disarmament negotiations- in retrospect & prospect- part- i

8/4/2019 Disarmament Negotiations- In Retrospect & Prospect- Part- i

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DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

IN RETROSPECT & PROSPECT

Part - I

N.D. Jayaprakash

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the end of the Second World War in 1945, there have beennumerous attempts under the aegis of the United Nations Organisation(UN) to end the arms race and proceed towards disarmament. Egged onby the war-weary peoples of the world who clamoured for peace, theproclaimed aim of the UN became general and complete disarmament.However, even sixty-two years later far from attaining that admirablegoal not only has budgetary allocations for armaments, and concurrentlythe destructive power of weapons, increased manifold but also there has

been no end to the outbreak of wars and the accompanying death,destruction and misery. Of course, there have been fleeting occasionswhen major breakthroughs in negotiations did take place and progresstowards disarmament appeared imminent. To the utter dismay of theproponents of peace, counter moves by the armaments lobby haveinvariably thwarted all such possibilities.

Since the pressure exerted by the global peace movement was soimmense in the late 1950s and early 1960s for concrete action towardsdisarmament, the then two major ideological adversaries the U.S. andthe USSR were forced to arrive at a significant agreement the McCloy-

Zorin Accord on 20 September 1961. For the next two years, the worldawaited eagerly for the signing of a comprehensive Nuclear Test BanTreaty as the first step towards general and complete disarmament. Thetreaty that was finally signed in August 1963 with great euphoria by theU.S., the USSR and the U.K. was only a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT),which banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in spacewhile permitting underground ones. Although the PTBT may have beensigned with good intentions, in order to allay fears of a nuclearconflagration in the background of the Cuban Missile crisis of October1962, in effect the signing of the PTBT instead of the much-awaitedcomprehensive nuclear test ban treaty constituted a great betrayal of thepeace movement.

With the signing of the PTBT, the powerful global peace movement notonly almost dissipated away but also the attention of whatever was left ofit was focused on issues related to peace and disarmament other thannuclear weapons. Seizing on the opportunity, the nuclear weapon states(NWS) made a radical departure away from the goal of general andcomplete disarmament and began to introduce what were termed as


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pragmatic steps or partial arms control measures. Treaties such as theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Weapon Free Zone(NWFZ) treaties, the retrogressed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treat (FMCT), etc., while not hurtingthe interests of the nuclear weapon powers in any way gave the false

impression that concrete action were being taken by the NWS to stem thenuclear arms race. The nuclear disarmament movement did resurrect inthe late 1970s/early 1980s following the scare unleashed by utterances inthe U.S. ruling circles of the possibility of waging limited/winnablenuclear war in Europe. However, by placing undue emphasis on benigntreaties such as NPT, NWFZ, etc., the NWS have successfully managedto divert attention of peace activists away from the present nuclear dangerto the probable nuclear danger in future. Potential nuclear weapon-capable states have since become the primary focus of attention of thenuclear non-proliferation campaign; clear and present danger held out bythe NWS has been conveniently relegated to the background and has only

of late, if at all, become part of the discourse, that too mostly in relation tothe teeth-less Article VI of the NPT.

Non-proliferation has now become the catchword; the phrase generaland complete disarmament has disappeared from the vocabulary of thedominant peace movement. (If at all any reference is made to generaland complete disarmament, it is only in a derogatory sense by beingdismissive about it and by alleging that it was primarily designed to score

propaganda points rather than serve as any true basis for negotiations1).So drastic has been the adverse impact of the signing of the PTBT in 1963on the disarmament movement as a whole that since then over two

generations of peace activists are hardly aware of the McCloy-ZorinAccord! Nor were the two separate proposals for general and completedisarmament put forward by the USSR and USA, on 15 March and 18April 1962 respectively, ever an integral part of the discourse of even thedominant peace movements! These shocking facts testify to the level ofdisinformation that the peace loving people across the world have beensubjected to since 1963! The present analysis of the history ofdisarmament negotiations is an attempt to understand the factors behindthe failure of the disarmament process till date so that it enables the peacemovement to draw appropriate lessons to pursue the same with renewedvigour by avoiding the pitfalls of the past and surmounting the likelyhurdles in future.

UN DEBATE

1. It may be recalled that the purpose of founding the United NationsOrganisation was to prevent aggression and war. The UN Charter wasdrawn up by the 46 nations then at war with the Axis powers and wasadopted by them at the San Francisco Conference on 26 June 1945. USA


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became the first nation to join the UN after the U.S. Senate ratified thedecision on 28 July 1945. The U.S. also became the first nation toblatantly violate the basic aim enshrined in the UN Charter, namely tosave succeeding generation from the scourge of war. Within nine days of

joining the UN, the U.S. carried out its atomic bomb attack on Japan, a

nation on the verge of surrender. This mindless act was a shattering blowto the high expectations of all war-weary peoples of a peaceful post-warworld held out by the formation of the UN. Strange as it may seem, the UNGeneral Assembly till date has never taken the U.S. to task for daring toviolate the tenets of the UN Charter and committing that heinous crime. (Incomparison, the magnitude of the crime that Saddam Hussein hadsupposedly committed and for which he was executed at the instance ofthe U.S. Administration, pales into insignificance.)

2. Nevertheless, the first resolution of the first session of the UNGeneral Assembly that was passed on 24 January1946 was entitled "The

Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by theDiscovery of Atomic Energy". The UNGA called upon the commission,named the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNACE), to make specificproposals for"the elimination from national armaments of atomic weaponsand of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction".2 On 14June 1946, Barnard Baruch introduced the U.S. Plan before the UNACEpurportedly as per the UNGA guidelines. Five days later, on 19 June1946, Andrei Gromyko introduced the Soviet Plan as a counter to the saidU.S. Plan. Commenting on the two plans, Alva Myrdal, Swedens Ministerfor Disarmament (1966-73) and one of the worlds leading peace activists,later wrote:

The Baruch Plan assigned obligations to the United States thatwere extremely vague, while the obligations of the Soviet Unionwere to be quite strict and harsh.Moreover,the United Stateswas to retain its monopoly on atomic secrets and it did not promiseto end production of new atomic weapons.Andrei Gromykoimmediately countered the Baruch Plan with a proposal to destroyall nuclear weapons in existence and cease all production and useof atomic weapons categorically. The United States insteadimmediately demontrated its unwillingness to sacrifice itsadvantage by conducting its first post-war atomic test over Bikini on1 July 1946 seventeen days after Baruch had presented his planto the Commission and before its relevant subcommittees met.3

3. According to McGeorge Bundy, who was Special Assistant forNational Security Affairs to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson during 1961-1966 and head of the Ford Foundation during 19661979: the Soviet

proposal calledfor a big separate first stage: prohibition of use,production and possession before there was any agreement on long-term
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resolution_(policy_debate)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_24http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_National_Security_Advisorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_National_Security_Advisorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Kennedyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_Johnsonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Foundationhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resolution_(policy_debate)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_24http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_National_Security_Advisorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_National_Security_Advisorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Kennedyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_Johnsonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Foundationhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979


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control. 4 However, the U.S. not only declined to destroy its stockpile ofnuclear weapons but also flatly refused to give an undertaking that itwould not use such weapons.

