disposal of chemical weapons: alternative technologies

Disposal of Chemical Weapons: AlternativeTechnologies

June 1992

OTA-BP-O-95NTIS order #PB92-202180

Recommended Citation:U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alter-native Technologies-Background Paper, OTA-BP-O-95 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, June 1992).

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing OfficeSuperintendent of’ Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16 -037951-2

Foreword

The United States has pledged to destroy its entire stockpile of chemical weapons by theend of this decade. The U.S. Army has begun this process by building and testing ademonstration facility to disassemble and incinerate these weapons on Johnston Island, asmall island in the mid-Pacific Ocean. After tests prove the concept, the Army plans to buildsimilar facilities for the other chemical weapons now stored at each of eight sites in thecontinental United States.

Local community groups are opposed to the Army’s current program at a number of thesesites. The incineration of hazardous materials of all kinds has engendered concerns aboutpublic health impacts. Several organizations have suggested that technologies other thanincineration may be safer and more appropriate for this program. Because of these factors,Senator Wendell H. Ford asked the Office of Technology Assessment to evaluate the statusand availability of alternative technologies for destruction of chemical weapons in the U.S.stockpile as an adjunct to OTA’s larger assessment of weapons dismantlement.

This background paper briefly describes the Army’s chemical weapons destructionprogram, discusses the factors that could affect a decision to develop alternatives, discussesthe alternatives, and illustrates the difficulty of gaining public acceptance of complextechnical systems.

OTA appreciates the assistance and support this effort received from workshopparticipants, reviewers, and other participants. They provided valuable information that wascritical to the completion of this study, and enabled OTA to develop a much more completeand accurate analysis. OTA, however, remains solely responsible for the contents of thisreport.

~zfAdL&L4-JOHN H. GIBBONS

- D i r e c t o r

,,,Ill

Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Workshop Participants

Edgar BerkeyNational Environmental Technology

Applications Corp.

Gene DyerBechtel Corp. (Retired) andMember of the National ResearchCouncil Committee on Review

and Evaluation of theArmy chemical StockpileDisposal Program

Larry EitelConsultant Chemical Engineer

Richard ErikssonCalifornia Department of Toxic

Substances Control, AlternativeTechnologies Division

Walter KovalickU.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Technology Assessment

Jack SwearengenSandia National Laboratories

Robert WhelenU.S. Army Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Reviewers

Col. Eric AzumaOffice of the Assistant

Secretary of the Army

Charles BaronianU.S. Army Chemical


James BartelSandia National Laboratories

Hayden BurgessCitizen of Waianae, HI

Ned CoaleU.S. Army Chemical


Jeanette CrowAlabama Conservancy

Workshop Participants and Reviewers

William DavisonDirectorGeneral Atomics

Angela DooleyCitizen of Pine Bluff, AR

Kevin J. FlammU.S. Army Chemical


Bracelen FloodConcerned Citizens of

Madison County, Kentucky

Terry GallowaySynthetic Technologies Inc.

Sebia HawkinsGreenpeace Pacific Campaign

Thomas HessOffice of the Assistant

Secretary of the Army

Peter HilleCommon Ground

Cathy HindsNational Toxics Campaign Fund

Valerie HudsonKentucky Department for

Environmental Protection

Col. William R. HumbaughOrdinance CorpsLexington-Bluegrass Army Depot

Mark KaganThe Committee for National

securityCindy KingUtah Chapter, Sierra Club

Jim KnippCitizen of Milan, TN

Linda KoplovitzConcerned Citizens for

Maryland’s Environment

Toni LampkinCitizens for Environmental Quality

John LongwellMassachusetts Institute of

Technology

William McKennaDepartment of Army HeadquarterUs. Army Armament, Munitions

dand Chemical Comman

Michael ModellModell Development Corp.

Carl PetersonMassachusetts Institute of

Technology

Al PicardiConsultant

Robert SabiaBurns and Roe Industrial

Services Co.

Donald L. SiebenalerNational Academy of SciencesBoard on Army Science and

Technology

Lenny SiegelPacific Studies CenterNational Toxics Campaign Fund

Jeremy SprungSandia National Laboratories

Ross VincentSierra Club

Thomas J. WilbanksOak Ridge National Laboratories

Craig WilliamsKentucky Environmental Foundation

David WoodNational Toxics Campaign

Rainer ZangerlCitizen of Rockville, IN

NOTE:

iv

OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants andreviewers. The workshop participants and reviewers do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse thisbackground paper. OTA assumes full responsibility for the background paper and the accuracy of its contents.

OTA Project Staff—Disposal of Chemical Weapons:Alternative Technologies

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTAScience, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Robert Niblock, Oceans and Environment Program Manager

Peter Johnson, Project Director

Mark Brown, Senior Analyst

Jan Linsenmeyer, Research Assistant

Administrative Staff

Kathleen Beil, Office Administrator

Sally Van Aller, Administrative Secretary

Contractor

Florence Poillon, Editor

v

ContentsPage

Chapter l. Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1SUMMARY AND FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Opposition to the Army’s Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Approaches to Developing Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Timing Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Risks of Developing Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Alternative Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6International Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

CHAPTER 1 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Chapter 2. The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13THE U.S. ARMY’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Geography and Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13History of Chemical Weapons Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16On-Site Destruction vs. Relocation of the CW Stockpile for Off-Site Destruction . . . . . . . . . 17Condition of the CW Stockpile-Potential of Increased Risk From CW Deterioration . . . . . 17

DISPOSAL OF THE ARMY’S CW STOCKPILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18The Army’s Demonstration Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE CURRENT CW DISPOSAL PROGRAM . . . . . 18Local and National Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Projected Program Schedule—Revised Deadlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Cost Estimates--Cost Overruns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR THE ARMY’S BASELINE PROJECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Chapter 3. Current Technology and Alternatives ● . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . 0 0 . ● 0 . . 25CURRENT TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Army’s CW Disassembly and Incineration Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Chemical Neutralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Supercritical Water Oxidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Steam Gasification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Plasma Arc Pyrolysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Improved Interim Continued Storage-The CW Demilitarization Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Alternatives Involving Transportation and Relocation of the CW Stockpile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

CHAPTER PREFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix A. Selected Chemical Weapon Destruction Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Appendix B. U.S. Army Risk Assessment for Off-Site Transportation of

Chemical Weapons ..0..0.. . . . . . . . . . ● 0.0..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .000...0. . . . . . . . . . ● . . 36Appendix C. Summary of the Chemical Weapons Workshop . 0 0 0 . . . . ● * . . . . * . * . . . . . . . . . 39

BoxesBox Pagel-A. Federal Laws Addressing Chemical Weapons Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2l-B. State Authority Over the Siting, Construction, and Operation of

Incinerators for Chemical Weapons Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

l-C. Condition of the M55 Rockets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7l-D. Programs for the Promotion of Alternative Technologies for

Hazardous Waste Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92-A. Properties of chemical Weapons Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142-B. Some Regulatory Hurdles for CW Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

FiguresFigure Page1-1. M55 Rocket, Filled With Agent GB or VX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-1. U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-2. Structures of Chemical Weapons Nerve (Organophosphorus) and

Blister (Mustard) Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TablesTable1-1.2-1.2-2.2-3.

Revised Programmatic Chemical Disposal ScheduleCharacteristics of Chemical Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Physical Characteristics of Chemical Munitions . . . . .

713

15

Page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Program Implementation Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

vii

Chapter 1

Alternative Destruction Technologies—History and Summary

INTRODUCTIONThe U.S. Army currently has custody of chemical

weapons (CW) containing nerve and blister (vesi-cant) agents l located at eight sites in the continentalUnited States and at Johnston Island, a small islandin the Pacific Ocean. The Army’s current disposalprogram calls for munition disassembly followed byincineration, on-site, at all of the present locations ofthe CW stockpiles. This approach has met withopposition by some communities and States thathave CW stockpiles and by several national andinternational environmental groups. At the Statelevel, this opposition may succeed in preventing orseriously delaying construction of the Army’splanned CW disposal facilities at certain locations.The Army itself has expressed concern aboutpotential regulatory obstacles to completing its CWdisposal program. Additional program delays havealso been experienced because the Army’s JohnstonIsland demonstration program, required by Con-gress prior to construction of CW disposal facilitiesin the continental United States, has not yet beensuccessfully completed.

Because of the legal, social, and technical obsta-cles faced by the Army, the Office of TechnologyAssessment (OTA) was asked to examine alterna-tives to on-site incineration for the destruction ofthese weapons. This report does not attempt to assessin any detail the technical aspects of the Army’scurrent CW destruction program.2 It reviews thestatus and availability of alternative technologiesand discusses the factors that could lead to theconsideration of such alternatives.

The need for an effective U.S. CW stockpiledestruction program has been driven by severalfactors. The Army has had its own requirements fora disposal method for surplus and obsolete chemicalweapons for as long as these materials have been partof its arsenal. In 1982, Under Secretary of the ArmyJ.R. Ambrose stated in a letter to the chairman of the

National Research Council (NRC) Board on ArmyScience and Technology that:

[T]he United States faces a formidable problem indisposing of its current obsolete chemical munitionsand agent stockpile. About 90 percent of theinventory of chemical agent and nearly as much ofthe munitions inventory has little or no militaryvalue and will require disposal regardless of futuredecisions regarding the binary weapons program (l).

A related and ongoing concern expressed both bythe Army and the NRC is the potentially increasingrisk from the existing U.S. CW stockpile as itdeteriorates with age.

Congress has directed the Army to develop andimplement a CW destruction program (see box l-A).The Department of Defense Appropriation Act of1986 (Public Law 99-145) directed the Secretary ofDefense to destroy the current U.S. CW stockpile ina safe and effective manner. This directive wasoriginally tied to the Army’s acquisition of newerbinary chemical weapons, although the developmentof such weapons is no longer planned and few wereactually ever built (2, 3). A plan provided by theSecretary of the Army to Congress in 1986 becamethe basis of a Programmatic Environmental ImpactStatement (PEIS). As the Army’s program develop-ment encountered unanticipated technical and politi-cal hurdles, Congress flexibly responded by amend-ing completion timetables. Initially, the Army wasrequired to destroy its CW stockpile by 1994. In1988, Congress extended the completion date to1997. Also in 1988 the Army compared alternativesof relocation of weapons to one or more centraldisposal sites to that of on-site disposal at each of theeight locations. The Army chose on-site disposalbecause it believed that any accident on an existingArmy base would be easier to mitigate than anaccident at some unknown point along a transpor-tation route. Recently, the Army has submitted arevised completion date of 2000 to Congress thatmaintains the plan to build on-site disposal systemsat each of eight sites (see table l-l) (4, 5, 6).

1 See box 2-A for a more complete description of chemical weapons agents and their effects.2 It aISo does not discuss c~ofrac~e, an experimental munitions disassembly technique that freezes and crushes CWS. Cryofracture is pm of tie

current development program and is considered by the Armytobeonlya‘‘front end’ process that must be coupled to incineratio~ and does not thereforeconstitute an incineration alternative.

– l –324-649 0 - 92 - 2

2 ● Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Box I-A—Federal Laws Addressing Chemical Weapons Disposal

A number of laws have been passed over the years that specifically address chemical weapons disposal.The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986 (Pubic Law 99-145) mandated the destruction of the

U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions. It directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to developa comprehensive plan for destruction of the stockpile, which would be carried out by an Army managementorganization. The law established a destruction deadline of September 30, 1994, and provided a separate DODaccount to fund all activities. The law further required that the Army plan should provide for maximum protectionfor the environment and human health and that the facilities constructed would only be used for destruction ofchemical weapons and munitions. Public Law 99-145 clearly stated that once the stockpile elimination wascomplete, all facilities would be dismantled and removed.

Amendments and revisions have since been made to the law governing the stockpile destruction requirementsand the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to issue the final ProgrammaticEnvironmental Impact Statement on the chemical stockpile destruction program by January 1,1988. The law furtherrequired that funds designated for the program could not be obligated until the Secretary of Defense providesCongress, in writing, proof that the overall concept plan for the Chemical Demilitarization Program includes:

1. An evaluation of alternate technologies for disposal of the existing stockpile, and2. Full-scale operational verification tests of the selected chemical weapons disposal technology or

technologies.In addition, Public Law 100-180 required the Secretary of Defense to submit an alternative concept plan for

the chemical stockpile demilitarization program to both Committees on Armed Services of the Congress. Thisalternative concept plan was to be completed by March 15, 1988. The law also required the Secretary of Defenseto establish an ongoing program for surveillance and maintenance of the stockpile and assess its overall condition.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989, (Public Law 100-456) made additionalchanges that affected the Army’s program to destroy the chemical weapons stockpile. This law extended thestockpile elimination deadline to April 30, 1997. It also required the Army to complete Operational VerificationTesting (OVT) of its demonstration facility at Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) beforeproceeding with construction of similar full-scale facilities for the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpilelocated in the continental United States. However, this provision did not prohibit construction activities at theChemical Agent Munition Disposal System in Tooele, Utah.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510) also addressed theChemical Weapons Demilitarization Program. This Iaw pays particular attention to issues involving the safety statusand the integrity of the stockpile. In the law, Congress requires the Secretary of Defense to develop a ChemicalWeapons Stockpile Safety Contingency Plan. This plan would detail the steps that DOD would follow if thechemical weapons stockpile began an accelerated rate of deterioration or any other question of its integrity arosebefore full-scale disposal capability was developed. This plan, which is to set forth a planning schedule, fundingrequirements, equipment needs, and time frame for emergency plan implementation, was to be submitted toCongress 180 days after the law was passed.

Currently, legislation involving the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program addresses the delays in theprogram and proposed deadlines. Both the House and Senate bills for National Defense Authorization for FiscalYear 1992 and 1993 (S. 1507 and H.R. 2100) propose extending the stockpile elimination deadline to July 1999.

Other laws that helped shape the Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program include Public Laws 91-672and 92-532.

The Foreign Military Sales Act Amendment (Public Law 91-672), passed in 1971, prohibited the transportationof chemical weapons from the Island of Okinawa to the United States. It further directed the U.S. Department ofDefense to destroy these chemical weapons outside the United States. (In 1971, the U.S. Army moved chemicalweapons from Okinawa to storage facilities at Johnston Island.)

The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries ACt of 1972 (Public Law 92-532) prohibited ocean dumpingof chemical weapons.

Chapter 1-Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary ● 3

Table l-l—Revised Programmatic Chemical Disposal Schedule

Startfacility Start Start End

Location construction prove-out operations operations

Johnston Island. . . . . . . . . . . .

Training Facility. . . . . . . . . . . .

Tooele Army Depot. . . . . . . . .

Anniston Depot. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Umatilla Depot. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pine Bluff Arsenal. . . . . . . . . . .

Lexington-Blue Grass. . . . . . .

Pueblo Depot . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newport Ammo Plant.... . . . .

Aberdeen Proving Ground. . .

November 1985

June 1989

September 1989

June 1993

January 1994

January 1994

May 1994

May 1994

January 1995

January 1995

August 1988

N/A

August 1993

April 1996

November 1996

September 1996

March 1997

March 1997

June 1997

June 1997

July 1990

October 1991

February 1995

October 1997

May 1998

March 1998

September 1998

September 1998

June 1998

June 1998

October 1995

December 1999

April 2000

November 2000

December 2000

November 2000

February 2000

May 2000

April 1999

June 1999

NOTE: This schedule does not take into account delays from major system failures or litigation and is dependent on fundingsupport.

SOURCE: S. Livingstone, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment), testimony before theHouse Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Apr. 1, 1992, Second Session, 102d Congress.

Bilateral treaties that were negotiated with theformer Soviet Union (now the Commonwealth ofIndependent States, C. I. S.) contained deadlines forCW destruction by each signatory. One of theseagreements that had been under final negotiationbetween the United States and the Soviet Unionmandated staged destruction over time of the CWstockpile of both countries to 5,000 metric tons ofagent by 2002. Even though this agreement has notbeen put into force, many believe it is in the bestinterest of the United States to honor its intent if notits timetables. However, both the United States andthe C.I.S. are having difficulties in achieving thesetimetables for several reasons. The C.I.S. currentlyhas no active CW disposal program, and past effortsto develop a disposal facility in the Soviet Unionwere derailed by local citizen opposition (7). Atpresent, Russia has no project ready for the destruc-tion of an estimated 40,000 tons of chemicalweapons agents stored there (8). The agreementsthat have been negotiated appear to allow flexibilityin accommodating technical and other problems thataffect CW destruction program timetables. It isbecoming clear that the flexibility is needed evengiven the significant pressures to move aheadexpeditiously.

SUMMARY AND FINDINGSAlthough the Army has done a credible job

developing the technical aspects of its currentprogram, major political and social obstacles re-

main. Analyses other than OTA’s of the Army’scurrent program indicate that there are also someremaining technical and cost obstacles (9, 10, 11, 12,13, 14). At present, the Army has no backup planshould its current program be unsuccessful.

Opposition to the Army’s Program

Local and national opposition may be able toprevent or seriously delay construction of theArmy’s planned CW disposal facilities. For exam-ple, the State of Kentucky has passed legislationestablishing more stringent measures for the Armyto obtain the permits required under the ResourceConservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (see boxl-B). Other States could follow this lead. Also, theArmy has not completed a congressionally man-dated demonstration of its technology at JohnstonIsland. It is not clear that this demonstration aspresently planned will adequately address concernsraised by groups who oppose the Army’s CWprogram.

The Army itself has been concerned about thedifficulties affecting the completion of its currentCW disposal program (4). In 1984, after reviewingthe Army’s experience with CW neutralization andincineration, the National Research Council (NRC)endorsed the Army’s decision to use incineration(l).

