I
The Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of
Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Its Functioning during periods;
2002-2006 and 2008-2011
Submitted by
Faisal Hayat
NDU-GPP/M.P-09/F-060
Supervised by
Dr. Usman Mustafa
Department of Government & Public Policy
National Defence University, Islamabad-Pakistan
II
To my parents,
III
Acknowledgement
Foremost, my sincere gratitude to my Supervisor, Dr. Usman Mustafa for his continuous
support to my M Phil research for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm and immense
knowledge. Defiantly, it was his guidance that helped me all the course of research and
writing of this Dissertation.
My special gratitude also goes to Dr. Ilhan Niaz, for his unlimited support in reviewing
my initial chapters. My special thanks to Dr. Bashir Hussain, Dr. Sarfraz Hussain Ansari
and Asif Shah for their technical support, encouragement and insightful comments.
My sincere thanks to Honourable Nadeem Afzal Gondal, Chairman PAC, Honourable
Yasmeen Rehman, Member PAC and Honourable Riaz Fatyana, Member PAC for their
precious time and continued support to my research. I am equally thankful to all other
members for their interviews and response to my research questionnaires.
My utmost gratitude to PAC Secretariat, especially Moosa Raza Afandi, Additional
Secretary, Najma Saddiquee, Joint Secretary, Muhammad Mushtaq, DS Legislation,
Roomana Kakar, Deputy Secretary, Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Secretary, Sharafat Ali,
Section Officer, Salamat Ali, Section Officer and Shabbir Ahmed, Assistant, Haji Hattar
Librarian-NA for facilitating my access to PAC, for their briefings and providing with
necessary data.
I am so grateful to Mohammad Mohsin Khan former Controller General of Accounts and
Deputy Auditor General Pakistan for his technical support and guidance. I found him the
best guide with technical knowledge about auditing, financial oversight and PAC
operations among the persons I accessed for this study.
I am so grateful to my friends Hassan Choukhia, Afzal Tarar, Muhammad Maqsood,
Shahzad Rao, Bilal Maghrani, Asad Kamal, Iqbal Haider, Imran Haider and Sohail Ikram
for their encouragement and morale support.
I importantly thank my family especially my parents, brothers, sisters, wife, nephews and
nieces who missed my company most of the time and sometimes on very special
occasions.
In the end I cannot forget to acknowledge the contribution of Ahmed Bilal Mehboob and
Aasiya Riaz (PILDAT) who give me assignment to work for the most effective
committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan and I eventually got the idea to work on
the functioning of PAC. PILDAT assignment was done in a couple of weeks after
counting number of meetings of the National Assembly and Senate standing committees
and declaring PAC the most effective committee of the National Assembly on meeting
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for maximum number of times but my research just started to further investigate the
operations of PAC.
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IV
List of Figures------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VI
List of Abbreviations----------------------------------------------------------------------------------IX
Abstract-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------XI
Chapter 1
Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
Chapter 2
Literature Review--------------------------------------------------------------------------9
Chapter 3
Methodology and Theoretical Framework-----------------------------------------22
Chapter 4
The Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC -------------------------------------28
Chapter 5
Colliding Facts------------------------------------------------------------------------61
Chapter 6
Challenging the Past-----------------------------------------------------------------101
Chapter 7
The culture of governance in Pakistan--------------------------------------------142
Chapter 8
Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------------160
Chapter 9
Making PAC Effective--------------------------------------------------------------161
Cited References------------------------------------------------------------------------------167
Annexure---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------176
VI
List of Figures
Figure 3.1. Survey Population and Response Rate 23
Figure 4.2. PAC Organogram 38
Figure 4.3. Channels of supervision 39
Figure. 4.3 Process MAP of PAC 46
Figure 4.4. Sitting Arrangement of PAC Meeting 47
Figure 4.5. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points 49
Figure 4.6. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points 49
Figure 4.7. AG relationship with PAC 54
Figure 5.1. Comparative Delay 60
Figure 5.2. Performance of MIC 64
Figure 5.3. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA 66
Figure 5.4. Details of the Audit Reports examined by
Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA 68
Figure 5.5. Backlog Status 69
Figure 5.6. General Comparison of 12th & 13th PAC 70
Figure 5.7. Excess budget Statements examined by 12th PAC 80
Figure 5.8. Excess budget Statements examined by 13th PAC 84
Figure 5.9. Audit Paras Discussed V/S Directives Passed 89
Figure 5.10. Compliance Rate in Per centage 90
Figure 5.11. Quality of Clearance 90
Table 6.2. A perception of the respondent about the of the Best Chair
of 12th
and 13th
PAC 100
Table 6.3.Tthe perception of the Capacity of Committee Staff of
12th
and 13th
PAC 101
VII
Table 6.4. Availability of Research Facility 101
Table 6.5. Government Response to Committee Recommendations 102
Table 6.6. Government Implements Committee Recommendations 103
Table 6.7. Institutionalization of practices 103
Table 6.8. Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases 104
Table 6.9. Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws 104
Table 6.10. Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene
administrative guidelines 105
Table 6.11. Resistant to Political Pressure 106
Table 6.12. PAOs found hiding facts 106
Table 6.13. Adoption of latest Financial Oversight Developments 107
Table 6.14. The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles
required to meet its objective 107