THE WINNING WEAPON

4. Recalling the U.S. reaction, Greg Herken, a U.S. historian lateralso curator at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and SpaceMuseum (Washington, D.C.) observed as follows:

Baruch rejected another suggestion that the United Statestemporarily stop producing bombs as a sign of good faith during thenegotiations. The US should retain its winning weapon as a meansof maintaining its security, he objected, since if we were to stopmaking bombs we would be almost defenseless and wouldcertainly have only a modicum of military power with which to stand

up to the USSR.

5

5. Gregg Herken had already noted that: the Baruch plan did notdiffer in substance from an ultimatum the United States might have givenRussia [USSR] to forswear nuclear weapons or be destroyed. 6 TheBaruch Plan, in short, epitomized not only U.S. Administrations perniciousstrategy for monopolizing the possession of nuclear weapons but also itsinsatiable craving for using them again. The resumption of nuclearweapon tests by the U.S. on 01 July 1946, just seventeen days after thesubmission of the Baruch Plan, spoke volumes about USAs realintentions. The enactment of theAtomic Energy Actby the U.S. Congress

on 01 August 1946 did not leave room for any further doubts. The Actunderlined not only The significance of the atomic bomb for militarypurposes but also about the necessity of A program for Governmentcontrol of production, ownership, and use of fissionable material to assurethe common defense and security and to insure the broadest possibleexploitation of the fields.7Nevertheless, discussions on the pros and consof the Baruch and Gromyko Plans continued in the UNAEC well until July1949, when talks completely broke down.

6. Reports, which became subsequently available, show that while theBaruch and Gromyko Plans were being debated in the UNAEC: Soviettargets were coded according to type a city, a factory or an airfield and were then listed in the annually prepared Emergency War Plan.War Plan Broiler in 1947 called for 34 bombs to be dropped on 24 cities;war plan Trojan, one year later targeted 70 cities with 133 bombs, and war

plan Offtackle, in 1949, called for 220 bombs on 104 cities with 72weapons in reserve.8


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7. While negotiations were underway for amicably settling the issue ofcontrol and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the U.S. had no inhibitionsabout secretly preparing to wage nuclear war on the USSR, which wouldhave destroyed an entire nation and killed several million people! Publicly,the U.S. and its allies also set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) on 04 April 1949 as an aggressive military alliance against theUSSR. The U.S. was all the while confident that it would retain monopolyof nuclear weapons at least for the next several years if not decades. Itseems incredible that most other UN members then did not come forwardto support USSRs proposal for a convention to prohibit the use,production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and to declare the use ofsuch horrendous weapons as a crime against humanity as the first andmost important step that the UNAEC had to take. The intransigent attitudeof the U.S. and its allies and the fear of an impending nuclear attack on itforced the USSR to neutralize the U.S. nuclear advantage by making itsown nuclear weapon, which was first tested on 29 August 1949 and which

became public knowledge on 23 September 1949.

SUPER BOMB

8. Peeved at the manner in which the USSR had neutralized the U.S.nuclear hegemony, the U.S. leadership was intent on regaining theadvantage. On 31 January 1950, President Truman issued the order forbuilding super bombs, which were to be thousands of times morepowerful than atomic bombs. (However, the U.S. leadership was soappalled by the fact that Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, popularly known as thefather of the U.S. atom bomb and the then Chairperson of the General

Advisory Committee of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, had dared toexpress his opposition to the proposal. He was subsequently suspendedfrom his post in 1953 reportedly for harbouring "communist" sympathies!His security clearance was revoked in 1954 and was denied free accessto the very atomic research laboratories he had built up.9) Thus, the onusof launching a full-scale nuclear arms race rests first and foremost with theU.S. leadership. It was left to organisations like the World Committee ofPartisans for Peace (consisting of artists, scientists, writers and otherintellectuals and later renamed World Peace Council), led by stalwartssuch as Prof. Juliot Curie, to launch the "Stockholm Appeal" in March1950 demanding an absolute ban on nuclear weapons. While the"Stockholm Appeal" evoked enthusiastic support from reportedly about500 million peace loving people across the world, that was seemingly notsufficient enough to curtail the nuclear arms race that had already beenset in motion.

9. In the meantime, on 13 February 1947, the UN Security Councilhad also set up a Commission for Conventional Armaments in order toregulate conventional armaments and armed forces under an


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international system of control and inspection. This Commissions debatesalso ended in deadlock on 27 April 1950 on the question of membership ofthe Republic of China [Taiwan] on the Commission, which USSR hadopposed. Since neither the UNAEC nor the Commission for ConventionalArmaments had made any progress in tackling their respective tasks, the

UN Security Council consolidated them into a single 11-memberDisarmament Commission in January 1952 with the renewed hope thatthe issue of disarmament would receive the urgent attention it deserved.The Disarmament Commission was to prepare proposals for theregulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and allarmaments, nuclear and conventional alike, and it was to propose aneffective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure thatatomic energy would be used only for peaceful purposes.10However, thedebates in the Disarmament Commission ended abruptly in October 1952.Soon afterwards, the U.S. carried out its first hydrogen bomb test on 01November 1952. The USSR followed suit on 12 August 1953. Britain

conducted its first atomic test on 03 October 1953. Meanwhile, anotheraggressive military alliance called ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, USA)Treaty had also been set up in the South Pacific on 01 September 1951.

