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i
Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR96949
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
P126424
(TF-99535, TF-99554, TF-99555)
ON
GRANTS
IN THE AMOUNT OF USD8,350,300
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
FOR
PNPM PEDULI
PROMOTING CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT FOR HIGHLY VULNERABLE AND
MARGINALIZED GROUPS
April 2015
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective November 30, 2014)
Currency Unit = Indonesian Rupiah (Rp)
USD1.00 =Rp 12,204
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 – December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AAA
ACE
Analytical and Advisory Activities
Association for Community Empowerment
AF Additional Financing
AIDS
ARV
AUD
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
Antiretroviral
Australian Dollar
Bappenas
BETF
BTOR
CB
CDD
CONS SERV
Badan Perencana Pembangunan Nasional (National Development
Planning Agency)
Bank Executed Trust Fund
Back-to-Office Report
Capacity Building
community-driven development
Consultant Services
CPS Country Partnership Strategy
CSO
CSR
Civil Society Organization
Corporate Social Responsibility
DFAT
DIPA
DO
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (previously known as
AusAID – Australian AID)
Daftar Isian Proyek Anggaran (Special Project Reserve)
Development Objective
EAP East Asia and Pacific
EACIF World Bank Office: Jakarta
EASID
EIRR
Indonesia Social Development Unit
Economic Internal Rate of Return
EO Executing Organizations
ETC Extended Term Consultant
FM Financial Management
FMR Financial Management Review
GA Grant Agreement
GOI
GSURR
GTTPPO
Government of Indonesia
Global Practice on Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience
Gugus Tugas Tindak Pidana Perdagangan Orang (a joint task force
against human trafficking)
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ii
ID Identification
IDF
IDP
IFR
IGA
Institutional Development Framework
Institutional Development Profile
Interim Financial Report
Income generating activity
IKA Indonesia untuk Kemanusiaan (Indonesia for Humanity)
IGSES
IP
IRR
Implementation Guideline of Social and Environmental Safeguards
Intermediary Partner
Internal Rate of Return
ISR Implementation Status Report
JMC Joint Management Committee
KBCF
KemenkoKesra
Kemitraan
KPI
Komnas Perempuan
Kawal Borneo Community Foundation
Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat (Coordinating
Ministry of People’s Welfare)
Kemitraan bagi Pembaruan Tata Pemerintahan (The Partnership for
Governance Reform)
Key Performance Indicator
Komisi Nasional Perempuan (National Commission for Women)
Lakpesdam NU Lembaga Kajiandan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Nahdlatul Ulama
LNG
LPPNU
LPNU
LPSDM
Liquid Natural Gas
Lembaga Pengembangan Pertanian Nahdlatul Ulama (Agricultural
Development Institution under NU)
Lembaga Perekonomian Nahdlatul Ulama (Economic Institution under
NU)
Lembaga Peningkatan Sumber Daya Manusia (Human Resources
Development Institution)
M&E
MDTF
MIS
Monitoring and Evaluation
Multi Donor Trust Fund
Management Information System
MOF
MOU
MP
Ministry of Finance
Memorandum of Understanding
Managing Partner
MP3KI
MPS
MTR
Master Plan for the Acceleration of Indonesia’s Poverty Reduction
Majelis Pelayanan Sosial (Social Service Council)
Mid Term Review
NGO
NPV
Non-governmental organization
Net Present Value
OD
OP
Organization Development
Operations Procedure
ORAF Operational Risk Assessment Framework
PCN
PCR
PID
PDO
PKBI
PMP
Project Concept Note
Project Completion Report
Project Information Document
Project Development Objectives
PerkumpulanKeluargaBerencana Indonesia (Indonesian Planned
Parenthood Association)
Performance Management Plans
PNPM
PPK
QAG
Program NasionalPemberdayaanMasyarakat (National Program for
Community Empowerment)
Perkumpulan Panca Karsa
Quality Assurance Group
iii
QEA
QSA
PRA
Quality at Entry
Quality at Supervision
Participatory Rural Appraisal
PSF PNPM Support Facility
RETF
RF
Recipient Executed Trust Fund
Result Framework
RPJMN
Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (National Mid Term
Development Plan)
SG
SLA
SME
SSS
Small Grant
Sustainable Livelihood Approach
Small Medium Enterprises
Sumatera Sustainability Support
STC
STI
Short Term Consultant
Sexually Transmitted Infections
SUB GRNT
TA
TAF
Sub Grant
Technical assistance
The Asia Foundation
TF
TNP2K
Trust Fund
Tim National Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (National Team for
Acceleration of Poverty Reduction)
TRT Technical Review Team
TSG Technical Support Group
TTL Task Team Leader
UKP2K
UPP
Utusan Khusus Presiden Republik Indonesia untuk Penanggulangan
Kemiskinan (The President Representative for Poverty Reduction)
Urban Poverty Project
US$/USD United States dollar
VIP
WB
WDI
Very Important Person
World Bank
World Development Indicators
YPEKA Yayasan Pelita Kasih Abadi
Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg
Country Director: Rodrigo A. Chaves
Practice Manager: Kevin A Tomlinson
Project Team Leader: Natasha Hayward
ICR Lead Author: Paul Boon
iv
COUNTRY
INDONESIA
PNPM PEDULI
PROMOTING CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT FOR HIGHLY VULNERABLE AND
MARGINALIZED GROUPS
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information
B. Key Dates
C. Ratings Summary
D. Sector and Theme Codes
E. Bank Staff
F. Results Framework Analysis
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H. Restructuring
I. Disbursement Graph
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ........................................................... 1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ........................................................... 5
3. Assessment of Outcomes ...................................................................................................... 13
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ..................................................................... 20
5. Assessment of Bank and Recipient Performance .................................................................. 20
6. Lessons Learned .................................................................................................................... 23
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Recipient/Implementing Agencies/Partners ....................... 25
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...................................................................................... 26
Annex 2. Outputs by Component .............................................................................................. 27
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ............................................................................. 30
Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................... 32
Annex 5.Capacity Building Assessment ................................................................................... 34
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ............................................................... 41
Annex 7. Summary of Recipient’s Project Completion Report ................................................ 43
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ................................... 51
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents................................................................................... 52
MAP……………………………………………………………………………………………….53
v
A. Basic Information
Country: Indonesia Project Name: Indonesia: PNPM
Peduli
Project ID: P126424 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-99535,TF-
99554,TF-99555
ICR Date: 04/23/2015 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: SIL Grantee: LAKPESDAM,
KEMITRAAN, ACE
Original Total
Commitment: USD 3.71M Disbursed Amount: USD 8.20M
Revised Amount: USD 8.35M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies:
Association for Community Empowerment (ACE)
Kemitraan
Lakpesdam/Nahdlatul Ulama
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: Effectiveness: 06/30/2011 06/30/2011
Appraisal: Restructuring(s):
06/20/2012
03/11/2013
06/04/2014
Approval: 04/14/2011 Mid-term Review: 09/10/2012 09/10/2012
Closing: 06/30/2012 11/30/2014
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate
Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Grantee Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
vi
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing
Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): No
Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): No
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 20 20
General education sector 20 20
Health 20 20
Law and justice 20 20
Micro- and SME finance 20 20
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Child health 20 20
HIV/AIDS 20 20
Income Support for Old Age, Disability & Survivorship 20 20
Indigenous peoples 20 20
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support 20 20
vii
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: James W. Adams Axel van Trotsenburg
Country Director: Rodrigo A. Chaves Stefan G. Koeberle
Practice
Manager/Manager: Kevin A Tomlinson Jan Weetjens
Project Team Leader: Natasha Hayward Kevin A Tomlinson
ICR Team Leader: Natasha Hayward
ICR Primary Author: Paul Gerard M Boon
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The development objective of PNPM Peduli is to strengthen the capacities of Indonesian CSOs to
reach and empower marginalized communities to improve their socio-economic conditions.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Community groups/village branches engaging with local government on their
rights, access to services and improving livelihood
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
N/A 420 440 442
Date achieved 06/30/2011 06/30/2012 06/04/2014 11/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Based on the last EOs/CSOs Quarterly reporting. The achievement is 0.45%
above target.
Indicator 2 : Direct beneficiaries from marginalised groups (male/female/transgender)
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
9125, 5793 (f) - 63%,
3247 (m) - 36% and 85
(transgender) - 1%
13,000
15,000
9,260 (f)-
61.7%
5,400 (m)-
36%
340 (t)-2.3%
19,645
11,494(f)-58.5%
7,684 (m)-39.1%
467(t)-2.4%
Date achieved 06/30/2011 06/30/2012 06/04/2014 11/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Based on the last EOs/CSOs Quarterly reporting. The achievement is 31% above
target.
viii
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Total funded local projects working with marginalized groups
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
N/A 80 66
Date achieved 06/30/2011 06/30/2012 11/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
The target was defined to cover the PNPM Peduli Pilot Phase and also Phase II,
that was expected to be implemented under WB. Therefore, with the move of
Phase II, the achievement is short by about 20% from the agreed target.
Indicator 2 : Provinces/district/villages in which Peduli projects are working
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
N/A
24 provinces, 91
districts, 280
villages
25 provinces, 91
districts, 231
villages.
Date achieved 06/30/2011 06/30/2012 11/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Based on the last EOs/CSOs Quarterly reporting. Target achieved at provincial
and district level.
Indicator 3 : CSO/Branch partners complying fully with PSF Fiduciary Standards
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
N/A CSO/Branch 80% CSO/Branch 94%
Date achieved 06/30/2011 06/30/2012 11/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Based on the last EOs/CSOs Quarterly reporting. Achievement has surpassed
14% over the set target.
Indicator 4 : CSO/branch partners engaging with local government related to marginalized
people
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
N/A 40 59
Date achieved 06/30/2011 06/30/2012 11/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Based on the last EOs/CSOs Quarterly reporting. The achievement is 47.5%
above target.
Indicator 5 : CSO/Branch staff participating in capacity building activities
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
N/A 147 209
Date achieved 06/30/2011 06/30/2012 11/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Based on the last EOs/CSOs Quarterly reporting. The achievement has surpassed
42% the original target.
Indicator 6 : EOs complying fully with PSF Fiduciary Standards
ix
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
N/A 100% 100%
Date achieved 09/30/2011 06/30/2012 11/30/2014
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Based on the last EOs/CSOs Quarterly reporting. Target achieved.
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 08/15/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.20
2 01/14/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.49
3 07/30/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.29
H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructuring
Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in USD
millions
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made DO IP
06/20/2012 3.28 Extension of closing date and
additional financing
03/11/2013 6.21 Additional financing
06/04/2014 S S 7.60 Extension of closing date and
additional financing
x
I. Disbursement Profile
1
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
Country Background
Indonesia’s success in halving its poverty rate from 23.4 percent in 1999 to 11.4 percent in 2013
(approximately 29 million people) has been globally recognised. At the same time, the
Government of Indonesia (GoI) is committed to addressing growing inequality1, given that 68
million Indonesians still live just above the poverty line2 and non-income poverty, measured by
health and education access and outcomes, has continued to rise.
GoI has given high priority to inclusive and equitable growth, reflected in the National Mid Term
Development Plan (RPJMN 2009-2014), which articulates that Indonesia’s development efforts
should reach all people, ensuring no one is left behind3. Indonesia already has a range of
legislative and policy provisions that give recognition to the situation of specific groups including
equal employment opportunities, services for people with disabilities, land rights of indigenous
populations, social protection for the elderly, and services for victims of conflict. In recent times,
transgender people have been given representation on Komnas Perempuan (National Commission
for Women). However, legal and policy implementation of these measures is weak across the
country.
Indonesia remains a highly stratified society with long-established social hierachies and
discriminatory practices4 which leads to the exclusion of a sizeable section of the population
from mainstream5 decision making, markets and service delivery. While there is global evidence
that social exclusion has deleterious consequences for human capital development6, Indonesia has
scant data or analysis on the causes and impacts of social exclusion that would be needed to
improve delivery of services and participation of particular groups in development decision
making. Filling this knowledge gap is an imperative for inclusive development in Indonesia.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
In 2007, the GoI, with World Bank (WB) support, launched the National Program for Community
Empowerment (PNPM Mandiri) as a broad-based community-driven development (CDD)
poverty reduction program covering every sub-district in Indonesia. Its approach is to empower
local communities in addressing their basic infrastructure and social services needs through
providing direct financial and technical support and improving public participation, local
decision-making and resource management.
1 At the time of the ICR, the negative trend in increased inequality measured by the Gini ratio was still rising from 0.37
in 2012 to 0.41 in 2013. 2 World Bank: Poverty Reduction in Indonesia Slows; Inequality Rises -23 September 2014 | Indonesia Investments 3 In the words of a high level UN panel: “We should ensure that no person, regardless of ethnicity, gender, geography,
disability, race or status is denied universal human rights and basic economic opportunities” (2013). 4 Such practices include: legal and policy restrictions related to gender, marital status, age, disabilities and sexual
orientation; cultural and religious norms; and stigma and discrimination. 5 Social inclusion and social transformation in Indonesia, Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, International Journal of
Business and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 23, December 2011; Invisible People: Poverty and Empowerment in Indonesia.
Irfan Kortschak, Scott Guggenheim & Poriaman Sitanggang, Jakarta 2010. 6 Inclusion Matters, Sharing the Prosperity, World Bank, 2013.
2
While PNPM has been a successful national poverty reduction program, as evidenced by robust
impact evaluation findings, a 2010 World Bank study 7 found that processes of social and
economic exclusion, together with internalized stigmatization, prevented particular groups from
accessing this local development program. The study showed that very poor, marginalized and
socially excluded individuals had limited access to the decision-making processes in PNPM
Mandiri as village meetings were often dominated by local activists or elites.
Responding to this, GoI in collaboration with the WB Indonesia’s Social Development team therefore
conceptualized PNPM Peduli8 as a standalone project – distinct from PNPM Mandiri – that would
provide operational learning to accelerate the integration of marginalized groups into mainstream
development programs, government-led or otherwise, improving access to services and ‘unlocking’
the potential of these people to live more self-reliant, dignified lives.
At the same time, Indonesia experienced development of a more conducive environment for civic
participation by virtue of a number of legal changes pertaining to regional governance. CSOs, in
various forms (mass organizations, foundations and associations) were keen to take advantage of
these openings at the national level as well as in small scale local efforts. While civil society was
gaining momentum, however, internal governance remained weak among many CSOs and some
government actors remained reluctant to engage with them.
Under the Project’s design, GoI and WB, through the multi-donor trust funded PNPM Support
Facility (PSF9), partnered directly with national CSOs (referred to as Executing Organizations or
EOs) who in turn funded and supported local CSOs/EO branches. It was recognised that CSOs10
were well placed to reach marginalized groups and provide areas of expertise such as community
facilitation in ways that are often more difficult for government programs. Partnering with CSOs
offered the opportunity for GoI and WB to seek complementarity with their poverty reduction
efforts, to build the institutional capacity of CSOs as long term development partners and to test
an operational on-granting modality as a means for the WB to partner with local civil society.
The project aimed to work with and through strengthened CSOs to improve the lives of
marginalized people in two ways. First, was to build CSO capacity to identify and help organize
marginalized groups so that their voices could be heard and they could interact with Government
entities and programs. The second was for the CSOs to provide direct assistance to target
communities to support their access to improved livelihoods opportunities, social assistance and
social services.
The Coordinating Ministry of People’s Welfare (Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan
Rakyat/KemenkoKesra) provided overall strategic guidance and some support for implementation
including leading field missions and holding periodic meetings with CSOs to discuss progress.
1.2. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
7Marginalized Groups in PNPM-Rural, World Bank 2010. 8For easy reading, from here on PNPM Peduli is referred to as ‘The Project’. 9The PSF was established in 2007 to support GoI in delivery of PNPM Mandiri, providing technical support and
oversight to government operations. 10For ease of reading, throughout the report, CSOs refer to both partners of national EOs as well as branches of EOs in
the case of the NU-affiliated Lakpesdam.
3
The PDO is: ‘To strengthen the capacities of Indonesian CSOs to reach and empower
marginalized groups to improve their socio-economic conditions’. In this ICR, the two principal
expected outcomes against which the PDO is being evaluated are therefore: (i) at the level of
increased CSO capacity; and (ii) at the level of empowered marginalized groups. The Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs) guiding the Project were:
Outcome Indicators
1. # community groups/village branches engaging with local government on their rights,
access to services and improving livelihoods
2. # total direct beneficiaries from marginalized groups (m/f/transgender)
Intermediate Outcome Indicators
1. # total funded local projects working with marginalized groups
2. # Provinces/district/villages in which Peduli projects are working
3. % CSO/Branch partners complying fully with the Bank’s Fiduciary Standards
4. # CSO/branch staff participating in capacity building activities
5. # CSO/Branch partners engaging with local government related to marginalized people
6. % EOs complying fully with the Bank’s Fiduciary Standards
Although indicators were not well defined at the outset, the original Design Note for the small
grant Project anticipated that the Project would provide an implementation structure and
operational procedures for WB to award grants11 to national CSOs to target marginalized groups
for poverty reduction activities and test a business model for Bank-CSO collaboration. In addition,
the Project would provide capacity building (CB) support to strengthen the participating
organizations, particularly related to targeting these groups.
