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Chapter 1: Islamic Liberation Theology

Hamas’ actions may be best understood from the perspective of an Islamic

theology of liberation. Their actions in the social, political, and military realm are a direct

result of their interpretation of Islam in their unique historical and geopolitical context.

Liberation theology is a social and subsequently political way of interpreting religion. It

puts more emphasis on practice, and necessitates action unlike other theological

interpretations (Lane, 1984). “Until recently, the impression was often given that … faith

was a highly private affair concerned with individual salvation regardless of the society in

which the (Lane, 1984, Synopsis)” religious adherent resided (Lane, 1984). This attitude

has shifted in many theological circles to the understanding that a person belongs to a

society, is interconnected with others, and therefore, “to claim any relevance for our time

… theology must have a profound social dimension (Lane, 1984, Synopsis).”

Liberation theology affirms that all religion is political, because even the practice

of conscious indifference to politics is in itself a cognizant politically inspired action, so

whether or not religion encourages political participation, both courses of action are

actually political whether intended or not (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986, pg. 73-75).

Liberation theology also states that “religion is concerned with human fulfillment…[and]

that exploitation has …hindered …[this] notably among the most materially

impoverished, excluded or marginal (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986, pgs. 74-75).” Liberation

theology also asserts that spiritual attention should be directed toward altering the status

quo circumstances that perpetuate exploitation and exclusion (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986,

pg. 75). All of these tenets of liberation theology were prevalent in Latin America in the

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seventies and eighties, where perhaps the most notable context of liberation theology

occurred (Novak, 1986).

Theological interpretation is primarily influenced by the context of the interpreter.

In the context of oppression, theological interpretation concerns itself with interpreting

religion in a way to liberate its oppressed followers. This type of theological

interpretation is termed liberation theology. It has been a phenomenon most notable in

Latin America (Novak, 1986), but also in other regions such as Iran (Dabashi, 2008) and

South Africa (Esack, 1997). There are certain conditions that cause liberation theology to

develop and manifest itself as the dominant religious interpretation of a region. All of

these necessary conditions for liberation theology to develop are present in Palestine

(Schanzer, 2008).

The necessary condition for the development and manifestation of liberation

theology is a circumstance of oppression among an identified group. Such a group is

generally clearly defined based on religion, ethnicity, culture, nationality or some other

visible, clearly recognized trait (Novak, 1986). In Palestine, this group is the largely

Muslim, and Arab population living under the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and

Gaza Strip (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).

A distinct feeling of oppression from a source projecting superiority always

characterizes the formation of liberationist interpretations. This source may be a

government, a foreign power that has interfered, a colonizer or any other body that has

authority. There has to be some sort of hierarchical or elitist system in place that exploits

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a group of people socially and economically. Such a group can adopt a liberationist

perspective in their religion (Novak, 1986).

The perspective of Liberation theology has been previously applied to Palestinian

Christian and Jewish interpretations of scripture, but not to Islamic interpretations of

scripture. In order to apply this useful perspective to understanding Palestinian Islamic

practice, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the origins of liberation theology

and its main tenets. This chapter will develop an explanation of Islamic liberation

theology by describing the context of oppression Palestinians reside within, briefly

introducing the history of liberation theology originating in Christianity and finally the

newer study of Islamic liberation theology (Ateek, 1989).

The oppression and discrimination that Palestinians have experienced is

intolerable by any standards of what human beings can be reasonably expected to endure

before resisting (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). It has been so for decades. Palestinians

have been discriminated against in some part because of their religion and ethnicity.

Therefore, it should not seem unusual that certain Palestinians turn to religion as a source

of inspiration. It should also seem reasonable that Palestinians would look to their religion

as a source of guidance for how to best cope with their current predicament. Hamas has

looked to the Qur’an after recognizing a necessity to reinterpret scripture in their context

of oppression and as an inspiration for resisting the Zionist occupation of their home

(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).

The unfortunate predicament of the majority of Latin Americans was due to their

long history of exploitation, colonialism and conquest at the hands of the Spanish,

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Portuguese and United States (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986). Latin American Christian

liberationist theologians affirmed that the entire “Third World circumstance as a whole

[…was] a consequence of the operation of a world system of economic and political

exploitation (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986, pg.75).” Liberation theologies argue for the

necessity to reinterpret scripture as it related to the modern and imminent context and to

read religious history in a manner that validates “the interpretive starting point within the

modern circumstances and the reading of history upon (Hadden and Shuper, 1986, pg.

75)” which such an interpretation is based (Hadden and Shuppe, 1986, pg. 75). In Latin

America this meant interpreting history as a series of ethical decisions that ultimately led

to an oppressive and elitist social structure that oppressed even the most observant

Christian adherents. These Christians adopted the idea that their poverty was not God’s

will, it was due to the actions of humans possessing free will. From such an assumption,

there can be reinterpretation of scripture through a liberationist framework that asserts the

poor and marginalized people’s right to liberate themselves through social and political

change. The liberation from earthly woes was to be tangible rather than heavenly (Novak,

1986). Belief was no longer enough for the truly devout Christian, practice became of

equal or even superior importance to belief (O’Malley).

Liberation theology in Latin America became political as a subsequent effect of

the fact that it preached a communitarian and social gospel (Shuppe and Hadden, 1988,

pg. 5). Social action can be defined as “the mobilization of resources to influence the

course of profane social life. The resources for such action may be of any sort - economic,

military, political, educational, even religious-and religious social action may be directed

to any realm of life, not just the political. [It follows then, that] for religion, any effort to

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affect the world would count as a social action (Shuppe and Hadden, 1988, pg. 5).”

Advocating a social gospel was a deeply politically charged action in the Latin American

context, especially considering the tyrannical rule, the immense human suffering and

overall extremely volatile and unstable context from which this theology emerged

(Shuppe and Hadden, 1988).

Liberation theology (especially in third world contexts) places strong emphasis on

“human freedom and … the right of self-determination … of exploited classes (Shuppe

and Hadden, 1988, pg. 128).” The political issue with this importance placed on self-

determination is the reality that all people are bound by the social, lawful and economic

constraints of the area in which they reside. Under these conditions it is impossible for

people to be the sole master of their own destinies, so people participate in society and

politics to advocate for a system that they believe provides the most ideal social

conditions (Shuppe and Hadden, 1988, pg. 5). Politics can be defined as “one specific

form of social action that centers on conflict over collective decisions (Shuppe and

Hadden, 1988, pg. 5).” Politics is the process that addresses “the predicament of having to

choose a common line of action […between] alternatives […that are] mutually exclusive

(Shuppe and Hadden, 1988, pg. 5).”Politics addresses the economic reality of scarcity; it

addresses the issue of appropriating the resources of a society. In Latin America, people

supported the social ideal that resources should be shared equally. Liberationists sought to

build their theological infrastructure based on the ideals of equality and putting the

decisions of appropriating resources to elected leaders trustworthy of the responsibility of

representing first and foremost the marginalized classes (Shuppe and Hadden, 1988, pg.

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128) - a true Marxist system, based on their Christological framework. “From each

according to his ability, to each according to his need (Marx, 1875).”

Liberation theology reached prominence among Latin American Christians “as a

human response to the large scale human suffering that [was…] so manifest there

(Haight, 1985, pg. 27).”The Latin American clergy recognized that scripture “must be

reinterpreted in terms corresponding to and illuminating the problems or crises of each

age (Haight, 1985, pg. 29).” In the case of Latin America, religious interpretations sought

to liberate the poor from their extreme economic oppression. Liberation theology was

“born of faith…[and] based on human aspirations for freedom (Haight, 1985, pg. 29).”It

was a social interpretation siding with the impoverished masses, a collectivist rather than

individualist interpretation. “It arose as a theology of the poor, for the poor, on the side of

the poor, committed to the liberation of those … literally in captivity (Haight, 1983, pg.

28).”

Although liberation theology gained some popularity in Latin America, it is

important to note that this is not where the first seeds of a collectivist Christian practice

were actually planted (O’Malley). Liberation theology’s “leading proponents, …Gustavo

Gutierrez, Juan Segundo, Jose Miranda, […were] responsive to the epistemological and

social perspectives of Kant, Hegel, and Marx…Liberation theology […was] greatly

influenced by European political […theological findings] in J. B. Metz, … Jurgen

Moltmann and Harvey Cox perspectives which … criticized the … individualistic nature

of existential theology (O’Malley)” that ultimately had led to Christians perpetrating the

Holocaust (Haight, 1983).

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Latin Americans particularly were influenced by Marxist social analysis, and

affirmed that a Marxist republic was what Jesus would have advocated as they viewed

Jesus as having embodied Marxist principles. Latin American Liberation theology was a

direct result of the unrelenting and despairingly severe conditions of poverty in Latin

America, but it was also a result of European schools of political and social thought that

had become popular among Latin Americans (O’Malley).

Christian liberation theology cites examples of Jesus’ humble background, his

kindness toward the marginalized and his adamant refusal to engage in a decadent

lifestyle. A representative group of Latin Americans surveyed in 1985 shared their

favourite biblical passages, all of which were examples of Christ’s affinity to the poor and

marginalized (Berryman, 1987). They cited “The Acts of the Apostles, where it describes

how the early Christian communities shared their goods and no one was poor (Berryman,

1987, pg. 45).” They named “The Exodus, where God hears the cry of his people and

comes to liberate them … (Berryman, 1987, pg. 45).” They cited “Matthew 25, where

Jesus says ‘whatever you did for one of my least brother or sisters you did it for me,

[and…] where Jesus goes into the synagogue and says he has come to bring glad tidings

to the poor, and to proclaim liberty (Berryman, 1987, pg. 45).” The poor and politically

disenfranchised saw Jesus as their ultimate hero, liberator, and savior. Jesus was to the

liberationist Latin Americans, unquestionably on their side (Berryman, 1987).

“The last shall be first and the first last (Matthew 20:16)” philosophy was applied

to the side of the impoverished and oppressed Latin Americans who affirmed that Jesus

would have stood on the side of the poor (Novak, 1986). They also applied this thought to

vindication of their rights in the present life, and not as a heavenly reward for living a

good Christian life. This was a new idea in Christianity that had previously emphasized

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personal, and divine rather than earthly salvation from suffering (Novak, 1986). Within

liberation theology there is an earthly oppressive force from which the marginalized must

liberate themselves. Novak describes this very clearly in his book “Will it Liberate?” in

the chapter titled “Look North in Anger.” He cites a quote from the well-known Peruvian

priest Gustavo Guitierrez:

Liberation is a term which expresses a new posture in Latin America…Among more alert people today, what we have called a new awareness of Latin American reality is making headway. They believe that there can be authentic development for Latin America only if there is liberation from the domination exercised by the greatest capitalist countries, especially the most powerful, the United States of America (Novak, 1986, pg. 11).

The Latin American theologians held that the Christian gospels were socialist and

therefore social and political. They viewed capitalism and American hegemony in Latin

America as the main enemy of their theological quest to liberate the poor and

marginalized. This anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, liberationist stance is paralleled in

Islamic liberation theology (Novak, 1986).

Jesus, the Christian Messiah and Muhammad the messenger of Islam both led

exemplary lives of morality, and courageously performed unconventional acts of

revolutionary kindness according to their followers. Adherents of both Christianity and

Islam seek to emulate the enviable traits of these two influential men of history. Both

have looked to their exemplary actions when faced with a pressing need to challenge the

status quo (Ali, 1990). This has been evident in the liberationist scriptural interpretations

of feminists, Blacks, the poor, and in more recent years the homosexual, bi-sexual and

transgendered community. This theological dilemma has been posed to any group that has

been scraped to the margins of society by the dominating status quo (Hadden and Shuppe,

1986). Marginalization has been a shared experience of Christians and Muslims alike.

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Outlined in the Christian Bible are countless examples of Jesus’ kindness and acceptance

of the most marginalized and even abhorred members of society. Muhammad’s life is also

filled with such examples of revolutionary and anti-status quo acts of inclusion and

kindness (Ali, 1990).

Although the prevailing idea of Jesus as embodying socialism or Marxism has not

been applied as the political affiliation that Muhammad would most likely have

subscribed to, there are political, social and collectivist elements in Islam. Liberation

theology as an Islamic phenomenon is a relatively new area of study but it is very relevant

to understanding some of the new Islamic religious movements of modernity (Ali, 1990).

Although liberation theology emerged as a Christian response to oppression, Islam is an

Abrahamic, prophetic faith that shares many characteristics with Christianity. They share

an idea of human free-will, a linear conception of time, a belief in divine judgment, of

angels and demons, of good and evil and of heaven and hell. Like Christianity, Islam has

also been reinterpreted by its adherents who have found themselves in similar

circumstances of oppression. There are enough similarities in Christianity and Islam that

the liberationist perspective and label can appropriately be applied to both religions

(Esack, 1997).

It is academically accepted that there are liberationist perspectives of religion in

Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Esack, 1997). This perspective is generally not applied

to Muslim Palestinians, or to Hamas specifically. There are many parallels between the

oppression suffered by Palestinians and those people of nations where “liberation

movements” have emerged. Despite that fact, Hamas often is described as a “terrorist

organization (Kepel, 2002).” This means that the very useful perspective of liberation

theology has not been applied to Hamas. It is our argument that applying the perspective

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of liberation theology could be a very effective strategy to further an understanding of

Hamas, and their unique interpretation of Islam. The tendency to generalize all

fundamentalist, radical, or liberationist Islamic groups as homogenous has been extremely

detrimental to the process of improving the relationship between The West and the

Islamic world. This has been especially apparent in the aftermath of 9/11 and the “War on

Terror.” (Griefenhagen, 2004).

The various interpretations of Islam are very unique and as heterogeneous as the

Islamic populations of the world. It is not accurate to reduce all of the liberationist,

fundamentalist or radical interpretations of Islam to the level of terrorist as has been the

observable tendency. Careful consideration must be given to each specific group and its

own interpretation in its own context. If an adequate understanding of Hamas can ever be

reached, it must be considered on its own and not considered as a part of Al Qaeda, or any

other terrorist network. For this reason, it is our argument that Hamas can be considered

and interpreted most appropriately on its own, and as a liberationist movement

(Griefenhagen, 2004).

Liberation theology is not the same as fundamentalist theology. The latter is a

nostalgic desire to restore a religion to its pure form as it was at the time of its emergence.

Liberation theology is concerned with the here and now, and recognizes the need to

reinterpret religion as it relates to the changing times and the present context. It is not

primarily concerned with liberation in the afterlife, but focuses on achieving liberation in

the present life, and freeing its adherents from earthly troubles (Ali, 1990).

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Palestinians certainly have earthly troubles. Palestinians have been oppressed by

apartheid, occupation and colonization of their lands, and by economic hardship (Farrell,

Milton-Edwards, 2010). Their context of oppression is an environment in which an

Islamic theology of liberation could develop as it has in other areas of the world (Novak,

1986). It is our argument that Hamas developed a distinct theology of liberation as a

result of their modern, and unique context of oppression (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).

