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Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00003946
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-54400)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 614.10 MILLION
(US$ 900 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
FOR A
FISCALLY SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
DEVELOPMENT POLICY CREDIT
June 15, 2017
Macroeconomics and Fiscal Policy Management Global Practice
Pakistan Country Management Unit
South Asia Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective as of 15 June 2017)
Currency Unit = Pakistani Rupee
US$ 1.00 = PKR 104.8391
FISCAL YEAR
1 July – 30 June
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ABL Allied Bank Limited
ADB Asian Development Bank
BISP Benazir Income Support Program
CCT Conditional Cash Transfers
CPS Country Program Strategy
DFID Department for International Development
DPC Development Policy Credit
DPL Development Policy Lending
EFF Extended Fund Facility
EOBI Employees Old age Benefit Institute
FBR Federal Bureau of Statistics
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program
FSIG Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth
FY Financial Year
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoP Government of Pakistan
GST General Sales Tax
HBL Habib Bank Limited
HEC Higher Education Commission
ICR Implementation Completion Report
IDA International Development Association
IEG Internal Evaluation Group
IMF International Monetary Fund
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MoF Ministry of Finance
MSMEs Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NFIS National Financial Inclusion Strategy
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NPCC National Power Construction Corporation
OSS One Stop Shop
PA Project Agreement
PBG Performance Based Growth
PDOs Project Development Objectives
PKRs Pakistan Rupees
PPL Pakistan Petroleum Limited
QAG Quality Assurance Group
RDs Regulatory Duties
SBP State Bank of Pakistan
SECP Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
SOEs State Owned Enterprises
SRO Statutory Rules and Orders
TA Technical Assistance
TAGR Trust Fund for Accelerated Growth and Reforms
TF Trust Fund
UBL United Bank Limited
UCT Unconditional Cash Transfers
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VOSS Virtual One Stop Shop
WB World Bank
Senior Global Practice Director: Carlos Felipe Jaramillo
Practice Manager: Manuela Francisco
Project Team Leader: Enrique Blanco Armas/ Jose Lopez Calix
ICR Team Leader: Jeff Chelsky
5
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth
Development Policy Credit Series
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information
B. Key Dates
C. Ratings Summary
D. Sector and Theme Codes
E. Bank Staff
F. Results Framework Analysis
G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs
H. Restructuring
1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design .......................................... 12
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................ 16
3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 23
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 28
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 29
6. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................ 31
Annex 1 Policy and Results Matrix……………………………………………...……34
Annex 2. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............. 37
Annex 3. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 39
Annex 4. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 40
6
A. Basic Information
Program 1
Country Pakistan Program Name
PK Fiscally Sustainable
and Inclusive Growth
DPC
Program ID P147557 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-54400
ICR Date 06/15/2017 ICR Type Core ICR
Lending Instrument DPL Borrower ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF PAKISTAN
Original Total
Commitment SDR 258.50M Disbursed Amount SDR 258.50M
Implementing Agencies -- Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan
Program 2
Country Pakistan Program Name
PK Fiscally Sustainable
and Inclusive Growth
DPCII
Program ID P151620 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-56820
ICR Date 06/15/2017 ICR Type Core ICR
Lending Instrument DPL Borrower ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF PAKISTAN
Original Total
Commitment SDR 355.60M Disbursed Amount SDR 355.60M
Implementing Agencies -- Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan
B. Key Dates
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPC - P147557
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 10/25/2013 Effectiveness:
Appraisal: 03/20/2014 Restructuring(s):
Approval: 05/01/2014 Mid-term Review:
Closing: 06/30/2015 06/30/2015
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPCII - P151620
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 01/28/2015 Effectiveness: 06/26/2015 06/19/2015
Appraisal: 05/04/2015 Restructuring(s):
Approval: 06/18/2015 Mid-term Review:
Closing: 06/30/2016 06/30/2016
7
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Overall Program Rating
Outcomes Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome Substantial
Bank Performance Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance Moderately Satisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Overall Program Rating
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing
Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance Moderately Satisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPC - P147557
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating:
Potential Problem
Program at any time
(Yes/No):
No Quality at Entry
(QEA) None
Problem Program at any
time (Yes/No): No
Quality of
Supervision (QSA) None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPCII - P151620
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating:
Potential Problem
Program at any time
(Yes/No):
No Quality at Entry
(QEA) None
Problem Program at any
time (Yes/No): No
Quality of
Supervision (QSA) None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status Satisfactory
8
D. Sector and Theme Codes
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPC - P147557
Original Actual
Major Sector
Public Administration
Other Public Administration 13 13
Central Government (Central Agencies) 50 50
Financial Sector
Credit Reporting and Secured Transactions 13 13
Microfinance 12 12
(Historic)Health and other social services
Other social services 12 12
Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme
Economic Policy
Fiscal Policy 25 25
Tax policy 25 25
Private Sector Development
Business Enabling Environment 25 25
Investment and Business Climate 12 12
Regulation and Competition Policy 13 13
Public Sector Management
Public Administration 13 13
State-owned Enterprise Reform and Privatization 13 13
Public Finance Management 25 25
Domestic Revenue Administration 25 25
Social Development and Protection
Social Protection 12 12
Social Safety Nets 12 12
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPCII - P151620
Original Actual
Major Sector
Public Administration
Other Public Administration 18 18
Central Government (Central Agencies) 55 55
Financial Sector
9
General finance sector 9 9
Microfinance 9 9
(Historic)Health and other social services
Other social services 9 9
Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme
Economic Policy
Fiscal Policy 25 25
Tax policy 25 25
Private Sector Development
Business Enabling Environment 25 25
Regulation and Competition Policy 13 13
Public Sector Management
Public Administration 13 13
State-owned Enterprise Reform and Privatization 13 13
Public Finance Management 25 25
Domestic Revenue Administration 25 25
Rule of Law 18 18
Legal Institutions for a Market Economy 18 18
Social Development and Protection
Social Protection 12 12
Social Safety Nets 12 12
E. Bank Staff
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPC - P147557
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Annette Dixon Philippe H. Le Houerou
Country Director: Patchamuthu Illangovan Rachid Benmessaoud
Practice
Manager/Manager: Deepak K. Mishra Vinaya Swaroop
Task Team Leader: Jose R. Lopez Calix Jose R. Lopez Calix
ICR Team Leader: Jeffrey Allen Chelsky
ICR Primary Author: Jeffrey Allen Chelsky
10
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPCII - P151620
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Annette Dixon Annette Dixon
Country Director: Patchamuthu Illangovan Rachid Benmessaoud
Practice
Manager/Manager: Deepak K. Mishra Shubham Chaudhuri
Task Team Leader: Jose R. Lopez Calix Jose R. Lopez Calix
ICR Team Leader: Jeffrey Allen Chelsky
ICR Primary Author: Jeffrey Allen Chelsky
F. Results Framework Analysis
Program Development Objectives (from Program Document) The DPC series is structured around two development objectives: (I) fostering private and
financial sector development and (ii) mobilizing revenue and expanding priority social spending.
Indicator(s)
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPC - P147557
Indicator Baseline
Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPCII - P151620
Indicator Baseline
Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1: At least five entities privatized through strategic equity sale by June 2015
Value
No privatization
transactions took place in
2012/13
At least five entities
privatized through
strategic equity sale
by June 2016.
Equity stakes of
various magnitude
were divested by the
GOP in five entities.
Date achieved 05/01/2014 06/30/2016 06/30/2016
Comments
Share of ownership sold -- UBL 19.6% Jun-14; PPL 5% Jun-14; ABL 11.5%
Dec-14; HBL 42.5% Apr-15; NPCC
11
Indicator 2: Improved system/framework providing availability/coverage/quality of
credit information for consumers and SMEs by June 2016.
Value
No such a system in place
in June 2013
An improved
system/framework
providing
availability/coverag
e/quality of credit
information for
consumers
The Credit bureau
Bill was passed by
the National
Assembly.
Membership in the
Better Than
Cash Alliance
announced in
September 2015.
Date achieved 06/01/2013 06/30/2016 03/23/2016
Comments
Credit Bureaus Bill was subsequently amended by Senate and made
incompatible with PA. However, legislative correction was introduced as a PA in
the subsequent DPC and brought into compliance.
Indicator 3: Simple average statutory tariff rate is at or lower than 12 percent in June
2016.
Value
Simple average statutory
tariff rate is 14.4 percent in
June 2013.
At or lower than 12
percent in June
2016.
Simple average
statutory tariff rate
was 13.4 percent
Date achieved 06/01/2013 06/30/2016 03/29/2016
Comments
Ambition of effort to reduce average tariffs was undermined but continued
reliance on customs revenue to achieve fiscal targets.
Indicator 4: Number of UCT beneficiaries who received full benefits is at least 5.5
million in June 2016.
Value
Number of unconditional
cash transfers (UCT)
beneficiaries who received
full benefits is at 4.4
million in 2012/13.