A pilot approach was adopted, with a strong focus on ‘learning by doing’. A fully fledged Results
Framework and relevant indicators were developed in partnership with the national EOs over the
pilot phase12.
1.3. Revised PDO and Key Indicators
While the PDO remained the same, the early 2014 Project Paper for Third Additional Financing
(AF) increased the quantitative targets to reflect the additional round of activities, as seen in the
attached Datasheet.
1.4. Main Beneficiaries
The main beneficiaries of PNPM Peduli were Indonesian CSOs, including the three grantee EOs:
Kemitraan (Kemitraan bagi Pembaruan tata Pemerintahan); Lakpesdam NU (Lembaga Kajian
dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Nahdlatul Ulama) and ACE (Association for Community
Empowerment) and their partner CSOs13. Beneficiaries were also the marginalized community
11 This on-granting model involved grants (Recipient Executed Trust Funds) to 3 national level EOs and their onward
sub-grants to 3 Intermediary Partners (IPs) and 66 local CSOs for sub-project activities with marginalized groups. 12 A draft Results Framework was appended to the January 2013 Project Paper for Additional Financing which
augmented the 8 original KPIs with a further 8 indicators, developed with the EOs, which was intended to guide
development of their results frameworks and M&E work. 13 These also included three Intermediary Partners as explained under 1.7.2
4
groups supported by the local CSOs. Relevant national and local government agencies were
considered indirect beneficiaries as the Project intended to support them in learning from the
approaches tested through the Project.
1.5. Original Components
The Design Note originally identified four mechanisms14 as components; however for the final
pilot project design, the components were recast as below so that they were causally linked to the
PDO:
1. Component 1 (USD6.18m) - Partnerships between CSOs and marginalized groups
aimed to implement strategies that empower these groups to become more self-reliant, take
action, access services and participate in development activities. This component financed
small activities carried out by local CSOs with community groups.
2. Component 2 (USD1.27m) - Strengthening Indonesian CSO capacities to empower
marginalized groups aimed to strengthen the capacity of Indonesian CSOs to act as
facilitators in a development process where marginalized men, women, children and
transgender persons are empowered to take action. This component financed CB activities for
CSOs such as trainings, learning forums and peer review.
3. Component 3 (USD0.90m) - Strengthening capacities of EOs to identify and provide
grants and technical support to CSO partners that work with and empower
marginalized groups aimed to strengthen the national level EOs to manage small grants,
identify and provide technical support to CSO partners and to develop strategies to translate
their learning to bring about change at the local and national level (policies, regulations
and/or societal attitudes). This component financed TA, capacity support and mentoring to
the EOs.
1.6. Revised Components
No further revisions were made to the components during the life of the Project.
1.7. Other significant changes
Implementation arrangement: The design provided for a contracted Technical Support Group
(TSG) - a local private firm – to be responsible at the national level for project implementation
support and oversight15. TSG functions included: undertaking CSO organizational assessments
and developing a related capacity building strategy; providing technical support for partners;
routine monitoring, project evaluation and documenting learning and establishment of MIS
(through an external consultant). When the arrangement was terminated in June 2012 on the basis
14 They are: 1.Grants awarded by the PSF Trust Fund to Executing Organizations (EOs); 2.Sub-Grants awarded by the
EOs and sub-granted to local CSOs or local branches; 3.Capacity-Building to EOs to support the objective of PNPM
Peduli to strengthen the capacities of Indonesian CSOs; and 4.Capacity-Building to local CSOs/Branches. 15 Utilizing BETF resources.
5
of disputed performance, the oversight tasks reverted to the (expanded) Task Team16 enabling the
Project to continue without interruption17.
Project Partners: A significant change from the Design Note was the introduction of three
Intermediary Partners (IPs)18, emerging from the EO selection process who, while unsuccessful in
their original applications, were seen as having potential to graduate to full EOs in an anticipated
Phase II. In the meantime, they received funding from the selected EOs which they on-granted to
a smaller number of CSO partners. Although an innovative idea, implementation challenges arose
as EOs were one step further removed from the local CSO and the beneficiary levels, making
reporting more difficult and adding another layer to financial allocations.
Budget: The Project was funded through Recipient Executed Trust Funds (RETF) with an
original budget of USD3,708,700, increased to a total budget of USD8,350,300 through
Additional Financing (AF) approvals as follows: USD2,512,000 (June 20th, 2012) for 3 RETFs;
USD1,426,500 (January 30th, 2013) for 3 RETFs and USD703,100 (February 28th, 2014) for 2
RETFs19. AFs were provided to enable the EOs to continue the pilot phase and prepare for
implementation of Phase II and an eventual hand-over of the project to The Asia Foundation
(TAF) as the Managing Partner (MP) of Phase II. Oversight and implementation support through
the TSG and, later, through the Task Team was funded through an associated Bank Executed
Trust Fund (BETF).
Peduli Phase II: Originally, it was envisaged that Phase II would continue to be financed and
managed under the WB (through the PSF). Learning from the TSG experience, a new Managing
Partner arrangement - this time allowing for international firms and including grants funds
management - was planned, and The Asia Foundation (TAF) was identified through a competitive
selection process. Unforeseen events, including significant changes to the PSF institutional
mechanism, led to a deviation from this plan in early 2014 with the Indonesia Country Director
and the Joint Management Committee (JMC) of the PSF endorsing a decision to move Phase II
from WB to the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) for their direct
financing and oversight. This decision had significant impacts on the Task Team, EOs and
partners, who previously had had their Phase II proposals approved by WB, and who were ready
to start implementation.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
Background analysis, lessons incorporated and rationale
The Project was initiated in response to findings20 from the social development team’s analytic
16 The then WB Sector management decided not tender a new TSG given the difficulty and time it had taken in finding
interested parties during the first selection process. A number of qualified parties did not take part in the selection
process when they learned that grants management was not part of the services to be delivered. 17 The loss of the TSG had relatively modest impact on project performance, with the exception of some deliverables,
including a communications strategy, and some discontinuity in response to the capacity building (CB) assessments
initially led by them (see Annex on CB for more details). 18 IKA (Indonesia untuk Kemanusiaan), Bina Swadaya and PKBI (Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia) 19 More recently, the Bank has recognized the transaction costs involved in repeated AFs to a small grant project of this
nature, and has endorsed an approach whereby a full budget envelope may be indicated prospectively at project
inception, with tranches captured through amendments to existing Grant Agreements, rather than full AFs. This
institutional learning had not been captured at the time of PNPM Peduli. 20Marginalized Groups in PNPM-Rural, World Bank, 2010.
6
work and proved an example of a successful ‘knowledge into programming’ feedback loop. The
Project responded to GoI’s priorities for more inclusive and equitable development which aligned
with the WB Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) Core Engagement 3 - Community
Development and Social Protection. The Project enabled the WB to support GoI in working with
CSOs to improve the capacity and accountability of these non-state organizations in addressing
Indonesia’s development objectives.
Project Design
The Project design focus on testing and learning - both operational and substantive - to better
integrate marginalized groups into government poverty alleviation programs and services more
broadly21, was highly valid and relevant, particularly given:
social exclusion was a relatively new, but a priority, area of interest for the WB and GoI;
the complexities inherent in addressing participation of and reaching out to marginalized
groups in a vast and diverse archipelago such as Indonesia; and
the challenges of developing a new business model for WB grant making. Unlike the regular
PNPM program, under the Peduli project, grants were provided to CSOs rather than directly
to communities. This involved the WB working closely with national CSOs to find
appropriate processes that met WB quality, fiduciary and safeguards requirements, while also
ensuring a viable on-granting delivery model.
On the other hand, the design did not fully anticipate issues which later emerged during
implementation including:
divergent expectations - some stakeholders envisioned the Project as a direct poverty
alleviation tool for specific groups, while others identified it as a CSO capacity building
program, and others as a means to influence the discussion on marginalization (and later
Social Inclusion) in GoI by providing supporting knowledge;
coordination - the Project provided a good learning opportunity, but did not provide sufficient
mechanisms for effective coordination and sharing with other GoI-implemented PNPM
projects22;
implementation arrangements – the failed engagement with a local consultancy firm to
provide implementation services;
WB systems adaptation - while EOs with experience running on-granting programs
(including for other donors) were selected, these CSOs were not familiar with WB systems,
which were also not set up with granting to CSOs in mind23, resulting in some bottlenecks.
21 Initial focus was on experiential field-based learning whereas attention to policy dialogue and influencing were later
emphasized following recommendations of the MTR (2012) which directed the proposed Phase II design. 22 While the origin of the Project was in the PNPM Mandiri experience, the pilot supported an evolution in thinking
away from PNPM as the sole or best vehicle for addressing social inclusion to consideration of broader opportunities in
wider government and CSO programming. 23 EOs and CSOs found the WB procurement procedures complicated and onerous with guidelines that were not user-
friendly, even when utilizing the simplest competitive procurement method. The EO and CSO challenges in
implementing WB procurement processes, combined with poor financing timeframes, have had a significant negative
impact on timeliness of program delivery. Notably however, as the project continued, the WB agreed on the need to
further simplify the procurement procedures for CSOs resulting in an adjusted procurement guidance booklet being
adopted.
7
Participating Partners and Stakeholder Commitment
The Project was unique in that it involved an extensive number of stakeholders spanning GoI,
multiple donors to the PSF, WB, and partners from civil society and the private sector:
The Joint Management Committee (JMC)24 provided strong support, with the approval in
2013 of financing for a second phase as evidence of their commitment.
The Deputy Minister in KemenkoKesra, one of GoI’s Coordinating Ministries, played a
prominent role as part of his mandated oversight of all PNPM efforts. However, while this
role was highly welcomed, interaction with wider GoI stakeholders would have further
highlighted the added value of CSO involvement in development activities and helped create
additional political space for such GoI-CSO partnerships.
WB support at the corporate and country level was strong during the preparation and early
implementation of the Project. WB responsiveness to resolving procedural issues experienced
by EOs provided evidence of its commitment to establishing an effective and efficient system
for financing CSOs in Indonesia.
The Task Team, whose role increased with the termination of the TSG, were:
dedicated to make the Project work and ensure continuous GoI-WB-CSO collaboration;
committed to simultaneously provide Project oversight, and timely and tailored technical
assistance to the EOs; and while understaffed25, the Task Team developed approaches
and tools26 for and with the EOs that could be used with their local CSOs;
catalytic in expanding discussions related to issues of marginalisation and social
inclusion up the corporate chain, linking pro-actively with efforts led by the Social
Development anchor in Washington on the Inclusion Matters flagship report.
The TSG was assigned to provide key implementation support functions, but quality issues
and differing expectations resulted in early, but mutually agreed termination of the contract.
EOs benefited from the opportunity to be able to work with new and existing CSO partners
and showed commitment in dealing with them in often difficult circumstances, partly due to
disbursement delays and lack of clarity in funding commitments.
CSOs were able to expand their beneficiary reach. They maintained strong interest in the
program despite, at times, feeling dependent on decisions from the donor or under-supported
as budget releases were delayed and Phase II commitments altered27.
Assessment of risks and mitigation
No significant risks were identified in the Design Note and risks related to the capacity of the
EOs in working with and properly targeting marginalized groups and the capacity for on-granting
24The JMC is the governing body of the PSF Trust Fund, chaired by Bappenas (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan
Nasional/ National Development Planning Agency), and comprises representatives of GoI and PSF donors. The JMC
was the key decision maker regarding Peduli funding and provided periodic inputs on the strategic direction and
oversight of the Project and reviewed its progress. 25 The envisioned selection of both a knowledge management and a livelihoods expert did not materialize. 26 A key example is the Quality Assurance Tool developed to help EOs operationalize the concept of social inclusion
such that they could check both the content of the programs and the process of implementing them against clear and
concrete standards. This was developed jointly by Task Team and EOs based on field testing with CSO partners. 27Refer to Implementation for further elaboration.
8
were rated low. Risks in relation to EO capacity to comply with WB standards were significantly
under-estimated at inception and a substantial effort was required to support them in these areas.
2.2 Implementation
While originally conceived as the pilot phase of a prospective longer term intervention, the
Project was, in the end, implemented from July 2011 to November 2014. Implementation was
marked by periodic delivery of relatively small tranches of Additional Financing and associated
Grant Agreement (GA) extensions28 to EOs, but without any formal longer term commitment,
beyond each GA extension.
The PDO reflected the goal of building the capacity of local partners to address the needs of
marginalized groups through a cascade approach which was reflected in the components, i.e.,
building the capacity of the national EOs to strengthen capacity of their CSO partners to
effectively work through CSO projects with marginalized groups.
The delivery strategy for the individual components was less explicit, especially regarding CB by
EOs to CSOs and CSOs to the beneficiaries. Project proposals of EOs reflected the intent of the
CB efforts, but delivery, while moderately effective, was limited by:
the relatively limited human and budget resource29 allocation for CB;
the on-going discussion among GoI and PSF stakeholders about prioritizing CSO capacity-
building or direct poverty alleviation investments to the beneficiaries; and
a somewhat limited knowledge base of EOs about the specific nature of addressing
marginalized groups (and later social inclusion issues).
At the Project level, implementation challenges stemmed from:
1. The competing demands between organizational capacity building and poverty alleviation.
While the PDO and two of the three sub-objectives clearly identified the Project as an
organizational capacity development project, originally KemenkoKesra gave greater emphasis
to improvements in the economic welfare of marginalized groups, Given this emphasis, the
largest proportion of Peduli supported projects (88% at MTR; 72% by end of project)30
worked on activities with a focus on income generating activities.
While the TSG-led organizational capacity assessments were considered useful by the
partners, there were insufficient resources (time, funds and staff) to implement the emerging
CB plans and TSG leadership on this was interrupted by their termination. As a result, the
main CB activities focused on EO project personnel rather than on broader organizational
development as originally intended.
28The process of AF from drafting paperwork to funds being available in CSO designated bank accounts took up to 3
months, even longer for disbursements to small local CSOs. This meant that every few months the Task Team and
CSOs entered into the same lengthy administrative process even though program funds had been committed. 29EOs dealt with a high number of local CSOs spread over a wide geographical area, which impacted the cost of CB-
efforts. 30 Holden D. et all (2012), PNPM Peduli, One Year On, Independent Review of Lessons Learned, Pg 32
9
EOs were similarly limited to addressing the most immediate needs articulated by their
partners. Recognising that EOs could not be wholly responsible for the delivery of CB efforts,
the Task Team found various ways to resource their CB efforts. This included providing
funds for EOs to hire external assistance for their own and their partner CB activities and
direct mentoring and training delivered by the Task Team and other WB personnel,
particularly on topics of monitoring, evaluation, learning, reporting, procurement and
financial management.
2. Mid Term Review (MTR) – a turning point
The MTR identified:
a need to shift the focus from economic marginalization to social inclusion issues while
ensuring a clear overall vision to unite stakeholders efforts and a focus on specific issues,
causes and/or groups31;
a number of emerging tensions among stakeholder groups in their interpretation of the
ultimate Project objectives 32;
the need for a new knowledge-to-policy focus in which EOs would engage more with
government entities to provide learning and evidence to back policy change in favor of
marginalized groups.
EOs agreed that the conceptual shifts emerging from the MTR, although challenging, were
very relevant to their work. Shared reflections on social inclusion during the design process
for Phase II generated dynamism in their approach to programming, in which the EOs
without exception readily engaged. This is considered one of the most significant
accomplishments of the Project33.
The Task Team followed MTR recommendations in preparing for the expected Phase II.
3. World Bank understanding and support of the Project.
WB was very supportive at the outset in establishing the architecture for the delivery of the
Project. The task Team support was strong, resulting in adaptation of business systems and
improved understanding about the new business model. Awareness internally was raised
about the Project’s scope and issues of exclusion and marginalization that were useful for the
broader WB and PNPM community34. At the same time, the Project experienced frequent
leadership changes, some at critical phases, which can now be seen to have contributed to
delays in WB planning and financing approvals.