10. The ascendancy of General Dwight Eisenhower, who was theCommander of the Allied Forces in Western Europe during the SecondWorld War, as the 34th President of the United States appeared to bringabout a refreshing change. It is interesting to note that soon after he hadstepped into office, in a speech before the American Society ofNewspaper Editors on 16 April 1953, President Eisenhower had said:

(a) Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocketfired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger andare not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world inarms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of itslaborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

(b) This Government is ready to ask its people to join with allnations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savingsachieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid andreconstruction.

(c) The monuments to this new kind of war would be these: roadsand schools, hospitals and homes, food and health. We are ready,in short, to dedicate our strength to serving the needs, rather thanthe fears, of the world.11

MASSIVE RETALIATION


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11. However, subsequent developments show that most of his cabinetcolleagues did not share Eisenhowers optimism. Instead of slamming thebrakes on the arms race, the U.S. reacted to USSRs hydrogen bomb testby introducing the doctrine of massive retaliation. According toMcGeorge Bundy: The man who tried to put it together in public was

[John Foster] Dulles. On January 12, 1954, the secretary of stateannounced the decision of NSC 162/2 in a form which became knowninaccurately but indelibly as the doctrine of massive retaliation. QuotingDulles, Bundy further added: we needed to be ready to fight in the

Arctic and in the Tropics; in Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by sea, byland, and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.12Dulles didnot leave any room for doubts as to the dangerous direction in which theU.S. had decided to tread despite President Eisenhowerspronouncements to the contrary.

12. Dulles and his camp followers soon raised an alarm about the non-

existent Bomber Gap. According to Michael R. Beschloss, an AdjunctHistorian at the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC:

In the spring of 1956, [General Nathan] Twining [Air Force ViceChief of Staff],[General Curtis] LeMay[Commander of the StrategicAir Command (SAC)], and other Air Force titans testified beforeCongress that Russia [USSR] has almost closed the air powergap. In airplane after airplane, they are approaching us in qualityand surpassing us in quantity.

Beschloss then went on to add:

General Twinning, LeMay and their cohorts warned Congressthat Russias long-range bomber fleet might be twice the size ofSACs by 1959.13

13. The truth was otherwise, as the staff of the Bulletin of the AtomicScientists has shown. In a note titled Truth v. Reality, they have exposedthe baseless allegations about the "Bomber Gap" with the followinginformation:

The [U.S.] intelligence community predicted in 1956 that by mid-1959 the Soviet Union would have 400 Bison and 300 Bearbombers "in operational use." By 1958 subsequent assessmentsfound the Soviet Union had built only about 85 heavy bombers.Meanwhile, the U.S. heavy bomber force had grown to 1,769, for aratio of 21 to 1 in favor of the United States.14

The net result was that profits of the U.S. armament industries had soaredas never before at the expense of the social benefits that may have gone


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to the U.S. citizens, as President Eisenhower had pointed out on 16 April1953! [See para 10 above]

14. An integral part of the nuclear arms race was the periodic testing ofnuclear weapons of various intensities in the atmosphere, underwater and

underground. It did not take long before the world began to realize thehigh risks involved in spewing radioactive particles from the ongoingnuclear tests especially into the atmosphere and underwater. The growingmenace of radioactive fallout from nuclear tests was exemplified by the15-megaton atmospheric test conducted by the U.S. on 01 March 1954over Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. The widespread revulsion that theBikini (Bravo) Test had evoked also contributed to revitalizing the peacemovement. Following the havoc caused by the radioactive fallout from theBikini Test, it was Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was the firststatesman to give a clarion call on 02 April 1954 before the IndianParliament for immediate suspension of all nuclear weapon tests. Nehru

had made the following proposals:

"(1) Some sort of, what may be called, "Standstill Agreement" inrespect, at least, of these actual explosions, even if arrangementsabout the discontinuance of production and stockpiling, must awaitmore substantial agreements amongst those principally concerned.

"(2) Full publicity by those principally concerned in the production ofthese weapons and by the United Nations, of the extent of thedestructive power and the known effects of these weapons andalso adequate indication of the extent of the unknown but probable

effects. Informed world public opinion is in our view the mosteffective factor in bringing about the results we desire.

"(3) Immediate (and continuing) private meetings of the sub-committees of the Disarmament Commission to consider the"Standstill" proposal, which I have just mentioned, pendingdecisions on prohibitions and controls etc., to which theDisarmament Commission is asked by the General Assembly toaddress itself.

"(4) Active steps by States and peoples of the world, who thoughnot concerned with the production of these weapons, are verymuch concerned by the possible use of them, also at present, bythese experiments and their effects. They would, I venture to hope,express their concern and add their voices and influences, in aseffective a manner as possible to arrest the progress of thisdestructive potential which menaces all alike."15


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15. The USSR responded to Nehrus call by moving a draft resolutionin the UNGA for convening an international convention on the reduction ofarmaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons ofmass destruction [a resolution that was subsequently adopted by theUNGA as Resolution No.808 (IX) on 04 November 1954]. However, the

response of the Western states from Canadas point of view was asfollows:

A few days later[after Nehrus statement] the Government of Indiarequested that these suggestions be placed before theDisarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. The Nehru

proposals, however, have not yet been considered in the Sub-Committee or the Disarmament Commission nor was there anydiscussion of these proposals in the General Assembly at the 9thSession. On November 19, 1954, the Indian Government againasked that these proposals be taken into consideration by the

Disarmament Commission

From a military point of view continuance of tests would providethe best means of following the Soviet development of nuclearweapons. Canada's close association with the United States andthe United Kingdom in the basic Western defence programme,which relies on the use of nuclear weapons, makes it difficult for usto support the suggestion of a ban on test explosions if it isconsidered that these tests are essential to the proper developmentof the defence programme. The United States recently confirmedits opposition to the proposed ban on tests.