At least 5.5 million
5.3 million
beneficiaries
Date achieved 06/28/2013 06/30/2016 06/30/2016
Comments
BISP reported that 5.7 million beneficiaries were identified but that only 5.3
million registered for benefits. They consider that the on-registrants may have
been either died or been unable to register because of relocation due to floods or
conflict.
Indicator 5: Overall tax collection is at least 11.5 percent of GDP by end-2015/16 and no
special concessionary exemptions issued through SROs by FBR.
Value
Overall-federal &
provincial-tax collection is
at 9.6 percent of GDP by
end-2012/13.
Overall tax
collection is at least
11.5 percent of
GDP by end-
2015/16
A ratio to GDP of
12.4 percent was
reached, a significant
over performance.
Date achieved 06/28/2013 06/30/2016 06/30/2016
Comments
The authorities were also able to curtail the use of SROs by the FBR except in a
few narrowly defined sectors.
12
G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs
PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPCII - P151620
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 04/18/2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 500.11
1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design
In May 2013, Pakistan experienced its first peaceful transition from one democratically
elected government to another with the incoming administration possessing a solid reform
mandate. At the time, Pakistan faced a serious economic situation. Unprecedented floods
in 2010 and 2011, coupled with continuing security issues, stalling economic reform,
falling investment and external financial inflows, increased devolution of responsibilities
to the provinces, and fiscal disarray in the run up to elections severely affected
macroeconomic imbalances. By the end of 2012/13 international reserves were below 1.5
months of imports, and the fiscal deficit (excluding grants) had reached 8 percent of GDP,
a very high level for the third year in row. As soon as it took office in mid-June 2013, the
new Government began to articulate an ambitious emergency response to prevent a
balance-of- payments crisis, correct fiscal imbalances and put the economy on the road to
stabilization and rapid recovery. It was against this backdrop that Bank support to the
authorities through a two operation programmatic series of DPCs on Fiscally Sustainable
and Inclusive Growth (FSIG) was conceived.
This Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) assesses the achievements of
the expected results of the programmatic series of Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive
Growth (FSIG) Development Policy Credits (DPCs) to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
The series supports the economic pillar (the second of four “E”s – Energy, Economy,
Education and Extremism) of the Government of Pakistan’s (GOP) development agenda,
which sets out the following objectives:
13
Box 1. Key Economic Priorities of the Government’s Program
The government envisages stabilizing the economy, bringing inflation down to the 6–7 percent range, and
achieving growth rate targets of 6–7 percent by 2017/18 or earlier. To do this, it has set the following goals
and comprehensive policy agenda:
Stabilization
Moving to fiscal consolidation. Reducing the fiscal deficit from 8.3 percent of GDP in 2012/13 to 3.5-4 percent
in 2016/17 by increasing revenues by around 3 percent of GDP, eliminating tax exemptions; imposing
austerity in expenditure management, cutting down subsidy outlays; protecting the priority safety net (BISP);
and carrying on active public debt management.
Rebuilding the external position to no less than 3 months of imports and tightening monetary policy. Scaling
back monetary accommodation of fiscal deficits and setting up policy rates to keep positive real interest
rates; strengthening the central bank’s independence; and protecting the external position by repurchasing
reserves to cushion against major shocks.
Main growth-enhancing reforms
Comprehensive power sector reform. Reducing power subsidies; restructuring boards of power distribution and
generation companies; making new investments; strengthening the power sector regulator; and expanding
alternative sources of energy.
Reforming or privatizing SOEs. Privatizing by equity or strategic sales; or if restructuring, then requiring
professional chief executives and board members and their compliance with Public Sector Companies
(Corporate Governance) Rules 2013.
Improving trade competitiveness. Simplifying tariffs, with four slabs and 1–25 percent rates, and phasing out
trade-distortive statutory regulatory orders (SROs) on some 4,000 products.
Expanding trade relations with neighbors. Facilitate regional trade and take full advantage of trade preferences
available from the European Union.
Enhancing the investment climate. Establishing a One Stop Shop for registering limited liability companies; and
strengthening of the BOI in implementing a plan for improving the business environment and investment-
friendly special economic zones.
Expanding access to finance. Developing the SBP’s Financial Inclusion Program to enhance access of SMEs to
financial services through regulatory reforms, product innovation, financial literacy, and consumer
protection.
It is aligned with the four strategic pillars of the Country Partnership Strategy (2014): (i)
Transforming the Energy Sector; (ii) Private Sector Development (strengthening the
business environment, improving trade logistics, and privatizing/restructuring SOEs); (iii)
Reaching out to the underserved, neglected and poor (including MSMEs); and (iv) Service
Delivery (reduce vulnerability to income shocks by expanding coverage of the Benazir
Income Support Program (BISP), accelerate improvements in services, increase revenue to
fund service delivery and increase provincial non-wage spending on education and health).
The series had two broad development objectives: (i) fostering private and financial sector
development to bolster economic growth; and (ii) mobilizing revenue while preserving
priority use of fiscal space. The first of the series (FSIG I) addressed critical institutional
and regulatory changes required to jumpstart the reform process. The second (FSIG II)
was intended to bring continuity and sustainability to most actions of the first phase, while
introducing new inclusion and governance actions. Both operations are linked to several
pillars of the GOP reform program, including: (i) privatization of SOEs; (ii) improving the
investment climate; (iii) mobilizing revenue; and (iv) protecting priority social
expenditures.
14
The design of the series also reflected lessons learned from previous experience as
described in the CPS Completion Report (2010-2014). These included:
Importance of coordinating donor responses
Traditional approaches to capacity building had been only moderately effective given
high staff turnover in public service and therefore there was a need to focus on systems
rather than training
Simpler Results frameworks with fewer outcomes were advisable
There was a need to strengthen attention at provincial level
1.1 Context at Appraisal
In the run up to the May 2013 election, which precipitated the first peaceful transition from
one democratically elected government to another in Pakistan’s history, Pakistan was in a
near-crisis economic situation. Unprecedented floods in 2010 and 2011, coupled with
continuing security issues, stalling economic reform, failing investment and external
financial inflows, and fiscal disarray preceding the elections severely undermined internal
and external macroeconomic balances.
Within months of taking office, the new government had successfully negotiated an
arrangement under the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility (EFF), focused on putting the
economy on the road to macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth. Successful
implementation was slowed-down somewhat by political constraints and unrest. The
response to these developments distracted the GOP somewhat from implementation of their
reform agenda
The measures supported by the FSIG DPCs, alongside the Power Sector Reform DPC,
were an effort to reinvigorate the reform agenda. A programmatic approach was adopted
to support reform momentum while catalyzing the initial outcomes required for further
consolidation and deepening of key inclusive growth enhancing components of the GOP’s
program.
Despite the depth, ambition and trajectory of the authorities’ reform program, the DPC
series that began in 2014 was composed of only two operations. This reflected the
uncertainty associated with a resumption of policy-based lending to Pakistan following
earlier, largely unsuccessful, attempts under previous governments. Previous engagements,
particularly in support of revenue mobilization, were undermined by a lack of political will,
public and private vested interests, and weak institutional capacity.
1.2 Original Program Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (Annex 1:
Policy and Results Matrix)
Program Development Objectives
1. Fostering Private and Financial Sector Development
15
2. Expanding Social Protection and Mobilizing Revenue
Key Results Indicators
1. At least five entities privatized through strategic or equity sale by June 2016
2. An improved system/framework providing availability/coverage/quality of credit
information for consumers and SMEs by June 2016.
3. Simple average statutory tariff rate is at or lower than 12 percent in June 2016.
4. Number of UCT beneficiaries who received full benefits is at least 5.5 million in June
2016. 5. Overall tax collection is at least 11.5 percent of GDP by end-2015/16 and no special
concessionary exemptions issued through SROs by FBR.
1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators and Reasons/Justifications
There were no revisions to the PDOs. Triggers, while supporting the original two pillars,
were adjusted where necessary. Two prior actions were added in FSIG-II to address
inclusion and economic governance concerns and no trigger from the FSIG-I was dropped.
On inclusion, a prior action was added to reflect the GOP’s intention to join the Better than
Cash Alliance and, on the governance front, a prior action was introduced to more clearly
delineate the powers and functions of the BISP management and Board. An additional
capital transaction was added to the prior action on the privatization program to recognize
progress achieved. The floor tariff rate was raised from zero to one percent to ensure that
fiscal targets under the IMF program were reached. Several other prior actions were
reformatted for purposes of clarity.
The only significant change to the results indicators pertained to the availability of credit
information to individuals. The first DPC sought 100% access to credit information by
June 2016 from a baseline where no consumer has access to its own credit information in
June 2013. In DPC II, this was changed to “an improved system/framework providing
availability/coverage/quality of credit information for consumers and SMEs by June
2016.” The DPC I formulation was considered to be overly ambitious and not well linked
to the PA (i.e., approving the credit bureau law and secured transaction law would not
ensure 100% access to credit information). Given that the PA was passage of the Credit
Bureau Act, the DPC II formulation was more realistic.