However, possibly in reaction to political opposi-tion to its program, the Army recently requested the

4 ● Disposal of Chemical weapons: Alternative Technologies

Box l-B—State Authority Over the Siting, Construction, andOperation of Incinerators for Chemical Weapons Destruction

The Commonwealth of Kentucky has been delegated authority under the Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct (RCRA) and the Clean Air Act to issue within the state construction and operation permits for hazardous wastemanagement facilities such as a CW incinerator. State authority affects all phases of the construction and operationof an incineration facility. Statutes passed under this authority by the Kentucky State legislature have placedadditional specific requirements for hazardous waste incinerators intended for use with chemical weapons (theKentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 224, 224.865) (l). These revisions have not only included CW agents aschemicals to be regulated, but also required that an equivalent treatment/destruction technology be fullydemonstrated prior to permitting the proposed CW incinerators.

These revised statutes require submission of:

monitoring data from a comparable facility [that] reflects the absence of emissions from stack or fugitive sourcesincluding but not limited to the products of combustion and incomplete combustion which alone or in combinationpresent any risk of acute or chronic human health effect or adverse environmental effect [Kentucky Revised Statute224.865].

One interpretation of this requirement according to Kentucky State officials as suggested by the Center forDisease Control (CDC) is that it would require a 30-year epidemiological study on a similar site, along withcomplete monitoring data (l). In addition to State control over new incinerators, local county courts in Kentuckymay also have authority to veto the siting of a CW destruction facility.

During the 1992 Session of the Kentucky General Assembly, House Bill 465 was passed and signed by theGovernor on April 1, 1992. This legislation, effective July 15, 1992, specifically requires that before a permit canbe issued to construct a CW destruction facility information must be provided showing that:

no alternative method of treatment or disposal, including, but not limited to, neutralization and transportation to a lesspopulated disposal site, exists . . .or is likely to exist or could be developed. . that creates less risk of release or harmto the public or the environment. . .

The legislation also sites State authority under Section 6929 of Title 42 of U.S. Code to:

impose reasonable restrictions directly relating to public health and safety with respect to the management ofhazardous wastes beyond the minimum standards established under federal law. [Moreover] [T]here exist

NRC Committee on Review and Evaluation of the need to address the relevant social and politicalArmy Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program to issues involved as well. This is likely to require thereevaluate the status of incineration. An additional active participation of all interested parties, includ-NRC committee has also been formed, the Commit- ing the Army, regulators, contractors, communitytee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Tech- organizations, and environmental groups.nologies (Alternatives Committee), to examine al-ternatives for CW disposal. The first meeting of the Such a collaborative effort could begin by devel-Alternatives Committee was held in March 1992. oping criteria for an acceptable program that addressMany believe that this new NRC committee effort is the key technical and social obstacles. Features thatimportant not only because of technical benefits but are important to some groups include:because it could reflect the Army’s willingness to

●

integrate community and environmental concerns inits decisions.

Approaches to Developing Technologies●

The nature of the political problems faced by theArmy’s CW destruction program suggests thatcompleting its present program or developing asuccessful alternative one involves more than tech- ●

nology development. Any successful program will

Use of a destruction technology that does nothave smokestacks, which are associated withuncontrolled environmental emissions;Selection of a technology with features specifi-cally appropriate for the CW stockpile and thatcould not become the basis of continuedoperation for hazardous waste disposal at thefacilities sites;Development of portable CW destruction sys-tems that could be used directly in a munition


substantial gaps in informati‘on concerning the acute and chronic health effects and environmental consequences ofexposure to [chemical weapons agents] and [their] degradation products.. .[which] justify the imposition of standardscorrelative to the uncertainties and severity of risks potentially posed by the treatment or disposal of the compounds.

The legislation specifies that before anyone may construct or operate a facility for treatment, storage, ordisposal of CW agents, he or she must demonstrate that:

The proposed treatment or destruction technology has been fully proven in an operational facility of scale,configuration and throughput comparable to the proposed facility [to ensure] destruction [efficiency] of 99.9999percent. . .as achievable during the design life of the facility under all operating conditions including during theoccurrence of malfunctions, upsets, or unplanned shutdowns.

The legislation also requires monitoring data from an operation facility showing the “absence of emissions”that “present any risk of acute or chronic human health effects... .“ Plans are also required for a State and localemergency response.

Representatives from other States legislatures that have CW depots within their States have made inquiries ofthe Kentucky state authorities about the nature of this strategy. According to a General Accounting Office (GAO)study, other States where the Army has proposed constructing CW destruction facilities, such as Indiana haveshown an interest in how the Kentucky State legislature has dealt with the Army’s program (2). The State of Utahhas enacted legislation affecting the permitting of CW destruction facilities (2). Utah has required that the disposalfacility built at Tooele, Utah will operate at 50 percent capacity for 6 months for each and every individual chemicalagent to be destroyed (2). State environmental officials will then evaluate test data for the individual agents (2).According to the GAO report, in 1988, the Army’s estimates for construction State dates assumed that State-issuedenvironmental permits for each of the proposed sites could be obtained in 15 months. On the basis of its experiencewith Utah, the Army now anticipates that it will take 24 months, and it is not clear how realistic even this revisedestimate will be (2).

References

1. Hudson, V., Deputy Commissioner for Special Projects, Kentucky Department for EnvironmentalProtection, Frankfort Office Park Frankfort, KY. Telephone Conversation December 12, 1991.

2. U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages areLikely to Continue, GAO/NSIAD-92-18 (Washington, DC: November 1991).

storage facility to avoid risks associated withtransporting and handling CWs away from theirpresent storage locations;

. Development of individual programs with fea-tures specific to individual sites; and

. Development of safe and effective communityemergency response programs.

Timing Questions

It is difficult to predict the time that may be

While there are pressures to destroy the CWstockpile quickly, there is no technical basis to setabsolute deadlines for completion of the CW de-struction program. The condition of the existing CWstockpile is probably the most serious considerationbut few data and no rigorous, comprehensive analy-sis of the risks posed by deterioration of the weaponsexist. The Army’s monitoring program has yet toidentify trends of increasing deterioration. There arealso domestic and international political pressures toexpedite the weapons destruction program. How-

required to develop an alternative program given the ever, many believe that congressional mandates andavailable information about alternative technolo-gies. It is clear that the alternatives identified byOTA are all in early stages of development—perhaps several years behind the Army program’scurrent development stage. It is also evident, how-ever, that political or legal delays could preventimplementation of current technology at some orseveral of the weapons storage sites for a number ofyears.

the status of bilateral treaties and agreements aresufficiently flexible to consider the development ofalternative programs.

As stated above, the least flexible deadline maybethe increasing risk associated with deterioration ofthe CW stockpile. With the exception of the M55rockets located at five of the eight continental U.S.sites, the best available information about the


condition of the CW stockpile, including that fromongoing surveys, suggests there are few problemswith agent leakage from bombs, artillery projectiles,mines, or bulk storage tanks (1, 15, 16). In 1984 theNRC indicated that although there were insufficientdata to project the near-or long-term storage life ofCW agent containers, available information sug-gested that the overall leak frequency had notsubstantially increased during the lifetime of the CWstockpile (l). However, the report also concludedthat the M55 rocket is the primary basis for amaximum credible accident at each of the depots dueto the possible harm that could be inflicted on bothworkers and civilian populations. In a 1985 study bythe Army on the condition of the M55 rockets, theoccurrence of a catastrophic event from a deteriorat-ing stockpile in the near future was consideredhighly unlikely (17). Nevertheless, the continuedstorage of M55 rockets and other types of munitionsat Army depots represents a continued, finite risk tocommunities located near these depots. To betterquantify this risk, existing monitoring programs onthe status of the U.S. CW stockpile could beexpanded to provide additional information aboutthe rate of deterioration of the M55’s. In addition,further analyses of the risks from continued storageas well as possible risk reduction measures could bevery useful in decisions about time available topursue alternative programs (see box l-C).

The timing issue is critical in alternative technol-ogy development planning. One approach to analternative program could be to try and find mid-term corrections for the Army’s current system, e.g.,replacing one or more of the incinerators themselveswith some other method of destruction but keepingthe rest of the system. Another would be to start overwith an entirely new system. The impact on theArmy’s current program clearly will be quite differ-ent with these two approaches. A sense of timeconstraints will also dictate where a new programcan begin. For examples, if lots of time is available,then a new program could afford to begin in thelaboratory; if less time is available, then a newprogram would probably be forced to consider onlyexisting bench-scale technologies or technologiesalready tested in related areas.

How much time may be available to developalternatives is not known nor is there an accurateestimate of time required for various approaches.Technical and regulatory hurdles faced by thecurrent program may delay it well beyond its

planned completion date. In any case, a clearanalysis of time constraints is critical and it shouldinclude costs of delay, the risks of delaying, thedegree of uncertainty and other factors.

Risks of Developing Alternatives

Even though it may be desirable to sponsor analternative technology development program, it isimportant to understand the risks of such an effort.The prospects for success of an alternative programare not assured. There could always be a number oftechnical or political problems and delays associatedwith any development program. Failure of a technol-ogy or approach in a full-scale test is alwayspossible. After even the best efforts to develop newtechnologies, it is possible that the results could beno better or even worse than those from the currentsystem.

Therefore, if an alternative development programwas supported it would not necessarily follow thatthe current program should be stopped. It may bepossible to combine the best features of bothprograms in the future, or it may be that currenttechnologies will be superior to any alternatives inthe end.

Alternative Technologies

To be applicable to the current CW stockpile, atechnology must be able to effectively destroy ordecontaminate the chemical agents, the drained andempty munitions and containers, the associatedexplosives and propellants, and the munition pack-aging material (dunnage). The Army’s current sys-tem incorporates all of these waste streams. Somealternatives that have been proposed, however, maybe expected to be useful in destroying only thechemical agent itself. Others could possibly beapplicable to other waste streams (e.g., explosivesand propellants). In any case, any complete systemwould need to integrate the capability to handle allwaste streams as well as to handle, disassemble, anddrain the various types of containers or weaponsinvolved.

OTA reviewed available data on alternative tech-nologies. Of those that have been proposed by othersfor CW destruction, OTA selected four that arebriefly discussed in this report (chemical neutraliza-tion, super critical water oxidation, steam gasifica-tion, and plasma arc pyrolysis). These four wereselected only for the purpose of illustrating the

Chapter I-Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary . 7

Box 1-Condition of the M55 Rockets

The M55 rockets (see figure l-l) are considered the most dangerous items in the current stockpile for a varietyof reasons (1, 2). Since the M55 rocket is a fully assembled munition containing either agent VX or GB, along withfuses, burster charges, and propellants-in a configuration that cannot be separated easily-it is the most potentiallyhazardous item in the CW stockpile (3, 4). The M55 rockets are also the source of the greatest number of leakingmunitions. Not surprisingly, M55s are the primary basis for a maximum credible accident at each of the depots wherethey are located due to the possible harm that could be inflicted on workers and civilian populations (1).Approximately 478,000 M55 rackets are located at five of the eight continental U.S. sites and at Johnston Atoll (3,4). In part because of these problems, the 1984 National Research Council report recommended that disposal of theM55 rockets be expedited.

Historical records of the M55 rockets are largely lost, destroyed, misfiled, or nonexistent (3, 4). The rockets weredeveloped in the 1950s. The GB-filled rockets were manufactured at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, between1%1 and 1965, and the VX rockets were manufactured at Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana, in 1964 and1%5. The M55 was shown to be erratic and undependable, and the Army declared it obsolete in 1981 (3, 4).

In the risk analysis for different transportation options at the eight U.S. CW storage sites (which assumed thatincineration would be the destruction method; described more fully in appendix B), a large portion of the risk oftenwas due to the presence of specific munitions(5). For example, the M55 rockets are stored at the Anniston (Alabama),Lexington-Blue Grass (Kentucky), Pine Bluff (Arkansas), Tooele (Utah), and Umatilla (Oregon) Army depots (6).At Anniston, with the option of continued CW storage and with the adoption of appropriate safety procedures, morethan 40 percent of the remaining risk was associated with the M55 rockets (5). (The balance of the remaining riskis distributed among the other types of munitions.)

For on-site disposal with adoption of appropriate safety procedures at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot,rockets are responsible for essentially all of the risk At Pine Bluff, for on-site destruction with adoption of appropriatesafety procedures, more than 95 percent of the risk is due to the M55 rockets. At the Tooele site, most of the risk isassociated with bulk containers of agent GB in warehouses, although handling projectiles, rockets, and mines withVX is also a contributing factor. At the Pueblo facility, which lacks M55 rockets, the on-site destruction alternativewith adoption of appropriate safety procedures has most of the risk associated with the projectile munitions.

The M55 rocket contains a chemical agent (either VX or GB), in an aluminum warhead a rocket motor witha solid propellant; a burster loaded with an explosive to explode the warhead on impact and disseminate the agent;an igniter to ignite the rocket motor; and a fuse designed to arm after rocket launch and to detonate the burster onstriking the ground (3, 4). Leaks or other degradation of any of these systems over time could lead to an increasedrisk of accident. In 1985 the U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) conducted a study on thecondition of the M55 stockpile in which 393 rockets were selected randomly from the total stockpile of 478,000 (3,4). These rockets were disassembled and the individual components assessed to estimate the amount of

Figure 1-1—M55 Rocket, Filled With Agent GB or VX

Fin

19

FuIgnitercable

Chemical agent

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, 115mm: Chemical Agent (GB or VX), M55,” U.S. ArmyMaterial Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, October 1985.

(Continued on next page)


Box 1-C-Condition of the M55 Rockets-Continued

degradation they had undergone after 20 to 25 years of storage. These estimates were presented as a means toestimate the continued storability of the rockets and were not considered accurate predictions.

Both external and internal leaks of chemical agents in the M55 rockets were found. The rocket propellantcontains a stabilizer that was present at 1.6 to 2.2 percent by weight. If the stabilizer content, which is depleted duringnormal conditions, falls below 0.2 percent then auto ignition of the propellant could occur. The stabilizer hasprobably been diminishing ever since the weapons were manufactured, but because the 1985 assessment was thefirst evaluation since production, it was impossible to quantify stabilizer degradation over time. A worst-caseestimate of remaining storage life, obtained by projecting stabilizer loss for the lot showing the greatest decreasesince production (stored at Johnston Island), indicated that this lot would reach the “first decision point (increasedsurveillance)” after 25 years, in 2010. Overall, the propellant was estimated to show a minimal loss of stabilizer,which indicates an extensive remaining safe storage life. Other potential hazards identified in this project includedinteraction between internally leaking GB agent and the burster agent to produce a highly sensitive organometalliccompound, although, “unless the reactions are highly efficient, sufficient amounts of the metal organic compounds[to cause an explosion] are not expected.” Metal springs that keep the fuse in an unarmedposition may be corrodedby internally leaking GB, causing the fuse to become armed and able to function during a handling accident.However, the study concluded that, overall, the occurrence of a catastrophic event with the M55 rocket in the nearfuture is highly unlikely (3, 4).

Overall, the rocket stockpile was estimated to be in good condition by the Army’s 1985 study. The Army hasestablished a continued monitoring program to monitor degradation and rapidly identify new leakers (6). AlthoughM55 rockets containing agent GB were first found to be leaking in 1966 (3, 4), there has been no trend toward anincreased rate of leakers detected (7). At the Kentucky Blue Grass facility, as is routine at all U.S. CW storagefacilities, air in igloos containing M55 rockets and other CW munitions is monitored for chemical agent prior toentry. The M55 rockets are stacked on wooden pallets with 15 rockets per pallet. A positive igloo detection of CWagent requires that the individual leaking rocket be located. Individual rockets, sealed in their fiberglass firing tubes,are also routinely tested for leaks. Leaking rockets are transferred to steel tubes that are bolted together and sealedat the middle with a flange and rubber “O” ring. However, only 897 individual rockets are monitored per quarter,out of a total of 69,500 at the Kentucky base (1.3 percent per quarter). Very few munitions other than the racketshave leaked at this facility (7). Although it is difficult to support conclusions made from data taken from the limitedsample sizes used in these studies, the Army has found no trends in the frequency of leak detection in M55 rocketsover time.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

References

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Supporting the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program(CSDP),” prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army,Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, December 1987.National Research Council, Disposal of Chemical Munitions and Agents (Washington, DC: NationalAcademy Press, 1984).McKenna, W., U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Defense AmmunitionDirectorate, Air, Sea and Toxic Chemical Munitions, Rock Island, IL, personal communication, Dec. 2,1991.U.S. Department of the Army, “Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, l15mm: Chemical Agent(GB or VX), M55,” U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,October 1985.Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Supporting the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program(CSDP),” prepared for the Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army,Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, December 1987.U.S. Department of the Army, ‘‘Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic EnvironmentalImpact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, 1988.Briefing to Office of Technology Assessment staff at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot. Lexington.KY, Dec. 10, 1991.

-.


state-of-the-art of alternatives we were able toexamine and of showing the level of information thatexists about alternatives. If a program to developalternatives was pursued, these four may or may notbe among those selected for further tests.

Present work with alternative technologies isfocused on treatment of hazardous wastes other thanchemical weapons. None of these techniques isavailable at present as a working alternative to theArmy’s current disassembly-incineration program.Moreover, it is not possible, on the basis ofinformation currently available, to predict whichalternative technique, if any, would be the bestcandidate for development into an acceptable andsuccessful CW disposal technology. If the Army’spresent program does not succeed, there could wellbe advantages in supporting the development ofmore than a single CW destruction technology bothto encourage competition and to ensure that at leastone of them will be successful. There may also beadvantages to certain technologies that are unique tospecific sites.

Market forces alone cannot be expected to lead thedevelopment of alternative CW destruction technol-ogies. The U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons issmall compared to industrial chemical waste. If analternative is to be developed, government will haveto be depended on for at least some of the support.There are existing programs at the Federal and Statelevel and in private industry and universities that aredesigned to promote alternative technologies forhazardous waste disposal. These might serve asmodels for development of alternative technologiesfor chemical weapons disposal, although none hasbeen given this mission (see box l-D).