Table 6.15. Adherence to financial control of resources 108
Table 6.16. The policy of waste prevention 109
Table 6.17. The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources 109
Table 6.18. Representation of Political Parties 110
Table 6.19. Ministerial Exclusion 111
Table 6.20. PAC focus on holding the government accountable for its
spending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets 112
Table 6.21. Committee focus on administration of policy 112
Table 6.22. Reference to examine the Public Accounts 113
Table 6.23. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 114
Table 6.24. Power to call independent witnesses 114
Table 6.25. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed
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expenditures of government Organizations receiving funds from
the government and all state corporations 115
Table 6.26. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specific
reviews or tasks 116
Table 6.27. Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable
for administrative, performance even after they have left office 117
Table 6.28. Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 117
Table 6.29. Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 118
Table 6.30. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 119
Table 6.31. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive
or national security issues 119
Table 6.32. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the
Legislative Auditor’s Act 120
Table 6.33. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 121
Table 6.34. Power to choose subjects for examination without government
direction and advice 121
Table 6.35. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committee 122
Table 6.36. Powers to take Suo-Moto actions 123
Table 6.37. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action 123
Table 6.38. Powers to take action on media review 124
Table 6.39. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate
governance arrangements 124
Table 6.40. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 125
Table 6.41. Close working relationship between members from
different political parties 126
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Table 6.42. Advance preparation of members 126
Table 6.43. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/
Accounts/Grants 127
Table 6.44. Quick and in time decisions 128
Table 6.45. Close working relationship with Auditor General 128
Table 6.46. Provision of independent technical expertise and research
support for hearings 129
Table 6.47. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with Backlog 129
Table 6.48. Strategic prioritization of items for committee review,
with time limits for stages of committee work like consideration of
departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports 130
Table 6.49. Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 131
Table 6.50. Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament
and stays active between sessions 131
Table 6.51. Televised public hearings 132
Table 6.52. Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 133
Table 6.53. Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 133
Table 6.54. Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior
Committee experience 134
Table 6.55. Having committee members with prior administrative or
business experience 134
Table 6.56. Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in
hearings outside the normal legislative session 135
Table 6.57. Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 136
Table 6.58. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee
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recommendations 137
Table 6.59. Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has
been taken to implement the committee’s recommendations 137
Table 6.60. Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms
such as the budget committee 138
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List of Abbreviations
AGP Auditor-General of Pakistan
ANP Awami National Party
APAC Adhoc Public Accounts Committee
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CCAF-FCVI The Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation-La
Fondation canadienne pour la vérification integrée
CEO Chief Executive Order
CDA Capital Development Authority
CGA Controller General of Accounts
CoD Charter of Democracy
CPA Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
DG Director General
ICG International Crisis Group
JCPA Australian parliament’s Joint Committee of Public
Accounts
KPMG KPMG is a global network of professional services firms
providing Audit, Tax and Advisory services.
MIC Monitoring & Implementation Committee MMA Muthida Majlis-e-Amal
MNA Member of National Assembly of Pakistan
MQM Mutihida Qaumi Movement
NA National Assembly of Pakistan
PAC Public Accounts Committee
PAKPK Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa
PAO Principal Accounting Officer
PML Pakistan Muslim League
PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PPP Pakistan People’s Party
PTA Pakistan Telecommunication Authority
UK United Kingdom
USAID United States Aid for International Development
WBI World Bank Institute
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development)
INTOSAI International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions
RETA Regional Technical Assistance
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Abstract
The Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan (PAC) is a
standing committee of the National Assembly- a legislative oversight committee that
holds the government to account for its use of public funds and resources by examining
the public accounts. Naturally a probing and regulating body, it performs financial
oversight while, examining the effectiveness of government programmes in achieving
their objectives. The PAC has an independent financial oversight role on National
Assembly’s behalf of the government and the public services. In performance of this task,
it is largely dependent on the information provided by the Auditor General in its audit
reports that reach the PAC vide Article 171 of the Constitution. In addition PAC takes
suo motu action on issues of public importance and also written public complaints.