1.4 Original Policy Areas Supported by the Program (as approved):
In the area of private and financial sector development, the series sought policy reform in
the following areas:
Privatization—Pakistan’s SOEs deliver poor services to the private sector (particularly
in the critical energy sector) and create market distortions, which holds back economic
growth and suppresses private investment. They contribute to a fiscal burden that
crowds out the private sector’s access to finance. The DPCs attempt to kick start the
16
privatization process by supporting equity and strategic sales of SOEs consistent with
the GOP’s identification of 31 priority projects to be privatized in a “phased manner”.
Improving the business environment and investment climate—Improving the
availability and accuracy of credit information, the Program seeks to facilitate access
to credit by the private sector and enhance consumer protection. A step in this direction
is strengthening the regulatory framework for the operation of credit bureaus in the
public and private sector. This is to be achieved through passage of the Credit Bureau
Act. The establishment of a One Stop Shop (OSS) for business registration for
registering limited liability companies is a prior action for the DPCs and is an explicit
part of the GOP’s reform strategy.
Financial sector (insurance) liberalization—Through the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Micro-Insurance) Rules, the DPCs support the GOP’s objectives of
financial sector product innovation and enhancing social protection through the
development of a micro-insurance sector by providing affordable outreach to low-
income people.
Trade policy reform— The complexity of the tariff regime and the level of protection
undermines the quality of the investment climate, undermining competitiveness,
imposing a burden on importers and constraining the ability of firms to innovate.
Reduction in the number of tariffs “slabs” and phasing out of exemptions were
priorities under the GOP’s reform agenda.
In support of expanding social protection and revenue mobilization, policy areas supported
by the DPCs included:
Improving revenue mobilization—By supporting a reduction in the use of SROs to
create tax exemptions and constraining the ability of the FBR to issue new SROs, the
DPCs provide strong support for the GOP’s efforts to achieve fiscal consolidation and
build fiscal space to support expand social spending.
Privatization—In addition to the negative impact of Pakistan’s SOEs on the business
climate mentioned above, they are a major burden on the GOP’s fiscal resources as
many rely on direct subsidies from the GOP or generate large contingent liabilities.
Privatization is intended to reduce the fiscal costs to the GOP thereby opening up fiscal
space to expand social spending.
Expanding Social Protection—By supporting the BISP by raising the level of benefits,
expanding the number of low-income beneficiaries, improving the timeliness of
payments and enlisting the support of the provinces in the delivery of BISP, the DPCs
help the GOP to use the enhanced fiscal space to strengthen the social safety net.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Program Performance
DPC Amount Expected
Release Date
Actual Release
Date
Release
FSIG DPC I XDR258.5M May 6, 2014 May 7, 2014 Regular
FSIG DPC II XDR355.6M June 18, 2015 June 19, 2015 Regular
17
All prior actions were met.
List Prior Actions from Legal Agreement/ Program Document
1. Fostering Private and Financial Sector Development
Action 1.1: The Privatization Commission has launched the Privatization Program, including: (a)
taking to market one strategic sale of an SOE, including calling for expressions of interest from
prospective investors; and (b) issuing requests for proposals and calling for expressions of interest in
connection with the procurement of financial advisors to advise on (i) another SOE strategic sale, and
(ii) the offering of equity in three SOEs in domestic and international capital markets.
Action 1.2: The Ministry of Finance has submitted the Credit Bureaus Bill, 2014 to the National
Assembly for approval.
Action 1.3: The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan has approved the Securities and
Exchange Commission (Micro-insurance) Rules, 2014.
2. Expanding Social Protection and Mobilizing Revenue
Action 1.4: The Ministry of Finance has strengthened the pro-poor orientation of the BISP through: (a)
raising the basic benefit under BISP to PKRs.1,200 per family per month; (b) issuing a notification
guaranteeing timely and full quarterly budget releases to BISP; and (c) obtaining the endorsement of
the Chief Secretaries of the Provinces of memoranda of understanding between BISP and the
Provinces to extend conditional cash transfers for primary education to twenty districts.
Action 1.5:(a) The Ministry of Finance has approved the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) Strategy
Paper containing a comprehensive tax reform strategy; and consistent with it (b) FBR has refrained,
since July 1, 2013, from issuing statutory regulatory orders granting special tax exemptions.
Action 1.6: The Federal Board of Revenue, as part of the implementation of the FBR Strategy Paper,
has: (a) issued at least seventy thousand (70,000) notices to potential tax evaders to register and file
tax payments; and (b) undertaken provisional tax assessments of at least eight thousand (8,000)
individuals.
Action 1.7:The Federal Board of Revenue, as part of the implementation of the FBR Strategy Paper,
has: (a) launched an information technology-based Taxpayers Audit Monitoring System; (b)
undertaken ballot-based audits of at least five (5) percent of total tax returns filed for tax year 2012;
and (c) completed at least twenty-five (25) percent of such audits.
Action 1.8: The Federal Board of Revenue, as part of the implementation of the FBR Strategy Paper,
has: (a) published the Parliamentarians Tax Directory; and (b) issued national tax numbers to all
members of the Senate, the National Assembly, and the Provincial Assemblies, and disclosed their tax
payments.
DPC II
1. Fostering Private and Financial Sector Development
Action 2.1: As part of the implementation of its Privatization Program, the GOP has completed one
SOE strategic sale and three capital market SOE equity transactions.
18
Action 2.2: The National Assembly has approved the Credit Bureau Act; and the GOP has joined the
Better than Cash Alliance Initiative.
Action 2.3: The Parliament has approved a budget law 2014/15 providing for the application of 6
statutory tariff slabs; and the MoF has approved a Plan to achieve 4 slabs in 3-years, within a range of
1 to 25 percent for all tariff lines, allowing very few exceptions and tariff peaks to address sensitive
goods or special sectors only.
Action 2.4: As part of the implementation of its Plan for improving the business environment, SECP,
FBR and EOBI have established a virtual One-Stop-Shop (OSS) for business registration, and a
physical OSS in Lahore.
2. Expanding Social Protection and Mobilizing Revenue
Action 2.5: The Parliament has approved a budget law 2014/15 increasing the BISP allocation to
PKRs. 97.15 billion in order to raise the benefit amount to PKRs. 1,500/month per beneficiary, well
above inflation, and start activities to expand CCTs for primary education in no less than 27 districts
with a benefit of PKRs.250 per month per child attending school; and the BISP has reached an
implementation agreement with each provincial/regional government on a cost-sharing arrangement
for CCTs.
Action 2.6: In compliance with BISP Act 2010, the BISP Board has issued internal rules and
regulations delineating the powers and functions of the BISP Management and the BISP Board.
Action 2.7: The Parliament has approved a budget 2014/15 which includes (i) a tax expenditure annex,
(ii) the elimination of a set of tax exemptions and SROs, and (iii) provision of additional tax measures
for a total revenue impact equivalent to at least 0.7 percent of GDP.
Action 2.8: The Government (a) has issued a Presidential Ordinance containing all amendments of the
corresponding tax laws to permanently eliminate the discretion of FBR to issue special tax
exemptions, making any proposed tax exemption subject to parliamentary approval as part of the
annual budget law and/or the corresponding tax legislation; and (b) has submitted to the Parliament
such amendments as part of the Finance Bill for the budget 2015/16.
Action 2.9: FBR has (a) issued 171,000 notices to identified potential tax evaders to register and file
tax payment, and taken administrative and/or legal actions on at least 25 percent of the potential
taxpayers who received notices by 31 December 2014, but failed to respond to them; and (b) selected
at least 7.5percent of non-salary-including large taxpayers (filed for tax year 2013) through ballot- or
risk-based audits, and completed audits for at least 10 percent of those selected cases.
Action 2.10: (a) Two provinces have expanded the scope of their GST on services to increase their
revenue; and (b) the provinces have increased their 2014/15 budget allocations to non-salary education
and health spending by no less than 26 percent.
Action 2.11: (a) The MoF has issued a notification requiring each drawing and disbursing officer to
provide commitments details to the Accountant General within 10 days of the month closure. The
quarterly budget releases to all department and ministries will be contingent on full compliance with
this provision; (b) the Recipient’s Controller General of Accounts has issued a notification to disclose
on its website the annual audited financial statements for the last 5 years, and committing to disclose
future financial statements within 15 days of the date they are laid before the Parliament; and (c) the
MoF has issued a notification to disclose on its website monthly in-year revenue and expenditure
reports of the federal government within 30 days after the month-end.