In developing alternative programs, a clearlydefined process and definition for judging them willbe required. Even though difficult, failure to estab-lish applicable criteria for assessing alternativeprograms will make it impossible to gauge theirsuccess or to make necessary corrections.

For example, the limited scope of the Army’scurrent technology demonstration project atJohnston Island was criticized in a 1991 NRC Letter

Box l-D—Programs for the Promotion of AlternativeTechnologies for Hazardous Waste Destruction

Existing programs designed to promote alternative technologies for hazardous waste disposal may serve asmodels for the development and promotion of alternative technologies for chemical weapons disposal. State andFederal Government, private industry, and universities have developed programs that attempt to address thetechnical, legal, and social obstacles involved with the development and introduction of new technologies for thedisposal of hazardous waste. For example, a workshop at the annual meeting sponsored by the National SolidWastes Management Association is titled, “Dealing With an Angry Public: Siting Strategies To Gain PublicAcceptance.” Topics include how to define realistic, measurable public acceptance goals; analysis of key audiences;identification and mobilization of grass-roots support; and implementation of cost-effective strategies andmonitoring their success while building public acceptance (l).

The Technology Innovation Office (TIO) in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of SolidWaste and Emergency Response has the mission of identifying and publicizing more efficient, cost-effectivesolutions from developers and technology users that address hazardous waste disposal problems faced by theFederal Government and private sector. The TIO mission includes promoting the use of innovative treatmenttechnologies by government and industry on contaminated waste sites, soils, and groundwater by providingtechnology and market information to targeted audiences of Federal agencies, States, consulting engineering firms,technology developers, and the investment community (2). TIO also attempts to facilitate the cooperativedevelopment, evaluation, and implementation of innovative treatment alternatives at Federal facility sites (3). Theyhave compiled a list of resources for alternative technology development including regional ERA offices that dealwith permitting and performance standards; Federal and State assistance programs; Federal, State, nonprofit, andprivate test and evaluation facilities; and university affiliated hazardous waste research centers (4). EPA’s Officeof Research and Development (ORD) also plays a role in alternative technology development by helping vendorsdevelop and test, at both pilot and full scale, technologies that may be applicable to U.S. waste site remediation,through such programs as the Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation (SITE) program (5). The SITE includesa demonstration program that funds developers through a cost-sharing process in which developers pay for the

(Continued on next page)

324-649 0 - 92 - 3

10 ● Disposal of Chemical weapons: Alternative Technologies

Box l-D—Programs for the Promotion of AlternativeTechnologies for Hazardous Waste Destruction-Continued

mobilization and operation of technology demonstrations and EPA pays for the planning, sampling, analysis,quality assurance, and report preparation. SITE’s Emerging Technologies Program, with currently more than 30participants, funds up to $300,000 over 2 years for bench or pilot technology development.

The National Environmental Technology Applications Corporation (NETAC), has a similar mission ofaccelerating, on a national basis, the commercialization of environmental technologies under development by thepublic and private sectors (6, 7). This not-for-profit corporation was established through a cooperative agreementbetween EPA and the University of Pittsburgh Trust, specifically for the purpose of developing innovativecommercial environmental technologies. This program reaches across all of the EPA programs described above,in addition to the private sector. NETAC offers a variety of services to the environmental technology developer,supplier, end user, and government official. Services include business planning, market and financial analysis, entrystrategy, technology evaluation, laboratory services, and regulatory analysis.

References

1. National Solid Wastes Management Association, “Waste Expo ‘92,” New Orleans, LA, May 5-8, 1992.2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Technology

Innovation Office, Mission Statement, Washington, DC.3. Powell, D.M., and Kovalick Jr., W.W., “Innovative Treatment Technologies: A New Forum for

Cooperation,” paper submitted to “Federal Environmental Restoration 1992,” U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Technology Innovation Office,January 1992.

4. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, TechnologyInnovation Office, “Innovative Hazardous Waste Treatment Technologies: A Developer’s Guide ToSupport Services,’ EPA 540/2-91/012, Washington, DC, June 1991.

5. Kovalick, Jr., W.W., “Innovative Site Remediation Technologies: Barriers and Opportunities,” paperpresented at the “Symposium on Global Environment and the Construction Industry,” MassachusettsInstitute of bchnology, Cambridge, MA, Oct. 21, 1991.

6. Letter from Sharon L. Ross, Business Analyst, NETAC, University of Pittsburgh Applied Research Center,Pittsburgh, PA, Apr. 28, 1992.

7. Berkey, Edgar, President, National Environmental Technology Applications Corp. (NETAC), Pittsburgh,PA, Written comments received Apr. 15, 1992.

Review. The NRC pointed out that the Army was continental sites are covered by the Clean Air Actmissing the opportunity to provide crucial assess-ments of the technology and program that wouldsupport the construction of future sites by generatinghigher levels of public confidence. The NRC alsostated that the success of any demonstration projectshould be gauged by the degree to which it facilitatespublic understanding and acceptance by providingwell-documented answers to reasonable, and proba-bly inevitable, questions from concerned citizens aswell as regulators. For example, a failure of thecurrent demonstration is that it does not requiremeasurement of products of incomplete combustion(PICs), especially dioxins and dibenzofurans (13).The Clean Air Act does not apply to the JohnstonAtoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS)facility and therefore the Army is not collecting datato demonstrate compliance with this act, but the

and the relevant States will need this type ofinformation.

International Implications

A successful U.S. CW disposal program will havebroad international implications. The United Statesand the C.I.S. are setting the stage for worldwideCW disposal. A United Nations special commissionis currently investigating possible methods for thedestruction of the Iraqi CW stockpile. As many as 18countries in addition to the United States and theC.I.S. may now possess chemical weapons. Withincreasing international pressure to eliminate chemi-cal weapons, the need for an appropriate andacceptable CW program also increases. This pres-sure also makes it difficult to discuss delays of any

Chapter 1-Alternative Destruction Technologies-History and Summary . 11

type. If any alternative technology developmentprogram is supported, it will be necessary to bring allof these considerations into the decision. This OTAbackground paper provides only some of the infor-mation about the potential benefits and risks thatalternative technologies could offer. It is not clear atthis point whether benefits exceed the risks, butdirected development work on alternatives couldhelp answer some of the key technical questions.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

CHAPTER 1 REFERENCESNational Research Council, Disposal of ChemicalMunitions and Agents (Washington, DC: NationalAcademy Press, 1984).Whelen, R. P., Engineering and Technology Division,briefing at the Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen, MD, Oct. 29,1991.U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, CongressionalResearch Service, “Chemical Weapons: U.S. ArmsControl Negotiations and Destruction,” prepared bySteven R. Bowman, Washington, DC, updated Sept.25, 1991 and Feb. 13, 1992.Baronian, C., Deputy Program Manager and Techni-cal Director, briefing at the Office of the ProgramManager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen,MD, Oct. 29, 1991.Busbee, W.L., briefing at the National ResearchCouncil Committee on Review and Evaluation of theArmy Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, Wash-ington, DC, Jan. 21, 1992.Livingstone, S., Assistant Secretary of the Army(Installations, Logistics and Environment), testi-mony before the House Committee on Appropria-tions, Subcommittee on Defense, Apr. 1, 1992,Second Session, 102d Congress.Ember, L., “Chemical Weapons Disposal: DauntingChallenges Still Ahead,’ Chemical and EngineeringNews, 68(33):9-19, Aug. 13, 1990.Chemical and Engineering News, “Russia Not AbleTo Destroy Chemical Arms,” Chemical and Engi-neering News 70(3):17, Jan. 20, 1992.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, StockpileDestruction Delayed at the Army’s Prototype Dis-posal Facility, GAO/NSIAD-90-222 (Washington,DC: July 1990).U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Obsta-cles to the Army’s Plan To Destroy Obsolete U.S.Stockpile, GAO/NSIAD-90-155 (Washington, DC:May 1990).U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, StockpileDestruction Cost Growth and Schedule SlippagesAre Likely To Continue, GAO/NSMD-92-18 (Wash-ington, DC: November 1991).Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Evaluation of the GBRocket Campaign: Johnston Atoll Chemical AgentDisposal System Operational Verification Testing,”prepared for the Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, June 1991.National Research Council, Committee on Reviewand Evaluation of the Army Chemical StockpileDisposal Program, “Review of the Mitre Report:Evaluation of the GB Rocket Campaign: JohnstonAtoll Chemical Agent Disposal System OperationalVerification Testing, Dated May 1991,’ letter report,Washington, DC.Hudson, V., Deputy Commissioner for Special Pro-jects, Kentucky Department for Environmental Pro-tection, Frankfort Office Park, Frankfort, KY, per-sonal communication, Dec. 12, 1991; letter review,Apr. 15, 1992.Briefing of Office of Technology staff at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, Lexington, KY, Dec. 10,1991.McKenna, W., U.S. Army Armament, Munitions andChemical Command, Defense Ammunition Direc-torate, Air, Sea and Toxic Chemical Munitions, RockIsland, IL, personal communication, Dec. 2, 1991.U.S. Department of the Army, “Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, l15mm: Chemical Agent(GB or VX), M55,” U.S. Army Material SystemsAnalysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,October 1985.

Chapter 2

The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program

THE U.S. ARMY’S CHEMICAL PercentageSite Iocation of total

WEAPONS STOCKPILE Tooele Army Depot, UT,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.3Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.0

Geography and DistributionUmatilla Depot, OR... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6Pueblo Depot, CO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9Anniston Army Depot, AL.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1

The chemical weapons (CW) stockpile is located Johnston Island, South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6

on Army bases at eight continental U.S. sites (see Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0

figure 2-1) and at Johnston Island in the Pacific Newport Army Ammunition Plant, IN...... . . . 3.9Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. . . . . . 1.6

Ocean (717 nautical miles southwest of Hawaii). Itis distributed as follows (by percentage of chemical The stockpile includes chemical agents stored in

agent): bulk containers without explosives and propellants,as well as rockets, land mines, mortars, cartridges,

Figure 2-1—U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile Distribution

I Newport Army I

Pine Bluff

/

Ammunition Plant IVX - TC(3.9%)

GB, VX, H, HD, HT = Chemical agents.

TC = Ton containerR = RocketsM = Mines

ST= Spray tanksB = BombsC = CartridgesP = Projectiles

Umatilla DepotHD - TC

GB -P, R, BVX - P, R, M, ST

(1 1.6%)

Tooele ArmyDepot Lexington-H - P Blue Grass Army

HD -C, P, TCHT -C, P

GB -C, P, R, B, TC GB - P, R, TC(42.3%) VX -P, R

(1 .6%)

Pueblo DepotHD -C, P

HT - C(9.9%)

ArsenalHD -C, TC

HT - TCGB - R

VX - R, M(12.0%)

Anniston ArmyDepot

HD -C, P, TCHT - C

GB -C, P, RVX -P, R, M

(7.1%)

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office ofthe Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

–13–


Table 2-l-Characteristics of Chemical Agents

Vapor Liquidpressure density

Common Chemical torr g/cm 3 Freezing Mode ofAgent name CAS No.a Chemical name formula (at 25° C) {at 25o C) point (°C) Color action

Nerve

GA Tabun 77-81-6

GB Sarin 107-44-8

VX 50782-69-9

Vesicant

H, HD Mustard 505-60-2

HT Mustard

L Lewisite 541-25-3

Ethyl-N, N-dimethyl C6H11N2O 2Pphosphoramidocyani-date

Isopropyl methyl C4H IOFO 2Pphosphonofluoridate

o-ethyl-S-(2- C 1lH 26N O2P Sdiisopropylaminoethyl)methyl phosphonothio-

Iate

Bis(2-chlomethyl)sulfide C4H8Cl2S

60% HD and 40% TC

Dichloro(2- C4H2AsCl3

chlorovinyl)arsine.

0.07

2.9

0,0007

0.08b (H)0.11 (HD)

0.104

0.58

1.073 -50

1.089 -56

1.008 <-51

1.27 8-12 (H)14 (HD)

1.27 1

1.89 - l 8d

Colorless to Nervous systembrown poison

Clear to straw Nervous systemto amber poison

Clear to straw Nervous systempoison

Amber to Blistering ofdark brown exposed tissue

Amber to dark Blistering ofbrown exposed tissue

Amber to dark Blistering ofbrown to black exposed tissue

a Chemi=l Abstracts Service number.b Varies with purity of sample.c Agent T is Bis[2(2aloroethyl.thio) ethyllester; it is CAS No. 63918-89-8.d Vafies * O.1O C, depending on purity and isomers prWWIt.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” VOIS. 1,2,3, Office ofthe Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

and artillery projectiles composed of both chemical chemical agents are ‘‘unitary’ in that they areagent and various explosive-propellant components. directly toxic to humans, as opposed to “binary”

The total amount of chemical agents contained inagents, which are relatively nontoxic until they are

the stockpile has been estimated to be 25,000 tons (1,mixed together. Although the exact amount ofbinary weapons in the U.S. stockpile is classified, it

2), although the exact amount is classified. The has been described by the House Committee onchemical weapons contain organophosphorus nerve Appropriations as “negligible” (3).agents (GA, GB, and VX) or vesicant compounds(mustard and Lewisite) (table 2-l). (See box 2-A on Most (61 percent) CW agents are not contained inthe toxic properties of these compounds.) These munitions but stored in steel l-ton bulk containers

Box 2-A—Properties of Chemical Weapons Agents

Chemical weapons agents stored at the eight continental U.S. Army sites include both organophosphorus esternerve agents and mustard blister (vesicant) agents.

Mustards. The sulfur mustards in the U.S. Army stockpile are blister (vesicant) agents H, HD, HT, and Lewisite(table 2-l). Agent H typically contains about 30 percent related impurities (l), but in some cases may contain only18 percent of the nominal material. The impurity of some of these materials makes monitoring and confirming theirdestruction by certain proposed technologies, such as chemical neutralization, more difficult (2). HD) and HT arepurified by washing or distillation. Lewisite is a more volatile organic arsenic-based vesicant compound (1).

Human exposure to vesicants leads to blistering of exposed tissue and can cause severe skin blisters, injuryto the eyes, and damage to the respiratory tract from inhalation of vapors (l). Epidemiological data indicate thatagent His a human carcinogenic, and T (in HT) and Lewisite are probably carcinogens (3,4, 5).

Nerve Agents. The three nerve agents in the U.S. Army CW Stockpile are GA (Tabun), GB (Sarin), and VX(figure 2-2). They are normally liquids at room temperature but are highly toxic both as liquids or followingvaporization (see table 2-l). Structurally related organophosphorus ester compounds having less acute humantoxicity are used as insecticides. These compounds are potent inhibitors of acetylcholinesterase (AChE), an enzyme

Chapter 2-The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program ● 15

that normally breaks down the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. With AChE inhibited, acetylcholine builds up toabnormal levels, causing a continuous, uncontrolled stimulation of nerves that use this neurotransmitter. Amongother characteristic poisoning symptoms from AChE inhibition are convulsions, with death in mammals caused byrespiratory failure. Death from these nerve agents can occur within 10 minutes of exposure (l). None of the nerveagents is apparently carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic. In one review, nerve degeneration was considered anunlikely outcome from either acute or chronic exposure to these nerve agents (5).

1.

2.

3.

4.5.

References

U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic EnvironmentalImpact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program Manager for chemical Demilitarization, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, 1988.Whelen, R.P., Engineering and Technology Division, briefing at the Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen, MD, Oct. 29, 1991.U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Toxicology Program, Fourth Annual Report onCarcinogens, NTP 85-002, Washington, DC, 1985.International Agency for Research on Cancer, Monograph 9, pp. 181-192, Geneva, Switzerland, 1975.Journal of the American Medical Association, “Recommendations for Protecting Human Health AgainstPotential Adverse Effects of Long-term Exposure to Low Doses of Chemical Warfare Agents,” Jourrnalof the American Medical Association, 259(10):1453, 1459, Mar. 11, 1988.

Figure 2-2-Structures of Chemical Weapons Nerve (Organophosphorus) and Blister (Mustard) Agents

ocl-b

\ II Cl CH2CH2S CH2 CH2 Cl

N — P — C NCH 3 /

I

H,HD (Mustard)‘ \ CH2CH3

GA (Tabun)

CH3 oI IIcl-lo— P — F

I IC(CH3)3 C H3

GB (Sarin)

o/

CH(CH3)2

C H3C H20 — P — S C H2C H2NI \I

cl-k

VX

‘ CH(CH3)2

, C W, / s , ,C H 2, ,C H 2, / S , / C H 2 ,

cl CH2 CH2 o CH2 CH2 cl

T

c’\ / H

H/ c – c\ / c ’

‘ \Lewisite c1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3,Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.