The overall objective of the study is to identify the major problems, discrepancies and
failures relating to the performance of PAC, while counting the successes of PAC. In
order to achieve this objective a comparative study of functioning of the Public Accounts
Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan during the periods: 2002-2006 and
2008-2011 is being done through this study
The study is largely based on McGee’s thought expressed in the Overseers and the
framework as defined by World Bank working paper by Stapenhurst, et.al., “Scrutinizing
Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public Accounts Committees” to
assess the performance of the PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan.
The study revealed that PAC operations were restricted to years of backlog, inefficient
bureaucracy and political posturing. PAC is independent according to its mandate but still
leans heavily on the Auditor-General to prioritize areas of review. PAC has become a
platform to regulate the excess budget grants and to recommend settlement of paras. The
compliance rate is as low as 12 per cent on an average while 88 per cent of actions were
pending. (Monitoring and Implementation Committee 2012) The PAOs or the ministries
are continually violating the directives of PAC thus breaching the privilege of the
parliamentary committee. Leader of the Opposition who was the Chairman of PAC
according to Charter of Democracy resigned (November 27, 2011) on personnel stakes
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while keeping the Office of the Leader of the Opposition burying the best practice of
financial oversight process, a sacred trust put on the shoulders of Opposition under the
Charter of Democracy.
The study also revealed that the state was spending much more on the institutions of audit
and financial oversight than their outputs the reported recoveries, financial management
and the impact on good governance. The study observed that certain audit practices like
highlighting of paras and audit sampling were quite ambiguous, and at the discretion of
the Auditor General.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The State is a major form of human political organisation that performs the critical
functions of establishing and sustaining order and collecting taxes, which, if not carried
out effectively, can lead to anarchy. Although states were greatly developed in earlier
periods of history with defined political setups, courts, tax systems and administrations,
democratic norms and constitutionalism are relatively recent phenomena (Niaz, 2010). In
South Asia, for example, rulers had a free hand over the resources of the state and the
people that resulted in chaotic conditions and wastage of taxes. In contrast, after
generations of political development, the British realised the importance of the proper
handling of state funds in order to combat fraud and corruption and to get the most from
the tax money. In 1857 a small group of the members of Parliament lead by Sir Francis
Bearing, recommended the creation of a committee to oversee the government accounts
to the parliament. William Gladstone, the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer,
initiated reforms and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was established through a
resolution to structure and function in 1861 (Government of UK 2012). The practice
proved so effective that most of the commonwealth and other countries have adopted it
(McGee 2002).
In India, the Montague-Chelmsford Reform set the first PAC in 1921, chaired by the
Finance Member of the Executive Council and assisted by the finance department to
restrict the contradictory opinion and public criticism of the Executive (McIntyre, 1977).
The system continued till 1949.
In Pakistan, the first PAC was constituted on May 3, 1948 by Presidential approval to
adopt the Pakistan Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Rules (May 3, 1948) under section
38(3) of Government of India Act, 1935, read with the Pakistan Provisional
Constitutional Order, 1947. However, its meeting never took place (NA, 1985). The PAC
of the National Assembly of Pakistan is based on the basic Westminster Model of
2
Democracy approach1 whereby the Executive-led government is accountable to
Parliament and the Parliament exercises oversight over the Executive-led Government
(USAID, 2009). The approach is largely based on learning lessons from the best practices
of tried and tested values among different democracies. In such a parliamentary system,
various committees are formed to overcome the legislative burden.
In addition to this, the institution of PAC in Pakistan existed even when parliament
remained dissolved, a minimum of six (6) adhoc PACs have functioned during military
rule which accounts for about half of Pakistan’s history. The PAC was normally chaired
by the Finance Minister till 1977 with the exception of Noor-ul-Amin, MNA,2 who
chaired 5th
PAC and then 2nd
adhoc PAC during Ayub Khan’s Marshal Law period (NA,
1985). In UK, since the origin of PAC, it is a convention that a Treasury Minister sits in
the committee meeting but does not participate in the debate (Government of UK, 2012).
Under General Zia, A.G.N. Kazi and Ghulam Ishaq Khan were the 4th
and 5th
Chairmen of
the adhoc PAC, respectively, Shahibzada M. Ali Shah, MNA, was appointed as the
Chairman PAC when General Zia established a democratic government during his rule
(Saeed, 1998).
