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The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom.
(People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988)
Pregnant women become tired more readily; therefore, the prevention of fatigue must
be stressed very emphatically. The body is made up of various types of cells, each
type with a specific function. Depletion of nerve-cell energy results in fatigue, and
fatigue causes certain reactions in the body that are injurious. (Maternity Nursing 12th
Edition, by Fitzpatrick, Reeder and Mastroianni, Jr.)
It is not considered desirable for pregnant women to be employed in the followingtypes of occupation and they should, if possible, be transferred to lighter and more
sedentary works:
(a) Occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy work; and
(b) Occupation involving continuous standing and moving about. (One of the
Standards for Maternity Case and Employment of Mothers recommended by the
Children's Bureau of the United States) (Rollo, p. 12,)
Moreover, spontaneous abortion may result from the influence of periodicity as the
uterine muscle reaches a certain state of detention; or in various accidents as a fall,
strain or overmuscular exertion when the uterus reacts and expels its load. (Emphasissupplied; "Anatomy and Allied Sciences for Lawyers, W.F. English, p. 181)
(Carbajal v. GSIS, G.R. No. L-46654 August 9, 1988)
As distinguished from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are as
follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such
pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally
exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or
after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that
the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent existence.However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive
at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6
months is not viable. In the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the
appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.
(People v. Paycana, G.R. No. 179035 April 16, 2008)
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People vs. Bandian
G.R. No. 45186
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and
Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to
the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength
to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was
helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the
truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the
fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that
from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her
extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage
which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is aprimipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to
childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and
the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five
centavos a day — is uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned
from books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why
she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was
unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or
insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal
Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to
leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the
thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she
had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as
that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because
of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness
and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by
mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
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People vs. Jaca and RasalanG.R. No. L-34866
There is no dispute about the fact that Severa Jaca's new-born baby died a violent
death; this has been sufficiently proved. The evidence for the prosecution points to
Proceso Rasalan as the offender; but Margarita Jaca, the latter's wife, affirms that it
was Aurea Zabella, the midwife who attended Severa Jaca in her delivery, who
caused the death of the child.
This accusation of Margarita Jaca against Aurea Zabella is not supported by the
evidence of record. The appellant himself does not blame Aurea for the death of theinfant, for he assured in his testimony that he had only heard the child cry once, and
when Aurea Zabella, who was assisting the woman in labor, went to attend to the
babe, she found it already dead (pages 145, 146, t. s. n.). Furthermore, there is nothing
in the record to show what motive Aurea Zabella might have had to take the life of
that unfortunate new-born babe.
Rejecting, then, this incrimination of Aurea Zabella as unlikely and unproved, let us
see if there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court convicting
Proceso Rasalan of the infanticide.
Two eyewitnesses, Aurea Zabella and Agapita Navaja, both of them related to the
appellant, the first by consaguinity and the second by affinity, testify that Proceso
Rasalan wrapped up the baby in a cloth which asphyxiated it — resulting in its death.
Tomas Jaca, the appellant's father-in-law, testified that when the latter handed to him
the corpse of the newly-born child in order that he might secretly throw it into the
river, the accused revealed to him that he, Proceso Rasalan, had killed it in order to
conceal the dishonor of Severa Jaca, which cast a reflection upon them, for Severa
was the witness Tomas' Daughter, and the defendant's sister-in-law. The defendant
questions the veracity of these three witnesses, especially of the two last, Agapita
Navaja and Tomas Jaca, alleging that they had a grievance against him and his family.
The grievance mentioned is not, to our mind, sufficient to make the witnesses tell a
falsehood in accusing their own relative of so serious crime.
In addition to this evidence, there is the plain, clear, and evident proof of the
appellant's own admission contained in Exhibit C, assailed on the ground that the
defendant signed it under pressure of the Constabulary Lieutenant Santiano and the
justice of the peace Velez Martinez, without knowing its contents. That the accused
signed said exhibit knowingly and willingly has been satisfactorily proven by the
testimony of said justice of the peace, whose veracity there is in the record no reason
to doubt.
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That the infant really died, through asphyxiation, is amply shown by the testimony of
Doctor Potenciano, who examined the exhumed corpse, thus corroborating the other
witnesses for the prosecution.
As it has been established in the record that the crime charged was committed, and
that the defendant committed it; that, inasmuch as he is not an ascendant of the deadchild, he has incurred, according to the law (art. 409, par. 3, Penal Code) the penalty
for murder and is guilty of this crime (U. S. vs. Aquino and Casipit, 34 Phil., 813).
United States vs. Vedra
G.R. No. L-4779
No proof has been offered, however, that an accident of any sort had occurred which
might have produced the death of the child. Inasmuch as it was born alive and in a
healthy condition, it is not to be presumed, without some just reason therefor, that it
died a natural death within the extremely short time that elapsed between its birth and
its burial. The latter took place immediately after without further interval of time thanthat which was strictly necessary to carry the child a distance of about 150 meters
from the house of the defendant to the site where the infant was buried. On the
contrary, all of the acts related above, performed by the accused immediately after her
confinement, reveal in a clear and unquestionable manner her decided intent to kill the
newly born child in order to conceal her dishonor; and the signs of violence found on
the body demonstrate that she actually effected her purpose. The aforesaid signs,
together with the abovementioned conduct of the accused, constitute conclusive proof
of her guilt as the author of the crime of infanticide herein prosecuted.
People vs. PaycanaG.R. No. L-179035
As distinguished from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are as
follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such
pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally
exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or
after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that
the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent existence.
However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive
at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6months is not viable. In the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the
appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.
The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 4828 because by a single
act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of parricide as
well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex crime is committed
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying
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circumstances. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the
most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of Appeals properly
commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant to reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.