Islam emerged as both a religion and a social revolution posing a “powerful

challenge to the oppressive structures of its time (Ali, 1990, pg. 22).” It advocated social

justice, and encouraged universal human unity and brotherhood. This is evident in the

suras (Qur’anic verses) condemning racism at a hierarchical and elitist time in human

history (Ali, 1990). “The Arabs … were greatly constrained by tribal outlook. This …

was shattered by the Qur’anic teaching that […the human race in its entirety…]

originated from the same man and woman and no one has any distinction over the other

on the basis of tribe, nation race or colour (Ali, 1990, pg. 31)” […It stresses…] “that

these differences are explicitly for purposes of identification (Ali, 1990, pg. 31).”The

Qur’an makes it very clear that God’s judgment is a true meritocracy, with no race

superior to another in this sura: “O men, We created you from male and female, and

formed you into tribes that you may recognize each other. He who has more integrity has

indeed greater honour with God. Surely God is all knowing and well-informed (Ali, 1993,

49:13-14).”

The blatant condemnation of racism is furthered by observing Muhammad’s

actions. Muhammad performed an unheard of action by promoting an African slave to the

honoured rank of being his muezzin. This man, named Bilal was noted as one of

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Muhammad’s most trusted companions (Ali, 1990, pg. 3). The practice of slavery was

widespread at the time and the entire Arabian society was dependent on it. This would

have been an impossible context in which to outlaw or eradicate slavery outright, but

Muhammad did set an example through his kindness toward slaves that showed his

unconventional respect for the human dignity of even the lowest members of society (Ali,

1990, pg. 29). This kindness is paralleled by Jesus’ fearless visit of the diseased, socially

reviled and feared lepers (Mark 1:40-45). The Qur’an does not explicitly abolish slavery,

but it is seriously discouraged: “Free those slaves you possess who wish to buy their

freedom after a written undertaking, if you know they have some goodness, and give

them out of the riches God has given you, Do not force your maids into prostitution (Ali,

1993, 24:33).”

This recommendation of improving the treatment of women was extended to free

women as well. At a time when polygamy was unrestricted, Muhammad sought to

regulate it and make it much less exploitive. Completely eradicating this practice would

have been inconceivable in the context of the emergence of Islam. At the time of the

Qur’an’s revelation, the societal status of women could most accurately be described as

severely restricted both socially and economically (Ali, 1990, pg. 29). “They had to live

at times, with more than a dozen co-wives…[and] they were […often] considered [a]

burden…In many cases […attempts…were] made to bury them alive (Ali, 1990, pg. 29).”

The Qur’an condemns this practice of female infanticide in sura 81:8-9 “And the little

girl buried alive is asked, for what crime she was put to death (Ali, 1993, 81:8-9).” This

sura refers to the resurrection of these buried little girls from their graves on the day of

judgment, and their immediate ascension into paradise as innocent and pure children free

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of any blemish of sin. It also hints to the wrath of judgment their gravediggers should fear

(Ali, 1990, pg. 29).

Concerning the practice of polygamy it is important to note that in the context in

which Islam emerged and the prevailing misogynistic cultural ideas of the time, any

attempt to restrict polygamy was a progressive and indeed revolutionary step. Muhammad

actually gave women some rights and protection, and not just the right to life rather than

being buried alive, he gave some regard for their primal human dignity (Ali, 1990).

Polygamy is not encouraged by the Qur’an. It is simply acknowledged and permitted

granted appropriate circumstances (Badawi, 1995, pg. 27). The verse in the Qur’an

concerning polygamy is as follows: “If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly

with the orphans, marry women of your choice, two or three or four; but if you fear that

you shall not be able to deal justly with them, then only one…(Qur’an, 4:3, Badawi,

1995, pg. 28).”

It may also be worth noting that the passage of the Qur’an regarding polygamy

“was revealed after the battle of Uhud, in which dozens of Muslims were martyred,

leaving behind widows and orphans (Badawi, 1995).” This was a dire predicament,

particularly for widows and female children considered at best a burden on society

(Badawi, 1995). It can therefore be assumed from a liberationist perspective (because it

should not be neglected that the technical permissibility to take four wives has been

exploited by certain men and certain patriarchal societies) that the intention behind

permitting polygamy was to provide “a practical and humane solution to the problems of

widows and orphans who would otherwise surely be more vulnerable (Badawi, 1995, pg.

28)” especially given the patriarchy and barbarism of Muhammad’s time (Ali, 1990).

When considering Muhammad’s context, it can be very well understood that feminist

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liberationist interpretations of the Qur’an could be taken from Muhammad as a liberator

(Ali, 1990).

Muhammad’s liberating actions extended to the impoverished and economically

oppressed peoples of society - people who found themselves in oppressive circumstances

similar to the Latin Americans discussed previously (Novak, 1986). Muhammad had

much to say in favor of the oppressed, and there are also many Qur’anic

recommendations to promote social justice and reduce the hoarding of money (Ali, 1990).

The third pillar of Islam zakat (charity) is the example of this that undoubtedly comes to

mind, but there are many more recommendations made by Muhammad to show that he

stood, like Jesus did on the side of the poor and oppressed and sought their liberation and

salvation (Ali, 1990).

“Religion […far from being a mere] sigh of the oppressed […may] provide a

powerful motivation to overthrow the status quo (Ali, 1990, pg.20).” This is evident in

Muhammad’s unconventional ideals, and awe-inspiring demonstrations of justice.

Muhammad advocated economic justice, women’s emancipation, and was consistently

“engaged in liberating the weaker sections of society (Ali, 1990, pg. 33).” Muhammad’s

contributions to implementing economic justice may actually be unparalleled. During the

time of the Qur’an’s revelation, the highly exploitive practice of usury was widespread.

Many Meccans were trapped in debt and suffered extreme poverty while others engaged

in gross lifestyles of debauchery, decadence, and intoxication (Ali, 1990). Muhammad

staunchly condemned this practice “and warned those who perpetuate[d] it to (Ali, 1990,

pg. 35)” be wary of certain divine punishment (Ali, 1990, pg. 35). “The Qur’an lays great

emphasis on distributive justice (Ali, 1990, pg. 35).”It blatantly condemns excessive

accumulation of and hoarding of wealth warning that “One who accumulates and counts

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again and again will certainly be hurled … into hell fire (Ali, 1990, pg. 35.)” Given all of

these liberationist elements of the Qur’an, which could be reasonably considered to be

very similar to the loving, tolerant and socialist message of Jesus it seems obvious that

one may wonder why the study of Islamic liberation theology is relatively new. This is

due to the unfortunate human tendency to be greedy, selfish, over-indulgent and fearful of

upsetting the status quo (Ali, 1990, pg. 37).

Tragically, within a mere 30 years of Muhammad’s death “Islam lost its liberative

and democratic character and became part of the monarchial establishment of the

Umayyads (Ali, 1990, pg. 37).” While Muhammad had summoned the marginalized

classes together and even willingly suffered at their side, the Umayyads “gathered

powerful tyrants …and ruthlessly suppressed all those who opposed their (Ali, 1990, pg.

37)” oppression and brutality (Ali, 1990). “The number of slaves multiplied, women

[were again] subjugated …, non-Arabs discriminated against and [the] liberative […

elements] of Islam replaced by a fatalistic outlook (Ali, 1990, pg. 37).” Elitist,

hierarchical power structures developed and the cherished “socio-political equality [that

Muhammad had fought for] was lost (Ali, 1990, pg. 37).”

This Islamic monarchial style is still an image that characterizes Islam today,

especially in the well-known Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman

(BBC, 2012). When considering the unenviable status of women in some Islamic states

such as Saudi Arabia, The Sudan, or Iran and massive accumulation of wealth in the

Saudi Kingdom’s royal family (BBC, 2012), the idea that Muhammad was in fact as

much of a liberator, humanist, and feminist as Jesus could reasonably seem ludicrous,

even ridiculous (Ali, 1990, pg. 37)-especially to someone ignorant about the Islamic faith.

But at its core, at its source, there are liberative elements in Islam that are beginning to be

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revived. Islam in its liberationist, modernist and feminist interpretations is not inherently

elitist. In fact, liberationist interpretations have been emerging in several different modern

contexts, most notably during the Arab spring. Perhaps however, the most prevalent case

of the development and ascension of a liberationist theology of Islam can be observed in

the Islamist revolution in response to the Western imperialism that was overthrown in

Iran (Dabashi, 2008).

Dabashi characterizes Islamic liberation theology as a resistance to Imperialism

that has been largely Western dominated. He describes Islamic liberation theology as

largely inspired by the modern post-colonial period (Dabashi, 2008). Dabashi credits his

inspiration to the liberative elements of Christian liberation theology citing the renowned

Argentinian theologian Gustavo Gutierrez:

The revolutionary situation which prevails today, especially in the Third World, is an expression of this growing radicalization. To support the social revolution means to abolish the present status quo and to attempt to replace it with a qualitatively different one;…it means to attempt to put an end to the domination of some countries by others (Dabashi, 2008, dedication page).

Gutierrez’s eloquently expressed frustrations with imperialism share uncanny

similarities with the Iranian experience of colonialism. Both have shared a history of

exploitation at the hands of Western colonial, capitalist and secular interests. Both have

seen a return to religion in response to this. In Iran, this response was a particularly

radical, and extremely anti-imperialist theology of liberation (Dabashi, 2008, 62).

“In Iran, successive generations of corrupt politicians facilitated the colonial

plundering [and economic exploitation] of the nation while (Dabashi, 2008, pg.

62)”sabotaging any hope of “domestic political maturity (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 62),”

autonomy and flourishing (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 62). The revolution of 1979 definitively

ended decades of tyrannical “monarchy and its active complacency in integrating Iran

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into a servile state in the global configuration of capital (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 62).” The

radical Islam that characterized the overwhelming success of the Iranian Islamist

revolution had distinctly anti-colonial and liberative elements. The type of Islamism that

inspired the revolution in Iran was a result of a new interpretation of scripture in light of

the current circumstances of oppression and exploitation (Dabashi, 2008). This is a

distinctly liberationist pursuit (Ali, 1990).

Iranians viewed America as a “predatory empire” from which they felt a pressing

need to liberate themselves. In the face of this undesired predicament, they looked to

Islam for answers, which they found in its liberationist characteristics (Dabashi, 2008).

Iranian scholar Hamid Dabashi in his book “Islamic Liberation Theology” explains that

as long as the West seeks to dominate other peoples there will constantly be forces of

resistance equal to the forces of oppression strengthened by Islam’s liberative traits

(Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197). He asserts that since the Iranian Islamist revolution, Islam has

been emerging as a liberative force “of political resistance to the globalizing empire….

[and that] the result of this … is the possibility of a new liberation theodicy (Dabashi

2008, pg. 197)” (theodicy being a theology that seeks to reconcile with the existence of

evil in the world and reinstate a just social order). He theorizes that this liberationist

theodicy will evolve and take shape in the future as a continuing resistance to Western

domination not just in Iran but throughout the Islamic world (Dabashi, 2008). He gives

examples of this theodicy’s “emerging disposition … now evident in … the Hamas

movement for the liberation of Palestine, Hezbollah in defending the territorial integrity

of Lebanon, and the Shi’i community resisting the colonial occupation of their homeland

in Iraq (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197).” He affirms that all of these movements are examples of

Islam’s new tendency to adopt more liberationist theological interpretations in the context

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of Americanized interference in their homes (Dabashi, 2008). Dabashi also describes the

perception of these Islamic movements toward Israel as the “mini-imperial cloning

(Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197)”of the predatory empire of America (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197).

This is particularly evident when observing the hostility of many Arab states toward

Israel, and some Arab states’ open financial support of Hamas (Mannes, 2004).

Dabashi names the Zionist project to be “the most enduring sore at the heart of the

[Arab] regional politics (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 198)” - which are increasingly defined by

anti- American sentiment. Dabashi argues that in an environment defined by an “them

versus us” (West versus Islam) mindset, he believes that the existing liberationist

movements of Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine will eventually develop Islamic liberationist

counterparts in the rest of the Islamic world, the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast

Asia. He hypothesizes these groups will be characterized by a multi-faceted but united

front reflecting their cultural and ethnic diversity but also their common commitment to

Islam and to resist imperialism (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197-198). He sees this united

liberative multi-state force as the only natural progression to the pursuit of resisting US-

Israeli hegemony and what he calls “the discredited and failed Zionist project that has

culminated […a] racist, apartheid, colonial (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 198)” occupation of

sovereign Islamic territory and oppression of Muslims. (Dabashi, 2008, pg. 197-198).

The liberative elements of Islam are not exclusively awakened by Western-Israeli

colonial pursuits and imperialism. They have also been revived in response to apartheid,

not just in Israel but also in South Africa by perhaps the pioneer of Islamic liberation

theology, Farid Esack (Esack, 1997).

Farid affirmed the liberationist interpretation that the context of scriptural

interpretation is the primary influence (Esack, 1997). After his struggle against South

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African Apartheid he reflected that “standing within the struggle for justice was itself a

good point from which to get a better view of the text […and that] the context of the

interpreter […is a] consciously chosen […interpretive] key (Esack, 1997, pg. 82).” Farid

had survived his own context of oppression as a Black living under the brutality of

Apartheid. He was brought up by a single mother. He was also a Muslim and

consequently part of a religious minority. Although he eventually studied theology at a

staunchly conservative institution in the Islamic country of Pakistan, he always

remembered the oppression he had suffered as a member of a minority, and the kindness

of his Christian neighbours. Deeply influenced by his personal experiences of Christians

living the socialist, kind and loving lifestyle exemplified by Jesus in the Christian Bible,

Esack was also influenced by Christian liberationist ideas. These ultimately led him to his

own liberationist, socialist, inclusive, and feminist interpretation of the Qur’an (Esack,

1997, pg. 4). While studying Islamic theology in Pakistan, Esack frequently attended

meetings of the Student Christian Movement “and witnessed how they tried to make

sense of living as Christians in a fundamentally unjust and exploitive society (Esack,

1997, pg. 5).” These are all parallel theological challenges faced by the Latin Americans

of the same time period struggling to redefine their Christian practice in light of societal

injustice. Esack was greatly impressed and influenced by their devotion to a socially

conscious, and collectivist religious practice. He was very inspired by their shift from

emphasis on individual belief and salvation to collective conscience, responsibility and

action (Esack, 1997). He sought to redefine Islam, “from a noun to a verb (Esack, 1997,

pg. 126)”as these Christians had done in their own religion. Motivated by the desire to

liberate oppressed South Africans from Apartheid, he looked to interpret the Qur’an as a

20

liberationist and found all of the necessary elements there, and also in Muhammad’s life

(Esack, 1997, pg. 83).

He discovered uncanny similarities in Christian liberation theology to his own

Islamic liberation theology, in that all “liberation theology […seeks] to achieve its

objectives through a process that is both participatory and liberatory…It is formulated by,

and in solidarity with, those whose socio-political liberation it seeks and whose personal

liberation becomes real through their participation in this process…[It] derives its

inspiration from the Qur’an and the struggles of all the prophets (Esack,1997, pg. 83).”