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2.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation:
Design
Sequencing of Reforms – The sequencing of reforms, both across DPCs and with other
development partners (mainly the IMF and its EFF program), put correct focus on
stabilization at the outset, without which the feasibility and impact of other aspects of
the reform agenda would have been significantly diminished. This suggests that, of the
two DOs – (1) Fostering Private and Financial Sector Development and (2) Expanding
Social Protection and Mobilizing Revenue, the latter was clearly of the greatest
importance, with efforts in support of the first objective largely to seed the ground for
subsequent reforms. This hierarchy could have been more clearly articulated in the
DPC to moderate expectations on the growth/structural reform front and ensure a
shared understanding among the GOP, Bank and development partners of the
importance of a more deliberate and explicit strategy for facilitating the shift in
emphasis from stabilization to growth (i.e., structural reform).
Pace of Reform – With the exception of efforts to stabilize the fiscal situation, which
were ambitious and front loaded, the contribution of the program to the growth-
enhancing reforms was more modest. While this could be interpreted as a lack of
ambition, it was more likely the result of: (i) the need to keep GOP attention initially
on the demands of implementing a robust stabilization effort; (ii) a prudent and more
far-sighted effort to build relationships and trust between the Bank and a reform-
minded, albeit new, GOP administration following a prolonged hiatus from policy-
based lending and (iii) the need to develop a shared and deeper understanding of the
structural challenges facing the Pakistan economy before taking a more aggressive
approach to growth oriented reforms.
On the last point, the measured approach to structural reform seems justified by the
need for both the Bank to learn from experience with a relatively new administration
with weak and/or uncertain implementation capacity, and to test the resilience of the
GOP’s commitment to an ambitious reform agenda and assess what was feasible. For
example, neither the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) nor the
Development Module of the FSAP was available in 2013 and 2014 when the Bank,
alongside key development partners, was called on to provide coordinated support to
the new GOP. Now, with a significantly improved macroeconomic situation, a track
record of success, and greater trust between the Bank and GOP, and on the basis of
comprehensive analysis, the GOP with the support of the Bank, are better positioned to
articulate and implement a more ambitious, coherent and sustained reform agenda,
particularly for the financial sector. Evidence of this can be seen in the subsequent
Competitiveness and Growth DPF (approved June 2016) and the Finance for Growth
DPC (under preparation).
Regular Monitoring of Reform Implementation – The close attention of development
partners to the implementation of clearly articulated and quantified reforms (e.g., BISP)
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was seen to have strengthened budgetary discipline in ensuring that timely transfers
were made to support safety net payments to BISP.
Lack of Sufficient Specificity on Prior Actions – Given the length of time since Pakistan
had had its last DPO, and the associated lack of familiarity of some officials with Bank
practice, additional specificity in some prior actions (e.g., with respect to privatization
as well as elimination of FBR discretion to issue tax exemptions) could have helped
avoid misunderstandings on what was required for a prior action to be considered
completed.
Context-specific factors
Strength and Ambition of GOP Commitment—The GOP demonstrated strong
ownership of the reform agenda supported by the DPCs, particularly on the fiscal side,
where major progress was made in stabilization and in curtailing the use of exemptions
through SROs. However, this was less the case for the growth/structural reform aspects
of the program, resulting in less traction during FSIG I and II, particularly on the trade
side (while some simplification of the tariff regime was achieved, efforts to bring down
the overall level of protection fell short). Privatization efforts also fell short of plans,
which were overly ambitious at the outset given the length of time since Pakistan had
last successfully undertaken a privatization transaction. However, in this case, it was
the GOP’s privatization program that was overly ambitious rather than the Bank’s
support for privatization.
Responding to political resistance from vested interests in parliament – As foreseen at
the outset, there was strong parliamentary opposition to several aspects of the reform
program. For example, opposition to elements of the Credit Bureau Act within the
Senate resulted in the Act being modified in such a way as to materially undermine its
effectiveness (a requirement for the Central Bank to review all credit reports was
inserted, although this amendment was subsequently reversed in the context of the
follow-on Competitiveness and Growth DPF). The DPCs’ emphasis on transparency,
particularly on the tax front, was therefore appropriate and prudent given the need to
inform and educate the public about tradeoffs and the extent and nature of opposition
to the program.
Weak capacity and lack of experience within the Privatization Commission – An
inadequately staffed and insufficiently experienced Privatization Commission,
combined with a very ambitious privatization agenda presented challenges to the
implementation of the prior actions. Recognizing the Privatization Commission’s
capacity constraints, development partners, including the Bank, made significant
technical assistance and advisory support available to the Commission. However, this
exceeded the Commission’s absorptive capacity, and the considerable support was
therefore less effective than it might have been otherwise. Moreover, the ambitious
targets for privatization transactions meant that the Commission’s management was
not able to give adequate attention to training and capacity building. The focus on
transactions was not surprising given that privatization transactions figured
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prominently in the conditionality of the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development
Bank. However, capacity challenges contributed to delays in the privatization process,
contributing to the intensification of public opposition to the privatization program. At
the same time, a lack of familiarity of the Commission with Bank requirements
regarding the completion of prior actions led to miscommunication with Bank staff on
the status of a prior action and subsequently incorrect information was shared with the
Board. In hindsight, initial efforts could have given greater attention to building
capacity at the Privatization Commission, better situating a smaller number of specific
privatizations in the context of sector-specific reform, and implementing a more
aggressive communications strategy alongside privatization efforts. To the extent that
a key constraint to privatization was political rather than technical suggests that future
efforts need to emphasize communication/engagement, rather than more analysis or
technical capability.
Openness of GOP to Technical and Advisory Support from Development Partners –
The authorities clearly appreciated the technical assistance provide by the Bank and
other development partners. While most of the GOP sought, and readily accepted,
technical assistance, other parts (e.g., FBR, Privatization Commission) were initially
somewhat less open to greater engagement. This was the result of a combination of an
initial underestimation of the complexity of the reforms being implemented (e.g., in the
case of privatization), differences of views on TA priorities as well as some suspicion
due to concerns with the scope and relevance of past TA. This last factor eased
significantly over the life of the DPC series as trust and familiarity was developed
between the GOP and WB staff.
Relevance of Risks Identified
FSIG I (2014) identified the following key risks to the operations:
o Political opposition in Senate on tax front
o Social unrest from opposition to measures
o Implementation challenges due to staff turnover, counterparty capacity constraints,
weak policy coordination
o Internal control system weaknesses given no progress on internal audit
o Impact of regional or domestic conflict on FDI
o Terms of trade shocks (oil)
o IMF program could go off track
This was a well-articulated list of risks, with all but the last two negatively impacting the
implementation of the reform program in some form or another. In the case of terms of
trade shocks, the decline in the prices of several commodities Pakistan exports was more
than offset by the decline in world oil prices. The positive net impact on Pakistan’s balance
of payments facilitated the authorities’ ability to implement their reform agenda, with the
resulting decline in inflation contributing to a reduction in domestic interest rates. However,
had prices moved the other way, the ability of the authorities to make progress on key
aspects of the program would have been compromised. The decline in interest rates did
22
provide an additional incentive for domestic banks to seek alternative sources of revenue
and ultimately, contributed to an expansion of credit to the private sector. The IMF
program did face some delays in implementation but none that proved overly lengthy or
that seriously threatened the viability of Bank support through the DPCs.
Social unrest did have an impact on the privatization process and will likely affect the
prospects for subsequent privatizations going forward. In the case of weaknesses in policy
coordination, this appears to have contributed to the more modest progress on the growth
agenda. With the MOF firmly in control of negotiating the DPC, other parts of the
government may not have been fully integrated into the policy dialogue.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization:
One of the lessons from earlier experience was the need for simpler results frameworks
with fewer outcomes. This was acknowledged in the program, with a streamlined set of
prior actions and results indicators, particularly in the first operation in the series.
Among the lessons from an IEG Project Performance Report on four structural adjustment
loans in Pakistan (December 19, 2005) was a call for: “precise definitions of actions and
when they are considered complete are needed to avoid delays or failures to achieve
objectives, and these cannot always be described in the policy matrix alone” (page 12).
Given the authorities lack of familiarity with policy-based lending through DPCs (the
previous attempt by the Bank with policy-based lending to Pakistan had been some time
ago and not successful), a more explicit and detailed description of prior actions and the
evidence required for their implementation was warranted. An interesting example was
privatization for which no definition was provided. The five transactions undertaken
represented a wide range in ambition, from only five percent for PPL to 88 percent of the
NPCC. Since “privatization” is a term for which the Bank has no set definition, the Results
indicator would have been more meaningful (and the outcome perhaps more ambitious),
had some indication been provided of the magnitude of ownership that needed to be
transferred to constitute a “privatization”.
In three cases – the HEC privatization, the elimination of FBR discretion to issue tax
exemptions, and what was required to complete expenditure and review reporting under
Action 2.11 – there was miscommunication between the Bank and authorities as to what
was needed to meet prior actions. In the case of the elimination of FBR discretion, a
misunderstanding on the timing of action to permanently eliminate the discretion of the
FBR to issue special tax exemptions (making any proposed tax exemptions subject to
Parliamentary approval) required a last minute Presidential Ordinance to complete the prior
action1.