The United States Atomic Energy Commission Report of February15, 1955, implicitly rejects the suggestion of a ban on nuclear testexplosions. last September [1954] the United States expressedits firm opposition to the Nehru proposal as such which calls for "full

publicity".16

16. In, what was then a secret document, USA, UK and Canada hadadmitted that they had no hesitation in rejecting Nehrus proposalsbecause Western defence programme, which relies on the use ofnuclear weaponsmade it difficult for them to support the suggestion of aban on test explosions Instead, in a bid to spread its global tentacles,the U.S. decided to set up another military alliance called the South EastAsian Treaty Organization (SEATO) on 08 September 1954. Themembers of the alliance were: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan,Philippines, Thailand, UK and USA. Significantly, Burma (now Myanmar),Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India and Indonesia firmly rejected the offer to

join the alliance. The U.S. went on to set up yet another military alliancecalled the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) on 24 February 1955 with


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Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the UK. [USA de facto joined CENTOafter the withdrawal of Iraq in 1958. Pakistan withdrew from both thealliance in 1973. SEATO was formally wound up in 1977 and CENTO toobecame defunct after the withdrawal of Iran in 1979.]

BANDUNG CONFERENCE

17. While USA, UK and Canada had scant respect for Nehrus test banand other proposals, Nehru had persisted with his efforts at buildingpeace. Talks between Nehru and the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai wereheld in New Delhi and it ended on 28 June 1954 in the signing of a jointstatement on the principles on which relations between India and Chinawere to be based. These principles, which became subsequently knownas the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence or Panch Sheel, were:(1) mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2)non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each others internal affairs; (4)

equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. The PanchSheel principles were also the basis of positive neutrality, for thepromotion of which the first Asian-African conference was organised atBandung, Indonesia, from 18 to 24 April 1955.

18. Positive neutrality consisted in non-participation in military blocscombined with active moves against the conclusion of imperialist militaryalliances, and in championing general and complete disarmament andabolition of colonialism. Also mediation in the settlement of internationaldisputes for the purpose of easing international tensions; anti-colonialismmanifesting itself in active support of all peoples fighting for independence

and, once that has been gained, for complete elimination of the colonialaftermath; anti-racialism expressed in the demand for complete equality ofraces and the banning of discrimination of any people. While the BandungConference appeared to provide an opportunity to build solidarity of Asianand African countries, in reality that did not happen due to the acutestruggle that took place there between the real non-aligned countries andthose countries that were still under the tutelage and stranglehold of theimperialist powers.

19. Yet, an important section of the Final Communiqu of the BandungConference was on Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation and itstated as follows:

(a) The Conference considered that disarmament and theprohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclearand thermo-nuclear weapons of war imperative to save[hu]mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect ofwholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and

Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and


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civilization to proclaim their support for disarmament and for theprohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principallyconcerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmamentand prohibition.

(b) The Conference declared universal disarmament is anabsolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested theUnited Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concernedspeedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control andreduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the

prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of allweapons of mass destruction, and to establish effectiveinternational control to this end.17

The failure of the Bandung Conference to launch a permanent Asian-African nations organisation to carry forward its objectives was a sign that

it was the writ of the imperialist powers that ultimately prevailed, althoughNehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Nkrumah and others did make valiant attemptslater to revive it in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961.

SABOTAGE OF THE 1955 SUMMIT

20. Meanwhile, in 1953, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) had set upa sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission consisting ofrepresentatives of the Powers principally involved, namely Canada,France, the USSR, the UK, and the U.S., which held a number ofmeetings in the following two years. During meetings of the Sub-

Committee of the Disarmament Commission at London from 25 February 18 May 1955, the USSR, on 10 May 1955, proposed a comprehensiveplan for reduction of conventional forces and armaments, discontinuanceof nuclear weapons tests and elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingto the summary report of the Canadian delegation at the talks:

The discussions of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in Londonmay have brought about a substantial narrowing of the gapbetween the Western and Soviet positions. 18

21. As a result of thenarrowing of the gap between the Western andSoviet positions, at the summit meeting of the leaders of USA, USSR, UKand France, which was held during 18-23 July 1955 at Geneva, there wasa real possibility that an agreement would be reached on drawing up acomprehensive disarmament plan. However, a right-wing clique within theU.S. Administration led by John Foster Dulles (the then U.S. Secretaryof State) and Allen Dulles (the then Director of the CIA) did everythingthey could to sabotage the possibility of arriving at any such agreement. Inthe words of McGeorge Bundy: In essence what [John Foster] Dulles


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feared about proposals for disarmament in 1955 was simply that theymight lead to agreement.he did not fear the nuclear arms race, becausehe had confidence the Russians could not keep up. What he feared muchmore was an agreement [on disarmament] 19 Bundys assessmentcandidly sums-up the attitude of the right-wing lobby in the U.S. on the

issue of disarmament.

22. The telegram sent by the Canadian High Commissioner in the UKto Canadas Secretary of State for External Affairs on 27 July 1955,provides further proof of the U.S. Administrations attitude towardsdisarmament. It says:

The United States position on disarmament was now even morecautious than it had been when the Sub Committee recessed inMay [1955]. There was absolutely no hope of obtaining UnitedStates support for the Anglo-French 75 proposal or the proposal onlevels of forces.The United States would probably not go so far as

to write itself out of the Four Power plan of March 8[1955], but it isin fact no longer interested in pushing it. [Canadian HighCommissioner to the UK] Nutting's firm conviction, which he

passed on for our secret ear, is that present United States policy isopposed to any attempt to secure nuclear disarmament.[Emphasis added]20

The 1955 Geneva summit meeting naturally failed to live up to itsexpectations.

[A little known fact is that the wily brothers John and Allen Dulles were

also instrumental in ousting Harold Stassen, chief U.S. disarmamentnegotiator, midway from the sub-committee meeting of the DisarmamentCommission, which was being held in London from 18 March to 06September 1957. John Dulles himself went on to occupy Stassens placeat the talks. Stassens misdemeanor was that he was seriously pursuingthe task that was assigned to him. However, his detractors quickly seizedupon a procedural lapse on his part to undermine his position and tomalign him. According to the Minnesota Historical Society: Stassensviews regarding disarmament and negotiations with the Russians werestrongly opposed by other members of Eisenhowers cabinet, particularlySecretary of State John Foster Dulles. (http://www.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00202-5.html ) Stassen, who wasnicknamed Secretary of Peace, had been appointed as Special Assistantto the President for Disarmament in March 1955. After the Londonmeeting ended in stalemate, he resigned from his post on 18 February1958 to the delight of the anti-disarmament lobby.]

