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Chapter 1: Islamic Liberation Theology
Hamas’ actions may be best understood from the perspective of an Islamic
theology of liberation. Their actions in the social, political, and military realm are a direct
result of their interpretation of Islam in their unique historical and geopolitical context.
Liberation theology is a social and subsequently political way of interpreting religion. It
puts more emphasis on practice, and necessitates action unlike other theological
interpretations (Lane, 1984). “Until recently, the impression was often given that … faith
was a highly private affair concerned with individual salvation regardless of the society in
which the (Lane, 1984, Synopsis)” religious adherent resided (Lane, 1984). This attitude
has shifted in many theological circles to the understanding that a person belongs to a
society, is interconnected with others, and therefore, “to claim any relevance for our time
… theology must have a profound social dimension (Lane, 1984, Synopsis).”
Liberation theology affirms that all religion is political, because even the practice
of conscious indifference to politics is in itself a cognizant politically inspired action, so
whether or not religion encourages political participation, both courses of action are
actually political whether intended or not (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986, pg. 73-75).
Liberation theology also states that “religion is concerned with human fulfillment…[and]
that exploitation has …hindered …[this] notably among the most materially
impoverished, excluded or marginal (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986, pgs. 74-75).” Liberation
theology also asserts that spiritual attention should be directed toward altering the status
quo circumstances that perpetuate exploitation and exclusion (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986,
pg. 75). All of these tenets of liberation theology were prevalent in Latin America in the
2
seventies and eighties, where perhaps the most notable context of liberation theology
occurred (Novak, 1986).
Theological interpretation is primarily influenced by the context of the interpreter.
In the context of oppression, theological interpretation concerns itself with interpreting
religion in a way to liberate its oppressed followers. This type of theological
interpretation is termed liberation theology. It has been a phenomenon most notable in
Latin America (Novak, 1986), but also in other regions such as Iran (Dabashi, 2008) and
South Africa (Esack, 1997). There are certain conditions that cause liberation theology to
develop and manifest itself as the dominant religious interpretation of a region. All of
these necessary conditions for liberation theology to develop are present in Palestine
(Schanzer, 2008).
The necessary condition for the development and manifestation of liberation
theology is a circumstance of oppression among an identified group. Such a group is
generally clearly defined based on religion, ethnicity, culture, nationality or some other
visible, clearly recognized trait (Novak, 1986). In Palestine, this group is the largely
Muslim, and Arab population living under the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).
A distinct feeling of oppression from a source projecting superiority always
characterizes the formation of liberationist interpretations. This source may be a
government, a foreign power that has interfered, a colonizer or any other body that has
authority. There has to be some sort of hierarchical or elitist system in place that exploits
3
a group of people socially and economically. Such a group can adopt a liberationist
perspective in their religion (Novak, 1986).
The perspective of Liberation theology has been previously applied to Palestinian
Christian and Jewish interpretations of scripture, but not to Islamic interpretations of
scripture. In order to apply this useful perspective to understanding Palestinian Islamic
practice, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the origins of liberation theology
and its main tenets. This chapter will develop an explanation of Islamic liberation
theology by describing the context of oppression Palestinians reside within, briefly
introducing the history of liberation theology originating in Christianity and finally the
newer study of Islamic liberation theology (Ateek, 1989).
The oppression and discrimination that Palestinians have experienced is
intolerable by any standards of what human beings can be reasonably expected to endure
before resisting (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). It has been so for decades. Palestinians
have been discriminated against in some part because of their religion and ethnicity.
Therefore, it should not seem unusual that certain Palestinians turn to religion as a source
of inspiration. It should also seem reasonable that Palestinians would look to their religion
as a source of guidance for how to best cope with their current predicament. Hamas has
looked to the Qur’an after recognizing a necessity to reinterpret scripture in their context
of oppression and as an inspiration for resisting the Zionist occupation of their home
(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).
The unfortunate predicament of the majority of Latin Americans was due to their
long history of exploitation, colonialism and conquest at the hands of the Spanish,
4
Portuguese and United States (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986). Latin American Christian
liberationist theologians affirmed that the entire “Third World circumstance as a whole
[…was] a consequence of the operation of a world system of economic and political
exploitation (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986, pg.75).” Liberation theologies argue for the
necessity to reinterpret scripture as it related to the modern and imminent context and to
read religious history in a manner that validates “the interpretive starting point within the
modern circumstances and the reading of history upon (Hadden and Shuper, 1986, pg.
75)” which such an interpretation is based (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986, pg. 75). In Latin
America this meant interpreting history as a series of ethical decisions that ultimately led
to an oppressive and elitist social structure that oppressed even the most observant
Christian adherents. These Christians adopted the idea that their poverty was not God’s
will, it was due to the actions of humans possessing free will. From such an assumption,
there can be reinterpretation of scripture through a liberationist framework that asserts the
poor and marginalized people’s right to liberate themselves through social and political
change. The liberation from earthly woes was to be tangible rather than heavenly (Novak,
1986). Belief was no longer enough for the truly devout Christian, practice became of
equal or even superior importance to belief (O’Malley).
Liberation theology in Latin America became political as a subsequent effect of
the fact that it preached a communitarian and social gospel (Shuppe and Hadden, 1988,
pg. 5). Social action can be defined as “the mobilization of resources to influence the
course of profane social life. The resources for such action may be of any sort - economic,
military, political, educational, even religious-and religious social action may be directed
to any realm of life, not just the political. [It follows then, that] for religion, any effort to
5
affect the world would count as a social action (Shuppe and Hadden, 1988, pg. 5).”
Advocating a social gospel was a deeply politically charged action in the Latin American
context, especially considering the tyrannical rule, the immense human suffering and
overall extremely volatile and unstable context from which this theology emerged
(Shuppe and Hadden, 1988).
Liberation theology (especially in third world contexts) places strong emphasis on
“human freedom and … the right of self-determination … of exploited classes (Shuppe
and Hadden, 1988, pg. 128).” The political issue with this importance placed on self-
determination is the reality that all people are bound by the social, lawful and economic
constraints of the area in which they reside. Under these conditions it is impossible for
people to be the sole master of their own destinies, so people participate in society and
politics to advocate for a system that they believe provides the most ideal social
conditions (Shuppe and Hadden, 1988, pg. 5). Politics can be defined as “one specific
form of social action that centers on conflict over collective decisions (Shuppe and
Hadden, 1988, pg. 5).” Politics is the process that addresses “the predicament of having to
choose a common line of action […between] alternatives […that are] mutually exclusive
(Shuppe and Hadden, 1988, pg. 5).”Politics addresses the economic reality of scarcity; it
addresses the issue of appropriating the resources of a society. In Latin America, people
supported the social ideal that resources should be shared equally. Liberationists sought to
build their theological infrastructure based on the ideals of equality and putting the
decisions of appropriating resources to elected leaders trustworthy of the responsibility of
representing first and foremost the marginalized classes (Shuppe and Hadden, 1988, pg.
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128) - a true Marxist system, based on their Christological framework. “From each
according to his ability, to each according to his need (Marx, 1875).”
Liberation theology reached prominence among Latin American Christians “as a
human response to the large scale human suffering that [was…] so manifest there
(Haight, 1985, pg. 27).”The Latin American clergy recognized that scripture “must be
reinterpreted in terms corresponding to and illuminating the problems or crises of each
age (Haight, 1985, pg. 29).” In the case of Latin America, religious interpretations sought
to liberate the poor from their extreme economic oppression. Liberation theology was
“born of faith…[and] based on human aspirations for freedom (Haight, 1985, pg. 29).”It
was a social interpretation siding with the impoverished masses, a collectivist rather than
individualist interpretation. “It arose as a theology of the poor, for the poor, on the side of
the poor, committed to the liberation of those … literally in captivity (Haight, 1983, pg.
28).”
Although liberation theology gained some popularity in Latin America, it is
important to note that this is not where the first seeds of a collectivist Christian practice
were actually planted (O’Malley). Liberation theology’s “leading proponents, …Gustavo
Gutierrez, Juan Segundo, Jose Miranda, […were] responsive to the epistemological and
social perspectives of Kant, Hegel, and Marx…Liberation theology […was] greatly
influenced by European political […theological findings] in J. B. Metz, … Jurgen
Moltmann and Harvey Cox perspectives which … criticized the … individualistic nature
of existential theology (O’Malley)” that ultimately had led to Christians perpetrating the
Holocaust (Haight, 1983).
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Latin Americans particularly were influenced by Marxist social analysis, and
affirmed that a Marxist republic was what Jesus would have advocated as they viewed
Jesus as having embodied Marxist principles. Latin American Liberation theology was a
direct result of the unrelenting and despairingly severe conditions of poverty in Latin
America, but it was also a result of European schools of political and social thought that
had become popular among Latin Americans (O’Malley).
Christian liberation theology cites examples of Jesus’ humble background, his
kindness toward the marginalized and his adamant refusal to engage in a decadent
lifestyle. A representative group of Latin Americans surveyed in 1985 shared their
favourite biblical passages, all of which were examples of Christ’s affinity to the poor and
marginalized (Berryman, 1987). They cited “The Acts of the Apostles, where it describes
how the early Christian communities shared their goods and no one was poor (Berryman,
1987, pg. 45).” They named “The Exodus, where God hears the cry of his people and
comes to liberate them … (Berryman, 1987, pg. 45).” They cited “Matthew 25, where
Jesus says ‘whatever you did for one of my least brother or sisters you did it for me,
[and…] where Jesus goes into the synagogue and says he has come to bring glad tidings
to the poor, and to proclaim liberty (Berryman, 1987, pg. 45).” The poor and politically
disenfranchised saw Jesus as their ultimate hero, liberator, and savior. Jesus was to the
liberationist Latin Americans, unquestionably on their side (Berryman, 1987).
“The last shall be first and the first last (Matthew 20:16)” philosophy was applied
to the side of the impoverished and oppressed Latin Americans who affirmed that Jesus
would have stood on the side of the poor (Novak, 1986). They also applied this thought to
vindication of their rights in the present life, and not as a heavenly reward for living a
good Christian life. This was a new idea in Christianity that had previously emphasized
8
personal, and divine rather than earthly salvation from suffering (Novak, 1986). Within
liberation theology there is an earthly oppressive force from which the marginalized must
liberate themselves. Novak describes this very clearly in his book “Will it Liberate?” in
the chapter titled “Look North in Anger.” He cites a quote from the well-known Peruvian
priest Gustavo Guitierrez:
Liberation is a term which expresses a new posture in Latin America…Among more alert people today, what we have called a new awareness of Latin American reality is making headway. They believe that there can be authentic development for Latin America only if there is liberation from the domination exercised by the greatest capitalist countries, especially the most powerful, the United States of America (Novak, 1986, pg. 11).
The Latin American theologians held that the Christian gospels were socialist and
therefore social and political. They viewed capitalism and American hegemony in Latin
America as the main enemy of their theological quest to liberate the poor and
marginalized. This anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, liberationist stance is paralleled in
Islamic liberation theology (Novak, 1986).
Jesus, the Christian Messiah and Muhammad the messenger of Islam both led
exemplary lives of morality, and courageously performed unconventional acts of
revolutionary kindness according to their followers. Adherents of both Christianity and
Islam seek to emulate the enviable traits of these two influential men of history. Both
have looked to their exemplary actions when faced with a pressing need to challenge the
status quo (Ali, 1990). This has been evident in the liberationist scriptural interpretations
of feminists, Blacks, the poor, and in more recent years the homosexual, bi-sexual and
transgendered community. This theological dilemma has been posed to any group that has
been scraped to the margins of society by the dominating status quo (Hadden and Shuppe,
1986). Marginalization has been a shared experience of Christians and Muslims alike.
9
Outlined in the Christian Bible are countless examples of Jesus’ kindness and acceptance
of the most marginalized and even abhorred members of society. Muhammad’s life is also
filled with such examples of revolutionary and anti-status quo acts of inclusion and
kindness (Ali, 1990).
Although the prevailing idea of Jesus as embodying socialism or Marxism has not
been applied as the political affiliation that Muhammad would most likely have
subscribed to, there are political, social and collectivist elements in Islam. Liberation
theology as an Islamic phenomenon is a relatively new area of study but it is very relevant
to understanding some of the new Islamic religious movements of modernity (Ali, 1990).
Although liberation theology emerged as a Christian response to oppression, Islam is an
Abrahamic, prophetic faith that shares many characteristics with Christianity. They share
an idea of human free-will, a linear conception of time, a belief in divine judgment, of
angels and demons, of good and evil and of heaven and hell. Like Christianity, Islam has
also been reinterpreted by its adherents who have found themselves in similar
circumstances of oppression. There are enough similarities in Christianity and Islam that
the liberationist perspective and label can appropriately be applied to both religions
(Esack, 1997).
It is academically accepted that there are liberationist perspectives of religion in
Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Esack, 1997). This perspective is generally not applied
to Muslim Palestinians, or to Hamas specifically. There are many parallels between the
oppression suffered by Palestinians and those people of nations where “liberation
movements” have emerged. Despite that fact, Hamas often is described as a “terrorist
organization (Kepel, 2002).” This means that the very useful perspective of liberation
theology has not been applied to Hamas. It is our argument that applying the perspective
10
of liberation theology could be a very effective strategy to further an understanding of
Hamas, and their unique interpretation of Islam. The tendency to generalize all
fundamentalist, radical, or liberationist Islamic groups as homogenous has been extremely
detrimental to the process of improving the relationship between The West and the
Islamic world. This has been especially apparent in the aftermath of 9/11 and the “War on
Terror.” (Griefenhagen, 2004).
The various interpretations of Islam are very unique and as heterogeneous as the
Islamic populations of the world. It is not accurate to reduce all of the liberationist,
fundamentalist or radical interpretations of Islam to the level of terrorist as has been the
observable tendency. Careful consideration must be given to each specific group and its
own interpretation in its own context. If an adequate understanding of Hamas can ever be
reached, it must be considered on its own and not considered as a part of Al Qaeda, or any
other terrorist network. For this reason, it is our argument that Hamas can be considered
and interpreted most appropriately on its own, and as a liberationist movement
(Griefenhagen, 2004).
Liberation theology is not the same as fundamentalist theology. The latter is a
nostalgic desire to restore a religion to its pure form as it was at the time of its emergence.
Liberation theology is concerned with the here and now, and recognizes the need to
reinterpret religion as it relates to the changing times and the present context. It is not
primarily concerned with liberation in the afterlife, but focuses on achieving liberation in
the present life, and freeing its adherents from earthly troubles (Ali, 1990).
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Palestinians certainly have earthly troubles. Palestinians have been oppressed by
apartheid, occupation and colonization of their lands, and by economic hardship (Farrell,
Milton-Edwards, 2010). Their context of oppression is an environment in which an
Islamic theology of liberation could develop as it has in other areas of the world (Novak,
1986). It is our argument that Hamas developed a distinct theology of liberation as a
result of their modern, and unique context of oppression (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).