Esack asserted that any liberation theology must strive to liberate a religion and its

adherents from “all forms of injustice and exploitation including those of race, gender,

class and religion (Esack, 1997, pg.83).”

Christianity and Islam in their liberationist forms both seek to address the

universal problem of human suffering and misery (Dabashi, 2008). In the modern context

this misery has been largely caused by the post-colonial project and the utter failure of

modernity to fulfill promise (Moghissi, 1999). In the Third World context, modernity and

the post-colonial project has been characterized by “incompetent and corrupt state

management; the incapacity of sophisticated scientific medicine to cure horrifying

diseases […and] ethnic conflicts ripening into full-fledged bloody wars […all...] exposing

the […precariousness] of the Enlightenment progress, the … failure to share the benefits

of […medical] advance, …democracy, legal equity […and] individual autonomy and

freedom (Moghissi, 1999, pg. 55)” The developments of globalization, and

“McDonalization” have not benefitted everyone. Adding insult to injury are the loud,

obnoxious and incessant First World voices constantly reminding the Third World of

their superior living standards through advertising, social media and news broadcasting.

21

The hegemonic experience of modernity has been characterized by utter unfairness and

caused deep seeded resentment (Moghissi, 1999). This is reflected in the religious

movements of the current age. It can be observed in Gustavo Gutierrez’s insistence on the

end of American dominion in Latin America (Ali, 1990), in Ayatollah Khomeini’s

condemnation of America as “The Great Satan” (Foreign Policy, 2012) and in the anger

of rock-hurling Gazans when receiving the bodies of their comrades while returning home

with their meager earnings after spending each day servicing their colonial occupier’s

flourishing economy (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 53).

Hamas’ geo-political context and experience with Israel has very much influenced

its development of an Islamic theology of liberation. Its history of conflict with Israel has

contributed to its goal of resisting the Israeli occupation, and its belief that this resistance

is divinely sanctioned. When exploring Hamas’ history, it can be deduced that they have

been in a circumstance of oppression long enough that reinterpreting their religion in a

liberationist manner would be the logical progression of the Hamas movement.

22

Chapter 2: Hamas’ Emergence and Dual Mandate

As previously suggested; Hamas’ actions may be best understood from the

perspective of an Islamic theology of liberation. How they developed as an Islamic

Resistance and Liberation Movement cannot be understood without considering their

history and the context from which they emerged. This history will illustrate the

frustrations of Palestinian Muslims and how these frustrations eventually evolved into a

liberationist interpretation of Islam and the development of Hamas as an Islamic

movement devoted to the resistance of what many Palestinians consider an unjust

occupation.

Hamas began as a charitable and social outreach organization seeking to liberate

Palestinians from the poverty and oppression of the Israeli occupation. They became

violent after Israeli oppression became intolerable and violence appeared to be the only

viable strategy to counter Israel’s occupation (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010).

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is one of two main political factions

(the other is Fatah) vying for governance of the population in the Palestinian territories

(BBC, 2011). To their voters, they are an alternative to Fatah, a legacy of unfruitful

negotiations with Israel and corruption. To Israel and its international allies; they are a

terrorist organization. To themselves, they are heroes-the only hope for the liberation of

Palestine from the Zionist entity. The development of this perplexing identity will be

explained by exploring some key events in the group’s founding, growth, and liberationist

interpretation of Islam (BBC, 2011).

23

Due to an accident Sheikh Yassin, the primary founder of Hamas was a

quadriplegic from the age of twelve. He personally witnessed the bulldozing of his

family’s home in 1948 at the establishment of the first Israeli settlements. He grew up in a

Gaza refugee camp. It is likely due at least in part to his physical condition that he

became an avid scholar of the Qur’an from an early age (Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades,

2010). It seems unimaginable that such a marginalized person was capable of founding

the most formidable opposition to Fatah and Israel. Underestimating this man came at

severe costs (Farell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). The effort that went into his eventual

assassination, when he was nearly blind and in his nineties shows just how much

influence he wielded, and how important it was to his enemies to have this influence end

(Al-Jazeera, 2011).

Aside from introducing the main founder of Hamas, identifying Hamas will not be

possible without looking at some of its other co-founders, the events that led to its

creation, and also the history of its major accomplishments in its pursuit of sovereign,

autonomous governance in Gaza and the West Bank (BBC, 2011).

Sheikh Yassin and Hamas’ co-founders including Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantissi, Dr

Mahmoud Zahar, Musa Abu Marzouq, Ismail Abu Shanab, Salah Shehadeh, Ibrahim al-

Yazuri, Issa al-Nashar and Abdel Fattah al-Dukhan, were all members of the Muslim

Brotherhood. Many of them were highly educated men, some even medical doctors. They

were respected by Palestinians for their religious dedication, community service, and

prestigious education (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 53).

24

The Muslim Brotherhood originated in Egypt but now has branches all over the

Middle East and the world, with the highest membership in Arab states (Schanzer, 2008,

pg. 15). The Brotherhood was founded by a man of humble beginnings, Hassan Al-Banna

in 1928. The movement emerged among frustrations “with ...Western influence in Egypt,

[and...] envisioned the return to a time marked by a global Islamist order (Schanzer, 2008,

pg.1).” These frustrations only grew, and membership in the Brotherhood (although exact

membership numbers are not known) expanded rapidly (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 15). “The

British mandate of Palestine was one of the first territories to be influenced by the

Brotherhood movement...A handful of branches were founded even before the State of

Israel was established in 1948 (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 15).” Evidently, the seed of this

Islamist and anti-Imperialist movement was planted in Palestine even before Palestinian

frustrations with Israel, and only strengthened after the partition and subsequent

occupation of Palestine (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 15).

In his youth, Sheikh Yassin studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo where he met

and was influenced by the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was not able to

complete his studies there due to his serious health problems and returned home where he

became active in the Palestinian faction of the Brotherhood (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 20).

“Islam is the Solution” is the Brotherhood’s slogan (Stilt, 2010). “The

Brotherhood pursue[s] an Islamic society through tarbiyya (preaching and educating),

concentrating first on changing the outlook of individuals, then families, and finally

societies (Leiken, Brooke, 2008).” The Brotherhood is considered by many non-Muslims

to be fundamentalist, and by the most radical Islamist extremists it is considered to be far

too moderate. Indisputably, it is one of the most influential Islamist organizations in the

25

world. The Brotherhood sees Islam as the way to solve the problems of the current age

(Schanzer, 2008, pg.15) “The Brotherhood is a collection of national groups with

differing outlooks, and the various factions disagree about how best to advance its

mission (Leiken, Brooke, 2008).” The Palestinian faction that spawned Hamas was one

such faction. Important to understanding Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim

Brotherhood is noting that neither sees Islam to be incompatible with the democratic

process or modernity (Leiken, Brooke, 2008).

Sheikh Yassin disagreed with his Muslim Brothers on some key issues, mainly

their more moderate stances and their willingness to compromise with Israel. “The …

more zealous Islamists believed that Israel had to be conquered (and become Palestine)

before the larger spiritual transformation could take place ... The longstanding

Brotherhood approach, held that nonviolent outreach (dawa) was the way to slowly retake

Palestine in what they viewed would be a long …battle of wills (Schanzer, 2008, pg.21).”

This divide between the Muslim brothers ultimately led Yassin and his followers to found

Al-Mujama (the predecessor organization to Hamas). Al-Mujama was a social outreach

group through which Yassin oversaw charitable services to the Palestinian population. He

slowly preached his message of returning to Islam and gained respect and support due to

his successful management of Al-Mujama. Israel granted a license for the official

establishment of Al-Mujama in 1973. They did not foresee what this organization would

eventually become (Schanzer, 2008, pg.20). It is well documented that Israel sought to

divide and weaken the Palestinian population by funding, encouraging and making the

establishment of Al-Mujama possible. This was seen as a way to create a rival for, and

26

consequently weaken their primary fixation of the time: Fatah. This “divide and conquer”

strategy would ultimately backfire (Wall Street Journal, 2009).

After the 1967 war and the overwhelming Israeli victory which included the

Palestinian loss of Jerusalem, the situation for Palestinians worsened. A Palestinian

consensus that originated within the Muslim Brotherhood held that Jerusalem, the third

holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina was conquered by Israel to punish

Palestinians for becoming too secular. This is an opinion Sheikh Yassin agreed with and

promoted while gaining the trust of the disenfranchised Palestinian population through

Al-Mujama (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). “As Israel continued its occupation, the

Mujama provided a form of religious solidarity and comfort (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,

2010, pg.50).” By the eighties, this theory of divine punishment prevailed in the Gaza

strip. Islamism had taken off and the Islamists were ready to extend their mission from

charity to militancy (Schanzer, 2008, pg. 22).

In 1984, sheikh Yassin was arrested for founding a military cell which eventually

became Hamas’ militant branch (Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades). Israel had become

fearful that the Mujama, once exclusively pursuing social welfare endeavors, would target

Israel, since Al-Mujama had begun targeting secular Palestinians who were supporters of

Fatah. Their fears were not unfounded. Sheikh Yassin did not end up serving his full

sentence and returned to his Islamist, and now anti-Zionist activities (Schanzer, 2008, pg.

80-81). This became very apparent during 1987 and what is likely the most important

event in Hamas’ history; the first Intifada (Palestinian uprising) (Farell, Milton-Edwards,

2010). This uprising would be defined by a very one-sided civilian death toll - a ratio of

27

25 Palestinian deaths for each Israeli death, and 300 Palestinian and 15 Israeli deaths in

total (Farell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 89).

What specifically sparked the Intifada is not entirely clear. Many have speculated

that the anger and frustrations experienced by Palestinians in the occupied territories had

simply become intolerable and it took only a small incident to ignite a response (Farell,

Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 52). One such incident, a car crash may have been such an

incident. Each day before dawn, the men of the Jabalia Gazan refugee camp travelled on

unsafe roads in rusty cars to their meager jobs in Israel. The Israeli economy was

booming, and every day they witnessed the prosperity Israelis lived in and returned home,

long after dark to share their small earnings with their impoverished families in Gaza.

This caused intense resentment and hostility. Unrelenting poverty, and unsafe

transportation conditions were all effects of the occupation that undoubtedly influenced

the outbreak of the uprising (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 52).

One particular evening, nine Gazan workers were struck and killed by an Israeli

truck while commuting home from work. Upon reception of the worker’s bodies in the

Jabalia refugee camp, they were immediately mourned as martyrs. The incident was not

widely viewed by Gazans as an accident. Israel was considered responsible for the murder

of these Palestinians. (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 53). Since then, Hamas has

considered any Palestinian killed even indirectly by an Israeli to be a martyr (Ezzedeen

Al-Qassam Brigades, 2010).

Word of the martyred Gazans spread rapidly through Jabalia, Gaza, and the West

Bank . “Within ten days of the accident, thousands of Palestinians had taken to the

28

streets ... to protest the occupation (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 52).” Palestinians

in the occupied territories of all ages hurled rocks at Israeli border guards and troops.

Shopkeepers closed, people refused to work, and Palestinians urged each other to

participate in the uprising (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 53). “It appeared as if one

mighty force was uniting the Palestinians [...in…] their desire to bring the occupation to

an end through ... mass rebellion and disobedience (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg.

53).”

Hamas came into all of this when they provided the leadership in the midst of the

seemingly chaotic uprising. The outbreak of the unexpected intifada in 1987 (BBC, 2011)

caused Yasser Arafat and his fellow Palestinian Fatah leaders to attempt to reassert

leadership over the rioting Palestinians. At the beginning of the uprising, Hamas was still

not considered to be a serious threat, and Israel focused primarily on Fatah - a diversion

that Hamas took advantage of. A few years later - Israeli, and international attention

would be turned to the newly established Hamas Islamists. The Palestinian population in

Gaza and the West Bank would be divided (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 54).

“The establishment of Hamas came at a time of unprecedented national

unity ...against Israel’s ... occupation (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 54).” Hamas

refused to align itself with the secular nationalists they despised. Their agenda was to

assert themselves first and foremost as an Islamic organization, dedicated to the liberation

of Palestine and the end of the Israeli occupation and encroachment within the borders of

1967 (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 54). Hamas made their reason for being and

goals very clear by publishing their official charter in 1988 (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,

2010, pg. 311). This charter made it clear that Hamas was above all, an Islamic

29

organization, taking its motivation from the Qur’an and dedicated to the Islamization and

liberation of Palestine (Palestine Center, 1988). To accomplish this, it was not opposed to

participation in armed combat. Originally, these militant pursuits were directed

exclusively at Israeli military targets. The attacks on civilians began later (Farrell, Milton-

Edwards, 2010).

Even after Hamas had asserted itself through its charter in 1988, it was still

considered a lesser threat than Fatah, which had until the full escalation of the first

Intifada caused the greatest hindrance to furthering Israeli interests. It likely did not have

occur to Israel that Hamas would act as drastically as they did (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,

2010, pg. 61). In 1989, two Israeli soldiers disappeared. Hamas later claimed

responsibility and disclosed the whereabouts of their bodies. One soldier named Avi

Sasportas was hitch-hiking home from his base. The other, Ilam Saadon, was hitch-hiking

in an Israeli settlement called Ashkelon. Both men were targeted by Hamas as soldiers.

Hamas at this point was still opposed to targeting Israeli civilians (Israel Insider, 2001).

Shortly after, Israel declared Hamas to be a terrorist organization. Israeli authority, and

secular Palestinian factions cut off contact with them, and membership of Hamas became

a punishable crime (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 61).

Hamas replaced Fatah as Israel’s primary fixation. Yitzhak Rabin (Israeli Prime

Minister) eventually adopted an “iron fist policy” against the Palestinian resistance

(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 54). Rabin stated: “this government will fight any

manifestation of violence and terror, and will not permit, …Hamas … to harm citizens of

Israel, and … will take all steps at its disposal to battle murderous terrorist organizations

(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 64).” This statement was made in 1992, and it is

30

important to note that this very hostile “declaration of war against Hamas (Farrell,

Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 65)” may not have been the desired outcome of Hamas’ heavy

involvement in Palestinian resistance to the Zionist occupation (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,

2010).

Dr. Mahmoud Zahar (a co-founder of Hamas) attempted to negotiate with Israeli

politicians, and insisted that Hamas’ agenda was not anti-Jewish, and that Jews could be

accepted as fellow monotheistic adherents of an Abrahamic faith. He explained that

Hamas’ agenda was concerned exclusively with the Israeli state, and that what they

sought was a non-secular Islamist Palestinian state - an autonomous state with elected

representatives , free from the interference of Israel and neighbouring Arab states (Farrell

and Milton-Edwards, 2010). Even the notoriously radical Sheikh Yassin advocated for

negotiations at this time “so long as Israel was prepared to recognize Hamas and its

demand for Palestinian rights (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 59).”

