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LEVERAGING TRANSFORMATION:SURFACE DEPLOYMENT &DISTRIBUTION COMMAND

(SDDC) IN OKINAWA, JAPAN

BY

COLONEL RICHARD J. KRAMERUnited States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:Approved for Public Release.

Distribution is Unlimited.

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of therequirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree.The views expressed in this student academic researchpaper are those of the author and do not reflect theofficial policy or position of the Department of theArmy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

USAWC CLASS OF 2009

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Associationof Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on

Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and theCouncil for Higher Education Accreditation.

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OMB No. 0704-0188Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining thedata needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducingthis burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currentlyvalid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

23-02-20092. REPORT TYPE

Strategy Research Project3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Leveraging Transformation: Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC) inOkinawa, Japan

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

Colonel Richard J. Kramer

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Professor Bernie GriffardCenter for Strategic Leadership

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORTNUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

U.S. Army War College122 Forbes Avenue

Carlisle, PA 17013 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

NUMBER(S)

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Distribution A: Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

Effective deployment and sustainment of United States expeditionary armed forces requires Surface Deployment andDistribution Command (SDDC) to implement all efficiencies and take advantage of all opportunities available to increaseorganizational flexibility and streamline seaport planning, operations and management. Challenged by the strategic globalrealignment of the United States, changes in the commercial shipping industry, and demand for further cost efficiencies, SDDChas restructured many of their permanent worldwide seaport operations. However, in certain key areas these efforts fall shortof adequately transforming, and providing full support to the Combatant Commander. Using Okinawa, Japan as a case studywill show how SDDC can further leverage transformation options, their impacts on overall costs, and operations to improvecontingency planning.

15. SUBJECT TERMS Stevedore & Terminal Related Services (S&TRS) Contract, Global Privately Owned Vehicle Contract (GPC),Okinawa Seaports, Government Furnished Materials (GFM), Afloat Preposition Program (APS), Maritime Preposition Squadron (MPS),Common User Land Transportation (CULT), Naha Military Port (NMP), Naha Port International Container Terminal (NPICT)16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION

OF ABSTRACT18. NUMBEROF PAGES

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a. REPORT

UNCLASSIFEDb. ABSTRACT

UNCLASSIFEDc. THIS PAGE

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

LEVERAGING TRANSFORMATION: SURFACE DEPLOYMENT &DISTRIBUTION COMMAND (SDDC) IN OKINAWA, JAPAN

by

Colonel Richard J. KramerUnited States Army

Professor Bernie GriffardProject Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master ofStrategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by theCommission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Collegesand Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. TheCommission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agencyrecognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for HigherEducation Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of theauthor and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of theArmy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War CollegeCARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Richard J. Kramer

TITLE: Leveraging Transformation: Surface Deployment & DistributionCommand (SDDC) in Okinawa, Japan

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 23 February 2009 WORD COUNT: 5,497 PAGES: 32

KEY TERMS: Stevedore & Terminal Related Services (S&TRS) Contract, GlobalPrivately Owned Vehicle Contract (GPC), Okinawa Seaports,Government Furnished Materials (GFM), Afloat PrepositionProgram (APS), Maritime Preposition Squadron (MPS), CommonUser Land Transportation (CULT), Naha Military Port (NMP), NahaPort International Container Terminal (NPICT)

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Effective deployment and sustainment of United States expeditionary armed

forces requires Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) to implement

all efficiencies and take advantage of all opportunities available to increase

organizational flexibility and streamline seaport planning, operations and management.

Challenged by the strategic global realignment of the United States, changes in the

commercial shipping industry, and demand for further cost efficiencies, SDDC has

restructured many of their permanent worldwide seaport operations. However, in

certain key areas these efforts fall short of adequately transforming, and providing full

support to the Combatant Commander. Using Okinawa, Japan as a case study will

show how SDDC can further leverage transformation options, their impacts on overall

costs, and operations to improve contingency planning.

LEVERAGING TRANSFORMATION: SURFACE DEPLOYMENT & DISTRIBUTIONCOMMAND (SDDC) IN OKINAWA, JAPAN

Fifty years ago most cargo moved in surface vessels as “Break-Bulk” loaded on

pallets and lifted on or off vessels in cargo nets by either ship’s gear or shore cranes.

Containerization changed ocean shipping forever.1 Now vessels carry thousands of

individual containers, discharging and reloading in hours vice days and weeks at each

seaport of call. Service frequency, efficiency and volume are keys to a profitable

shipping carrier in today’s competitive market environment.

The DoD organization most affected by changes in commercial transportation is

the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the Army

Component Command (ACC), of the United States Transportation Command

(USTRANSCOM). SDDC’s mission is to “provide global surface deployment and

distribution services to meet the nation’s objectives.”2 They are the focal point for

surface shipping and must deliver services at the right place, at the right time, and with

value-added to meet its stakeholder’s demands. Meeting these demands requires

compliance with Defense Transportation System (DTS) standards for cargo in-transit

visibility, continued collaboration with partners and their stakeholders, and using

feedback to improve SDDC business approaches.

As vessels increased in draft and length, many private and military seaports

could no longer accommodate these modern vessels or support containerized handling

requirements such as maintaining overhead gantry cranes. SDDC changed with

industry by reducing the scope and manning of military seaports worldwide, as they

were able to leverage commercial seaport capability. They used contracting in three

ways to further increase overall efficiency and costs. First, they awarded Stevedore &

2

Related Terminal Services (S&RTS) contracts at military and commercial seaports.3

These requirements-based contracts replaced hundreds of military and civilian

personnel who used to plan, execute and operate military seaports. When requested by

a SDDC Contract Officer Representative (COR), the stevedore contractor provides the

manpower and specialized equipment, and is only paid for labor and equipment

ordered, the cargo moved and specialized equipment or services ordered by the COR.

Second, SDDC awarded the Universal Services Contract (USC),4 a worldwide contract

to move DoD cargo door to door for both unit moves and sustainment cargo.