31Holden D. et all (2012), PNPM Peduli, One Year On, Independent Review of Lessons Learned, Pg 19-20 32 The MTR identified the following tensions: social vs economic development; rights vs welfare; civil society vs
technocratic approaches; thematic targeting or vulnerability and poverty targeting; geographic vs thematic scope; and
scope vs impact. It also highlighted the tension between the Project as a poverty alleviation project or as a capacity
development program for CSOs to be able to work on marginalization and social exclusion and in the long-run build a
network of CSOs who could empower excluded groups and support social inclusion initiatives. 33 In particular, EOs cited that the use of root cause analysis for social exclusion had inspired them to design other
projects in a different way including increased engagement with new stakeholders. One EO stated that they now have a
more “systemic process in developing social change plans”. 34 In early 2013, WB headquarters endorsed the flagship report ‘Inclusion Matters’ and positioned this as central to the
Bank’s current twin goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity.
10
Recently, the refocusing of the role of WB in Indonesia and the restructuring of the WB PSF
portfolio has meant that support for PNPM Peduli-like interventions and partnerships with
CSOs has changed35.
The hand-over of Phase II to DFAT was received with mixed feelings and some
dissatisfaction with the process by EOs36 and their CSO partners given that, based on the mid-
2013 JMC decision, the WB task team had already been working with them to develop
proposals for Phase II37. Considerable resources had been invested by beneficiaries, CSOs,
EOs and the WB.
Amongst these stakeholders on the recipient side, while the WB management decision had
been taken to consolidate the portfolio and minimize the transaction costs of smaller scale
engagements, an impression was given that the WB had little consideration for the impact of
its decisions on beneficiaries, particularly civil society, as articulated during the ICR
consultation process.
4. Management Issues
Workloads – As a result of engaging on the MTR recommendations, the workload of EOs
and the Task Team significantly increased. The EOs were implementing Pilot activities
while also designing Phase II proposals, including conducting social assessments and
related analysis. The Task Team were also required to provide technical and operational
mentoring and assistance to EOs for both sets of activities whilst carrying forward
dialogue on the Project’s future and redesign.
Role expectations – Within ‘a grant partnership environment’ there is a need for the
supervising entity to ensure fine balancing of due diligence/oversight with
implementation support activities, ensuring that partners have the space to implement
their projects.38 The fact that the expanded Task Team fulfilled both roles sometimes
hampered strategic communications with EOs as it was difficult to maintain a ‘light
touch’ oversight approach while providing technical support.
Identity –The absence of clear branding resulted in the Project being identified variously
as a World Bank program financed by a loan or grant (a sensitive and sometimes
threatening issue amongst the broader CSO community), a GoI program (as it was linked
with PNPM), or an EO or CSO program.
The absence of a communication strategy39 made sharing of lessons, collaboration and
interaction with government more ad hoc than systematic.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
35 Refer to Section 1.7 Significant Changes – pointer 4. 36 The proposals from the EOs had already gone through a rigorous technical review process and been approved at the
PSF level. Unfortunately under the new DFAT supported program of Peduli Phase II a number of the CSOs are not
involved. 37Previously USD250,000 was earmarked for EOs (and IPs) to prepare proposals for Phase II. 38This concern was specific to the core (Project)Task Team and not for other WB personnel (financial management,
procurement, etc) but signals the importance of having clear role expectations and documented policies and procedures. 39The communication strategy development was part of the agreement between PNPM Peduli and TSG but was never
finalized after the collaboration ceased.
11
M&E Design: While the M&E design outlined in the PID was fairly minimal, a set of KPIs
based on the PDO and an M&E system were later developed in consultation with the EOs in
order to guide routine monitoring and reporting needs. The KPIs reflect the GoI’s primary
concerns in the Pilot phase, in particular related to EOs/CSO capacity and fiduciary management,
participation of excluded men, women and transgender people, and timely completion of sub
project activities. Some weakness is found in the breadth of the PDO and the resulting range of
RF indicators, which aimed to cover the divergent expectations of stakeholders with respect to
both CSOs and communities as beneficiaries. Owing to the demand-driven nature of the project,
which did not pre-identify sub-grant recipients, nor prescribe in which areas/sectors these CSO
activities with communities would be conducted, an overarching project baseline was not
conducted at the sub-grant level, and was only carried out at the EO level, to benchmark capacity
needs and changes. A revised set of KPIs and full Results Framework were drafted with EOs and
other stakeholders as part of Phase II preparation, refining the project target groups and building
on the pilot experience and results of the MTR.
M&E Implementation: The Task Team took on responsibility for M&E support after the TSG
was discontinued with additional monitoring conducted by the WB/PSF field, fiduciary and
safeguards teams. KPIs were regularly40 reported against, fulfilling both Bank and JMC reporting
requirements and several workshops were conducted with EOs to improve project performance
based on emerging results. An independent MTR report was commissioned41 and CSOs and EOs
prepared project completion reports as required, albeit with variable quality.
EOs reported improved capacity for M&E including logframe design, conduct of community
assessments and better data collection (including a reduction in double counting). However, the
cascade approach for M&E involving the Task Team, EOs and CSOs was ambitious42, given the
short timeframe, geographic coverage and diversity of sub projects, as well as limited EO and
CSO capacity. The absence of dedicated CSO M&E personnel, plus relatively weak
documentation of findings by local level CSOs created their own challenges. Despite these
limitations, there were clear improvements in EO capacity for M&E over time, due mostly to
intensive coaching and mentoring from the Task Team. The web-based MIS-system development,
while initiated, was not completed by the contracted MIS consultant. This gap in ‘live’ systems
meant the Task Team relied heavily on EO progress reports for data, combined with field visits
and related team reports.
M&E Utilization: Quantitative and qualitative data were used to compile reports and produce
information on the Project for JMC, WB, donors and the broader community which enhanced
stakeholder support for the Project and increased their awareness of social inclusion priorities,
risks and benefits - one of the objectives of the pilot phase. Qualitative data was routinely
discussed with EOs and informed program strategies, including identifying areas for additional
capacity development. In a sufficient number of cases, M&E data proved instrumental in being
used with Local Governments to decide on further action in favor of the marginalized43. The
40 The KPIs are reported in quarterly, semi-annually (ISR) and annual reports. 41 Holden D. et al, PNPM Peduli, One Year On, Independent Review of Lessons Learned. PSF, Jakarta, October 2012. 42 CSOs monitored their projects and reported to EOs who supplemented this information with their own field visits
and communication by phone and emails. 43 For example: the CSO SSS Pundi has developed a monitoring database on the Suku Anak Dalam (SAD), nomadic
indigenous groups in Dharmasraya District (West Sumatra) through a satellite mapping exercise that has enabled the
District Health Office in Dharmasraya to now target and conduct regular health checks for SAD communities via
mobile clinic where these communities reside.
12
MTR findings were significant in guiding Phase II preparation by redirecting the Project towards
social as well as economic marginalization and greater learning on social inclusion.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
The Project used the WB’s updated PNPM Implementation Guidelines on Social and
Environmental Safeguards (IGSES) as the main compliance and guidance instrument, with the
project’s category B classification signaling that it was unlikely to lead to significant adverse
social and environment impacts.
Two safeguard policies were, however, triggered: (i) Environmental Assessment, and (ii)
Indigenous Peoples. WB assessments found that, overall, safeguard compliance was satisfactory
throughout implementation and no specific issues were observed. At the same time, beyond
compliance, findings indicate that EOs and partners had not fully understood the safeguards they
were applying and how they informed their own and their partners’ project designs. The task
team has therefore taken lessons from the project’s social and environmental safeguard
experience and incorporated these into a Quality Assurance Tool for project implementation that
is being finalized at the time of ICR preparation and will be made available to other projects.
Financial Management: Reviews were done at least once a year in order to assess whether the
project financial management system was functioning as required and all project funds being used
for intended purposes. Limited transaction reviews were conducted both at EO level and at the
CSO partner’s offices.
Overall, financial management in the project was rated as Moderately Satisfactory during the
project period. Internal control systems worked well; IFRs were submitted on time; and Audit
Reports were submitted on time and with unqualified opinions. However, submission of financial
reports and supporting documentation from CSO partners to EOs was not routinely on time.
These delays enabled provision of feedback to CSO partners and identification of FM capacity
building required by CSO partners and monitoring of follow-up of recommendations to CSO
partners.
The Task Team responded directly to occasional complaints reported by partners, mostly related
to lengthy processes and WB procedures on disbursement. Only two cases of fraud were reported
during the Project period, which were pro-actively responded to by EOs and the task team, and
were addressed to the satisfaction of both the Bank and the local community44.
Overall, four significant lessons on EOs’ Financial Management Systems were learned from the
PNPM Peduli Project experience: (i) as the project was managed by established non-
governmental organizations (EOs) with a good Financial Management system, all mandatory
financial reporting including IFRs and external audit reports were submitted on-time and with
unqualified opinions respectively; (ii) long process verification of the supporting documents for
CSO partners’ disbursement was common, due to the late submission of CSO reports. This
resulted in delays to any required follow up actions. Under a Peduli-like model, EOs should
prioritize and ensure that CSO partners submit the accounted reports regularly as required in the
grant agreement; (iii) EOs should visit CSO partners at least once a year for field supervision and
44A complaints handling mechanism had been planned as part of the overall project MIS but was never fully completed
and operationalized.
13
in order to provide direct and timely feedback on any operational issues; and (iv) Capacity
building to CSO partners on fiduciary practices should be given prior to the project
implementation and followed by refreshment trainings during the project implementation.
Procurement: In March 2013, the Project introduced further simplified procedures for
procurement to meet EOs and CSOs needs through revisions of the original procurement
procedures specified in the Project Operation Manual and with issuance of a dedicated guideline
for CSOs in carrying out Procurement of Goods, Non-consulting services, Works, and Consulting
Services (“the Booklet for Procurement”). “The Booklet for Procurement” included specific
guidance for further strengthening the procurement procedures and standard forms for EOs/CSOs
to enable greater competitiveness, economy, efficiency and transparency in the procurement
process.
The Bank allowed EOs and CSOs to use their own procurement forms and procedures, which
were reviewed and found to be consistent with the key procurement principles of the Bank's
Guidelines and to the extent that they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Grant or
Sub-Grant, while providing guidance on good procurement practices for further improvement.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
Learning lessons from the TSG experience and subsequent expanded Task Team, the Phase II
Project Concept Note (PCN) prepared by the Task Team included a shift in grant administration
and implementation support from the PSF to TAF in their role as MP45.
With the eventual shift of Phase II from WB to DFAT, the project will continue and, having
drawn lessons from the Pilot, will target outreach efforts to six key identity groups. The WB has,
however, lost its direct channel to operationalize social inclusion efforts in Indonesia. New
avenues are however being explored through the programmatic AAA related to Village Law
Implementation in Indonesia.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
Rating for Relevance of Objective: High
The Project objectives continue to have high strategic relevance for Indonesia and remain well
aligned with the Bank’s country strategy. Social inclusion is embedded in the World Bank's
current twin goals46 at the global level. Consistent with these global level goals, the Project’s
PDO and its activities also directly supported the Indonesia CPS by contributing new knowledge
regarding inclusive development and improving service delivery to marginalized groups as well
as by focusing on non-state actors from civil society.
The recent release of the WB flagship report ‘Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared
45 This decision recognised the value of an experienced third party (selected through a competitive selection of grant
recipient process process) to better address challenges regarding financing, program support and CB of partners to
enable them to achieve social inclusion objectives. 46 i.e. eliminating extreme poverty by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity, measured as the income of the bottom 40
percent in any given country
14
Prosperity’47 included video testimonials48 from beneficiaries of PNPM Peduli. This highlights
the close alignment of the Project with the higher WB goals and the contribution of operational
lessons learned on social inclusion in Indonesia to higher level policy fora.
While the previous Government had given high priority to inclusive growth, as reflected in its
National Mid Term Development Plan (RPJMN 2009-2014), the current President Jokowi’s nine
priority “Nawa Cita” for his 2014-2019 presidency also endorse the high priority to inclusive
growth reflected in the RPJMN 2015-2019. The government has a range of legislative and policy
provisions in place that give recognition to the situation of specific groups as targeted under the
project.
Rating for Relevance of Design: Substantial
The Project’s design and implementation arrangements are not typical within the Bank’s portfolio.
Bank support for this Project was different in that: (i) it provided grants from a Trust Fund
directly to national CSOs as recipients to build capacity of down-stream civil society
organizations; (ii) it contracted a TSG to provide implementation support (but not grants
management); and, (iii) it used a sizeable BETF for oversight and implementation support.
The design provided the opportunity to implement a pilot approach which enabled learning-by-
doing in a relatively new programming area for government and civil society, with a significant
achievement in the deepened understanding among stakeholders about issues of social inclusion.
The results of intensive stakeholder discussions, the iterative learning process related to issues of
social inclusion and adaptations in design of the project’s second phase kept the program fully
relevant.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objective
Rating: Substantial
PNPM Peduli was successful in substantially achieving the key elements of its development
objective of strengthening the capacities of Indonesian CSOs to reach and empower marginalized
groups to improve their socio-economic conditions, as reflected in the delivery of component
activities, the attainment of key targets at both outcome and intermediate outcome levels, the
economic analysis findings and as captured in the Capacity Building assessment report.
The PDO covers two principal expected outcomes: (i) one at the level of increased CSO
capacity; and (ii) the other at the level of empowered marginalized groups.
On the first outcome, the results of the Project are visible on two levels: national level CSOs (the
EOs) and local level CSOs. For national CSOs, a priority was to improve their skills to be able to
reach out and support the local CSOs, whereas the local CSOs where supported in empowering
their communities. The two levels comprised a mechanism that can be used by donors and/or GoI
to support local action in the future.
47http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2013/09/23/inclusion-matters-foundation-of-shared-prosperity 48 Videos produced included: Transgender Story (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1GaZBk9oIQ); Indigenous
People Story (Suku Anak Dalam) ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XyRF-W3qsck); Female Sex Workers
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TEFDC1106rY) and PNPM Peduli Phase I (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwPEe7VEb_Y)
15
Both EOs and CSOs acknowledged that participation in the Project has strengthened their
capacities with regard to financial and grant management, technical implementation and capacity
to increase quality of engagement with stakeholders, especially local governments. The RF target
for CSO staff participating in CB activities was exceeded by 42% (see Annex 2). The RF target
for EO attainment of and compliance with WB fiduciary standards was met at 100%. With
reference to the outcome level indicator seen as a direct result of CB to the CSOs - # community
groups/village branches engaging with local government on rights, access to services and
improved livelihoods - from the 66 local CSO partners, 59 reported active engagement with local
government and, within that group, 38 collaborated successfully with 44 district/cities or
provincial governments on issues related to marginalized groups, leading to changes in local
policies, funding allocation, and/or practice49.
Based on ICR interviews and the final CB assessment process undertaken by the Project (see
Annex 6), broader organizational practices at the EO level improved against the baseline, in
addition to positive influences on the partner project implementing teams, including:
First - an increase in willingness of EOs to reach out to other stakeholders to share learning,
improve program implementation and advocate for key groups. Some EOs and partners came to
the Project with a wide stakeholder network and were encouraged to strengthen and utilize those
connections to address issues of exclusion. For others, networking and advocacy were new
concepts, so they were challenged to engage strategically with entities outside their usual circles
for a common goal.
Secondly – enhanced ability to identify the challenges faced by excluded groups and
enhanced understanding of social inclusion. This includes the ability to develop appropriate
measures for addressing exclusion 50 , an achievement specifically recognized by the Deputy
Minister of KemenkoKesra and Head of the National Oversight Working Group for PNPM during
the “PNPM Peduli Phase 1 Closing Workshop” (August 2014).
Thirdly - significant learning in program logic development, monitoring and data
collection/verification and analysis. In early design of Phase II, crafting a theory of change and
resulting logframes was a major lesson for the EOs in terms of program logic, causality, and
measuring intended changes. Another example is the Quality Assurance Tool developed jointly
by Task Team and EOs, that enabled EOs to better monitor implementation quality, checking
both program substance and processes against clear standards.
Fourthly – increased understanding of fiduciary processes, transparency and accountability
principles. Participation in the Project has strengthened EOs capacity with regard to financial,
49 For example: Following up on the MoU signed in 2012 between the CSO SSS Pundi and the District Head of
Dharmasraya, the Local Government developed and budgeted for a five year strategic plan for a Suku Anak Dalam
Community Empowerment program that committed the LG to improve the lives of indigenous people, including with
access to land for traditional land use purposes. Other examples include: an MoU was signed between PKBI Bengkulu
(CSO partner) and the District Law and Human Rights Office that enabled youth in correctional facilities to have
access to health services and other activities conducted by PKBI Bengkulu; 40 parents of street children were enabled
access to a cash transfer program under the Social Affairs District Office of East Jakarta, etc. 50 EOs now appreciate that a livelihoods approach can provide an entry point to address social inclusion, but that it
alone is not sufficient. Instead, a rights-based approach and emphasis on interventions such as access to public services,
citizenship, social protection and legal and social inclusion more broadly are necessary.