Benazir Bhutto came into government in 1989 and appointed Hakim Ali Zardari, MNA,
from government party as the Chairman PAC. During the Benazir-Nawaz governments,
normally the PAC was chaired by the ruling party MNAs. On 25th
August 2000,
Musharraf formed 6th
adhoc PAC and appointed H.U. Beg3 as the chairman. While,
Musharraf held elections to give people a democratic government in 2002. The regime
established a proto-PAC to carry out the functions that would otherwise be performed by
1The Westminster system is a democratic parliamentary system of government modelled after the politics of the
United Kingdom. This term comes from the Palace of Westminster, the seat of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
The term, ‘Westminster model of democracy’ was developed by political scientist Arend Lijphart. The term
Westminster model interchangeably with majoritarian mode is used to refer to a general model of democracy. See
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999, p.9. This model of democracy is
defined as concentration of executive power in one party and bare majority cabinets, cabinets dominance, two-party
system, majoritarian and disproportional systems of elections, interest groups pluralism, unitary and centralized
government, concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature, constitutional flexibility, absence of judicial
review, a central bank controlled by the executive. 2 Noor-ul-Amin, MNA, was also from government party. He also has been Prime Minister of Pakistan from (December
7, 1971 to December 20, 1971) and Vice President of Pakistan from (1970-72). 3Mr.H.U.Beg had an illustrious career in the civil service, holding various key positions for about five decades. He
served as secretary at several federal ministries and autonomous bodies and was the longest serving finance secretary.
Mr. Beg was a long serving distinguished member of the FAST-NU BoG. He was also chairman of the KASB Bank.
He passed away on December 9, 2009.
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the PAC in a parliamentary environment. Apparently, it was not any ideal condition,
however, being Parliament in abeyance, it is regarded a good practice in International
community. McGee (2002) acknowledges the existing of proto-PAC during Musharraf
regime saying the Government of Pakistan recognises the importance of PAC in good
governance and sound public sector accountability. However, the first Adhoc PAC was
first established in Pakistan in 1962 releasing the importance of public sector
accountability by Gen. Ayub Khan (NA, 1985).
The 12th
PAC was thus formed on 3rd November 2003 and Malik Allah Yar Khan, MNA,
from the government party was appointed chairman (National Assembly Secretariat,
2007). Generally it is observed that having a Government member as a chair could
indicate a lack of independence on the part of PAC from executive and consequently lack
of effective accountability and oversight. However, it is observed that in the Australian
context that a chair from the government can advocate that the PAC’s recommendations
be implemented by the government. Clearly this question of both the independence and
the implementation is empirical and can only be addressed by studying the actual
activities of the PACs (McGee, 2002).
The 13th
National Assembly first met on 17 March, 2008 but the PAC was formed on 19
September, 2008 with a delay of six (6) months and two (2) days. Ch. Nisar Ali, MNA
and the Leader of Opposition in National Assembly of Pakistan, was asked to chair PAC
for the first time in Pakistan as a Leader of the Opposition as is the practice in the
Westminster democracies respecting the Charter of Democracy (NA, 2007:Charter of
Democracy, Rule 15).
The purpose of the PAC in the parliamentary system of Pakistan is to identify wastage of
national wealth, tackling poor performance of departments and making the best use of
public funds, but the committee has become a probing body. Reports of the Auditor
General of Pakistan (AGP) and accounts of the Federal Government are referred to it for
a review. The review was not conducted in a timely and efficient manner causing a big
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backlog.4The big backlog diverted the focus of successive PACs towards violations
concerning the previous government rather than focusing on the present one. The modern
democracies benefit from PAC in over-sighting their on-going projects and policies to
boost their delivery in a more efficient way but the case in Pakistan is different due to the
backlog and lopsided accountability meted out to the previous government’s projects. As
an example, the PAC of British Parliament has issued 62 reports in 2006-07 which
mainly include the work of government from major projects such as the Thames Gateway
and the preparations for the 2012 Olympics, administrative processes like helping
companies achieve their tax obligations and the implementation of child support reforms,
social issues like legal aid and anti-social behaviour, as well as timeless value for money
concerns such as procurement and employment programmes. These democracies are
working on Value for Money and Audit Performance concepts with a 90% of compliance
rate (Government of UK, 2012).
In case of Pakistan, during every period of democratic government the political leaders
politicised the civil servants for mostly ulterior motives. The original breaches in the
functional divisions of the state were made by elected representatives during the early
years of Pakistan. Heedless, the politicians used and abused the apparatus to secure their
personal power and wealth and drew the higher bureaucracy and the armed forces into
politics while punishing opposition leaders and dissenters through repressive legislation,
ordinances and the repeated imposition of governor’s rule (Niaz, 2010).With the
elevation of Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat to cabinet post and the rise of Ayub Khan,
to the post of army chief, the politicians opened the corridors of corruption, mal-
practices, poor governance and the worse of all welcoming military to enter the politics
(Bhutto, 1973).