Commercial carriers bid periodically on shipping routes from seaport to seaport as well

as inland line-haul costs and other associated accessorial services. The USC covers

both costs of moving containers as well as break-bulk cargo (usually moved via flat-

racks).5 The contract allows the military flexibility in planning shipments, both large and

small, as well as achieving cost effectiveness in most cases. Third, SDDC outsourced a

large portion of their daily seaport workload with implementation of a Global Privately

Owned Vehicle (POV) Contract (GPC) in 1998.6

While supporting current war efforts for deployment, redeployment and

sustainment operations, SDDC continues to transform as they reduce their number of

command layers and consolidate operations in response to Base Realignment and

Closure Commission (BRAC).7 Another factor impacting SDDC transformation efforts is

the Army’s plan for Global Repositioning of Forces. This largest force shift since WWII

changes SDDC’s sustainment and workload dynamics worldwide. In the Pacific, Hawaii

and Alaska are growing in military end strength while Korea is reducing forces. In

Okinawa, 8,000 Marines are scheduled to move to Guam over the next decade. With

3

increased pressure on cost savings and efficiency, SDDC needs to continue reforms to

realign manpower to meet future force requirements, while satisfying all current

exercise, contingency and sustainment missions. To illustrate the complexity of the

challenges facing SDDC, this paper will focus on Okinawa, Japan. Okinawa’s seaports’

workloads, limitations and challenges will be discussed within the context of fourteen

issues. The issues are broken down in three categories: outsourcing of non-core

competencies; cost avoidance; and improved war fighter support readiness.

An Overview of SDDC in Okinawa, Japan

SDDC uses four seaports to support military operations in Okinawa: Naha

Military Port (NMP); Tengan Pier, White Beach (which has both a Navy and Army Pier),

and Naha Port International Container Terminal (NPICT). A discussion of the

advantages, disadvantages and workloads (see Table 1) follows:8

Table 1: Characteristics of Okinawa Seaports

4

The 835th US Transportation Battalion (SDDC) operates out of Naha Military

Port, which is used for exercise cargo as well as retrograde or fielding cargo

requirements. Table 2 depicts the workload at NMP over the last ten years.9 The

downward trend in the numbers of vessels, and cargo volume is reflective of the

changing ocean shipping environment, as well as the physical restrictions of NMP to

berth modern vessels. First, more and more cargo is going via the USC Contract

through NPICT as containerized or flat-rack cargo as it is more cost effective, efficient

and on a Time Definite Delivery (TDD) schedule. Second, due to post 9/11 operational

deployment requirements, annual exercise deployments to Korea, Philippines, Thailand

and Australia have been smaller in scope than in previous years. Third, smaller

exercises mean less justification to obtain a commercial charter vessel, or a Military

Sealift Command (MSC) vessel to meet requirements (other than for movement of

exercise munitions), which leads to more and more 100% commercial operations where

cargo is containerized or flat-racked under the USC from seaport to seaport, unloaded

and trucked to exercise sites. Fourth, NMP is too shallow (28 feet)10 and its turning

radius is too small (700 feet) to accommodate most modern Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO)

vessels in the commercial and military inventory. Lastly, the Marines contracted a High

Speed Vessel (HSV), the West Pac Express (WPE)11 which is berthed at NMP and used

to move exercise cargo (32,000 square feet or RO/RO capacity) and up to 900

passengers to and from exercise sites. The operational disadvantage of the WPE is its

straight ramp at the stern that can’t slew to allow loading or discharging at a pier or

berth, only at an L shaped berth.12 NMP berth 5 is L Shaped and meets WPE

requirements. The USMC has contract options on the WPE until 2012.

5

Import #Vessels Pieces MTs Export #Vessels Pieces MTs

1999 15 251 43059 1999 14 272 49429

2000 16 301 41359 2000 13 377 26906

2001 17 487 30348 2001 13 446 40572

2002 10 333 32601 2002 10 368 25194

2003 12 526 83470 2003 14 649 77119

2004 11 459 55029 2004 9 515 38088

2005 8 362 43015 2005 9 551 40552

2006 11 463 47886 2006 9 325 24428

2007 10 411 29049 2007 12 460 20263

2008 9 216 10005 2008 10 276 14464

TOTAL 119 3809 415821 TOTAL 113 4239 357015

Table 2: NMP Workload Statistics

Tengan Pier, located near USMC Base Camp Courtney, is used for import and

export in support of ammunition operations. The Pier is 100 feet wide, 806 feet long

and the water depth is 36 feet. Because of the height of the pier, it is more suited for

Break Bulk (BB) operations in support of small exercises than any RO/RO operation.

The staging area at this pier is limited, and the site is often subject to protesters, who

are against military operations.13 Table 3 shows the last ten years workload statistics of

Tengan Pier.14

Import #Vessels CNTRS MTs Export #Vessels CNTRS MTs

1999 8 177 7165 1999 6 95 11559

2000 1 4 128 2000 1 12 384

2001 4 122 3218 2001 3 66 1914

2002 5 119 4615 2002 5 47 9150

2003 5 64 5060 2003 2 75 3404

2004 4 37 1434 2004 3 213 7104

2005 2 205 6726 2005 2 140 4760

2006 3 28 952 2006 2 21 705

2007 4 152 6826 2007 5 270 8731

2008 4 191 6424 2008 4 81 2629

TOTAL 40 1099 42548 TOTAL 33 1020 50340

Table 3: Tengan Pier Workload Statistics

6

White Beach is a Naval Base having both a Navy and Army Pier. The Army Pier

is used mostly for bulk fuel receipt, but could be used in support of small exercise

deployments and redeployments with advance coordination. Most fuel vessels arrive

from mainland Japan with at least seven to ten days notice and are discharged within

three to five hours.15 Most scheduled exercise deployment and redeployment windows

for Okinawa are known months in advance and usually completed within an eight hour

shift, so berthing can be de-conflicted. In 2007 White Beach Army Pier was used only

69 days,16 so additional cargo operations are feasible. Limiting factors of the White

Beach Army Pier are the length of (612 feet), depth of water at the pier (28 feet), pier

width (80 feet), fuel hook ups on the pier could be damaged by Lift-On/Lift-Off (LO/LO)

or RO/RO operations, available vehicle staging is very limited and the road network to

and from White Beach is narrow and congested. The Navy East Pier is superior in

length (977 feet), depth (35 feet) and pier width (100 feet). SDDC indicates that the

Navy Pier could handle a Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR)17 vessel.18

Table 4 shows the ten year history on White Beach cargo operations.19

Import #Vessels CNTRS MTs Export #Vessels CNTRS MTs

1999 0 0 0 1999 0 0 0

2000 1 0 1241 2000 0 0 0

2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 0

2002 0 0 0 2002 0 0 0

2003 0 0 0 2003 0 0 0

2004 1 2 68 2004 1 276 27459

2005 0 0 0 2005 0 0 0

2006 0 0 0 2006 1 40 1941

2007 1 57 3618 2007 1 298 11393

2008 0 0 0 2008 0 0 0

TOTAL 3 59 4927 TOTAL 3 614 40793

Table 4: White Beach Cargo Operation Statistics

7

NPICT receives over 7,500 import and over 600 export DoD containers annually

for Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES), Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA),

House Hold Goods (HHGs) and Service repair parts. DoD is NPICTs largest single

customer by revenue.20 The port opened its first 1,000 foot berth in 1997 and its

second 1,000 foot berth in 2006. The seaport channel and berths are dredged to 46-50

feet in depth and are able to handle the largest vessels made to include a Navy carrier.