Unfortunately, these dialogues proved to be unproductive. Hamas ultimately

deemed them to be useless, and their hostility toward Israel deepened. They resorted to

militancy and launching more attacks against military targets. Foreign Arab states

sympathetic to the Palestinian cause also began to favor Hamas over Fatah. This caused

increased tensions between Hamas and Fatah and influenced Hamas’ increasingly anti-

Israeli, and anti-Fatah stances (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).

These tensions continued to escalate after the end of the first Palestinian uprising,

and throughout the 1990s. Hamas also continued to gain political strength. Hamas was

adamantly opposed to the Oslo accords, and was infuriated by Yasser Arafat’s (Fatahs’s

31

leader) cooperation with Israel, and invitation of the international community to interfere

in Palestinian affairs. Hamas publicly attacked Fatah’s members for corruption and

squandering Palestinian money, while seeking the approval of the Palestinian population

through Islamization. Hamas began to punish collaborators with Israel by execution

(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 77). Even after Israel began orchestrating the earliest

stages of its withdrawal of troops from Gaza and the West Bank in accordance with the

1993 Oslo agreements (BBC, 2011), Hamas asserted that this was not enough. This

message was carried out largely through attacks on Israeli military targets. Hamas

targeted the Israeli military in Jericho (located in the West Bank), and Gaza’s major

towns. They were getting brasher, more confident (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 77-

78). Hamas was “convinced that its weapons would […protect…] itself from Israel

(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 77).”

Between the end of the first intifada and 1994, there were several skirmishes

between Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas’ military branch), Fatah, and Israeli

forces. Hamas’ targets were Palestinians (many of Fatah’s supporters) who were

conspiring by collaboration with Israel, or Israeli military targets. In 1994 the Brigades

turned their sights on Israeli civilian targets after one pivotal event (Farrell, Milton-

Edwards, 2010, pg. 77).

During the month of Ramadan in 1994 , an Israeli settler named Baruch Goldstein

walked into the Ibrahimi mosque in a military uniform where he proceeded to open fire

on the Palestinian worshippers. He murdered 29 Palestinian civilians and seriously

injured several others. Israelis and Palestinians alike were appalled by the act of

extremism, especially since the mosque is believed to be Abraham’s burial site and is

32

revered by both Jews and Muslims. Even though the Israeli state vowed to eliminate such

extremism in its own members, and publicly condemned the massacre, this was not

enough to undo the damage inflicted. The fury that erupted within the Palestinian

population following the massacre was inconsolable (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg.

77). “The Palestinian-Israeli conflict […was] irrevocably altered for the worse (Farrell,

Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 77).”

Contributing to Palestinian anger was the feeling that this attack could have been

prevented. Goldstein had made threats, shown violent tendencies, and had even poured

acid over the interior of the mosque a few months prior to the murderous attack.

Palestinian authorities had urged the Israeli Prime Minister to monitor Goldstein’s actions

but with no results (The Independent, 1994). The Israeli army was also “reported to have

killed 12 Palestinians as rioting erupted … in the aftermath of the shootings (BBC,

1994).” Adding insult to injury was the eventual celebrity status that Goldstein achieved

after his “martyrdom” among certain Jewish factions (Ynet News, 2010).

Although Palestinian civilians had been casualties of the Israeli army for decades,

the massacre marked the beginning of Hamas’ intentional attacks against Israeli civilians.

Musa Abu Marzouq of Hamas reflected on these attacks: “we were against targeting

civilians… but no one asked about Palestinian civilian deaths…no one cared…After …

the massacre we determined it was time to kill Israel’s civilians…we offered to stop if

Israel would, but they rejected that offer (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 79).”Hamas

carried out its first suicide attack against civilians in Afula, an Israeli town, in response to

the massacre. This attack claimed eight lives (BBC, 2007).

33

Hamas justified its civilian attacks inside Israel through “tactical necessity […as]

reciprocation (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 79),” and also through religion, “an eye

for an eye (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 79).” They claimed to be “mandated by

Islam - in a war situation - to do unto others as they have done unto us (Farrell, Milton-

Edwards, 2010, pg. 79).”There was ample supply of Palestinians eager to implement the

suicide attacks on civilians. The result was dozens of civilian deaths and casualties. As

Fatah attempted to salvage the negotiation process, Hamas’ militancy continued through

the nineties, all the way up to the second Intifada (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 84).

The first Intifada was characterized by “overmatched Palestinian youth hurling

rocks at Israeli tanks…The Second Intifada was altogether different (Farrell, Milton-

Edwards, 2010, pg. 85).” Palestinians had changed their tactics, and moved from

launching rocks, to launching their own bodies strapped with explosives. Unlike the

outbreak of the “Stone-throwing Intifada,” the events leading to the provocation of the

“Al-Aqsa Intifada” are undisputed (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).

Perhaps the most unprecedented loathing among Palestinians and their

neighbouring supporters for one man was embodied in the rampant and passionate hatred

for “Israel’s right-wing opposition leader, Ariel Sharon (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010,

pg. 87).” He earned “particular notoriety when… he masterminded the invasion of

Lebanon, only for Israel’s …allies to massacre Palestinian refugees in Beirut’s Sabra and

Shatila refugee camps (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 87).” He has been found

responsible for “what is considered the bloodiest single incident of the Arab-Israeli

conflict (The Corner Report, 2010).” The death toll of the Sabra and Shatila massacre was

34

indisputably at least 800, and has been counted at more than 3500 at some estimates

(Palestine Facts, 2011).

On the 28th of September, 2000, the abhorred and detested Mr. Sharon conducted

a political demonstration in the Old city of Jerusalem, near the Al-Aqsa mosque. “The site

of this walkabout was probably the most sensitive political and religious fault-line in the

world… the third holiest site in Islam …for the …journey of the Prophet Mohammed to

heaven (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 87).” The religious importance of the Al-

Aqsa mosque in Islam is surpassed only by the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi

Arabia. Sharon’s demonstration there was interpreted by Palestinians to be a blatant

assertion of sovereignty over the long-disputed area - an intentional insult and a direct

provocation. When Palestinians protested, they were fired upon with tear gas, and four

protestors were shot and killed. The violence escalated and riots spread from Jerusalem to

all of Gaza and the West Bank. Two days into the rioting, twelve year-old Muhammad al-

Dura was shot dead after being targeted by an Israeli soldier (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,

2010, pg. 87). His death was captured on film “while he huddled defenselessly behind his

father (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 87).” This very emotionally charged video

spread rapidly throughout the Islamic world and he was immediately mourned as a

martyr. This led to the escalation of the Intifada, and resulted in the deaths of 564

Palestinians and 181 Israelis in the first 12 months (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg.

89). Mostly, these deaths were caused by Israeli troops and Hamas’ suicide attacks. These

attacks earned Hamas notoriety not just in Israel, but all over the world. It also caused an

abrupt end to the international sympathy toward the pathetically depicted rock-throwing

Palestinians, and caused a new characterization of Palestinians as dangerous, fanatical

35

and violent. This persona was exacerbated by the 9/11 Islamophobic hysteria. The attacks

also contributed to the growing fear and hatred of Hamas and the perception of them as

terrorists (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 89).

Hamas asserted during the Second Intifada and the 9/11 aftermath that its struggle

for Palestine was specific, that it had no intention of joining Al-Qaeda and that its mission

was not against the West but was confined within the small (1967) borders of Palestine.

Hamas has maintained this stance. At the end of the Second Intifada, Palestine was even

more polarized between the nationalists (Fatah) and the Islamists (Hamas). The Gaza strip

became the area of Palestine with the most support for Palestine. Eventually, this resulted

in Hamas winning a landslide victory in the Gaza elections and the expulsion of Fatah

from the Gaza strip (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). The West Bank became the

stronghold for Fatah. These two areas of Palestine are geographically separate and

increasingly autonomous from each other (Schanzer, 2008).

Gaza, as Hamas’ domain has been the central target of Israeli attack. This is very

evident when looking at Operation Cast Lead. From December 27, 2007 until January 18,

2009, the Israeli military fired into Gaza, causing the deaths of 1400 Palestinians, and

seriously injuring 5000 Palestinians (Electronic Intifada, 2010 ). The International Court

of Justice ruled the events leading up to Operation Cast Lead to be insufficient grounds to

justify Israel’s claim for self - defense. They deemed Israel’s use of force and attack on

Gaza to be completely unjustifiable. Israel claimed to be defending itself against rocket

attacks from Gaza that had killed 14 Israelis over several years. Rather than investigating

these attacks and finding the militants who were responsible, Israel opted to attack an

entire Palestinian settlement and kill several hundred people (Counterpunch, 2009),

36

including 350 children in just 23 days (Electronic Intifada, 2010). Furthering the

International Court of Justice’s condemnation of Israel’s attack on Gaza is the fact that

prior to the attack, there had been a ceasefire and truce between Israel and Hamas. It was

Israel, not Hamas that broke this truce (Counterpunch, 2009).

Hamas’ relationship with Israel and with Fatah has become increasingly unstable

and unpredictable. It remains so today. Hamas is an alternative to, or even an enemy of

Fatah. Hamas is capable of kindness, charity and progress, but also violence and

destruction. It has shown willingness to compromise, but also staunch opposition. Hamas’

policies are a direct result of Palestinians’ long and tumultuous historical relationship

with Israel. Their radicalism has escalated simultaneously with the deepening severity of

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hamas’ policies are also a direct result of their religious

dedication to Islam, and their interpretation of it in their distinct historical context

(Schanzer, 2008).

Their context of oppression had contributed to their interpretation of Islamic

theology from a liberation perspective. They see the Israeli occupation as a force from

which they see a pressing need to liberate themselves. Their policies and operations are a

direct manifestation of their unique theology of liberation in their context of oppression.

Their experience under the Israeli occupation has been the primary influence of their

interpretation of Islam. As the oppression imposed by the Israelis continued and became

more oppressive, Hamas’ interpretation became increasingly radical and even violent.

They see above all else, the goal to liberate Palestinians from Israeli oppression. They are

ready to resort to violence to achieve this goal.

37

Their radical interpretation of Islam was not a spontaneous occurrence. Nor was it

a completely unique occurrence in that it had several parallels to other circumstances

where liberationist interpretations became the norm- oppression from an outside force, a

feeling of fear at the prospect of losing a religious and ethnic identity and poverty. Hamas

seeks to liberate those at the bottom of society just as Muhammad, Jesus, and Gustavo

Guitierrez did.

38

Chapter 3: Hamas’ Unique Theology of Liberation and its Applications

The argument that Hamas is best understood through the lens of an Islamic

liberation theology has been developed in two steps. First we looked briefly at the

meaning of liberation theology and connected that meaning to Islamic history. Secondly,

we have examined the history of Hamas as an organization with a view to explaining its

origins, development of its self-understanding and the critical role played by the events in

the conflict with Israel to understand that development. In this chapter, we turn to the task

of explaining the specifics of Hamas liberation theology. Liberation theology is a result of

reinterpreting religion and applying it to current circumstances. Hamas has been

influenced to interpret Islam in a way that focuses on the urgency to liberate the

Palestinian people and to understand that liberation within the framework of a

contemporary reinterpretation of Islam.

The shift indicative of liberation theology from individual salvation to community

and social religious practice can be observed in Hamas’ evolution from Al-Mujama, a

purely Islamist and social outreach organization, to their eventual development into a

political party (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). This evolution illustrates their use of

current circumstance as a basis for reinterpreting their religion in light of their Palestinian

experience with Israel. The elements of a theology of liberation were described in Chapter

1, and all of the political, historical, social and religious elements of a theology of

liberation are evident in the Hamas context. It should be noted that integrating a religion

into the political arena makes it as vulnerable to corruption and adaptation as any other

element of politics (Novak, 1989). It should be noted as well here that Hamas’ particular

brand of Islamic liberation theology or political Islam, and the applications and practices

39

necessitated by its individual and unique circumstances and is not reflective of Arabs, of

Muslims, of Palestinians or even of Gazans as a whole (Farell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).

The most pressing question about Hamas’ interpretation of Islam inevitably

concerns their use of suicide attacks, especially those directed at Israeli civilians (Farrell,

Milton-Edwards, 2010). This is the most paradoxical component of Hamas’ distinct

religious interpretation. Suicide in Islam is perhaps the most despicable sin as it is

considered a blatant insult to one’s creator. The taking of one’s own life is vehemently

condemned and suicide is considered a certain facet through which to ensure one’s eternal

damnation to the fires of hell. This is explicitly stated in several Qur’anic suras: “Do not

destroy yourselves. God is merciful to you. If someone does so… We shall cast him into

hell (Ali, 1993, 4:29-30).” It is also condemned in sura 2:195 “do not seek destruction at

your own hands (Ali, 1993).”

The existence of these verses may seem strange and in blatant contradiction to

Hamas’ interpretation of Islam. This is because of the glamorization of martyrdom in the

Qur’an and some of the ambiguous language used to explain what is considered a

legitimate circumstance of martyrdom (The religion of Peace, 2011). Muhammad was

reported to have said (in one of the Hadith) that “I would love to be martyred in Al1ah's

cause and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again and

then get martyred and then get resurrected again and then get martyred (The religion of

Peace, 2011).” Martyrdom therefore, is one of the highest honours in Islam. There is

however, disagreement over what actually constitutes an appropriate circumstance for

martyrdom. The former Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini stated that “the

purest joy in Islam is to kill and be killed for Allah (The religion of Peace, 2011).” It seems

reasonable under this (extremely radical) interpretation that any violent pursuit (including

40

one where there is a certainty of death) is acceptable in furthering an Islamist agenda. The

more moderate and progressive stance on the issue of martyrdom can be understood

through a statement by the well-known proponent of moderate Islam, Dr. Jamal Badawi

“Suicide out of despair is not acceptable…Giving one’s life in a military situation is

different and can be heroic if there is no other way of resisting (The Religion of Peace,

2011).”

One other component of Islam that cannot be overlooked is the fact that Islam in

no way encourages pacifism (Halima, Rane, 1993). “Turn the other cheek” (Matthew,

5:39) is what Jesus instructs Christians to do in the face of an attack. Islam does not

advocate this. Non-violent resistance is far from the normative stance in Islam, especially

when confronting a violent attack, or what is perceived to be an attack on the Islamic

religion in its entirety. Although the Qur’an discourages the initiation of conflict and

participation in violence, the Muslim’s right to self-defense, through violence if necessary

is strongly emphasized in Islam (Halima, Rane, 1993, pg. 41).

The Qur’an explicitly condemns the act of murder, but it is justified in self-

defense or as a punishment for a murderer in sura 4:32: “Whosoever kills a human being

except as punishment for murder or for spreading corruption in the land, it shall be like

killing all humanity (Ali, 1993).” Defense against one’s enemies is again permitted in

sura 4:33: “The punishment for those who wage war against God and his prophet…is to

kill … them (Ali, 1993).” Again, the act of murder is condemned out of just cause in

sura 17:33: “ Do not take a life, which God has forbidden, except in a just cause (Ali,

1993).” Muslims are directed by the Qur’an to avoid the initiation of armed conflict at all

costs, “Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God does

41

not like aggressors (Ali, 1993, sura 2:190).” Even after a conflict has begun, Muslims are

urged not to use excessive force and even encouraged to reconcile with their enemies

after a battle. “Fight them until sedition comes to an end and the law of God prevails. If

they desist, then cease to be hostile (Ali, 1993, sura 2:193)… “if they desist, God is

forgiving and kind (Ali, 1993, sura 2:192).”