Table 2-2—Physical Characteristics of Chemical Munitions

Munitions typea — P h y s i c a l d a t a — — A g e n t — Explosive/energetic components

Length(in)

78.078.0

Weight(lb)b

5756

Weight(lb)b

10.710.0

10.5

11.711.711.76.56.0

3.01.6

14.5

5.86.0

108

220

347

1,356

Diameter

115 mm115 mm

13.5 in

155 mm155 mm155 mm155 mm155 mm

105 mm105 mm

8 in

4.2 in4.2 in

11 in

16 in

14 in

22.5 in

30.1 in30.1 in30.1 in30.1 in

Rocket Type

GBVx

Burster

YesYes

Yes

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

Yesd

YesYes

No

No

No

No

NoNoNoNo

Propellant

YesYes

Fuze

YesYes

M55M55

Land mineM23 5.0 23 VX No Yesc

155-mm projectileM104M11OM11OM121, M121A1 , M122M121A1

26.826.826.826.726.7

959999100100

HDHHDGBVX

NoNoNoNoNo

NoNoNoNoNo

105-mm projectileM60M360

Yesc

Yesc21.016.0

3232

HDGB

Yese

Yes”

8-in projectileM426 No35.1 199 GB or VX No

4.2-in mortarM2, M2A1M2, M2A1

YesYes

YesYes

21.021.0

2525

HTHD

500-lb bombMK-94-O 60 441 GB No No

750-lb bombMC-1 50 725 GB No No

M4teye bombMC-1 GB No No86 525

Spray tankTMU-28/B 185

81.581.581.581.5

1.935 VX No

NoNoNoNo

No

NoNoNoNo

Ton container 3,100 H, HD, HT, or L 1,700N / Af

GA N / Af

2,900 GB 1,5003,000 Vx 1,600

a Military &signation numbers are shown below the munitions tyw.b For~nvers]on of the U.S. military standard sizes to metric units, 1 in -2.54 cm and 1 lb= 0.454 kg.c Land mines and fuzes are stored together but are fIOt SSSWlbbd.d Not all proj=tiles have been put into explosive configurations.e The 10l&mm pj~tile is ~nfigur~ both ~th and without ~rsters, fuzes, and artridge CaSeS COflhhlhlg pmpehlt.f [nforrnation is not available.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final Programmatk Environmental Impact Statement,” VOIS. 1,2,3, Office ofthe Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 19SS.

(4). However, most of the individual items to be tions in concrete coffins for ocean dumping (5, 6).destroyed in the stockpile are the various munitions During the decades of experience with CW disposal,described in table 2-2. although Army personnel have been exposed to CW

agents, no casualties have resulted (7).

History of Chemical Weapons DisposalIn 1969 at the request of the U.S. Department of

Defense (DOD), the National Research Council(NRC) reviewed the issue of CW disposal andrecommended chemical neutralization via alkalinehydrolysis for the nerve agent GB and incinerationfor the mustard agents H and HD (6). After researchand development work by the Army in the 1970s onthese technologies, the Army concluded that inciner-

The Army has an ongoing need for disposal ofsurplus and obsolete chemical weapons. Attempts tomanage the problems of CW disposal have a longhistory involving a variety of destruction tech-niques. Prior to 1969, the Army disposed of chemi-cal weapons by open-pit burning, evaporative “at-mospheric dilution,’ burial, and placement of muni-

Chapter 2—The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program ● 17

ation was the preferred method for the destruction ofall classes of chemical weapons.

The Army indicated that the decision to abandonchemical neutralization in favor of incineration(officially in 1982) resulted from problems encoun-tered with the chemical neutralization process (6).The Army’s early chemical neutralization programactually applied only to destruction of the chemicalagent itself. Incineration was used to decontaminatemetal parts centaining residual chemical agent thatcame from disassembled CW munitions and storagecontainers. Since incineration was introduced as anecessary component of all early CW disposalschemes, the fact that it became the basis of theArmy’s CW disposal program was probably inevita-ble. The 1987 report by the Army about its experi-ence with CW destruction refers to the “widespreadacceptance of incineration as an effective, safe, andenvironmentally sound method of disposal of haz-ardous materials’ (6). Now, 5 years later, thesuggestion of widespread acceptance of incinerationseems insupportable in light of the strong andeffective opposition to most applications of inciner-ation for waste disposal.

In 1984 the incineration decision was supportedby another NRC review. The NRC based itsendorsement on a review of existing data suppliedalmost entirely by Army research. In 1988 the Armypublished a Final Programmatic EnvironmentalImpact Statement (PEIS) designating on-site dis-posal consisting of disassembly followed by inciner-ation as the preferred method of CW destruction (4).

On-Site Destruction vs. Relocation of theCW Stockpile for Off-Site Destruction

In the 1988 PEIS for its on-site CW disassemblyand incineration program, the Army comparedseveral alternatives, including partial or completerelocation of the CW stockpile to regional ornational sites for destruction. The comparative riskof the entire CW disposal program associated withon-site versus regional disposal was evaluated as notstatistically distinguishable according to an analysiscontracted by the Army (7). The Army argued thatthis apparent risk equivalence was misleading be-cause the analysis failed to consider the location interms of corresponding mitigation of possible acci-dents. That is, an accident on an existing Army basewould be easier to mitigate than an accidentoccurring at some unknown point along a transporta-

tion corridor. A qualitative consideration of thisdifference led to the conclusion that any optioninvolving CW transportation off-site was more risky(7). The current Army program specifies that chemi-cal weapons will remain on-site, at the eightcontinental U.S. bases and Johnston Island wherethey are now located, for destruction by disassemblyand incineration.

Condition of the CW Stockpile—Potential of Increased Risk From

CW Deterioration

In 1992, chemical weapons containing unitaryagents stored in the continental United States will befrom 24 to 47 years old (8). Low-level leaks ofagents have been detected in some of the munitions,although the risk from such leaks has been suggestedto be low. The M55 rockets (box l-C) filled with GBagent are the greatest source of leaks. All other typesof munitions and storage containers in the CWstockpile have substantially fewer leakages and arein stable condition (4, 5, 9, 10). The relativeinstability of the M55 rocket is probably due to itsunique construction, which includes a thin alumi-num warhead filled with GB chemical agent (7, 10,11). The other agent-filled munitions are constructedof much heavier gauge aluminum plate or steel thatis more resistant to corrosion and leakage. Most ofthe leaking M55 rockets, first discovered in 1966,come from one manufacturing source of GB agent,and there appears to be a correlation between acidcontent and frequency of leakage through thealuminum walls (7, 10, 11, 12).

Primarily because of leakage problems, the M55rockets constitute a major portion of the total risk ofCW handling and storage at the five continental U.S.sites where they are located (12). The CW monitor-ing program directs Army personnel to conductongoing surveillance of the stockpile. The Army hasestablished a continuous monitoring program torapidly identify new leaking munitions (4). Asleaking munitions are discovered, they are sealed inprotective steel tubes (“overpacks”) to containfurther leakage. Although M55 rockets containingagent GB were first found to be leaking in 1966(11,12), there has been no trend toward an increased rateof leakers detected (9).

In a partial answer to questions about the urgencyof CW disposal, the NRC committee in its 1984report stated that data are insufficient to project the

324-649 0 - 92 - 4


near- or long-term storage life of CW agent contain-ers. However, in the face of this uncertainty,available information indicates that the frequency ofleaks for most munitions at all eight U.S. sites,except for the M55 rockets, did not increasesubstantially in the years prior to (5) or after 1984 atat least the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot inKentucky (9). A 1985 study by the Army specifi-cally on the condition of the M55 rockets concludedthat the occurrence of a catastrophic event in the nearfuture is “highly unlikely” (11, 12). However, inview of the critical importance of this issue, thisstudy could be updated.

DISPOSAL OF THE ARMY’SCW STOCKPILE

The Army’s Demonstration Projects

The Army’s current program requires a series ofpilot demonstration CW disposal facilities. Some ofthese demonstrations have been required by Con-gress. The Chemical Agent Munitions DisposalSystem (CAMDS) (Tooele, Utah) was initiated bythe Army to test and evaluate equipment andprocesses to be used in CW disposal facilities.Although CAMDS is authorized to dispose ofchemical weapons, its primary purpose is datacollection and test evaluation of the process equip-ment (13).

The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent DisposalSystem (JACADS) is currently undergoing opera-tional verification and testing for the destruction ofM55 rockets. The Army anticipates that JACADSwill eventually demonstrate the destruction of alltypes of CW munitions and storage containers. Thissystem is actually not one but four separate inciner-ator systems, each designed to handle a distinctcomponent from the CW disassembly waste stream.Public Law 100-456 (the National Defense Authori-zation Act of Fiscal Year 1989) requires the Army tocomplete operational verification of its technologyat JACADS before proceeding with equipment testsat Tooele, Utah, and other U.S. sites (14). Based inpart on the CAMDS experience, this “new genera-tion’ of CW incinerators is intended to demonstratecompliance with current Toxic Substances ControlAct (TSCA) and Resource Conservation and Recov-ery Act (RCRA) standards. TSCA compliance isrequired because the tube containers for M55 rocketscontain small amounts of polychlorinated biphenyls(PCBs). RCRA compliance is similar for any new

incinerator and involves demonstrating acceptableemission rates of metals in ash, particulate loading,hydrogen chloride and hydrogen fluoride stackemissions, etc. (See box 2-B on regulatory hurdlesfor CW incineration facilities.) Results from thistechnology demonstration design facility are in-tended for use as a basis for the design andconstruction of the eight proposed continental U.S.on-site incinerators, although construction at Tooele,Utah has already begun.

Four evaluations of the JACADS operation by theMitre Corp. have been planned for completion by1993. The frost report was released in June 1991 (14).A final evaluation directed to Congress, followed bycongressional certification of JACADS, is antici-pated in February 1993 (15).

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BYTHE CURRENT CW DISPOSAL

PROGRAM

Local and National Opposition

Several national and local organizations areopposed to the Army’s present CW disposal pro-gram. Citizens at the Lexington-Blue Grass ArmyDepot (Kentucky) have mounted the most effectiveresistance. The opposition to the Army’s CWdestruction program in Kentucky may be able toblock or seriously delay its completion. (See box 1-Bfor a description of Kentucky State authority forregulating hazardous waste facilities.)

Currently, less opposition exists at other conti-nental U.S. sites (16). However, other States mightfollow Kentucky’s lead. The Utah State legislaturehas implemented some restrictive requirements forCW disposal facilities proposed for the Tooele site.Specifically, it has required a series of additional andtime-consuming test burns. Citizen groups thatoppose the Armys current CW destruction plan alsoexist in every one of the eight states with CWstockpiles.

Although the public was not informed of theArmy’s plans to build a CW destruction facility atthe Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot until January1984, citizen concerns about the CW storage hadbeen developing for decades. Although the Armymoved chemical weapons into the Lexington-BlueGrass Army Depot during the 1950s, local residentswere not informed of this fact until 10 years later.

Chapter 2—The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program . 19

Box 2-B—Some Regulatory Hurdles for CW Destruction

The Army must secure environmental permits for its CW incineration facilities in the same manner as civilianprojects. The Army’s Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) demonstration facility, locatedon Johnston Island, however, is exempt from obtaining certain environmental permits that will be required for CWdestruction facilities planned for the continental United States. Although Executive Order 12088 provides forwaivers of these laws in cases of national emergency, the Army has not yet requested such a waiver for the storageand handling of chemical weapons. A range of Federal, State, and local permits required prior to the start ofconstruction include:

1. A review by the Department of Health and Human Services of public health and safety issues and theenvironmental impact of the Army’s CW destruction program (l).

2. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permits for construction and for operation of incineratorfacilities. Full-scale incinerator operations cannot begin until trial burns are satisfactorily completed,following construction approval, in accordance with final RCRA permitting requirement. The U.S.Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has delegated RCRA authority to all of the eight States in whichincinerators are planned.

3. Toxic Substances Control Act approval before operation of incinerators with M55 rockets, because of thepresence of PCBs in rocket-firing tubes.

4. Air emissions source permits under the Clean Air Act and State or local air quality regulations. Clean airpermits must be obtained from each relevant State authority.

5. Other environmentally oriented regulations including the Endangered Species Act (Public Law 93-205),Floodplain Management Executive Order 11988, and Protection of Wetlands Executive Order 11990.

6. For transportation off-site, approval from the U.S. Department of Transportation, the EnvironmentalProtection Agency, and other relevant Federal and State authorities.

Reference

1. U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical stockpile DisposalProgram Fina.1 Programmatic EnvironmentalImpact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, 1988.

This led to the impression that the Army had Army Depot should be moved to another site for“sneaked’ chemical weapons into the area withoutany regard for the safety of citizens who lived nearby(17). Although the amount of chemical weaponsstored at the Kentucky depot is proportionally small(1.6 percent of the total U.S. stockpile), localresidents are aware that Kentucky’s share includes ahigher proportion of the most dangerous types,especially the M55 rockets (69,500 rockets out of atotal of 478,000, or 14.5 percent in the total M55rocket stockpile) (9, 11, 12).

At present, organized opposition to the Army’sCW incineration program in Kentucky comes frommembers of the State legislature; civic leaders;academics; and key political, citizen, and nationalgroups that together comprise a highly organizedand potentially very effective opposition (17). In1988 (when the Army’s PEIS was published), theGovernor of the State of Kentucky stated that thechemical weapons at the Lexington-Blue Grass

destruction (18).

Based on conversations with representatives fromthree Kentucky citizen groups (the Kentucky Envi-ronmental Foundation, Concerned Citizens of Madi-son County, and Common Ground), opposition isbased on several issues, and there is no consensus onwhich concerns are most important. Issues of publicconcern include the possible health risks associatedwith effluents from incineration, as well as thepossibility that the planned CW destruction facilitieswill be used to incinerate other types of waste oncethe weapons disposal program is complete. Thelatter concern is founded partially on reports thatspecifically direct the Army to consider using theincinerator facilities, after the completion of CWdestruction, for the disposal of hazardous wastegenerated by DOD; Federal, State, or local govern-ments; and private industry (3, 5, 19). A generalconcern is that the Army may have not adequatelyaddressed unique aspects of the Kentucky Blue

20 ● Disposal Of chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

Grass facility, such as its proximity to majorpopulation centers.1 Another often repeated issue isthe perceived risk to citizens in communities sur-rounding CW stockpiles during munitions transportfrom storage igloos to the central on-site incineratorfacility.

As a result of this last concern, Kentucky citizengroups continue to express a strong preference forthe option of removing the chemical weapons fromKentucky to some other site for storage or destruc-tion using a transport container that would preventleakage in case of an accident. They refer to the 1987Mitre report concluding that there is no significantdifference in risk between on-site incineration andmoving the stockpile to a less populated area (1,12).They also cite the Army’s successful movement ofCWs stored in Germany to Johnston Island in thesummer of 1990 (17, 20). Many of the communitiesthat surround the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depothave indicated a reluctance to have chemical weap-ons transported through their own communities.Similarly, the Army’s counter argument is that theMitre risk assessment failed to consider the geo-graphic location and the potential for adequateresponse to accidents occurring on-site versus thoseoccurring during transportation off-site (7).

Projected Program Schedule—Revised Deadlines

The Army’s current proposed schedule for its CWdestruction program is shown in table 2-3. Thisschedule has been revised more than once since the1988 PEIS, and unforeseen events may promptfurther revisions. The schedule shown in this tablewas presented to Congress on April 1, 1992 (21).

Cost Estimates-Cost Overruns

The Amy’s cost estimates for the CW destructionprogram have been continually revised upward. In1985 the Army’s life-cycle cost estimate for comple-tion of destruction of the CW stockpile at the eightcontinental U.S. storage sites and Johnston Islandwas $1.7 billion. In 1988 the Army revised the totalprogram cost to $3.4 billion (19). Recent reports

indicate that the Army is revising its cost estimatesfor CW destruction upward to $6.5 billion (3, 17) oras high as $7.9 billion (21). The largest portion of thecost is for existing and projected operating expenses(while the incineration facilities are operational).Facility construction is a small fraction of the totalcost (17).

INTERNATIONALIMPLICATIONS OF A

SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMThe United States and former Soviet Union

signed a bilateral agreement in June 1990 to destroytheir CW stockpiles, although acceptable verifica-tion and destruction technologies were not resolved(3, 22). The agreement timetable specified thatdestruction should begin by December 1992; that 50percent stockpile would be destroyed by December1999, followed by all but 5,000 metric tons de-stroyed by May 2002. Although the agreement wasnot ratified by either country, some of its provisionswere adopted. Both nations have declared an end toCW production and in May 1991 president Bushforswore U.S. use of chemical weapons and pledgedto destroy all U.S. chemical weapons within 10 yearsof the Geneva global chemical weapons convention(CWC) negotiations (a multilateral effort now in its24th year) coming into effect. This renunciation wasvery positively received by the participants of theconvention and was widely seen as a significantimpetus for the CWC negotiations (3). If ratificationof the bilateral agreement continues to be delayed,then the CWC may be concluded and allowed tosupersede the U.S./Soviet bilateral agreement onCW destruction (3).

Negotiations over the bilateral agreement wereprolonged primarily by the Soviet Union’s inabilityto develop a workable plan for the destruction of itschemical weapons. U.S. officials now believe thatthe agreement deadlines will have to be extendedbecause of the lack of CW destruction facilities inthe independent republics. The agreement allowedfor postponement of deadlines should either sideencounter delays in the construction of facilities.

1 The Kentucky Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, which stores chemical weapons and is the proposed site of the Army’s chemicrd weaponsdestruction facility, is 1/2 mile from an elementary school, in an area with approximately 55,000 inhabitants. Several schools are within a 5-mile radiusof the depot (1, 17). A related problem is the apparently poor credibility of the Army in the eyes of many of the citizens in the affected area. For example,late in 1991 an incident in which a small amount of leaked mustard agent was detected by the Army inside one of the munitions storage igloos at theLexington-Blue Grass depot was revealed to the general public indirectly via a “leak” to a local school newspaper. Public reaction to this apparentlyminor incident was one of outrage and expressed the general feeling that the Army was neither sincere in its efforts to protect the public nor crediblein keeping the public informed of potential hazards.