The port equipment is new; road access is excellent; stadium lighting is superior; and it

maintains over two million square feet of paved staging and eight hundred thousand

square feet in gravel staging. Physical security is enhanced by the fact that three sides

of the seaport are surrounded by water, and is several miles off the main road, and out

of view of normal traffic, and the public. It also has Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

and motion detector sensors on the perimeter fence.

Figure 1: NPICT Aerial Photo

8

NPICT currently maintains two 40-ton overhead gantry cranes and will add two more

cranes if workload ever increases enough to justify the additional expense. The current

port utilization rate is 15% and there is no indication this will increase anytime soon. If

the two additional cranes where installed at current import and export rates, it would

drop the port productivity utilization rate to a mere 7.5% of capability.21 NPICT is

approximately two miles north of NMP and two miles South of United States Marine

Corps (USMC) Base Camp Kinser. A minimum amount of oversized cargo is shipped

through this port via containerized flat-racks and will be discussed later in this paper

under “Restriction of War like Materials.” Table 5 depicts container statistics for NPICT

over the last ten years.22

Import #Vessels CNTRS MTs Export #Vessels CNTRS MTs

1999 202 8508 317402 1999 134 483 16666

2000 195 8581 320315 2000 123 751 26442

2001 163 8339 309162 2001 122 808 27056

2002 150 8360 297723 2002 118 673 20754

2003 162 8522 292047 2003 75 631 19559

2004 139 8251 279456 2004 67 576 18663

2005 146 7824 262438 2005 88 830 27529

2006 126 8087 276838 2006 87 737 24367

2007 84 8046 268423 2007 93 570 19242

2008 65 6742 232123 2008 75 593 24838

TOTAL 1432 81260 2855927 TOTAL 982 6652 225116

Table 5: NPICT Container Statistics

Outsourcing of Non Corp Competencies

The first of the fourteen areas of discussion is Issue #1: Global POV Contract

(GPC). When the GPC was implemented worldwide in 1998, both SDDC Battalion

Commands in Japan (Yokohama and Okinawa) were opted out of participating in the

contract. The justification was that Japan had a small workload of POV shipments23

(mostly within Japan from Okinawa to the Mainland) due to the restrictions placed on

9

US vehicles from being imported to Japan. Despite the low averages of POVs shipped

every week, SDDC maintains full time employees to manage the POV shipment

operations. This oversight raises the overall costs for shipping a POV. A

commercially operated Vehicle Processing Center (VPC) at one of the major bases,

even if opened only one day a week would mitigate facility costs as well as the

personnel costs leaving only the actual contractor cost of POV shipments (see Table 6).

Year Import Export Total

2008 57 153 210

2007 54 131 185

2006 65 156 221

2005 75 151 226

2004 94 216 310

2003 121 206 327

2002 111 205 316

2001 143 269 412

2000 117 225 342

1999 103 140 243

Table 6: POV Statistics24

Issue #2: Stevedore & Related Terminal Services (S&RTS) contracts. Most

SDDC Terminals eliminated Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to streamline

capital overhead, and reduce maintenance costs and liability risks to the command.

However, SDDC Okinawa not only provides Material Handling Equipment (MHE) in the

form of forklifts, but they also provide the maintenance for this equipment.25 These

costs are covered by SDDC, and not by the stevedore contract. With diminishing

annual workload levels, the justification to continue this practice is reduced. The capital

and maintenance costs are excessive given the current workload and should be tied

back to the stevedore contract as other SDDC commands are doing.26 Cost aside, there

10

is a liability issue if there is a forklift accident or injury, it could come back against either

SDDC or IMCOM who maintains the forklifts vice the stevedore contractor.

SDDC also let their S&RTS for a ten year period with yearly increases of 3%.

Most SDDC S&RTS contracts are let for a two year period with three one year option

periods.27 Re-competing contracts often is good for competition. Re-awarding

contracts allows SDDC and the contractor to address changes in the industry,

requirements, and workload projections. SDDC requires efficient and effective

stevedore labor on demand.

Issue #3: Under Pacific Command (PACOM) Instruction 4600.3K there is no

standardization for Common User Land Transportation (CULT).28 On mainland Japan,

CULT is managed by the U. S. Army Garrison-Japan; in Okinawa, Japan, it’s managed

by SDDC; in Hawaii it’s managed by U.S. Army Garrison and in Korea it is managed by

the 25th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control). In Japan, two different

organizations should not have split responsibility for the same function. Lastly, the

predominate DoD Service user is usually assigned by the Theater Commander as the

CULT manager.29 In this case, the United States Marine Corps is the largest user on

Okinawa with approximately 50% of the workload, followed by DeCA with 30% and the

Army with 14%.30

Issue #4: Elimination of the NMP Break-Bulk-Point (BBP) as a shipping location

for multipack containers. On 15 May 08, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) opened a

Defense Distribution Command (DDC) Depot on Camp Kinser for the receipt, storage

and issue of common user class IX parts for the Services. NMP averaged eight DLA

multipack containers a week, but this workload is now diverted to the DDC depot.31

11

There are cost advantages of un-stuffing at a DDC depot. First, DDC uses their own in-

house vice contract labor which is cheaper. Second, they already have standing

transportation delivery routes to the island customers in support of Service supply

request demands. This prevents special trucks from being ordered for delivery as was

the case at NMP. The DDC depot at Camp Kinser is the Theater Consolidation and

Shipping Point (TCSP) for all of Okinawa.

Other, non DLA multi-pack containers should also be booked to the DDC to

piggyback off the labor and transportation savings or booked as multi-stop containers.

Because the major customers on Okinawa are within twenty miles of the commercial

seaport, it is an ideal location for multi-stop container load planning by shippers.

