Political Law Review

Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

ARTICLE VIII JUDICIARY

SECTION 1

SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA

judicial power and judicial function Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors (3rd placer). 3 days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors. They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim that the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only. That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5 that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair advantage) The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers. That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first place was erased and replaced with second place That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances. The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded). Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions)ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?

SC:

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,

(TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS)

1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination. , and

2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.

3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)

It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

The phrase judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property. authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication. The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them. The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties.

There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee.

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges.

And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.

NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title

The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain.

Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court

Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES)

Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?

SC: NO.

If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.

As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.

The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.

Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS VS. ANG CHO KIOpower to recommend Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by order of the Executive Secretary.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also denied it. But the CA made a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first available transporation abroad.

The Solgen assailed this CA decision, claiming that the recommendation by the CA should not be part of the decision, because it gives the decision a political complextion, because courts are not empowered to make such recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers. The Solgen contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE: Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations?

SC: NO.

The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there was whether the RTC correctely denied the petition. The CA was not called upon the review any sentence imposed upon Ang. The sentence against him had long become final and in fact, he was pardoned. The opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the decision of the RTC, and no more.

The recommendatory power of the courts are limited to those expressly provided in the law, such as Art 5 RPC. (when an act is not punishable by law ( judge should report it to the executive).

The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or not under the Director of Prisons (for violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or correction of the act of the President. The matter of whether an alien who violated the law may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the President, under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an action by the President, which are purely political in nature.

After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon the competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.

Summary:

1) Recommendatory powers of the SC under RPC does not include matters which are purely political in nature. (otherwise it violates separation of powers)

2) deportation of aliens is a political question

3) opinion of judges should be relevant to the question presented for decision.

In re LAURETApower to preserve judiciary s honor Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference.

Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.

The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.

Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.

True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption.

The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.

Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.

They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court.

SC:

The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.

There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as undue influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.

In short, SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government.

ECHEGARY VS. SOJsuspension of execution of decision Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, 4 and passed Republic Act No. 8177,

Petitioner filed a Petition 8 for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection, claiming it as cruel form of punishment, among many others.

the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and directed the parties "to MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."

(from poli compendium: The decision sentencing him to death pursuant to RA 7659 became final. Upon motion of the petitioner, the SC issued a TRO restraining his execution on the ground that there is a possibility that Congress might repeal RA 7659. Respondent argued that the TRO was illegal because in effect it granted petitioner a reprieve, which was the exclusive prerogative of the President)

SC:

The constitutional provision granting the Presidnet the power to grant reprieves cannot be interpreted as denying the power of the courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. An accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights, and these can be claimed in a proper court. For instance, a convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of death sentence is an exercise of judicial power. SECTION 5(2)

LINA VS. PURISIMA power to dispense rules

Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB.

Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej.

It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable.

The RTC dismissed the petition because:

Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.

The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity or legality of any decree order or act issued by President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.

SC:

The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations.

Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC.

Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the case. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be tried on the merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do justice are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it appears that final resolution of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the best interest of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and rended the final judgment on the merits.

SC reinstated Lina to work.

TAN VS, MACAPAGALjudicial review for adjudication

Tan et. al (as taxpayers) filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the LAUREL LEIDO RESOLUTION which deals with the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to declare that it has no power to consider and adopt proposals which seek to revise the constitution through the adoption of a new form of government. Under the Resolution, the Con-Con is merely empowered to propose amendments to the Consti, without altering the general plan.

The SC dismissed it. Tan filed a MR.

The members of the Con-Con claim that Tan has no personal and substantial interest in the case.

ISSUE: Whther the petitioners had the standing to seek a declaration of the nullity of the resolution of the Con-Con.

SC: NO.

The rule is, Any person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

However, there are many instances where taxpayers can nullify laws. But this is upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds for purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Hence, it may be enjoined at the instance of taxpayers.

Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion whether to entertain a taxpayers suit. In the Gonzales case, it was held that taxpayers must wait before filing the suit until AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE. It was only then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action (separation of powers).

Hence, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for judicial oversight. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction.

Here, what is being asked was that the judiciary inquire into the validity of the acts of the Con-Con. However, it is a pre-requisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed before court may inquire. What the Con-Con did was merely to propose an amendment to the Consti.

There is no room for judicial review.

TELECOMS VS. COMELEClocus standi

Telecoms and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and tv companies. They are suing as taxpayers and citizens and registered voters. They assail the validity of BP 881 which requires that radio and tv companies provide free airtime to Comelec for the use of candidates in the campaign and for other political purposes.

Telebap claims that the law takes property without due process and that it violates the eminent domain clause which provides for payment of just compensation.

GMA Network, also filed a similar case.

ISSUE: Whether Telebap and GMA have locus standi

SC:

Telebap No standing as CITIZENS.

A Citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government, that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. In this case, it has not shown that they will suffer or have suffered harm as a result of the operation of BP 881.

Telebap No standing as REGISTERED VOTERS.

No interest as registered voters since this case does not concern their right to suffrage. Their interest in BP 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity.

Telebap No standing as TAXPAYERS.

No interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the execise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain direct injury as a resulf of the enforcement of the questioned statute.

Telebap No standing as CORPORATE ENTITY

No standing to assert the rights of radio and television companies which they represent. The mere fact that Telebap is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right.

GMA7 has standing.

Since GMA operates radio and tv broadcast stations, they will be affected by the enforcement of BP 881. It suffered losses amounting to several millions in providing Comelec time in connection with the 1992 and 1995 electoins. Now, its stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year (1998 elections). GMAs allegations that it will suffer losses again is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of BP 881.

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATOlocus standi

Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens, priests, pastors, nuns and taxpayers. They are joined by some members of Congress. (Tanada, Joker A.)

They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO on the ground that it was similar to the one earlier nullified by the SC.

There was a lease contract between PCSO and Phil. Gaming Mgt. Corp. The equipment lease agreement covers online lottery equipment to be leased to PCSO. The agreement was invalidated by the SC for it violated the Charter of PCSO.

An Amended Lease Agreement was later made providing for 4.3% of the gross sales as consideration.

PCSO and PGMC claim that the Amended Lease Agreement is a different lease contract. They claim that the Agreement did not have to be submitted for public bidding because it fell within the exception under EO 301. They also claim that the power to determine whether the Agreement is disadvantageous belongs to the Board of Directors of PCSO. Thus they question the petitioners standing.

PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no standing since they are not parties to the contract, and have no personal or substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the Contract.

Petitioners however contend that the earlier case sustained their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract, and as such, that is now the law of the case (that they have standing).

SC:

The law of the case is not applicable in this case because this case is NOT a sequel to the previous case. It is not its continuation. This proceeding is essentially different from the 1993 Lease Contract. Hence, a prior case that petitioners had standing to challenge that 1993 Contract does NOT PRECLUDE their determination of their standing in the present suit.

Concern for stability in decisional law does not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as rule since the previous ruling sustaining petitioners intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. (It seems here that the real issue is not lack of legal standing but whether they are real parties in interest.) Standing is not even an issue in this case since standing is a CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, and here no constitutional question was actually involved.

Standing has constitutional underpinnings. It is very different from questions relation to whether a party is the real party in interest. Party in interest ensures that only certain parties can maintain an action, Standing requires partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader public policy concerns.

The question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largele depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

NO STANDING. Here, petitioners have not in fact shown what particularized interest they have for bringing the suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of the required to maintain an action. It is true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made by a government corporation. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT PUBLIC FUNDS ARE BEING MISSPENT SO AS TO MAKE THIS ACTION A PUBLIC ONE, and justify the relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Because this is an action for annulment of contracts, the real parties in interest are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the deteriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it.

The phrase present substantial interest means such interest of a party in a subject matter of action as will entitle him to recover if the evidence is sufficient. Petitioners here DO NOT HAVE SUCH PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST in the Lease Agreement as would entitle them to bring this suit.

Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding can be raised in an appropriate case before the COA, or before the Ombudsman.

Requisites of TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE:

1) public funds involved

2) utter disregard for the constitution

3) lack of party who can bring a suit.

FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Facts:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."

On June 2, 2003, President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2008 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Thereafter, the second impeachment complaint was filed by Representatives Teodoro of Tarlac and Fuentebella of Camarines Sur, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House.

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Respondent House of submitted a Manifestation asserting that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. Senator Pimentel filed a Motion to Intervene and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."

Issue: W/N the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Such power of judicial review was expounded upon by Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission: x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. This "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."

Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review. Briefly stated, it is their position that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review. In defense of their claims, Respondents rely on American jurisprudence, American Constitution and American authorities.

However, said American jurisprudence and authorities are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled.

The courts' power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Standing Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Respondents contend that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. On the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental importance.

There is a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

Ripeness and Prematurity For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture." Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit has been complied with.

Justiciability Judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. SSection 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

In the present case, five substantial issues are raised: 1. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution; 2. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution; 3. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; 4. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, and 5. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Hence, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

The instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."

The Court held that these two issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the Supreme Court should exercise Judicial Restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.

Rspondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred." Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution.

More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. According Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty." Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review. Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.

Such an argument is specious, to say the least. Tthe possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Such an argument also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

David vs. Arroyo

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency.

and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners counsels.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES:

1. whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic

One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.

But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity." Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.2. whether petitioners (Escudero et al, Cadiz et al, and Legarda) have legal standing

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.

In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.

In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,63 and Taada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.

