transformation Alberts 2002

Understanding Information Age Warfare Alberts, Garstka, Hayes, & Signori 2001

Information Warfare and International Law Greenberg, Goodman, & Soo Hoo 1998

The Mesh and the Net Libicki 1994

Network Centric Warfare Alberts, Garstka, & Stein 1999

Standards: The Rough Road to the Common Byte Libicki 1995

The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies Alberts 1996

What Is Information Warfare? Libicki 1995

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Confrontation Analysis: How to Win Operations Other Than War Howard 1999

Doing Windows B. Hayes & Sands 1999

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Next Century Sovereign 1998

Information Campaigns for Peace Operations Avruch, Narel, & Siegel 2000

Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti Daly Hayes & Wheatley, eds. 1996

Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience Wentz, ed. 1998

Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience Wentz, ed. 2002

NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process Davidson, Landon, & Daly Hayes 1996

Operations Other Than War Alberts & Hayes 1995

Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance Ullman & Wade 1996

Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations Siegel 1998

For further information on CCRP, please visit our Web site at

www.dodccrp.org

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