Sending a container multi-stop is more cost efficient than sending it to SDDC’s Break

Bulk Point (BBP) where the container is unstuffed by stevedore contractors, the cargo

inventoried, stored in a warehouse and consolidated, later trucks are ordered and the

cargo is loaded on trucks for delivery to the customer. This process not only increases

the Customer Wait Time (CWT), but usually more than triples the cost to the tax payer

by double handling the cargo with contract labor and paying for the transportation

delivery twice. Lastly, multi-pack containers could also be unstuffed at NPICT and put

on CULT assets for delivery. These DDC capabilities and other options eliminate the

requirement for SDDC to maintain a BBP. This concept follows the same model as

SDDC in Korea after Defense Distribution Depot Korea (DDDK) was stood up in 2005.32

Operationally, it reduces the NMP and their stevedore workload but increases cost

saving and efficiency, while reducing CWT.

12

Cost Avoidance

Issue #5: Evaluation of the Infrastructure at NMP. “NMP no longer meets the

demands of a modern port facility. The current basin width and depth prevent vessels

longer than 700 feet and with a draft greater than 26 feet from entering. Most of the

work-horse ships of the strategic sealift program (military and civilian) exceed these

dimensions and cannot access NMP, complicating strategic planning. The ocean

shipping industry continues to grow and lessen the capability of NMP.”33 The two

restrictions identified make NMP marginal in a strategic sense as it allows very few

vessels (only 23% of MSC’s current fleet) access.34 Neither an LMSR, the cornerstone

of the strategic sealift program, nor a Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) could berth at NMP due to

their lengths and drafts. Figure 2 below shows the narrow channel leading into the port.

The lower half of the photo shows the NMP side, which has the four angled main berths

and a fifth berth in the middle right photo. No ammunition operations are authorized at

this seaport. The main road to the airport passes along the seaport and is often a

location for reporters and protesters to photograph equipment discharge, loading or

staging operations. With these limitations, it is harder and harder for SDDC to let a

Request for Proposal (RFP) to contract sealift as most of the smaller, less cost effective

vessels are no longer in the commercial inventory. The restrictions make it more

difficult for SDDC to support the war fighter deployment timelines in a confident or

efficient manner. None of the vessels in the Army’s Afloat Preposition Squadron

(APS3) or the USMC’s Maritime Preposition Squadron (MPS) can berth at NMP due to

both vessel draft and length.35 These vessels are loaded with military equipment and

sustainment supplies and are anchored in Guam, Saipan and Diego Garcia; they

13

remain on standby to support Combatant Commanders’ contingency and humanitarian

requirements worldwide.

Figure 2: Naha Military Port (NMP) Perimeter

Issue 6: Force Protection Concerns for NMP. Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability

Assessments (JSIVA) are conducted periodically at locations throughout the world.

“From 21-27 October 2006 NMP was inspected and cited for having nine vulnerabilities

that needed correction to bring the facility into compliance with DoD Standard 16.

Unfortunately, most of these deficiencies are not easy to correct or require a great deal

of funding and cooperation with outside organizations.”36 If you own a seaport, either

military, commercial or private, you are responsible for the waterside, pier side,

perimeter fence, cargo yards, ware houses, sensitive cargo holding areas and Access

Control Points (ACP) security, which is very expensive to maintain 24/7/365. With

decreased workload going through NMP in peacetime and limited operational use

physically possible in contingencies, it becomes increasing expensive to maintain and

14

keep secure a legacy facility when other more viable options are readily available or

possible. When a commercial facility is used to ship DoD cargo, the normal operating

expense is only the S&RTS contractor costs for charter vessels, or the USC rates for

cargo going via liner service vessels.37

Issue 7: Infrastructure and facility maintenance costs are high. SDDC’s own

assessment is that NMP is ill-suited for strategic operations. Both the GOJ and US

taxpayer are paying large recurring bills to maintain this legacy infrastructure facility.

Table 7 shows the past three year costs for maintaining NMP. Some costs, such as

security and fire department personnel are paid by the GOJ, but are manpower assets

the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) Garrison could reprogram for higher

priority requirements on Okinawa. Due to the poor state of NMP facilities, the

maintenance costs alone have been averaging one and a half million dollars per year.

Cost Description FY06 Costs FY07 Costs FY08 Costs

Electrical $210,700 $238,000 $249,316

Water $150,900 $145,000 $155,740

Sewage $78,100 $66,100 $84,228

Refuse Collection $42,100 $20,000 $16,695

Custodial $28,700 $26,000 $12,900

Ground Maintenance $24,542 $24,910 24,590

DPW In-House Supplies $24,327 $24,692 $24,375

Hazardous waste $200 $0 $180

Environmental Projects 0 0 $106,350

Security (23 pax) $695,000 $716,000 $737,480

Fire Department (12 pax) $305,000 $312,000 $469,563

DOL Forklift Repair Parts $12,769 $12,622 $14,221

DOL Labor Support (7 pax) $260,497 $266,721 $272,362

DPW Labor Support ( 7 pax) $260,497 $266,721 $273,362

NMP Maintenance Costs $1,130,969 $1,772,000 $1,611,309

Total Costs $3,224,301 $3,890,766 $4,053,571

Table 7: NMP Annual Infrastructure and Maintenance Cost38

15

Issue #8 Dredging does not solve the vessel accessibility problem for NMP.

SDDC has been working for years to get NMP dredged at an estimated cost of $14

million.39 This is a flawed strategy; even if you could get funding to dredge NMP, it

doesn’t eliminate the restriction on the 700 foot turning radius. The agencies requested

to provide dredging funding are not aware of the other operational restrictions to NMP.

Dredging is a recurring problem at NMP. In this case, even if dredging occurred, it is

doubtful that it could increase cargo throughput for the customer base in either

peacetime or contingency.

Increase War Fighter Support Readiness

Issue #9: The GOJ allows local politicians to impose restrictions on shipments of

warlike materials (green cargo) through commercial seaports. This issue has been an

operational problem for SDDC and United States Forces Japan (USFJ) for over 20

years. It is a violation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to restrict DoD

imports.40 These restrictions cost American forces both time and increased shipment

costs. “In 2006 alone it cost DoD an additional $434,000 to send 1-1 ADA Battalion

(Patriot) through NMP via a chartered vessel vice through NPICT booked on a liner

service vessel.”41 This restriction also goes against the 2005 United States/Japan

Allies: Transformation and Realignment for the future where both parties stated they

want to increase cooperation in areas such as transportation and seaports matters.42

This restriction needs to be addressed, challenged and eliminated to resolve operational

and contingency throughput issues, while immediately achieving transportation cost

savings.

