Module Two
Food Defense Food Defense & the & the
Psychology of Psychology of TerrorismTerrorism
National Center for Food Protection & Defense
Risk Communicator
Training
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Food Defense & Food Defense & the Psychology of the Psychology of
TerrorismTerrorismTopic 1
Psychology of Fear & Trust
Topic 2
The Food System as a Target of Attack
Topic 3
Natural Disasters, Terrorism & Catastrophic Events
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Module 2 Learner OutcomesLearner Outcomes
Compare and contrast fear and trust as adaptive survival processes.
Describe the positive and negative consequences of fear, denial and panic as adaptive responses to heightened risk.
Identify the factors that make the food system vulnerable to intentional attack.
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Learner Outcomes Learner Outcomes - continued
Compare and contrast characteristics of a natural or “traditional” disaster and an intentional terrorist attack.
Describe the psychological consequences of natural disasters and terrorism within the context of fear and trust.
module two
Food Defense &Food Defense &
the Psychology of Terrorismthe Psychology of Terrorism
topic one
The Psychology of The Psychology of Fear & TrustFear & Trust
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TRUST • Slowly acquired
• Readily extinguished
• Difficult to re-establish
FEAR • Rapidly acquired
• Slow to extinguish
• Easily re-established
Fear & TrustFear & Trust
Fear & trust are two adaptive survival processes
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Adjustment to riskAdjustment to risk
SOURCE: Peter Sandman, 2005
Low perceived risk High
Reactions change as risk increases.
Acceptance Fear
Denial
Panic
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We accept most risks We accept most risks wellwell
SOURCE: Peter Sandman, 2005
Humans usually adapt well to risk.
Acceptance Fear
Denial
Panic
Frequently Rarely
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FEAR as a FEAR as a adjustment reactionadjustment reaction
Fear is our natural reaction in a crisis. It is automatic It comes early It is temporary It is a small over-reaction It may need guidance It serves as a rehearsal It reduces later over-reaction
Fear is a useful
response.
Let it happen!
Fear is a useful
response.
Let it happen!
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Reactions to Reactions to perceived riskperceived risk
Over-reaction is our initial reaction to a new, potentially serious risk.
We pauseWe become hyper-vigilantWe personalize the riskWe take extra precautions that are probably
unnecessary, or at least premature.
SOURCE: Peter Sandman
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Heightened Fear Heightened Fear Leads to DenialLeads to Denial
Less common than fear More dangerous than fear More common response than panic Denial is reduced when:
• Legitimize the fear• Action – do something• Decision – given range of actions
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What is What is panic?panic?
A sudden strong feeling of fear that prevents reasonable thought or action.
While “panicky feelings” are common… panic is rare.
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Response to the 2001 Response to the 2001 anthrax scareanthrax scare
In the 3 impacted cities:
1% - purchased gas masks
5% - purchased antibiotic prescriptions (80% of these did not take prescriptions)
98% opened mail as usual
3% consulted doctor about anxiety
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““Fear Fear” & “Panic Fear Fear” & “Panic Panic”Panic”
Do NOT ‘Fear Fear’ or ‘Panic Panic’
Most people can cope & manage their fear
To “Fear Fear” & “Panic Panic” can result in unwise strategies:
Withhold information
Over assure
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Applying the conceptsApplying the concepts
Public’s Reaction to Spinach – E.coli Outbreak
August-September, 2006
Public’s Reaction to Spinach – E.coli Outbreak
August-September, 2006
module two
Food Defense &Food Defense &
the Psychology of Terrorismthe Psychology of Terrorism
topic two
The Food System The Food System
as a Potential as a Potential Target of AttackTarget of Attack
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“I, for the life of me, cannot understand why
the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.”