JACADS

CDTF

TEAD

ANAD

UMDA

PBA

PUDA

LBAD

NAAP

APQ

1

Table 2-3-U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Program Implementation Schedule

CY 89 , CY 90 CY 91 CY 92 CY 93 , CY 94 , CY 95 CY96 CY 97 CY98 CY 99 CY OO CY 01I I I

SYST 7 / 9 0 O V T 3/93 OPNS2/96

(36) CLO

6/89 CONST/SYST 10-91 OPNS12199

(28) (99) CLO

9/89 CONST 8-93 SYST 2-95 OPNS4/00

(47) (18) (63) CLO

7 $ 9 D E S 4& 2 R E P 6/93 CONST 4&W SYST ‘ ~9 7 O P N S1 1/00

(14) (34) (18) (38) CLO

6/$9 1 /9 3REPv 1/9411/96 5/98 1 2/00

DES CONST OPNS(12) (34) (32) CLO

8/89 DES 1/93 REP 1/94 CONST 9/96 SYST 3/98 OPNS 1 1/00

(12) (32) (18) (33) CLO

10$30 DES 5/ 93 REP 5/94 CONST 3/97 SYST 9/89 OPNS 5/00(12) (34) (18) CLO

10/90 DES 5 ’ 83 R E P 5& C O N S T 3 & 7 S Y S T ‘ &g O P N S ‘ $0

(12) (34) (18) CLO

? ?1 1 y R E P1~ g 5 CONST

6/986-97SYST VO

(12) (29) (12) (11)CLO

1/92 1/94 1/956/97SYST

6/98REP CONST v OPNS6/99(12) v (29) (12) (11) CLO

JACADS = Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal FacilityCDTF = Chemical DemilitarizationTEAD = Tooele Army DepotANAD = Anniston Army DepotUMDA = Umatilla Depot ActivityPBA = Pine Bluff ArsenalLBAD = Lexington-Bluegrass Army DepotNAAP = Newport Army Ammunition PlantAPQ = Aberdeen Proving Ground

DES = DesignSYST = SystemizationCONST = ConstructionOPNS = OperationsCLO = ClOSUreOVT = Operational Verification TestingRFP = Issue and Evaluate Request for Propose

V. start activity first of monthT = complete activity end of month

SOURCE: Livingstone, S., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment), testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, April 1,1992, Second Session, 102nd Congress.

22 . Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies

According to the June 1990 bilateral agreement,destruction technologies were to be shared. How-ever, it appears that Soviet CW destruction capabili-ties are currently nonexistent. The entire CW stock-pile is located in Russia (23), which may berequesting U.S. assistance in building CW destruc-tion facilities. The political disarray caused by thebreakup of the Soviet Union into independentrepublics has made this more difficult.

The U.S. CW destruction program has also beendelayed, as described earlier in this paper. Recently,on the recommendation of the House Committee onAppropriations, the FY 1992 DOD appropriationsbill as passed by the House prohibited obligation of$151.9 million in procurement funds for the CWdestruction facilities planned at Anniston, Umatilla,and Pine Bluff until the following events occurred:Operational testing at Johnston Island is certifiedcomplete and a report submitted to Congress; theJohnston Island plant design has been verified; andappropriate environmental permits for the three newfacilities have been secured. The restriction forobligation of procurement funds for Anniston is tiedto the start of the third phase of OperationalVerification Testing of JACADS (OVT 3) (24).

In developing their current disposal programs, theUnited States and Russia are setting the stage forgeneral and worldwide weapons disposal. Thecontrol and prevention of the proliferation of chemi-cal weapons is a problem paralleling that of nuclearweapons: They have in common similar problems ofthe verification of manufacture or destruction, andthe potential for illegal use. A United Nationsspecial commission is currently investigating possi-ble methods for the destruction of Iraq’s CWstockpile. Iraq has acknowledged having a variety ofchemical weapons containing nerve and blisteragents that will be destroyed under this program(25). As many as 18 countries in addition to theUnited States and the Commonwealth of Independ-ent States (C. I. S.) may possess chemical weapons. Intestimony before the House Committee on ArmedServices in 1991, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks,Chief of Naval Intelligence, estimated that thefollowing 14 non-NATO or non-Warsaw Pact coun-tries probably have chemical weapons: Burma(Myanmar), China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel,Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria,Taiwan, and Vietnam (3). Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,South Africa, and Thailand were also identified aspossibly having chemical weapons. As international

proliferation of chemical weapons expands, the needfor an appropriate and acceptable CW disposalprogram becomes increasingly critical.

The C.I.S. is facing problems surprisingly similarto those of the U.S. Army in establishing a CWdestruction program. In 1990 the Soviets unveiledtheir only CW destruction plant near Chapayevsk inthe Ural Mountains, 500 miles southeast of Moscow(1, 20). In contrast to the U.S. Army’s program, thisfacility was designed to use chemical neutralizationrather than incineration as the primary means forCW destruction. However, local citizens opposed tothe facility for ecological and environmental rea-sons, and possibly as a reaction to the Chernobylnuclear accident in 1986, were successful in oppos-ing the facility and it was eventually shut down (l).

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FORTHE ARMY’S BASELINE

PROJECTThe current Army program for CW destruction

specifies destruction by disassembly and inciner-ation on-site at the eight continental U.S. Armybases and at Johnston Island where they are nowlocated. The Army is required by law to prove thesuccessful demonstration of the Johnston Islandchemical Agent Disposal System. Results from thisprototype design are intended to be used as a basisfor design and construction of the eight proposedcontinental U.S. facilities. This “new-generation”CW incinerator is designed to show that the technol-ogy can meet current TSCA and RCRA standards.The Clean Air Act does not apply to the JACADSfacility and therefore the Army is not collecting datato demonstrate compliance with this act. Since alleight continental sites will have to host Clean AirAct standards, operation and tests of the JACADSfacility will not provide all the data needed.

The first of four planned evaluations by the MitreCorp., “Evaluation of the GB Rocket Campaign:Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal SystemOperational Verification Testing,” was released inJune 1991 (14). In September 1991, the NRCreleased a “Letter Report” review of this firstevaluation. In the review, the NRC was optimisticabout the eventual success of the JACADS demon-stration project and recommended that operationaltesting be continued. It also made several relevantcriticisms that suggested certain shortcomings in theJACADS evaluation strategy:

Chapter 2—The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program ● 23

Additional performance measurements, whichcould be made at JACADS, would support futuresites by providing higher levels of confidence in thetechnology. . .[The current program] does not re-quire measurement. . .of PICS. . especially dioxinsand furans. . . There is a larger issue than theaccuracy of. . .measurements. It is important that thetotal environmental impact of JACADS be charac-terized. . . . These data would facilitate permittingand public understanding by providing well docu-mented answers to reasonable, and probably inevita-ble, questions from concerned citizens as well asregulators.

Although the Army has not had time to respond,these and other criticisms of the JACADS projectsuggest a series of possible scenarios that may resultbased strictly on the outcome of the demonstrationproject.

In one scenario, the Army’s demonstration pro-gram at Johnston Island could be successfullyconcluded and the construction of facilities at thecontinental sites could continue as planned. It wouldprobably be useful to provide local groups andinvolved States with data from JACADS operationsto show safety standards can be met. If citizengroups become convinced that the Army’s technol-ogy will safely destroy the weapons at each site, andthe technology functions as proposed, then theprogram could proceed without opposition.

In another scenario, the Army’s JACADS facilitycould successfully demonstrate that the technologywill perform as expected but the organized opposi-tion would remain unconvinced.

In this case, facilities in individual States might beeffectively halted by blocking the issuance ofrequired State permits. In a final scenario, theJACADS incineration technology demonstrationproject might prove unsuccessful and eventually beabandoned. This, in turn, would probably mean anend to construction at any U.S. site.

The second and third scenarios could result in theneed for a CW disposal alternative to incineration,depending on whether opposition was primarily toon-site disposal or to the specific destruction tech-nology. In this event the weapons stockpile wouldprobably be stored and maintained at current siteswhile an alternative technology and CW destructionprogram is developed.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12,

13,

CHAPTER 2 REFERENCESEmber, L., “Chemical Weapons Disposal: DauntingChallenges Still Ahead,” Chemical and EngineeringNews, 68(33):9-19, Aug. 13, 1990.Picardi, A., International Environmental AssessmentGroup, Alexandria, VA, “Alternative Technologiesfor the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: AnInformation Document,” prepared for Greenpeacelnternational, Washington, DC, May 1991.U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, CongressionalResearch Service, “Chemical Weapons: U.S. ArmsControl Negotiations and Destruction,” prepared bySteven R. Bowman, Washington, DC, updated Sept.25, 1991 and Feb. 13, 1992.U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical StockpileDisposal Program Final Programmatic Environ-mental Impact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of theProgram Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.National Research Council, Disposal of ChemicalMunitions and Agents (Washington, DC: NationalAcademy Press, 1984).U.S. Department of the Army, ‘Chemical Agent andMunition Disposal: Summary of the U.S. Army’sExperience,” Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen ProvingGround, MD, September 1987.Azuma, E., Office of the Assistant Secretary of theArmy, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, briefing atthe Office of Technology Assessment, Washington,DC, Oct. 18, 1991.U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, StockpileDestruction Delayed at the Army’s Prototype Dis-posal Facility, GAO/NSIAD-90-222 (Washington,DC: July 1990).Briefing of Office of Technology staff at theLexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, Lexington, KY, Dec. 10,1991.McKenna, W., U.S. Army Armament, Munitions andChemical Command, Defense Ammunition Direc-torate, Air, Sea and Toxic Chemical Munitions, RockIsland, IL, personal communication, Dec. 2, 1991.U.S. Department of the Army, “Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, 115mm: Chemical Agent(GB or VX), M55,” U.S. Army Material SystemsAnalysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,October 1985.Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Support-ing the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP),”prepared for the Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, December 1987.FIamm, K. J., briefing at the Office of the ProgramManager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen,MD, October 29, 1991.


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Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Evaluation of the GBRocket Campaign: Johnston Atoll chemical AgentDisposal System Operational Verification Testing,”prepared for the Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, June 1991.Wojciechowski, P., briefing at the Office of theProgram Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,Aberdeen, MD, Oct. 29, 1991.Baronian, C., Deputy Program Manager and Techni-cal Director, briefing at the Office of the ProgramManager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen,MD, Oct. 29, 1991.Stuart, D., U.S. Congress, General Accounting Of-fice, personal communication, Nov. 4, 1991.Wilkinson, W. G., Governor of the Commonwealth ofKentucky, in a letter dated February 3, 1988 toBrigadere General D.A. Nydam, Program ExecutiveOfficer, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitari-zation, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Obsta-cles to the Army’s Plan To Destroy Obsolete U.S.Stockpile, GAO/NSIAD-90-155 (Washington, DC:May 1990).

20.

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Morrison, D., “No Easy out,” National Journal,23(19):1100-1104, May 11, 1991.

Livingstone, S., Assistant Secretary of the Army(Installations, Logistics and Environment), testi-mony before the House Committee on Appropria-tions, Subcommittee on Defense, Apr. 1, 1992,Second Session, 102d Congress.

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, StockpileDestruction Cost Growth and Schedule SlippagesAre Likely To Continue, GAO/NSL4D-92-18 (Wash-ington, DC: November 1991).

“Russia Not Able To Destroy Chemical Arms,”Chemical and Engineering News 70(3):17, Jan. 20,1992.

Ned Coale, Department of the Army, Office of theProgram Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,personal communication, Apr. 22, 1992.

U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, CongressionalResearch Service, “Chemical Weapons Prolifera-tion: Issues for Congress,” prepared by Steven R.Bowman, Washington, DC, June 20, 1991.

Chapter 3

Current Technology and Alternatives

CURRENT TECHNOLOGYThe Army’s CW Disassembly and

Incineration Technology

The Army’s current chemical weapons (CW)disposal program involves robotic, machine disas-sembly of the chemical weapon as appropriate foreach specific munition. The various waste materialsfrom disassembly are incinerated separately. Theseinclude the chemical agent, explosives and propel-lants, empty munitions and nonexplosive (storage)containers, and shipping and packing materials(dunnage). Preliminary separation produces individ-ual waste streams that are relatively homogeneous,which makes it feasible to optimize conditions forthe incineration of each.

To handle the various waste streams produced bydisassembly, four different furnace systems arerequired:

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Incinerator for the liquid chemical agent andprocess liquid waste;Rotary kiln furnace for the destruction ofexplosives and propellants, with an accompa-nying heated discharge conveyer to removeleftover materials;Metal parts furnace to decontaminate by incin-eration the empty bulk containers, shells, andbombs; andDunnage incinerator for the combustion ofwaste packaging.

The resulting gases and other products of inciner-ation are treated with a variety of modern pollutionabatement equipment, including a quench tower,venturi scrubber, scrubber tower, demister, and forthe dunnage furnace, a baghouse for removal ofparticulate. Brine produced by the scrubbers isevaporated, and the resulting salts are packed indrums for eventual landfill. The final products thatwill require disposal such as landfill are scrap metal,drums of salt, and ash (l).

The time required to dispose of the stockpiles atthe eight continental U.S. sites after the incineratorsbegin to work was estimated in the 1988 Program-matic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) to befrom 11 months (at Lexington-Blue Grass Army

Depot, Kentucky) to 41 months (at Tooele, Utah).This was recently revised in the Army’s March 1991Program Implementation Schedule (Rev. 3) to 11months (at Newport, Indiana) and 63 months (atTooele) (see table 2-3).

EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVETECHNIQUES

A number of techniques have been suggested fordisposal of chemical weapons. To be applicable tothe current CW stockpile, a technology must be ableto effectively destroy or decontaminate the chemicalagents, the drained and empty munitions and con-tainers, the associated explosives and propellants,and the munition packaging material (dunnage). Thedunnage is largely conventional packing materialsuch as wooden pallets and crates. However, thepossibility that the dunnage may be contaminatedwith CW agents requires that it be treated as if itwere contaminated.

In 1991 the international environmental organiza-tion Greenpeace published a review of nonincinera-tion alternatives for CW destruction, “AlternativeTechnologies for the Detoxification of ChemicalWeapons: An Information Document” (5). Thisreview was very broad in scope and included manyreports of the destruction of a CW agent or relatedcompounds. Virtually none of these alternativetechniques with the exception of chemical neutrali-zation has been demonstrated for use with actual CWagents on the scale required for the current disposalprogram. The Greenpeace review avoids specificallyendorsing any single technique and concentrates onthose methods that would be most applicable to thedestruction of liquid CW agents. Many of thetechnologies proposed would handle only the chem-ical agent and the other waste materials would needsome other treatment or disposal method.

Many of the CW destruction alternative tech-niques or technologies discussed in the Greenpeacereport or proposed by others are not new and wereproposed for CW destruction in the early 1980 orbefore. In response to a 1982 request to industry forproposals on techniques for CW destruction, theArmy received suggestions for agent destructionfrom eight private companies. These included:

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conversion to nontoxic useful chemical products;chemical destruction (neutralization); molten metal,plasmas, pyrolysis; molten salt incineration; acidroasting; cement kiln; large kiln; use of a rotaryhearth furnace; supercritical fluid (oxidation); andthermal tower destruction (2). Although these andother techniques might be developed into technolo-gies appropriate for CW destruction, none appears atpresent to be in a position to serve as an immediatealternative to incineration. Moreover, in the absenceof more specific information about alternative tech-nologies for CW disposal, it is impossible to predictwhich technique could be developed into an accepta-ble CW disposal technology. The Army rejectedthese alternatives primarily because it believed theywould require much more time to develop or provecapable.

The following is a brief review of four techniquesselected only because they have been specificallysuggested by various interested groups or technol-ogy developers as appropriate for CW destruction:chemical neutralization, supercritical water oxida-tion, steam gasification, and plasma arc pyrolysis.Many other techniques have been suggested that arenot reviewed here. There is no technical basis uponwhich to select (or reject) these or any other specifictechnology. Application of the last three techniquesto dioxin-contaminated soil has recently been re-viewed (3). It is quite possible that if a successfulalternative technology is developed for CW destruc-tion, it will be none of these. The proponents of thesealternatives believe that they offer advantages be-cause air emissions may be more readily controlledand minimized and because of possible improvedsafety during on-site handling and transportation.More details of these techniques are provided inappendix A.

Chemical Neutralization

The alternative technology for CW destructionhaving the greatest amount of available informationis chemical neutralization. The U.S. Army hadextensive experience with this process for thedestruction of CW agents. Chemical neutralizationvia alkaline hydrolysis was successfully used todestroy a substantial proportion of at least someclasses of CW agents in the current stockpile.Hydrolysis is the reaction of water with a chemical,such as the CW agent, using an acid or base catalyst,to produce compounds of greatly reduced toxicity.In principle, alkaline hydrolysis could be a means to

chemica.lly neutralize the agents GB, VX, andmustards. Problems encountered by the Army withalkaline hydrolysis of all types of CW agents may besurmountable today in view of new techniques (seeappendix A) that were not considered at the time ofthe Army’s research in this area and of the increasedpressure to exploit existing nonincineration tech-niques in CW destruction. Neutralization technol-ogy was, however, rejected by the Army as unsuita-ble for the current CW destruction program. (Appen-dix A gives a further description of the Army’s workwith and decision to abandon neutralization.)

Most experience with large-scale chemical neu-tralization of chemical weapons has been with theagent GB. This agent was successfully neutralizedon a large scale by the use of aqueous sodiumhydroxide. Approximately 8.4 million pounds of GB(17 percent of the total weight of all agents to bedestroyed in the current program), taken fromvarious munitions and storage tanks, were neutral-ized at Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Tooele, Utah,between 1974 and 1982. From 1979 to 1981, 13,951M55 rockets containing GB (approximately 3 per-cent of today’s stockpile and 20 percent of the M55rocket stockpile at the Lexington-Blue Grass ArmyDepot) were destroyed by this combined chemicalneutralization/incineration process (4).

The drained empty munition and ton (bulk stor-age) containers left over from this process weretreated in a furnace where the explosives wereincinerated and the metal parts thermally decontami-nated. In general, chemical neutralization appliedonly to the drained chemical agent itself, anddisposal of the remaining waste relied on inciner-ation. Another variation in some of the workperformed involved decontamination of drainedcluster bomblets and ton containers with a causticwash to neutralize any residual agent. However, thecaustic wash treatment was also followed by inciner-ation.