16

Issue #10: Naha Military Port Replacement Facility (NMPRF) see figure 3. The

proposed location of this new facility is in front of USMC Base Camp Kinser (which is

scheduled to be closed and relocated on the island in conjunction with all the other base

realignment moves).43 Due to the NMP limitations discussed already, NMPRF has been

under discussion for over thirty years. Completion of NMPRF is predicted to be twenty

years in the future. The GOJ cost is approximately $600 million in today’s dollars to

develop this new seaport and industrial park.44 However, the requirements for DoD

changed over the last 30 years and may not be fully understood by the GOJ. SDDC

only needs access to and control of a seaport facility for as little as 48 hours to conduct

operations. There is excess requirements capacity built in the NMPRF, which is

designed to simultaneously berth: two LMSR’s, one FSS, one Cape H Class vessel and

one T-ACS6 for a total of five vessels discharging or loading. The more realistic

requirement for either peacetime or contingency is only one berth. NMPRF also calls

for warehouses for storage (which are obsolete due to containerization) and a POV

operation, which has been discussed already and appears excessive given the current

requirements. MSC has the same issues as SDDC; they need access when required to

allow their vessels to berth to take on stores (water & food). However, MSC maintains

options as it can continue to use NMP, can use White Beach, Tengan Pier or even

NPICT under the right agreement scenarios. This could lead NMP to transition to a

combined use facility with GoJ in the lead, as DoD conducts less operations there and

spends less revenue on upkeep.45 Lastly, this could allow an earlier full transfer of

NMP back to the GOJ, which would be seen as a success to the GOJ/DoD relations.

17

Figure 3: Artist’s Depiction of Completed NMP Replacement Facility.

Issue 11: Proposed NMPRF Alternate COA. In lieu of building a $600 million

dollar facility (which is probably more than twenty years from completion), another

option would be for the GOJ to build berth #11 at NPICT and turn it over to DoD for

operational use. Construction on this berth could start quickly and would be an

estimated 5-10%46 of the cost of constructing the NMPRF proposed in Figure 3. An

additional advantage would be that berth 11 could also have access to the gantry

cranes from berths 9 and 10 when required. The advantage to the GOJ would be in

meeting US base realignment objectives sooner and at less cost than programmed.

Okinawa officials could get back NMP for commercial development much sooner. DoD

would have access to a facility that meets all their operational, exercise and contingency

requirements as well being more economical to maintain. Figure 4 depicts the location

of berth 11 in relation to NMP, NPICT and Camp Kinser.

NMPRF

Camp Kinser

18

Figure 4: NMPRF Alternate Seaport Recommendation

Summary of the perceived stakeholder positions concerning NMP, NPICT and

NMPRF. The key stakeholder positions as follows: USFJ requires access to seaports to

meet operational, sustainment (AAFES, DeCA and repair parts), exercise and

contingency requirements; the GOJ desires to support USFJ in conjunction with the

SOFA and any other bilateral agreements; Okinawa Area Prefecture (OAP) would like

NMP returned so they can develop it and would also like the GOJ to fund building an

alternate NMPRF; III MEF wants to be able to deploy or redeploy its forces on a Time

Definite Delivery (TDD) schedule; SDDC requires secure office space, communications

and access to seaports to execute their mission; SDDC employees desire a status quo

to ensure good job security; SDDC stevedore contractor desires a status quo; NPICT

already moves 100% of DoD sustainment cargo and can accommodate more workload

if it was offered as they are operating at only 15% of capacity;47 USAG-J provides facility

NMP

AlternateNMPRF

NMPRF

Camp Kinser

19

maintenance support to NMP and would support implementing changes to decrease

overhead and recurring costs where feasible.48

Issue 12: There is no Explosive Quantity Distance (ESQD) survey for NPICT.49

SDDC should work with 83rd OD Bn to conduct an ESQD survey and initiate a draft

ammunition event waiver for NPICT for 750,000 lbs.50 This waiver could allow an MPS

or APS vessel to berth for exercises or contingency operations. By completing the

ESQD survey and waiver in advance, it will facilitate actual execution in the future for

peacetime exercise, deployment or contingency operations rather than starting from

scratch. A model to follow is the Korea Theater of Operation (KTO) where from 2004-

2006 the theater was able to complete four ESQD surveys (Gwangyang, Mokpo,

Gunsan, and Pyongteak) and obtain six ammunition event waivers. With the waivers,

SDDC was able to conduct proof of concept demonstrations at Gwangyang Seaport for

an APS3 discharge and trans-load;51 at Mokpo seaport for a MPS discharge52 and load-

back and further proof of concept event waivers at Gunsan and Pyongteak seaports for

an MPS vessel. These event waivers and proof of concept exercises were very

important as they led to operational and contingency changes in current planning

documents as well as familiarized these commercial seaports with military operations.

Later, because of the successful proof of concept exercises, the theater was able to get

approval for an event waiver for 3.5 million pounds at Gwangyang seaport in order to

execute a containerized ammunition discharge. Incremental steps over time will change

attitudes, instill cooperation and improve readiness.

Issue 13: There is no long term strategy to test using alternate seaports in

Okinawa. Proof of concept exercises should be conducted at NPICT, Tengan Pier and

20

White Beach.53 For NPICT, SDDC has several options. First, they need to start booking

oversized cargo via the USC to force the warlike material restriction issue to the surface

with the GOJ. Second, they need to let an RFP to load or discharge cargo at NPICT to

further test these limitations. Third, they should work with MSC and the United States

Navy (USN) to bring in an APS3 or MPS3 vessel for a port call. For White Beach and

Tengan Piers, SDDC can simply coordinate the RFP for an exercise deployment.

Issue 14: Leveraging Naval Port Calls to NPICT. Economic concerns vice the

US Military presence, is now the number one issue in Okinawa.54 The best approach in

affecting change in access to commercial seaports should be through economic

incentives. An example, “from October 26-30, 2007, the American Carrier USS KITTY

HAWK and the Destroyer, USS FITZGERALD conducted a Port Call at Muroran,

Hokkaido, Japan. The Muroran Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) released a

statement in early December stating that the visit generated $2.9 million in revenue to

the local community as 5,300 Sailors and 23,300 Japanese visited the vessels and

bought items from local vendors.”55 By working with the local authorities, the US can

work to achieve its objectives, which at the same time can build relationships and help

the local economy.

Recommendations

First, outsourcing non-core competencies will make SDDC more efficient and

provide additional expeditionary flexibility to their manpower for short-term or long-term

reorganization. The changes identified will help standardize the missions with other

SDDC Battalions in operations (POV GPC), contracting (GFE) and in distribution (CULT

and the elimination of NMP BBP (multipack container un-stuffing operations).