Hamas’ violence is a direct manifestation of liberation theology as liberation

theology necessitates participation in society and active social involvement. Although

social involvement does not always mean participation in violence, given the

circumstances of serious conflict in the region where Hamas resides, it would be nearly

impossible to participate in society without engaging in some way in the violence that is

ongoing.

Hamas views the Zionist forces as aggressors of war. They see themselves as the

victims and certainly not as the perpetrators. It is also worth noting that Hamas’ first

suicide attack against Israeli civilians came after decades of the murder of their own

civilians (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). Some have speculated that Hamas’ adoption of

the use of suicide attacks may have been partially influenced by the monetary support

they receive from the Shii extremist nation of Iran (Mannes, 2004, pg. 127). Suicide

attacks are often viewed to be a Shii tactic. The first modern Islamic suicide bomber was

a 13 year-old Shii Iranian Muslim (Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh). During a pivotal

battle of the Iran-Iraq war, young Fahmideh grabbed a hand grenade, jumped under an

Iraqi tank and detonated- instantly incinerating the tank, as well as himself. There are

several internet forums dedicated to his commemoration as a martyr (The Cultural

Website of Martyrdom and Sacrifice, 2007).

42

The Shii, and Iranian supported, Lebanese political faction Hezbollah is listed by

Canada as a terrorist organization (Public Safety Canada, 2010). Shortly after

Fahmideh’s martyrdom, Hezbollah adopted the tactic of suicide attacks, (ABC News,

2006) which they used in October 1983 “on barracks housing US and French military

personnel in Beirut result[ing] in the deaths of over 240 US Marines … the deadliest

individual assault on US [and Israeli] interests between World War II and the World

Trade Center attacks of 2001 (Husseini, 2010, pg. 803).” Hezbollah subsequently

employed the tactic of suicide bombing to successfully oust Israeli troops from Lebanon.

This overwhelming victory was acutely observed by Hezbollah’s humiliated, desperate,

politically disenfranchised and increasingly radical neighbours to the South (Kepel, 2002,

pg. 333).

Upon its founding, Iran saw no reason to invest in the Sunni organization of

Hamas. This opinion changed in 1992 after Israel deported 418 Hamas militants to

Southern Lebanon (Kepel, 2002, pg. 326). Here, Hamas’ most capable militants came

into contact with the Shii group Hezbollah, which receives financial support from Iran

(Mannes, 2004, pg. 127). “Hamas was inspired by Hezbollah’s long war with Israel in

Lebanon, which ultimately culminated in Israel’s complete withdrawal (Mannes, 2004,

pg. 127).” Hamas has since the early nineties maintained close ties with Hezbollah,

employed some of their tactics, and availed themselves of Hezbollah’s sophisticated

militant expertise. Hamas’ growth, and close relationship to Hezbollah eventually

contributed to Iran’s decision to support them directly both financially and technically.

Hamas’ non-secular nature and animosity toward Zionism also contributed to their

Iranian appeal (Mannes, 2004, pg. 128).

43

Hamas’ adoption of the tactic of suicide attacks is a direct result of their history of

turmoil and extreme hostility toward what they consider the unjust Zionist occupation of

Palestine. They view suicide attacks as a necessary element of their resistance of Zionism

which is encouraged by their liberationist Islamic interpretation (Juergensmeyer, 2008).

Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantissi, one of Hamas’ primary founders described the attacks not as

“suicide attacks” but instead as istishhadi, meaning “self-chosen martyrdom

(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).” Seven years before his assassination in 2004, professor

Rantissi asserted in an interview with an American scholar that the term “suicide bomber

implied an impulsive act by a deranged individual…[while] the missions undertaken by

the young men in the Hamas cadres … were ones that they deliberately and carefully

chose as part of their religious obligation (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).” When pressed

about the issue of targeting non-combatants, Dr. Rantissi stressed the severity of his

situation by reminding the interviewer that his people were “at war (Juergensmeyer, 2008,

pg. 73).” In his perception Hamas got into the undesirable predicament “of war with

Israel … because of Israel’s stance toward Palestine - especially toward the Hamas

concept of an Islamic Palestine. It was Islamic nationalism that Israel wanted to destroy

(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).”He stressed that this hostile stance toward Hamas’

Islamic nationalist imperative was embodied in all facets of Israeli society and that “for

this reason, the war between Israel and Hamas was one with no innocent victims

(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).”

Dr. Rantissi affirmed Hamas’ stance that the suicide attacks were a last resort after

a history of targeting exclusively soldiers, and attempting to avoid harming Israeli

civilians (Juergnesmeyer, 2008). After all, Hamas has regularly emphasized their stance

that they “are not against Jews just because they’re Jews (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73)”

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but two events Dr. Rantissi cited were used as grounds for the justification of civilian

attacks. One, was an “attack by Israeli police on Palestinians demonstrating in front of the

Al-Aqsa mosque … in 1990 (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73)” and predictably, the Hebron

massacre perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein in 1994. Rantissi was convinced that the Israeli

military had conspired to carry out these attacks and was at least indirectly responsible for

the two incidents. He also pointed out that both of these attacks targeted mosques, and

especially stressed that the Hebron massacre took place during the holy month of

Ramadan, and that Goldstein had killed defenseless worshippers (Juergensmeyer, 2008,

pg. 73). “He concluded that these were attacks on Islam as a religion as well as

Palestinians as a people (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).”

As previously noted, an attack on the Islamic religion and its adherents is not

grounds for passivity. It necessitates defensive action (Ali, 1993, 17:33). This is

especially apparent in this context as Hamas certainly does not view Palestinians as the

aggressors, and would state that Palestinians are indeed purely innocent victims of the

Israeli occupation (Juergensmeyer, 2008). Rantissi argued that the suicide attacks were a

defense. He said that they were only permitted as a response to “specific acts of violence

from the Israeli side … that affected innocent civilians… If we did not respond this way

Rantissi explained, Israelis would keep doing the same thing (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg

7).” He described the intense pain and suffering that Israeli attacks on Palestinian

civilians had caused for years, and then explained the suicide attacks as a “moral lesson

… a way of making innocent Israelis feel the pain that innocent Palestinians have felt

(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 73).” Rantissi saw the suicide attacks as absolutely necessary

and unavoidable in the pursuit of providing Israelis understanding of the severe brutality

they had for decades inflicted on their Palestinian neighbours (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg.

45

74). Hamas stresses an affinity to Jews on the grounds that “the divine [Abrahamic]

religions were revealed by God for the happiness of humanity. They preach peace (Rubin,

2002, pg. 37).” But Hamas differentiates between Jews, and Israelis, because they view

Israelis as Zionist occupiers. Hamas sees no Israelis, male or female as innocent partly

because of the fact that all Israelis are conscripted to military service, so none are truly in

their view non-combatants (Kepel, 2002, pg. 333).

Like Sheikh Yassin, and many other prominent and committed Hamas members,

Dr. Rantissi had his own personal experiences with the brutality of the Israeli forces. He

gave a nostalgic description of his family’s prosperous home that was demolished in the

pursuit of creating the modern Israeli state. He said that when his family members had

resisted the occupation of, and subsequent expulsion from their land, Rantissi’s

grandfather, uncle and three cousins were killed by the Zionist soldiers. He stressed that

his own sad story was not at all uncommon, and expressed his frustration with the

continued encroachment of Israeli settlements on the meager remaining Palestinian lands

(Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 75). He said that “if the Israeli government continues to allow

settlements to be built …we should use all means to stop it (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg.

75).”

Sheikh Yassin echoed Rantissi’s “we are at war” stance (Juergensmeyer, 2008).

His belief in the tragic necessity of suicide attacks was emphasized so much that it is

made mention of in his memorial page on Hamas’ website in the following statement:

“He vehemently defended martyrdom bombings against the Zionist entity, explaining that

they constituted the sole and only weapon available to the Palestinian people in the face

of the enemy with far more powerful military capabilities that is hell-bent on

exterminating and crushing the Palestinian people. He repeatedly demanded an end to all

46

attacks targeting Palestinian civilians … However, the Zionist entity consistently rejected

all initiatives to that effect (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).”

Hamas’ non-secular actions are not just demonstrated in their militancy, they are

also demonstrated in their social programs. Hamas has supported orphanages, primary

education and medical clinics. Besides offering monetary compensation to the families of

martyrs (approximately fifteen thousand American dollars), Hamas has also provided

housing for Palestinians left homeless after Israeli demolitions. It is largely for its social

involvement that Hamas has gained any support from Palestinians, and not because of its

militancy (Juergensmeyer, 2008, pg. 78).” This social involvement is a manifestation of

their theology of liberation because such a theological interpretation necessitates

participation in society and an effort to improve living conditions for oppressed people. It

also shows Hamas’ concern for the people it professes to serve and also that its

participation in society and politics is not purely militant, or motivated by violence.

Hamas’ violent, and non-violent agenda is very concisely outlined in its official

charter. Their agenda outlines all of their goals that involve extensive participation in

politics and society, a collectivist initiative toward salvation rather than individual. Their

charter outlines in great detail the actions necessitated by their liberation theology. The

charter does not deem secularity as compatible with Islam, but does name modernity,

scientific development, social justice, democracy and women’s participation in politics

and social affairs to be Islamic. All of this is outlined, in detail in Hamas’s charter

(Palestine Center, 1988). Predictably, the charter begins with the same opening statement

as that of the Holy Qur’an “In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate

(Palestine Center, 1988).” Hamas’ “ultimate goal is Islam, the Prophet its model, the

Qur’an its Constitution (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas Charter: article 5).”All thirty six

47

articles defined in the charter explain the role of Hamas and it followers in every aspect of

life. It advocates a socially and politically engaged life of resistance “in order to extricate

the country and the people from the …[oppressors’] desecration, filth and evil (Palestine

Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 3).”

The Hamas charter asserts that the pursuit of an Islamic state is a religious duty

and that they do not support any compromise that may result in the loss of what they

believe to be rightful Palestinian territory. The charter states that an Islamic society is the

only proper society for Palestine and that Hamas and indeed all Palestinian’s duty is to

regain Palestine, which was wrongfully stolen. It asserts the necessity to implement Islam

as the only solution to the Zionist occupation (Palestine Center, 1988). The charter

reflects the increasingly non-secular attitude of its time in article 9 “Hamas finds itself at

a period of time when Islam has waned away from the reality of life. For this reason, the

checks and balances have been upset, concepts have become confused, and values have

been transformed; evil has prevailed, oppression and obscurity have reigned; cowards

have turned tigers (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 9).”

Before more thoroughly examining the charter that has strong elements of Islamist

extremism, it should be noted that it was published amidst the chaos and turmoil of the

first Intifada and reflects the anger and desperation of the time. Since its publication, even

Sheikh Yassin has relaxed the charter’s stance on reclaiming “every inch of Palestine …

[because] only under the shadow of Islam could the members of all regions coexist in

safety and security …[for] in the absence of Islam, conflict arises, oppression reigns,

corruption is rampant and struggles and wars prevail (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’

Charter: article 6).”

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In an interview not long before his assassination (an Israeli attack which claimed

the lives of nine other Palestinians), Sheikh Yassin stated that Hamas sought “a place that

absorbs Palestinian Muslims, Jews and others without differentiation (Ezzedeen al-

Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).” When questioned about recognizing the

Israeli state and the potential of a two-state resolution, Yassin stated that Hamas’

recognition of the Israeli state was conditional on their recognition of Palestinian rights to

statehood, which have not materialized (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information

Offise, 2010). He furthered his argument of Israel’s failure to recognize Palestinian

statehood by asserting “Israel has not even acknowledged the Palestinians' right to 22

percent of our homeland (referring to the borders of 1967) (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades

Information Office, 2010).” Yassin stressed his frustration with the Palestinian situation

by saying “Our core position is that the Israelis stole our land and our homes and the

whole world supported them, and now, when we are asking for our land back, the world

is not supporting us, and this is unfair (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office,

2010).” He emphasized his sincere desire for a fair state without apartheid and equal

respect and opportunities for all regardless of religion. He described this by saying “my

own best vision for Palestine is of a land for Christians, Jews, Muslims -- a state where

everyone has equal rights (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).” He

was even shockingly open to the concept of secularity in such a state, asserting that the

question of secularity or Islamism in his ideal Palestinian state “should be left for the

democratic process. Let the people select the kind of state they want, in the same way that

the United States is a state for all its people and they solve their differences

democratically as equals (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).”

Yassin is frequently reported to have expressed how his personal experiences “rooted the

49

hate of injustice in his soul (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).”

He repeatedly stressed the need for justice (at least his own interpretation of justice) and

democracy to prevail over the ongoing occurrences concerning the conflict (Ezzedeen al-

Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).

Essentially, the tone of Yassin’s stance toward Israel appears to have shifted from

blatant hatred at the time of their charter’s publication in 1988, to an attitude advocating

fairness and social equality for all inhabitants of the disputed territories, and even a

potential for the hope of eventual openness to a two-state resolution (Ezzedeen al-Qassam

Brigades Information Office, 2010).

Besides considering the militancy of Hamas as a response to their oppression as

well as a manifestation of their interpretation of Islam, it is important to look at the

elements of their charter concerning other areas of life. The concern Hamas demonstrates

for its non-militant population is well demonstrated in its charter. This concern for

oppressed people and active participation in society is a direct result of Hamas’

liberationist interpretation of Islam and desire to promote fairness and equality in their

dominion. The elements of the charter which perhaps are most appealing to the

Palestinian community at large and which have contributed to Hamas’ popularity are its

charitable endeavors. In article 10, Hamas asserts its commitment to serving all

Palestinian citizens: “The Islamic Resistance Movement, while breaking its own path,

will do its utmost to constitute at the same time a support to the weak, a defense to all the

oppressed. It will spare no effort to implement the truth and abolish evil (Palestine Center,

1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 10).” In article 21 of the charter, Hamas again stresses that

its duty “consists of extending help to all the needy, both materially and morally, or

assisting in the execution of certain actions. It is incumbent upon the members of the

50

Hamas to look after the interests of the masses the way they would look after their own

interests (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 21).”

Hamas (unlike other Islamic fundamentalist groups it is often viewed as

synonymous to) strongly advocates the participation of women in politics (Palestine

Center, 1988). The encouragement of women’s participation in the Hamas movement is

especially apparent in the martyrdom operations that have been carried out by female

Hamas members (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010). This strongly

demonstrates Hamas’ religious interpretation as a liberationist movement rather than a

fundamentalist movement (Palestine Center, 1988). In its charter, Hamas cites Qur’anic

suras advocating the equality of women and men and necessitating women’s engaged and

active role in society. This is evident in article 18 of the charter which quotes sura 33:35

and emphasizes that both women and men should be active and pious because “Allah has

prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter:

article 18).” They see their goal of a high functioning society as completely unattainable

without the contributions of Palestinian women. In article seventeen, Hamas’ charter

strongly asserts this stance that “the Muslim women have a no lesser role than that of men

in the war of liberation (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 17).”