16
administrative, procurement and contract management improving their grant making procedures
and oversight mechanisms.
Fifthly – more experience interacting with donors. EOs feel that engaging in demanding WB
processes such as financial audits has increased their confidence in engaging with other donors.
All EOs independently reported that their relationships both with each other and the Bank Task
Team were the most valuable gains from the experience and that such communication and trust-
building is something they will foster with other donor partners.
Notwithstanding these achievements, EOs recognise that their strategies to support their partners
could be strengthened in some areas, particularly in relation to working on issues of social
inclusion and addressing discriminatory (national and local) regulations as well as community
prejudices and negativity towards certain excluded groups and “invisible people”. Other areas for
continued improvement, according to the EOs, include knowledge-to-policy work, knowledge
management, advocacy strategies and a more comprehensive understanding of social inclusion
programming.
It is also appropriate to note that the degree and pattern of influence on the systems of local CSOs
was quite varied. Sustainable capacity development at the organizational level of local small
CSOs is a long term and high resource endeavor, whereas, under this pilot Project, organizational
CB implemented by the EOs was relatively ‘light touch’ and more specific to the needs of project
delivery. It was found that the number of specific and locally targeted CB efforts conducted was
relatively limited in scope and participation.
On the second outcome of empowered marginalized communities, the second outcome level
indicator – # total direct beneficiaries from among marginalized groups (disaggregated by
gender) – addresses only the scope of project reach with respect to the targeted communities, but
project data positively indicates that the Project’s final target of 15,000 beneficiaries was
exceeded by more than 30% with 19,645 marginalized individuals reached. This number
consisted of 11,494 or 58.5% female; 7,684 or 39.1% male; and 467 or 2.4% transgender51. As a
proxy for empowerment and an indicator of the concerned communities pursuing social and
economic change in their circumstances, among these beneficiaries, project data records a total of
13,254 people reported increased access to health and education services (67.5% of beneficiaries)
and 6,026 (30.7%) engaged in economic livelihood or income generating activities (IGAs), the
likely ‘empowerment’ benefits of which, in economic terms, are underscored by the analysis in
Section 3.3.
As detailed in Annex 2, other indicators relevant to this outcome captured the number and range
of activities working with the target communities to empower them through provision of
information, skills, participation in economic opportunities and access to services. Exceeding its
targets for these indicators, the Project, through its 72 CSOs, partnered to implement activities in
231 villages in 91 districts across 25 provinces throughout Indonesia, strengthening a total of 442
community groups, comprising individuals not previously reached by GoI or other projects.
Observations during field visits and consultations for both the MTR and ICR showed that the
community level beneficiaries were able to identify drivers and constraints of their exclusion and
demonstrated improved capacity to engage with local government and also the private sector in
51 Peduli is the first WB project in Indonesia that specifically disaggregates by transgender status.
17
advocating for their rights and needs. They showed increased awareness of both issues and the
benefits to organizing for their interests and participating more actively in broader community
meetings. This has led to increased access to resources that have sustainably impacted on their
incomes. For example, community advocacy for continued CSR funding from PT Badak (one
large LNG company in East Kalimantan) regularly supports women’s groups in three remote
villages in East Kalimantan to improve their IGAs. In some cases, this has also increased
community tolerance towards those who have traditionally been stigmatized. For example, a
dance group comprised of transgender persons has now been formally registered as the only
transgender dance group in the Local Office of Culture of West Java Province.
Taken together, the available project data for key input, output and intermediate outcome
indicators, in addition to qualitative data, the completed CB assessments and field level findings,
support that the capacities of Indonesian CSOs under PNPM Peduli have been increased to
successfully reach and empower marginalized communities.
3.3 Efficiency
Rating: Substantial
That exclusion creates economic costs is clear from studies summarized in the WB report
Inclusion Matters: The Foundations for Shared Prosperity52 . Although there are significant
methodological challenges in measuring the cost of exclusion, some efforts have been made, for
example in a World Bank project targeting Roma people, an ethnic group in Europe53 which
could provide an approach for future investments in Indonesia. However, measures of the direct
financial costs of social exclusion across different segments of society in Indonesia do not yet
exist, making it difficult to develop an economic rate of return measure for the Project.
It should also be noted that, from the outset, the PNPM Peduli pilot was not intended as an
operation that would aim to achieve a higher return on the cost of capital invested, nor to be a
least cost operation in its delivery. WB and GoI stakeholders envisioned it to be a high cost
experimental endeavor necessitating considerable investments of both financial and human
resources given the goal of reaching highly marginalized groups by partnering with (and
investing in) local level CSOs and addressing the imbalance of investment in the hard-to-reach
populations.
Nonetheless, as part of the ICR process, economic models to try and estimate the net present
value of the project, under different scenarios were estimated (please see Annex 3 for fuller
details). At a range of set (favourable, but reasonable) assumed income increase rates – one more
optimistic and one a more reasonable base case – the analysis asked what would the discount
rate/IRR have to have been for the project to break even in economic investment terms (= Net
Present Value (NPV) zero)? For the (more conservative) base case income increases, analysis
indicates that, for Peduli investments, this is an IRR/discount rate of 7.8%. While not regarded
as an optimal IRR threshold in terms of pure financial market investment terms, it is arguably
quite reasonable as far as a ‘social’ rate of return for this project goes.
52Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity, World Bank 2013 53A World Bank report on the Roma (ethnic minority in Europe) estimates annual productivity losses caused by their
exclusion ranging from €231 million in Serbia to €887 million in Romania (de Laat 2010).
18
The other way the analysis looked at the project is not what the rate of return is (using the
assumptions of a (social) discount rate of 6.1%, 10 years length of benefits and starting income
levels at the poverty level), but what would the annual increases in income over 10 years have to
be over that time period (for the different investment areas of access to services, economic
livelihoods and social justice) in order to break even with an NPV equal to zero?
Looking at the discount rates used for other comparable social programs (e.g., the MCC here in
Indonesia, which uses a rate of 10%), on that basis, the rates for economic livelihoods (13.20%)
and access to services (9.55%) break even or are very close to it. However, the same cannot be
said for social justice, where the rate was 8.7%. It should be noted that the majority of grants
(72%) supported activities for economic development and to a less extent for access to services
(26%). There were few social justice activities funded during this first Phase (2%).
Based on an understanding of the program, activity areas and the target group, the assumptions
made about income level (around the poverty rate) are reasonable and the discount rate of 6.10%,
while low in purely financial terms, is also reasonable in social terms. The key question on which
this analysis turns is on length of benefits and how long these can be assumed to endure. We do
not have actual data on that and so have made an assumption of 10 years.
From the overall analysis, we can state that, under favorable, but reasonable, assumptions about
the degree and length of benefits, and given the distribution of grant investment areas with a
weighting to livelihoods support, the overall NPV of the project is positive. However, from the
further breakdown, one may also posit that the assumptions made around enduring benefits are
more plausible for the economic livelihoods investments than for others.
In addition to the standard efficiency terms, the WB’s investment provided added value through
the Project’s engagement in five different ways: (i) providing technical leadership and developing
new practices for reaching marginalized groups – an issue not specifically addressed by other
donors or GoI; (ii) providing exemplary strong fiscal oversight and CB support of CSOs and
ensuring that funding reaches the target beneficiaries; (iii) increasing the understanding of social
inclusion and building a pool of service providers at national and local level able to engage with
others on these issues, including bridging relations between GoI (Kemenko Kesra) and EOs; (iv)
linking the Project to the WB’s global social inclusion initiatives and building awareness across
the WBs social development portfolio; and, (v) preparing for Peduli Phase II through
considerable investment of resources. Factoring in all these elements, the efficiency of PNPM
Peduli – a project that was not originally conceived of in terms of strictly economic goals – has
been significant.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
Combining the three elements of outcome, based on relevance, achievement of PDO, and
efficiency as described above, the rating of MS reflects the Project’s overall outcome.
Relevance - The Project was (and is) highly consistent with the priorities of GoI and the Bank
CPS for Indonesia. The design remained relevant throughout the implementation period. The
Project has contributed to perceptions of social inclusion in Indonesia and, indeed, worldwide
through the Bank’s cross-learning, and sustained donor funding will ensure support for GoI’s
continued efforts to find programmatic solutions to better empower socially excluded groups.
Looking forward, while the signs for sustainability are positive, this will only become fully
evident under Phase II.
19
Achievement of PDO – As explained above, the Project has substantially achieved its
development objective by exceeding achievement of the outcome indicators in terms of building
the capacity of CSOs to reach and empower marginalized groups. In addition, and as supported
by the economic data, socio economic conditions of the targeted groups have also been shown to
have improved. Minor shortcomings are seen however in the breadth of the PDO, the challenge
in calibrating related indicators and the differing emphases placed by stakeholders on differing
dimensions of that PDO.
Efficiency - The economic models built to try and estimate the NPV of the project, under
different scenarios, have shown the project to be efficient, given that under favorable, but
reasonable, assumptions about the degree and length of benefits, and given the distribution of
grant investment areas (with a weighting to the better performing livelihoods investments), the
overall NPV of the project is positive.
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development The Project has directly addressed key social development challenges in Indonesia of more
equitable development opportunities for marginalized men, women and transgender communities.
At the outset, the focus of most subprojects was on poverty reduction and livelihoods
development for these groups. As the project evolved, new learning emerged that addressing
income poverty – while critical and often correlated with exclusion –was not the sole need. A
broader theory of change recognizing multiple pathways for addressing social exclusion (e.g.
access to services and justice; fulfilment of human rights; etc) is being taken forward under Phase
II as a result.
The Project played a significant role in positioning WB Indonesia in the higher level discourse
led by the Social Inclusion cluster of what is now GSURR, contributing to global discussion and
strategy development. At the country level, the Project’s experiences have helped pave the way
for further diagnostics in the WB portfolio, specifically related to appropriate community
engagement strategies and social inclusion as a cross-cutting theme related to implementation of
the new Village Law. The Project also played a part in the WB decision to designate a senior
level focal point for Gender and Social Inclusion for the broader portfolio in PSF.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
The efforts by the Task Team to further simplify processes for procurement and grant-making
succeeded in the development of a ‘CSO guidebook – in conducting Procurement of Goods, Non-
consulting Services, Works, and Consulting Services (“the Booklet for Procurement”)’. Further
uptake is proven as the provisions of procurement specified in “the Booklet for Procurement” are
now included in the Project Operation Manual and Sub Grant Manual of the other World Bank
financed projects e.g., Creative Communities II Project.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Strengthened civil society position within Indonesia’s democratic space – Through their
participation in the Project, EOs have increased confidence in their abilities as development
partners in their own right, for the following reasons:
20
EOs were regularly present at the table with GoI actors in strategic discussions and were
given multiple opportunities to represent their programs to GoI, donors and the public,
furthering their legitimacy as development actors;
EOs successfully passed World Bank financial and programmatic audits;
EOs acted as lead designers for Phase II and passed rigorous technical proposal reviews.
Declining trust between stakeholders at different levels owing to the non-fulfillment of
promises and procedural delays - WB due diligence and internal processes often followed
slower timelines than expected by EO partners and unintentionally but commonly delayed
funding and on-granting to CSOs. As programs were crafted with constituent participation, delays
in promised funding for a number of months meant EOs had to manage expectations of their
partners and respective beneficiaries. For CSOs, this particularly threatened their ability to reach,
mobilize and build trust with their constituencies.
An extreme example is the agreement on a prospective hand-over of the Project to DFAT, with
the JMC revising its earlier decision for WB to implement Phase II. As a result of this fairly
sudden shift, EOs and CSOs had to manage significant frustration among CSO and beneficiary
stakeholders. While there was no reason to believe the project would not be well managed by
DFAT, there was a real and valid concern that preparation procedures would have to be repeated
within the new ‘authorising environment’ with no guarantees of continued involvement – borne
out for some CSOs who were not retained under Phase II.
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
See Annex 6.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Moderate
The rating reflects the fact, expressed earlier, that the efforts to learn about and institutionalize
social inclusion analysis and operational approaches at local, national and global level have
benefited from the Project. Principal stakeholders acknowledge that lessons from the Project
have been well integrated into Phase II design being taken forward by DFAT, including the
understanding that intensive CB support and technical assistance to CSOs is needed, in addition
to a decision to prioritise focus on a smaller subset of identity groups.
On the other hand, generation of lessons on application of social inclusion approaches at a much
larger scale and a related, indirect objective of integrating these into PNPM and other poverty
programs was less successful. However, institutionally in Indonesia, the experience of the Project
has been recognized as a significant contribution with KemenkoKesra requesting a scale-up of the
Project through a second phase, addressing lessons learned from the pilot approach.
Financial and technical support for the implementation of Phase II is ensured given that
Australian DFAT has committed AUD 17.9million (over a 32 month period) for implementation
of Peduli Phase II. This has now been launched under a grant to TAF, an organization with long-
term experience in addressing social inclusion issues in Indonesia and a history of facilitating
networks and coalitions among NGOs/CSOs.
21
On an organizational level, Phase II continues to work with the majority of the EOs from the Pilot
phase which guarantees that their improved capacities, experiences gained, and strengthened
relationships between actors on different levels will be built upon.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
The Project was conceptualized in response to findings from the WB Social Development team’s
analytic work related to the national level PNPM Rural program and illustrate well a knowledge-
into-practice loop. Peduli was designed specifically to respond to the findings that GoI’s
mainstream poverty instruments – broader than PNPM – were not successfully reaching the most
economically and socially marginalized groups at the local level. Preparation time for the design
was less than 6 months following on from the Marginalized People’s study (June 2010) to a final
Design Note (December 2010), indicating the Bank’s responsiveness to an identified GoI priority.
The pilot identified an appropriate CSO mechanism through which to enhance outreach to hard-
to-reach identity groups.
However, more time may have allowed the team to build increased consensus as to which aspects
of the design were the main priority, mitigating some of the later divergence in stakeholder
expectations, and allowing for upfront tightening of the broad PDO, which covers both CSOs and
marginalized groups as beneficiaries in the results chain. The Design Note recognized some
relevant sustainability risks and put in place mitigation measures for those, but it did not fully
anticipate risks related to WB direct financing to CSOs nor the establishment of a local TSG as
the main implementing body.
During preparation, the Task Team pursued further simplification of the procurement provisions
specified in the Project Operation Manual to enable the EOs to use their own procurement forms
and procedures, consistent with the key procurement principles of the Bank's Guidelines, now
captured in a revised Booklet and adopted by other WB projects.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
Through its implementation support, the Bank succeeded in ensuring:
implementation of a relatively new instrument, i.e., direct financing to CSOs to reach out to
marginalized groups;
frequent and responsive interaction with the grantees, even in difficult circumstances due to
uncertain budgets and timeframes;
more intensive oversight of project implementation after the termination of the TSG;
support to Menkokesra champions in the conceptual shift from poverty reduction to one of
dignity and social justice for the excluded;
contribution to the world wide discussion on social inclusion and that Project learning was
valuable for the Bank on a wider scale;
22
development of procurement guidelines suitable for local CSOs but still adhering to WB
fiduciary and procurement standards;
compliance with WB operational requirements during a period in which guidelines and
process steps for Small Grants was ill defined54.
On the other hand a number of issues influenced performance negatively:
Changes in personnel - while the project coordinator/co-TTL remained a constant for much of
the project timeframe, having four TTLs over the life of the Project caused some
inconsistencies in handling and affected EO relationships;
Field level implementation support missions to CSO-partners was reported by EOs to be
relatively limited, largely as a result of time and budget trade-offs between focused missions
and frequent VIP visits to the field55;
Changes in Bank leadership and related changes of course in Bank positioning and decisions
related to Phase II, with procedural and perception effects, as noted earlier;
The conceptual shift from working with the economically marginalized to socially excluded
individuals and groups was highlighted in project documents, but was not pursued through
any restructuring at the level of PDO or indicator changes, given that this was envisioned to
be addressed in the design of Phase II.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
The rating reflects the efforts of the Task Team, Sector leadership and wider WB teams to
implement an innovative design that was responsive to Indonesian CSO partners. Overcoming a
number of constraints in WB systems and processes designed to support large scale lending
operations to governments (e.g., procurement) has paved the way for improvements to future
program delivery and CSO collaboration, supporting the WB reform agenda to ensure its systems
work for ‘borrowers’ and their operations, even when not following the conventional Bank
investment model.
The rating also reflects the contribution from the Project to an increased understanding about
social inclusion in Indonesia and to the global WB agenda related to social inclusion.