21

Second, cost avoidance. Due to changes in vessel size and the commercial

industry, it has made some of our military seaport infrastructure inadequate to support

current military requirements. When this is the case, such as at NMP, SDDC needs to

educate other stakeholders and mitigate current spending (FP, security, infrastructure

maintenance and dredging). NMP is legacy infrastructure for SDDC due to its port

limitations, out of date warehouses, deteriorating offices and an excess BBP operation.

It’s costing millions annually just to maintain NMP and these levels will be difficult to

sustain in the future. New infrastructure funding should focus on an alternative HQs

location such as Torii Station. With vessel operations as infrequent as they are (once a

month at NMP) a permanent 24/7/365 presence at NMP for SDDC is not required.

After all, SDDC conducts operations at White Beach, Tengan Pier and NPICT and does

not maintain a 24/7/365 presence there. Additionally, SDDC often deploys to Thailand

and the Philippines, conducts deployment and redeployment operations and returns

without maintaining a permanent presence. What SDDC needs is unrestricted cargo

access to adequate commercial facilities when required for short periods of time. In that

way, they are not paying for security, electricity, water, facilities maintenance, fire

department support etc.

Third and finally, supporting the war fighter readiness requirements is the primary

responsibility of SDDC. Maximizing cargo through put and minimizing CWT is a

standing mandate on behalf of all customers. To accomplish this mission, SDDC needs

to provide the customers with as many shipping, deployment or redeployment options

as possible to ensure flexibility in execution and meeting TDD requirements. In the

short term, SDDC needs to do everything possible to increase the war fighter readiness

22

(gain unrestricted cargo access of NPICT and completion of an ESQD survey). In the

long term, SDDC needs to educate the stakeholders on the minimum NMPRF

requirements so this initiative can move forward faster and cheaper than currently

programmed.

Conclusion

As a result of the modernization and streamlining of the international shipping

industry over the past 50 years, Naha Military Port’s operational usefulness in the

projection and sustainment of U.S. strategic power is extremely limited. The discussion

above offers a roadmap for improving regional warfighter support through the

outsourcing of non-core competencies, a reduction in recurring annual facility

maintenance costs, and the mitigation of long-term security risks. In the end these

actions would increase throughput and TDD capability while at the same time improving

the efficiency and expeditionary capabilities for SDDC operations at Okinawa, Japan.

There are certainly other stakeholders involved in executing parts of these

recommendations. It is SDDC’s responsibility to educate and lead these partners, who

may not understand the business end of seaport operations, in recognizing the impact

of today’s shipping business environment on achieving our operational requirements.

Endnotes

1 George Raine, “Containerization Changed Shipping Industry Forever,” San FranciscoChronicle, 10 February 2006, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/259042_containerships10.html (accessed 27 Nov 2008).

2 Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), “Mission Statement,” SDDC HomePage at http://www.sddc.army.mil/ Public/Home/About%20SDDC/Mission%20Statement(accessed on November 20, 2008).

23

3 Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), “Stevedoring and RelatedTerminal Services (S&RTS),” May 13, 2008, S&RTS contracts require the contractor to arrangefor stevedoring services, including material and equipment, except those materials specified asGovernment Furnished, in accordance with the Schedule Notes of the Request for Proposal(RFP) and Performance Work Statement (PWS) of the Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) to loadand discharge DoD cargo from commercial and military vessels. https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=41573c9e78005c823812b4ce4ca14c08&tab=core&_cview=0 (accessed on December 17, 2008)

4 Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), “Universal Service Contract (USC)05,” linked from the SDDC homepage at http://www.sddc.army.mil/sddc/Content/Pub/38059/USC05%20Contract.pdf (accessed on November 4, 2008).

5 Flatracks consist of a floor structure with a high loading capacity composed of a steelframe and a softwood floor and two wend walls, which may either be fixed or collapsible. Theend walls are stable enough to allow cargo securing means to be attached and several flatracksto be stacked on top of one another. Flatracks are available in 20’ and 40’ sizes. A number oflashing rings, to which the cargo may be secured, are installed in the side rails, the corner postsand the floor. The lashing rings may take loads of up to 2000 kg in the case of 20’flatranks orup to 4,000 kg in the case of 40’ flatracks. Some types of 20’flatracks have forklift pockets. 40’flatracks have gooseneck tunnels at each end. In addition, they are sometimes equipped withlashing winches with 2 metric ton lashing belts. Transportation-Information Service, “Flatracksversion 1.1.0.05,”http://www.tis-gdv.de/tis e/containe/arten/ flat/flat.htm (accessed December 172008)

6 The factors leading to the GPC decision were the overall increase in the booking ofcontainerized POVs on the numerous commercial carriers which provided a Time DefiniteDelivery (TDD) to the customer; decreases in scheduling and, thus POV shipping by Break-Bulk(BB), Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) vessels; decreased costs of containerization shipping vicebreak-bulk shipping; and finally this contract provided that both the government and thecustomer could quickly file claims against the carrier in the event of damage or loss. Awardingthe contract to a single carrier meant the government did not have to prove where damageoccurred from point of origin to point of destination when numerous subcontractors whereinvolved in actual shipments. Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), “Personalproperty / POV, Global POV Contract, Attachment 1 to DAMJ01-03-D-184, Performance WorkStatement (PWS),” http//:www.sddc.army/sddc/content/pub) (accessed on November 27 2008)

7 The 1995 BRAC forced the closure of the Bayonne, New Jersey and Oakland, CaliforniaArea Commands, which were consolidated at Fort Eustis, Virginia with the standing up of theDeployment Support Command (DSC). The 2005 BRAC forced the movement of the SDDCHQs from Alexandria, Virginia to Scott, AFB in 2007. In 2010, The G3 and remaining sectionsat Fort Eustis will move into their new HQs at Scott, AFB. Surface Deployment & DistributionCommand (SDDC), “Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Historical Overview,” 2004,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/mtmc (accessed on 9 October 2008)

8 LCDR Alex Soe, email message to author, November, 05, 2008, “Characteristics ofOkinawa Seaports, Table 1.” The author prepared the table and draft data and it was confirmedby LCDR Soe. LCDR Soe is the Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC) in Okinawa,Japan.

24

9 Ron Day, e-mail message to author, November 3, 2008, “Naha Military Port (NMP),Workload Statistics, Table 2,” The author created the table and Mr. Day coordinated for thepopulation of the data fields. Mr. Day is the 599th Transportation Group, Deputy OperationsOfficer.