Tommy Thompson, former HHS SecretaryDecember 3, 2004
AP Photo
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Food Safety… Security… Food Safety… Security… DefenseDefense
Naturally occurring orunintentional
contamination
Access to adequate food
supply
Intentional attack
on the foodsystem
Food Security
Food Safety
Food Defense
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Food system Food system vulnerabilitiesvulnerabilities
Exposed crops
High concentrations of livestock and poultry
Vulnerability points along the farm-to-fork
chain
Large batch sizes in processing
Imported foods from a complex and global
supply chain
Growth in niche and foreign markets
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Strategic vulnerabilitiesStrategic vulnerabilities
Ease in obtaining crop and animal pathogens Mass contamination could yield huge
consequences with minimal effort Low risk in being detected, caught, or
accidentally contaminated Substantial economic and psychological impact
– even in the case of a threat or hoax
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Beyond the Terrorist: Beyond the Terrorist: Who are the Who are the
perpetrators?perpetrators?
Usual suspects
• Criminals• Extortionists• Subversives
- political ideologists• Terrorists
Usual suspects
• Criminals• Extortionists• Subversives
- political ideologists• Terrorists
The not so obvious• Disgruntled employees• Competitors• Mentally ill
The not so obvious• Disgruntled employees• Competitors• Mentally ill
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Weapons of Attack: Weapons of Attack: Bioterrorism Bioterrorism
Diseases/Agents Diseases/Agents
Category A examples: Anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, viral
hemorrhagic
Category B examples: Brucellosis, E.coli, salmonella, ricin,
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB)
Category C: Emerging pathogens that could be engineered
Source: CDC
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Foodborne disease costsFoodborne disease costs
INDUSTRY
• Product recall• Poor publicity• Loss of reputation• Legal liability costs
• Increased insur-ance costs
• Loss of business• Closure
CONSUMER
Pain & suffering Medical costs Loss of income Loss of leisure &
enjoyment Increased insurance Physical rehab Long term care Death expenses
PUBLIC
• Health care• Legislation• Plant inspection• Medical investigation& surveillance
• Prosecution costs• Education costs• Clean-up & disinfection
SOURCE: Food Alert
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Recent FOOD DEFENSE Recent FOOD DEFENSE eventsevents
1984751 people became ill after
members of a religious cult
contaminated salad bars in 10
restaurants in Oregon with
Salmonella typhimuriumBhagwan Shree Rajneesh
AP Photo
First came the stomach cramps and nausea. Next came dizziness and disorientation. It was the chills, fever, diarrhea and vomiting that finally sent them to their doctors. Nearly a thousand of them…
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Recent FOOD Recent FOOD DEFENSE eventsDEFENSE events
1989Terrorists phoned the U.S. embassy in Santiago and claimed to have laced all Chilean grapes with cyanide
Chilean Fruit Pulled From Shelves as U.S. Widens Inquiry on Poison By PHILIP SHENON, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES Published: March 15, 1989
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Post Sept. 11, 2001 Post Sept. 11, 2001 eventsevents
2002
Three Israeli-Arabs were arrested in Jerusalem for allegedly planning a mass poisoning of Israeli patrons at a local café.
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Post Sept. 11, 2001 Post Sept. 11, 2001 eventsevents
Fall, 2002A China restaurateur added a chemical (rat poisoning) to a competitor’s food. 38 people died and hundreds were sent to hospitals.
Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Monday, September 30, 2002
China Sentences Rat Poison Killer to Death
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New Zealand FMD New Zealand FMD HoaxHoax
Rural community near urban center (Auckland)
May, 2005
New Zealand Prime Minister received
letter claiming Food and Mouth
Disease (FMD) was introduction on
Waiheke Island. Was eventually
determined to be a hoax. Cost was
$1.5-2 million in compensation costs
to dairy farmers on island.