1 See “Agreed Minutes of Negotiations Between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the
International Development Association Regarding the Second FSIG DPF”, May 13, 2015
23
The HEC privatization, one of the prior actions in the FSIG DPC II, could not be completed
because the check provided by the buyer was not honored. But the documentation
submitted to the Board for approval said that the HEC privatization had been completed,
as informed by the Government. In this case, more could have been done to explain to the
staff at the Privatization Commission how DPCs worked, as well as the implications of
submitting incorrect information to the Board. A better understanding of this on the part of
the GOP could have precipitated an early conversation with the Bank on concerns with the
bidder for HEC and could have avoided a more difficult discussion as to whether or not the
check received for HEC from the bidder was “legal tender”. (Under Pakistan law a check
was “legal tender” and therefore the authorities interpreted its provision by the prospective
buyer as fulfillment of the “letter” of the prior action, despite concern with the credibility
of the bidder). That the check was not honored (and the privatization not completed) came
as a surprise to the Bank. The resulting miscommunication led to a difficult situation for
both the Bank and the authorities that was only resolved through a legal note to the
Executive Board interpreting the precise language of the prior action.
Lastly, in the case of Action 2.11 (c) - MoF notification to disclose on its website monthly
in-year revenue and expenditure reports of the federal government within 30 days after the
month-end.—while the Finance Secretary approved the proposal for disclosure of
provisional monthly revenue and expenditures statements on the website of the Finance
Division, with the Budget Wing responsible for dissemination, there was no subsequent
publication of monthly in-year data on GOP revenue and expenditures. As late as October
2016, only quarterly reporting was available on the MOF website.
The overarching lesson from this experience was the importance, particularly when it
concerns authorities that are unfamiliar with a particular Bank instrument, to ensure close
and clear communication throughout the transaction. This points to the need to have in
place follow on monitoring of implementation to ensure that actions are fulfilled as
anticipated.
2.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation:
With FSIG I and II having successfully set a foundation for a more ambitious set of reforms,
a Competitiveness and Growth DPC and PBG which builds on and deepens the reforms
begun under FSIG, was approved by the Board in June 2016. A Finance for Growth DPC
that draws on the GOP’s May 2015 National Financial Inclusion Strategy and the recently
completed FSAP development module is being designed and a fifth DPC that focuses more
directly on constraints to growth, including in the trade sector and business climate, is in
the pipeline.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
1. Fostering Private and Financial Sector Development
2. Expanding Social Protection and Mobilizing Revenue
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Overall Rating: Substantial
(a) Relevance of Objectives: High
The overall objectives of the program were and remain highly relevant. Private and
Financial Sector Development remain key to building a diverse and vibrant private sector
that can create jobs, enhance productivity, promote trade, broaden the tax base, and build
support for stability and security, and contribute to poverty reduction and shared prosperity.
Improving revenue mobilization is a critical element of macroeconomic stabilization,
contributing to the development of the formal sector, and reducing corruption. It is also
essential for expanding social protection, which is critical in an environment prone to
economic, political and natural disaster related shocks. However, as noted above, the
second objective was clearly the dominant one, with efforts in support of the first objective
more in the nature of seeding the ground for subsequent substantive measures.
(b) Relevance of Design: Substantial
The design of the program recognized several of the key lessons from previous engagement
in Pakistan, including the need for a focused program with clear priorities and a streamlined
results framework. Policy measures supported by the program and results indicators were
broadly in line with the objectives. Some of the policy measures were central to the
achievement of program objectives. This was particularly the case with respect to fiscal
measures such as those designed to curtail the use of tax exemptions, reduce tax avoidance
or enhance the transparency of fiscal policy. Measures to expand social protection were
also highly relevant, drawing as they did on BISP, an existing and well-targeted social
assistance program. Other program measures, on the other hand, were less central to
program objectives or were not obvious reform priorities in a streamlined program.
That said, at the outset, the GOP’s implementation capacity was uncertain and some major
diagnostic and analytical work was not yet available. The decision to include measures
that were a lower priority from the standpoint of growth or stabilization (such as passage
of the Credit Bureau Act, or tariff simplification rather than reduction), can be seen as part
of an effort to firmly establish these important themes (e.g., trade reform, financial
inclusion, improvements in the business climate) as pillars of the overall Bank-supported
reform agenda. This allowed Bank staff the time to develop a better appreciation of the
political economy challenges in these areas and served as a prelude for more ambition in
subsequent Bank-supported reforms.
(c) Relevance of Implementation: Substantial
Implementation arrangements, with the MOF the main executing agency, were relevant at
the outset given the centrality of the stabilization effort and the close link between revenue
mobilization and many other priority elements of the reform agenda. As the relative
importance of the growth agenda increases, and issues such as trade reform, business
climate and SOE reform take on greater urgency from the standpoint of the sustainability
of the reform agenda, other departments will need to play a greater role. Ambition of
25
privatization objectives2 could have been better calibrated to capacity of Privatization
Commission.
3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives
The two PDOs of the DPL series were evaluated using five results indicators.
1. PDO 1: Fostering Private and Financial Sector Development – Modest
Only modest progress was made in achieving this objective during the period of the FSIG
DPCs. Efforts to improve the investment climate did not advance significantly, trade
liberalization was tentative, expansion of credit to the private sector was more related to
external developments than sector reform, and forward momentum on privatization was
not sustained. However, the FSIG DPCs played an important role in getting
privatization/SOE reform and (to a lesser extent) trade reform on the GOP’s public policy
agenda (two of the results indicators). Prior to the first DPC, there was little if any
momentum behind reform in either area. Both are now explicit pillars of the growth agenda
and the FSIG DPCs did help create a foundation for more substantive progress in
subsequent DPCs although trade reform continues to lag.
o At least five entities privatized through strategic or equity sale by June 2016 – While
the target for the results indicator was achieved, the privatizations that were undertaken
were not particularly ambitious and the more ambitious efforts tended not to succeed,
usually due to public or political opposition. However, lessons learned from experience
under the FSIGs DPCs, have led to some rethinking by the GOP of their approach to
privatization, with some evidence of more attention to support broader sector reforms.
o An improved system/framework providing availability/coverage/quality of credit
information for consumers and SMEs by June 2016 – The modality through which this
outcome was achieved was the Credit Bureau Act. However, while the Act was passed
by the National Assembly, subsequent modifications in the Senate undermined the
effectiveness of the measure although this was corrected in the context of the
subsequent Competitiveness and Growth DPF and the measure is now in place as
intended. That said, inclusion of the Credit Bureau Act in the program took advantage
of its readiness for submission to Parliament, despite being a lower priority measure in
support of private and financial sector development. It was, in effect, “low hanging
fruit” (albeit important in the longer-term) pending completion of major diagnostic
work on the financial sector. It also had the benefit of helping to build support among
the GOP for a Bank-supported reform effort.
2 While the DPC’s requirement of five privatizations in two years was not itself overly ambitious,
this needs to be seen in the context of additional privatization ambitions, including the GoP’s
aspiration to privatize 39 entities in three years.
26
o Simple average statutory tariff rate is at or lower than 12 percent by June 2016– High
tariffs (with average rates among the highest in South Asia) shield Pakistan’s domestic
producers from international competition and prevent access to imported inputs. As
such, they represent a major impediment to productivity growth and improved
standards of living. While down somewhat from the baseline of 14.4 percent, the
reduction fell short of the target, reaching only 13.4 percent, well short of the original
target for the simple average tariff of 12 percent by June 2016. However, the program
was able to significantly curtail the use of SROs to grant tax exemptions (SROs
severely distort the tariff structure, decrease transparency and create an uneven playing
field for Pakistani importers). Unfortunately, this progress was partially undermined
by the significant increase in the number of products subject to Regulatory Duties
(RDs). In fact, the number of tariff lines subject to RDs increased from 105 in FY12/13
to 568 in FY14/15, with the share of imports paying RDs increasing from 0.6 percent
to 9.7 percent over the same period.
While not supported by a results indicator, one of the prior actions fell well short of
achieving its objective. For Action 2.4 (SECP, FBR and EOBI will have established (a) a
virtual one stop shop for business registration and (b) a physical OSS in one province),
while both the OSS and VOSS were created, neither has been successful to date. The
authorities reported significant problems with the associated software and, as a result, few
of the links on the VOSS site work. The authorities report that since its establishment, only
four firms have used it to register businesses. That said, the authorities were able to
significantly shorten processing time on the sites of the individual entities responsible for
business registration, but the achievement of this objective cannot be directly attributed to
DPC measures although the DPC may have helped draw the authorities’ attention to the
importance of simplifying and shortening the process for registering a business.