Although the agent VX, which is structurallysimilar to GB, can also be chemically neutralized, byhydrolysis with aqueous sodium hydroxide, theArmy only demonstrated this on a small scale.Mustard agent has also been shown by the Army tobe hydrolyzed under alkaline conditions on a smallscale, although only very slowly at ambient tempera-ture. The effectiveness of alkaline hydrolysis ofmustards at elevated temperature was not reported(4).

Chapter 3-Current Technology and Alternatives ● 27

Supercritical Water Oxidation

Supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) has beensuggested as a plausible alternative for destructionof the agents contained in chemical weapons (2, 5).Supercritical water refers to water that has beenheated and pressurized to a transition point betweengas and liquid phases, and thus has some of theproperties of both. Organic materials in solutionwith supercritical water can be oxidized by oxygenintroduced from air. This technology is currentlyunder development by U.S. companies (GeneralAtomics, Modell Corp., and Modar) and by at leastthree major universities, for the destruction of avariety of hazardous wastes including dioxin-contaminated soil (3, 6, 7). Although these compa-nies have prototype devices, none has demonstratedits use with an actual CW agent. Current prototypeswould be most appropriate for the destruction ofonly the liquid chemical agent. However, manynontrivial technical details remain to be worked outbefore SCWO will be suitable for use even with CWagents alone; no actual CW agents have even beentested with SCWO destruction technology (6) (seeappendix A for more details). Their design wouldnot be suitable for decontamin ation of drainedmunitions and containers, or for destruction of theexplosives and propellants loaded into burster tubes,etc., associated with CW munitions. SCWO is beingdeveloped commercially as a general technology forthe destruction of many different organic hazardousmaterials, and the destruction of CW agents isconceived by its developers as, at most, a minorapplication of its use.

SCWO in principle may have certain advantagesover incineration for the oxidation of organic waste.It is similar to incineration in that it involvesoxidation of organic compounds to carbon dioxideand inorganic acids or salts. However, SCWOoperates at much lower temperatures than inciner-ation. Further, it does not require a large airflow.SCWO carries out oxidation at lower temperature,and the reaction medium (water) can be containeduntil tested to be safe. Potential products of incom-plete combustion (PICs) are entrained in solutionrather than emitted in stack gases. The apparentlysuperior control of emissions is an attractive featureof SCWO technology. The effluents from SCWO, incontrast to the exhaust stack gases from incineration,may be collected, analyzed, and even recycled toachieve more complete destruction.

Steam Gasification

Steam gasification (or reformation) has beenproposed for the destruction of chemical weapons byGreenpeace and by Kentucky citizen groups. Steamgasification would treat organic materials such aschemical agents (as well as propellants and explo-sives) with high temperature steam to producesimple organic molecules. One vendor is developingand marketing a portable device using high-temperature steam gasification for the destruction ofgaseous, liquid, and solid organic-containing wastes(8). The machine is designed to handle bulk objectssuch as 55-gallon drums fried with waste, andtherefore may be suitable for handling certainmunitions and bulk CW containers. However, thedevice has not been tested with actual CW agents oractual CW munitions.

In contrast to conventional incineration, steamgasification does not use an airflow, so the gasproduced by the process is minimized. The samevendor is currently working on CW disposal prob-lems for the DOE, such as solvent contaminated soil,that do not involve chemical weapons. It proposesthe use of one or more of its mobile devicesoperating directly in or next to a CW storage igloo.With proper modification, the igloo might serve asa secondary confinement container. The vendorclaims that this system could avoid the risksassociated with transporting chemical weapons outof the igloo, a major concern to some citizen groupsthat live around such facilities.

Plasma Arc Pyrolysis

Plasma arc pyrolysis, currently in the develop-ment stage, has also been proposed for destruction ofchemical weapons by Kentucky citizen groups. Inthis process, chemical substances are dissociatedinto their atomic elements in a thermal plasma fieldcreated by passing an electric current through alow-pressure airstreamo The entire system is trans-portable on a tractor-trailer bed. The most significantlimitation of plasma arc pyrolysis treatment is thatonly liquids can be treated. Contaminated soil andviscous materials cannot be processed by the system(3). Therefore, plasma arc pyrolysis technology in itscurrent form would not be suitable for the treatmentof contaminated, drained munitions or of the con-tainers, explosives, propellants, and dunnage associ-ated with chemical weapons.


Improved Interim Continued Storage—The CW Demilitarization Alternative

In view of the current uncertainty about when anytechnology will be available for destruction of theCW stockpile, an interim alternative that wouldinvolve the transfer of chemical agents from muni-tions to superior-quality, long-term storage tanks hasbeen proposed (9, 10). It is not clear if the approachof interim storage would conflict with either bilat-eral or multilateral treaties on CW disposal. Theadvantage of interim storage would be to secure theCW agents in the existing stockpile, particularlythose in the M55 rockets, while developing somealternative destruction technology. Although notanalyzed in this report, in principle the separation ofchemical agents from explosives and propellantscould enhance the safety of storage. This would stillrequire a mechanical weapons disassembly processfor removal of the chemical agents, as well assubsequent decontamination and disposal of thedrained munitions and corresponding explosivesand propellants.

Although it is likely that solving these problemsmay be no less difficult than disposal of the CWagent itself, an analysis of separating the chemicalagents from the M55 rockets has been carried out forthe Army (11). That study presented a conceptualengineering design, cost estimate, and risk assess-ment for draining and storing in bulk containers thechemical agents from the explosive and propellantportions of the M55 rockets. The remaining rocketcomponents were to be chemically decontaminatedand stored for latter disposal. The report did notaddress the issues of the storage and ultimatedestruction of the separated rocket components, thechemical decontamination solutions or the CWagents. Moreover, the report indicated that the rocketseparation concept was in an extremely early stageof development and should be viewed as preliminaryin nature. As with any new unproven technology thatmight be applicable to CW destruction, pilot-planttesting and verification of the process would berequired before it could be implemented (11). Apossible interim solution for the leaking M55rockets would be to place all of the rockets now instorage into the protective steel “overpack” con-tainers that the Army already uses only for leakingrockets (see box l-C).

Alternatives Involving Transportation andRelocation of the CW Stockpile

In the 1988 PEIS, the Army considered andrejected the alternative of partial or complete reloca-tion of the U.S. CW stockpile to either regional ornational sites for disassembly and incinerationbecause the overall risk was calculated to be higher.However, CW relocation may in principle be consid-ered with whatever destruction technology is se-lected. In 1987 the Mitre Corp. prepared a riskassessment for the Army that compared varioustransportation alternatives (12). Further details ofthis report are given in Appendix B.

Since the condition of the U.S. CW stockpile hasnot received rigorous analysis, many conclusionsabout the relative safety of various transportationoptions will remain questionable regardless of thespecific destruction technology used. The onlyoptions considered in the Mitre report were contin-ued storage (the ‘‘no-action” alternative) versuson-site destruction, and partial or complete reloca-tion, for destruction via disassembly-incineration.The Mitre risk comparisons considered only relativerisks to the general population and excluded risks toworkers at the CW destruction facilities.

The risks associated with different options will beborne by different populations. Thus, the risk ofcontinued storage will be borne mostly by thepopulation surrounding the storage site, whereas therisks associated with transport will be borne largelyby populations along the transportation corridor andat the final destination (12). The fact that the risks forvarious alternatives might generate controversyamong the different populations involved was notconsidered in the Mitre risk assessment.

According to the Mitre report, the continuedstorage option had significantly greater expectedfatalities than all other alternatives when consider-ing the combined risks at all eight U.S. sites. Usingappropriate safety procedures, on-site incinerationwas estimated to be significantly less risky than anyother alternative considered. Combining the totalrisk at all eight U.S. sites, the continued storagealternative-even with appropriate safety procedures-had the greatest expected fatalities associated withit, whereas on-site destruction involves the least risk.Regional, national, or partial relocation and disposalalternatives, respectively, have increasingly greaterexpected fatalities than on-site destruction (12). The

Chapter 3-Current Technology and Alternatives ● 29

on-site disposal alternative also had the lowestprobability of causing one or more fatalities, andpartial relocation the highest. For the on-site dis-posal alternative, transportation activities accountedfor 44 percent of the expected fatalities and plantoperations for 48 percent. In this situation, the M55rockets in the CW stockpile accounted for 50 percentand bulk containers 42 percent of the expectedfatalities.

The general conclusions reached about the rela-tive risks of transportation alternatives for thecombined eight sites often differed significantlyfrom the conclusions reached by site-specific analy-ses. For example, the risk from continued storagewith appropriate safety procedures was much lowerat the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot than at theseven other U.S. sites. Although the risk of contin-ued storage was clearly greater than that of on-sitedisposal at the Aberdeen (Maryland), Newport(Indiana), Pueblo (Colorado), Tooele (Utah), andUmatilla (Oregon) sites, this was not the case withLexington-Blue Grass Army Depot (Kentucky) andPine Bluff (Arkansas) facilities.

Transportation of chemical weapons from theircurrent sites to regional or national locations fordestruction may be challenged by the States throughwhich they would have to be moved. The Army 1988PEIS stated that rail is the preferred mode for thetransportation alternative (13). It described a re-gional relocation plan using rail shipment to relocateall continental U.S. chemical weapons to the Tooele(Utah) and Anniston (Alabama) sites. This planrequires CW transport from 730 to 1,800 miles,through 5 to 11 States. A national relocation plandescribed by the Army in its 1988 PEIS calls for railshipment of all chemical weapons within the conti-nental United States to the Tooele site. This planrequires CW transport from 730 to 2,670 miles,through as many as 20 States. A partial relocationplan was also considered that calls for moving thechemical stockpiles from the Lexington-Blue GrassArmy Depot and Aberdeen sites to Tooele fordestruction. This plan specified approximately 2,100to 2,700 air flights over 1,500 to 2,060 miles.

1

CHAPTER 3 REFERENCESWhelen, R. P., Engineering and Technology Division,briefing at the Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen, MD, Oct. 29,1991.

2.

3.

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8,

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Baronian, C., Deputy Program Manager and Techni-cal Director, briefing at the Office of the ProgramManager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen,MD, Oct. 29, 1991.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,Dioxin Treatment Technologies- Background Paper,OTA-BP-O-93 (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, November 1991).

U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Agent andMunition Disposal; Summary of the U.S. Army’sExperience,” Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen ProvingGround, MD, September 1987.

Picardi, A., International Environmental AssessmentGroup, Alexandria, VA, “Alternative Technologiesfor the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: AnInformation Document,” prepared for GreenpeaceInternational, Washington, DC, May 1991.

Davison, W., Director, Advanced Processing Sys-tems, General Atomics, San Diego, CA, personalcommunication, Nov. 19, 1991.

Modell, M., Modell Development Corp., Framing-ham, MA, personal communication, Nov. 14, 1991.

Galloway, T., Synthetic Technologies Inc.,Richmond, CA, and Sprung, J. L., Sandia NationalLaboratories, Albuquerque, NM, personal communi-cation, Dec. 20, 1991.

Hawkins, S., Greenpeace Pacific Campaign, Wash-ington, DC, personal communication, Oct. 22, 1991.

Hille, P. J., Common Ground, Berea, KY, letterreview of the OTA draft on alternatives for chemicalweapons disposal, Apr. 15, 1992.

Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, MA, "M55 RocketSeparation Study,” prepared for the Office of theProgram Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,U.S. Army, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Novem-ber 1985.

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Support-ing the chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP),”prepared for the Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, December 1987.

U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical StockpileDisposal Program Final Programmatic Environ-mental Impact Statement, ’ vols. 1,2,3, Office of theProgram Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988.

Appendix A

Selected Chemical Weapon Destruction Techniques

CHEMICAL NEUTRALIZATION:THE ARMY’S EXPERIENCE

In a 1969 report, the National Research Council (NRC)recommended chemical neutralization for the destructionof the chemical weapons (CW) agent GB and incinerationfor mustard agents H and HD. After research anddevelopment work on chemical neutralization at theChemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS)(Tooele, Utah) and Rocky Mountain Arsenal (Denver,Colorado) in the 1970s, the Army concluded that inciner-ation was the best method for the destruction of allchemical weapons. The NRC Committee on ChemicalWeapons Disposal has recently been asked by the Armyto reevaluate incineration and alternatives for CW dis-posal.

Chemical Neutralization of Nerve Agents

Most of the Army’s experience with large-scale chemi-cal neutralization of chemical weapons was with theorganophosphorus ester agent GB. This agent was suc-cessfully neutralized using aqueous sodium hydroxide ona scale compatible with destruction of the current U.S.CW stockpile. Approximately 8.4 million pounds ofGB-taken from underground storage tanks, GB toncontainers, M139 bomblets (Honest John Warhead), M34cluster bombs, M55 rockets, and 155/105-mm projectiles,were neutralized at Rocky Mountain Arsenal from 1974to 1976 and at CAMDS between 1979 and 1982. Byweight, this represents 17 percent of the 25,000 tons ofagent to be destroyed in the current program.

GB is stable at neutral pH but is hydrolyzed rapidly atalkaline pH. The half-life of GB at 300 C in aqueoussolution is 146 hours at pH 7 (neutral conditions) butdecreases to 0.4 hour at pH 9 (alkaline conditions) (l).Presumably at higher pH and temperature, the hydrolysisrate would be even more rapid. The suggestion has beenmade that the addition of a catalyst could speed up thishydrolysis reaction even more (2).

As part of the Army’s program, after GB neutralizationwas determined to be complete, the resulting brine wasevaporated by spray drying and the salts were packed intodrums for disposal. There were some problems with thespray-drying process, including the possibility that GBmight re-form under certain conditions. This re-formationcould be successfully avoided by adjusting the pH andbrine flow rate, and by reducing the operating temperature(l).

Difficulties were also encountered in confirming thatthe brine was agent-free. Particularly at the CAMDS

facility, minute quantities of agent were detected in thebrine. At Rocky Mountain Arsenal the neutralizationbrine was considered agent-free if a 5 percent excesssodium hydroxide level was achieved. At CAMDS a morestrict criterion was used of less than 20 parts per billion(ppb) agent (the Army’s soldier drinking water standard).Difficulties in certifying this level of destruction atCAMDS may have come from occlusion of GB in rust orother particulate, formation of GB during analysis, orfalse positives resulting from some unidentified interfer-ence in the complex neutralization mixture (l). Agentemissions at the facility during brine spraying at RockyMountain Arsenal often exceeded the action level (0.0003milligram per cubic meter (mg/m3)) and occasionally theshutdown level (0.003 mg/m3). These levels were promul-gated by the Department of Health and Human Services(DHHS) and the Army’s Surgeon General. However,perimeter monitors showed that the emission standard forthe general population was not exceeded (l).

After being drained of GB, the empty munition bodieswere moved to a deactivation furnace where explosivesand propellants were incinerated and metal parts ther-mally decontaminated, i.e., incinerated. Empty ton con-tainers were similarly incinerated in separate furnaces.Thus, “chemical neutralization” actually applied only tothe drained agent and treatment of the remaining wastedepended on incineration. However, disposal of the M34cluster bomblets and ton containers used a caustic(aqueous sodium hydroxide) wash to treat the drainedcontainer by neutralizing any residual agent. For somereason—possibly a lack of confidence in the efficacy ofthis process-the caustic wash treatment was also fol-lowed by thermal decontamination (incineration).

From 1979 to 1981,13,951 M55 rockets containing GB(2.9 percent of the current M55 rocket stockpile) weredestroyed by this combined chemical neutralization/incineration process (l). The Army also reported prob-lems with re-formation of GB during the brine dryingprocess, although it is not clear why the corrective actionsdescribed above were not applied to solve the problem inthis instance. The reaction was also reported to take longerthan expected. Adding excess sodium hydroxide toaccelerate the reaction created a larger amount of salt fordisposal. Given the intrinsically rapid hydrolysis rate ofGB under alkaline conditions (corresponding to a shorthalf life), the apparent slow reaction encountered in thissituation may have been due to problems associated withthe large scale of the demonstration such as complete andthorough mixing of the organic material with the aqueoussodium hydroxide.

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Although the agent VX, which is structurally similar toGB, can also be chemically neutralized, this was neverdemonstrated by the Army on a large scale. Acidchlorinolysis (chlorination in an aqueous acidic mediumfollowed by caustic neutralization) rather than alkalinehydrolysis was suggested by the Army as the best methodfor chemical destruction of VX (l). However, VX wasshown to be neutralized on a small scale by hydrolysiswith sodium hydroxide. The problems encountered withthe neutralization of GB led the Army to abandon plansto test the large-scale neutralization of VX. The Armyindicated that a poor water volubility, mixing problems,and the presence of a “bis” impurity (with unspecifiedsusceptibility to alkaline hydrolysis) made alkaline hy-drolysis of VX difficult (l). As with GB, neutralizationwas apparently intended only for the liquid chemicalagent. Incineration was to be used for destruction of theexplosives and propellant components, and for thermaldecontamination of munition cavities and metal parts. Inaddition, lack of a reliable low-level monitoring capabil-ity for VX in the neutralization brine at the time of theArmy’s research program led it to conclude that DHHSwould never approve chemical hydrolysis (l).

Chemical Neutralization of Mustard AgentsMustard agent has also been shown in the Army’s

research to be hydrolyzed under alkaline conditions on asmall scale, although only slowly at ambient temperature.The corresponding reaction rates with alkaline hydrolysisat elevated temperature were not reported. The productsof mustard hydrolysis with sodium hydroxide were notidentified and their toxicities were not assessed. Alkalinehydrolysis of mustard agents on a pilot-plant scale wasreported, using the base monomethanolamine instead ofsodium hydroxide, to produce a homogeneous nontoxicorganic waste. Calcium hypochlorite slurry or aqueousbleach (sodium hypochlorite) was used to oxidize ratherthan hydrolyze mustard agents, but there was “uncer-tainty about the completeness of the reaction” (l).