Islam emerged as both a religion and a social revolution posing a “powerful
challenge to the oppressive structures of its time (Ali, 1990, pg. 22).” It advocated social
justice, and encouraged universal human unity and brotherhood. This is evident in the
suras (Qur’anic verses) condemning racism at a hierarchical and elitist time in human
history (Ali, 1990). “The Arabs … were greatly constrained by tribal outlook. This …
was shattered by the Qur’anic teaching that […the human race in its entirety…]
originated from the same man and woman and no one has any distinction over the other
on the basis of tribe, nation race or colour (Ali, 1990, pg. 31)” […It stresses…] “that
these differences are explicitly for purposes of identification (Ali, 1990, pg. 31).”The
Qur’an makes it very clear that God’s judgment is a true meritocracy, with no race
superior to another in this sura: “O men, We created you from male and female, and
formed you into tribes that you may recognize each other. He who has more integrity has
indeed greater honour with God. Surely God is all knowing and well-informed (Ali, 1993,
49:13-14).”
The blatant condemnation of racism is furthered by observing Muhammad’s
actions. Muhammad performed an unheard of action by promoting an African slave to the
honoured rank of being his muezzin. This man, named Bilal was noted as one of
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Muhammad’s most trusted companions (Ali, 1990, pg. 3). The practice of slavery was
widespread at the time and the entire Arabian society was dependent on it. This would
have been an impossible context in which to outlaw or eradicate slavery outright, but
Muhammad did set an example through his kindness toward slaves that showed his
unconventional respect for the human dignity of even the lowest members of society (Ali,
1990, pg. 29). This kindness is paralleled by Jesus’ fearless visit of the diseased, socially
reviled and feared lepers (Mark 1:40-45). The Qur’an does not explicitly abolish slavery,
but it is seriously discouraged: “Free those slaves you possess who wish to buy their
freedom after a written undertaking, if you know they have some goodness, and give
them out of the riches God has given you, Do not force your maids into prostitution (Ali,
1993, 24:33).”
This recommendation of improving the treatment of women was extended to free
women as well. At a time when polygamy was unrestricted, Muhammad sought to
regulate it and make it much less exploitive. Completely eradicating this practice would
have been inconceivable in the context of the emergence of Islam. At the time of the
Qur’an’s revelation, the societal status of women could most accurately be described as
severely restricted both socially and economically (Ali, 1990, pg. 29). “They had to live
at times, with more than a dozen co-wives…[and] they were […often] considered [a]
burden…In many cases […attempts…were] made to bury them alive (Ali, 1990, pg. 29).”
The Qur’an condemns this practice of female infanticide in sura 81:8-9 “And the little
girl buried alive is asked, for what crime she was put to death (Ali, 1993, 81:8-9).” This
sura refers to the resurrection of these buried little girls from their graves on the day of
judgment, and their immediate ascension into paradise as innocent and pure children free
13
of any blemish of sin. It also hints to the wrath of judgment their gravediggers should fear
(Ali, 1990, pg. 29).
Concerning the practice of polygamy it is important to note that in the context in
which Islam emerged and the prevailing misogynistic cultural ideas of the time, any
attempt to restrict polygamy was a progressive and indeed revolutionary step. Muhammad
actually gave women some rights and protection, and not just the right to life rather than
being buried alive, he gave some regard for their primal human dignity (Ali, 1990).
Polygamy is not encouraged by the Qur’an. It is simply acknowledged and permitted
granted appropriate circumstances (Badawi, 1995, pg. 27). The verse in the Qur’an
concerning polygamy is as follows: “If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly
with the orphans, marry women of your choice, two or three or four; but if you fear that
you shall not be able to deal justly with them, then only one…(Qur’an, 4:3, Badawi,
1995, pg. 28).”
It may also be worth noting that the passage of the Qur’an regarding polygamy
“was revealed after the battle of Uhud, in which dozens of Muslims were martyred,
leaving behind widows and orphans (Badawi, 1995).” This was a dire predicament,
particularly for widows and female children considered at best a burden on society
(Badawi, 1995). It can therefore be assumed from a liberationist perspective (because it
should not be neglected that the technical permissibility to take four wives has been
exploited by certain men and certain patriarchal societies) that the intention behind
permitting polygamy was to provide “a practical and humane solution to the problems of
widows and orphans who would otherwise surely be more vulnerable (Badawi, 1995, pg.
28)” especially given the patriarchy and barbarism of Muhammad’s time (Ali, 1990).
When considering Muhammad’s context, it can be very well understood that feminist
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liberationist interpretations of the Qur’an could be taken from Muhammad as a liberator
(Ali, 1990).
Muhammad’s liberating actions extended to the impoverished and economically
oppressed peoples of society - people who found themselves in oppressive circumstances
similar to the Latin Americans discussed previously (Novak, 1986). Muhammad had
much to say in favor of the oppressed, and there are also many Qur’anic
recommendations to promote social justice and reduce the hoarding of money (Ali, 1990).
The third pillar of Islam zakat (charity) is the example of this that undoubtedly comes to
mind, but there are many more recommendations made by Muhammad to show that he
stood, like Jesus did on the side of the poor and oppressed and sought their liberation and
salvation (Ali, 1990).
“Religion […far from being a mere] sigh of the oppressed […may] provide a
powerful motivation to overthrow the status quo (Ali, 1990, pg.20).” This is evident in
Muhammad’s unconventional ideals, and awe-inspiring demonstrations of justice.
Muhammad advocated economic justice, women’s emancipation, and was consistently
“engaged in liberating the weaker sections of society (Ali, 1990, pg. 33).” Muhammad’s
contributions to implementing economic justice may actually be unparalleled. During the
time of the Qur’an’s revelation, the highly exploitive practice of usury was widespread.
Many Meccans were trapped in debt and suffered extreme poverty while others engaged
in gross lifestyles of debauchery, decadence, and intoxication (Ali, 1990). Muhammad
staunchly condemned this practice “and warned those who perpetuate[d] it to (Ali, 1990,
pg. 35)” be wary of certain divine punishment (Ali, 1990, pg. 35). “The Qur’an lays great
emphasis on distributive justice (Ali, 1990, pg. 35).”It blatantly condemns excessive
accumulation of and hoarding of wealth warning that “One who accumulates and counts
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again and again will certainly be hurled … into hell fire (Ali, 1990, pg. 35.)” Given all of
these liberationist elements of the Qur’an, which could be reasonably considered to be
very similar to the loving, tolerant and socialist message of Jesus it seems obvious that
one may wonder why the study of Islamic liberation theology is relatively new. This is
due to the unfortunate human tendency to be greedy, selfish, over-indulgent and fearful of
upsetting the status quo (Ali, 1990, pg. 37).
Tragically, within a mere 30 years of Muhammad’s death “Islam lost its liberative
and democratic character and became part of the monarchial establishment of the
Umayyads (Ali, 1990, pg. 37).” While Muhammad had summoned the marginalized
classes together and even willingly suffered at their side, the Umayyads “gathered
powerful tyrants …and ruthlessly suppressed all those who opposed their (Ali, 1990, pg.
37)” oppression and brutality (Ali, 1990). “The number of slaves multiplied, women
[were again] subjugated …, non-Arabs discriminated against and [the] liberative […
elements] of Islam replaced by a fatalistic outlook (Ali, 1990, pg. 37).” Elitist,
hierarchical power structures developed and the cherished “socio-political equality [that
Muhammad had fought for] was lost (Ali, 1990, pg. 37).”
This Islamic monarchial style is still an image that characterizes Islam today,
especially in the well-known Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman
(BBC, 2012). When considering the unenviable status of women in some Islamic states
such as Saudi Arabia, The Sudan, or Iran and massive accumulation of wealth in the
Saudi Kingdom’s royal family (BBC, 2012), the idea that Muhammad was in fact as
much of a liberator, humanist, and feminist as Jesus could reasonably seem ludicrous,
even ridiculous (Ali, 1990, pg. 37)-especially to someone ignorant about the Islamic faith.
But at its core, at its source, there are liberative elements in Islam that are beginning to be
16
revived. Islam in its liberationist, modernist and feminist interpretations is not inherently
elitist. In fact, liberationist interpretations have been emerging in several different modern
contexts, most notably during the Arab spring. Perhaps however, the most prevalent case
of the development and ascension of a liberationist theology of Islam can be observed in
the Islamist revolution in response to the Western imperialism that was overthrown in
Iran (Dabashi, 2008).
Dabashi characterizes Islamic liberation theology as a resistance to Imperialism
that has been largely Western dominated. He describes Islamic liberation theology as
largely inspired by the modern post-colonial period (Dabashi, 2008). Dabashi credits his
inspiration to the liberative elements of Christian liberation theology citing the renowned
Argentinian theologian Gustavo Gutierrez:
The revolutionary situation which prevails today, especially in the Third World, is an expression of this growing radicalization. To support the social revolution means to abolish the present status quo and to attempt to replace it with a qualitatively different one;…it means to attempt to put an end to the domination of some countries by others (Dabashi, 2008, dedication page).
Gutierrez’s eloquently expressed frustrations with imperialism share uncanny
similarities with the Iranian experience of colonialism. Both have shared a history of
exploitation at the hands of Western colonial, capitalist and secular interests. Both have
seen a return to religion in response to this. In Iran, this response was a particularly
radical, and extremely anti-imperialist theology of liberation (Dabashi, 2008, 62).
“In Iran, successive generations of corrupt politicians facilitated the colonial
plundering [and economic exploitation] of the nation while (Dabashi, 2008, pg.
62)”sabotaging any hope of “domestic political maturity (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 62),”
autonomy and flourishing (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 62). The revolution of 1979 definitively
ended decades of tyrannical “monarchy and its active complacency in integrating Iran
17
into a servile state in the global configuration of capital (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 62).” The
radical Islam that characterized the overwhelming success of the Iranian Islamist
revolution had distinctly anti-colonial and liberative elements. The type of Islamism that
inspired the revolution in Iran was a result of a new interpretation of scripture in light of
the current circumstances of oppression and exploitation (Dabashi, 2008). This is a
distinctly liberationist pursuit (Ali, 1990).
Iranians viewed America as a “predatory empire” from which they felt a pressing
need to liberate themselves. In the face of this undesired predicament, they looked to
Islam for answers, which they found in its liberationist characteristics (Dabashi, 2008).
Iranian scholar Hamid Dabashi in his book “Islamic Liberation Theology” explains that
as long as the West seeks to dominate other peoples there will constantly be forces of
resistance equal to the forces of oppression strengthened by Islam’s liberative traits
(Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197). He asserts that since the Iranian Islamist revolution, Islam has
been emerging as a liberative force “of political resistance to the globalizing empire….
[and that] the result of this … is the possibility of a new liberation theodicy (Dabashi
2008, pg. 197)” (theodicy being a theology that seeks to reconcile with the existence of
evil in the world and reinstate a just social order). He theorizes that this liberationist
theodicy will evolve and take shape in the future as a continuing resistance to Western
domination not just in Iran but throughout the Islamic world (Dabashi, 2008). He gives
examples of this theodicy’s “emerging disposition … now evident in … the Hamas
movement for the liberation of Palestine, Hezbollah in defending the territorial integrity
of Lebanon, and the Shi’i community resisting the colonial occupation of their homeland
in Iraq (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197).” He affirms that all of these movements are examples of
Islam’s new tendency to adopt more liberationist theological interpretations in the context
18
of Americanized interference in their homes (Dabashi, 2008). Dabashi also describes the
perception of these Islamic movements toward Israel as the “mini-imperial cloning
(Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197)”of the predatory empire of America (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197).
This is particularly evident when observing the hostility of many Arab states toward
Israel, and some Arab states’ open financial support of Hamas (Mannes, 2004).
Dabashi names the Zionist project to be “the most enduring sore at the heart of the
[Arab] regional politics (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 198)” - which are increasingly defined by
anti- American sentiment. Dabashi argues that in an environment defined by an “them
versus us” (West versus Islam) mindset, he believes that the existing liberationist
movements of Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine will eventually develop Islamic liberationist
counterparts in the rest of the Islamic world, the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast
Asia. He hypothesizes these groups will be characterized by a multi-faceted but united
front reflecting their cultural and ethnic diversity but also their common commitment to
Islam and to resist imperialism (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197-198). He sees this united
liberative multi-state force as the only natural progression to the pursuit of resisting US-
Israeli hegemony and what he calls “the discredited and failed Zionist project that has
culminated […a] racist, apartheid, colonial (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 198)” occupation of
sovereign Islamic territory and oppression of Muslims. (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197-198).
The liberative elements of Islam are not exclusively awakened by Western-Israeli
colonial pursuits and imperialism. They have also been revived in response to apartheid,
not just in Israel but also in South Africa by perhaps the pioneer of Islamic liberation
theology, Farid Esack (Esack, 1997).
Farid affirmed the liberationist interpretation that the context of scriptural
interpretation is the primary influence (Esack, 1997). After his struggle against South
19
African Apartheid he reflected that “standing within the struggle for justice was itself a
good point from which to get a better view of the text […and that] the context of the
interpreter […is a] consciously chosen […interpretive] key (Esack, 1997, pg. 82).” Farid
had survived his own context of oppression as a Black living under the brutality of
Apartheid. He was brought up by a single mother. He was also a Muslim and
consequently part of a religious minority. Although he eventually studied theology at a
staunchly conservative institution in the Islamic country of Pakistan, he always
remembered the oppression he had suffered as a member of a minority, and the kindness
of his Christian neighbours. Deeply influenced by his personal experiences of Christians
living the socialist, kind and loving lifestyle exemplified by Jesus in the Christian Bible,
Esack was also influenced by Christian liberationist ideas. These ultimately led him to his
own liberationist, socialist, inclusive, and feminist interpretation of the Qur’an (Esack,
1997, pg. 4). While studying Islamic theology in Pakistan, Esack frequently attended
meetings of the Student Christian Movement “and witnessed how they tried to make
sense of living as Christians in a fundamentally unjust and exploitive society (Esack,
1997, pg. 5).” These are all parallel theological challenges faced by the Latin Americans
of the same time period struggling to redefine their Christian practice in light of societal
injustice. Esack was greatly impressed and influenced by their devotion to a socially
conscious, and collectivist religious practice. He was very inspired by their shift from
emphasis on individual belief and salvation to collective conscience, responsibility and
action (Esack, 1997). He sought to redefine Islam, “from a noun to a verb (Esack, 1997,
pg. 126)”as these Christians had done in their own religion. Motivated by the desire to
liberate oppressed South Africans from Apartheid, he looked to interpret the Qur’an as a
20
liberationist and found all of the necessary elements there, and also in Muhammad’s life
(Esack, 1997, pg. 83).