2. PDO 2: Expanding Social Protection and Mobilizing Revenue – High
In contrast to achievement of PDO 1, significant progress was made to expand social
protection and mobilize revenue. The latter, which exceeded its target of 11.5 percent, was
particularly critical given the need to stabilize the Pakistani economy and without which
reliable funding of the expansion of BISP would not have been possible. Moreover, the
efforts of the FSIG DPCs likely contributed to the reduction in the macroeconomic risks,
which, by the time of the Competitiveness and Growth DPC had fallen from “high” to
“substantial”.
Number of UCT beneficiaries who received full benefits is at least 5.5 million in June
2016 – The FSIG DPCs were very successful in expanding both the number of
beneficiaries, the size of benefits and the reliability of benefit payments. The GOP was
also able enlist the support of the provinces in the BISP program though the regular
provision of information on eligibility. The modest short fall in beneficiaries (5.3
million) reflected the fact that not all of the 5.7 million identified beneficiaries
registered for BISP. This is not surprising given displacement from natural disasters
and conflict.
27
Overall tax collection is at least 11.5 percent of GDP by end 2015/16 and no special
concessionary exemptions issued through SROs by FBR -- Revenue to GDP reached
12.4 percent by 2015/16, and the FBR’s power to issue SROs was curtailed and
transferred to parliament, a major achievement.
3.3 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Overall Rating – Moderately Satisfactory
While achievement of the first objective was moderately unsatisfactory, the series was
considerably more successful in achieving its second objective, with significant
overshooting of the revenue to GDP target. The overall assessment was on balance positive
given the primacy of the fiscal objective both to underpin macroeconomic stability and to
finance expanded social protection. While progress toward the private and financial sector
objective was moderately unsatisfactory during the program, this agenda is gaining traction
in subsequent DPCs, which have been able to build on the strengthening of the relationship
with the authorities to which the first operation contributed, and the more stable
macroeconomic situation.
2.4 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
The program contributed to macroeconomic stabilization and a gradual acceleration of
growth. The World Bank estimates that poverty, using the US$1.9 in PPP terms poverty
line, has declined from 6.1 percent in 2013 to 5.4 percent in 2016. Growth in Pakistan has
been historically pro-poor, which suggests that reforms that contribute to a gradual
acceleration of growth will also contribute to poverty reduction. In addition, some of the
prior actions had a beneficial impact on poverty reduction. The operation supported an
expansion of BISP, increased generosity of the benefits and improvements in governance
and the regular disbursements of budget allocations. Given the strong performance of the
program’s targeting system, this suggests that significant benefits have accrued to the
poor. BISP cash transfers contribute particularly to Pakistani women’s human capital
development. A significant share of BISP cash transfers is given to women who are heads
of households. Data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement survey
and recent evaluations and beneficiary assessments of the BISP program confirm
multiple channels through which this happens:
Households headed by Pakistani women receiving transfers spend significantly more
on human capital development-related outlays than those households headed by men..
As BISP cash transfers require a Computerized National Identity (CNI) card,
registration in the program gives women the right of a citizen (voting, opening a bank
account and the like). From 2009 to 2012, more than 15 million female citizens
obtained a CNI card, largely due to registration with BISP.
BISP payments raise their role in the family and empowerment. About 58 percent of
women BISP cash-recipients reported spending money as they wanted; 75 percent felt
28
their importance in the family had increased; 62 percent took more decisions than
before receiving the transfer; and 72 percent reported increasing their level of
confidence.
The ability of the program to protect BISP from the fiscal consolidation effort implemented
over the past few years was recognized by stakeholders in discussions to prepare this ICR.
The progressivity of the tax system improved with the withdrawal of tax exemptions,
particularly given the fact that the Government retained a number of tax exemptions on
basic goods consumed by the poor.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
Implementing an ambitious set of reforms under a tight timeline can challenge less
established bureaucracies. Pakistan’s bureaucracy is relatively sophisticated, although as
discussed in this report, at times the ambition of reforms was not commensurate with
available capacities. The process of preparing the DPC and following up on the
implementation of agreed reforms evolved over time, with clear signs of a stronger
preparation and monitoring process in place toward the end of the implementation period
of the FSIG DPC series, partly as a result of lessons learned during the process. These
included: (i) regular meetings chaired by the Minister of Finance to assess progress in the
implementation of prior actions; (ii) development of processes to monitor the
implementation of agreed reforms after the approval of the operations, agreed at
negotiations; (iii) the GOP and the World Bank also organized a ‘lessons learned’ session
after the closing of the FSIG series to assess the results achieved through the DPC series
and identify areas in which progress had been less than desired and where further support
was warranted; and (iv) adoption of a time-bound strategy for improving the business
environment with a clear system for allocating responsibilities across tiers of government
and agencies.
As a whole, it seems that the DPC has further strengthened an already capable bureaucracy
to implement a series of priority reforms in a disciplined manner, while improving
monitoring mechanisms over time.
3.5 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
There was no beneficiary survey or stakeholder workshop.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Substantial
The achievements of the FSIG series have already begun to be reinforced by subsequent
Bank-supported operations. The Competitiveness and Growth DPC and related Policy
Based Guarantee approved in June 2016 build significantly on the reform agenda supported
by FSIG I&II, particularly in further expanding social protection and revenue mobilization.
A Finance for Growth DPC is under preparation to take forward the private and financial
sector development agenda, drawing on the experience of the FSIG DPCs as well as the
29
development module of Pakistan’s FSAP and the National Financial Inclusion Strategy.
With these two major pieces of analysis now complete, a more targeted approach to reform
is planned which should help address the shortcomings in the achievement of the first of
the two development outcomes.
Progress in improving the investment climate will likely continue but this will require more
calibrated priority setting that extends beyond a mechanistic effort to improve Pakistan’s
Doing Business ranking. The fact that the GOP has been able to significantly shorten the
time required to register a business (through pre-existing websites linked between the
relevant agencies) despite the failure of the VOSS and OSS to gain traction suggests that
ownership of this part of the policy agenda is well rooted. On the other hand, recent security
incidents will continue to undermine investor confidence, generating challenging head
winds for the economy.
Ongoing opposition to key pillars of the reform agenda remains substantial, with vested
interests expected to continue to seek preferential treatment through the tax and customs
revenue systems and through ongoing protection of domestic industry. This is likely the
greatest risk to sustainable achievement of the PDOs. In addition, as the reform agenda
moves from macroeconomic stabilization (with the MOF firmly in the driver’s seat), to
growth, it will be important to more directly engage other parts of the GOP, including the
Ministry of Commerce, in setting and building ownership of the policy agenda.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Ratings: Satisfactory
In anticipation of engagement with a new government, the Bank undertook extensive
analysis of the challenges facing Pakistan (see Pakistan: Finding the Path to Job-Enhancing
Growth, Country Economic Memorandum (2013) and Pakistan: the Transformative Path
(2013)). The latter publication was composed of short, easily digestible, pieces covering a
broad range of policy areas and targeted specifically to a policy maker perspective. These
provided a sound analytical basis on which to begin discussions of Bank-supported
reforms. That said, not all policy makers interviewed for this ICR were aware of the work
suggesting that a more systematic and sustained effort to disseminate the valuable work
could have been useful.
In preparing for the FSIG series, the Bank consulted and coordinated extensively with
major development partners, including by participating in the 2013 London meeting of the
leading development partners (DFID, USAID, IMF, WB and AsDB), created early on to
support the new administration. There was particularly close alignment between the IMF-
supported EFF arrangement, support provided by DFID and this DPC series. The World
Bank and DFID established the Multi-donor Trust Fund for Accelerating Growth and
Reforms (TAGR). TAGR facilitated the provision of technical assistance in four broad
30
areas: (i) taxation; (ii) energy sector; (iii) debt management; and (iv) privatization and SOE
reforms, all areas of focus in the IMF and WB budget support programs. In addition, DFID
provided grant financing to the GOP, linked to the IMF and WB programs, but requiring
achievement of additional results on tax and social protection.
The Bank’s decision to separate out complex reforms in the energy sector and place them
in a parallel DPC series was, in retrospective, a wise one as it helped ensure sufficient focus
and enhanced leverage on critical but complementary reforms. With energy sector reform
essential to achieve fiscal objectives, there was a risk that the focus on some key reforms
could have been diluted if combined into a single MOF-focused DPC.
A notable shortcoming at entry pertained to the adequacy of the capacity of the
Privatization Commission to implement agreed reforms/prior actions and a very ambitious
privatization program. The Bank and other development partners (USAID, ADB, IFC and
DFID) offered significant technical assistance and capacity support but delivery of this
support took some time.
(b) Quality of Supervision Ratings: Moderately Satisfactory
While there was little formal supervision under the series, this was largely compensated
for by an extensive program of technical assistance, supporting most areas of reform
covered by the DPCs (privatization, tax policy and administration, social assistance,
business environment, trade, etc.). The strong in-country presence of Bank staff involved
in the DPC series also ensured close attention to implementation during the regular policy
dialogue between the World Bank and the GOP. While this ensured adequate supervision
in areas covered by ongoing TA and policy dialogue, more minor reforms that were not
part of this dialogue received less attention.