23. Meanwhile, on 09 May 1955, West Germany was inducted intoNATO. It was a disturbing move since for the first time the NATO bloc had
http://www.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00202-5.htmlhttp://www.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00202-5.html


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a common border with an ally of the USSR, East Germany. USSR, whichhad resisted the formation of any military alliance till then (despite theexistence of four U.S.-led military alliances NATO, ANZUS, SEATO &CENTO) was left with no option but to counter the NATO decision bysigning the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955 to defend itself and its allies

against any preemptive attack. In the background of the increasing tensionbetween USA and USSR, Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein prepared aManifesto with a view to warn the peoples of the world about thedisastrous effects of a nuclear war and about the urgency of preventingany such misadventure. The Manifesto, which was signed by nine otherscientists, was released in London on 09 July 1955.21

RUSSELL-EINSTEIN MANIFESTO

24. The Manifesto, which had a profound influence on the peacemovement, helped peace groups to arouse peoples' consciousness and

organize mass movements in many parts of the world for abolition ofnuclear weapons. The radiation effects of the 1954 Bravo test hadalready caused outrage in Japan. These factors led to the holding of thefirst World Conference against A & H Bombs in August 1955 in Hiroshimaand Nagasaki, followed by the founding of the Japan Council AgainstAtomic and Hydrogen Bombs (GENSUIKYO) in September 1955.Subsequently, India, which vociferously supported nuclear disarmament,placed yet another proposal on 12July 1956 before the UN DisarmamentCommission for 'Cessation of All Explosions of Nuclear and OtherWeapons of Mass Destruction'.22

25. At the request of Bertrand Russell, Nehru had also agreed to host aconference on science and world affairs in New Delhi in December 1956.However, due to Indias preoccupation with the Suez Crisis (October 1956- March 1957), the venue of the conference to promote disarmament andpeace had to be shifted to Pugwash in Canada and was held there in July1957. Consequently, that conference gave impetus to the PugwashMovement or, what is now known as, the Pugwash Conferences onScience and World Affairs. That same year, the National Committee for ASane Nuclear Policy (SANE) was established in the U.S. Soon afterBritain had carried out its first hydrogen bomb test on 08 November 1957,the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) came into existence inBritain. The primary focus of the peace movement then was to endnuclear weapon tests.

26. The launching of the communication satellite Sputnik by theUSSR on 04 October 1957, which symbolized the potential of peacefuluses of advanced science & technology, had also proved that the USSRhad overtaken the U.S. in this area. This development, which wasdescribed by some journalists as the shock of the century 23, had a


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sobering impact on the aggressive stance of the U.S. The peace dividendfrom the successful "Sputnik" launch was almost immediate. Although theU.S. rejected yet another proposal for a moratorium on nuclear weapontesting, which the USSR had renewed in March 1958, at the end of April1958, Eisenhower proposed an international conference of experts to

study the problem of verification. According to the Federation of AmericanScientists:

President Eisenhower propose[d] a Conference of Experts toexamine the issues involved in verifying a nuclear test ban. Theconference convene[d] on July 1 [1958] in Geneva with scientistsfrom the US, Britain, USSR, France, Canada, Czechoslovakia,Romania, and Poland. On August 21, the conference release[d] areport that a comprehensive test ban (CTB) can be verified througha network of 160 monitoring stations and that nuclear tests inspace out to 50 kilometers can be verified, but that current

technology cannot detect tests in deep space.

24

27. Subsequently, the U.S., the UK, and the USSR agreed to amoratorium on nuclear weapon tests from 31 October 1958 onwards andbegan negotiations for a test ban treaty. The ongoing powerful worldwidecampaign against nuclear weapon testing was an equally important factorthat led to these developments. The moratorium on testing paved the wayfor establishment in 1959 of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament(TNCD), which formally remained outside the UN system. It comprised offive members each from the two military blocs NATO and the WarsawPact and was mandated to formulate measures leading to general and

complete disarmament.

28. The developments that took place in the UN General Assemblyduring the period when the moratorium was being adhered to were just assignificant. In 1957, the UNGA had enlarged the DisarmamentCommission from 11 to 25 nations; and by 1958, it was further expandedto include all members of the UN. The significant development that tookplace in 1959 was that two major plans for general and completedisarmament was submitted before the UNGA: one by the UK on 17September 1959 and the other by the USSR on 18 September 1959. Itwas said that both the plans were not too dissimilar. Both plans not onlysought to abolish the ability of all states to wage war but also sought toreduce all military forces and armaments to the requirement of internalsecurity. In the debate that followed in the Assembly's Political andSecurity Committee, many proposals and suggestions were discussedvirtually without acrimony or mutual recrimination.

SABOTAGE OF THE 1960 SUMMIT


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29. Finally, on 20 November 1959, the UN General Assemblyunanimously adopted Resolution No.1378 (XIV) without a formal vote, thefirst resolution ever to be sponsored by all member nations. The resolutionon disarmament stated that the UN was "striving to put an end completelyand forever to the armaments race,"and that "the question of general and

complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today."25

The resolution was transmitted to the Disarmament Commission and tothe 10-Nation Disarmament Committee for thorough considerations. Fromthe positive discussions that took place in the Disarmament Committee, amajor initiative on disarmament was expected at the forthcoming Parissummit. According to McGeorge Bundy:

By the spring of 1960, Eisenhower and Khrushchev had made arecord of proposals and counterproposals, joint technical inquiry,and serious argument, that was entirely without precedent innuclear arms control negotiations. They had drafted a treaty

banning tests at all levels except that of small underground tests for those there would be an uninspected moratorium. Only twoissues remained: how much inspection would be allowed, and howlong the moratorium would last. The Americans were lookingforward with hope to a summit meeting in Paris as the place whereEisenhower and Khrushchev might resolve these two remainingissues.26

However, the infamous U-2 incident sabotaged the Paris Summit meetingbetween leaders of France, the UK, the U.S. and the USSR, which wasscheduled to take place from 18 May 1960 onwards, and relations

between the U.S. and the USSR seriously deteriorated. As a result, thework of the 10-Nation Disarmament Committee was disrupted andremained so for nearly a year.