He discovered uncanny similarities in Christian liberation theology to his own
Islamic liberation theology, in that all “liberation theology […seeks] to achieve its
objectives through a process that is both participatory and liberatory…It is formulated by,
and in solidarity with, those whose socio-political liberation it seeks and whose personal
liberation becomes real through their participation in this process…[It] derives its
inspiration from the Qur’an and the struggles of all the prophets (Esack,1997, pg. 83).”
Esack asserted that any liberation theology must strive to liberate a religion and its
adherents from “all forms of injustice and exploitation including those of race, gender,
class and religion (Esack, 1997, pg.83).”
Christianity and Islam in their liberationist forms both seek to address the
universal problem of human suffering and misery (Dabashi, 2008). In the modern context
this misery has been largely caused by the post-colonial project and the utter failure of
modernity to fulfill promise (Moghissi, 1999). In the Third World context, modernity and
the post-colonial project has been characterized by “incompetent and corrupt state
management; the incapacity of sophisticated scientific medicine to cure horrifying
diseases […and] ethnic conflicts ripening into full-fledged bloody wars […all...] exposing
the […precariousness] of the Enlightenment progress, the … failure to share the benefits
of […medical] advance, …democracy, legal equity […and] individual autonomy and
freedom (Moghissi, 1999, pg. 55)” The developments of globalization, and
“McDonalization” have not benefitted everyone. Adding insult to injury are the loud,
obnoxious and incessant First World voices constantly reminding the Third World of
their superior living standards through advertising, social media and news broadcasting.
21
The hegemonic experience of modernity has been characterized by utter unfairness and
caused deep seeded resentment (Moghissi, 1999). This is reflected in the religious
movements of the current age. It can be observed in Gustavo Gutierrez’s insistence on the
end of American dominion in Latin America (Ali, 1990), in Ayatollah Khomeini’s
condemnation of America as “The Great Satan” (Foreign Policy, 2012) and in the anger
of rock-hurling Gazans when receiving the bodies of their comrades while returning home
with their meager earnings after spending each day servicing their colonial occupier’s
flourishing economy (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 53).
Hamas’ geo-political context and experience with Israel has very much influenced
its development of an Islamic theology of liberation. Its history of conflict with Israel has
contributed to its goal of resisting the Israeli occupation, and its belief that this resistance
is divinely sanctioned. When exploring Hamas’ history, it can be deduced that they have
been in a circumstance of oppression long enough that reinterpreting their religion in a
liberationist manner would be the logical progression of the Hamas movement.
22
Chapter 2: Hamas’ Emergence and Dual Mandate
As previously suggested; Hamas’ actions may be best understood from the
perspective of an Islamic theology of liberation. How they developed as an Islamic
Resistance and Liberation Movement cannot be understood without considering their
history and the context from which they emerged. This history will illustrate the
frustrations of Palestinian Muslims and how these frustrations eventually evolved into a
liberationist interpretation of Islam and the development of Hamas as an Islamic
movement devoted to the resistance of what many Palestinians consider an unjust
occupation.
Hamas began as a charitable and social outreach organization seeking to liberate
Palestinians from the poverty and oppression of the Israeli occupation. They became
violent after Israeli oppression became intolerable and violence appeared to be the only
viable strategy to counter Israel’s occupation (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010).
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is one of two main political factions
(the other is Fatah) vying for governance of the population in the Palestinian territories
(BBC, 2011). To their voters, they are an alternative to Fatah, a legacy of unfruitful
negotiations with Israel and corruption. To Israel and its international allies; they are a
terrorist organization. To themselves, they are heroes-the only hope for the liberation of
Palestine from the Zionist entity. The development of this perplexing identity will be
explained by exploring some key events in the group’s founding, growth, and liberationist
interpretation of Islam (BBC, 2011).
23
Due to an accident Sheikh Yassin, the primary founder of Hamas was a
quadriplegic from the age of twelve. He personally witnessed the bulldozing of his
family’s home in 1948 at the establishment of the first Israeli settlements. He grew up in a
Gaza refugee camp. It is likely due at least in part to his physical condition that he
became an avid scholar of the Qur’an from an early age (Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades,
2010). It seems unimaginable that such a marginalized person was capable of founding
the most formidable opposition to Fatah and Israel. Underestimating this man came at
severe costs (Farell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). The effort that went into his eventual
assassination, when he was nearly blind and in his nineties shows just how much
influence he wielded, and how important it was to his enemies to have this influence end
(Al-Jazeera, 2011).
Aside from introducing the main founder of Hamas, identifying Hamas will not be
possible without looking at some of its other co-founders, the events that led to its
creation, and also the history of its major accomplishments in its pursuit of sovereign,
autonomous governance in Gaza and the West Bank (BBC, 2011).
Sheikh Yassin and Hamas’ co-founders including Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantissi, Dr
Mahmoud Zahar, Musa Abu Marzouq, Ismail Abu Shanab, Salah Shehadeh, Ibrahim al-
Yazuri, Issa al-Nashar and Abdel Fattah al-Dukhan, were all members of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Many of them were highly educated men, some even medical doctors. They
were respected by Palestinians for their religious dedication, community service, and
prestigious education (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 53).
24
The Muslim Brotherhood originated in Egypt but now has branches all over the
Middle East and the world, with the highest membership in Arab states (Schanzer, 2008,
pg. 15). The Brotherhood was founded by a man of humble beginnings, Hassan Al-Banna
in 1928. The movement emerged among frustrations “with ...Western influence in Egypt,
[and...] envisioned the return to a time marked by a global Islamist order (Schanzer, 2008,
pg.1).” These frustrations only grew, and membership in the Brotherhood (although exact
membership numbers are not known) expanded rapidly (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 15). “The
British mandate of Palestine was one of the first territories to be influenced by the
Brotherhood movement...A handful of branches were founded even before the State of
Israel was established in 1948 (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 15).” Evidently, the seed of this
Islamist and anti-Imperialist movement was planted in Palestine even before Palestinian
frustrations with Israel, and only strengthened after the partition and subsequent
occupation of Palestine (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 15).
In his youth, Sheikh Yassin studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo where he met
and was influenced by the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was not able to
complete his studies there due to his serious health problems and returned home where he
became active in the Palestinian faction of the Brotherhood (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 20).
“Islam is the Solution” is the Brotherhood’s slogan (Stilt, 2010). “The
Brotherhood pursue[s] an Islamic society through tarbiyya (preaching and educating),
concentrating first on changing the outlook of individuals, then families, and finally
societies (Leiken, Brooke, 2008).” The Brotherhood is considered by many non-Muslims
to be fundamentalist, and by the most radical Islamist extremists it is considered to be far
too moderate. Indisputably, it is one of the most influential Islamist organizations in the
25
world. The Brotherhood sees Islam as the way to solve the problems of the current age
(Schanzer, 2008, pg.15) “The Brotherhood is a collection of national groups with
differing outlooks, and the various factions disagree about how best to advance its
mission (Leiken, Brooke, 2008).” The Palestinian faction that spawned Hamas was one
such faction. Important to understanding Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim
Brotherhood is noting that neither sees Islam to be incompatible with the democratic
process or modernity (Leiken, Brooke, 2008).
Sheikh Yassin disagreed with his Muslim Brothers on some key issues, mainly
their more moderate stances and their willingness to compromise with Israel. “The …
more zealous Islamists believed that Israel had to be conquered (and become Palestine)
before the larger spiritual transformation could take place ... The longstanding
Brotherhood approach, held that nonviolent outreach (dawa) was the way to slowly retake
Palestine in what they viewed would be a long …battle of wills (Schanzer, 2008, pg.21).”
This divide between the Muslim brothers ultimately led Yassin and his followers to found
Al-Mujama (the predecessor organization to Hamas). Al-Mujama was a social outreach
group through which Yassin oversaw charitable services to the Palestinian population. He
slowly preached his message of returning to Islam and gained respect and support due to
his successful management of Al-Mujama. Israel granted a license for the official
establishment of Al-Mujama in 1973. They did not foresee what this organization would
eventually become (Schanzer, 2008, pg.20). It is well documented that Israel sought to
divide and weaken the Palestinian population by funding, encouraging and making the
establishment of Al-Mujama possible. This was seen as a way to create a rival for, and
26
consequently weaken their primary fixation of the time: Fatah. This “divide and conquer”
strategy would ultimately backfire (Wall Street Journal, 2009).
After the 1967 war and the overwhelming Israeli victory which included the
Palestinian loss of Jerusalem, the situation for Palestinians worsened. A Palestinian
consensus that originated within the Muslim Brotherhood held that Jerusalem, the third
holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina was conquered by Israel to punish
Palestinians for becoming too secular. This is an opinion Sheikh Yassin agreed with and
promoted while gaining the trust of the disenfranchised Palestinian population through
Al-Mujama (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). “As Israel continued its occupation, the
Mujama provided a form of religious solidarity and comfort (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,
2010, pg.50).” By the eighties, this theory of divine punishment prevailed in the Gaza
strip. Islamism had taken off and the Islamists were ready to extend their mission from
charity to militancy (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 22).
In 1984, sheikh Yassin was arrested for founding a military cell which eventually
became Hamas’ militant branch (Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades). Israel had become
fearful that the Mujama, once exclusively pursuing social welfare endeavors, would target
Israel, since Al-Mujama had begun targeting secular Palestinians who were supporters of
Fatah. Their fears were not unfounded. Sheikh Yassin did not end up serving his full
sentence and returned to his Islamist, and now anti-Zionist activities (Schanzer, 2008, pg.
80-81). This became very apparent during 1987 and what is likely the most important
event in Hamas’ history; the first Intifada (Palestinian uprising) (Farell, Milton-Edwards,
2010). This uprising would be defined by a very one-sided civilian death toll - a ratio of
27
25 Palestinian deaths for each Israeli death, and 300 Palestinian and 15 Israeli deaths in
total (Farell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 89).
What specifically sparked the Intifada is not entirely clear. Many have speculated
that the anger and frustrations experienced by Palestinians in the occupied territories had
simply become intolerable and it took only a small incident to ignite a response (Farell,
Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 52). One such incident, a car crash may have been such an
incident. Each day before dawn, the men of the Jabalia Gazan refugee camp travelled on
unsafe roads in rusty cars to their meager jobs in Israel. The Israeli economy was
booming, and every day they witnessed the prosperity Israelis lived in and returned home,
long after dark to share their small earnings with their impoverished families in Gaza.
This caused intense resentment and hostility. Unrelenting poverty, and unsafe
transportation conditions were all effects of the occupation that undoubtedly influenced
the outbreak of the uprising (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 52).
One particular evening, nine Gazan workers were struck and killed by an Israeli
truck while commuting home from work. Upon reception of the worker’s bodies in the
Jabalia refugee camp, they were immediately mourned as martyrs. The incident was not
widely viewed by Gazans as an accident. Israel was considered responsible for the murder
of these Palestinians. (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 53). Since then, Hamas has
considered any Palestinian killed even indirectly by an Israeli to be a martyr (Ezzedeen
Al-Qassam Brigades, 2010).
Word of the martyred Gazans spread rapidly through Jabalia, Gaza, and the West
Bank . “Within ten days of the accident, thousands of Palestinians had taken to the
28
streets ... to protest the occupation (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 52).” Palestinians
in the occupied territories of all ages hurled rocks at Israeli border guards and troops.
Shopkeepers closed, people refused to work, and Palestinians urged each other to
participate in the uprising (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 53). “It appeared as if one
mighty force was uniting the Palestinians [...in…] their desire to bring the occupation to
an end through ... mass rebellion and disobedience (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg.
53).”
Hamas came into all of this when they provided the leadership in the midst of the
seemingly chaotic uprising. The outbreak of the unexpected intifada in 1987 (BBC, 2011)
caused Yasser Arafat and his fellow Palestinian Fatah leaders to attempt to reassert
leadership over the rioting Palestinians. At the beginning of the uprising, Hamas was still
not considered to be a serious threat, and Israel focused primarily on Fatah - a diversion
that Hamas took advantage of. A few years later - Israeli, and international attention
would be turned to the newly established Hamas Islamists. The Palestinian population in
Gaza and the West Bank would be divided (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 54).
“The establishment of Hamas came at a time of unprecedented national
unity ...against Israel’s ... occupation (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 54).” Hamas
refused to align itself with the secular nationalists they despised. Their agenda was to
assert themselves first and foremost as an Islamic organization, dedicated to the liberation
of Palestine and the end of the Israeli occupation and encroachment within the borders of
1967 (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 54). Hamas made their reason for being and
goals very clear by publishing their official charter in 1988 (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,
2010, pg. 311). This charter made it clear that Hamas was above all, an Islamic
29
organization, taking its motivation from the Qur’an and dedicated to the Islamization and
liberation of Palestine (Palestine Center, 1988). To accomplish this, it was not opposed to
participation in armed combat. Originally, these militant pursuits were directed
exclusively at Israeli military targets. The attacks on civilians began later (Farrell, Milton-
Edwards, 2010).
Even after Hamas had asserted itself through its charter in 1988, it was still
considered a lesser threat than Fatah, which had until the full escalation of the first
Intifada caused the greatest hindrance to furthering Israeli interests. It likely did not have
occur to Israel that Hamas would act as drastically as they did (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,
2010, pg. 61). In 1989, two Israeli soldiers disappeared. Hamas later claimed
responsibility and disclosed the whereabouts of their bodies. One soldier named Avi
Sasportas was hitch-hiking home from his base. The other, Ilam Saadon, was hitch-hiking
in an Israeli settlement called Ashkelon. Both men were targeted by Hamas as soldiers.
Hamas at this point was still opposed to targeting Israeli civilians (Israel Insider, 2001).
Shortly after, Israel declared Hamas to be a terrorist organization. Israeli authority, and
secular Palestinian factions cut off contact with them, and membership of Hamas became
a punishable crime (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 61).
Hamas replaced Fatah as Israel’s primary fixation. Yitzhak Rabin (Israeli Prime
Minister) eventually adopted an “iron fist policy” against the Palestinian resistance
(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 54). Rabin stated: “this government will fight any
manifestation of violence and terror, and will not permit, …Hamas … to harm citizens of
Israel, and … will take all steps at its disposal to battle murderous terrorist organizations
(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 64).” This statement was made in 1992, and it is
30
important to note that this very hostile “declaration of war against Hamas (Farrell,
Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 65)” may not have been the desired outcome of Hamas’ heavy
involvement in Palestinian resistance to the Zionist occupation (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,
2010).