Reputational risks to both the WB and EOs resulted from both shifts and delays in decision-
making which brought frustration and uuncertainties for CSO partners and beneficiaries. These
issues resulted from a higher level restructuring process to the overarching PSF financing
mechanism, as led and agreed by members of the JMC.
54 Given the pilot’s original status as a SG, instruments such as formal Aide Memoires were initially not used, and
instead, jointly produced Back to Office Reports (BTORs) were agreed upon and disseminated to stakeholders
involved. With the increased financing amount over time, and coinciding with clarification of the Bank’s Small Grant
guidelines, which were updated to be more consistent with regular investment lending and integrated with the Project
Portal, the Project was ‘grandfathered’ and then subject to ‘regular’ Bank processes and from early 2013, ISRs were
filed. 55 Once implementation started, the project attracted a high degree of donor and Government attention and the team
was frequently and suddenly called upon to prepare and/or accompany visiting delegations to the field, which reduced
the number of implementation focused monitoring visits.
23
5.2 Recipient56Performance
(a) Government57 Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
The rating reflects the level of support received from KemenkoKesra and GoI JMC members
including for AF approvals, reviews, field missions, meetings with EOs and CSOs to discuss
progress and provision of some guidance and strategic direction. Champions within this
Coordinating Ministry showed increased ownership and support as the Project developed.
Involvement in steering the Project brought about a remarkable transition in GoI champions’
views regarding marginalization, moving from a focus on economic empowerment alone towards
a broader conceptualization of inclusion and the necessity to provide broad-based opportunities
for the excluded to lead more dignified lives.
GoI’s involvement did not, however, extend to integrating learning from PNPM Peduli with other
PNPM programs, as anticipated in the Design Note. Furthermore, while KemenkoKesra was
open to consulting and collaborating with civil society and government, at times the EOs appear
to have been perceived solely as implementers of a government program, rather than as
development partners in their own right.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance58
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
This rating reflects positive considerations regarding the EOs performance in:
selection of CSOs partners based on experience working with marginalized groups;
guidance provided by the EOs to help CSOs target marginalized groups;
oversight provided and corrective action directed to the CSOs;
applying deeper understanding and application of social inclusion principles for Phase II
proposals;
ensuring that financial, procurement and fiduciary procedures met WB standards;
continuing to implement their activities despite funding uncertainty and operational
challenges of working with WB processes and procedures;
professionalism throughout the transition to DFAT in dealing with CSO partners (and their
beneficiaries) who were not included in Phase II, as originally anticipated.
It also reflects the fact that EOs and their partners were able to engage with government on issues
of marginalization and social inclusion both at national and local levels. Areas where EO
performance had shortcomings, but where some capacity gains were seen over the duration of the
project include: quality of reporting; prioritization and utilization of an adequate MIS; cascading
of information from the national to local level partners.
56 The heading has been changed from “Borrower” to “Recipient” performance. There is some sensitivity among CSOs
in public use of the word “Borrowers”, particularly when related to WB funding for CSO activities. 57 Given the unique nature of PNPM Peduli, ‘The Government’ is not the borrower but fulfilled a supportive role. 58 The 3 EOs58 as grantees of the Trust Funds are regarded as the Implementing Agencies.
24
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
This rating reflects the support from Indonesian stakeholders, including grant recipients as well as
GoI, to the Project. At the level of the EOs, it acknowledges the efforts they put in place and the
results achieved collaborating with non-traditional partners to address issues rarely confronted in
Indonesia, which contributed to the global knowledge base on marginalization and social
inclusion.
6. Lessons Learned
The following are some of the main lessons learned from the Project:
1. Direct World Bank funding to CSOs to contribute to GoI programs enables the Bank to
play a critical convening role and opens opportunities for the partners to appreciate the
added-value these different actors bring to the development process. The Bank has an entry
point to promote the role of civil society actors, open space for CSOs in national engagement,
convene a platform for the CSOs to help shape policy and enable them to play a more
strategic role on emerging policy issues of national interest.
2. Local level organizations are critical in reaching hard-to-reach groups59.Working with
EOs enabled the Project to tap into their partner CSOs’ field expertise to reach beneficiary
groups not easily accessed – physically or socially. CSO partners can play a useful role in
bridging the information/access gap between local government and excluded communities
and fill a gap in service delivery to those groups whom the government is less able to reach,
particularly in remote locations or where available services do not meet the specific needs of
the most marginalized. Local governments are not necessarily aware of the needs of
excluded groups nor specific approaches needed to address them effectively.
3. Economic poverty alleviation efforts and livelihood improvement is a useful but not
sufficient entry point for reaching excluded groups. A multifaceted approach is needed to
address the complexity of exclusionary systems/practices, particularly related to issues of
stigma and systemic discrimination. Empowerment of excluded citizens requires a rights-
based approach involving the whole community, rather than one only focused on meeting
direct and immediate material needs. Performance indicators need to capture comprehensive
information about changes to the lives of beneficiaries, for example, in access to services
(health, education legal and financial); in increased social interaction between groups (thus
measuring social cohesion); in attitudinal changes and increased participation in community
life. Such Projects would also need to monitor and measure efforts for knowledge
management and policy influence to be able to adapt and link the investment with the broader
development agenda.
4. Adapting World Bank financial and administrative processes and requirements when
granting to (national) CSOs makes them more accessible and functional for local CSO
partners in the field, while still meeting globally accepted fiduciary and governance
59 These groups include, but not limited to sex workers, transgender people, youth in prisons, victims of gross human
rights violation and street children but also marginalized groups in remote geographic locations.
25
standards60. It involves WB ensuring that performance for results, rather than compliance, to
avoid delays in implementation while still adhering to fiduciary principles. Adhering to these
modified guidelines provides the CSOs with an opportunity to ensure that their internal
systems are up to standards necessary for effective functioning but also for their long-term
legitimacy.
5. Longer-term commitment on engagement and provision of flexibility is a necessity for
pilot programs to successfully work on innovation around complex issues, enabling them
to experiment with a variety of approaches and providing evidence for the alternative
approaches emerging. It allows for a programmatic knowledge-to-policy approach focusing
on building a body of knowledge and learning on sustainable pathways to social inclusion. It
would also enable medium-term strategy development to translate the learning into policy
advice to inform the development of government policies and drive more inclusive
development outcomes.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors
(a) Grantee/Implementing agencies
(b) Cofinanciers/Donors
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
No comments received.
60‘CSO guidebook – Procuring goods, non-consulting services, and works’ a procurement procedures manual
developed based on PNPM Peduli experiences now used in other WB Projects granting with CSOs.
26
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components Original Allocation
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate (USD
millions)
Percentage of
Revised Total
1. Innovative Poverty Reduction
Projects: To create partnerships
between CSOs and marginalized
groups for implementation of
strategies to empower these
groups
2.84 6.13 216%
2. CSO partners/Sub-branches: To
strengthen Indonesian CSO
capacities to empower
marginalized groups
0.55 1.18 215%
3. Executing Organizations: To
strengthen the capacities of
Indonesian EOs to identify and
provide grants and technical
support to CSO partners that
work with and empower
marginalized groups
0.32 0.89 279%
Total Baseline Cost 3.71 8.20 221%
Physical Contingencies - - -
Price Contingencies - - -
Total Project Costs 3.71 8.20 221%
(b) Financing
Source of Funds Type of
Cofinancing
Appraisal
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Trust Funds 0.00 0.00
Indonesia - Program for Community
Empowerment 3.71 8.20 221%
27
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
The Project Development Objective of PNPM Peduli is “To strengthen the capacities of
Indonesian CSOs to reach and empower marginalized groups to improve their socio-economic
conditions.” There are two PDO Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that guided the project, as
reflected in Table 1 below:
Table 1 – PDO Indicators (Ouctome)
No. Indicator Target Achievement
1 Direct beneficiaries from marginalized groups
(male/female/transgender)
15,000
9,260 (f)-
61.7%
5,400 (m)-
36.0%
340 (t)-2.3%
19,645
11,494 (f)-
58.5%
7,684 (m)-
39.1%
467 (t)-2.4%
2 Community groups/village branches engaging with
local government on their rights, access to services and
improving livelihood
440 442
Throughout its 47 months of implementation, PNPM Peduli reached 19,645 direct beneficiaries61
that comprised 18 62 identity groups, from 442 community groups/villages branches. These
spanned 231 villages, in 91 rural districts/urban municipalities in 25 provinces where PNPM
Peduli was active. 67.5% of beneficiaries (13,254) reported improved access to health and
education services. 30.7% of beneficiaries (6,026) were engaged in micro and small income
generating activities and the remaining (1.8%) were engaged on local activities addressing access
to social justice. To achieve its objective as articulated in the PDO, PNPM Peduli focused its
activities as reflected in the three main components below:
Component 1: To create partnerships between CSOs and marginalized groups for
implementation of strategies to empower these groups. This component focused on
implementing strategies that empower marginalized groups to become more self-reliant, take
action, access services and participate in development activities. Table 2 below illustrates two
KPIs that guided the project in implementation:
Table 2: Component 1 - Key Performance Indicators (Intermediate Outcome)
No. Indicator Target Achievement
1 Total funded local projects working with marginalized
people
80 66
2 Provinces/districts/villages in which Peduli projects are
working
Provinces:24
Districts: 91
Villages: 280
Provinces: 25
Districts:91
Villages:231
61 By gender: female (58.5%), male (39.1%) and transgender (2.4%) 62 Child workers (including street children), Drug users, Sex workers, Migrant workers, People living with HIV/AIDS and other
infectious diseases, Ethnic minorities, Indigenous people, Farmers/fisher folk, Poor female headed households, People in the state
border areas, Scavengers/garbage collectors/beggars, Gay, lesbian, transgender, bisexual, Victims of conflict, Victims of natural disaster, Victims of domestic or community abuse, Victims of trafficking, Youth in conflict with the law and others.
28
This component captures the innovative sub-projects implemented by the 66 local CSOs focused
on 3 thematic areas: i) access to basic services (7 CSOs); ii) economic livelihoods (56 CSOs); and,
iii) access to social justice (3 CSOs). The geographic coverage of the project was locations in 25
Provinces and 91 Districts as shown on Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 – Geographical coverage by province (PNPM Peduli)
Component 2: To strengthen Indonesian CSO capacities to empower marginalized groups.
This component aimed to strengthen the capacity of Indonesian CSOs to act as facilitators for
marginalized people to take action, access services and participate in development processes. This
component financed capacity building activities for CSOs, such as trainings, learning forums and
peer review support. Table 3 below shows three KPIs that guided the implementation. Table 3: Component 2 - Key Performance Indicators (Intermediate Outcome)
No. Indicator Target Achievement
1 CSOs/branch partners complying with PSF Fiduciary
Standard
80 94
2 CSO/branches staff participating in capacity building
activities
147 209
3 CSO/branch partners engaging with local government
related to marginalized people
40 59
The above component captured the collaboration between Executing Organizations (EOs) and
local CSOs, including developing joint performance management plans (PMP) for capacity
building activities and performance monitoring against targets. EOs successfully built the
capacity of partner CSOs as agents of change for empowering targeted groups through training,
workshop, technical assistance and supervision. This included activities such as participatory
outreach, participatory rural appraisal (PRA), project management, gender awareness and human
rights, advocacy to local governments, communication strategies to promote social inclusion,
development of micro-enterprises, financial management and M&E. In total, 209 CSOs staff
reported increase in their technical capacity across a range of relevant topics. In particular, the
EO Project Completion Reports (PCR) reflected that there was increased capacity of local CSOs
for financial management, advocacy to government and other stakeholders, conduct of
community assessments with marginalized people, monitoring using EO instruments and project
reporting. In addition, 59 local CSOs engaged with local government and actively promoted
PNPM Peduli activities. As a result of this active engagement, 38 local CSOs have influenced
29
various changes in local policies, regulations and attitudes that concern the life of marginalized
groups in 44 rural districts/urban municipalities or provinces. Emerging changes included land
allocation for the indigenous people, trainings and technical assistance provided for the
marginalized groups, local government registration system that accommodates specific
circumstances faced by marginalized groups, and improved service delivery for the marginalized
groups.
Component 3: To strengthen the capacities of Indonesian EOs to identify and provide
grants and technical support to CSO partners that work with and empower marginalized
groups. This component aimed to strengthen the National CSOs (EOs) to manage small grants
and support local CSOs partners in working with the marginalized communities. This component
financed technical assistance, capacity support and mentoring to the EOs. Table below shows
Key Performance Indicators that guide implementation in component three.
Table 4: Component 3 - Key Performance Indicators (Intermediate Outcome)
No. Indicator Target Achievement
1 EOs complying fully with PSF Fiduciary Standards 100% 100%
This component captures the partnerships between The World Bank Peduli Task Team and
Executing Organizations (EOs). The role of the Task Team was to strengthen the three EOs on
fiduciary, project management and organizational development skills; understanding of social
inclusion; program quality assurance mechanisms, community assessment and monitoring and
evaluation. In total, 15 EO staff participated regularly in capacity building activities resulting in
improved knowledge and skills, particularly related to financial management, with all EOs
complying fully with World Bank fiduciary standards, and development of a logical framework
as a management tool for designing, monitoring and evaluating their projects. In addition, the
concept of partnership encouraged the EOs to engage with the national government, especially
Kemenkokesra to advocate for socially inclusive programming in order to improve access of
marginalized people to services, space and markets.
30
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
From the outset, the PNPM Peduli pilot was not intended as an operation that would aim to
achieve a higher return on the cost of capital invested, nor to be a least cost operation in its
delivery. As noted, both WB and GoI stakeholders envisioned it to be a high cost ‘experimental’
endeavor, necessitating considerable investments of both financial and human resources given the
goal of reaching highly marginalized groups by partnering with (and investing in) local level
CSOs and addressing the imbalance of investment in the hard-to-reach populations. The project
was not conceived of in terms of strictly economic or financial goals.
Nonetheless, as part of the ICR process, economic models to try and estimate the net present
value of the project, under different scenarios were estimated, and the approach and key findings
may be seen here:
Assumptions
1. t_0 2011
2. Discount rate 6.10%
3. Length of benefits 10 years (starting at 2012), until 2021
4. Median for lower income (Rp/month)* 563,897
5. Exchange rate (Rp/$) 12,000
6. Per capita income ($/year) 563.90
7. We assume that marginal income for economic livelihood is the highest, and the
marginal income of social justice is the lowest among the three themes (access to
services, economic livelihood, and social justice).
*Source: Susenas and WDI (assuming that the beneficiaries have similar characteristics (i.e
levels of income) recipients of the Revolving Loan Fund available under the GoI PNPM
program). Note that this income level, on the assumption of a family of four with two working
adults, places that family at the national poverty level.
1. Scenario 1 (Medium-high marginal income)
Marginal benefits from Percentages Values ($)
Access to services 15.00% 84.58
Economic Livelihood 20.00% 112.78
Social Justice 10.00% 56.39
NPV ($) 4,357,176.42
IRR 17.29%
2. Scenario 2 (Base case income)
Marginal benefits from Percentages Values ($)
Access to services 10.00% 56.39
Economic Livelihood 15.00% 84.58
Social Justice 5.00% 28.19
NPV ($) 611,109.33
IRR 7.80%
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3. NPV=0 (i.e. when EIRR=discount rate)
NPV is equal to zero when we have:
Marginal benefits from Percentages Values ($)
Access to services 9.55% 53.85
Economic Livelihood 13.20% 74.43
Social Justice 8.70% 49.06
At these set (favorable, but reasonable) assumed income increase rates – one more optimistic (1
above) and one a more reasonable base case (2) – the exercise asked: what would the discount
rate/IRR have to have been for us to break even in economic investment terms (=NPV zero)?
Focusing on the more reasonable base case income increases, analysis indicates that, for Peduli
investments, this is an IRR/discount rate of 7.8%. While not regarded as a particularly favorable
IRR threshold in terms of pure financial market investment terms, it is arguably quite reasonable
as far as a ‘social’ rate of return for this project goes.
The other way the analysis looked at the project is not what the rate of return is (using the
assumptions of a social discount rate of 6.1%, 10 years length of benefits and starting income
levels at the poverty level), but, rather, what would the annual increases in income over 10 years
have to be over that time period (for each of the different investment areas of access to services,
economic livelihoods and social justice) in order to break even with an NPV equal to zero?
Looking at the discount rates used for other comparable social programs that have undertaken
such analysis (e.g., the Millenium Challenge Corporation here in Indonesia, which uses a rate of
10%), on that basis, the rates for economic livelihoods (13.20%) and access to services (9.55%)
break even or are very close to it. However, the same cannot be said for social justice, where the
rate was 8.7%. It should be noted that the majority of grants (72% by number; 79% by financing
amount) supported activities for economic development and to a less extent for access to services
(26% by number; 17% by financing amount). There were few social justice activities funded
during this first Phase (2% by number; 4% by financing amount).