In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.69SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

a. Facial Challenge

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104 the US Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment" (freedom of speech).

econd, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.

Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.

b. Constitutional Basis

First provision:"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.

Second Provision: "Take Care" PowerThe second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,115 the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local Government.119This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:

x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

c. As Applied Challenge

One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.

Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.

Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.

S U M M A T I O NIn sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.

It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.158WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.PHIL ASSOC. COLLEGES VS. SEC OF EDUCATIONjusticiable controversy / locus standi

Petitioners assail Act 2706 requiring the inspection and recognition of private schools. It makes it obligatory upon the Secretary of Educ to inspect said schools.

They contend that the law deprives the school owners of liberty and property without due process, and they deprive the parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children.

They claim that requiring previous governmental approval before they could exercise their right to own and operate a school amounts to censorship of prior restraint.

Solgen countered that the matter has no justiciable controversy. The government argues that the petitioners suffered no wrong, nor allege any, from the enforcement of the statute. The government insists that for the past 37years the DepEd has supervised and regulated private schools with the general acquiescence of the public. Solgen claims that there is no cause of action because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating schools already. There is no threat that the permits will be revoked, hence they have suffered no wrong.

Issue: Is there a justiciable controversy?

SC: NONE.

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of parties concerned.

When the private schools are actually operating by virtue of the permits issued by the Secretary, who is not shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is no justiciable controversy that would authorize the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of said Act.. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might under the law withdraw the permit of the petitioners DOES NOT CONSTITUTE JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.

An action must be brought for a positive purpose ( to obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, no matter how intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there come into play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues UNLESS AVOIDANCE BECOMES EVASION.

*the textbooks were also not shown by petitioners. They claimed that the Board prohibited certain types of textbooks.

DE AGBAYANI VS. PNBeffects of constitutionality

**Justice Fernando ponente kaya wordy at magulo**

Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later.

15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM.

Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff.

PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted.

E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium

RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium

The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified.

Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution).

PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed.

ISSUE: Has the action prescribed?

SC: NO.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.

(read orig)..

PEOPLE vs. MATEOOn October 1996, ten information, one for each count of rape, all allegedly committed on ten different dates were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The accused was the live-in partner of Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of the victim. Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being malicious retribution of a vengeful stepdaughter. Allegedly, he tool private complainant to task after his son, Marlon Mateo, who had reported seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the room of their house. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo. He then forbade her from going out at night and leaving her siblings alone in the house. Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of complainant, rose to testify in defense of her common-law husband. She believed that the charges may have been fabricated by her relatives who were jealous of appellant because it was he, not they, who had been receiving the remittances of her earnings from Saudi Arabia. The court found accused guilty for ten counts of rape. Issue:Whether or not the SC can create an intermediate review for death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment cases by the CA before the case is elevated to the SCHeld: Up until now, the SC has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution in Article 8, Section 5: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The same constitutional article has evidently a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of RA 7659, as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty is at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.

The cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total death penalty cases directly elevated before the Court on automatic review that translates to a total of 651 out of 907 appellants saved from lethal injection. Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court. The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the CA, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter. (As to the rape, the Court held that while it may be argued that appellants moral ascendancy over Imelda was enough to intimidate her to suffer in silence; still, it could well be improbable for a victim who had been raped no less than ten times not to make a simple outcry against her unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so. Also, the Court took notice that the victim did not undergo any change in behaviour which was the typical attitude of a victim of rape.)

SECTION 5(4)

PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ

transfer of venue to avoid miscarriage of justice

This is the case of Bingbong Crisologo. A group of armed men set fire various inhabited houses in Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Bingbong was charged but pleaded not guilty.

AO 221 the Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Anover of San Fernando La Union, to hold special term in Ilocos Sur.

AO 226 Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Gutierrez (Vigan) to transfer the case to Judge Anovers Court in La Union.

Prosecution moved that Judge Gutierrez allow a transfer of the case to the La Union Circuit Court by virtue of said AOs and for security and personal safety of the witnesses.

The accused obviously opposed the transfer of the case, claiming that the transfer of the case would be railroading them into a conviction.

Judge Gutierrez denied the transfer.

Prosecution now imputes gadalej on Judge Gutierrez.

SC:

The Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard. Any such power even in the guise of AOs trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and Judiciary. The law creating the transfer of cases to Circuit Criminal Courts should be effected by raffle.

Nevertheless, the COURT WILL ORDER THE TRANSFER. There is a justified refusal by the witnesses in Ilocos Sur to testify where they felt their lives would be endangered. Judge Gutierrez failed to consider the possibility of miscarriage of justice may result. The witnesses had earlier manifested of the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial outside of Ilocos Sur, in the interest of truth and justice, and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side.

Here, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process. The exigencies of justice demand that the general rule should yield to occasional exceptions wherever th