The three military takeovers, bureaucratic overstretch, introduction of local government
system at the cost of civil administration and unstable political governments of 1990s,
caused lasting harm to the state machinery. All these circumstances and the events
undermined the purpose of creation of PAC to oversight the institutions. The
4PAC had formed three sub committees to deal this backlog of the last PAC. When Ch. Nisar Ali resigned as a
Chairman of PAC, they were up-to 2008 in dealing with the AGP reports and paras. (Please check the exact date that
they had cleared the back log to.
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politicisation of civil servants and the institutions badly affected the good governance;
hence, PAC remained ineffective across the history of Pakistan always struck with big
backlogs, on the mercy of inefficient civil servants and political posturing. The Study
will, however, focus the functioning of the PAC during the governments from 2002 to
2011.
1.2. Statement of the Problem
It is the responsibility of a state to provide its citizens with freedom from poverty,
freedom from servitude and a quality of life free from injustice and tyranny. Corruption is
the worse obstacle in achieving these objectives. It hampers development process of a
country. Once in practice, corruption encircles all sectors of state into its sphere on the
cost of citizen’s rights. Transparency International reported a loss of Rs. 8500 billion in
corruption, tax evasion and bad governance during the first four (04) years of recent PPP-
led coalition government (The Jang 2012). While, during the Musharraf period such
losses reported were Rs. 2576 billion only in five scams of Privatization, Bank of Punjab,
Petroleum, Stock Exchange and Sugar Scandal only (APSN 2009). These figures create a
terrible impression of governments when state institutions like PAC, the legislative
oversight body, were functioning. Why were these losses not avoided or minimised? The
Musharraf regime formed adhoc PAC realising the importance of financial oversight over
institution in time when National Assembly remained dissolved but does it meant
anything. In a scenario, the functioning of PAC in both eras is important to be discussed
under this study.
1.3. Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this study is that under both governments, the Musharraf Regime and
the Pakistan People’s Party-led Coalition Government, the operations of the PAC were
restrained by years of backlog, bureaucratic inefficiency and political posturing.
1.4. Objectives of the Study
The overall objective is to identify the major problems, discrepancies and failures, while
listing the successes of PAC keeping in mind its mandate according to the Rules and
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Procedures of the National Assembly of Pakistan. The effort is to achieve this objective
through conducting a comparative study of functioning of the Public Accounts
Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan during the periods: 2002-2006 and
2008-2011. However the specific objectives are;
To explore which one of the selected PAC remained most active/effective during
its respective periods based on quality of clearance provided its capacity
To outline obstacles in review process of public spending and government control
of public funds which PAC performs in cases related to the use of public assets,
resources and funds under two selected governments
To study the process of enquiry on evaluating financial management performance
to identify wastes and poor governance
To ascertain whether reports, recommendation and directives of PAC have any
influence in improving the performance of the institutions, strengthening internal
control and preventing re-occurrence (addressing of the weaknesses pointed out
on the system by AGP, PAC, PAO)
To formulate a set of policy recommendations on the basis of major findings, in
the end to help make the process of legislative oversight effective enhancing
accountability and transparency
1.6. Significance of the study
After a thorough review of the relevant data, it is observed that there is little work
available on the functioning of PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan, while, it’s
functioning is requisitely public, awareness of the performance of state organs concerning
accountability and oversight of state institutions can restore public confidence in
Government. A thorough study of the comparative functioning of PAC in the selected
periods is significant to this study. After the completion of this study, the research will be
able to fill the gaps in the existing literature on functioning, especially comparative
functioning, of PAC during two comparative/consecutive governments.
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Secondly, major findings and recommendations of this research will be helpful for the
institutions specially governmental and non-governmental organisations working and
interested in good governance and the operation of PAC in Pakistani jurisdictions.
1.7. Justification of the Study
Although, PAC is working for the last 64 years, it has achieved few of the assigned
objectives given its mandate. The idea of good governance in the state has largely faded
away; political institutions have weakened as a result of adversities and unethical
practices of insincere and disloyal leaders across the history of Pakistan. Constitutional
democracy was never given a chance to flourish while the political leaders politicised the
civil servants to use them for illegal and abusive practices. On the other hand, state
resources and properties were competitively grabbed by one or the other among the
circles of politicians. Those in power had tried their best to get the most from their
position and access to the state resources. The PAC, in the previous governments
remained under government control5, so was its oversight over state finances. Under the
present government, PAC only functioned to criticise the political rivals and policies of
the previous government. The moment, it cleared the back log and was ready to start
taking up issues that arose during the tenure of the present government, the AGP was
changed and Ch. Nisar Ali Khan resigned as a Chairman PAC leaving the committee to
its fate.