Dr. Mahmoud Zahar (a co-founder of Hamas) attempted to negotiate with Israeli
politicians, and insisted that Hamas’ agenda was not anti-Jewish, and that Jews could be
accepted as fellow monotheistic adherents of an Abrahamic faith. He explained that
Hamas’ agenda was concerned exclusively with the Israeli state, and that what they
sought was a non-secular Islamist Palestinian state - an autonomous state with elected
representatives , free from the interference of Israel and neighbouring Arab states (Farrell
and Milton-Edwards, 2010). Even the notoriously radical Sheikh Yassin advocated for
negotiations at this time “so long as Israel was prepared to recognize Hamas and its
demand for Palestinian rights (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 59).”
Unfortunately, these dialogues proved to be unproductive. Hamas ultimately
deemed them to be useless, and their hostility toward Israel deepened. They resorted to
militancy and launching more attacks against military targets. Foreign Arab states
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause also began to favor Hamas over Fatah. This caused
increased tensions between Hamas and Fatah and influenced Hamas’ increasingly anti-
Israeli, and anti-Fatah stances (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).
These tensions continued to escalate after the end of the first Palestinian uprising,
and throughout the 1990s. Hamas also continued to gain political strength. Hamas was
adamantly opposed to the Oslo accords, and was infuriated by Yasser Arafat’s (Fatahs’s
31
leader) cooperation with Israel, and invitation of the international community to interfere
in Palestinian affairs. Hamas publicly attacked Fatah’s members for corruption and
squandering Palestinian money, while seeking the approval of the Palestinian population
through Islamization. Hamas began to punish collaborators with Israel by execution
(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 77). Even after Israel began orchestrating the earliest
stages of its withdrawal of troops from Gaza and the West Bank in accordance with the
1993 Oslo agreements (BBC, 2011), Hamas asserted that this was not enough. This
message was carried out largely through attacks on Israeli military targets. Hamas
targeted the Israeli military in Jericho (located in the West Bank), and Gaza’s major
towns. They were getting brasher, more confident (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 77-
78). Hamas was “convinced that its weapons would […protect…] itself from Israel
(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 77).”
Between the end of the first intifada and 1994, there were several skirmishes
between Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas’ military branch), Fatah, and Israeli
forces. Hamas’ targets were Palestinians (many of Fatah’s supporters) who were
conspiring by collaboration with Israel, or Israeli military targets. In 1994 the Brigades
turned their sights on Israeli civilian targets after one pivotal event (Farrell, Milton-
Edwards, 2010, pg. 77).
During the month of Ramadan in 1994 , an Israeli settler named Baruch Goldstein
walked into the Ibrahimi mosque in a military uniform where he proceeded to open fire
on the Palestinian worshippers. He murdered 29 Palestinian civilians and seriously
injured several others. Israelis and Palestinians alike were appalled by the act of
extremism, especially since the mosque is believed to be Abraham’s burial site and is
32
revered by both Jews and Muslims. Even though the Israeli state vowed to eliminate such
extremism in its own members, and publicly condemned the massacre, this was not
enough to undo the damage inflicted. The fury that erupted within the Palestinian
population following the massacre was inconsolable (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg.
77). “The Palestinian-Israeli conflict […was] irrevocably altered for the worse (Farrell,
Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 77).”
Contributing to Palestinian anger was the feeling that this attack could have been
prevented. Goldstein had made threats, shown violent tendencies, and had even poured
acid over the interior of the mosque a few months prior to the murderous attack.
Palestinian authorities had urged the Israeli Prime Minister to monitor Goldstein’s actions
but with no results (The Independent, 1994). The Israeli army was also “reported to have
killed 12 Palestinians as rioting erupted … in the aftermath of the shootings (BBC,
1994).” Adding insult to injury was the eventual celebrity status that Goldstein achieved
after his “martyrdom” among certain Jewish factions (Ynet News, 2010).
Although Palestinian civilians had been casualties of the Israeli army for decades,
the massacre marked the beginning of Hamas’ intentional attacks against Israeli civilians.
Musa Abu Marzouq of Hamas reflected on these attacks: “we were against targeting
civilians… but no one asked about Palestinian civilian deaths…no one cared…After …
the massacre we determined it was time to kill Israel’s civilians…we offered to stop if
Israel would, but they rejected that offer (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 79).”Hamas
carried out its first suicide attack against civilians in Afula, an Israeli town, in response to
the massacre. This attack claimed eight lives (BBC, 2007).
33
Hamas justified its civilian attacks inside Israel through “tactical necessity […as]
reciprocation (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 79),” and also through religion, “an eye
for an eye (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 79).” They claimed to be “mandated by
Islam - in a war situation - to do unto others as they have done unto us (Farrell, Milton-
Edwards, 2010, pg. 79).”There was ample supply of Palestinians eager to implement the
suicide attacks on civilians. The result was dozens of civilian deaths and casualties. As
Fatah attempted to salvage the negotiation process, Hamas’ militancy continued through
the nineties, all the way up to the second Intifada (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 84).
The first Intifada was characterized by “overmatched Palestinian youth hurling
rocks at Israeli tanks…The Second Intifada was altogether different (Farrell, Milton-
Edwards, 2010, pg. 85).” Palestinians had changed their tactics, and moved from
launching rocks, to launching their own bodies strapped with explosives. Unlike the
outbreak of the “Stone-throwing Intifada,” the events leading to the provocation of the
“Al-Aqsa Intifada” are undisputed (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).
Perhaps the most unprecedented loathing among Palestinians and their
neighbouring supporters for one man was embodied in the rampant and passionate hatred
for “Israel’s right-wing opposition leader, Ariel Sharon (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010,
pg. 87).” He earned “particular notoriety when… he masterminded the invasion of
Lebanon, only for Israel’s …allies to massacre Palestinian refugees in Beirut’s Sabra and
Shatila refugee camps (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 87).” He has been found
responsible for “what is considered the bloodiest single incident of the Arab-Israeli
conflict (The Corner Report, 2010).” The death toll of the Sabra and Shatila massacre was
34
indisputably at least 800, and has been counted at more than 3500 at some estimates
(Palestine Facts, 2011).
On the 28th of September, 2000, the abhorred and detested Mr. Sharon conducted
a political demonstration in the Old city of Jerusalem, near the Al-Aqsa mosque. “The site
of this walkabout was probably the most sensitive political and religious fault-line in the
world… the third holiest site in Islam …for the …journey of the Prophet Mohammed to
heaven (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 87).” The religious importance of the Al-
Aqsa mosque in Islam is surpassed only by the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi
Arabia. Sharon’s demonstration there was interpreted by Palestinians to be a blatant
assertion of sovereignty over the long-disputed area - an intentional insult and a direct
provocation. When Palestinians protested, they were fired upon with tear gas, and four
protestors were shot and killed. The violence escalated and riots spread from Jerusalem to
all of Gaza and the West Bank. Two days into the rioting, twelve year-old Muhammad al-
Dura was shot dead after being targeted by an Israeli soldier (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,
2010, pg. 87). His death was captured on film “while he huddled defenselessly behind his
father (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 87).” This very emotionally charged video
spread rapidly throughout the Islamic world and he was immediately mourned as a
martyr. This led to the escalation of the Intifada, and resulted in the deaths of 564
Palestinians and 181 Israelis in the first 12 months (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg.
89). Mostly, these deaths were caused by Israeli troops and Hamas’ suicide attacks. These
attacks earned Hamas notoriety not just in Israel, but all over the world. It also caused an
abrupt end to the international sympathy toward the pathetically depicted rock-throwing
Palestinians, and caused a new characterization of Palestinians as dangerous, fanatical
35
and violent. This persona was exacerbated by the 9/11 Islamophobic hysteria. The attacks
also contributed to the growing fear and hatred of Hamas and the perception of them as
terrorists (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 89).
Hamas asserted during the Second Intifada and the 9/11 aftermath that its struggle
for Palestine was specific, that it had no intention of joining Al-Qaeda and that its mission
was not against the West but was confined within the small (1967) borders of Palestine.
Hamas has maintained this stance. At the end of the Second Intifada, Palestine was even
more polarized between the nationalists (Fatah) and the Islamists (Hamas). The Gaza strip
became the area of Palestine with the most support for Palestine. Eventually, this resulted
in Hamas winning a landslide victory in the Gaza elections and the expulsion of Fatah
from the Gaza strip (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). The West Bank became the
stronghold for Fatah. These two areas of Palestine are geographically separate and
increasingly autonomous from each other (Schanzer, 2008).
Gaza, as Hamas’ domain has been the central target of Israeli attack. This is very
evident when looking at Operation Cast Lead. From December 27, 2007 until January 18,
2009, the Israeli military fired into Gaza, causing the deaths of 1400 Palestinians, and
seriously injuring 5000 Palestinians (Electronic Intifada, 2010 ). The International Court
of Justice ruled the events leading up to Operation Cast Lead to be insufficient grounds to
justify Israel’s claim for self - defense. They deemed Israel’s use of force and attack on
Gaza to be completely unjustifiable. Israel claimed to be defending itself against rocket
attacks from Gaza that had killed 14 Israelis over several years. Rather than investigating
these attacks and finding the militants who were responsible, Israel opted to attack an
entire Palestinian settlement and kill several hundred people (Counterpunch, 2009),
36
including 350 children in just 23 days (Electronic Intifada, 2010). Furthering the
International Court of Justice’s condemnation of Israel’s attack on Gaza is the fact that
prior to the attack, there had been a ceasefire and truce between Israel and Hamas. It was
Israel, not Hamas that broke this truce (Counterpunch, 2009).
Hamas’ relationship with Israel and with Fatah has become increasingly unstable
and unpredictable. It remains so today. Hamas is an alternative to, or even an enemy of
Fatah. Hamas is capable of kindness, charity and progress, but also violence and
destruction. It has shown willingness to compromise, but also staunch opposition. Hamas’
policies are a direct result of Palestinians’ long and tumultuous historical relationship
with Israel. Their radicalism has escalated simultaneously with the deepening severity of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hamas’ policies are also a direct result of their religious
dedication to Islam, and their interpretation of it in their distinct historical context
(Schanzer, 2008).
Their context of oppression had contributed to their interpretation of Islamic
theology from a liberation perspective. They see the Israeli occupation as a force from
which they see a pressing need to liberate themselves. Their policies and operations are a
direct manifestation of their unique theology of liberation in their context of oppression.
Their experience under the Israeli occupation has been the primary influence of their
interpretation of Islam. As the oppression imposed by the Israelis continued and became
more oppressive, Hamas’ interpretation became increasingly radical and even violent.
They see above all else, the goal to liberate Palestinians from Israeli oppression. They are
ready to resort to violence to achieve this goal.
37
Their radical interpretation of Islam was not a spontaneous occurrence. Nor was it
a completely unique occurrence in that it had several parallels to other circumstances
where liberationist interpretations became the norm- oppression from an outside force, a
feeling of fear at the prospect of losing a religious and ethnic identity and poverty. Hamas
seeks to liberate those at the bottom of society just as Muhammad, Jesus, and Gustavo
Guitierrez did.
38
Chapter 3: Hamas’ Unique Theology of Liberation and its Applications
The argument that Hamas is best understood through the lens of an Islamic
liberation theology has been developed in two steps. First we looked briefly at the
meaning of liberation theology and connected that meaning to Islamic history. Secondly,
we have examined the history of Hamas as an organization with a view to explaining its
origins, development of its self-understanding and the critical role played by the events in
the conflict with Israel to understand that development. In this chapter, we turn to the task
of explaining the specifics of Hamas liberation theology. Liberation theology is a result of
reinterpreting religion and applying it to current circumstances. Hamas has been
influenced to interpret Islam in a way that focuses on the urgency to liberate the
Palestinian people and to understand that liberation within the framework of a
contemporary reinterpretation of Islam.
The shift indicative of liberation theology from individual salvation to community
and social religious practice can be observed in Hamas’ evolution from Al-Mujama, a
purely Islamist and social outreach organization, to their eventual development into a
political party (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). This evolution illustrates their use of
current circumstance as a basis for reinterpreting their religion in light of their Palestinian
experience with Israel. The elements of a theology of liberation were described in Chapter
1, and all of the political, historical, social and religious elements of a theology of
liberation are evident in the Hamas context. It should be noted that integrating a religion
into the political arena makes it as vulnerable to corruption and adaptation as any other
element of politics (Novak, 1989). It should be noted as well here that Hamas’ particular
brand of Islamic liberation theology or political Islam, and the applications and practices
39
necessitated by its individual and unique circumstances and is not reflective of Arabs, of
Muslims, of Palestinians or even of Gazans as a whole (Farell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).
The most pressing question about Hamas’ interpretation of Islam inevitably
concerns their use of suicide attacks, especially those directed at Israeli civilians (Farrell,
Milton-Edwards, 2010). This is the most paradoxical component of Hamas’ distinct
religious interpretation. Suicide in Islam is perhaps the most despicable sin as it is
considered a blatant insult to one’s creator. The taking of one’s own life is vehemently
condemned and suicide is considered a certain facet through which to ensure one’s eternal
damnation to the fires of hell. This is explicitly stated in several Qur’anic suras: “Do not
destroy yourselves. God is merciful to you. If someone does so… We shall cast him into
hell (Ali, 1993, 4:29-30).” It is also condemned in sura 2:195 “do not seek destruction at
your own hands (Ali, 1993).”
The existence of these verses may seem strange and in blatant contradiction to
Hamas’ interpretation of Islam. This is because of the glamorization of martyrdom in the
Qur’an and some of the ambiguous language used to explain what is considered a
legitimate circumstance of martyrdom (The religion of Peace, 2011). Muhammad was
reported to have said (in one of the Hadith) that “I would love to be martyred in Al1ah's
cause and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again and
then get martyred and then get resurrected again and then get martyred (The religion of
Peace, 2011).” Martyrdom therefore, is one of the highest honours in Islam. There is
however, disagreement over what actually constitutes an appropriate circumstance for
martyrdom. The former Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini stated that “the
purest joy in Islam is to kill and be killed for Allah (The religion of Peace, 2011).” It seems
reasonable under this (extremely radical) interpretation that any violent pursuit (including
40
one where there is a certainty of death) is acceptable in furthering an Islamist agenda. The
more moderate and progressive stance on the issue of martyrdom can be understood
through a statement by the well-known proponent of moderate Islam, Dr. Jamal Badawi
“Suicide out of despair is not acceptable…Giving one’s life in a military situation is
different and can be heroic if there is no other way of resisting (The Religion of Peace,
2011).”
One other component of Islam that cannot be overlooked is the fact that Islam in
no way encourages pacifism (Halima, Rane, 1993). “Turn the other cheek” (Matthew,
5:39) is what Jesus instructs Christians to do in the face of an attack. Islam does not
advocate this. Non-violent resistance is far from the normative stance in Islam, especially
when confronting a violent attack, or what is perceived to be an attack on the Islamic
religion in its entirety. Although the Qur’an discourages the initiation of conflict and
participation in violence, the Muslim’s right to self-defense, through violence if necessary
is strongly emphasized in Islam (Halima, Rane, 1993, pg. 41).