Based on an understanding of the program, activity areas and the target group, the assumptions
made about income level (around the poverty rate) are reasonable and the discount rate of 6.10%,
while low in purely financial terms, is also reasonable in social terms. The key question on which
this analysis rests is on the degree of benefits and how long these can be assumed to endure. We
do not have data on that and so have made an assumption of 10 years.
From the overall analysis, we can state that, under reasonable, favorable assumptions about the
degree and length of benefits, and with the overall distribution of grant activity areas, the overall
NPV of the project is positive. However, from the further breakdown, one may also posit that the
assumptions made around enduring benefits are more plausible for the economic livelihoods
investments than for others.
32
Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending/Grant Preparation
Jan Weetjens Lead Social Development Specialist EASID Sector Manager
Kevin A Tomlinson Senior Operations Officer EASID Task Team Leader
Annika Silva-Leander Social Development Specialist EASID Project Coordinator
Felicity Hall Pascoe Social Development Specialist EASID Project Coordinator
Hans Antlov Senior Social Development Specialist EASID Project Design
Scott E. Guggenheim Consultant EASID Project Design
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti Operations Analyst EACIF GAC
Achmad Affandi Nasution Temporary EACIF GAC
I Gusti Ngurah Wijayakusuma FM Analyst EASFM Financial Management
Unggul Suprayitno Senior Financial Management
Specialist
EASFM Financial Management
Yogana Prasta Operations Advisor EACIF Operations
Melinda Good Legal Counsel Legal
Darlina Wicaksono Procurement Analyst EACIF Procurement
Imad Saleh Lead Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement
Catrini Kubontubuh Operations Officer EASID Safeguards
Pahala Nainggolan Consultant EASID Financial Management
Ikabul Arianto Consultant
John Victor Bottini Social Development Specialist EASID Task Team Leader
Sentot Surya Satria Social Development Specialist EASID Operations
Imelda Luciana Noto Trust Fund Coordinator EACIF Trust Fund
Threesia Mariana Siregar Operations Analyst EASID Operations
Virza S. Sasmitawidjaja Consultant EASIS Safeguards
Juan Martinez Senior Social Scientist EASIS Safeguards
Supervision/ICR
Natasha Hayward Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Task Team Leader
Hans Antlov Senior Social Development Specialist GSURR Task Team Leader
Sonja E. Litz Senior Justice and Counsel LEGJR Task Team Leader
Felicity Hall Pascoe Social Development Specialist EASID Project Coordinator
Patrick Joseph Mc Innis Consultant EASID Acting Project
Coordinator
Nina Shatifan Consultant GSURR M&E
Siti Sulami Consultant GSURR M&E
Vinny Flaviana Hyunanda Consultant GSURR Operations
Early Dewi Nuriana Consultant GSURR Social Inclusion
Zoey Lena Breslar Consultant GSURR Capacity Building
Paul Gerard M Boon Consultant GSURR ICR Writer
Patricia Astiani Team Assistant EACIF Administration
Rani Dewi Maharani Team Assistant EACIF Administration
Chatarina Ayu Widiarti Program Assistant EACIF Operations
Kevin A Tomlinson Acting Practice Manager GSURR Practice Manager
(Acting)
Narae Choi Young Professional YPP Portfolio Management
33
Niruban Balachandran Operations Officer GSURR Portfolio Management
Juan Martinez Senior Social Scientist GSURR Safeguards
Dennie Stenly Mamonto Operations Analyst EASID Safeguards
Achmad Zacky Wasaraka Procurement Analyst GGODR Procurement
Ahsan Ali Lead Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement
I Gusti Ngurah Wijaya Kusuma FM Analyst GGODR Financial Management
Hanggar Irawan Operations Analyst GSURR Financial Management Festina Lavida Operations Officer GSURR Financial Management
Unggul Suprayitno Senior Financial Management
Specialist GGODR Financial Management
Yogana Prasta Operations Advisor EACIF Operations
Imelda Luciana Noto TF Coordinator EACIF Trust Fund
Jana Halida Uno Operations Officer EACIF Operations
Megan Scanlon Consultant EASID Knowledge Management
Mariangeles Sabella Senior Counsel LEGES Legal
Ria Nuri Dharmawan Associate Counsel EACIF Legal
Ekawati Liu Social Inclusion Specialist EASID Social Inclusion
Kian Siong Environmental Specialist GENDR Safeguards
Ani Himawati Operations Analyst GSURR Operations/Safeguards
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)*
No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY11 - 108,051.91
FY12 1.06 31,764.49
Total: 1.06 139,816.40
Supervision**/ICR
FY12 34.64 342,173.54
FY13 63.60 502,245.82
FY14 102.16 313,303.52
FY15 2.46 203,599.92
Total: 202.86 1,361,322.80
Staff time and cost is funded through separate TFs and different P#. Peduli BETFs are
TF-97534 (Lending) and TF-10671 (Supervision) under P121893.
** Including costs of TSG and subsequent expanded technical task team
34
Annex 5. Capacity Building Assessment
November 2014
Introduction
In July 2014, coming to the end of the PNPM Peduli project period, capacity assessments were
conducted with all five national-level implementing organizations. These were not the only
measurements of organizational change as data in implementers’ quarterly reports as well as other
qualitative information was collected over the course of the project. This report focuses on the
results of the formal assessments conducted in 2014, using information from other sources to
complete and complement the account of what and how these organizations changed while
engaged with Peduli since its inception in 2010.
Background
A range of capacity building approaches were employed by Peduli, the EOs63, and the civil
society organizations (CSOs)64 to achieve the goals of the project, with the intention of improving
organizations and ultimately enabling people to access services and engage in livelihoods
activities that would improve their lives. In some cases, these approaches provided critical
information and/or funding that people or organizations needed to make key changes. In others,
support and facilitation was given to help individuals and organizations determine their priorities
and find their own solutions. The discipline of facilitating change on an organizational level is
called organization development (OD).
OD is more than providing inputs to remedy weaknesses, it is rather about helping the
organization members understand their organization as an evolving entity that changes according
their investments and priorities. For this reason, a number of different processes were employed
over the course of the program to diagnose and address OD needs, which then helped to outline
the significant shifts that took place inside the organizations implementing Peduli during its three
years of implementation. These included several capacity and organizational assessments at the
beginning of Phase 1 (led by the TSG at that time), a Mid-Term Review conducted in August
through November 2012, and a retreat in late 2013 to introduce Phase 2 and the concept of social
inclusion. At the end of Phase 1, there were a number of additional opportunities for EOs to
reflect on their Peduli experiences: a learning assessment conducted in November 2013,
development of a Quality Assurance/Quality Improvement Tool, organizational capacity
assessments for each EO, and a culminating workshop to discuss the assessment results and
overall CB achievements for Phase 1.
Capacity building came in many forms over the course of the project and was an important part of
what was accomplished. While the initial plan prepared by the TSG had included many more
trainings for EOs and CSOs than were feasible, there remained consistent attention to OD while
63 Note that in this report, unless noted otherwise, the term EO is used for both EOs and IPs as they played the same
implementing role for Phase 1, and the IPs were to transition to EOs should Peduli have been funded through the PSF. 64 All of the EOs supported partners located in the districts who were geographically near to the target
beneficiaries/marginalized groups (and in most cases had prior relationships with them) to implement Peduli activities.
For ACE, Kemitraan and IKa, these partners were civil society organizations. Lakpesdam implemented through its
branches; PKBI implemented through its chapters. For ease of reference, this report refers to all of the local level
implementers as CSOs.
35
EOs focused on being innovative in their program approaches and while adapting to the World
Bank’s operational requirements.
Methodology
The tool chosen by the TSG in 2012 for the baseline capacity assessments was the Institutional
Development Framework (IDF)65. The follow-up assessments in 2014 therefore used the same
tool. The IDF employs a participatory method that requires facilitators to have a strong command
of organizational development and organization change. Facilitators and participants, in a
workshop setting, discuss each of the organizational elements, and the participants score each
element by consensus. The process of discussing each element often helps participants gain a
more holistic understanding of the functioning of their organization, and sometimes clears up
long-time questions among the staff about why and how things are done.
In addition to the standard capacity assessment, a twelve-question learning questionnaire was
added to the 2014 process. As the last year of Peduli implementation was a time of fast-paced
learning, all Peduli team members experienced an environment where a ‘learning approach’ was
truly operationalized. The questions were selected from a learning organization assessment tool66,
and participants were asked to score individually. Averages of the scores for each question were
then shared for discussion.
Once all of the scoring was complete, the Institutional Development Profile (IDP) gave a visual
depiction of the scores in graph format, and this was another opportunity for discussion about
organization trajectories and the importance of understanding the context and status of an
organization when making strategic decisions about the future. A structured action planning
process was not undertaken because it was assumed that The Asia Foundation would employ their
own process for partners’ capacity building for Phase 2. Rather, the workshop ended after the
IDP discussion. By nature of the conversations during the scoring and the impulse for
participants to want to suggest improvements, some next steps were identified and noted in the
sessions and subsequently in the summaries sent to the organizations with their completed
assessment materials.
Data Limitations
There were a number of important reasons why the PSF Peduli team chose to conduct the 2014
follow-up workshops. First and foremost, as there was a baseline for almost all organizations,
changes over the last two years of intense engagement in the Peduli project could be captured and
used in the project’s final reports. Second, holding workshops for the five EOs in Jakarta was
very low in cost. Finally, these assessments were valuable to the EOs as they reinforce
knowledge about organization development, give them with a snapshot of the state of their
organization as compared to 2012, and provide an opportunity to reflect on their experience with
the Peduli project.
There are four main limitations to the assessment data:
1. The capacity assessments provide measures at the organization level. While originally the
Peduli project intended to strengthen the overall capacities of the EOs over the duration of the
project period, with the termination of the TSG, much of the support was given to the
65 http://www.msiworldwide.com/approach/tools/institutional-development-framework/ 66 Kline, Peter and Bernard Sanders. Ten Steps to a Learning Organization. Salt Lake City: Great River Books, 1998.
36
members of the Peduli team in each EO. There is therefore a mismatch between the level at
which support was provided (project) and the level that was assessed (organization).
2. For the 2014 assessments, Kemitraan and Lakpesdam both underwent an iterative process of
finalizing their results, as there was no representation of their leadership or their Board in
their initial assessment workshops. Though the results were vetted with and approved by the
leadership teams in both organizations, the opportunity for mutual learning and sharing about
the organization during the scoring process whereby a range of internal perspectives is heard,
was lost.
3. Feedback from both Lakpesdam and ACE suggested that the assessment tools be tailored to
their organizational structures so that the process and results would be more relevant and
accurate. These adaptations to the IDF tools exist but were not used by the TSG, and for
consistency’s sake were also not used in the 2014 assessments.
4. According to the EO accounts of the 2012 assessment process, there were inconsistencies in
how the tools were administered. In some cases, TSG facilitated the sessions. In others, TSG
asked the EOs to facilitate the sessions. And yet in others, the materials were sent to
organizations with instructions, and the organizations sent the scores back to the EO. The
reliability of the scores is therefore questionable.
Findings
Overall, the EOs’ scores were quite high, with one having a nearly perfect score. Only one of the
five Peduli EOs changed dramatically over the two years of project implementation. That said,
there were some significant gains in each of the organizations, not all reflected in changes of
scores but that were nonetheless significant for the organization (or at least for the EO’s Peduli
team).
There were no noticeable trends in the scores or the scores changes between organizations. The
EOs are diverse in their organizational characteristics and histories, and the scoring and notes
capture these differences. Three organizations found it necessary to re-score between two and
five of the elements, revising their 2012 scores to reflect a more accurate picture of their
organization. Again, there were not any trends in the elements that were rescored.
Oversight/Vision
During the period between the two assessments, four of the five EOs recruited new Executive
Directors. In addition, three of the organizations made improvements in their Boards, or were
planning to make significant changes the Board’s membership and role. All of the EOs felt that
they were recognizable by their missions among their constituents and more broadly in certain
circles of the public. All organizations were receiving funding outside of PNPM Peduli, and felt
themselves to be autonomous in that they didn’t rely on any one donor (though this does not
preclude them from being financially vulnerable). As evidence of autonomy, the EO that
ultimately declined Phase 2 funding did so citing a disconnect between how the TRT defined
social inclusion programming, and its own ideas about a program that would both adhere to its
mission and keep its commitment to its network of NGO implementers.
Management Resources
Though EOs noted that most of the tangible changes that happened were in this category, not all
EOs had score improvements. Many noted the utility of the Program Operations Manuals
required by the World Bank in clarifying their own processes. Several EOs did not have one
document that outlined procedures in such detail before fulfilling Peduli project’s requirements.
37
Some EOs went further and created manuals for a number of specific procedures (e.g.,
procurement, grant-making, M&E, etc). As noted above, all EOs cited M&E as an area where
they had gained entirely new skills and understanding of the concepts and tools. The M&E
Officer from one organization said that she finally understood that M&E was not only for
recording numbers, but that by defining the measurements, you are also defining the goals of the
project. This is a significant learning.
While scores did not change dramatically in this section, two EOs rescored which suggests a
better appreciation of what management should be. Two EOs added internal communications as
a priority area of improvement as a result of discussions about the elements in this section.
Human Resources
While all EOs felt that their staff collectively possessed the skills their organizations needed,
human resources was most cited as needing improvement in every organization. In particular,
organizations needed strategies and defined interventions to support their staff. In the last two
years, two organizations restructured their staff to function more effectively; four EOs are
planning new procedures to improve overall individual and organizational performance, including
regular staff evaluations. This support should also help with continuity in program
implementation by reducing turnover. Two EOs identified needing an orientation program for
their new staff both because they were starting to hire professionals beyond their volunteer pool,
and because they realized the necessity of integrating staff quickly and in a structured manner.
Financial Resources
Because EOs were selected on part based on their ability to manage funds and on-grant to other
NGOs, their financial systems were in place and functioning. Most EOs had managed funds from
a range of donors, many at the same time. In adherence to normal operating procedures from the
of their relationship with the Peduli project, the EO finance departments underwent audits by the
World Bank finance team, and subsequently received a considerable assistance in ensuring that
all of the manuals and deliverables were in line with Bank standards.
Some EO assessment scores improved in financial management, and one organization revised
their 2012 score lower as they appreciated a higher standard for financial management after
having been engaged in the Peduli project. At least one EO dramatically increased the amount of
funding they managed because of Peduli, and all mentioned better performance on their routine
financial audits. All EOs have updated their procedures manuals, and in some cases have created
manuals for specific procedures (eg, procurement). Over the course of the Peduli project period,
three EOs adopted new finance software.
In all cases the experience implementing Peduli helped the EOs to improve their systems,
including budgeting and procurement. Though the EOs described the Bank requirements as
unnecessarily complicated, they also noted that they learned a considerable amount about
financial management and that they were proud to have passed the World Bank audit, considering
it a noteworthy achievement. Given their past experience with on-granting and procurement, they
were able to engage in a dialogue and educate the Bank about how to tailor processes to working
with NGOs while maintaining the essential elements needed for the Bank. This contributed to a
revised World Bank procurement manual that is now used for working with CSOs worldwide.
Finally, the experience with Peduli taught EOs how to manage when funding is not disbursed as
planned, both financially and by communicating changes to their beneficiaries/constituents so as
to handle the implications for project implementation.
38
External Resources
The various elements of External Relations are those where a number of EOs “truthed”
themselves, and where several rescored their 2012 assessment results. In this case, it was likely
that EOs changed their own standards about reaching to and communicating with their partners
and constituencies after having been challenged with implementing programs for marginalized
groups, and further by undertaking rigorous knowledge-to-policy participatory program design
for social inclusion issues.
In the early stages of Phase 1, EOs were encouraged to reach out to a range of marginalized
groups and several of them forged partnerships with new kinds of beneficiaries. For example,
both ACE and IKA engaged NGOs working with waria, which required new strategies for
meeting beneficiary needs in terms of livelihoods, service delivery, and rights issues.
The project design process for Phase 2 further encouraged EOs to reach out to their beneficiaries
to engage them in a participatory process of determining the root causes of their issues, a process
that required EOs and CSOs to connect more closely with their constituents. By engaging these
populations and learning about the barriers to inclusion, many EOs began incorporating inclusion
principles in their other programs and in their strategic plans. This project has helped many EOs
to “walk the talk” by growing their programs from the grassroots, and by better understanding the
all of the factors at play. Some EOs have made structural changes like hiring and training agents
of change in their target communities, and improving accountability by ensuring that there are
feedback mechanisms and robust monitoring systems for their projects.