30. The U-2 incident appears to have been stage-managed. On 01 May1960, just two weeks ahead of the proposed Paris Summit, a U.S. airplane(code-named U-2) went on a photoreconnaissance mission over theUSSR and was shot down by a Soviet missile. There have been deepsuspicions that the Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles (without the companyof his brother, John Foster Dulles, who was now dead) and his ilk hadengineered the incident without the knowledge of President Eisenhower todisrupt the Paris Summit, where a significant breakthrough in the nucleartest ban negotiations was expected. (McGeorge Bundy has pointed outthis in his observations, which have been quoted in para 29 above.) It mayalso have been intended to frustrate the proposed visit of PresidentEisenhower soon after the Paris Summit to the USSR, where he wasexpected to be given a tremendous welcome. As commander of the AlliedForces in Western Europe during the Second World War, General


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Eisenhower had enjoyed good rapport with the military leadership of theUSSR many of whom were still around.

31. The visit of President Eisenhower to the USSR would have not onlysignaled the process of dtente between the two nations but also would

have been a crowning achievement for President Eisenhower, who wasnearing the end of his second term as president. As it turned out, becauseof the spying episode, Soviet Premier Khrushchev had little option but toseek an apology from Eisenhower. However, Eisenhower could notdisown responsibility for the ugly incident without losing face. So all thatEisenhower managed to offer was an undertaking that such incidentswould not take place in future. Khrushchev refused to accept anythingshort of an apology and the summit meeting fell through. The spyingincident would have anyway marred the proceedings at the summitmeeting even if it had been held. It was also unlikely that Eisenhowerwould have visited the USSR, when a U.S. spy the U-2 pilot was being

held as a prisoner there. Anyway, for the opponents of disarmament, thecollapse of the Paris Summit of 1960 turned out to be a majoraccomplishment.

MYTH OF MISSILE GAP

32. U.S. President, John F. Kennedy, who had assumed office inJanuary 1961, was elected to his post largely due to his ability to exploitfears of an alleged Soviet strategic superiority, which was dubbed as the"Missile-Gap." The Missile-Gap was yet another fraud that wasvociferously perpetrated by the right-wing forces in the U.S. Administration

to play upon the sentiments of the U.S. citizens in order to elicit theirsupport for increased military spending, a demand that was beingcanvassed by interested parties. According to McGeorge Bundy:

Between 1957 and 1961, the nuclear weapon policy of the UnitedStates, and still more the state of public understanding on thissubject, was affected by a phantom the missile gap. The idea thatthe United States was faced by the prospect of a significant and

possibly even a decisive Soviet advantage in long-range ballisticmissiles persisted in one quarter or another until late in 1961.Drawing their numbers from different intelligence estimators atdifferent times, the presidents [President Eisenhowers] critics

predicted a Soviet advantage of hundreds, or of thousands, in ayear or two or three. Senator Stuart Symington was perhaps themost extreme, offering a flat prediction in early 1959 that in threeyears the Russians will prove to us that they have 3,000 ICBMs.27

President Eisenhower himself exposed the myth in his State of the NationMessage to the U.S. Congress on 12 January 1961 by pointing out that:


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The bomber gap of several years ago was always a fiction, and themissile gap shows every sign of being the same.28 The truth of thematter, as the staff of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has againshown in their note titled Truth v. Reality was that:

The [U.S.] intelligence community predicted in 1957 that by 1961the Soviet Union would have 500 operational intercontinentalballistic missiles (ICBMs). In mid-1960, Corona

photoreconnaissance demonstrated that the Soviet Union had fourICBMs in place; in 1962 it had 36. By 1963, the United States had500 operational ICBMs, thanks to the efforts of John F. Kennedy,who used the threat of a "missile gap" to defeat Richard M. Nixon inthe presidential election of 1960.29

REVERSAL OF SOVIET POLICY

34. Since the myth of the missile gap was perpetrated by theKennedy administration to justify a massive military build-up, the USSRhad real cause for concern leading to a panic reaction from its side, whichresulted in its decision to break the existing moratorium on nuclearweapon testing and to increase its stockpile of nuclear weapons. At thesame time, it is inexplicable as to why the Soviet leadership chose toignore the apprehensions expressed by President Eisenhower, in hisfamous Farewell Address to the U.S. citizens on 17 January 1961, justthree days before he laid down office. President Eisenhower had warned:

(a) This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a

large arms industry is new in the American experience. The totalinfluence-economic, political, even spiritual-is felt in every city,every state house, every office of the Federal government.

(b) In the councils of government, we must guard against theacquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought,by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrousrise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

(c) We must never let the weight of this combination endanger ourliberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing forgranted

(d) Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is acontinuing imperative. Together we must learn how to composedifference, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose.Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I laydown my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense ofdisappointment.30


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35. Eisenhowers grave apprehensions, which no other U.S. presidenthas ever admitted to, turned out to be prophetic. The U.S. society hassince been largely under the stranglehold of the military-industrial-complex. Instead of recognizing the significance of Eisenhower's

observations and redoubling the USSR's persistent efforts to achievegeneral and complete disarmament, the Soviet leadership recklesslyreversed their earlier policy and opted to compete with the U.S. military-industrial-complex in the mistaken belief that they can keep pace withthem or even beat the U.S. at their own game.

36. To the delight of the Soviet leadership, Yuri Gagarin's path-breaking space voyage on Vostok-I on 12 April 1961 turned out to be yetanother milestone for Soviet science. The envious U.S. leadership'sresponse to Gagarin's historic voyage was to launch a pathetic CIA-sponsored aerial bombing of Cuba on 14 April 1961 and destroying almost

all of Cubas aircrafts. This was followed by an amphibious counter-revolutionary attack on 17 April 1961 with a squad of 1500 Cuban exiles,which was crushed by the Cuban revolutionary forces in no time. (Thethen CIA Director, Allen Dulles, who had contrived the plot, was forced toresign in September 1961 following the ignoble fiasco.)37. So overwhelmed were the Soviet leadership with the recentsuccesses of the socialist system that they apparently lost their sense ofdirection. Instead of exploiting its successes in the field of scientificdevelopment for furthering the cause of peace, the USSR, which was untilthen in the forefront of the disarmament movement, suddenly seems tohave been overtaken by an illusion that it was in a position to establish

military superiority over the U.S. There is no other plausible explanation asto why the USSR took the deplorable decision to break the existingmoratorium on nuclear weapon testing (which was being formallyobserved by the U.S., the USSR and Britain from 31 October 1958onwards) by carrying out a series of atmospheric nuclear tests beginning01 September 1961. (Recent information suggests that the U.S., in fact,had been conducting sub-critical nuclear weapon tests during this periodof the moratorium. See: http://www.shundahai.org/sub_crit.htm ). It is alsostrange as to why the USSR chose to break the moratorium on 01September 1961, which happened to the opening day of the well-publicized First Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, a globalmovement that was launched by the third-world nations with one of theprime objectives of opposing war and supporting global disarmament.