The Qur’an explicitly condemns the act of murder, but it is justified in self-
defense or as a punishment for a murderer in sura 4:32: “Whosoever kills a human being
except as punishment for murder or for spreading corruption in the land, it shall be like
killing all humanity (Ali, 1993).” Defense against one’s enemies is again permitted in
sura 4:33: “The punishment for those who wage war against God and his prophet…is to
kill … them (Ali, 1993).” Again, the act of murder is condemned out of just cause in
sura 17:33: “ Do not take a life, which God has forbidden, except in a just cause (Ali,
1993).” Muslims are directed by the Qur’an to avoid the initiation of armed conflict at all
costs, “Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God does
41
not like aggressors (Ali, 1993, sura 2:190).” Even after a conflict has begun, Muslims are
urged not to use excessive force and even encouraged to reconcile with their enemies
after a battle. “Fight them until sedition comes to an end and the law of God prevails. If
they desist, then cease to be hostile (Ali, 1993, sura 2:193)… “if they desist, God is
forgiving and kind (Ali, 1993, sura 2:192).”
Hamas’ violence is a direct manifestation of liberation theology as liberation
theology necessitates participation in society and active social involvement. Although
social involvement does not always mean participation in violence, given the
circumstances of serious conflict in the region where Hamas resides, it would be nearly
impossible to participate in society without engaging in some way in the violence that is
ongoing.
Hamas views the Zionist forces as aggressors of war. They see themselves as the
victims and certainly not as the perpetrators. It is also worth noting that Hamas’ first
suicide attack against Israeli civilians came after decades of the murder of their own
civilians (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). Some have speculated that Hamas’ adoption of
the use of suicide attacks may have been partially influenced by the monetary support
they receive from the Shii extremist nation of Iran (Mannes, 2004, pg. 127). Suicide
attacks are often viewed to be a Shii tactic. The first modern Islamic suicide bomber was
a 13 year-old Shii Iranian Muslim (Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh). During a pivotal
battle of the Iran-Iraq war, young Fahmideh grabbed a hand grenade, jumped under an
Iraqi tank and detonated- instantly incinerating the tank, as well as himself. There are
several internet forums dedicated to his commemoration as a martyr (The Cultural
Website of Martyrdom and Sacrifice, 2007).
42
The Shii, and Iranian supported, Lebanese political faction Hezbollah is listed by
Canada as a terrorist organization (Public Safety Canada, 2010). Shortly after
Fahmideh’s martyrdom, Hezbollah adopted the tactic of suicide attacks, (ABC News,
2006) which they used in October 1983 “on barracks housing US and French military
personnel in Beirut result[ing] in the deaths of over 240 US Marines … the deadliest
individual assault on US [and Israeli] interests between World War II and the World
Trade Center attacks of 2001 (Husseini, 2010, pg. 803).” Hezbollah subsequently
employed the tactic of suicide bombing to successfully oust Israeli troops from Lebanon.
This overwhelming victory was acutely observed by Hezbollah’s humiliated, desperate,
politically disenfranchised and increasingly radical neighbours to the South (Kepel, 2002,
pg. 333).
Upon its founding, Iran saw no reason to invest in the Sunni organization of
Hamas. This opinion changed in 1992 after Israel deported 418 Hamas militants to
Southern Lebanon (Kepel, 2002, pg. 326). Here, Hamas’ most capable militants came
into contact with the Shii group Hezbollah, which receives financial support from Iran
(Mannes, 2004, pg. 127). “Hamas was inspired by Hezbollah’s long war with Israel in
Lebanon, which ultimately culminated in Israel’s complete withdrawal (Mannes, 2004,
pg. 127).” Hamas has since the early nineties maintained close ties with Hezbollah,
employed some of their tactics, and availed themselves of Hezbollah’s sophisticated
militant expertise. Hamas’ growth, and close relationship to Hezbollah eventually
contributed to Iran’s decision to support them directly both financially and technically.
Hamas’ non-secular nature and animosity toward Zionism also contributed to their
Iranian appeal (Mannes, 2004, pg. 128).
43
Hamas’ adoption of the tactic of suicide attacks is a direct result of their history of
turmoil and extreme hostility toward what they consider the unjust Zionist occupation of
Palestine. They view suicide attacks as a necessary element of their resistance of Zionism
which is encouraged by their liberationist Islamic interpretation (Juergensmeyer, 2008).
Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantissi, one of Hamas’ primary founders described the attacks not as
“suicide attacks” but instead as istishhadi, meaning “self-chosen martyrdom
(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).” Seven years before his assassination in 2004, professor
Rantissi asserted in an interview with an American scholar that the term “suicide bomber
implied an impulsive act by a deranged individual…[while] the missions undertaken by
the young men in the Hamas cadres … were ones that they deliberately and carefully
chose as part of their religious obligation (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).” When pressed
about the issue of targeting non-combatants, Dr. Rantissi stressed the severity of his
situation by reminding the interviewer that his people were “at war (Juergensmeyer, 2008,
pg. 73).” In his perception Hamas got into the undesirable predicament “of war with
Israel … because of Israel’s stance toward Palestine - especially toward the Hamas
concept of an Islamic Palestine. It was Islamic nationalism that Israel wanted to destroy
(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).”He stressed that this hostile stance toward Hamas’
Islamic nationalist imperative was embodied in all facets of Israeli society and that “for
this reason, the war between Israel and Hamas was one with no innocent victims
(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).”
Dr. Rantissi affirmed Hamas’ stance that the suicide attacks were a last resort after
a history of targeting exclusively soldiers, and attempting to avoid harming Israeli
civilians (Juergnesmeyer, 2008). After all, Hamas has regularly emphasized their stance
that they “are not against Jews just because they’re Jews (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73)”
44
but two events Dr. Rantissi cited were used as grounds for the justification of civilian
attacks. One, was an “attack by Israeli police on Palestinians demonstrating in front of the
Al-Aqsa mosque … in 1990 (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73)” and predictably, the Hebron
massacre perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein in 1994. Rantissi was convinced that the Israeli
military had conspired to carry out these attacks and was at least indirectly responsible for
the two incidents. He also pointed out that both of these attacks targeted mosques, and
especially stressed that the Hebron massacre took place during the holy month of
Ramadan, and that Goldstein had killed defenseless worshippers (Juergensmeyer, 2008,
pg. 73). “He concluded that these were attacks on Islam as a religion as well as
Palestinians as a people (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).”
As previously noted, an attack on the Islamic religion and its adherents is not
grounds for passivity. It necessitates defensive action (Ali, 1993, 17:33). This is
especially apparent in this context as Hamas certainly does not view Palestinians as the
aggressors, and would state that Palestinians are indeed purely innocent victims of the
Israeli occupation (Juergensmeyer, 2008). Rantissi argued that the suicide attacks were a
defense. He said that they were only permitted as a response to “specific acts of violence
from the Israeli side … that affected innocent civilians… If we did not respond this way
Rantissi explained, Israelis would keep doing the same thing (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg
7).” He described the intense pain and suffering that Israeli attacks on Palestinian
civilians had caused for years, and then explained the suicide attacks as a “moral lesson
… a way of making innocent Israelis feel the pain that innocent Palestinians have felt
(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).” Rantissi saw the suicide attacks as absolutely necessary
and unavoidable in the pursuit of providing Israelis understanding of the severe brutality
they had for decades inflicted on their Palestinian neighbours (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg.
45
74). Hamas stresses an affinity to Jews on the grounds that “the divine [Abrahamic]
religions were revealed by God for the happiness of humanity. They preach peace (Rubin,
2002, pg. 37).” But Hamas differentiates between Jews, and Israelis, because they view
Israelis as Zionist occupiers. Hamas sees no Israelis, male or female as innocent partly
because of the fact that all Israelis are conscripted to military service, so none are truly in
their view non-combatants (Kepel, 2002, pg. 333).
Like Sheikh Yassin, and many other prominent and committed Hamas members,
Dr. Rantissi had his own personal experiences with the brutality of the Israeli forces. He
gave a nostalgic description of his family’s prosperous home that was demolished in the
pursuit of creating the modern Israeli state. He said that when his family members had
resisted the occupation of, and subsequent expulsion from their land, Rantissi’s
grandfather, uncle and three cousins were killed by the Zionist soldiers. He stressed that
his own sad story was not at all uncommon, and expressed his frustration with the
continued encroachment of Israeli settlements on the meager remaining Palestinian lands
(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 75). He said that “if the Israeli government continues to allow
settlements to be built …we should use all means to stop it (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg.
75).”
Sheikh Yassin echoed Rantissi’s “we are at war” stance (Juergensmeyer, 2008).
His belief in the tragic necessity of suicide attacks was emphasized so much that it is
made mention of in his memorial page on Hamas’ website in the following statement:
“He vehemently defended martyrdom bombings against the Zionist entity, explaining that
they constituted the sole and only weapon available to the Palestinian people in the face
of the enemy with far more powerful military capabilities that is hell-bent on
exterminating and crushing the Palestinian people. He repeatedly demanded an end to all
46
attacks targeting Palestinian civilians … However, the Zionist entity consistently rejected
all initiatives to that effect (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).”
Hamas’ non-secular actions are not just demonstrated in their militancy, they are
also demonstrated in their social programs. Hamas has supported orphanages, primary
education and medical clinics. Besides offering monetary compensation to the families of
martyrs (approximately fifteen thousand American dollars), Hamas has also provided
housing for Palestinians left homeless after Israeli demolitions. It is largely for its social
involvement that Hamas has gained any support from Palestinians, and not because of its
militancy (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 78).” This social involvement is a manifestation of
their theology of liberation because such a theological interpretation necessitates
participation in society and an effort to improve living conditions for oppressed people. It
also shows Hamas’ concern for the people it professes to serve and also that its
participation in society and politics is not purely militant, or motivated by violence.
Hamas’ violent, and non-violent agenda is very concisely outlined in its official
charter. Their agenda outlines all of their goals that involve extensive participation in
politics and society, a collectivist initiative toward salvation rather than individual. Their
charter outlines in great detail the actions necessitated by their liberation theology. The
charter does not deem secularity as compatible with Islam, but does name modernity,
scientific development, social justice, democracy and women’s participation in politics
and social affairs to be Islamic. All of this is outlined, in detail in Hamas’s charter
(Palestine Center, 1988). Predictably, the charter begins with the same opening statement
as that of the Holy Qur’an “In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate
(Palestine Center, 1988).” Hamas’ “ultimate goal is Islam, the Prophet its model, the
Qur’an its Constitution (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas Charter: article 5).”All thirty six
47
articles defined in the charter explain the role of Hamas and it followers in every aspect of
life. It advocates a socially and politically engaged life of resistance “in order to extricate
the country and the people from the …[oppressors’] desecration, filth and evil (Palestine
Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 3).”
The Hamas charter asserts that the pursuit of an Islamic state is a religious duty
and that they do not support any compromise that may result in the loss of what they
believe to be rightful Palestinian territory. The charter states that an Islamic society is the
only proper society for Palestine and that Hamas and indeed all Palestinian’s duty is to
regain Palestine, which was wrongfully stolen. It asserts the necessity to implement Islam
as the only solution to the Zionist occupation (Palestine Center, 1988). The charter
reflects the increasingly non-secular attitude of its time in article 9 “Hamas finds itself at
a period of time when Islam has waned away from the reality of life. For this reason, the
checks and balances have been upset, concepts have become confused, and values have
been transformed; evil has prevailed, oppression and obscurity have reigned; cowards
have turned tigers (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 9).”
Before more thoroughly examining the charter that has strong elements of Islamist
extremism, it should be noted that it was published amidst the chaos and turmoil of the
first Intifada and reflects the anger and desperation of the time. Since its publication, even
Sheikh Yassin has relaxed the charter’s stance on reclaiming “every inch of Palestine …
[because] only under the shadow of Islam could the members of all regions coexist in
safety and security …[for] in the absence of Islam, conflict arises, oppression reigns,
corruption is rampant and struggles and wars prevail (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’
Charter: article 6).”
48
In an interview not long before his assassination (an Israeli attack which claimed
the lives of nine other Palestinians), Sheikh Yassin stated that Hamas sought “a place that
absorbs Palestinian Muslims, Jews and others without differentiation (Ezzedeen al-
Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).” When questioned about recognizing the
Israeli state and the potential of a two-state resolution, Yassin stated that Hamas’
recognition of the Israeli state was conditional on their recognition of Palestinian rights to
statehood, which have not materialized (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information
Offise, 2010). He furthered his argument of Israel’s failure to recognize Palestinian
statehood by asserting “Israel has not even acknowledged the Palestinians' right to 22
percent of our homeland (referring to the borders of 1967) (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades
Information Office, 2010).” Yassin stressed his frustration with the Palestinian situation
by saying “Our core position is that the Israelis stole our land and our homes and the
whole world supported them, and now, when we are asking for our land back, the world
is not supporting us, and this is unfair (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office,
2010).” He emphasized his sincere desire for a fair state without apartheid and equal
respect and opportunities for all regardless of religion. He described this by saying “my
own best vision for Palestine is of a land for Christians, Jews, Muslims -- a state where
everyone has equal rights (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).” He
was even shockingly open to the concept of secularity in such a state, asserting that the
question of secularity or Islamism in his ideal Palestinian state “should be left for the
democratic process. Let the people select the kind of state they want, in the same way that
the United States is a state for all its people and they solve their differences
democratically as equals (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).”
Yassin is frequently reported to have expressed how his personal experiences “rooted the
49
hate of injustice in his soul (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).”
He repeatedly stressed the need for justice (at least his own interpretation of justice) and
democracy to prevail over the ongoing occurrences concerning the conflict (Ezzedeen al-
Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).
Essentially, the tone of Yassin’s stance toward Israel appears to have shifted from
blatant hatred at the time of their charter’s publication in 1988, to an attitude advocating
fairness and social equality for all inhabitants of the disputed territories, and even a
potential for the hope of eventual openness to a two-state resolution (Ezzedeen al-Qassam
Brigades Information Office, 2010).
Besides considering the militancy of Hamas as a response to their oppression as
well as a manifestation of their interpretation of Islam, it is important to look at the
elements of their charter concerning other areas of life. The concern Hamas demonstrates
for its non-militant population is well demonstrated in its charter. This concern for
oppressed people and active participation in society is a direct result of Hamas’
liberationist interpretation of Islam and desire to promote fairness and equality in their
dominion. The elements of the charter which perhaps are most appealing to the
Palestinian community at large and which have contributed to Hamas’ popularity are its
charitable endeavors. In article 10, Hamas asserts its commitment to serving all
Palestinian citizens: “The Islamic Resistance Movement, while breaking its own path,
will do its utmost to constitute at the same time a support to the weak, a defense to all the
oppressed. It will spare no effort to implement the truth and abolish evil (Palestine Center,
1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 10).” In article 21 of the charter, Hamas again stresses that
its duty “consists of extending help to all the needy, both materially and morally, or
assisting in the execution of certain actions. It is incumbent upon the members of the
50
Hamas to look after the interests of the masses the way they would look after their own
interests (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 21).”