There were two noteworthy shortcomings in supervision that should be noted. The first
pertained to the establishment of the OSS/VOSS to facilitate business registration. From
the outset, there were problems that pointed to the need for a course correction (e.g., the
initial newspaper advertisement announcing the launch of the VOSS did not contain the
web address for the site, VOSS quickly ran into insurmountable software problems and
was left largely inactive by the authorities while they worked on making existing systems
more efficient, only four firms had used the system (of which only one used the OSS in
Lahore)). While Bank staff were aware of the problems in implementation, the VOSS
website and links to it on the relevant agencies’ websites remained active, despite the site
links being largely inactive, negatively impacting the reputation of the VOSS to anyone
who tried to access it.
The second shortcoming was partly related to the absence of related technical assistance or
projects. It pertained to a sub-element of one of the prior actions -- the publication on the
MOF website of monthly in-year reports on expenditures and revenues within 30 days of
month end. While a template of the report was shown to the Bank, there is no evidence that
reports were ever published on the MOF website. While this was admittedly not the most
31
important reform of the DPCs, its inclusion as a prior action implies that shortcomings in
implementation should have been noticed and addressed during the life of the operation or
in the period thereafter.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Ratings: Moderately Satisfactory
The overall MS reflects the fact that both of the shortcomings in supervision were relatively
minor or were compensated for in other ways – the authorities were able to achieve a
significant reduction in processing time through pre-existing systems, suggesting that this
prior action might have been better articulated as an objective of reducing the number of
days to register a business rather than as a specific modality (a “one stop shop”). In the
case of the monthly revenue and expenditure reports, the relevant information is available
on the website on a quarterly basis and in a timely manner. On the positive side, the
significant preparation of analytical work in anticipation of engagement with a new
government, as well as the willingness to provide ongoing technical (even if offers were
not always readily accepted) were considerably more significant and impactful
contributions to the success of the FSIG series.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance – Moderately Satisfactory
The FSIG series represented a significant departure from earlier engagements with the
GOP, which had been fraught with challenges. The fact that this was the first successful
attempt at policy-based lending in almost a decade was a reflection of the broadly held
assessment that the new GOP was demonstrating strong ownership of their reform agenda
and solid commitment to achieving development objectives. It was in this context (which
included a commitment to a credible macroeconomic stabilization program) that the group
of leading development partners agreed to provide substantial and well-coordinated
support.
Not surprisingly, most of the shortcomings were largely a function of the length of the
hiatus from policy based lending from the Bank. Missteps tended to be related to a lack of
familiarity with program requirements or a nascent understanding of the complexity of
some aspects of the reform program (e.g. privatization). When this happened, the GOP
demonstrated credible resolve (e.g., through issuance of Presidential Ordinances) in
responding to problems and both the Bank and GOP adapted their approach in subsequent
DPCs to reflect the lessons learned.
6. Lessons Learned
Experience with the FSIG DPCs both validated the merits of earlier lessons learned and
generated some new ones.
For example, when engaging with a new government for which implementation
capacity and the sustainability of political commitment are uncertain, a more gradual
32
approach can provide an important opportunity to develop the critical relationships
and trust needed to ensure successful and sustained implementation. While there is
often a tendency to seek strong up front demonstration of commitment, unless this is
essential (e.g., where stabilization must be achieved quickly to avoid further erosion of
development progress), ambition should take into account the depth of understanding of
the underlying challenges as well as the context in which reform is being implemented. A
measured pace can, as in the case of Pakistan, lay the basis for a longer term and more
sustained reform effort.
It is important to ensure a shared and clear understanding of the nature and timing
of the evidence and preconditions required to meet prior actions and other
conditionality to avoid last minute misunderstandings. Greater effort in this regard would
have avoided problems such as those experienced with the legislation supporting the
curtailment of SROs and the privatization of HEC. And when misunderstandings such as
those related to the HEC privatizations do arise, there needs to be a clear and timely process
for informing the Bank.
In formulating the results framework, a more satisfactory result can sometime be
achieved by focusing on the substance/objective of what needs to be achieved rather
than a specific modality for achieving it (e.g., a reduction in the number of days required
to register a business versus a requirement to establish a “one-stop-shop”), even when the
modality is considered “best practice”. This would not preclude the adoption of a “best
practice” modality but it would give the authorities flexibility to adapt to evolving
circumstances.
While the Doing Business indicators and rankings provide a valuable instrument for
drawing attention to shortcomings in the business and investment climate, the
reforms that it motivates should be chosen strategically, and not be driven entirely by
the desire to improve ranking. While this may give the impression of significant progress,
reform priorities need to be grounded in a more country-specific assessment of the major
constraints to private-sector growth, avoiding the prioritization of less critical DB reforms
which can sometimes hijack the agenda. The country specific challenges faced by the
private sector environment mean that at times, what matters is not, for example,
establishing a VOSS, but addressing other legal, regulatory and policy level constraints to
proper functioning of markets and the business environment.
In the face of government enthusiasm for an aggressive privatization agenda, combined
with limited administrative capacity, the Bank, rather than focusing on the number of
privatization transactions, should take a more holistic approach, with strategic
selection of privatizations taken in the context of sector-wide reform. Ideally, the
ambition of the GOP’s privatization agenda should have been better calibrated to
implementation capacity and the ability to achieve sector reform preconditions. An
overambitious agenda set the GOP up for failure and may have undermined support for
privatization over the longer term. And while the Bank may find itself under pressure to
maximize the number of privatization transactions (in pursuit of quantifiable targets), a
more strategic and holistic approach, accompanied by time and resources dedicated to
33
communications and outreach to potentially impacted constituencies, could have produced
better results over the longer term.
There is a need to have in place structured monitoring arrangements and clear
responsibilities to monitor on a systematic basis the implementation of prior actions
and other conditions that require ongoing efforts (e.g., VOSS, monthly publication of
reports, etc.). This is particularly relevant for reforms for which no complementary TA/
operation is in place.
Finally, close coordination, communications, and alignment with key development
partners (e.g., IMF and DFID) can create mutual reinforcement as can be seen with
reforms to tax policy and administration and the strong performance of BISP in improving
the pro-poor orientation and timeliness of social support.
34
ANNEX 1: POLICY AND RESULTS MATRIX
Actions Implemented Under DPC I Prior Actions for DPC II Results
PILLAR 1. FOSTERING PRIVATE AND FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
Action 1.1: The Privatization Commission has
launched the Privatization Program, including: (a)
taking to market one strategic sale of an SOE,
including calling for expressions of interest from
prospective investors; and (b) issuing requests for
proposals and calling for expressions of interest in
connection with the procurement of financial
advisors to advise on (i) another SOE strategic sale,
and (ii) the offering of equity in three SOEs in
domestic and international capital markets.
Action 2.1: As part of the implementation of its Privatization Program,
the GOP has completed one SOE strategic sale and three capital market
SOE equity transactions.
Results indicator: At least
five entities privatized
through strategic or equity
sale by June 2016.
Baseline: No privatization
transactions took place in
2012/13.
Action 1.2: The Ministry of Finance has
submitted the Credit Bureaus Bill, 2014 to the
National Assembly for approval.
Action 1.3: The Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan has approved the
Securities and Exchange Commission (Micro-
insurance) Rules, 2014.
Action 2.2: The National Assembly has approved the Credit Bureau Act;
and the GOP has joined the Better than Cash Alliance Initiative.
Action 2.3: The Parliament has approved a budget law 2014/15
providing for the application of 6 statutory tariff slabs; and the MoF has
approved a Plan to achieve 4 slabs in 3-years, within a range of 1 to 25
percent for all tariff lines, allowing very few exceptions and tariff peaks to
address sensitive goods or special sectors only.
Action 2.4: As part of the implementation of its Plan for improving the
business environment, SECP, FBR and EOBI have established a virtual
One-Stop-Shop (OSS) for business registration, and a physical OSS in
Lahore.
Results indicator: An
improved system/framework
providing
availability/coverage/quality
of credit information for
consumers and SMEs by
June 2016.
Baseline: No such a system
is in place in June 2013.
Results indicator: Simple
average statutory tariff rate is
at or lower than 12 percent in
June 2016.
Baseline: Simple average
statutory tariff rate is 14.4
percent in June 2013.
PILLAR 2. EXPANDING SOCIAL PROTECTION AND MOBILIZING REVENUE
35
Actions Implemented Under DPC I Prior Actions for DPC II Results
Action 1.4: The Ministry of Finance has
strengthened the pro-poor orientation of the BISP
through: (a) raising the basic benefit under BISP to
PKRs.1,200 per family per month; (b) issuing a
notification guaranteeing timely and full quarterly
budget releases to BISP; and (c) obtaining the
endorsement of the Chief Secretaries of the
Provinces of memoranda of understanding between
BISP and the Provinces to extend conditional cash
transfers for primary education to twenty districts.