10 A general rule of thumb is 10% of the vessels deepest draft from under-keel clearance ora minimum of two feet of clearance; the maximum draft of a tanker vessel entering Naha MilitaryPort (NMP) Harbor can be approximately 26 feet with a harbor depth of 28 feet. United StatesCoast Guard, “Code Federal Regulation (157.455),” http://www.mxsocal.org/pdffiles/Chap%20XIV%20Underkeel%20Clearance.pdf (accessed on January 16, 2009).

11 Military Sealift Command (MSC),“High Speed Vessel (HSV) West PAC Express,”http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=169&type=HighSpeedVessel (accessed onDecember 18, 2008).

12 The WestPac Express has a stern ramp so backs into an L shaped berth in order todischarge its cargo. Straight ramp vessels can’t be discharged on piers or container berths asthe ramp isn’t able to pivot to the pier. The WPE is the only HSV currently used by DoD with astraight stern ramp. Wikipedia, Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 19, 2008, page 5,http://wn//.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Westpac_Express_(HSV-4676)(accessed December 17,2008)

13 LTC Todd Wolf, e-mail message to author, December 22, 2008. Colonel Wolf was theCommander, 835th Transportation Battalion (SDDC) from January, 2004 to March, 2006.

14 Ron Day, e-mail to the author, November 22, 2008, “Okinawa Seaport WorkloadStatistics, Table 3.” Author prepared the table and Mr. Day coordinated for the population of thedata fields. Mr. Day is the 599th Transportation Group, Deputy Operations Officer.

15 MAJ Devon NuDelman, e-mail message to the author, Jan 8, 2009. Major NuDelmanwas the S3 and XO of the 505th Quartermaster Battalion located in Okinawa, Japan from 2006to 2008.

16 LCDR Alex Soe, e-mail message to author, November 4, 2008, “Okinawa VesselBerthing Characteristics.” Lieutenant Commander Soe is the Commander, Military SealiftCommand (MSC) in Okinawa, Japan.

17 A Large Medium Speed Ro-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessel is approximately 950 feet longand has a draft of 33-35 feet, and can carry 300-400K square feet of cargo; it is the cornerstoneof the DOD sealift program. DOD bases its requirements for strategic mobility forces on the1992 congressionally mandated analysis called the Mobility Requirements Study. The studyestablished a requirement for an additional 3 million square feet of surge capacity and 2 millionsquare feet of preposition capacity by fiscal year 1998. The study recommended that DODacquire 20 LMSR ships, 9 for prepositioning, and 11 for surge to meet this requirement. In the1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update, DOD validated the study’srecommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to buy 19 LMSR ships and established a 10 millionsquare feet of surge capability and 4 million square feet of prepositioned capacity for a total of14 million square feet. General Accounting Office (GAO), “Strategic Mobility: Late Deliveries ofLarge, Medium Speed Roll-On-Off Ships (LMSR),” (Washington, DC; General AccountingOffice, June 1997).

25

18 The author inquired as to studies or and recent rehearsals of cargo throughput at theNavy Pier. No rehearsal to evaluate the alignment of the vessel ramps to the Navy Pier wereconducted since pier renovation in 2006-2007. It is unknown if the vessel ramps canadequately facilitate discharge operations, and no comparative productivity discharge, or loadrates are unavailable. Ron Day, e-mail message to author, February 12, 2009

19 Ron Day, e-mail message to author, November 22, 2008, “Okinawa Seaport WorkloadStatistics for White Beach, Table 4.”

20 Aviana Detmongkhonh, e-mail message to author, March 26, 2007. Mrs. Detmongkhonhis the Chief, Traffic Management Division, 835th Transportation Battalion (SDDC), Okinawa,Japan.

21 Akira Chiba, Okinawa, Japan, interviewed by author, Naha Port International ContainerTerminal (NPICT), April 08, 2007; Captain Chiba is the General Manager of NPICT and met withthe author on two occasions and confirmed throughput productivity rate computations.

22 Ron Day, e-mail message to author, November 22, 2008,“Okinawa Seaport WorkloadStatistics for NPICT, Table 5,” November 22, 2008.

23 Ron Day, 599th Transportation Group, Hawaii, telephone interview by author, December22, 2008. Mr. Day worked for Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC) in Japan atthe time the Global POV Contract was being implemented.

24 Ron Day, e-mail message to author, November 17, 2008. “Okinawa Seaport WorkloadStatistics for Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs),” Table 6.

25 IMCOM maintains these forklifts and bills SDDC for repair parts, which were $14,221 inFY2008. The overall cost could be as high as $100,000 annually after Japanese labor isincluded, but this labor is provided and paid by the GoJ, but a cost no less. Steven Shelton, e-mail message to author, July 22, 2007. “Naha Military Port (NMP) Maintenance and FacilityCosts,” Steven Shelton is the Resource Manager, US Army Garrison, Okinawa.

26 Schedule 3, Longshoremen & Equipment Operator Table shows 4,500 hours ofestimated forklift operator requirements; schedule for list forklift equipment usage of 1,850 hourstotal by several types of forklifts, average cost is approximately $40 per hour so at $100,000 ofmaintenance cost would translate to 2,500 hours of contract forklift costs. United States AirForce (USAF), 18th Wing Contract Command, “Contract F62321-03-D-007,” October 1, 2003.

27 Ibid.

28 Common user Land Transportation (CULT) provides common use transportation such asflatbed trucks or low boy trailers for all Services if they have requirements that exceed theirorganic capabilities. Pacific Command (PACOM), “Instruction 4600.3K, subject: Common UserTransportation in PACOM.”

29 Ibid

30 MAJ Shane Barnes, e-mail to author, January 28, 2007. MAJ Barnes was the ExecutiveOfficer of the 835th Transportation Battalion from 2006 to 2008.

26

31 Larry J. Collignon, e-mail message to author, November 18, 2008. Mr. Collignon was aformer Commander, 599th Transportation Group and United States Army Pacific (USARPAC)G4. He is currently working at Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) as a Defense Contractorand oversaw the implementation of the Defense Depot Command (DDC) test on Okinawa.

32 Hui C. Son, “Distribution of Multipack Containers,” January 31, 2005. Dr. Son is the Chief,Traffic Management Division, 837th Transportation Battalion, Busan, South Korea.

33 “LTC Jonathan E. Watson, “Statement of Requirement (or Operational NeedsDocument),” May 10, 2007, quote is paragraph 4e, Memorandum from the Commander, 835th

Transportation Battalion (SDDC) to Commander, US Army Garrison-Japan.

34 Carlos Tibbets, e-mail message to author, January 5, 2009. Mr. Tibbets is the Chief,Traffic Management Division, 836th Transportation Battalion (SDDC), Yokohama, Japan.