Hamas (unlike other Islamic fundamentalist groups it is often viewed as
synonymous to) strongly advocates the participation of women in politics (Palestine
Center, 1988). The encouragement of women’s participation in the Hamas movement is
especially apparent in the martyrdom operations that have been carried out by female
Hamas members (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010). This strongly
demonstrates Hamas’ religious interpretation as a liberationist movement rather than a
fundamentalist movement (Palestine Center, 1988). In its charter, Hamas cites Qur’anic
suras advocating the equality of women and men and necessitating women’s engaged and
active role in society. This is evident in article 18 of the charter which quotes sura 33:35
and emphasizes that both women and men should be active and pious because “Allah has
prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter:
article 18).” They see their goal of a high functioning society as completely unattainable
without the contributions of Palestinian women. In article seventeen, Hamas’ charter
strongly asserts this stance that “the Muslim women have a no lesser role than that of men
in the war of liberation (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 17).”
The very specific target of Hamas’ violence and their expressed enemy are
Zionists and Zionist endeavors (Palestine Center, 1988). “The Zionist invasion is a
mischievous one. It does not hesitate to take any road, or to pursue all despicable and
repulsive means to fulfill its desires (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 28).”
What is very interesting about Hamas charter is a belief that the Zionist entity has an
endless amount of wealth, influence and powers of malicious indoctrination at its disposal
(Palestine Center, 1988). This is expressed in Article 22:“The enemies have been
51
scheming for a long time … in order to achieve what they have achieved. They took
advantage of key elements in unfolding events, and accumulated a huge and influential
material wealth which they put to the service of implementing their dream (Palestine
Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 22).” This is important to note because many fear
that Hamas may be a threat to other groups other than Zionists. This is highly unlikely,
because Hamas in Article 22 of its charter asserts a belief that Zionists have forced media,
and other countries to submit to their bidding through controlling wealth and also through
being involved behind the scenes in initiating many world conflicts in order to further
their Zionist agenda. They blame them for initiating the first World War in order to
overthrow the Islamic caliphate in the pursuit of their Zionist agenda, they say that
Zionists were the creators of the UN which they believe they have control over, they even
assert that Zionists were behind the initiation of the second World War as a stepping
stone to ultimately reach their Zionist goal (Palestine Center, 1988). Farfetched as these
accusations are, they do serve to assure supporters of the Israeli state that they are viewed
as fellow victims of what they perceive to be the cunning Zionists who conspired and
exploited ruthlessly in pursuit of their goal. Hamas’ enemy is not the West, or the
countries that support Zionism, it is very explicitly Zionists themselves (Palestine Center,
1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 22).
Hamas sees Zionists as the most evil players of world history and regularly speak
of them as synonymous with Nazis in their charter (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’
Charter: article 20). They cite their unprovoked attacks on Palestinian civilians and claim
that the Zionist’s “Nazism” “does not skip women and children, it scares everyone. They
make war against people’s livelihood, plunder their moneys and threaten their honor. In
their horrible actions they mistreat people like the most horrendous war criminals
52
(Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 20).” They strongly assert their Islamic
right of self-defense against this violence (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article
25).
The original shift toward Islamism within Palestine began in the aftermath of the
1967 war. The bitter loss of the war was considered to be a proof of the error of pan-
Nasserism, which was the socialist dominant ideology of the time. The loss of the war
furthered Palestinian frustrations that in their plight they were truly alone. On the eve of
the creation of the Zionist state, neighbouring Arab states had urged Palestinians to
remain in their homes, had expressed their support for their cause and consoled the
Palestinians by the promise of their loyalty in the pursuit of preserving Palestine (Farrell,
and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 35). These cooperative efforts had utterly failed in the late
forties, and again in 1967. Israel had destroyed the Egyptian air force and scared off the
anticipant militaries of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and
Algeria. Control of the Gaza strip, West Bank (as well as Syrian Golan heights and
Egypt’s Sinai peninsula) was taken over by Israel (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg.
35-39). The loss of the war and the Holy land of Palestine were interpreted to be a divine
punishment for Palestinians’ increasingly secular lifestyles. This rejection of the popular
pan - Arabic socialist ideas of 1967 is reflected in Hamas’ charter, published 20 years
after Egypt and Jordan had lost administration of the Gaza strip and West Bank to Israeli
control and the Zionist oppression worsened (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 35-
39).
The loss of the war served to vindicate Sheikh Yassin’s claims that the
Palestinians must return to Islam. Under Egyptian administration, conditions in Gaza had
been barely tolerable, and most Palestinians did not seek the consolation of Islamism.
53
President Nasser’s Egyptian administration had employed a hard-handed stance on the
Islamists of the area, likely due to an assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954 perpetrated
by a Muslim brother. Since Nasser’s Arab nationalism was the dominant ideology of the
time, many Gazans did not protest Egypt’s hard stance on the Islamists of the Gaza strip
(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). After the loss of the war, the subsequent brutal Zionist
occupation of Gaza and the unannounced bulldozing of homes in the middle of the night
(ordered by Ariel Sharon who was then serving as the Israeli military commander of
Gaza)(Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 48), Yassin’s spiritual advice was intently sought after and
heeded (Farrell, and Milton Edwards, 2010, pg. 39).
Hamas’ charter reflects the belief of the time that secular efforts to reclaim
Palestine are absolute futility. It explicitly cites the failure of Nasser’s pan-Arab
nationalist pursuits (Palestine Center, 1988). This is stated in a few places in the charter,
article 32: “World Zionism and Imperialist forces have been attempting, with smart
moves and considered planning, to push the Arab countries, one after another, out of the
circle of conflict with Zionism, in order, ultimately, to isolate the Palestinian People.
Egypt has already been cast out of the conflict (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter:
article 32).” Egypt’s failure to maintain sovereignty of the Gaza strip and win the war was
seen as a direct punishment for advocating more secular ideals and being an enemy of the
righteously guided Muslim Brotherhood (Farrell, and Milton Edwards, pg. 39). Hamas’s
charter asserts that Palestine is a holy Islamic land whose Islamic sovereignty is divinely
ordained. They saw any non-Islamic or secular attempt to conquer it as illegitimate. This
is evident in article 11: “The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of
Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf (meaning divinely sovereign land) throughout the
generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or
54
abandon it or part of it. No Arab country nor the aggregate of all Arab countries, and no
Arab King or President nor all of them in the aggregate, have that right (Palestine Center,
1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 11).” This is quite a blatant assertion of Hamas’ and
Islam’s divine superiority over pan-Arab nationalism, or secular efforts. Hamas saw its
way, the Islamic way as the only way to liberate, and defend Palestinians from their
detested enemy-Zionists (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter).
This vilification of a defined enemy is a tenet of liberation theology which was
paralleled in Latin American frustrations with the imperialism of the United States
(Novak, 1989). The perceived enemy that has forced Palestinians into a situation of
oppression and a circumstance necessitating theological interpretation is a colonizer- an
enemy that exploits the local population and threatens the local religious structure. An
exploitive colonizer and religious threat were both characteristics of the “enemies” that
inspired the liberationist reinterpretations of scripture in Latin America and Iran (Dabashi,
2008).
Hamas’ use of suicide attacks reflects a religious reinterpretation in light of their
context of oppression. Their predicament simply became so intolerable that religious
consolation and subsequently reinterpretation was a natural response (Farrell, Milton-
Edwards, 2010). Tragically, Hamas’ reinterpretation was influenced by some other
extremist organizations already employing the tactic. Hamas’ reinterpretation of scripture
in light of their current context of oppression was also characterized by a mindset of
superiority based on their negative attitude toward secularity. It was also characterized by
an acute feeling of desperation and rage (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010).
Hamas’ highly educated, modernist and oppressed founders were not
fundamentalists. They were influenced by a desire to restore conditions as they were in
55
the past, but only in the sense that they want to reclaim their home, which was lost 60
years ago. This is a recent past, not an ancient past. Yassin witnessed the destruction of
his own home (BBC, 2012). Hamas’ liberationist interpretation was influenced by living
memories, not ancient memories. Hamas wishes Palestinians to have their own state- not
a return to the past as Palestine was under British control prior to the creation of the
Israeli state (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010). This is not reflective of a fundamentalist
religious interpretation. Hamas is not seeking to restore Palestinian living conditions as
they were at the time of the religion’s emergence. They are attempting to interpret the
Qur’an as it relates to the here and now, to worldly troubles (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,
2010). These tangible, earthly troubles are of the most basic because they concern the
severe lack of access to the bare necessities of life and security (Abuelaish, 2009). These
troubles are incessant, just as the unrelenting poverty and human suffering of Latin
Americans. As Latin Americans were slaves to the American economy and decadent
lifestyle (Novak, 1986), Palestinians work meager jobs for rich Israelis and return home
to scarce rations shared in weathered shacks (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010). Hamas
seeks liberation from this economic and social inequality. Hamas fights for salvation
primarily in this life, and not the afterlife-also a liberationist pursuit (Ali, 1990).
Hamas has reinterpreted Islam in a way that promotes the democratic process.
They have created a website, many of their more prominent members have learned the
modern language of international business and diplomacy-English (Juergensmeyer,
2008). They encourage the participation of women in politics (Palestine Center, 1988).
This is certainly not a fundamentalist desire to impose the “pure” conditions of the
religions’ emergence concerning women (Ali, 1990). Hamas has also showed an
openness to continue to reinterpret in light of the current context. This is evident in the
56
way that Hamas’ liberationist interpretation has shifted since its charter’s publication
(Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter).
Since the publication of its charter, which outlines its extremely radical
interpretation of the time -Hamas’ interpretation of Islam has relaxed (Ezzedeen al-
Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010). Even Sheikh Yassin seemed to have become
slightly more progressive in his twilight years. Since his assassination, as well as Dr.
Rantissi’s, Hamas’ particular theology has evolved. This may be the result of the large
death toll of the two Intifada’s and Operation Cast Lead (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).
The current situation in Gaza is far from the dream of a liberated Palestine Hamas’
founders envisioned 24 years ago. There is a 44 percent rate of unemployment, and
seventy percent of people are well below the poverty line. Many rely on goods coming
through tunnels running underground from Egypt. This traffic is totally insufficient to
meet the needs of Gaza’s 1.5 million inhabitants. These tunnels are also regular targets of
the Israeli air force (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 112-113). The scarcity of food is particularly
severe when considering the fishing restrictions placed on Gazans, and the fact that 30
percent of Gazan fertile land is in the buffer, or “no-go” zone on the Gazan side of the
border fence (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 113). Certain medicines are banned from being
shipped into Gaza, and Israeli authorities “have even calculated the number of calories a
person needs to survive and allow only bare essentials (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 109).”
Palestinians have seen the destruction of their homes, the cold indifference of the
international community to their plight and in many cases even the murder of their own
family members and children (Abuelaish, 2009). If returning to Islam was to remedy a
divine malady caused by secularity, it has been a miserably ineffective cure (Abuelaish,
57
2009). This theological dilemma has caused a new shift in Hamas’ interpretation and in
action (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010).
Khaled Meshaal, Hamas’ current leader has shown considerable openness to
reconciliation with secular Fatah, showing he may be less radical than his predecessors
(BBC, 2012). This demonstrates his commitment to Hamas’ goal of liberating its people
by adapting to the current circumstances when necessary. Also, this openness to
adaptation is reflective of a liberationist Islamic interpretation (Ali, 1990). How this
shifting interpretation will manifest itself, remains to be seen.
Although Hamas’ radical stance has relaxed, it still is committed to its people, to
Islam, and is defined by its concern with the liberation of Palestinians from Zionist
oppression (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). What will be interesting to see, is the way
that its Islamic religious interpretation which is truly its backbone will shift as a result of
its evolving context. What can be certain about Hamas’ liberationist interpretation is that
it will continue to show support for oppressed Palestinians, seek their liberation and
restoration of homeland, and concern itself with the resistance of Zionism (Palestine
Center, 1988). It can also be supposed that whether or not the atmosphere is secular or
Islamic, so long a Hamas exists, it will operate as first and foremost an Islamic
organization (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010).
Hamas’ firm religious, and political commitment to the liberation of Palestinians
from Israeli oppression can be well understood as a manifestation of its Islamic theology
of liberation. This theology is evident in their charter, in their political endeavors, in their
social outreach initiatives and in their militancy (Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades
Information Office, 2010). It can be understood through their statement following the
death of each Palestinian “martyred after a long bright path of jihad, hard work, struggle
58
and sacrifice. Al Qassam Brigades mourn the death of the Mujahed, (martyred
Palestinian)[and] reaffirms the commitment and determination to continue the resistance
against the belligerent occupation forces…To God we belong and to him we shall return
(Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).”
This staunch commitment to resistance and liberation of the Palestinian people
from the oppression of a very specific enemy is very specifically a liberationist
manifestation of religion. Hamas’ social and political involvement also demonstrates their
liberationist interpretation of Islam which encourages cooperation and social solidarity in
the pursuit of liberating an oppressed group. Their charter outlines their liberationist
goals. They are motivated by Islam above all else, and their interpretation of it in a
liberationist form.
59
Chapter 4: Is Hamas an Islamic Liberation Movement?
Although Hamas is most often viewed as a terrorist organization, this label may be
too reductionist: Hamas may be better understood as an Islamic liberation movement
(Public Safety Canada, 2010). The stigma attached to the label of terrorist hinders the
process of understanding Hamas, and most importantly hinders the possibility of learning
how to prevent their violence from escalating. The fact that Hamas existed for years
before resorting to attacks on civilians and did not take this route immediately shows that
this is not the reason they came into existence, and is not their central goal (Farrell and
Milton-Edwards, 2010).
“The UN has no internationally-agreed definition of terrorism (Eye on the UN,
2012).” The creation of an international definition of terrorism is currently under intense
examination. The reason for the impasse on the recognition of an international convention
on terrorism is due to the possible necessity to exclude “"the activities of […] parties
during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign occupation" from the purview
of the Convention (Eye on the UN, 2012).”
Palestinians regularly assert their UN sanctioned right to employ the use of armed
resistance against the Zionist occupation of their home. Armed resistance is justified in
Islam given appropriate circumstances (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010) and would be
justified even in the secular sense based on normative expectations of what human beings
can be expected to endure before resisting (The Religion of Peace, 2010). UN General
Assembly resolutions 3236, and 3375, and also Article 51 of the UN charter outline the
right of oppressed peoples to resistance (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 3).