The very specific target of Hamas’ violence and their expressed enemy are

Zionists and Zionist endeavors (Palestine Center, 1988). “The Zionist invasion is a

mischievous one. It does not hesitate to take any road, or to pursue all despicable and

repulsive means to fulfill its desires (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 28).”

What is very interesting about Hamas charter is a belief that the Zionist entity has an

endless amount of wealth, influence and powers of malicious indoctrination at its disposal

(Palestine Center, 1988). This is expressed in Article 22:“The enemies have been

51

scheming for a long time … in order to achieve what they have achieved. They took

advantage of key elements in unfolding events, and accumulated a huge and influential

material wealth which they put to the service of implementing their dream (Palestine

Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 22).” This is important to note because many fear

that Hamas may be a threat to other groups other than Zionists. This is highly unlikely,

because Hamas in Article 22 of its charter asserts a belief that Zionists have forced media,

and other countries to submit to their bidding through controlling wealth and also through

being involved behind the scenes in initiating many world conflicts in order to further

their Zionist agenda. They blame them for initiating the first World War in order to

overthrow the Islamic caliphate in the pursuit of their Zionist agenda, they say that

Zionists were the creators of the UN which they believe they have control over, they even

assert that Zionists were behind the initiation of the second World War as a stepping

stone to ultimately reach their Zionist goal (Palestine Center, 1988). Farfetched as these

accusations are, they do serve to assure supporters of the Israeli state that they are viewed

as fellow victims of what they perceive to be the cunning Zionists who conspired and

exploited ruthlessly in pursuit of their goal. Hamas’ enemy is not the West, or the

countries that support Zionism, it is very explicitly Zionists themselves (Palestine Center,

1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 22).

Hamas sees Zionists as the most evil players of world history and regularly speak

of them as synonymous with Nazis in their charter (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’

Charter: article 20). They cite their unprovoked attacks on Palestinian civilians and claim

that the Zionist’s “Nazism” “does not skip women and children, it scares everyone. They

make war against people’s livelihood, plunder their moneys and threaten their honor. In

their horrible actions they mistreat people like the most horrendous war criminals

52

(Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 20).” They strongly assert their Islamic

right of self-defense against this violence (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter: article

25).

The original shift toward Islamism within Palestine began in the aftermath of the

1967 war. The bitter loss of the war was considered to be a proof of the error of pan-

Nasserism, which was the socialist dominant ideology of the time. The loss of the war

furthered Palestinian frustrations that in their plight they were truly alone. On the eve of

the creation of the Zionist state, neighbouring Arab states had urged Palestinians to

remain in their homes, had expressed their support for their cause and consoled the

Palestinians by the promise of their loyalty in the pursuit of preserving Palestine (Farrell,

and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 35). These cooperative efforts had utterly failed in the late

forties, and again in 1967. Israel had destroyed the Egyptian air force and scared off the

anticipant militaries of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and

Algeria. Control of the Gaza strip, West Bank (as well as Syrian Golan heights and

Egypt’s Sinai peninsula) was taken over by Israel (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg.

35-39). The loss of the war and the Holy land of Palestine were interpreted to be a divine

punishment for Palestinians’ increasingly secular lifestyles. This rejection of the popular

pan - Arabic socialist ideas of 1967 is reflected in Hamas’ charter, published 20 years

after Egypt and Jordan had lost administration of the Gaza strip and West Bank to Israeli

control and the Zionist oppression worsened (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 35-

39).

The loss of the war served to vindicate Sheikh Yassin’s claims that the

Palestinians must return to Islam. Under Egyptian administration, conditions in Gaza had

been barely tolerable, and most Palestinians did not seek the consolation of Islamism.

53

President Nasser’s Egyptian administration had employed a hard-handed stance on the

Islamists of the area, likely due to an assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954 perpetrated

by a Muslim brother. Since Nasser’s Arab nationalism was the dominant ideology of the

time, many Gazans did not protest Egypt’s hard stance on the Islamists of the Gaza strip

(Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). After the loss of the war, the subsequent brutal Zionist

occupation of Gaza and the unannounced bulldozing of homes in the middle of the night

(ordered by Ariel Sharon who was then serving as the Israeli military commander of

Gaza)(Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 48), Yassin’s spiritual advice was intently sought after and

heeded (Farrell, and Milton Edwards, 2010, pg. 39).

Hamas’ charter reflects the belief of the time that secular efforts to reclaim

Palestine are absolute futility. It explicitly cites the failure of Nasser’s pan-Arab

nationalist pursuits (Palestine Center, 1988). This is stated in a few places in the charter,

article 32: “World Zionism and Imperialist forces have been attempting, with smart

moves and considered planning, to push the Arab countries, one after another, out of the

circle of conflict with Zionism, in order, ultimately, to isolate the Palestinian People.

Egypt has already been cast out of the conflict (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter:

article 32).” Egypt’s failure to maintain sovereignty of the Gaza strip and win the war was

seen as a direct punishment for advocating more secular ideals and being an enemy of the

righteously guided Muslim Brotherhood (Farrell, and Milton Edwards, pg. 39). Hamas’s

charter asserts that Palestine is a holy Islamic land whose Islamic sovereignty is divinely

ordained. They saw any non-Islamic or secular attempt to conquer it as illegitimate. This

is evident in article 11: “The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of

Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf (meaning divinely sovereign land) throughout the

generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or

54

abandon it or part of it. No Arab country nor the aggregate of all Arab countries, and no

Arab King or President nor all of them in the aggregate, have that right (Palestine Center,

1988, Hamas’ Charter: article 11).” This is quite a blatant assertion of Hamas’ and

Islam’s divine superiority over pan-Arab nationalism, or secular efforts. Hamas saw its

way, the Islamic way as the only way to liberate, and defend Palestinians from their

detested enemy-Zionists (Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter).

This vilification of a defined enemy is a tenet of liberation theology which was

paralleled in Latin American frustrations with the imperialism of the United States

(Novak, 1989). The perceived enemy that has forced Palestinians into a situation of

oppression and a circumstance necessitating theological interpretation is a colonizer- an

enemy that exploits the local population and threatens the local religious structure. An

exploitive colonizer and religious threat were both characteristics of the “enemies” that

inspired the liberationist reinterpretations of scripture in Latin America and Iran (Dabashi,

2008).

Hamas’ use of suicide attacks reflects a religious reinterpretation in light of their

context of oppression. Their predicament simply became so intolerable that religious

consolation and subsequently reinterpretation was a natural response (Farrell, Milton-

Edwards, 2010). Tragically, Hamas’ reinterpretation was influenced by some other

extremist organizations already employing the tactic. Hamas’ reinterpretation of scripture

in light of their current context of oppression was also characterized by a mindset of

superiority based on their negative attitude toward secularity. It was also characterized by

an acute feeling of desperation and rage (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010).

Hamas’ highly educated, modernist and oppressed founders were not

fundamentalists. They were influenced by a desire to restore conditions as they were in

55

the past, but only in the sense that they want to reclaim their home, which was lost 60

years ago. This is a recent past, not an ancient past. Yassin witnessed the destruction of

his own home (BBC, 2012). Hamas’ liberationist interpretation was influenced by living

memories, not ancient memories. Hamas wishes Palestinians to have their own state- not

a return to the past as Palestine was under British control prior to the creation of the

Israeli state (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010). This is not reflective of a fundamentalist

religious interpretation. Hamas is not seeking to restore Palestinian living conditions as

they were at the time of the religion’s emergence. They are attempting to interpret the

Qur’an as it relates to the here and now, to worldly troubles (Farrell, Milton-Edwards,

2010). These tangible, earthly troubles are of the most basic because they concern the

severe lack of access to the bare necessities of life and security (Abuelaish, 2009). These

troubles are incessant, just as the unrelenting poverty and human suffering of Latin

Americans. As Latin Americans were slaves to the American economy and decadent

lifestyle (Novak, 1986), Palestinians work meager jobs for rich Israelis and return home

to scarce rations shared in weathered shacks (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010). Hamas

seeks liberation from this economic and social inequality. Hamas fights for salvation

primarily in this life, and not the afterlife-also a liberationist pursuit (Ali, 1990).

Hamas has reinterpreted Islam in a way that promotes the democratic process.

They have created a website, many of their more prominent members have learned the

modern language of international business and diplomacy-English (Juergensmeyer,

2008). They encourage the participation of women in politics (Palestine Center, 1988).

This is certainly not a fundamentalist desire to impose the “pure” conditions of the

religions’ emergence concerning women (Ali, 1990). Hamas has also showed an

openness to continue to reinterpret in light of the current context. This is evident in the

56

way that Hamas’ liberationist interpretation has shifted since its charter’s publication

(Palestine Center, 1988, Hamas’ Charter).

Since the publication of its charter, which outlines its extremely radical

interpretation of the time -Hamas’ interpretation of Islam has relaxed (Ezzedeen al-

Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010). Even Sheikh Yassin seemed to have become

slightly more progressive in his twilight years. Since his assassination, as well as Dr.

Rantissi’s, Hamas’ particular theology has evolved. This may be the result of the large

death toll of the two Intifada’s and Operation Cast Lead (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010).

The current situation in Gaza is far from the dream of a liberated Palestine Hamas’

founders envisioned 24 years ago. There is a 44 percent rate of unemployment, and

seventy percent of people are well below the poverty line. Many rely on goods coming

through tunnels running underground from Egypt. This traffic is totally insufficient to

meet the needs of Gaza’s 1.5 million inhabitants. These tunnels are also regular targets of

the Israeli air force (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 112-113). The scarcity of food is particularly

severe when considering the fishing restrictions placed on Gazans, and the fact that 30

percent of Gazan fertile land is in the buffer, or “no-go” zone on the Gazan side of the

border fence (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 113). Certain medicines are banned from being

shipped into Gaza, and Israeli authorities “have even calculated the number of calories a

person needs to survive and allow only bare essentials (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 109).”

Palestinians have seen the destruction of their homes, the cold indifference of the

international community to their plight and in many cases even the murder of their own

family members and children (Abuelaish, 2009). If returning to Islam was to remedy a

divine malady caused by secularity, it has been a miserably ineffective cure (Abuelaish,

57

2009). This theological dilemma has caused a new shift in Hamas’ interpretation and in

action (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010).

Khaled Meshaal, Hamas’ current leader has shown considerable openness to

reconciliation with secular Fatah, showing he may be less radical than his predecessors

(BBC, 2012). This demonstrates his commitment to Hamas’ goal of liberating its people

by adapting to the current circumstances when necessary. Also, this openness to

adaptation is reflective of a liberationist Islamic interpretation (Ali, 1990). How this

shifting interpretation will manifest itself, remains to be seen.

Although Hamas’ radical stance has relaxed, it still is committed to its people, to

Islam, and is defined by its concern with the liberation of Palestinians from Zionist

oppression (Farrell, Milton-Edwards, 2010). What will be interesting to see, is the way

that its Islamic religious interpretation which is truly its backbone will shift as a result of

its evolving context. What can be certain about Hamas’ liberationist interpretation is that

it will continue to show support for oppressed Palestinians, seek their liberation and

restoration of homeland, and concern itself with the resistance of Zionism (Palestine

Center, 1988). It can also be supposed that whether or not the atmosphere is secular or

Islamic, so long a Hamas exists, it will operate as first and foremost an Islamic

organization (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010).

Hamas’ firm religious, and political commitment to the liberation of Palestinians

from Israeli oppression can be well understood as a manifestation of its Islamic theology

of liberation. This theology is evident in their charter, in their political endeavors, in their

social outreach initiatives and in their militancy (Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades

Information Office, 2010). It can be understood through their statement following the

death of each Palestinian “martyred after a long bright path of jihad, hard work, struggle

58

and sacrifice. Al Qassam Brigades mourn the death of the Mujahed, (martyred

Palestinian)[and] reaffirms the commitment and determination to continue the resistance

against the belligerent occupation forces…To God we belong and to him we shall return

(Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades Information Office, 2010).”

This staunch commitment to resistance and liberation of the Palestinian people

from the oppression of a very specific enemy is very specifically a liberationist

manifestation of religion. Hamas’ social and political involvement also demonstrates their

liberationist interpretation of Islam which encourages cooperation and social solidarity in

the pursuit of liberating an oppressed group. Their charter outlines their liberationist

goals. They are motivated by Islam above all else, and their interpretation of it in a

liberationist form.

59

Chapter 4: Is Hamas an Islamic Liberation Movement?

Although Hamas is most often viewed as a terrorist organization, this label may be

too reductionist: Hamas may be better understood as an Islamic liberation movement

(Public Safety Canada, 2010). The stigma attached to the label of terrorist hinders the

process of understanding Hamas, and most importantly hinders the possibility of learning

how to prevent their violence from escalating. The fact that Hamas existed for years

before resorting to attacks on civilians and did not take this route immediately shows that

this is not the reason they came into existence, and is not their central goal (Farrell and

Milton-Edwards, 2010).

“The UN has no internationally-agreed definition of terrorism (Eye on the UN,

2012).” The creation of an international definition of terrorism is currently under intense

examination. The reason for the impasse on the recognition of an international convention

on terrorism is due to the possible necessity to exclude “"the activities of […] parties

during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign occupation" from the purview

of the Convention (Eye on the UN, 2012).”

Palestinians regularly assert their UN sanctioned right to employ the use of armed

resistance against the Zionist occupation of their home. Armed resistance is justified in

Islam given appropriate circumstances (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010) and would be

justified even in the secular sense based on normative expectations of what human beings

can be expected to endure before resisting (The Religion of Peace, 2010). UN General

Assembly resolutions 3236, and 3375, and also Article 51 of the UN charter outline the

right of oppressed peoples to resistance (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 3).

Palestinians insist that Israel has a far superior military capacity which it uses to “defend

60

its own state, …[enforce] its occupation of nearly 4 million stateless Palestinians, and …

[keep] millions of others stateless by refusing to recognize their right of return (Farrell,

and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 3).” Conditions for Palestinians are intolerable. Hamas

has offered some form of solace. Even death under such circumstances may be an

appealing escape route. This is evident in the abundant number of willing volunteers who

carry out Hamas’ deadly attacks (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010).