Summary of the Army’s NeutralizationProcess Experience

In the Army’s summary of its experience with chemicalneutralization, the following reasons were given forabandoning the process in favor of incineration (l):

1.

2.

The perceived complexity of neutralization com-pared to incineration. Caustic reactants used forchemical neutralization had to be handled safely inbulk quantities. However, many industrial large-scale processes routinely use such caustic agents,e.g., the manufacture of soap, The major safety issuein handling chemical weapons will always be theagents themselves.The sensitivity of neutralization to a number ofvariables that could slow the reaction and possibly

3.

4.

5.

lead to re-formation of the agent. In some situa-tions, the rate of neutralization in large-scale tests ofchemical agents was much slower than had beenpredicted. Very large amounts of impurities incertain grades of mustard agent also made neutrali-zation difficult to monitor adequately. However, itis not clear that the problems encountered with‘‘industrial scale-up” of chemical neutralization areinsurmountable, and the scale of a chemical neutral-ization program is similar to or smaller than that ofindustrial large-scale processes.The quantity and nature of the waste produced byneutralization are more problematic than thoseproduced by incineration. Calculations by the Armyindicated that 1 pound of GB will produce 1.5pounds of salt, compared to a salt yield of 1.4pounds from incineration. In practice, the excesscaustic added to speed up the reaction led to 2.6pounds at Rocky Mountain and 3 to 6 pounds atCAMDS of salt per pound of agent hydrolyzed. TheArmy speculated that the sometimes heterogeneousform of some agents (partially gelled, mixed withsolid particles such as rust) may have contributed tothe variation in results obtained with chemicalneutralization. These types of technical problemsencountered in the transformation of industrialprocesses from bench-scale demonstrations may notbe insurmountable given sufficient motivation toreach a solution. Also, it has been argued thatproducing larger amounts of salts from neutraliza-tion may be relatively more acceptable than some ofthe perceived problems of incineration, such as theformation of dioxins.The capital and operating costs of chemical neutral-ization were estimated to be higher than those ofincineration (1). This cost comparison might haveto be considerably revised now in light of theunanticipated cost increases in the Army’s inciner-ation program, which are due in part to technicalproblems encountered by the Army after 1987 (3).The analytical problems encountered in certifyingthat the waste materials of chemical neutralizationwere agent-free. This must be compared to theanalytical problems faced in demonstrating thatincineration products of incomplete combustion(PICs) are dioxin or agent-free, etc.

After reviewing the Army’s experience with chemicalneutralization and incineration of chemical weapons, theNRC in 1984 supported the Army’s decision to abandonchemical neutralization in favor of incineration. In light ofthe current political opposition to incineration, and afterconsiderably more experience with this technology, it isnot clear that the same endorsement would be made today.In principle, with appropriate conditions, alkaline hy-drolysis could be a means to chemically neutralize theCW agents GB, VX, and mustards. Problems encountered

Appendix A-Selected Chemical Weapon Destruction Techniques ● 33

with alkaline hydrolysis of all types of CW agents mighttoday appear to be surmountable in view of newtechniques as well as increased pressure to exploitexisting techniques for use with CW destruction. TheNRC’s Committee on Review and Evaluation of theArmy Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and Com-mittee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Tech-nologies, were recently requested by the Army toreevaluate incineration and alternatives for CW disposal.

SUPERCRITICAL WATEROXIDATION

Supercritical water refers to water that has been heatedand pressurized to a transition point between gas andliquid phases, and thus has some of the properties of both.In the supercritical phase the solvent properties of waterchange, and organic materials becomes soluble, whereasinorganic salts become insoluble and tend to precipitate(4). Organic materials in solution with supercritical watercan be oxidized by oxygen introduced from air. This is abroad-spectrum oxidation procedure for organic com-pounds, and at elevated temperature (4000 C), evenrefractory compounds such as coal are oxidized (5).Supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) is similar toincineration in that it involves oxidation of organiccompounds to carbon dioxide and inorganic acids or salts.However, SCWO operates at much lower temperaturesthan incineration. SCWO is under commercial develop-ment as a general technology for the destruction of manydifferent organic hazardous materials, and the destructionof CW agents would at most constitute only a smallportion of its use.

SCWO may have certain advantages over incinerationfor the oxidation of organic waste. Compared to inciner-ation, SCWO has no requirement for a large airflow.SCWO carries out oxidation at lower temperature, and thereaction medium (water) can be contained until it is testedto be safe. A major selling point of this technology is thatpotential PICs are entrained in solution rather thanemitted in stack gases. The apparently superior control ofemissions is an attractive feature of SCWO technology.The effluents from SCWO, in contrast to exhaust stackgases from incineration, may be collected, analyzed, andeven recycled to achieve more complete destruction.

In discussions with Modell Corp. and General Atomics,two companies that are involved in the development ofSCWO for CW agent destruction, it was apparent thatcurrently there are both advantages and limitations withthis technology. Modell has completed the initial phase ofa research program on the use of SCWO for the treatmentof CW agents (5). It has successfully demonstrated for theDefense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA)the destruction of “simulants” (analogs) of GB, VX, andHB on a bench scale. Modell achieved “destruction and

removal efficiencies” (DREs) of 99.99999 percent andhas proposed, but not begun, a demonstration of thetechnology for DARPA with actual agents. AlthoughModell has not yet worked with actual CW agents, it hasdemonstrated the oxidation of some explosive materialssuch as the effluent from TNT manufacture (’red water’).

The formation and environmental release of dioxin, aconcern in the incineration of organic materials, may notbe significant for SCWO. Modell has demonstrated thatthe dioxin congener (TCDD) was oxidized to belowdetectable levels when introduced at 500 parts per million(ppm). The Modell technology has also been demon-strated to work for the destruction of dioxin in pulp millwaste streams. Wood, when suitably pulverized andconverted to a flowable form, can also be treated.

Gaseous effluents from SCWO are carbon dioxide andoxygen with traces of carbon monoxide (10 to 15 ppmwith optimized operation). In Modell’s process, theseeffluent gases are expanded and cooled; the carbondioxide is solidified and removed, and the oxygen isrecycled through the system. This process might beconsidered a “closed” system in comparison withincineration. Oxidation of organic materials containinghetero atoms such as fluorine, chlorine, sulfur, orphosphorus produces the corresponding hydrofluoric,hydrochloric, sulfuric, and phosphoric mineral acids insolution. These can be neutralized, precipitated from theSCWO reactor water solution, and removed from theSCWO reaction vessel.

Although Modell believes that its SCWO technologycould be developed for the Army’s CW destructionprogram, it has been unable to interest the Army in thiswork. From Modell’s perspective, the Army’s commit-ment to incineration technology has led it to dismissviable alternatives such as SCWO. On the other hand, theU.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has apparently ex-pressed an interest in using the technology to treatradioactive mixed waste. In general, Modell considersthat the greatest commercial opportunities and market forthis technology are not in CW destruction but in otherareas of organic waste disposal. The Modell Corp. iscurrently operating a bench-scale SCWO facility with acapacity of 30 gallons per day and hopes soon to constructan SCWO facility in Germany with a capacity of 5 to 10tons a day. Modell estimates a cost of $200 per ton forsludge disposal.

General Atomics’ (GA) engineers who are involvedwith SCWO development are considerably more cautiousabout the future uses of this technology for hazardouswaste and CW agent disposal (6). Although a wide rangeof organic compounds have been shown by GA to beoxidized by SCWO technology on a bench scale, it hasnever been demonstrated with actual CW agents. GA iscurrently under contract to DARPA and the Office of


Naval Research to perform the necessary research andbuild a prototype SCWO system that would be capable ofprocessing relatively small amounts of chemical agents,propellants, and other U.S. Department of Defensewastes. SCWO as it is presently conceived is not designedto handle solid CW agent disposal waste forms such asdrained munitions or dunnage. The research program,which will be conducted with support from the Universityof Texas, the IIT Research Institute (Chicago, Illinois),and EcoWaste Technologies (Austin, Texas), will ini-tially focus on two areas of importance-corrosion andsolids handling. Corrosion with SCWO is a significantissue especially because of the mineral acids formed fromthe oxidation of compounds containing fluorine, chlorine,sulfur, and phosphorus hetero atoms. The handling ofsolids, such as the salts formed and precipitated duringSCWO, will require careful attention because suchinorganic salts can become sticky under SCWO condi-tions and could foul the walls of the reactor.

The DARPA contract calls for a 15-month researchphase to address these and other issues and to developdata, initially on simulants and then on actual CW agents.Concurrently, a 3+-year pilot-plant development effort isplanned to lead to the construction and testing of aprototype SCWO unit with a capacity of 1,000 to 1,500gallons per day. Full demonstration of the practicalapplication of this technology to CW agent destruction istherefore estimated by GA to be more than 3 years away.

In discussing the likely success of this application ofSCWO, GA tended to be cautious and to emphasize theneed for the data that will be developed during theresearch phase of this work

GA considers the recent bilateral, as well as current andfuture multilateral, agreements on CW destruction andnonproliferation to be an ideal opportunity for SCWOtechnology. For example, the United Nations has an-nounced its intention to destroy the Iraqi CW stockpile,which is considerably smaller than that of the UnitedStates. Use of mobile SCWO-based machines for destruc-tion of this type of small stockpile could be an idealapplication. Unfortunately, the technology may not bedeveloped in time to be applicable to this particularsituation.

STEAM GASIFICATIONTECHNOLOGY

A process known as steam gasification (re-forming)treats organic materials with steam at 1,000 to 1,300 ‘Cunder reducing conditions to produce carbon monoxide,carbon dioxide, and hydrogen (7). The steam/organicmaterials stream is recirculated through the high tempera-ture reactor to control destruction efficiency. The carbonmonoxide and hydrogen can be reacted over a suitablecatalyst to form either methanol or carbon dioxide and

water. Since steam gasification is a reducing processrather than an oxidation process such as incineration PICSwill not be formed. This reaction is a temperature-controlled equilibrium process so, in principle, any levelof destruction may be achieved by selecting an appropri-ate temperature.

The current developer is interested in testing its steamgasification system for CW destruction. It has demon-strated the device with CW simulants but not with actualCW agents. The machine is designed to handle bulkobjects, including 55-gallon drums filled with waste, andmay therefore be suitable for handling properly preparedmunitions and CW containers. Drummed wastes aregasified in the drums, one drum at a time, by placing eachdrum in a chamber operated at 300 to 700 ‘C. In its currentform, halogens are removed from organic materials bypretreatment with alkali, and the remaining dehaloge-nated organic material is destroyed by steam gasification.Sulfur- and phosphorus-containing materials are con-verted to salts of their reduced forms hydrogen sulfide andphosphine. In contrast to conventional incineration, steamgasification does not use an airflow so the gas flow outputto the environment is minimized.

The developer is offering a “premarket” machine forcustomer evaluation. The machine is approximately 5 by6 by 7 feet and costs about $700,000 when supplied witha drum feeder and flash vaporizer. The company isalready working on chemical waste disposal problems forDOE, such as destruction of chlorinated solvents andorganic wastes from weapons dismantlement, that do notinvolve chemical weapons. It has proposed a system thatwould use one or more mobile steam gasification devicesdirectly in a CW storage igloo or on a truck positionednext to the igloo. In this concept, a modified version of theArmy’s current M55 rocket shearing system could becoupled to the drum feeder. Passage of hot steam aroundand through the sheared, drained munition would decon-taminate the empty shell. This configuration would havethe advantage of avoiding the risk associated withtransporting CWs from the igloo to a larger stationarydestruction device.

The developer is currently negotiating a contract todestroy napalm bombs located at Camp Pendleton,California, by use of steam gasification. These napalmbombs consist of a 15-foot-long aluminum containerfilled with napalm and an explosive. The company plansto modify its device to contain an entire bomb during thesteam gasification destruction process.

PLASMA ARC TECHNOLOGYA newly developed Plasma Arc Technology System

can process nearly 10 pounds per minute of solid waste or55 gallons per hour of liquid waste (4). The developer iscurrently testing plasma arc pyrolysis (PAP) technology,

Appendix A-Selected Chemical Weapon Destruction Techniques ● 35

although it has not specifically tested the system with CWagents. After waste has been atomized in the plasmapyrolysis chamber the resulting elements are cooled in asecond portion of the chamber and recombine to formhydrogen, carbon monoxide, and hydrochloric acid. Suchplasmas can reach temperatures of 5,000 to 15,0000 C.The resulting gases are passed through a wet causticscrubber for removal of particulate and hydrochloricacid. The remaining gases are combusted with air. Theentire system fits on a 45-foot-long transportable tractor-trailer bed.

The most significant limitation of PAP treatment is thatonly liquids can be treated. Contaminated soil and viscousmaterials cannot be processed by the system (4). ThusPAP technology in its current form would not be suitablefor the treatment of contaminated drained munitions,containers, explosives, or propellants, and the dunnageassociated with chemical weapons.

Appendix A References1. U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Agent and

Munition Disposal; Summary of the U.S. Army’sExperience,” Office of the Program Manager for

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen ProvingGround, MD, September 1987.Picardi, A., International Environmental AssessmentGroup, Alexandria, VA, “Alternative Technologiesfor the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: AnInformation Document,” prepared for GreenpeaceInternational, Washington, DC, May 1991.U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, StockpileDestruction Delayed at the Army’s Prototype DisposalFacility, GAO/NSIAD-90-222 (Washington, DC: July1990).U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,Dioxin Treatment Technologies-Background Paper,OTA-BP-O-93 (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, November 1991).Modell, M., Modell Development Corp., Framing-ham, MA, personal communication, Nov. 14, 1991.Davison, W., Director, Advanced Processing Systems,General Atomics, San Diego, CA, personal communi-cation, Nov. 19, 1991.Galloway, T., Synthetic Technologies Inc.,Richmond, CA, and Sprung, J. L., Sandia NationalLaboratories, Albuquerque, NM, personal communi-cation, Dec. 20, 1991.

Appendix B

U.S. Army Risk Assessment for Off-Site Transportationof Chemical Weapons

In 1987a risk assessment on transportation alternativeswas conducted by the Mitre Corp. to support the Army’s1988 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement(PEIS) (1, 2). It was intended to give a consistent andquantitative comparison of the risks of accidental chemi-cal agent exposure to the public during on-site disposalversus various regional or national transportation anddisposal alternatives. The analysis assumed that disas-sembly and incineration would be used with any of thetransportation alternatives considered, so that the alterna-tives consisted only of variations on the logistics ofchemical weapons (CW) transportation and the locationof disposal facilities. However, many of the conclusionsabout transportation alternatives, and details about spe-cific storage sites, were independent of the method of CWdestruction. The analysis is unique in that it systemati-cally examined and compared risks associated withcertain CW transportation options, some of which are stillbeing seriously discussed. Therefore a review of thisdocument is relevant to a consideration of new alterna-tives.

In the Mitre analysis, risk was specifically defined asrisk to the public (individuals outside the boundaries ofthe military installation) at the proposed disposal sites oralong potential transportation corridors. Risks to personsinvolved in operating and maintaining the facilities werenot considered. Only accidents that could result in agentrelease at potentially lethal concentrations were consid-ered. Risks from chronic effects of long-term, low-levelexposure to CW agents, or to materials released duringCW incineration, were not included. This present reviewfocuses on the assumptions and conclusions of Mitre’srisk assessment and not with the risk assessment method-ology.

Five alternatives were evaluated in the Mitre report andin the 1988 PEIS:

1.

2.

On-site disposal. Chemical weapons would bedestroyed at their current locations. Risk wasassumed to come from handling, on-site transport,and plant operations.

Regional disposal. Chemical weapons stored in theeastern United States would be shipped by rail toAnniston Army Depot (Alabama), while those inthe western United States would be shipped toTooele Army Depot (Utah). Risk was assumed tocome from the same activities as on-site disposal,with additional risks from handling and off-sitetransport.

3.

4.

5.

National disposal. All chemical weapons in thecontinental United States would be shipped by railto Tooele Army Depot. Risk was assumed to comefrom the same activities as on-site disposal, withadditional risks from handling and off-site trans-port.Partial relocation. On-site CW disposal would beused at most sites, but the stockpile from AberdeenProving Ground (Maryland) and Lexington-BlueGrass Army Depot (Kentucky) would be relocatedby air transport to Tooele.‘‘No-action’ alternative. Chemical weapons wouldbe stored at their current locations for-at least 25years. Risk was assumed to come from relativelyrare catastrophic events such as tornadoes orairplane crashes. Although the probability of suchaccidents is low, the consequences would be great,and the risk extends over a relatively longer time.Risk would also come from normal monitoring andhandling operations of the CW stockpile, includingthe processing of leaking munitions.

Risk was measured exclusively in terms of acute effectsas the following:

●

●

●

e

●

●

●

●

Maximum individual risk;Maximum lethal plume distance, or minimum dis-tance of an individual from a given site or transporta-tion corridor with no risk of lethal exposure;Maximum total time at risk for an individual;Probability of one or more fatalities;Maximum number of fatalities;Expected fatalities;Total person-years at risk andExpected plume area (used in the study as a surrogatefor overall ecological impact).

Comparative risk assessments based on the abovecriteria were done both on the entire CW disposalprogram, along with site-specific assessments for theeight individual sites.

Events identified by the risk assessment process thatmight potentially lead to accidents involving release ofand exposure to CW agents could often be mitigated orreduced through design and procedural changes. Riskswere analyzed for the unmitigated case and again afterappropriate mitigation. Mitigation strategies included:using foam or other materials for rapid spill cleanup,battery-powered lifting devices, blunt bumpers on lifttruck tines, improved mobile fire control systems, seismicactuated gas cutoff valves in the munition demilitarization

–36-

Appendix B-U.S. Army Risk Assessment for Off-Site Transportation of Chemical Weapons ● 37

buildings, metal shields at the explosive containmententry and seismically actuated warehouse circuit break-ers, changing the munition unpacking area to preventmines and rockets from being inadvertently conveyed tothe dunnage furnace, freezing mustard ton containers fortransportation, and restricting airspace at all sites andeliminating military helicopter flights. The followingdiscussion of the Mitre report emphasizes the conclusionsabout risk assessments with all appropriate mitigationsteps in effect.