1.8. Limitations of the study
Although PAC is working since 1948 but the main aim of this research is to compare and
identify the better functioning of one government over other during year 2002-2006 and
2008- 2011. The study do not systematically examine the functioning of PAC during the
other governments in different times other than selected for this study and terminates
with the resignation of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan as its Chairman on November 27, 2011.
5PAC was mostly chaired by Finance Ministers or the Members of Parliament who belong to government party or the
trusted and obliged persons of the government (Bureaucrats etc.). While, in Commonwealth and other countries, it is a
practice that PAC will be chaired by the Opposition Leader which happened for the first time during recent PPPP-led
government, Who give a chance to Opposition Leader Ch. Nisar Ahmed, respecting international practices to chair the
Committee.
8
1.9. Organisation of the study
Chapter 1 is a Brief Background of the study. Chapter 2 is a Literature Review and
provide the sum of net practices related to the functioning of PAC. Chapter 3 is
Methodology and the Theoretical Framework of the study. Chapter 4 discusses the
Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC and is a brief guide for Members, Secretariat,
Auditor General, PAOs and general public to know about the process of PAC operations.
Chapter 5 & 6 examine and compare different traits of the PAC during two periods.
Chapter 5 in detail consists of major observations of the study during selected period
while Chapter 6 is the discussion of the results of the survey conducted for this study and
provides the perception of the respondents. Chapter 7 is a discussion of the major
findings bases on the theoretical framework set in the Methodology. Chapter 8 is a
Conclusion of the study and Chapter 9 is a set of Recommendations for making the
process of legislative financial oversight effective while enhancing transparency and
accountability. The next chapter is a detailed review of the literature.
9
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Although there is big accumulation of literature pertaining to the formation, functioning
and operations of Public Accounts Committees (PACs) across commonwealth and non-
commonwealth (McGee 2002; Wehner 2003, Gay and Winetrobe 2003, Stapenhurst,
Sahgal, Woodley and Pelizzo 2005; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2007; Jacobs, Jones and
Smith 2007; Jacobs and Jones 2009), very little investigation is made of the comparative
functioning of PAC in Pakistan. The study observes the comparative functioning of 12th
(2002-2006) and 13th
(2008-11) PACs of the National Assembly of Pakistan realizing the
gap existing in the entire literature. PAC, primarily being a financial oversight committee
of any Parliament, plays a vital role in implementing Public Sector Accountability being
a significant component of the parliamentary machine ensuring governments functions,
their working practices, policies, actions, course of execution and use of public monies
(McGee 2002:31). No democratic government can properly function unless an
appropriate accountability is not carry out (Funnell and Cooper 1998; Watson 2004).
However, Jones and Stewart (2008).deemed accountability could be an outcome of the
allocation of praise or blame.
PAC in Pakistan has always been an important standing committee of the legislature (NA
1885), realizing the importance of financial oversight of public monies, adhoc PACs
were constituted when National Assembly remained dissolved in Pakistan. However, the
operations of PACs across the history of Pakistan were only formalities (NA 1885). A
review of literature (ICG 2010, 2004; Shafqat 2010; Niaz 2010; Chaudry 2011 and Altaf
2011) holds that arbitrary transfers of state servants, bureaucratic inefficiency and
political posturing were major restrictions in the way of good governance in Pakistan.
This weak structure of governance never allowed oversight and accountability institutions
10
like Public Accounts Committee to properly function in order to strengthen parliamentary
oversight of resources and the governance.
2.2 PAC Role as an Institution
Aldons (1985); and Griffiths (2006) described PAC, naturally a standing committee of
the parliament, is regarded as a key financial legislative oversight committee assigned the
job of compliance of its directives and maintaining efficiency and good governance of
departments and agencies under its ambit. PAC’s major responsibility has been to
investigate the financial oversight of the resources allocated to a programme at budget
proposal level. Whereas the PAC plays an ex post facto oversight process at a secondary
level to check the regularity in spending of allocated monies as Wehner (2003) describes.
During the early nineteenth, the PACs were associated entirely with the public finances;
to examine government expenditures, mainly based on the information provided in the
Auditor General Reports, naturally working in close relationship with the Auditor
General, making certain that public money sectioned by the legislature had been
appropriately, economically and efficiently spent on defined projects and programmes.
PAC had another obligation of the non-enforcement limitations of PAC especially in
Pakistan due to absence of supportive financial legislation under Article 79 of the
Constitution, like the Financial Management Practices Act that exists in South Africa
where a government agency can be fined or an official jailed for violation for financial
rules. The audit courts in Europe and African countries are good examples of
enforcement of financial oversight.