35 Globalsecruity.org, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), http://www.globalsecurityorg/military/systems/ship/sealift-mps.htm, (accessed on October 21, 2008)

36 Watson.

37 Liner service is a commercial ocean carrier service that operates on a fixed route callingthe same ports on a regularly scheduled basis, i.e. weekly.

38 John Buesse e-mail message to author, February 12, 2009. John Buesse is the DirectorPlans, Training and Security (DPTS) for the U.S. Army Garrison, Okinawa, Japan. The costinformation was consolidated by the Chief, RM Steve Shelton and his staff.

39 GEN Norman Schwartz, e-mail to COL Prescott Marshall, October 18, 2006 andforwarded to the author by a third party. “200603563: Commander Interest: DredgingRequirements at Naha Port” discusses desire to support dredging and monitor the situation withthe GOJ.

40 The GOJ has allowed local mayors to set restrictions on movement of this “green” cargoin violation of Article XI, paragraph 2 of the US/GOJ Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), whichstates “All materials, supplies and equipment imported by the United States Armed Forces willbe permitted entry into Japan and free of customs duties and other charges.” Oyadormari,Yasuharu, Naha Mayor, subject: Handling of War-Like Material at Naha Port Area (Response)September 18, 1989.

41 Alan T. Nakai, “Memorandum for the Joint Entry and Exit Committee, subject: Use ofJapanese Commercial Seaports,” November 15, 2007.

42 “Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation;supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling; transportationcooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability providedby high speed vessels (HSV); transportation, use of facilities, medical support and other relatedactivities for non combatant evaluation operations (NEO); use of seaport and airport facilities,road water space and airspace, and frequency bands.”Security Consultative CommitteeDocument, “U.S. – Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 29

27

2005, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html, (accessed onOctober 22, 2008).

43 Ibid

44 LTC Richard A. Davis, e-mail message to the author, November 14, 2008. LTC Davispreviously served as the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) J42 Facilities Engineer Branch,Yokota, Japan. He is currently serving in Iraq and after his tour he will serve for the Army Corpsof Engineers at Camp Zama, Japan.

45 Currently, NMP is a Joint use facility, but with the US in the lead and GoJ Coast Guard asa user. This agreement was signed on February 28, 1980 and is updated every 3 years.Addendum #9 to agreement, Control AJO-80-020, For the Joint Use of USFJ Facilities andAreas by the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, June 12, 2007.

46 The basic price of a berth is about $35 million, each gantry crane is about $5 million ($10million for 2) and staging area cranes run $1 million for four, refrigeration is about $2 million asare all the buildings for a total of about $50 million per berth if all the extras are purchased. JoseR. Rosal, email message to author, December 27, 2008. Mr. Rosal is the Gwangyang BayArea Free Economic Zone Authority Marketing and Public Relations Associate Director,Gwangyang, South Korea. It is the authors opinion that no gantry or staging area cranes(designed for container operations), or refrigerated plugs are required to support militaryoperations.

47 Chiba.

48 John Buesse, e-mail message to author, December 16, 2008.

49 An ESQD Survey is a document and map that lists all the buildings, their value, thedistance from the hazard (ship berth in this example) and the day and night times number ofpeople working in each of the buildings. A separate computation is made for a blast radius of agiven quantity of a hazardous material. The arc is draw around the buildings to determinepersonnel and equipment within the computed blast area. The purpose of the ESQD is tosafeguard personnel, equipment, ammunition and public or private property in the event of anexplosion or fire. The Ordnance Shop, “Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD)Requirements,” Document not dated. http://www.ordance.org/esqd.htm (accessed onDecember 17, 2008)

50 The event waiver process is designed to allow commanders to meet critical operationalrequirements by obtaining authorization in a timely manner to deviate from establishedexplosives safety standards for a non-recurring event. When deviations from explosives safetycriteria are for a recurring event, issuance of a standing waiver or exemption from criteria isrequired. 750,000 pounds was chosen as it covers the majority of APS and MPS cargo carryingvessels. Navy Safety Center, Explosive Safety Event Waiver Requests,” July 26, 2002,http://www.nablc.navy.mil/safety/eventwaivers.htm (accessed on January 16, 2009)

51 LTG Charles C. Campbell, “Request for Event Waiver to AR 385-64, U.S. ArmyExplosives Safety program for Gwangyang Port, KIT New Berth, Gwangyang City, Republic ofSouth Korea,” August 30, 2004. EQSD survey was completed by Alfred Voelkelt 6th OrdnanceBattalion (Ammo). The event waiver was required because the APS3 vessel USNS Watson

28

was carrying ammunition with a Net Explosive Weight (NEW) of 750,000. It needed todischarge a portion of its cargo to another vessel bound for Iraq. Lieutenant General Campbellsigned the waiver as the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army (EUSA).

52 LTG Charles C. Campbell, “Explosive Event Waiver Request for Mokpo Newport, MokpoCity, Republic of South Korea,” March 2, 2006. EQSD survey was completed by AlfredVoelkelt, 6th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo). The event waiver was required to support thedischarge and load back of an MPS vessel, the USNS Pless, which carried ammunition with aNEW of 750,000 pounds. The III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was discharging the vesselas part of a Freedom Banner Exercise in conjunction the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) ExerciseReception Staging Onward-movement & Integration (RSOI) 06 in South Korea. LieutenantGeneral Campbell signed the waiver as the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army(EUSA).

53 Robert T. Chambers, e-mail message to the author, December 22, 2008. Mr. Chambersis the commercial load planner for chartered vessels calling Naha Military Seaport. It is hisevaluation that the vessels he represents are capable of berthing at White Beach withoutrestriction due to their draft, length or pier width. He also estimates that the average size ofloads is approximately 30,000 square feet or less so could be managed at White Beach despitetheir limited staging area.

54 COL Franklin presents a briefing titled “Managing the Relationship” to numerousdignitaries visiting Okinawa. The briefing covers history, politics and statistics for Okinawa. Inthe past, the US presence was the number one concern for the local population, but wasreplaced by economic issues in recent years. COL Mark Franklin, e-mail message to author,May 15, 2008. COL Franklin served as the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) J5, OkinawaArea Field Office (OAFO) representative from 2005-2008.

55 John Buesse, e-mail message to author, December 22, 2007. The newspaper articlewas written by Ian Hillman and Yumi Baba, Sapporo Newspaper, December 17, 2007. Thisarticle was written in Japanese and translated by an interpreter.