Action 2.5: The Parliament has approved a budget law 2014/15
increasing the BISP allocation to PKRs. 97.15 billion in order to raise the
benefit amount to PKRs. 1,500/month per beneficiary, well above
inflation, and start activities to expand CCTs for primary education in no
less than 27 districts with a benefit of PKRs.250 per month per child
attending school; and the BISP has reached an implementation agreement
with each provincial/regional government on a cost-sharing arrangement
for CCTs.
Action 2.6: In compliance with BISP Act 2010, the BISP Board has
issued internal rules and regulations delineating the powers and functions
of the BISP Management and the BISP Board.
Results indicator: Number
of UCT beneficiaries who
received full benefits is at
least 5.5 million in June
2016.
Baseline: Number of
unconditional cash transfers
(UCT) beneficiaries who
received full benefits is at 4.4
million in 2012/13.
Action 1.5:(a) The Ministry of Finance has
approved the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)
Strategy Paper containing a comprehensive tax
reform strategy; and consistent with it (b) FBR has
refrained, since July 1, 2013, from issuing statutory
regulatory orders granting special tax exemptions.
Action 1.6: The Federal Board of Revenue, as
part of the implementation of the FBR Strategy
Paper, has: (a) issued at least seventy thousand
(70,000) notices to potential tax evaders to register
and file tax payments; and (b) undertaken
provisional tax assessments of at least eight
thousand (8,000) individuals.
Action 1.7:The Federal Board of Revenue, as
part of the implementation of the FBR Strategy
Paper, has: (a) launched an information
technology-based Taxpayers Audit Monitoring
System; (b) undertaken ballot-based audits of at
least five (5) percent of total tax returns filed for
Action 2.7: The Parliament has approved a budget 2014/15 which
includes (i) a tax expenditure annex, (ii) the elimination of a set of tax
exemptions and SROs, and (iii) provision of additional tax measures for a
total revenue impact equivalent to at least 0.7 percent of GDP.
Action 2.8: The Government (a) has issued a Presidential Ordinance
containing all amendments of the corresponding tax laws to permanently
eliminate the discretion of FBR to issue special tax exemptions, making
any proposed tax exemption subject to parliamentary approval as part of
the annual budget law and/or the corresponding tax legislation; and (b) has
submitted to the Parliament such amendments as part of the Finance Bill
for the budget 2015/16.
Action 2.9: FBR has (a) issued 171,000 notices to identified potential
tax evaders to register and file tax payment, and taken administrative
and/or legal actions on at least 25 percent of the potential taxpayers who
received notices by 31 December 2014, but failed to respond to them; and
(b) selected at least 7.5percent of non-salary-including large taxpayers
(filed for tax year 2013) through ballot- or risk-based audits, and
completed audits for at least 10 percent of those selected cases.
Action 2.10: (a) Two provinces have expanded the scope of their GST
on services to increase their revenue; and (b) the provinces have increased
Results indicator: Overall
tax collection is at least
11.5percent of GDP by end-
2015/16 and no special
concessionary exemptions
issued through SROs by
FBR.
Baseline: Overall-federal &
provincial-tax collection is at
9.6 percent of GDP by end-
2012/13.
36
Actions Implemented Under DPC I Prior Actions for DPC II Results
tax year 2012; and (c) completed at least twenty-
five (25) percent of such audits.
Action 1.8: The Federal Board of Revenue, as
part of the implementation of the FBR Strategy
Paper, has: (a) published the Parliamentarians Tax
Directory; and (b) issued national tax numbers to
all members of the Senate, the National Assembly,
and the Provincial Assemblies, and disclosed their
tax payments.
their 2014/15 budget allocations to non-salary education and health
spending by no less than 26 percent.
Action 2.11: (a) The MoF has issued a notification requiring each
drawing and disbursing officer to provide commitments details to the
Accountant General within 10 days of the month closure. The quarterly
budget releases to all department and ministries will be contingent on full
compliance with this provision; (b) the Recipient’s Controller General of
Accounts has issued a notification to disclose on its website the annual
audited financial statements for the last 5 years, and committing to disclose
future financial statements within 15 days of the date they are laid before
the Parliament; and (c) the MoF has issued a notification to disclose on its
website monthly in-year revenue and expenditure reports of the federal
government within 30 days after the month-end.
37
Annex 2 Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
P147557 - PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPC
Names Title Unit
Gabi George Afram Program Leader SACPK
Rehan Hyder Senior Procurement Specialist GGO06
Shabnam Naz Program Assistant SACPK
Saadia Refaqat Senior Economist GMF06
Sarmad Ahmed Shaikh Financial Sector Specialist GFM06
Daria Taglioni Lead Economist GTCTC
Muhammad Waheed Senior Economist GMF06
Paul Welton Lead Financial Management Spec GGO24
Jose R Lopez Calix Program Leader AFCW3
Peter J Mousley Program Leader MNC02
Guillermo Carlos Arenas Economist GTCTC
Mehwish Ashraf Economist GMF06
Irum Touqeer Public Sector Specialist GGO18
Mehnaz S Safavian Lead Financial Sector Specialist GFM07
Jeffrey Allen Chelsky Lead Economist GMFDR
Sarwat Aftab Senior Private Sector Specialist GTC06
Kiran Afzal Senior Private Sector Specialist GTC06
Ana Bellver Vazquez-Dodero Senior Public Sector Specialist GGO27
Sunita Kikeri Lead Financial Sector Specialist GFM1B
Sebastian A Molineus Director GFMDR
Gonzalo J Varela Senior Economist GTCTC
Abid Khan Program Assistant SACPK
Aijaz Ahmad Senior Public Private Partnership Specialist GCPPP
P151620 - PK Fiscally Sustainable and Inclusive Growth DPCII
Names Title Unit
Gabi George Afram Program Leader SACPK
Amjad Zafar Khan Sr Social Protection Specialist GSP06
Yasuhiko Matsuda Sr Public Sector Spec. GSP06
Saadia Refaqat Senior Economist GMF06
Sarmad Ahmed Shaikh Financial Sector Specialist GFM06
Daria Taglioni Lead Economist GTCTC
Muhammad Waheed Senior Economist GMF06
Jose R Lopez Calix Program Leader AFCW3
Peter J Mousley Program Leader MNC02
Helene Bertaud Lead Counsel LEGES
Guillermo Carlos Arenas Economist GTCTC
Mehwish Ashraf Economist GMF06
Irum Touqeer Public Sector Specialist GGO18
Antonio Velandia-Rubiano Lead Financial Officer/Sovereign Debt FABDM
Cigdem Aslan Lead Financial Officer/Sovereign Debt FABDM
Mehnaz S Safavian Lead Financial Sector Specialist GFM07
Enrique Fanta Ivanovic Senior Private Sector Specialist GTC04
Jeffrey Allen Chelsky Lead Economist GMFDR
38
Muhammad Shafiq Program Assistant GMF06
Aijaz Ahmad Senior Public Private Partnership Sector Specialist GCPPP
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including
travel and consultant costs) Lending 171.38 555255.55 Total 171.38 555255.55 Supervision/ICR 19.17 116130.61 Total 19.17 116130.61 Grand Total 190.55 671386.16
Fiscal Years
P147557 P151620 LEN SPN LEN SPN
Weeks Amount Weeks Amount Weeks Amount Weeks Amount FY14 108.87 335383.25 3.60 22391.92 0 0 0 0 FY15 17.49 54758.84 0 0 41.81 139613.94 0 0 FY16 3.20 25499.52 0 0 0 0 11.77 71149.40 FY17 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.80 22589.40 Total 129.56 415641.61 3.60 22391.92 41.82 139613.94 15.57 93738.69 Grand Total
438033.53 233352.63
39
Annex 3. Comments on draft ICR
40
Annex 4. List of Supporting Documents
1- PK FSIG-I DPC Growth MOP
2- PK FSIG-I DPC Growth RVP Transmittal to SECPO
3- PK FSIG-I Growth Form 2337
4- PK FSIG-I Growth Signed Minutes of Negotiations
5- PK FSIG-I Data Sheet Program Document
6- PK FSIG-I Growth Program Document Final
7- PK FSIG-II DPC Growth MOP
8- PK FSIG-II DPC Growth RVP Transmittal to SECPO
9- PK FSIG-II Growth Form 2337
10- PK FSIG-II Growth Signed Minutes of Negotiations
11- PK FSIG-II Data Sheet Program Document
12- PK FSIG-II Growth Program Document Final
13- Finding the Path to Job-Enhancing Growth: A Country Economic Memorandum,
Report No 75521-PK, World Bank, 2013
14- Pakistan: The Transformative Path, The World Bank 2013
41