Palestinians insist that Israel has a far superior military capacity which it uses to “defend
60
its own state, …[enforce] its occupation of nearly 4 million stateless Palestinians, and …
[keep] millions of others stateless by refusing to recognize their right of return (Farrell,
and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 3).” Conditions for Palestinians are intolerable. Hamas
has offered some form of solace. Even death under such circumstances may be an
appealing escape route. This is evident in the abundant number of willing volunteers who
carry out Hamas’ deadly attacks (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010).
The Jewish right to return to the disputed Israeli- Palestinian territories is a further
insult to diasporic Palestinians. While Palestinians sit in crowded housing, or refugee
camps abroad, they get to watch while Europeans, Americans, Africans and people from
all over the world “return” to their homeland, while their own desire to return home is not
honored. Palestinians are forced into increasingly confined spaces to make room for
foreigners to occupy their once tilled and cultivated pastures. Vivid images of homeland,
family, and stability are in the living memories of many Palestinians. The three things
Muslims are instructed to do for their deceased loved ones are: “share their knowledge
and wisdom with others, pray for …[them] and give charity (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 66)” in
their name (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 66). Palestinian Muslims commemorate their dead by
spreading their memories and descriptions of their lost homes, speaking of their lost
family members dedication to the struggle and giving charity, sometimes to groups like
Al-Mujama- Hamas, who are if nothing else, steadfastly loyal to the Palestinians and their
struggle for liberation (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010).
The label of terrorist (Public Safety Canada, 2010) has had the unfortunate effect
of stigmatizing the entire Palestinian population-especially, the Gazan population. This is
very evident especially when considering the huge civilian death toll of Operation Cast
61
Lead (B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories, 2012). It should not be ignored that Hamas is an elected political party. The
majority of Gazans showed their support for Hamas by voting for them. Characterizing
these voters as supporters of terrorists, is equally vilifying as actually labeling them as
terrorists (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010).
Hamas was labeled a terrorist organization by Israel, and its most loyal
supporters-Western prosperous nations (Public Safety Canada, 2010). These are also
nations supporting the American “war on terror.” They are tainted by their fear of the
“other-” so much that they have become irrational. In the modern Western context, this
“other” is the Muslim inhabitants of the Middle East. The 9/11 terrorist attacks claimed
the lives of 2823 Americans (The Guardian, 2002). The Iraqi body count since America’s
invasion of Iraq is well over 1 million (Project Censored, 2007). It does not appear that
the protection of human rights and civilians is the goal of this war (Dalliare, 2005).
The highly respected former Lieutenant-General and now Senator Romeo Dallaire
reflected on the indifference of the international community during the Rwandan
genocide and asserted that the international community only acts in its own self-interest.
The permanent five (China, France, Russia, The United Kingdom, and the United States)
of the UN security council according to Dallaire are compelled to action exclusively in
the face of potential threat to their own interests. Other nations often follow their example
(Dallaire, 2005, pg. 517). “Canada and other peacekeeping nations have become
accustomed to acting if, and only if, international public opinion will support them
(Dallaire, 2005, pg. 517).” Offering aid to Palestinians, labeled as terrorists and often as
the aggressors in the conflict is unfortunately not a prudent PR endeavor- especially
62
amidst the prevailing post 9/11 Islamophobic attitude in the West. Dallaire asserted that
the civilians affected in conflicts that the international community deems less concerning
are viewed to be expendable (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 22). An American officer shamelessly
informed Dallaire during the peak of the Rwandan genocide “that the lives of 800,000
Rwandans were only worth risking the lives of ten Americans (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 522).”
This indifference can be viewed even now as the Sudanese pleas to the international
community for assistance in removing President Omar Al-Bashir found guilty of crimes
against humanity are consistently ignored (United Human Rights Council , 2012).
Dallaire has often posed the question: “Are we all human, or are some more human than
others (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 522)?” He emphasizes that the inhabitants of the first world
behave in a way suggestive of a sense of superiority and belief that first world lives “are
worth more than the lives of other citizens of the planet (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 522).” He
remarked that this reality has manifested in extreme, radical and in some cases even
murderous resentment (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 522).
Very insightfully, Dallaire asserted the possibility that prevention may be the best
possible solution to the threat of further terrorism and violence. He insisted that if
anything can be learned from the mistakes of the past, it should be that the powers of the
world must address the causes and motivations for terrorism. He stated that this is the
only way to bring about a sense of security because “for every ...[suicide] bomber that we
kill there will be a thousand more volunteers…to take his place (Dallaire, 2005, pg.
521).” This reactive approach to terrorism is an uphill battle, which is unlikely to be won.
The preventive approach may be much more conducive to maintaining peace than the
reactive approach (Dallaire, 2005).
63
The people who labeled Hamas as terrorist saw their kidnap of two Israeli soldiers
and decided they were inherently evil, blood thirsty and irrational. They saw their attacks
on Jews with the guilt of the holocaust still fresh. They didn’t make the connection that
these attacks were the direct result of decades of Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians.
They decided these people were murderous and dangerous and should not even be
considered (Abuelaish, 2009). There was not a thorough investigation of them. No
attempt to understand their motivations for violence. No attempt to understand their
human motivations, characteristics, and inevitable fallibilities (Abuelaish, 2009).
Those who labeled Hamas as terrorist enjoy the security of a predictable lifestyle,
the necessities of life, and the privilege of being the master of their own destiny. They
enjoy the reasonable expectation of outliving their children. Gazans do not. The people
who labeled Hamas as terrorist took a brief look at them and felt disgusted by their
actions while enjoying the luxury of never having to confront the very real and ugly
possibility that if faced with similar circumstances, their own actions may be equally
appalling (Abuelaish, 2009).
What is perhaps most tragic about Hamas’ eventual adoption of violence and
suicide attacks is that it very likely could have been prevented. The Israeli civilians who
were the victims of Hamas’ first suicide attack in response to Goldstein’s Ramadan
massacre would likely still be alive if Israeli authorities had not ignored Palestinian
concerns about Baruch Goldstein’s threatening actions. The hostility between Palestinians
and Israelis may not have become so intense if Palestinians were shown the same respect
and accommodation as Israelis. The idea that Hamas’ attacks were preventable is
confirmed in Dr. Rantissi’s stance that at the time Hamas began using suicide attacks,
64
people had nothing left to lose. He said the adoption of suicide attacks was a desperate
last resort (Juergensmeyer, 2008). It is well acknowledged in Hamas’ correspondence that
suicide attacks despite being an honour inevitably bring sadness and suffering to the
families and communities of martyrs. Ample condolences are offered to mourners of
martyrs (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades, 2012). Rantissi said that “the only reason we use
it [suicide attacks] is because we don’t have anything else to use. If we found something
which could stop the enemy from killing us without killing ourselves, it would be much,
much better (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 144).” He stated “if they stop killing
our civilians, we will stop killing theirs…every day we have a massacre…The
international community did nothing against Israel despite their bulldozing … of our
homes leaving women and children crying (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 144).”
This negative perception of Palestinians that is prevalent among Israel’s Western
supporters may also be a symptom of an Orientalist and colonial mindset. Orientalism is
well described by the Palestinian scholar Edward Said. He argues that an Orientalist
mindset prevents the objective pursuit of secular religious criticism (Said, 1983, pg. 290).
Orientalism is defined by Said as “fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the
Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference
with its weakness (Rahman, 2004, pg.347 ).” Many scholars have posited that the rhetoric
of Orientalism has become stronger in the 9/11 aftermath and the increased simplistic
categorization of people as good or evil. The subsequent violence that has resulted
because of this makes the need for propagating better understanding between the West
and the Orient more pressing than ever (Rahman, 2004, pg.347). Said was quite forward
thinking in his assertion that “impossibly huge generalizations like the Orient, Islam,
65
Communism or Terrorism play a significantly increased role in contemporary (Said,
1983, pg. 291)” characterizations of the “Other.” Said asserts that this heightened interest
in secular criticism of the “other” is reflective of how crucial a role religion continues to
play in the modern world. His prediction was that religion would return as a focal point in
world discourse. About 30 years after his prediction, it can be said that he was accurate in
this hypothesis. He was correct in his sentiment that unfortunately, Orientalism has
become an ideology that has contaminated the arena of academia. This has meant a
slanted and often non-objective study of others, especially Islam (Said, 1983). Said
cautions that in the “discourse of Orientalism there exists a strong yet subtle sense of
superiority as well as disapproval and reductionism. This is evident in the West’s
vilification of Islam, even by some of the most sophisticated, influential and educated
minds (Said, 1983, pg. 292).”
Hamas’ classification of terrorist may be a result of this Orientalist tendency to
reduce others to a simplification that is convenient to maintaining the Orientalist’s
dominance, and consequently vindication of superiority. Reducing Hamas and its voters
to the exclusivist label of terrorist makes it very easy to reconcile with the fact that
Israel’s Western supporters are at least indirectly responsible for Israel’s apartheid
practices, and brutal treatment of Palestinians. If these were merely terrorists posing a
threat to security and inherently simplistic, primitive and irrational then there is no moral
dilemma with condoning inhumane treatment of them (Said, 1983). If they are only
terrorists, then all other aspects of their humanity are conveniently excluded from
consideration. This Orientalist tendency blinds academics, intellectuals and those under
their influence to the obvious reality that human beings are at their core inherently far
more similar than different- that extensive othering and searching for minute differences
66
between peoples is a futile effort. It blinds them from the fact that humans are individuals,
unique and rarely homogenous enough that a reductionist label would actually be an
accurate assessment of a cohort as large as Palestinian Arab Muslims (Said, 1983). This
intense othering also manifests in a fear of the other, so much that otherwise rational and
moral people are compelled to irrational and immoral action which they perceive as
justified in their inevitable desire for self-preservation. This othering creates a fear that
paints the other as more dangerous than they actually are, and this fear causes authorities
to use excessive force and believe it to be necessary for self-defense. This fear
characterizes the other as more violent and dangerous than is likely to reflect reality
(Said, 1983).
Whether or not Hamas specifically deserves the label of terrorist will require
much more thorough examination than an undergraduate thesis has the potential to
conduct. But whether or not terrorist is too reductionist or simplistic of a term, it certainly
cannot be ignored that Hamas’ members, and voting supporters all possess primal human
dignity, the desire for self-determination, the willingness to fight for full access to the
necessities of life, the desire for a safe home, and for a better life for themselves and their
children. They are not above human error, and even in some circumstances retribution.
They also have families, hopes, emotions, ideas, opinions and intelligence. They
indisputably possess all of the definitive, universal, functional and equal traits of human
beings.
67
References
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Discusses the threat posed to the United States by Hezbollah. Also explains their affiliation with and support from Iran, also explains that they have sleeper celled all over the world, even in Western nations. Also mentions that Hezbollah was before Al Qaeda, the primary fixation of the United States prior to 9/11.
Abu-Amr (1993). Hamas: A historical and political background. Journal of Palestinian
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Describes the Muslim Brotherhood as a major influence in the birth of Hamas as well as their operations. Also describes how Hamas became increasingly autonomous from the Muslim Brotherhood as they evolved into a more radically Islamist entity.
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Despite this book being a personal account from a Palestinian perspective, it does provide a useful summary of the events leading up to the current situation in Israel and Palestine.
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An English and Arabic copy of the Qur’an.
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Al-jazeera (2011). Timeline: Palestine-Israel Conflict. A chronology of key events in the
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A condensed timeline of the events concerning the conflict from 1999 to 2011.
Appleby (1997). Spokesmen for the despised. The University of Chicago Press, London.
Provides one chapter on the origins of the Hamas movement, particularly on its primary founder Shaykh Ahmad Yassin. Physically disabled- a person who had been marginalized in many senses, he became politically and religiously active. When observing his experiences with the Israeli state throughout his life it is apparent that his interpretation of the Islamic faith would be from a perspective of a theology of liberation from what he saw as the Zionist occupation of his home.
Ateek (1989). Justice and Justice Only: A Palestinian Theology of Liberation. Orbis
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Provides a very straightforward and feminist interpretation of all of the Qur’anic suras concerning women in all areas of life. Describes how Islam needs to be reinterpreted, especially concerning the status of women in the context of modernity and human progress.
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An article reporting the massacre perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein in its immediate aftermath in 1994. Mentions some of the events of its aftermath and also some of the events leading up to it.
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Gives a brief history of Hamas’ suicide attacks
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Gives some necessary dates, mainly the outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising, or “rock-throwing uprising.”
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Gives an overview of the political structure of the country, provides a map and also a short description of the country’ defining social and cultural traits.
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70
in Latin America. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
Describes the beginnings of Latin American liberation theology. Explains how it was a movement of the poor and marginalized in society. Although it is from a Christian perspective it is useful to understanding the concept of Liberation Theology overall and to the use of a liberation perspective to view Hamas and their actions.
B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories
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Describes the premise of Islamic liberation theology as being a resistance to an imperial entity. Although it cites examples of Islamic resistance to imperialism in contexts other than the Palestinian circumstance, it is useful to explaining the theological motivations of interpreting the Qur’an in a liberationist manner.
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States Hamas’ radical opposition to Israel and also their goals and agenda. Gives some explanation of Hamas’ continued existence mainly made possible by its financial sponsors; Iran, and other private sponsors from around the world. These sponsors also have influence over Hamas’ planning and initiatives.
71
Dallaire (2005). Shake Hands with the Devil; the failure of humanity in Rwanda. Random
House, Canada.
The former military officer and part of the Canadian aid effort in Rwanda Romeo Dallaire give an account of his experiences during the conflict. Most relevant, is his conclusion where he gives an overview of the faults of the UN and its aid efforts. Gives his expert opinion on the best ways to make improvements.
El Fadl (2004). Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. Princeton University Press.
Engages the issue of Islam and democracy. Although it discusses the concept of whether or not Islam and democracy are compatible outside of the Palestinian context, it is useful to contributing to the understanding of the issues surrounding Islam and democracy. It gives some reasons why some Islamists (such as the members of Hamas) would argue that the only legitimate state under Islam is a non-secular Islamist state.
Esack (1997) Qur’an Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic perspective of interreligious
Solidarity against oppression. One World, Oxford.
Esack gives his modern interpretation of the Qur’an as a theology of liberation. Influenced by his experiences of oppression under South African Apartheid, he interpreted Islam as a liberationist theology. As an influential scholar on the subject of Islamic liberation theology his contribution is crucial to improving the understanding of Islamic liberation theology.
Eye on the UN (2012). Straight UN Facts : There is no UN Definition of Terrorism,
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Describes the ongoing process of the UN in their effort to create an internationally
agreed upon definition of terrorism. Also describes the issues creating hindrance
to creating an internationally agreed upon definition of terrorism.
Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office (2010). Retrieved December 20, 2011
from: http://www.qassam.ps/index.html
This is the official English version of Hamas’ website for its militant arm. It provides news about current developments in the ongoing conflict and also a lot of information about Hamas’ militant agenda. This website provides a forum for the
72
memory and celebration of those the group deems to be martyred. It is an element of media that serves in their effort to glamorize and celebrate martyred Palestinians.