38. Not only did the USSR break the moratorium, much to the relief ofthe U.S. Administration which itself was under tremendous for doing so,but the USSR also went on to conduct, with much fanfare, a mind-boggling atmospheric test on 31 September 1961 of a 50-megatonhydrogen bomb nicknamed "Tsar Bomba" as though to poke fun at
http://www.shundahai.org/sub_crit.htmhttp://www.shundahai.org/sub_crit.htm


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humanity. (In comparison, the biggest nuclear weapon test everconducted by the U.S. the Bravo test had an explosive power of 15-megaton TNT.) The shocking conduct of the Soviet leadership was highlyappalling. This was despite the fact that there was opposition within thescientific community in the USSR against breaking the moratorium on

nuclear tests. Dr.Andrei Sakharov, known as the father of the Soviethydrogen bomb, had expressed his strong opposition to the resumption ofnuclear tests, especially atmospheric ones. Sakharov was completelydejected after the Soviet leadership chose to dismiss his views summarily.It did not take long before the highly decorated Soviet scientist fell foulwith the Soviet establishment.

McCLOY-ZORIN ACCORD

39. The decision of the Soviet leadership to break the moratorium wasall the more inexplicable since talks between the U.S. and the USSR had

already restarted on 31 March 1961 for working out a framework ofAgreed Principles for General and Complete Disarmament. Theframework, known as the McCloy-Zorin Accord named after its authorsJohn I. McCloy of the U.S. and Valerian A. Zorin of the USSR wassubmitted before the UN General Assembly on 20 September 196131. Inan apparent reversal of roles, the United States, for the first time ever,now took the initiative in championing the cause of general and completedisarmament. In an address to the UN General Assembly on 25September 1961, President Kennedy presented the United StatesProgram for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.32

The McCloy-Zorin Accord, which is considered a high point in

disarmament efforts during the Cold War, set forth eight principles. Thepreamble of the Accord states that: The United States and the USSRhave agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for futuremultilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States tocooperate in reaching early agreement on general and completedisarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.

40. On 20 December 1961, through Resolution No.1722 (XVI)33, theUNGA unanimously adopted the McCloy-Zorin principles, which was toserve as the basic terms of reference for all subsequent discussions ongeneral and complete disarmament. On 20 December 1961, the UNGAhad also decided to expand the 10-Nation Disarmament Committee, whichwas beset with irresolvable differences a year earlier, by including eightnon-aligned nations (including India) with a view to bridging the gapbetween the NATO and Warsaw Pact factions of the Committee. TheParliament Library of the Parliament of Australia has put up a researchnote titled United Nations - General and Complete Disarmament, whichgives an overview of the debate on general and complete disarmamentduring that crucial period. It is as follows:


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(a) The objective of general and complete disarmament was tocreate a world where lasting peace and security were assured. Thisaim has been implicit in the provisions of the Charter of the UnitedNations since its inception in 1945.'General and Complete

Disarmament' was first included on the agenda of UNGA 14 [1959]at the request of the Soviet Union. Premier Khrushchev addressedthe assembly on 18 September 1959 and proposed a newdisarmament program in three stages aimed at eliminating allarmed forces and armaments within a four year period. The

program was revised and submitted to the Ten-NationDisarmament Committee (TNDC) in Geneva in March of 1960. TheTNDC was created by the Foreign Ministers of France, the SovietUnion, UK and USA as a body outside of the United Nations butlinked to it. Its task was to negotiate General and CompleteDisarmament. For reasons of parity, the TNDC was made up of five

Eastern Bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland,Romania and the Soviet Union), and five Western Bloc countries(Canada, France, Italy, UK and the USA). The TNDC met from 15March 1960 to 27 June 1960. During this time it tried,unsuccessfully, to attain consensus on the many, complex issuesfacing both sides on their way to general disarmament. TNDC'sfailure to reach agreement can be understood in the context of thestrained relations between East and West at the time.

(b) A joint statement by the United States of America and theSoviet Union on the agreed principles for disarmament was issued

on 20 September, 1961. Also referred to as the Zorin-McCloyagreement, it stated that the goal of negotiation was to assure thatwar would not be used as a way of settling international disputes.The statement recommended that a program for disarmamentapplying to all countries should comprise the following principles asa basis for new negotiations:

- that disarmament is general and complete and war is nolonger an instrument for settling international problems;

- that such disarmament is accompanied by theestablishment of reliable procedures for the peacefulsettlement of disputes and effective arrangements for themaintenance of peace in accordance with the Charter ofthe United Nations;

- that States have at their disposal only such non-nucleararmaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are


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agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order andprotect the personal security of citizens;

- that States shall support and provide agreed manpowerfor a United Nations peace force;

- the disbanding of armed forces;

- the dismantling of military establishments includingbases;

- the cessation of arms production;

- the liquidation of armaments, or their conversion forpeaceful purposes;

-the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical,bacteriological and other weapons of mass destructionas well as their means of delivery;

- the abolition of military institutions;

- the cessation of military training and the discontinuanceof military expenditures;

- that the disarmament program should be implemented instages within specified time limits until completion; and

- that no State or group of States gain military advantageover another.

(c) The statement also called for the creation of an internationaldisarmament organisation within the framework of the UnitedNations. Its inspectors would have unrestricted access to all

places, as necessary for verification of disarmament measures.

(d) As a result of the Zorin-McCloy statement, the following two proposals were submitted to the Eighteen-Nation DisarmamentCommittee (ENDC) in 1962. The ENDC was established in the16th General Assembly by Resolution 1722 on 20 December 1961.The two proposals were the 'Draft treaty on general and completedisarmament under strict international control' submitted by theSoviet Union on 15 March 1962, and the 'Outline of basic

provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in apeaceful world' submitted by the United States of America on 18April 1962. Theproposals and their revisions were discussed over


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the following years, but no final agreement could be reached. Theareas causing the most difficulty concerned the stages ofimplementation, the nuclear issue and the verification ofdisarmament measures. As the negotiation process continued overthe years, it became apparent that general and complete

disarmament was not going to be achieved through a single,comprehensive international instrument. Instead, arms control andarms limitation came to be seen as more viable and achievable,and GCD began to be regarded as a goal to work towards, with thehope that with each success, international mutual confidence andtrust would grow.