2.3 Modern Methods of Accountability- Audit Performance and Value for
Money
Mulgan (2001) and Guthrie and Parker (1999), have introduced the development of
performance auditing for the purpose of getting rid of old technical accounting methods,
while focusing on its prospective of resistance to political influences. They started
undertaking performance auditing work, while, other are exercising powers to examine
budget estimates, described as an ex-ante facto. Now, they better spotlight modern
concepts like value for money which is economy; the minimizing of costs of resources
11
utilized for an activity with regard to appropriate quality, efficiency; is the ratio between
outputs and inputs, the maximum outputs from minimum inputs, and effectiveness; is the
relationship between the intended impact and the actual impact of an activity or product
(Johnson, 2010 and The House of Commons, 2005). However, the concept of
parliamentary accountability somehow remained a controversy and debate. Among the
conventional forms of accountability, was the concept of ministerial responsibility, where
ministers were directly accountable to parliamentary inquiries. Walter (2006).holds that
the concept remained under political test as governments re-defined and to a larger
degree abated the ministerial responsibility. The reason for lack of appropriate focus on
performance audit is the AGP’s concentration on compliance with authority audits that
have to be done in absence of an effective internal audit structure in the Governance set
up in Pakistan.
2.4 Conventional Accountability
The findings reported by CCAF-FCVI are consistent to the finding of Simon McInnes
research during the mid-1970s. In his research, McInnes examined the provincial
experience regarding legislative scrutiny of public expenditures. His study focused on the
standard functioning and proceeding of PAC, the role of AG in accountability process
and the relationship between PAC and AG, while discussing external factors which
influence PAC in performing its activities. McInnes (1977:39) significantly found that
PAC of one province was varying from the PAC of other province in many ways.
McInnes added that most of the PACs were functioning on conventional methods in 1975
and there was not any established system of proceedings.
Mulgan (1997) also challenged this concept, according to him, this is a pluralistic model
of accountability where accountability is a multi-dimensional phenomenon starting with
the new public management theory during the late 20th
century. However, regardless of
both the value of financial oversight committees to public sector accountability and the
varying political and administrative atmosphere that facilitates its function and
strengthens governance, there is a big gap in academic research on the functioning of
PACs in this prospective, including both common wealth and non-common wealth
countries, particularly in Pakistan. Normally, the existing works available are of a
12
descriptive nature compiled by practitioners and politicians engaged in the PAC process
(McGee, 2002 and Watson, 2004) or by surveys conducted in the fields (KPMG, 2006
and Stapenhurst et al., 2005).
In a broader sense, a very significant academic study was by Degeling, Anderson and
Guthrie (1996) who carried out a content analysis of reports of the Australian
parliament’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) between the period 1914 and
1932 to study the activities involved in constituting the status and focus of a PAC. They
established that it was difficult to understand activities and outcomes of a PAC simply
with regard to purposes of its progenitors. They concluded that future studies are building
a link among accountability, accounting practices and PACs may be studied in an
analytical context of the concerned social and political environments (Degeling et al.,
1996: 47 and Jacobs and Jones 2009). While comprehending the earlier analysis of JCPA
into a study of demise in the early 1930s of JCPA and Victorian PAC, the study group
holds that both functionaries glided significantly from their deliberated job of financial
oversight to a legitimizing role.
Wehner (2003) and Newberry and Pallot (2005), in their studies highlighted the effects of
external factor on the functioning of PACs. Wehner (2003) arguments that regardless of
being a significant part of parliamentary structure and scrutiny process, the PACs are
largely dependent on external factors like political environment and resource provided.
The work of Newberry and Pallot (2005) recommended a pessimistic liaison among
PACs, accounting practice, and issues of parliamentary accountability. They further
argue that the introduction of the Public Finance Bill in New Zealand diluted
parliamentary oversight and control of spending in New Zealand. It highlighted a
significant question on the nature and independence of parliamentary finances and the
functions of PAC. A WBI survey of 51 PACs conducted by Pelizzo et. al., (2006)
resulted that broader mandate and freedom to set agenda were the successive factors of a
PAC. They also reported that 90% of Chairs acknowledged the authority of self-initiation
of agenda and choosing issues without any government meddling, was a successive factor
in PAC practices.
13
2.5 Relationship of PAC and Auditor General
McGee (2002) produced a very effective publication on financial oversight and
accountability discussing the role of PAC and Auditor General with support of
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. He worked to come-up with possible ways to
improve upshots through an effective use of PACs, while strengthening Auditor General.