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Cambridge.
Contributes a very detailed timeline of Hamas’ history and major accomplishments in their own view. Describes the preceding events to their establishment as a political party and gives information about their founders. This is necessary as it provides understanding of what led Hamas’ founder ultimately to adopt a radically Islamist stance and to start their own distinct group with a unique Islamist, and strictly nationalist mandate.
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/05/iran_is_the_great_distraction
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Griefenhagen (2004). Islamic Fundamentalism(s): More than a Pejorative Epiphet?
Fenwood Publishing, Halifax Nova Scotia. pp. 63-75.
Describes the way that the term “fundamentalism” has been far too liberally applied to different Islamic groups. Suggests that this may be a symptom of the post 9/11 Islamophobic environment. Explains that Islamic groups are diverse.
Hadden, Shupe (1986). Prophetic religions and politics, religion and the political order.
Paragon House, NY.
Most importantly this book explores some of the original Christian theologies of liberation originating mainly in Latin America. This is useful in understanding the general concept of liberation theology and the types of circumstances that generally cause it to manifest.
Hadden, Shupe (1986). Prophetic religions and politics, religion and the political order.
Paragon House, NY.
As does the other volume of Hadden and Shupe, this discusses other circumstances in which theologies of liberation have become popular and can be used to see parallels of liberation theology in different but similar circumstances.
73
Haight (1985). An Alternative Vision: An interpretation of Liberation Theology. Paulist
Press, United States.
Gives a background of Liberation Theology as it emerged in Latin America as a theology in favor of the poor and oppressed. Discusses how it became popular and gives some explanation of the shift of religious interpretation from an individualist to a collectivist interpretation.
Halima and Rane (1993). Jihad, Competing Norms and the Israel-Palestine Impasse:
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 63 (1).
Discusses the issue of non-violent resistance as not being the normative response to oppression in the Muslim world. Explores the Islamic permissibility of self-defense. Specifically explores this in the Israeli-Palestinian context.
Hashmi (2002). Islamic Political Ethics: Civil society, pluralism, and conflict. Princeton
University Press.
Discusses Islamic political ethics generally. Useful to understanding how Islamic political ideas may shift in response to conflict and also to understanding how Islamic politics may manifest themselves in the context of modernity. Gives an overall description of Islamic political ethics.
Husseini (2010). Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria: Third World
Quarterly, 31(5)
Gives a description of Hezbollah. Most relevant, is its discussion of Hezbollah’s use of suicide, and their massive attack un American Marines in Beirut.
International Solidarity Movement (2003). Peace with Realism, Retrieved December 30,
2011from: http://www.peacewithrealism.org/ism.htm
Describes the peacemaking mandate of the ISM and also their heavy involvement in the ongoing Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Author cites the Jewish Action taskforce and the Israeli Ministry of foreign affairs to give a comprehensive report of the ISM’s involvement in the conflict, their neutral stance and also their attitude toward the Palestinians use of violence as resistance which the author cites as justified under UN sanctions.
Israel Insider (2001). Twelve years later, security forces settle scores with Hamas
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terrorist. Retrieved January 23, 2012, from:
http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/security/articles/sec_0143.htm
Discusses the apprehending of the Hams members found responsible for the deaths of two Israeli soldiers Ilam Saadon, and Avi Sasportas. Gives a recounting of the events surrounding the deaths of these two soldiers.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). Hamas Terrorist Attacks, Retrieved March
2012, from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/Hamas+terror+attacks+22-Mar-2004.htm
Gives a list and brief description of all of Hamas’ terrorist attacks since 2000, and the outbreak of the second Intifada. Used as an appendix.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). UN General Assembly Resolution
181.Retrieved November 2011, from:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/UN%20General%20Assembly%20Resolution%20181
Describes the 1947 partition plan. Also provides a map of the original partition plan. Useful to understanding just how much the borders have changed. Included as an appendix.
Juergensmeyer (2003). Terror in the Mind of God. University of California Press, LA.
Two chapters in this book provide some answers into the motivations for beginning to interpret Islam in a violent way. “Islam’s Neglected Duty” is one of them and it includes one specific section on Hamas that includes descriptions of their suicide missions and some explanations for them. “Martyrs and Demons” is a chapter devoted to explaining some of the glamorization of martyrdom.
Juergensmeyer (2008). Global Rebellions: religious challenges to the secular state from
Christian Militias to Al Qaeda. University of California Press, LA.
Addresses specifically Hamas’ objection to secularity. They see their mission as the obligation to liberate Palestine and to instill an Islamist state. Their opposition to secularity can be well observed in their charter and actions. How these are a challenge to those who advocate secularity is addressed. This contributes to the understanding of their strictly religious administration of all of their activities.
Kepel (2002). Jihad: The trial of Political Islam. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
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Massachusetts.
Kepel’s chapter titled “Hamas, Israel, Arafat and Jordan” has been useful in explaining Hamas’ attitude toward negotiation with Israel. It describes their very strong devotion to reclaiming all of Palestine and focuses mainly on their nationalist agenda which is firmly rooted in their Islamic religious conviction.
Lane (1984). Foundations for a Social Theory: praxis, process and salvation. Paulist Press
NY.
Describes the development of liberation theology as a social and political interpretation of religion. Gives examples of places where this type of theology has become most prevalent.
Leiken, Brooke (2008). The moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Council on foreign relations.
86(2).
Describes the Muslim Brotherhood and their approach to Islam and modernity. This is relevant to the thesis as the Muslim Brotherhood provided many of the founders of Hamas as they differed in their opinions about the Qur’an and formed their own group. It assists in understanding the circumstances surrounding Hamas’ creation.
Lowy (1996). The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America. Verso NY.
Contributes to the understanding of Latin American Liberation theology. Contributes to the comprehension of Liberation theology generally and also as the lens through which to interpret the actions of Hamas.
Mainuddin (2002) Religion and politics in the developing world: explosive interactions.
North
Carolina Central University, USA
Contains one chapter on Hamas and its relationship to Islamic fundamentalism specifically. Describes its emergence as a radically Islamist political entity as largely a response to its relationship with the Israeli state.
Mannes (2004). Profiles in terror. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., NY.
One chapter deals specifically with Hamas as a terrorist organization. This is useful to the understanding of why Hamas is viewed primarily in this way.
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Describes their training with other recognized terrorist groups as well as their violent ambitions and their influences from Syria, Lebanon, and Hezbollah.
Marx (1875). Critique of the Gotha Programme, One. Retrieved February 9, 2012, from:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Critque_of_the_Gotha_Programme.pdf
A correspondence of Karl Marx, where he makes his famous statement “from each according to his ability and to each according to his need.” Useful to gaining a broad overview of Marxist thought and opinions.
MidEast Web for Coexistence (2007).Retrieved December12, from:
http://www.mideastweb.org/Middle-East-Encyclopedia/hamas.htm
Provides general info of Hamas’ role in the ongoing conflict. Gives some narrative of the history of Hamas and also about their opposition to Israel.
Moghissi (1999). Postmodern relativism and the Politics of Cultural Difference. Zed
Books, London/New York.
Discusses the impact of modernity and postmodernism on the developing world. Special focus is given to the failures of modernity and subsequently a return to religion as a superior alternative to secular democracy and particularly Western capitalism.
Novak (1986).Will it Liberate? Paulist Press, NY.
Provides a useful chapter describing the “basic concepts of liberation theology” which is helpful to explaining the concept of liberation theology and its main tenets. This is essential to the understanding of liberation theology as a tool to apply to the study of Hamas a liberation movement.
O’Malley. Advanced Information, Liberation Theology: Global Christians. Retrieved
March 5, 2012 from:
http://www.globalchristians.org/politics/2/Liberation%20Theology.pdf
Gives a background of the origins and influences of early liberation theology. Names the main advocates of early liberation theology in North America and also describes the influences of Marx, Metz ad Kant on the socialist ideas underlying Latin America liberation theology.
Palestine Center (1988). Selected Documents Regarding Palestine: Hamas Charter.
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Retrieved December 1, 2011 from:
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html
Provides an English translation of Hamas’ Charter.
Palestine Facts (2011). Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camps 1982 Massacre. Retrieved
February 22, 2012, from: http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_sabra_shatila.php
Gives a description of the events preceding the Sabra and Shatila massacre in Beirut
Palmer (2008). Islamic extremism, causes, diversity and challenges. Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers Inc. UK.
One extensive chapter covers many different aspects of Hamas; their origins and eventual split from the Muslim Brotherhood, their response to certain actions of the Israeli state and also their religious agenda. It also explores why Hamas has become an extremist Islamic group.
Public Safety Canada (2010). Currently listed entities. Retrieved December 17, 2011
from: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx#Hamas
Canada’s official government website listing current threats to public safety including terrorist organizations. Lists Hamas as one of these and gives a brief description of them. Useful to understanding why Hamas is generally understood to be a terrorist organization first and foremost by many governments.
Project Censored (2007). Over One Million Iraqi Deaths Caused by US Occupation.
Retrieved March 20, 2012 from: http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/1over-one- million- iraqi-deaths-caused-by-us-occupation/
Gives the number of Iraqi deaths since the US invasion.
Rahman (2004). Orientalism, Deconstruction and Relationality: Literature Interpretation
Theory, 15(4)
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Describes Said’s theory of Orientalism and how it pertains to the current age. Also explores Orientalism as a tenet of modern critiques of the “other.”
Said (1983).The World the Text and the Critic. Harvard University Press Ltd.
Said engages the issue of literary criticism as well as religious criticism from an Orientalist perspective. He also explores the problem of academia being largely influenced by Eurocentric ideas. As a Palestinian writer, Said provides a relevant perspective to the critique of religious and cultural criticism in the field of academia. A useful perspective to apply to many other academic texts on the subject of Palestine.
Sayyid (1997).A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism. Zed
Books Ltd. NY.
Explores the idea that Islamism has been largely influenced by the shadow of Eurocentric domination. Provides some understanding of why fundamentalism arose as a result of Western Imperialism. It does not address Hamas but addresses some similar issues ,mainly Muslims experiencing a feeling of having their right to self-determination destroyed by colonization.
Schanzer (2008). Hamas vs. Fatah. Palgrave Macmillan, NY.
This entire book gives valuable descriptions of Hamas and Fatah’s increasingly stressed relationship over time. It provides a detailed timeline of the main events that have been defining in what has become known as “the West Bank- Gaza Split” within Palestine. Some suggest that the Gaza strip and West Bank may eventually become two totally distinct geographical and political entities.
Shadid (1988) The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza. Third
World Quarterly.10(2).
Describes the faction of the Muslim Brotherhood that eventually stemmed the Hamas movement. Useful to understanding why Hamas turned away from them to begin their own organization and political as well as religious mandate.
Stilt (2010). “Islam is the Solution”: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood. Foreign Affairs, 46(1). pp. 73-108.
Gives a background and history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt where it began. Describes the Brotherhood’s stances on violence, modernity and the
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Palestinian question. He article gives examples of the Brotherhood’s constitutional visions and goals.
The Corner Report (2010). The Tides of September. Retrieved, February 20, 2012 From:
http://www.thecornerreport.com/index.php?p=6931&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1
Commemorates the victims of the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Gives some information on the events of the time and also what events preceded the massacre, as well as the officials who were considered responsible.
The Cultural Website of Martyrdom and Sacrifice (2007). Retrieved January 30, 2012
from: http://www.navideshahed.com/en/index.php?Page=definition&UID=82371
Internet forum dedicated to the celebration and commemoration if Islamic martyrs. Gives a short biography and description of the martyrdom of 13 year old Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh
The Electronic Intifada (2010). "We are all complicit": an interview with Ewa Jasiewicz,
Retrieved March 1, 2012 from: http://electronicintifada.net/content/we-are-all-complicit-nterview-ewa-jasiewicz/8631
An interview with a human rights activist who was one of the only foreign nationals in Gaza during operation cast lead. She gives her own description of the events, and discusses her own experience of the attack.
The Guardian (2002). 9/11 in Numbers. Retrieved March 10, 2012 from:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/aug/18/usa.terrorism
Gives the number of Americans killed in the 9/11 attacks.
The Independent (1994). Jewish killer attacked mosque last year: Evidence is mounting
that Baruch Goldstein was known to be dangerous well before the massacre,
writes Sarah Helm. Retrieved February 3rd, 2011 from:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/jewish-killer-attacked-mosque-last-year-evidence-is-mounting-that-baruch-goldstein-was-known-to-be-dangerous-
well-before-the-massacre-writes-sarah-helm-1426229.html
Gives a history of Baruch Goldstein’s threatening actions prior to his massacre of Muslims at a mosque. Also states that the Israeli government received many
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warnings about Mr. Goldstein’s intentions to harm Palestinians but took no action to prevent the attack.
The Religion of Peace: Guide to Understanding Islam (2011), Retrieved: March 2nd, 2012
from: http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/Quran/018-suicide-bombing.htm
A website devoted to propagating an understanding of Islam. Seeks to show Islam as a peaceful religion and shed a positive light on frequently misunderstood components of the religion. Gives some analysis of the phenomenon of suicide attacks.
The Wall Street Journal (2009). How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas. Retrieved, February
22, 2012 from: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123275572295011847.html
Describes Israel’s permission of Al-Mujama and even encouragement of this predecessor to Hamas. Explains that this original preference for the Islamists was part of a deliberate strategy to divide and weaken Palestinians to combat Israel’s primary fixation of the time –Fatah.
United Human Rights Council (2012). Genocide in Darfur, Retrieved April 2, 2012 from:
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm
Gives some detail on the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Most relevant is its mention
of President Bashir being indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity and the
continuation of the conflict.
Yadegari (1986). Liberation Theology and Islamic revivalism. Journal of religious
thought,43(2).
Describes the similarities between Christian and Islamic theologies of liberation. Offers a conclusive analysis of the ideas present in modern liberation theology such as looking at scripture as symbolic rather than literal and discussing the necessity to constantly reinterpret scripture to learn how to behave in the present context. Looks at the human’s role as the duty to make ethical choices and exercise proper conduct in their free will.
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Ynet News (2010). Sheikh Jarrah Jews praise Baruch Goldstein on Purim Residents of
east Jerusalem neighborhood celebrate holiday with songs of praise for Cave of
Patriarchs massacre. Left-wing activists plan protest. Retrieved, February 2, 2012,
from: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3857671,00.html
Describes the celebrity status that Baruch Goldstein, the orchestrator of the Hebron massacre achieved among some Israeli Jewish factions. Also describes the rejection of the celebrity status such factions awarded Goldstein from other Israeli and Jewish groups who passionately condemned Mr. Goldstein’s attack.