The Jewish right to return to the disputed Israeli- Palestinian territories is a further

insult to diasporic Palestinians. While Palestinians sit in crowded housing, or refugee

camps abroad, they get to watch while Europeans, Americans, Africans and people from

all over the world “return” to their homeland, while their own desire to return home is not

honored. Palestinians are forced into increasingly confined spaces to make room for

foreigners to occupy their once tilled and cultivated pastures. Vivid images of homeland,

family, and stability are in the living memories of many Palestinians. The three things

Muslims are instructed to do for their deceased loved ones are: “share their knowledge

and wisdom with others, pray for …[them] and give charity (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 66)” in

their name (Abuelaish, 2009, pg. 66). Palestinian Muslims commemorate their dead by

spreading their memories and descriptions of their lost homes, speaking of their lost

family members dedication to the struggle and giving charity, sometimes to groups like

Al-Mujama- Hamas, who are if nothing else, steadfastly loyal to the Palestinians and their

struggle for liberation (Farrell, and Milton-Edwards, 2010).

The label of terrorist (Public Safety Canada, 2010) has had the unfortunate effect

of stigmatizing the entire Palestinian population-especially, the Gazan population. This is

very evident especially when considering the huge civilian death toll of Operation Cast

61

Lead (B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied

Territories, 2012). It should not be ignored that Hamas is an elected political party. The

majority of Gazans showed their support for Hamas by voting for them. Characterizing

these voters as supporters of terrorists, is equally vilifying as actually labeling them as

terrorists (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010).

Hamas was labeled a terrorist organization by Israel, and its most loyal

supporters-Western prosperous nations (Public Safety Canada, 2010). These are also

nations supporting the American “war on terror.” They are tainted by their fear of the

“other-” so much that they have become irrational. In the modern Western context, this

“other” is the Muslim inhabitants of the Middle East. The 9/11 terrorist attacks claimed

the lives of 2823 Americans (The Guardian, 2002). The Iraqi body count since America’s

invasion of Iraq is well over 1 million (Project Censored, 2007). It does not appear that

the protection of human rights and civilians is the goal of this war (Dalliare, 2005).

The highly respected former Lieutenant-General and now Senator Romeo Dallaire

reflected on the indifference of the international community during the Rwandan

genocide and asserted that the international community only acts in its own self-interest.

The permanent five (China, France, Russia, The United Kingdom, and the United States)

of the UN security council according to Dallaire are compelled to action exclusively in

the face of potential threat to their own interests. Other nations often follow their example

(Dallaire, 2005, pg. 517). “Canada and other peacekeeping nations have become

accustomed to acting if, and only if, international public opinion will support them

(Dallaire, 2005, pg. 517).” Offering aid to Palestinians, labeled as terrorists and often as

the aggressors in the conflict is unfortunately not a prudent PR endeavor- especially

62

amidst the prevailing post 9/11 Islamophobic attitude in the West. Dallaire asserted that

the civilians affected in conflicts that the international community deems less concerning

are viewed to be expendable (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 22). An American officer shamelessly

informed Dallaire during the peak of the Rwandan genocide “that the lives of 800,000

Rwandans were only worth risking the lives of ten Americans (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 522).”

This indifference can be viewed even now as the Sudanese pleas to the international

community for assistance in removing President Omar Al-Bashir found guilty of crimes

against humanity are consistently ignored (United Human Rights Council , 2012).

Dallaire has often posed the question: “Are we all human, or are some more human than

others (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 522)?” He emphasizes that the inhabitants of the first world

behave in a way suggestive of a sense of superiority and belief that first world lives “are

worth more than the lives of other citizens of the planet (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 522).” He

remarked that this reality has manifested in extreme, radical and in some cases even

murderous resentment (Dallaire, 2005, pg. 522).

Very insightfully, Dallaire asserted the possibility that prevention may be the best

possible solution to the threat of further terrorism and violence. He insisted that if

anything can be learned from the mistakes of the past, it should be that the powers of the

world must address the causes and motivations for terrorism. He stated that this is the

only way to bring about a sense of security because “for every ...[suicide] bomber that we

kill there will be a thousand more volunteers…to take his place (Dallaire, 2005, pg.

521).” This reactive approach to terrorism is an uphill battle, which is unlikely to be won.

The preventive approach may be much more conducive to maintaining peace than the

reactive approach (Dallaire, 2005).

63

The people who labeled Hamas as terrorist saw their kidnap of two Israeli soldiers

and decided they were inherently evil, blood thirsty and irrational. They saw their attacks

on Jews with the guilt of the holocaust still fresh. They didn’t make the connection that

these attacks were the direct result of decades of Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians.

They decided these people were murderous and dangerous and should not even be

considered (Abuelaish, 2009). There was not a thorough investigation of them. No

attempt to understand their motivations for violence. No attempt to understand their

human motivations, characteristics, and inevitable fallibilities (Abuelaish, 2009).

Those who labeled Hamas as terrorist enjoy the security of a predictable lifestyle,

the necessities of life, and the privilege of being the master of their own destiny. They

enjoy the reasonable expectation of outliving their children. Gazans do not. The people

who labeled Hamas as terrorist took a brief look at them and felt disgusted by their

actions while enjoying the luxury of never having to confront the very real and ugly

possibility that if faced with similar circumstances, their own actions may be equally

appalling (Abuelaish, 2009).

What is perhaps most tragic about Hamas’ eventual adoption of violence and

suicide attacks is that it very likely could have been prevented. The Israeli civilians who

were the victims of Hamas’ first suicide attack in response to Goldstein’s Ramadan

massacre would likely still be alive if Israeli authorities had not ignored Palestinian

concerns about Baruch Goldstein’s threatening actions. The hostility between Palestinians

and Israelis may not have become so intense if Palestinians were shown the same respect

and accommodation as Israelis. The idea that Hamas’ attacks were preventable is

confirmed in Dr. Rantissi’s stance that at the time Hamas began using suicide attacks,

64

people had nothing left to lose. He said the adoption of suicide attacks was a desperate

last resort (Juergensmeyer, 2008). It is well acknowledged in Hamas’ correspondence that

suicide attacks despite being an honour inevitably bring sadness and suffering to the

families and communities of martyrs. Ample condolences are offered to mourners of

martyrs (Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades, 2012). Rantissi said that “the only reason we use

it [suicide attacks] is because we don’t have anything else to use. If we found something

which could stop the enemy from killing us without killing ourselves, it would be much,

much better (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 144).” He stated “if they stop killing

our civilians, we will stop killing theirs…every day we have a massacre…The

international community did nothing against Israel despite their bulldozing … of our

homes leaving women and children crying (Farrell and Milton-Edwards, 2010, pg. 144).”

This negative perception of Palestinians that is prevalent among Israel’s Western

supporters may also be a symptom of an Orientalist and colonial mindset. Orientalism is

well described by the Palestinian scholar Edward Said. He argues that an Orientalist

mindset prevents the objective pursuit of secular religious criticism (Said, 1983, pg. 290).

Orientalism is defined by Said as “fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the

Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference

with its weakness (Rahman, 2004, pg.347 ).” Many scholars have posited that the rhetoric

of Orientalism has become stronger in the 9/11 aftermath and the increased simplistic

categorization of people as good or evil. The subsequent violence that has resulted

because of this makes the need for propagating better understanding between the West

and the Orient more pressing than ever (Rahman, 2004, pg.347). Said was quite forward

thinking in his assertion that “impossibly huge generalizations like the Orient, Islam,

65

Communism or Terrorism play a significantly increased role in contemporary (Said,

1983, pg. 291)” characterizations of the “Other.” Said asserts that this heightened interest

in secular criticism of the “other” is reflective of how crucial a role religion continues to

play in the modern world. His prediction was that religion would return as a focal point in

world discourse. About 30 years after his prediction, it can be said that he was accurate in

this hypothesis. He was correct in his sentiment that unfortunately, Orientalism has

become an ideology that has contaminated the arena of academia. This has meant a

slanted and often non-objective study of others, especially Islam (Said, 1983). Said

cautions that in the “discourse of Orientalism there exists a strong yet subtle sense of

superiority as well as disapproval and reductionism. This is evident in the West’s

vilification of Islam, even by some of the most sophisticated, influential and educated

minds (Said, 1983, pg. 292).”

Hamas’ classification of terrorist may be a result of this Orientalist tendency to

reduce others to a simplification that is convenient to maintaining the Orientalist’s

dominance, and consequently vindication of superiority. Reducing Hamas and its voters

to the exclusivist label of terrorist makes it very easy to reconcile with the fact that

Israel’s Western supporters are at least indirectly responsible for Israel’s apartheid

practices, and brutal treatment of Palestinians. If these were merely terrorists posing a

threat to security and inherently simplistic, primitive and irrational then there is no moral

dilemma with condoning inhumane treatment of them (Said, 1983). If they are only

terrorists, then all other aspects of their humanity are conveniently excluded from

consideration. This Orientalist tendency blinds academics, intellectuals and those under

their influence to the obvious reality that human beings are at their core inherently far

more similar than different- that extensive othering and searching for minute differences

66

between peoples is a futile effort. It blinds them from the fact that humans are individuals,

unique and rarely homogenous enough that a reductionist label would actually be an

accurate assessment of a cohort as large as Palestinian Arab Muslims (Said, 1983). This

intense othering also manifests in a fear of the other, so much that otherwise rational and

moral people are compelled to irrational and immoral action which they perceive as

justified in their inevitable desire for self-preservation. This othering creates a fear that

paints the other as more dangerous than they actually are, and this fear causes authorities

to use excessive force and believe it to be necessary for self-defense. This fear

characterizes the other as more violent and dangerous than is likely to reflect reality

(Said, 1983).

Whether or not Hamas specifically deserves the label of terrorist will require

much more thorough examination than an undergraduate thesis has the potential to

conduct. But whether or not terrorist is too reductionist or simplistic of a term, it certainly

cannot be ignored that Hamas’ members, and voting supporters all possess primal human

dignity, the desire for self-determination, the willingness to fight for full access to the

necessities of life, the desire for a safe home, and for a better life for themselves and their

children. They are not above human error, and even in some circumstances retribution.

They also have families, hopes, emotions, ideas, opinions and intelligence. They

indisputably possess all of the definitive, universal, functional and equal traits of human

beings.

67

References

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Discusses the threat posed to the United States by Hezbollah. Also explains their affiliation with and support from Iran, also explains that they have sleeper celled all over the world, even in Western nations. Also mentions that Hezbollah was before Al Qaeda, the primary fixation of the United States prior to 9/11.

Abu-Amr (1993). Hamas: A historical and political background. Journal of Palestinian

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Describes the Muslim Brotherhood as a major influence in the birth of Hamas as well as their operations. Also describes how Hamas became increasingly autonomous from the Muslim Brotherhood as they evolved into a more radically Islamist entity.

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Despite this book being a personal account from a Palestinian perspective, it does provide a useful summary of the events leading up to the current situation in Israel and Palestine.

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An English and Arabic copy of the Qur’an.

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Al-jazeera (2011). Timeline: Palestine-Israel Conflict. A chronology of key events in the

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A condensed timeline of the events concerning the conflict from 1999 to 2011.

Appleby (1997). Spokesmen for the despised. The University of Chicago Press, London.

Provides one chapter on the origins of the Hamas movement, particularly on its primary founder Shaykh Ahmad Yassin. Physically disabled- a person who had been marginalized in many senses, he became politically and religiously active. When observing his experiences with the Israeli state throughout his life it is apparent that his interpretation of the Islamic faith would be from a perspective of a theology of liberation from what he saw as the Zionist occupation of his home.

Ateek (1989). Justice and Justice Only: A Palestinian Theology of Liberation. Orbis

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Describes the Palestinian theology of liberation specifically. It is useful to understanding the predicament of Palestinians and how this has contributed to influencing their interpretation of Islam. Details the developments and components of Palestinian liberation theology. Although this is largely through a Christian perspective it contributes to the understanding of a liberation perspective in Palestine.

Badawi (1995). Gender Equity in Islam: Basic Principles. American Trust Publication,

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Provides a very straightforward and feminist interpretation of all of the Qur’anic suras concerning women in all areas of life. Describes how Islam needs to be reinterpreted, especially concerning the status of women in the context of modernity and human progress.

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An article reporting the massacre perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein in its immediate aftermath in 1994. Mentions some of the events of its aftermath and also some of the events leading up to it.

BBC (2007). Analysis: Palestinian Suicide Attacks. Retrieved, March, 2012, from:

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Gives a brief history of Hamas’ suicide attacks

BBC (2011). Hamas uncertainty as Syria slides closer to civil war. Retrieved February 1,

2012 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16068871

Gives some necessary dates, mainly the outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising, or “rock-throwing uprising.”

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Provides an updated general report of Hamas’ actions and their impact on the ongoing conflict. Useful to providing a very preliminary general overview of Hamas and most applicable to the research by reporting the most important recent activities in which they are involved.

BBC (2011). West Bank Residents Split on Palestinian Statehood Bid. Retrieved

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Gives an overview of the political structure of the country, provides a map and also a short description of the country’ defining social and cultural traits.

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70

in Latin America. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

Describes the beginnings of Latin American liberation theology. Explains how it was a movement of the poor and marginalized in society. Although it is from a Christian perspective it is useful to understanding the concept of Liberation Theology overall and to the use of a liberation perspective to view Hamas and their actions.

B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

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Gives statistics concerning fatalities caused by the conflict.

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Dabashi (2008). Islamic liberation theology, resisting the empire. Routledge, London.

Describes the premise of Islamic liberation theology as being a resistance to an imperial entity. Although it cites examples of Islamic resistance to imperialism in contexts other than the Palestinian circumstance, it is useful to explaining the theological motivations of interpreting the Qur’an in a liberationist manner.

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States Hamas’ radical opposition to Israel and also their goals and agenda. Gives some explanation of Hamas’ continued existence mainly made possible by its financial sponsors; Iran, and other private sponsors from around the world. These sponsors also have influence over Hamas’ planning and initiatives.

71

Dallaire (2005). Shake Hands with the Devil; the failure of humanity in Rwanda. Random

House, Canada.

The former military officer and part of the Canadian aid effort in Rwanda Romeo Dallaire give an account of his experiences during the conflict. Most relevant, is his conclusion where he gives an overview of the faults of the UN and its aid efforts. Gives his expert opinion on the best ways to make improvements.

El Fadl (2004). Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. Princeton University Press.

Engages the issue of Islam and democracy. Although it discusses the concept of whether or not Islam and democracy are compatible outside of the Palestinian context, it is useful to contributing to the understanding of the issues surrounding Islam and democracy. It gives some reasons why some Islamists (such as the members of Hamas) would argue that the only legitimate state under Islam is a non-secular Islamist state.

Esack (1997) Qur’an Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic perspective of interreligious

Solidarity against oppression. One World, Oxford.

Esack gives his modern interpretation of the Qur’an as a theology of liberation. Influenced by his experiences of oppression under South African Apartheid, he interpreted Islam as a liberationist theology. As an influential scholar on the subject of Islamic liberation theology his contribution is crucial to improving the understanding of Islamic liberation theology.

Eye on the UN (2012). Straight UN Facts : There is no UN Definition of Terrorism,

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Describes the ongoing process of the UN in their effort to create an internationally

agreed upon definition of terrorism. Also describes the issues creating hindrance

to creating an internationally agreed upon definition of terrorism.

Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades Information Office (2010). Retrieved December 20, 2011

from: http://www.qassam.ps/index.html

This is the official English version of Hamas’ website for its militant arm. It provides news about current developments in the ongoing conflict and also a lot of information about Hamas’ militant agenda. This website provides a forum for the

72

memory and celebration of those the group deems to be martyred. It is an element of media that serves in their effort to glamorize and celebrate martyred Palestinians.

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Contributes a very detailed timeline of Hamas’ history and major accomplishments in their own view. Describes the preceding events to their establishment as a political party and gives information about their founders. This is necessary as it provides understanding of what led Hamas’ founder ultimately to adopt a radically Islamist stance and to start their own distinct group with a unique Islamist, and strictly nationalist mandate.

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Griefenhagen (2004). Islamic Fundamentalism(s): More than a Pejorative Epiphet?

Fenwood Publishing, Halifax Nova Scotia. pp. 63-75.

Describes the way that the term “fundamentalism” has been far too liberally applied to different Islamic groups. Suggests that this may be a symptom of the post 9/11 Islamophobic environment. Explains that Islamic groups are diverse.

Hadden, Shupe (1986). Prophetic religions and politics, religion and the political order.

Paragon House, NY.

Most importantly this book explores some of the original Christian theologies of liberation originating mainly in Latin America. This is useful in understanding the general concept of liberation theology and the types of circumstances that generally cause it to manifest.

Hadden, Shupe (1986). Prophetic religions and politics, religion and the political order.

Paragon House, NY.

As does the other volume of Hadden and Shupe, this discusses other circumstances in which theologies of liberation have become popular and can be used to see parallels of liberation theology in different but similar circumstances.

73

Haight (1985). An Alternative Vision: An interpretation of Liberation Theology. Paulist

Press, United States.

Gives a background of Liberation Theology as it emerged in Latin America as a theology in favor of the poor and oppressed. Discusses how it became popular and gives some explanation of the shift of religious interpretation from an individualist to a collectivist interpretation.

Halima and Rane (1993). Jihad, Competing Norms and the Israel-Palestine Impasse:

Australian Journal of International Affairs, 63 (1).

Discusses the issue of non-violent resistance as not being the normative response to oppression in the Muslim world. Explores the Islamic permissibility of self-defense. Specifically explores this in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

Hashmi (2002). Islamic Political Ethics: Civil society, pluralism, and conflict. Princeton

University Press.

Discusses Islamic political ethics generally. Useful to understanding how Islamic political ideas may shift in response to conflict and also to understanding how Islamic politics may manifest themselves in the context of modernity. Gives an overall description of Islamic political ethics.

Husseini (2010). Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria: Third World

Quarterly, 31(5)

Gives a description of Hezbollah. Most relevant, is its discussion of Hezbollah’s use of suicide, and their massive attack un American Marines in Beirut.

International Solidarity Movement (2003). Peace with Realism, Retrieved December 30,

2011from: http://www.peacewithrealism.org/ism.htm

Describes the peacemaking mandate of the ISM and also their heavy involvement in the ongoing Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Author cites the Jewish Action taskforce and the Israeli Ministry of foreign affairs to give a comprehensive report of the ISM’s involvement in the conflict, their neutral stance and also their attitude toward the Palestinians use of violence as resistance which the author cites as justified under UN sanctions.

Israel Insider (2001). Twelve years later, security forces settle scores with Hamas

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terrorist. Retrieved January 23, 2012, from:

http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/security/articles/sec_0143.htm

Discusses the apprehending of the Hams members found responsible for the deaths of two Israeli soldiers Ilam Saadon, and Avi Sasportas. Gives a recounting of the events surrounding the deaths of these two soldiers.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). Hamas Terrorist Attacks, Retrieved March

2012, from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/Hamas+terror+attacks+22-Mar-2004.htm

Gives a list and brief description of all of Hamas’ terrorist attacks since 2000, and the outbreak of the second Intifada. Used as an appendix.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). UN General Assembly Resolution

181.Retrieved November 2011, from:

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/UN%20General%20Assembly%20Resolution%20181

Describes the 1947 partition plan. Also provides a map of the original partition plan. Useful to understanding just how much the borders have changed. Included as an appendix.

Juergensmeyer (2003). Terror in the Mind of God. University of California Press, LA.

Two chapters in this book provide some answers into the motivations for beginning to interpret Islam in a violent way. “Islam’s Neglected Duty” is one of them and it includes one specific section on Hamas that includes descriptions of their suicide missions and some explanations for them. “Martyrs and Demons” is a chapter devoted to explaining some of the glamorization of martyrdom.

Juergensmeyer (2008). Global Rebellions: religious challenges to the secular state from

Christian Militias to Al Qaeda. University of California Press, LA.

Addresses specifically Hamas’ objection to secularity. They see their mission as the obligation to liberate Palestine and to instill an Islamist state. Their opposition to secularity can be well observed in their charter and actions. How these are a challenge to those who advocate secularity is addressed. This contributes to the understanding of their strictly religious administration of all of their activities.

Kepel (2002). Jihad: The trial of Political Islam. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

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Massachusetts.

Kepel’s chapter titled “Hamas, Israel, Arafat and Jordan” has been useful in explaining Hamas’ attitude toward negotiation with Israel. It describes their very strong devotion to reclaiming all of Palestine and focuses mainly on their nationalist agenda which is firmly rooted in their Islamic religious conviction.

Lane (1984). Foundations for a Social Theory: praxis, process and salvation. Paulist Press

NY.

Describes the development of liberation theology as a social and political interpretation of religion. Gives examples of places where this type of theology has become most prevalent.

Leiken, Brooke (2008). The moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Council on foreign relations.

86(2).

Describes the Muslim Brotherhood and their approach to Islam and modernity. This is relevant to the thesis as the Muslim Brotherhood provided many of the founders of Hamas as they differed in their opinions about the Qur’an and formed their own group. It assists in understanding the circumstances surrounding Hamas’ creation.

Lowy (1996). The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America. Verso NY.

Contributes to the understanding of Latin American Liberation theology. Contributes to the comprehension of Liberation theology generally and also as the lens through which to interpret the actions of Hamas.

Mainuddin (2002) Religion and politics in the developing world: explosive interactions.

North

Carolina Central University, USA

Contains one chapter on Hamas and its relationship to Islamic fundamentalism specifically. Describes its emergence as a radically Islamist political entity as largely a response to its relationship with the Israeli state.

Mannes (2004). Profiles in terror. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., NY.

One chapter deals specifically with Hamas as a terrorist organization. This is useful to the understanding of why Hamas is viewed primarily in this way.

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Describes their training with other recognized terrorist groups as well as their violent ambitions and their influences from Syria, Lebanon, and Hezbollah.

Marx (1875). Critique of the Gotha Programme, One. Retrieved February 9, 2012, from:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Critque_of_the_Gotha_Programme.pdf

A correspondence of Karl Marx, where he makes his famous statement “from each according to his ability and to each according to his need.” Useful to gaining a broad overview of Marxist thought and opinions.

MidEast Web for Coexistence (2007).Retrieved December12, from:

http://www.mideastweb.org/Middle-East-Encyclopedia/hamas.htm

Provides general info of Hamas’ role in the ongoing conflict. Gives some narrative of the history of Hamas and also about their opposition to Israel.

Moghissi (1999). Postmodern relativism and the Politics of Cultural Difference. Zed

Books, London/New York.

Discusses the impact of modernity and postmodernism on the developing world. Special focus is given to the failures of modernity and subsequently a return to religion as a superior alternative to secular democracy and particularly Western capitalism.

Novak (1986).Will it Liberate? Paulist Press, NY.

Provides a useful chapter describing the “basic concepts of liberation theology” which is helpful to explaining the concept of liberation theology and its main tenets. This is essential to the understanding of liberation theology as a tool to apply to the study of Hamas a liberation movement.

O’Malley. Advanced Information, Liberation Theology: Global Christians. Retrieved

March 5, 2012 from:

http://www.globalchristians.org/politics/2/Liberation%20Theology.pdf

Gives a background of the origins and influences of early liberation theology. Names the main advocates of early liberation theology in North America and also describes the influences of Marx, Metz ad Kant on the socialist ideas underlying Latin America liberation theology.

Palestine Center (1988). Selected Documents Regarding Palestine: Hamas Charter.

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Retrieved December 1, 2011 from:

http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html

Provides an English translation of Hamas’ Charter.

Palestine Facts (2011). Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camps 1982 Massacre. Retrieved

February 22, 2012, from: http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_sabra_shatila.php

Gives a description of the events preceding the Sabra and Shatila massacre in Beirut

Palmer (2008). Islamic extremism, causes, diversity and challenges. Rowman and

Littlefield Publishers Inc. UK.

One extensive chapter covers many different aspects of Hamas; their origins and eventual split from the Muslim Brotherhood, their response to certain actions of the Israeli state and also their religious agenda. It also explores why Hamas has become an extremist Islamic group.

Public Safety Canada (2010). Currently listed entities. Retrieved December 17, 2011

from: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx#Hamas

Canada’s official government website listing current threats to public safety including terrorist organizations. Lists Hamas as one of these and gives a brief description of them. Useful to understanding why Hamas is generally understood to be a terrorist organization first and foremost by many governments.

Project Censored (2007). Over One Million Iraqi Deaths Caused by US Occupation.

Retrieved March 20, 2012 from: http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/1over-one- million- iraqi-deaths-caused-by-us-occupation/

Gives the number of Iraqi deaths since the US invasion.

Rahman (2004). Orientalism, Deconstruction and Relationality: Literature Interpretation

Theory, 15(4)

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Describes Said’s theory of Orientalism and how it pertains to the current age. Also explores Orientalism as a tenet of modern critiques of the “other.”

Said (1983).The World the Text and the Critic. Harvard University Press Ltd.

Said engages the issue of literary criticism as well as religious criticism from an Orientalist perspective. He also explores the problem of academia being largely influenced by Eurocentric ideas. As a Palestinian writer, Said provides a relevant perspective to the critique of religious and cultural criticism in the field of academia. A useful perspective to apply to many other academic texts on the subject of Palestine.

Sayyid (1997).A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism. Zed

Books Ltd. NY.

Explores the idea that Islamism has been largely influenced by the shadow of Eurocentric domination. Provides some understanding of why fundamentalism arose as a result of Western Imperialism. It does not address Hamas but addresses some similar issues ,mainly Muslims experiencing a feeling of having their right to self-determination destroyed by colonization.

Schanzer (2008). Hamas vs. Fatah. Palgrave Macmillan, NY.

This entire book gives valuable descriptions of Hamas and Fatah’s increasingly stressed relationship over time. It provides a detailed timeline of the main events that have been defining in what has become known as “the West Bank- Gaza Split” within Palestine. Some suggest that the Gaza strip and West Bank may eventually become two totally distinct geographical and political entities.

Shadid (1988) The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza. Third

World Quarterly.10(2).

Describes the faction of the Muslim Brotherhood that eventually stemmed the Hamas movement. Useful to understanding why Hamas turned away from them to begin their own organization and political as well as religious mandate.

Stilt (2010). “Islam is the Solution”: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood. Foreign Affairs, 46(1). pp. 73-108.

Gives a background and history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt where it began. Describes the Brotherhood’s stances on violence, modernity and the

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Palestinian question. He article gives examples of the Brotherhood’s constitutional visions and goals.

The Corner Report (2010). The Tides of September. Retrieved, February 20, 2012 From:

http://www.thecornerreport.com/index.php?p=6931&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1

Commemorates the victims of the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Gives some information on the events of the time and also what events preceded the massacre, as well as the officials who were considered responsible.

The Cultural Website of Martyrdom and Sacrifice (2007). Retrieved January 30, 2012

from: http://www.navideshahed.com/en/index.php?Page=definition&UID=82371

Internet forum dedicated to the celebration and commemoration if Islamic martyrs. Gives a short biography and description of the martyrdom of 13 year old Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh

The Electronic Intifada (2010). "We are all complicit": an interview with Ewa Jasiewicz,

Retrieved March 1, 2012 from: http://electronicintifada.net/content/we-are-all-complicit-nterview-ewa-jasiewicz/8631

An interview with a human rights activist who was one of the only foreign nationals in Gaza during operation cast lead. She gives her own description of the events, and discusses her own experience of the attack.

The Guardian (2002). 9/11 in Numbers. Retrieved March 10, 2012 from:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/aug/18/usa.terrorism

Gives the number of Americans killed in the 9/11 attacks.

The Independent (1994). Jewish killer attacked mosque last year: Evidence is mounting

that Baruch Goldstein was known to be dangerous well before the massacre,

writes Sarah Helm. Retrieved February 3rd, 2011 from:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/jewish-killer-attacked-mosque-last-year-evidence-is-mounting-that-baruch-goldstein-was-known-to-be-dangerous-

well-before-the-massacre-writes-sarah-helm-1426229.html

Gives a history of Baruch Goldstein’s threatening actions prior to his massacre of Muslims at a mosque. Also states that the Israeli government received many

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warnings about Mr. Goldstein’s intentions to harm Palestinians but took no action to prevent the attack.

The Religion of Peace: Guide to Understanding Islam (2011), Retrieved: March 2nd, 2012

from: http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/Quran/018-suicide-bombing.htm

A website devoted to propagating an understanding of Islam. Seeks to show Islam as a peaceful religion and shed a positive light on frequently misunderstood components of the religion. Gives some analysis of the phenomenon of suicide attacks.

The Wall Street Journal (2009). How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas. Retrieved, February

22, 2012 from: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123275572295011847.html

Describes Israel’s permission of Al-Mujama and even encouragement of this predecessor to Hamas. Explains that this original preference for the Islamists was part of a deliberate strategy to divide and weaken Palestinians to combat Israel’s primary fixation of the time –Fatah.

United Human Rights Council (2012). Genocide in Darfur, Retrieved April 2, 2012 from:

http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm

Gives some detail on the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Most relevant is its mention

of President Bashir being indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity and the

continuation of the conflict.

Yadegari (1986). Liberation Theology and Islamic revivalism. Journal of religious

thought,43(2).

Describes the similarities between Christian and Islamic theologies of liberation. Offers a conclusive analysis of the ideas present in modern liberation theology such as looking at scripture as symbolic rather than literal and discussing the necessity to constantly reinterpret scripture to learn how to behave in the present context. Looks at the human’s role as the duty to make ethical choices and exercise proper conduct in their free will.

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Ynet News (2010). Sheikh Jarrah Jews praise Baruch Goldstein on Purim Residents of

east Jerusalem neighborhood celebrate holiday with songs of praise for Cave of

Patriarchs massacre. Left-wing activists plan protest. Retrieved, February 2, 2012,

from: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3857671,00.html

Describes the celebrity status that Baruch Goldstein, the orchestrator of the Hebron massacre achieved among some Israeli Jewish factions. Also describes the rejection of the celebrity status such factions awarded Goldstein from other Israeli and Jewish groups who passionately condemned Mr. Goldstein’s attack.