Transcript
Page 1: An Analysis of the Wombat Voting System Model

An Analysis of the Wombat Voting System Model

By Eitan Grundland

ElectionsSecurity

Democracy

ElectronicsTranspare

ncy

Hacking

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The System Goals

● Integrity

● Privacy

● Transparency

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Why Change to Digital?

● Computers are faster!● Computers are more accurate!● As days go by, digital interfaces are more

intuitive to the public!

The evolution in inevitable!

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From Paper to Digital

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From Paper to Digital

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From Paper to Digital

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From Paper to Digital

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From Paper to Digital

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SecurityComponentsOverview

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Security Components

A weak identification procedure can compromise the entire election process.

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Security Components

• Live CD OS• Encryption• Randomness Generation• Zero Knowledge 1 of L

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Security Components

• Voter's Receipt• Digital Signatures

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Security Components

• Paper Ballots• Serial Number

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Security Components

• Threshold Encryption• Hash for Tallying Verification

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Audit Ballot

Security Components

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Security Components

• Mixnet• Mixnet Zero

Knowledge

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TheParticipating

Parties

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1

● Ballot Stuffing● Voter Exposure● Authentication Disabling● Smart Card Forgery

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The Participating Parties

Actions That Pose No Threat When Carried Out by a Single Party

Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Polling Technicians and Staff 1

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

● False Results Publishing

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

● False Accusation

Voters 4

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4● Registration Frauds

Impostors 5

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5

● Vote Buyers Motivation● Voter Exposure

Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6

Actions That Pose No Threat When Carried Out by a Single Party

Smart Card Manufacturers 7

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7

● Voter Exposure● Printing Subliminal

Channel● Booth Denial of Service

Printer Manufacturer 8

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8

● Partial Voter Exposure

Scanner Manufacturer 9

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9

● Booth OS Built-in Backdoor

● Altering Ballots● Subliminal Channel● Printing Subliminal

ChannelLinux OS CD provider 10

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The Participating Parties

Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0

● Collecting External Information

External Attackers 11

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Threats of Attackers Collaboration

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Registration Frauds

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Repeating

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Booth's OS CD Manufacturers Capabilities Identity

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

● Partial Exposure Voter● Voter Exposure by the

Ability to Decrypt the Votes

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Voter Exposure by the Ability to Decrypt the Votes

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Ballot Stuffing

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Voter Exposure

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Chain Voting

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Chain Voting

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Voter Exposure by the Ability to Decrypt the Votes

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Subliminal Channel

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Attackers Collaboration Polling Technicians and Staff 1Supervising Authorities and Candidates System Administrators

2

Bulletin Board Administrators 3

Voters 4Impostors 5Vote Buyers/ Coercers 6Smart Card Manufacturers 7Printer Manufacturer 8Scanner Manufacturer 9Linux OS CD provider 1

0External Attackers 1

1

Voter Exposure by the Ability to Decrypt the Votes

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Conclusion

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Identification Process

• People can vote anywhere

• Biometric identification

• Limit each scanned vote to a single identification by software.

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Live OS CD

The CD should be digitally signed

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Booth Machine

The booth machine should be checked for suspicious components

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Physical Stamp

Each stamp should contain poll's digital signature

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Bulletin Board

A digitally signed list of all the cipher votes

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Booth Machine Auditing

An audit every two hours in each booth

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Ballot Scanning Authentications Auditing

A special "authentication audit ballot"

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Conclusion

An audit OCR program

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TheEnd


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