(e) For most of the 1950's and the early 1960's, the approachadopted to GCD was for an all-encompassing, coordinated andrigidly phased program of disarmament. By the mid 1960's, thefocus had shifted to achieving specific short-term objectives, which

could be agreed relatively easily and incorporated into legalinstruments. These include the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963),the Treaty on Nuclear Non Proliferation (1968), and most recentlythe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996).34

In short, where there was no will, there was no way of implementing theMcCloy-Zorin principles!

41. The submission made by the United States before the ENCD was amore precise elaboration of the proposals that President Kennedy hadplaced before the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1961. The

McCloy-Zorin Accord and the two proposals put forward by USSR andUSA in 1962 had remained the only sensible proposals on general andcomplete disarmament until Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi tabled IndiasAction Plan for a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-Violent World Order atthe Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in1988. The radical shift from the objective of general and completedisarmament to, what were being termed as, the more pragmatic stepsbegan with the signing of the PTBT in 1963. As noted in the above para,from the viewpoint of the so-called pragmatists, the PTBT, the NPT andthe CTBT were specific short-term objectives, which could be agreedrelatively easily and incorporated into legal instruments! Experience hasproved that these short-term objectives, instead of contributing to, haveonly hindered the process of general and complete disarmament. Equallycrucial is the fact that these short-term objectives, including the conceptof NWFZs or regional arms control measures, never in any way infringedon the interests of the nuclear weapon powers while at the same timegaving the false impression to the world at large that serious attemptswere being made to pursue the goal of disarmament and peace.


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1Daryl Kimball and Wade Boese, Limited Test Ban Treaty Turns 40, Arms Control Today, October 2003, at

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/LTBT.asp

2 Athttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm

3Alva Myrdal, Game of Disarmament, Pantheon Books, New York, 1976, pp.74-78

4McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, Affiliated East-West

Press Pvt Ltd., New Delhi, 1989, p.183

5Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950, Alfred A. Knopf, New

York, 1980, p.179

6Ibid, p.171

7USAsAtomic Energy Act of 1946, Section 1(a) & (b) (4), athttp://www.osti.gov/atomicenergyact.pdf

8Peter Pringle & William Arkin, SIOP*: Nuclear War From the Inside, Sphere Books Limited, London, 1983,

pp.32, 37*[Single-Integrated-Operation-Plan for waging nuclear war against the Soviet Union. The 1980 war plan SIOP-5D included a staggering 40,000 potential targets (p.143)]

9 For details see John Major, The Oppenheimer Hearing, Stein and Day Publishers, New York, 1971

10Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations United Nations, Worldmark Press Ltd., New York, 1984, p.52

11Athttp://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/speeches

12McGearge Bundy, op. cit., pp.255-256

13Michael R. Baschloss, May Day Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair, Harper & Row Publishers Inc.,

New York, 1986, pp.119 & 150

14Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago, (vol. 57, no. 04), July/August 2001, pp. 36-37

15Statement in the Lok Sabha, in India and Disarmament: An Anthology of Selected Writings and Speeches ,

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1988, pp.36-37

16Documents of Canadian External Relations, Volume #21 51, Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State

for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, February 22, 1955, on the Disarmament Meetings ofthe Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London, February 1955, athttp://www.international.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefId=1099

17Final Communiqu of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 24 April 1955, para F-2, at

http://www.iss.co.za/

18

Documents of Canadian External Relations, Volume #21 52, May 27, 1955, athttp://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefId=1100

19 McGeorge Bundy, op. cit., p.301

20 Documents of Canadian External Relations, Volume #21 55, at

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/hist/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefid=1101

21 Athttp://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/[email protected]://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/[email protected]://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/LTBT.asphttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htmhttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htmhttp://www.osti.gov/atomicenergyact.pdfhttp://www.osti.gov/atomicenergyact.pdfhttp://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/speecheshttp://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/speecheshttp://www.international.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefId=1099http://www.iss.co.za/http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefId=1100http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/hist/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefid=1101http://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htmhttp://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htmhttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/[email protected]://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/[email protected]://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/LTBT.asphttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htmhttp://www.osti.gov/atomicenergyact.pdfhttp://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/speecheshttp://www.international.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefId=1099http://www.iss.co.za/http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefId=1100http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/hist/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefid=1101http://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm


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22 DC/98, Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January-December 1956.Reproduced in Disarmament: IndiasInitiatives, External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs,Government of India, 1988, p.10

23 Paul Dickson, Sputnik: theShockoftheCentury, Walker & Co., New York, 2001

24Athttp://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron1.htm

25 Athttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/14/ares14.htm

26 McGeorge Bundy, op. cit., pp.332-33327

McGeorge Bundy, op. cit., pp.334, 337-33828

At http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu./ws/index.php?pid=12074

29 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, op. cit.

30At http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/farewell.htm

31http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/mccloy-zorin-accords_1961-09-20.htm

32 Athttp://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/33 Athttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/16/ares16.htm

34At http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/rn/1997-98/98rn05.htm

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N.D.JayaprakashDelhi Science Forum/Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace

E-mail:[email protected]

24 April 2007
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron1.htmhttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/14/ares14.htmhttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/14/ares14.htmhttp://www.presidency.ucsb.edu./ws/index.php?pid=12074http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu./ws/index.php?pid=12074http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/farewell.htmhttp://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/mccloy-zorin-accords_1961-09-20.htmhttp://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/mccloy-zorin-accords_1961-09-20.htmhttp://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/16/ares16.htmhttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/16/ares16.htmhttp://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/rn/1997-98/98rn05.htmmailto:[email protected]://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron1.htmhttp://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/14/ares14.htmhttp://www.presidency.ucsb.edu./ws/index.php?pid=12074http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/farewell.htmhttp://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/mccloy-zorin-accords_1961-09-20.htmhttp://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/mccloy-zorin-accords_1961-09-20.htmhttp://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/16/ares16.htmhttp://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/rn/1997-98/98rn05.htmmailto:[email protected]