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False claims & hoaxesFalse claims & hoaxes
Can seriously disrupt political, economic or psychological well-being
Copy cats are common & can interfere with actual response efforts
Internet is easy & effective tool for spreading false rumors
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Consumer attitudes & Consumer attitudes & expectations about food expectations about food
defensedefense
Goal: Learn consumers priorities on spending for terrorism defense – food relative to other targets
Conducted by: The Food Industry Center, University of Minnesota & sponsored by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense in April, 2005
Sample: 4000+ adult Americans internet responses; weighted to represent population
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Highlights of survey Highlights of survey findingsfindings
Over 90% of people believe there will be another terrorist attack in this country in the next four years.
There is less likely to be a terrorist attack on the food system than on other economic sectors.
Government and food processors are held the most responsible for both food safety & food defense, but government bears more responsibility for food defense.
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Survey highlights Survey highlights - - continued
Retailers bear more responsibility & should bear more cost for food safety than food defense
Consequences of an attack on the food system are more serious than on other sectors.
Consumers would spend more to protect against a terrorist attack on the food system or against a chemical or biological release than they would for protecting airlines.
module two
Food Defense &Food Defense &
the Psychology of Terrorismthe Psychology of Terrorism
topic three
Natural Disasters, Natural Disasters, TerrorismTerrorism
and Catastrophic and Catastrophic IncidentsIncidents
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Natural and Natural and ‘traditional’ disasters‘traditional’ disasters
Types of natural or traditional disasters Fire, floods, earthquakes, drought,
hurricanes, tsunamis, mechanical failures, explosions, etc.
Disasters due to acts of human error (accident) or neglect
Airplane crash, fire, building collapse, mislabeled product, etc.
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Characteristics of Characteristics of natural eventsnatural events
Well-defined time frame in terms of
beginning and ending
Sensory cues are readily availableWhere is the danger?
Where is safety?
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Terrorist eventsTerrorist events
Types of terrorist events CBRNE categories: chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, explosive
Food defense focuses on chemical & biological
Goal of terrorism is primarily psychological – eroding sense of security & safety
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Characteristics of Characteristics of terrorist eventsterrorist events
Intentional criminal acts directed toward others
Mysterious agents and/or source of symptoms
Random and outside of our control Potential permanent & catastrophic
harm & loss No well-defined beginning or end May not provide routine sensory cues
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Response to terrorist Response to terrorist eventevent
MYSTERMYSTERY Y
intensifies
FEAR FEAR
These characteristics These characteristics create a different and create a different and unique emotional charge unique emotional charge than a natural or than a natural or traditional disaster.traditional disaster.
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Food terrorism Food terrorism challengeschallenges
Contamination may not be discovered for
days or even weeks after the event
Even a threat or hoax involving the food
supply can trigger mass anxiety and
significant economic loss
May be significant number of ‘unknowns’
(‘mystery’)
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Catastrophic potential Unfamiliar Decision processes not
understood Lack of personal control Involuntary exposure Delayed effects Children at risk Risk to future
generations
Lack of trust in relevant institutions
Much media attention Previous history Unclear benefits Potentially irreversible
effects Origins caused by
human actions (vs. act of nature)
Factors associated with Factors associated with increased public increased public
concern (fear)concern (fear)
- Covello, in NRC, 1989
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Risk Communication Risk Communication
Goal of terrorism is to create contextual fear and to eliminate trust in the various critical US infrastructures
In response, Risk Communication can: Reduces the mystery of the agents OR
Help tolerate the mystery/uncertainty when faced significant ‘unknowns’
Less mystery yields less fear which yields more trust
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Take AwaysTake Aways
Don’t ‘fear fear’ or experience ‘panic panic’
Most people can cope & manage their fear
If we ‘fear fear’ official reactions to terrorist attacks may provoke unnecessary & unwise steps:
Withholding information
Over assurance
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Take Aways Take Aways – – continued
Food defense addresses an intentional attack
on the food system; food safety pertains to
natural or accidental contamination.
The dynamic nature of the food system
makes it particularly vulnerable to attack.
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Listen to public’s concerns & understand audience
For Effective Food DefenseBestBest
Practices
PracticesBest
Best
Practices
Practices