During the 2014 assessment, having reflected on their key relationships, two EOs cited the need
for a review of their own public relations functions, including the channels they use to reach
partner organizations and beneficiaries of their projects.
Peduli EOs have also proactively sought collaboration with local government entities in the areas
in which they implement Peduli projects. In some cases, the relationships already existed and
Peduli provided another opportunity to pursue synergies and support. In other cases, the
relationships were new. Through the process of crafting projects that aimed to change policies,
EOs not only gained a better understanding of government agendas and politics, but also engaged
in “below the line” advocacy where CSOs gather government support at various local levels to
enable programming for sensitive and complex issues. One EO in particular expanded its
influence by working in a coalition, which has required partnership, trust and an openness to
collaborative work towards a common goal.
Learning Organizations
The results of all twelve survey questions for all EOs averaged between 3.1 and 4.3 on a five-
point scale. The two highest scoring questions reflected that participants felt that they were free to
speak their minds about what they learned without fear of repercussions for disagreeing or
dissenting, and that there was a general feeling that it’s always possible to find a better way to do
something. The two lowest scoring questions, on average, indicated that workers didn’t feel that
they are directed toward learning and training opportunities, nor are they encouraged and given
resources to become self-directed learners.
All EO training events were designed to bring together various partners to learn new skills and
information, in some cases including local government officials and other stakeholders who
would both benefit from and contribute to the topic at hand. Some EOs cited exchanges between
chapters or CSOs as an effective way to help their managers learn good practice for both the
procedural and substantive elements of their role. Technical assistance and mentoring were
39
continuously provided by the EOs, especially to help with quarterly reporting—for which there
was continuous feedback to the authors and periodic training.
Implementing through Chapters versus CSOs
There were clear differences in implementation between organizations that had branches or
chapters implemented Peduli, and those that recruited NGOs based on the project description.
Lakpesdam and PKBI, both implementing through their branches and chapters (respectively), had
existing relationships where the headquarters office provided strategic direction and support to
the provincial and district entities. Both organizations provided clear and strong guidance about
organizational philosophy and programming. While Lakpesdam is a religious organization and
PKBI is not, PKBI takes a strong stand on abortion and reproductive health rights that sometimes
contradict legal codes—so both organizations are comprised of constituents that adhere based on
common beliefs. Illustrating a different model, Kemitraan and IKA have experience and
networks of NGOs with which they work, but in this case, forged some new partnerships to reach
other marginalized groups. While it is likely that some of the CSOs knew one another from prior
programs, they did not have the same allegiance and working relationship with each other as did
those who were branches/chapters of the implementing organization. ACE was a hybrid of the
two models, where it implemented solely through its long-standing network of NGOs and funding
was allocated based on Board and staff decisions.
As it happened, PKBI and Lakpesdam are also the longest running organizations among the five
Peduli EOs. Their Boards are well established, and their systems for sharing information and
learning are in place. Often, representatives from a number of chapters—including some not
implementing Peduli projects—were brought together to take advantage of a learning opportunity
funded by Peduli (the non-Peduli entities were not funded by Peduli to attend). As can be
expected, chapters and branches implementing Peduli were also included in all of the
organization’s planning and improvement activities, which often translated to improvements in
Peduli implementation.
While the systems and structures were well in place for PKBI and Lakpesdam, the other three
EOs had the advantage of being able to articulate their terms based solely on the particulars of the
Peduli project and could terminate the relationship in the case of non-performance. Though
different in terms of operations and incentives, both structures allowed for leveraging the assets
and relationships at the provincial, district and beneficiary levels, which was essential for PNPM
Peduli.
Workshop Evaluations
At the conclusion of each workshop held in July 2014, each participant was asked to provide
feedback using a one-page evaluation. Feedback from the participants was positive. The scores
were averaged for four EOs67. The usefulness of the assessment tool was rated the highest at 4.57.
The average of the three questions about the facilitator was 4.41. Averages for all questions were
over 4.00 except for one: How confident are you in your ability to repeat the IDF assessment
without the assistance of an outside facilitator? This question was rated 3.69. Given that there
67 Evaluations for IKA’s workshop were not scored in the same way as the others, but rather requested written answers
for each question. This information is captured in the narrative but not included in the scores.
40
were no training-of-facilitator modules included in the workshop, this is not surprising.
Comments noted the need for more and more representative participation by EO staff, more
regularly held organizational assessments, and longer workshops that included an action planning
process.
Conclusions
Overall, the organizational capacity assessments were a useful endeavor providing information to
both PNPM Peduli and to the EOs assessed. The data collected reinforced and complemented the
other information available about the EOs’ changes in capacities over the course of the project.
The process was appreciated and the importance of organization development understood by most
participants. As a result, the EOs will likely make some organizational changes, and may engage
a similar assessment process in future planning exercises.
In general, the EOs changed in significant ways, several directly attributable to Peduli and the
World Bank: improved financial systems and improved operations. Other changes took place
rather at the individual and team level: better integrated constituents’ priorities, better assessed
beneficiary needs, a better understanding of social inclusion, and the ability to craft and monitor
projects using M&E tools. While these skills are held by individual members of the Peduli team,
they can—and in some cases have already—spread to other parts of the organization. In addition,
because of the new relationships and activities undertaken in Phases 1 and 2, EOs that hadn’t
before are now beginning to see themselves as valuable interlocutors between the citizens and the
policy makers. Those EOs that had previously played that role are now doing it better.
EOs are more confident and more prepared as project implementers. Assuming the lessons and
the people stay with their organizations, they will likely design more relevant and successful
programs with the tools and experience they acquired working with Peduli. They will likely ask
more questions of donors, insist on being more involved in project design, and request to be more
visible with government and other partners.
The experience of Peduli has also reinforced the need for good donor practice. Donors should
engage NGOs:
- To have citizens’ voices represented in development projects from the design phase onwards
- To seize opportunities to pilot new approaches
- To create and strengthen NGO networks
- To facilitate a space for civil society with the private sector and host government
- To help grow NGO’s ability to hold government accountable
Donors should also be specific about their expectations for performance; they should endeavor to
fund NGOs in a way that is flexible enough to test new approaches and to enable them to learn
and share their learning; and, they should aim to build their capacity in partnership with the NGO
and its goals and priorities.
41
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
A one day PNPM Peduli Multi Stakeholder Workshop was held on August 20, 2014 and was
hosted by Coordinating Ministry of People’s Welfare, supported by the WB/PSF. Participants
included representatives from PNPM Peduli Executing Organizations (Kemitraan, ACE, and
Lakpesdam NU), Intermediary Partners (IKA and PKBI), members of selected local CSO
partners, program beneficiaries, and development partners. The workshop was organized by its
three objectives, namely: (i) to showcase learning and experience in PNPM Peduli Pilot Phase;
(ii) to celebrate PNPM Peduli’s partnership with a number of key stakeholders and; (iii) to
generate discussion among key stakeholders on PNPM Peduli’s implementation experience and
lessons learnt as substantive inputs to the ICR.
The vast majority of the participants agreed that throughout program implementation in the Pilot
Phase, PNPM Peduli has contributed to the strengthened capacity of Indonesian CSO and the
improved socio-economic condition of the marginalized groups. In the workshop, the participants
also identified a series of lessons learned from Pilot Phase implementation summarized as follow:
A key ‘champion’ in the Government has been very important in supporting PNPM Peduli
since its inception. This has demonstrated GoI’s high level of commitment and strong support
towards the program implementation and achievements.
Livelihood activities remain the most useful entry point to encourage initial participation in
PNPM Peduli activities from members of marginalized groups. Although there was some lack
of comprehensive understanding about sustainable livelihoods across CSOs, these activities
remained the catalyst for participation, as they provide relatively fast economic returns,
which are tangible incentives for the target beneficiaries.
In the Pilot Phase, PNPM Peduli invested its resources in the community cadres as they are
the backbone of the program, especially in geographically remote locations. Cadres are key in
facilitating the marginalized groups, given that they are continuously accessible to the
communities and inherently understand the dynamics and challenges that face the groups.
CSOs’ relatively fluid structure and flexibility are one of key characteristics that allow them
to reach the marginalized communities. PNPM Peduli has engaged a number of diverse
CSOs in this program which has enabled outreach to a diverse range of marginalized
communities.
It is critically important to garner the support of key local figures, for example religious
leaders, community champions and local village head. Throughout PNPM Peduli’s
implementation, CSOs and marginalized groups have learnt that getting the support of local
figures is important for the success of program activities.
A multi stakeholder approach is required to improve access to public services and social
justice for the marginalized groups. Networking and relationship building among a range of
local stakeholders is critically important as a core approach to improving marginalized
people’s access to public services. In addition, the program has also learned that involving
different stakeholders in designing, planning and evaluating the program is important to
establish stronger cooperation and collaboration among key stakeholders.
The program has learnt that it requires ‘marriage’ between different approaches:
structural/process reform and community empowerment efforts. A number of
structural/process changes were facilitated by the CSOs, in collaboration with other
stakeholder to be more inclusive. In addition, CSOs provided substantial support to the
42
marginalized groups to increase their self-confidence to then be able to participate in public
decision making fora.
Experience from PNPM Peduli Pilot Phase shows increased engagement with the private
sector, especially through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs. Tapping into
CSR resources has become one of the CSOs’ strategies to reduce reliance on donor funding
as it decreases overtime. In addition to that, a number of marginalized groups also have
directly obtained funding, equipment and training from CSR funding through facilitation
from the CSOs.
Evidence from PNPM Peduli shows that there are emerging changes in government practices,
priorities and policies concerning the lives and inclusion of marginalized groups. PNPM
Peduli has enabled the CSOs to share their ‘know-how’ with both the government and private
sector about reaching and working with the marginalized groups.
Through participation under PNPM Peduli, CSOs institutional structures and capacity in
program management have improved. In its Pilot Phase, PNPM Peduli has contributed to
strengthened capacity of Indonesian CSOs in financial management, administration and
programming.
Media plays an important role in disseminating program achievements.
43
Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
1. Summary of Grant Recipient Completion Report: Lakpesdam NU
In mid-2010, Lakpesdam NU was selected through a competitive selection process to act as one
of the three Executing Organizations to implement PNPM Peduli and to receive funding under a
PSF grant (TF-99535). With funding of USD 2,053,100 received under this grant, Lakpesdam
NU aimed to strengthen the capacities of Indonesian CSOs to enable them to reach and empower
marginalized groups to improve their socio-economic conditions.
Throughout the almost four years during which the program has been implemented, Lakpesdam
NU has conducted activities to strengthen the capacities of 30 Lakpesdam NU branches and
affiliate organizations. This figure consists of 20 Lakpesdam NU branches; 9 LPPNU and 1 LP
NU. In addition, Lakpesdam NU also provided sub-grants to its local affiliates to implement
activities in the geographical areas in which they operate, with these activities involving 14
different marginalized identity groups. These groups consist of indigenous people; landless
farmers; poor farmers and fishermen; plantation laborers; informal workers; the urban poor;
victims of religious conflict; and former political prisoners. To date, Lakpesdam NU and its
branches have engaged in activities to benefit 2,526 marginalized people (38% male, 62%
female), living in 63 villages in 44 sub-districts across 30 districts throughout 11 provinces in
Indonesia. The beneficiaries were involved in 123 community groups consisting of 10-15 people.
The primary focus of the activities supported through the project was on economic development
and improving the livelihoods of the project beneficiaries. Implemented activities include:
vocational trainings; strengthening community institutions; community facilitation to improve
access to public services; and advocacy activities with local key stakeholders to promote
marginalized peoples’ basic rights.
In supporting a range of cross sectoral activities with different types of marginalized groups,
Lakpesdam NU tested different approaches to empowerment, with these approaches primarily
involving improving access to economic livelihood and basic services. An open menu of
activities enabled Lakpesdam NU and its branches to work with the marginalized groups to
implement appropriate activities that suited their needs. A number of project achievements are
highlighted below:
Small income generating activities: With the support of the program, 2,274 marginalized
men and women participated in small income generating activities. In total, 76 businesses
groups were established, with these groups engaged in 13 types of small scale business
activities’. To strengthen member’s’ capacities to manage a small business and to enhance the
quality of their output, each community group was provided with 6 vocational training
sessions throughout the period in which the project was implemented. These training
activities covered 10 types of vocational activities, including tailoring; brick making;
handicrafts; organic farming and poultry; weaving; and producing organic fertilizer. In
addition, training on topics such as on-line marketing and business management was also
provided to ensure a higher level of sustainability of these new businesses.
The establishment of training centers and saving and loans cooperatives: To further
improve the operation and management of the small businesses established under the
program, Lakpesdam NU branches worked with marginalized communities to establish 28
training centers that gave participating groups control over productive assets. Because most
of the marginalized participants in the project had no direct access to formal financial
institutions, the PNPM Peduli project established 5 saving and lending cooperatives to enable
participants to access financial services, including loans and savings services.
44
Access to basic services, including health, education and civil registration: Lakpesdam
NU local branches and affiliates worked with marginalized members of the community to
improve their access to basic services, especially health and educational services and civil
registration. These organizations have worked to raise awareness and to provide relevant
information related to accessing public services to members of marginalized groups. In
particular, these organizations worked to ensure that their beneficiaries were able to acquire
identity cards, as it is recognized that possession of identity cards is a critical starting point
for ensuring that marginalized members of the community are able to access the public
services to which they are entitled. In total, 253 marginalized people (approximately 10% of
the project beneficiaries) have benefitted from improved access to public services as a result
of the project investment.
Engagement with local governments, private sector organizations and universities: With
the support of PNPM Peduli, Lakpesdam NU local branches and their affiliates have engaged
with 15 local governments; 11 private sector partners; and 3 universities in 18 districts
throughout 7 provinces. The strong partnerships and collaboration that resulted from these
engagements have resulted in in-kind contributions, financial assistance and other support.
Capacity building at multiple levels: PNPM Peduli has a very strong capacity building
feature at every level of the project, working to build capacities at the national level (by
building the capacities of EOs); at the district level (by building the capacities of CSOs); and
at the community level (by building the capacities of beneficiaries). The project has made a
significant contribution towards strengthening the capacities of Lakpesdam NU; its local
branches and affiliates; and project beneficiaries. During the period in which the program was
implemented, 90 members of staff of local branches of Lakpesdam NU benefitted from
workshops and training provided by the project. The provided training related to issues such
as participatory poverty assessment; community organizing; and program management. In
addition, a number of changes occurred at the national level as a result of capacity support
provided by the PSF Task Team. These changes related to matters such as monitoring and
evaluation, financial management and procurement.
During the 47 months during which the project was implemented, Lakpesdam NU and its local
branches generated a number of important lessons learned, with this learning relating to a range
of the project’s dimensions. These lessons are expected to serve as inputs for the future design,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects related to CSO capacity strengthening and
community driven development projects with marginalized groups. Highlights of lessons learned
as follows:
In the designing and planning of the program, the full participation of the marginalized
groups is a vital necessity: Lakpesdam NU and its branches have learned that to better
articulate program activities, the project teams need to encourage beneficiaries to participate’
in all related processes. It is essential that beneficiaries are able to voice their concerns and to
ensure that activities suit their immediate priorities and strategic needs.
Building community trust before project implementation is important: Lakpesdam NU
and its branches have learned that building and maintaining community trust is critical before
and throughout the life of the project. In the early period of the implementation of the project,
it was found that a number of identified beneficiaries were hesitant to participate in the
project because of a lack of such trust. Therefore, the local branches engaged in a series of
informal approaches to the potential beneficiaries to overcome this barrier.
It is important to consider local values when working on issues related to marginalized
populations: Lakpesdam NU and its branches have learned that recognizing, understanding
and respecting local community values is an extremely important measure to engage the
45
beneficiaries in project activities. Given that activities that are conducted with respect for
local values are more easily accepted by the community, Lakpesdam NU’ and its branches
have developed strategies to involve marginalized groups in their projects on the basis of
such respect.
Strong collaboration and active engagement with local stakeholders contribute
significantly to the success of the program: Lakpesdam NU and its local branches have
learned that collaboration with national/local key stakeholders is essential to address issues of
importance to marginalized groups. To tackle the complex issues facing marginalized
members of the community, it is essential to engage in cooperative efforts between different
sectors and stakeholders. Therefore, Lakpesdam NU and its local branches strived to network
and to develop strong partnerships with these stakeholders, which significantly contributed to
the program’s success.