Uncertainty in these risk assessments was assumed tocome from uncertainty in the estimated probability that anaccident would take place, not uncertainty about theconsequence of an accident or about estimates of popula-tion density, atmospheric conditions, and dose response.

PROGRAMMATIC RISKCOMPARISONS (RISK

COMBINING ALL SITES)With mitigation, on-site disposal had the lowest

probability of causing one or more fatalities, whereasregional relocation, continued storage, national relo-cation, and partial relocation with disposal alternativeshad 5, 7, 10, and 11 times greater probability of one ormore fatalities, respectively. Regional disposal, partialrelocation, and national disposal alternatives had, respec-tively, 10-, 26-, and 30-fold greater expected fatalitiesthan on-site disposal. Even with mitigation, the continuedstorage alternative had the greatest number of expectedfatalities and on-site destruction the least. This resultedlargely because the estimated risk from continued storageoccurred over a relatively long period (25 years) and camefrom rare catastrophic events that would have relativelylarge consequences. With mitigation, on-site disposal hadthe lowest probability of causing one or more fatalitiesand partial relocation had the highest. Mitigation did notchange the number of maximum possible fatalities. As inthe unmitigated case, continued storage had significantlygreater expected fatalities than all other alternatives. Withmitigation, on-site disposal was significantly less riskythan any other alternative considered.

For the continued storage with mitigation programmaticalternative, 99 percent of the expected fatalities wereassociated with CW storage, and the risk associated withhandling and stockpile movement for maintenance andsurveillance accounted for the remaining 1 percent.Accidents with bulk containers accounted for 99 percentof the expected fatalities. For the programmatic on-sitedisposal alternative with mitigation, on-site transporta-tion activities accounted for 44 percent of expectedfatalities, and plant operations for 48 percent. The M55rockets in the CW stockpile accounted for 50 percent andbulk containers 42 percent of expected fatalities.

For the partial relocation alternative without mitigation(which calls for air transport of the CW stockpile from theAberdeen (Maryland) and Lexington-Blue Grass (Ken-tucky) facilities to Tooele (Utah) using C141 airplanes),accidents involving rockets contributed 77 percent andin-flight air accidents along the transportation corridoraccounted for 46 percent of the total risk Accidents withthe highest consequence were considered to occur duringaircraft takeoff involving rockets and projectiles con-taining GB. Mitigation reduced the probability of one ormore fatalities approximately threefold, although ex-pected fatalities were not significantly decreased. Mitiga-tion had the largest effect on reducing risk from plantoperations.

SITE-SPECIFIC RISKCOMPARISONS

The conclusions reached about programmatic risks forthe combined eight sites described above were oftendifferent from the conclusions reached by site-specificrisk analysis. For example, the risk from continuedstorage with mitigation was much lower at Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot than at the seven other U.S. sites.Although the risk associated with continued storage withmitigation clearly was greater than on-site disposal withmitigation at the sites in Aberdeen, Maryland; Newport,Indiana; Pueblo, Colorado; Tooele, Utah; and Umatilla,Oregon, this was not the case with Lexington-Blue Grassand Pine Bluff (Arkansas) facilities.

Major differences were reported in the distribution ofrisk among populations at the eight continental U.S. sites,in terms of expected fatalities. For the continued storageoption with mitigation, the total program risk is mostlyfrom potential accidents involving the CW stockpiles atthe Newport Army, Aberdeen Proving Ground, andUmatilla depots. The risk of continued storage withmitigation at the other five sites contributes little to theoverall programmatic risk. For on-site disposal withmitigation, 75 percent of the total program risk is borneapproximately equally by the Army depots in Pueblo,Colorado, and Newport, Indiana.

For the regional disposal alternative with mitigation, 75percent of the total program risk is borne by populationsalong transportation corridors. For the national disposalsite alternative with mitigation, 98 percent of the total riskis borne by the population along the transportationcorridor. An intuitive understanding of these relative risksmay explain why transportation alternatives are morepopular with people living near existing stockpile sites.

The total program risk from on-site versus regionaldisposal was not statistically distinguishable (3). Otherfactors entered into the Army’s decision to select on-site,rather than regional, disposal. The Army argued that theresults showing a lack of significant difference in risk


associated with these two programmatic alternatives didnot consider the location and mitigation of possibleaccidents. A qualitative consideration of this risk factor 2.led to the conclusion that any option that involvestransportation of chemical weapons off-site is more risky(3).

Appendix B References1. U.S. Department of the Army, “Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program Final Programmatic EnvironmentalImpact Statement,” vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program

3.

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, 1988.

Mitre Corp., McLean, VA, “Risk Analysis Supportingthe Chemical Stockpile Disposal program (CSDP),”prepared for the Office of the Program Manager forChemical Demilitarization, U.S. Army, AberdeenProving Ground, MD, December 1987.

Azuma, E., Office of the Assistant Secretary of theArmy, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, briefing at theOffice of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC,Oct. 18, 1991.

Appendix C

Summary of the Chemical Weapons Workshop

To investigate the feasibility of developing alternativetechnologies and approaches to chemical weapons (CW)destruction, OTA conducted a l-day workshop on Febru-ary 24, 1992. The workshop explored approaches toimplementing such a development program if that policywas adopted. The participants were selected from privateand public institutions with background and experience inresearch, development, and demonstration of innovativetechnologies in the fields of both waste treatment andchemical processing. The agenda was set to first givesome history of the current program, to discuss the keyobstacles to implementing the technology now under test,and then to discuss ideas for the creation of an alternative,and possibly concurrent, plan.

It was noted that public acceptance problems areseriously affecting the U.S. Government’s ability toefficiently and effectively establish incineration facilitiesat the eight sites and successfully destroy the stockpile ofobsolete weapons as directed by treaties and domesticlaws. Until these problems are overcome, it is likely thatdelays will continue and added costs will mount. Somebelieve that the public acceptance problem, in particular,will prevent incineration facilities from being built andoperated in the foreseeable future at some, if not most, ofthe depot locations.

OTA staff had concluded and the workshop partici-pants agreed, that none of the alternatives to the currentArmy program, that have been proposed by variousindividuals or groups, could be expected to be availablesoon for destruction of the weapons stockpile. Rather,each is in some early stage of development where it mustundergo substantial integration with a larger system andtesting or field demonstrations before it could be consid-ered acceptable. Further, the process for supporting thedevelopment and testing of alternative technologies andsystems is limited. While some firms and individuals haveproposed alternative technologies that are promising,none have been tested with actual chemical agent andmost only address a part of the total weapons destructionsystem (usually the treatment of the agent itself) and thusmust be considered as only part of the total solution.

Because any alternative technology would need to befurther developed and tested, the workshop participantsdiscussed how a development program should be struc-tured, how certain promising technologies might beselected for further development, what criteria would beselected for judging the acceptability of new technologies,what other factors need to be considered, and what timeand resources would be required. The following is asummary of the points made during these discussions.

An important conclusion of the workshop was that,even though a technology (namely, incineration) may beviewed by the government as the “technically best” or“most available” (or even, as in this case, the “onlyavailable’ ‘), it may nonetheless be necessary to developalternative technologies for possible use at some of thesites because some of the communities will not accept thechosen solution. Even though current deadlines estab-lished by law and government policy may, in principle,not allow enough time to develop alternatives, much moretime is likely to be available when public oppositiondelays the implementation of the current technical ap-proach. However, workshop participants noted, it’s im-portant that the government doesn’t make the samemistakes in developing alternative technologies as it didin picking the current one. That is, it mustn’t be done ina process closed to the stakeholders and interested parties.Thus the process of developing a possible alternativetechnology will be as important as the pure technicalsolution itself. The process must involve the public earlyand continuously and must provide for meaningful publicinput to the decisions that are made.

Congressional concerns about the current program andits chances for success were discussed by workshopparticipants. Four committees in Congress have authorityover the Army’s Chemical Demilitarization program:Senate and House Committees on Appropriations (Sub-committee on Defense), and the Senate and HouseCommittees on Armed Services. These committees do notall agree about the proper direction of this program, but itscost is becoming an increasingly important issue to all.Some feel that the eight sites where incinerators areplanned are somewhat politically isolated-’ ‘them againstthe world. ’

Implementation of an alternative technology developmentprogram may require a new, neutral institution other thanthe Army to administer it. Some participants believed thata location should be designated, probably by Congress,where new, competing technologies could be tried. Anexample might be to use a portion of the Johnston Atollchemical Agent Disposal System facilities at JohnstonIsland, although the possibility of site contamination withagent would have to be evaluated. This facility is alreadydesigned to handle the CW munitions and agents.

National Research Council (NRC) activity was alsodiscussed at the workshop. The NRC has a Committee onAlternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies, underthe Board on Army Science and Technology, chaired byJohn Longwell (MIT) and Gene Dyer (Bechtel). Thecommittee plans to review all proposals for alternativetechnologies and to identify the most promising ap-

–39–


preaches. It will ask the scientific and commercialcommunity to come forward and present their ideas. Thecommittee will characterize the alternatives, enumeratingtheir strengths, weaknesses, potential advantages anddisadvantages, and needed research. It is possible thatthese NRC committee activities will become beginningsteps of new national alternatives for CW destructionprogram, even though this is not the intention now. TheNRC expects to develop a data bank to which others willhave access. The OTA workshop participants suggestedthat the NRC also deal with the key issues of publicparticipation in its work. However, its position as a purelyscientific body may make this difficult.

The NRC committee considers that an alternativetechnology must have application to one or more of thefour process streams currently used to destroy agent andmunitions. Considering the sites, and the nature of thechemical stockpile located therein, it’s possible that oneor more alternatives (in combination) could apply.Whatever the case, a total working system is required inthe end, and the system eventually developed must be theresult of a series of reevaluations and corrections.Workshop participants agreed that only after integrationand conceptual system design is done will it be possibleto compare the merits of alternatives to the current system.It is very difficult, as well, to compare technologies thatare in early stages of development. Usually more design,testing, and evaluation work is needed before validcomparisons are made and NRC does not have theresources to do this.

During discussions of public participation and alterna-tive technology criteria, workshop participants agreedthat different solutions may be appropriate for differentsites or different weapons. The Army and concernedcitizens would need to work together on establishingsite-specific solutions if that approach was followed. Suchpublic participation is crucial to acceptance of a solution:merely an explanation of risk to the public is generallyineffective. Participants all stated that the development ofa new technology is more than just a technical problem,and the nontechnical community must be involved in asuccessful program.

A common nontechnical community position is that thetechnical community does not have the right to imposeany risks on the affected public. The problem is that theU.S. public is unwilling to accept any risk that they did notconsent to. The criteria for a new technology are onlypartially technical, and also involve managerial, legal, andother nontechnical aspects that all must be addressed fora successful program. A critical point is that the develop-ers of the new technology need a very clear concept of theneeds and concerns of the people who will be affected bythe new technology. Workshop participants felt thecurrent Army program lacks this concept.

Workshop discussions led to the conclusion thatwithout local involvement most projects involving ‘wastedisposal” are likely to be vehemently opposed. However,this may or may not change with community involve-ment. In addition, the agenda of national groups may bedifferent than that of local groups and probably should behandled differently. With regard to the Army’s CWdestruction program, most believed that alternativesshould be developed—the only question is how. TheNation’s ability to carry this out will reflect on its abilityto function as a technical society in the next century.

Workshop participants also discussed the role ofcontractors. Contractors are a key interested party thatshould be involved in planning the development of newtechnologies. Contractors also have their own agendasand preferences. The contractor community also needs toknow, and factor in, the political realities, i.e., generalunpopularity of incinerators. Although the CW disposalprogram will require oversight from government agen-cies, the design and implementation will probably comefrom private industry. The Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) is developing a computer database onavailable vendors and technology for alternative technol-ogy development in a number of waste treatment areas.Most believe that we need some model on how tocommercialize a technology in order to move ahead in thisfield.

Some workshop discussion focused on the fact thatgood ideas from small companies often have a difficulttime penetrating the Federal procurement system. Thesecompanies will need assistance to do this effectively. Thesmall developers of new technologies typically haveannual revenues of a few million dollars and are notcapable of financing major development and testing.Small companies are often willing to try new solutions forrelatively very small amounts of money. However, smallcompanies often lack a necessary understanding of thewhole system. A second concern of small companies istheir need to protect ownership of new, innovative ideasthat they consider proprietary.

A suggested model by some workshop participants wasto offer a national prize for the best solution to thisproblem. This would not necessarily be to invent a totallynew process but rather to work out the technical details ofcurrently available techniques. It could have the effect ofturning loose competent engineers to work on theproblem. Possibly it could be a joint project withunemployed Soviet scientists. A disadvantage to this ideais that small companies may not be able to participate aswell as large ones.

The university consortia concept was another sugges-tion discussed as a mechanism to develop alternatives.EPA has developed such consortia with five universitiesreceiving $5 million over 5 years. EPA feels that the

Appendix C-Summary of the Chemical Weapons Workshop ● 41

universities are bringing new ideas to the stage ofbench-scale testing in about 3 years.

Workshop discussion of regulatory issues affecting theimplementation of a new technology concluded that theseissues should be anticipated at the earliest stage, ratherthan waiting until the last minute to worry about them.Many development programs do not include regulatoryissues until they are ready for field trials, and then projectsare surprised by the delays they encountered. Someregulations are developed purely as a means to thwart anunpopular technology. It would be worthwhile to learnfrom the Army’s experience about the regulatory issues ithas had to deal with in its current program. In the end,regulatory issues can make or break a technology.

A key criterion for the development of new technolo-gies is meeting appropriate standards. This will apply tolevels in air, liquids, and solids. Different alternativetechnologies will require different disposal criteria. Forexample, certain processes may provide less decontami-nation for CW containers and it will be necessary tounderstand how to integrate regulatory standards early inthe development process.

Substantial workshop discussion focused on timeconstraints for the Army’s Chemical Weapons Demilita-rization Program. The time issue is critical in alternativetechnology development planning. One approach to analternative program could be to try and find mid-termcorrections for the Army’s current system, e.g., replacingsome or all of the incinerators with some other method butkeeping everything else. Another would be to start overwith an entirely new system. The impact on the Army’scurrent program clearly will be quite different with thesetwo approaches. A sense of time constraints will alsodictate where a new program can begin. For example, iflots of time is available then a new program could affordto begin in the laboratory; if less time is available then anew program would probably be forced to consider onlyexisting bench-scale technologies or technologies alreadytested in related areas. In addition, it maybe premature totry and be definitive in estimating the time required forsuccessful completion of the Army’s current program.Technical and regulatory hurdles faced by the programmay delay it more than what has been estimated.Replacing incineration with some other CW agent treat-ment technology at this point could be considered bysome a ‘‘mid-term’ modification.

Most workshop participants agreed that a clear analysisof time constraints is required. This should include ananalysis of the costs of delay, the risks of delaying, thedegree of uncertainty and other factors, and how toevaluate them.

Workshop discussions explored examples of anal-ogous alternative technology programs. After the Valdezoil spill in Alaska, bioremediation companies saw the

situation as a golden opportunity. One workshop partici-pant explained the recent experience of the NationalEnvironmental Technology Applications Corp. (NETAC,see box l-D), which served as an evaluator for EPA andalso put together a national committee that establishedtechnical and nontechnical criteria to evaluate hundreds ofsuggestions. This process narrowed the field to twoalternatives that were eventually tested in the field. Thetests involved importation of bacteria not indigenous toAlaska, despite the concerns of Alaska citizens. This wasaccomplished by incorporating public participation in thedecisionmaking process and explaining the relevanttechnology to the public. A key to the success of thisprogram was to initially develop a set of seven key criteriawith public involvement for the evaluation of suggestedtechnologies.

Another example given by a workshop participant wasthe alternative fuels development program, e.g., oil shaleconversion. This is an example of a new technology thatstarted from scratch. The Synthetic Fuels Demonstrationprogram eventually produced six major demonstrationprojects, but the program eventually failed for financialreasons when the price of oil went down. Shale oil wouldhave been competitive only if oil prices continued to goup, which they didn’t. The lesson of this example is thata powerful national interest can significantly accelerate aprogram.

Discussions also included some history of incinerationin the United States. Incineration was initially perceivedas a panacea for waste treatment. As instrumentation gotbetter and real experience was gained, unanticipatedproblems with incineration were discovered. A similarprogression may be occurring today with bioremediation,which initially looked as a promising, benign method forhandling waste. Today, people are beginning to ask aboutpotential hazards from intermediates and byproducts ofbioremediation processes.

Even though most believed that it is desirable and evenessential to sponsor an alternative technology develop-ment program, workshop participants felt it important tounderstand the risks of such an effort. The prospects forsuccess of an alternative program are not assured. Therecould always be a number of technical problems anddelays associated with any development program. Failureof a technology or approach in a full-scale test is alwayspossible. After even the best efforts to develop newtechnologies, it is possible that the results could be nobetter or even worse than the current system.

Therefore, if an alternative development program wassupported it would not necessarily follow that the currentprogram should be stopped. It may be possible to combinethe best features of both programs in the future or it maybe that current technologies will be superior to anyalternatives in the end.


Workshop participants agreed that it is not clear struction. An important issue, therefore, is a continuingwhether future degradation of the weapons in the stock- program to evaluate stockpile condition and predict anypile poses a significant threat and, thus, how this would future problems.affect decisions about time available for initiating de-