Behavioral change is an essential component in the implementation of community-based
poverty reduction programs: Lakpesdam NU and its local branches have learned that
changing the attitudinal behavior of the marginalized groups is vitally important for the
successful achievement of the project’s objectives. Experiences from project implementation
show that unless such measures are implemented, most marginalized people will consider
themselves as ‘objects’ of the project, rather than as ‘subjects’ of development processes.
A comprehensive Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) is required to implement
income generating activities for marginalized communities: Lakpesdam NU and its local
branches have learned that, as the SLA remains very new to the project implementers, it is
necessary for local branches and affiliate’s to develop a better understanding of this approach
to ensure business sustainability. The project needs to address a range of different dimensions
of livelihood activities, including supply chain management; business management; access to
markets; and access to financial services.
World Bank administrative procedures created a heavy operational burden that
impacts project implementation at the local level: Lakpesdam NU and its local branches
found that the World Bank’s administrative procedures disturbed the ongoing processes at the
community level to some extent. To some extent, delays resulting from the World Bank’s
procedural requirements had a negative impact on longstanding relationships built with both
communities and local stakeholders. Lakpesdam NU and its local branches recommend that
the address this, PSF should take a more active role in communicating clearly the
administrative process and procedures, especially their potential impact on the project
timeline.
2. Summary of Grant Recipient Completion Report: Kemitraan
In mid-2010, Kemitraan was selected through a competitive selection process to act as one of the
three Executing Organizations to implement PNPM Peduli and to receive funding under PSF
grant (TF-99535). With funding of USD 3,086,400 received under this grant, Kemitraan aimed to
strengthen the capacities of Indonesian CSOs to enable them to reach and empower marginalized
groups to improve their socio-economic condition. A key objective was to develop the capacity of
CSOs to reach and work with marginalized women and men to enable them to exercise their
rights and to access basic health and education services; to generate livelihoods; and to gain
access to the resources required to improve their quality of life.
Thus, Kemitraan focused on three thematic areas, as follows: (i) access to services; (ii) economic
livelihoods, and (iii) access to social justice. To achieve these objectives, Kemitraan provided
sub-grants to 15 local CSO partners (10 Sub-grantees; one Intermediary Partner; and four Tertiary
Partners) to implement the project. Throughout the period during which the project was
46
implemented, Kemitraan and its partners reached seven 68 diverse marginalized groups in 62
villages, 47 sub-districts, 27 districts and 13 provinces in Indonesia. To date, the activities
implemented by Kemitraan through PNPM Peduli have reached 11,001 direct beneficiaries
(53.5% female, 46.5% male, and 3.3% transgender) that connected into 88 community groups.
Kemitraan and its partners have reached the following four conclusions regarding their
involvement in the project: (i) project management was conducted effectively; (ii) the capacities
of local CSOs was improved as a result of the implementation of the project; (iii) an innovative
strategy for a poverty reduction and social inclusion project was developed; and (iv) the socio
economic condition of marginalized people was improved. Some highlights of project outputs are
outlined below:
1. Capacity building for local CSOs: To improve the knowledge and skills of 15 local CSOs
to manage the project, Kemitraan conducted training, workshop and the sharing of learning
through social media, on the job training, media visits, and other means. The results were that
14 out of 15 local CSOs increased their level of understanding of the development
performance management plan (PMP) and of procurement, disbursement and administrative
standards. They were also able to record and report on activities in a timely manner and to
conduct routine monitoring and evaluation of the project. In spite of these results, Kemitraan
often faced problems when attempting to verify the local CSOs’’ reports due to the work load
of project staff and the wide geographic distribution of project activities.
2. Other capacity building activities: Kemitraan also conducted other capacity building
activities, with these activities related to participatory outreach; participatory rural appraisal
(PRA); gender issues; advocacy techniques; communication strategies; the promotion of the
social inclusion program to other stakeholders; and the development of small businesses. In
total, 70 members of staff of CSOs participated in those activities. Based on exit interviews,
17% of participating staff reported that they were highly satisfied with the training in terms of
the materials provided, the facilitators and nonmaterial factors (time, place etc); 70% reported
that they were satisfied; 11% reported that they were fairly satisfied; and 2% ’reported that
they were not satisfied.
3. Strategies for poverty reduction and social inclusion: Kemitraan has developed innovative
strategies for poverty reduction and social inclusion. Throughout the period during which the
project was implemented, Kemitraan promoted and socialized these strategies amongst
national and local government69 and other stakeholders by 15 local CSOs. In parallel, the
local CSOs implemented similar strategies to promote local activities with the marginalized
groups. A number of project achievements are highlighted below:
Engagement with local governments: Of 15 local CSOs, eight (in 10 districts across 7
provinces) have engaged with local governments to achieve significant benefits for
marginalized groups. An example of such an engagement is the one conducted by
Sumatera Sustainability Support (SSS), which signed a MOU with the district
government of Dharmasraya to facilitate access to health and education services for
68 Indigenous peoples, women headed households, landless farmers, displaced people in conflict areas, victims of
trafficking, people living with HIV/AIDS, farmers in areas prone to climate change induced disaster 69 Directorate General of Village Community Empowerment Ministry of Public Work, The National Team for
Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K), The President Representative for Poverty Reduction (UKP2K) and
Ministry of Rural Development. And also to their related department in provincial and district level.
47
indigenous people; to allocate 100 hectares of land for indigenous people; to provide 59
health insurance card for indigenous people; and to develop a five-year strategic plan to
empower indigenous people.
Improved access to health and educational services and to economic livelihoods:
With the support of the PNPM Peduli program, Kemitraan reached ’11,001 marginalized
individuals, of whom 94% benefited from improved access to health and education
services and 16% from improved access to economic livelihoods. An example involved
CSO-MPS Muhammadiyah, which facilitated the provision of social assistance to 120
street children (IDR 1.5 million per child) by the Ministry of Social Affairs, to support
school attendance.
4. The goal of improving the socio-economic conditions of marginalized people is in line with
the goal defined in point 3, with the local CSOs acting as agents of change for marginalized
people by working at the grass root level and engaging in intensive partnerships. During the
period during which the project was implemented, 15 local CSOs conducted activities to
empower marginalized people to enable them to utilize and derive benefits from the natural
resources located in the areas around which they live. A number of project achievements are
highlighted below:
Skills in the areas of fisheries, vegetables plantation, and poultry farming: The
project facilitated capacity building activities for 105 indigenous people in the district of
Dharmasraya, in Jambi, to develop their skills in the areas of fisheries, vegetables
plantation, and poultry farming. As a result of these activities, they have successfully
derived yields from fisheries and vegetable plantations. The local CSO that facilitated
these activities, SSS, has provided participants with assistance to sell their produce at
public markets.
Skills in the area of food production: The project facilitated capacity building activities
for 79 isolated women in the district of Bontang, in East Kalimantan, to develop their
skills to produce syrup and powder from mangrove seeds and to produce biscuits and
cooking oil from coconuts. The local CSO that facilitated these activities, KBCF, has
provided the women’s groups with assistance to sell and promote their produce at
exhibitions.
Skills in the area of organic farming: The project facilitated capacity building activities
for 108 indigenous people in the district of Arfak Mountain, in West Papua, to develop
their skills in the area of organic farming and to cultivate crops such as carrots, potatoes,
scallions, and onions. The local CSO that facilitated these activities, Kamuki, has
engaged with the Department Of Agriculture to open a traditional market close to the area
in which this group lives to enable them to sell their produce.
Birth certificates and access to education for street children: The project facilitated
the acquisition of birth certificates and access to education for 195 street children in East
Jakarta, DKI Jakarta.
Access to HIV and STI test services for sex workers in Kupang: The project
facilitated access to HIV and STI test services for 614 female sex workers in Kupang,
East Nusa Tenggara. Of these sex workers, the 13.8% who are HIV positive now have
access to ARV treatment services, while the 61.2% who were infected by STI have
access to care services.
48
During the 40 months during which the project was implemented, Kemitraan has generated a
number of important lessons learned. These lessons are expected to serve as inputs for the future
design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects related to CSO capacity
strengthening and community driven development projects intended to benefit marginalized
groups. Highlights of lessons learned are as follows:
Synergy with government and non-government institutions: Through its experiences with
the project, Kemitraan has learned that synergy with government and non-government
institution is important in the promotion of a social inclusion program as a means to ensure
that the needs of marginalized people are recognized by the system.
Issues in remote and isolated areas: Through its experiences with the project, Kemitraan
has learned the location of many marginalized people in isolated and remote areas has a
significant impact on project implementation, in part due to the high cost of transportation
and time taken to reach those areas.
The importance of respect for local culture: Through its experiences with the project,
Kemitraan has learned respect for local culture is vitally important if project staff intend to
implement a program to benefit marginalized people, especially indigenous people.
A “Live in” approach: Through its experiences with the project, Kemitraan has learned that
this approach is an effective means for field facilitators to reach marginalized people. The
adoption of this approach can contribute to building trust and establishing friendly
relationships with members of these communities. In addition, it reduces transportation costs.
World Bank administrative procedures created a heavy operational burden that
impacts project implementation at the local level: Kemitraan has learned that the World
Bank’s administrative procedures disturbed the ongoing processes at the community level to
some extent. To some extent, delays resulting from the World Bank’s procedural
requirements had a negative impact on longstanding relationships built with both
communities and local stakeholders. Lakpesdam NU and its local branches recommend that
the address this, PSF should take a more active role in communicating clearly the
administrative process and procedures, especially their potential impact on the project
timeline.
3. Summary of Grant Recipient Completion Report: ACE (including PKBI)
The Association for Community Empowerment (ACE) was selected through a competitive
selection process to act as one of the three Executing Organizations to implement PNPM Peduli
and to receive funding under PSF grant (TF-99555). With funding of USD 2,460,800 received
under this grant, ACE aimed to strengthen the capacities of Indonesian CSOs to enable them to
reach and empower marginalized groups to improve their socio-economic condition.
During the 36 month period during which ACE participated in the program, it provided sub-
grants to 24 local CSO partners (16 sub-grantees, 2 Intermediary Partners and 6 tertiary grantees)
to improve their organizational capacities and to conduct local activities with the marginalized
groups. Throughout the period during which the project was implemented, ACE and its partners
reached 11 types of marginalized groups live in 111 villages in 78 sub-districts in 40 districts
across 16 provinces of Indonesia. These groups included sexual minorities; female sex workers;
peoples living with HIV/AIDS; drug addicts; communities living in conflict area; landless
farmers; indigenous people; and migrant workers. To date, PNPM Peduli has facilitated 6,118
marginalized individual (32.2% male, 67.3% female, and 0.5% transgender) that connected into
231 community groups to improve their socio-economic conditions through participation in small
scale livelihood activities and improved access to public services, primarily health, education,
civic registration and legal support services.
49
PNPM Peduli’s open menu of activities enabled ACE and its local CSO partners to work together
with marginalized groups to determine the most appropriate activities to meet their strategic
priorities and immediate needs. Highlights of project achievements include the following:
Improving the institutional capacities of local CSOs: To improve the institutional capacity
of its 24 local CSO partners, ACE conducted 5 training activities on the subjects of leadership,
organizational, livelihood, project management and media strategy. In addition, it provided
technical assistance on 13 occasions, benefiting 134 local CSO’s members of staff (45%
female, 55% male). To ensure effective program implementation, ACE conducted intensive
financial monitoring over all sub-grantees, IPs and tertiary grantees. From this monitoring,
one case of misused of funds was discovered, with this case involving a local CSO, a tertiary
grantee. Even though all the misused funds were returned, the CSO was excluded from the
project, as was one Intermediary Partner that was considered to have failed to conduct
financial checks regularly. In addition, to strengthen the fiduciary capacities of local CSOs,
ACE simplified the financial reporting template for the local CSOs to adopt internally.
Capacity building at the community level: At the’ community level, ACE provided
capacity building activities for 4,321 marginalized individuals, who participated in small
livelihood activities to improve their daily incomes. These people were connected into 107
small groups and managed 36 types of small scale business. In addition, to improve access to
financial services, 10 credit union and 5 savings and loans cooperatives were established by
marginalized individuals with the support of local CSOs.
Improved access to basic services: After participating in PNPM Peduli activities, at least
1,620 marginalized people have benefitted from improved access to basic services, especially
health and education services, civic registration and legal support. Specifically, 534
marginalized women and their babies received health checks; 162 received birth certificates;
212 received marriage certificates; and 50 received identity cards. In addition, facilitated by
local CSOs, 29 child housemaids were enrolled in informal schools.
Capacity building for community-level cadres: Local CSOs played an important role in
strengthening the capacity of 367 cadres to enable them to serve as community leaders, with
some becoming role models for others.
Establishing connections between marginalized groups and local governments, the
private sector and the broader community: Under PNPM Peduli, ACE conducted
activities to establish connections between marginalized men, women, children and
transgenders and local governments, the private sector and the broader community. Through
intensive facilitation and advocacy activities, PNPM Peduli facilitated the development of a
number of new government initiatives and initiated changes in both policies and practices.
During the period during which the project was implemented, 13 local CSOs engaged with
local governments and the private sector to assist marginalized groups to improve their
economic conditions and to facilitate access to health, education and legal services. During
the period during which the project was implemented, these CSOs worked with a network of
NGOs and the broader community to advocate for policies and practices to benefit
marginalized people. For example, YPEKA worked with other NGOs to establish a joint task
force to combat human trafficking, with this task force named Gugus Tugas Tindak Pidana
Perdagangan Orang (GTTPPO) and operating in Manado to promote multi-stakeholder
coordination in the areas of advocacy, budgeting and training. In addition, to local regulations
were issued in three villages to protect migrant workers and victims of domestic violence,
with this initiative being facilitated by two local CSOs, namely LPSDM and PPK.
After 36 months of project implementation, a number of lesson learned have been gathered to
further inform the design, implementation, monitor and evaluate similar project that work with
50
civil society organizations to reach out to members of marginalized groups. These lessons include
the following:
The importance of a multi stakeholder approach: Through its experiences with the project,
ACE has learned that a multi-stakeholder approach is required to address multifaceted issues
faced by marginalized groups. Such an approach is essential to consolidate efforts to work
together with the local government and the broader community to understand and to identify
the appropriate interventions to benefit the targeted members of marginalized communities.
PNPM Peduli encouraged networking and the building of relationships between a range of
local stakeholders as a core approach to work on complex issues faced by marginalized
people.
The importance of the support of key local figures: Through its experiences with the
project, ACE has learned that it is critically important to garner the support of key local
figures, including religious leaders, community champions and local village heads.
Throughout the period of the implementation of PNPM Peduli’, CSOs and marginalized
groups learned that garnering the support of key local figures is important for the success of
program activities. A number of experiences from the implementation of the program
illustrate that strong support from village heads, religious and local leaders was instrumental
to carrying out activities with the marginalized groups.
Community organization as a core approach to facilitating marginalized people:
Through its experiences with the project, ACE has learned that it is important to organize
marginalized people as groups to generate a sense of collective community ownership among
the groups’ members. It was found that through community groups, CSOs and marginalized
individuals recognized the importance of advocating for their interests in a collective manner.
The role of emerging natural “champions of life”: Throughout its implementation, PNPM
Peduli fostered the emergence of natural leaders within the marginalized communities. These
individuals represent the voice of their communities and articulate their unmet needs. In
addition, these individuals play an important role in sharing information across the group and
in bringing people together to share experiences and discuss issues. A number of individuals
have played an active role in leading their community groups and have become strong
influences in bringing about change in the community.
The importance of investment in community cadres: PNPM Peduli invested heavily in the
community cadres, recognizing their vital role in the implementation of the program. Largely
because of the work of the community cadres, PNPM Peduli has grown to become a strong
community movement. Most community cadres are themselves members of marginalized
groups and therefore an integral part of the excluded community. Through the provision of
continuous facilitation and capacity building support by CSO partners, these cadres learned
how to facilitate their communities and to identify their most pressing needs. By acting as the
on-the-ground mobilizers of PNPM Peduli activities, most cadres increased their knowledge
and community facilitation skills, which enabled them to serve as key actors in improving
access by marginalized groups to public services, particularly health and education services
and civil registration.
World Bank administrative procedures created a heavy operational burden that
impacts project implementation at the local level: ACE has learned that the World Bank’s
administrative procedures disturbed the ongoing processes at the community level to some
extent. To some extent, delays resulting from the World Bank’s procedural requirements had
a negative impact on longstanding relationships built with both communities and local
stakeholders. ACE concurs with Lakpesdam NU in recommending that to address this, PSF
51
should take a more active role in communicating clearly the administrative process and
procedures, especially their potential impact on the project timeline.
52
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
The draft ICR was shared with partners and feedback was invited, including from
Government and development partner counterparts, but no comments were received.
53
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents
54
MAP