His core identifications include; capacity building, independence, and information
exchange. Realizing the significance of the departmental capacity of the overseers for an
effective financial oversight of the government expenses, He upholds that the ability of
the three prime oversight institutions including the Parliament, the PAC and the Auditor
General to accomplish their oversight functions should be strengthened to the maximum.
He further says that it is also under the procedural ambit of PAC to work on the
strengthening of AG office to ensure effective accountability. AG office is regarded as
the main source of information for PAC working was also endorsed by Wehner (2003).
McGee (2002:31) also described that initially, PACs were constituted to ensure the
parliamentary follow up of Audit reports and compliance of its own Directives because of
a more common remit of PAC legal jurisdictions with Auditor General. He further
endorsed, while identifying the weakness of all three institutions involved in the financial
oversight process that better results can be achieved with the provision of required
staffing, resources, trainings and in time information. McGee also emphasizes that the
independent role of Auditors General from partisan and political influence is a successive
factor in its business. In order to perform its duties impartially, independence is the core
value for the Auditor General. McGee focused that availability of information and its
exchange among stakeholders was a successive factor in carrying out the business of a
PAC, he further stresses on the need of information exchange and sharing ideas while
keeping PAC fashioned with latest developments, changing standards and best practices.
The PAC and the Auditor General have a critical relationship in the course of public
sector accountability (Coghill, 2004; Jones and Jacobs, 2006; McGee, 2002; Stapenhurst
et al., 2005). Across the common wealth and non-common wealth jurisdictions PAC and
the Auditor General operate in coincidence and both are critical to financial oversight and
accountability holds (Jacobs and Jones 2006). Coghill (2004) argued that while
14
accommodating rapport between PAC and an Auditor General are indispensable. He says
that this relationship might not overlap, necessarily transpiring effective governance as a
result when AG listen the views of PAC but never claim a caption of such views.
However, the point of significance is the trust of both Auditor General and PAC in
implementing and upholding a nonpartisan behaviour in their mutual trades. PAC should
be independent of the AGP in so far as the process of determining the nature of review
process prioritization. PAC can seek advice but decide on its own criteria rather than
AGPs irrespective of agreement or disagreement. In fact PAC should dictate the criteria
of prioritization. An effective decision support MIS is required in this case.
2.6 Agenda Setting-Who are the main Actors
This study also profited from the studies of Kingdon (1984 and 2003). He describes that
setting of policy agenda can leave critical inferences on the successive policy debaters
and the out springs. It is of significant that the agenda setter or the resource provider or
the source of inquiry to PAC has a greater role in shaping its role and it behaves as a tool
of governance and accountability of that political set up. It is very important to reason out
its focus of sources of inquiry necessarily in time. Despite a big resurgence in PAC
functioning in Pakistan since the late 2000, such activities have a limited scope because
of restraint resource supply or local political culture.
A central point of investigation in the PAC is how and by whom the agenda of PAC
proceedings is set and managed. It is also equally important to be aware of how different
institutional actors took part in the operations of efficient and effective public sector
governance and accountability, the roles of individual actors and their effects on
outcomes (Kingdon 2003; Ryan 1998). Kingdon (2003) describes that there are two
important factors which facilitate agendas to be set; the actors themselves, and the
processes involved in agenda setting. Deepening Kingdon’s (1984) work, Ryan
(1998:520) differentiate between the political agenda and the policy agenda, while,
defining political agenda as comprising on the broad issues which comes under the
jurisdictions of government functionaries and which are the basis of their functions, the
policy agenda relates to matters concerning policy formulation. In the Pakistani financial
reporting ambit, the main actors are PAC and the Auditor-General, while in developed
15
countries like Canada and Australia main actors include PACs, AG, and the organized
accounting professionals, all of whom seek to influence the Australian or Canadian
political agenda, describes Ryan (1998). Political agenda is one of the significant areas
because PACs rarely address matters of policy overtly although; their activities are
patiently impinged on public policies.
An important question raised in this study is of the key actors that influence the political
agenda ‘who sets the agenda with respect to public sector accountability?’ The scope and
mandate of the PAC has a prospective that the agenda might be set by a number of
dissimilar sources. KPMG (2006) reported that other than a routine role of following up
of Auditor General’s Reports and the matters sometimes referred by the parliament ,
certain PACs took suo-moto actions on major issues of public importance, public
complaints, media reviews, showing powers to initiate self-enquiries. However Jacobs et
al. (2007) observed the relationship between AG and PAC largely depends on the
jurisdiction of that democratic setup. He also observed that PACs have the powers of
parliamentary review of audit reports but nearly half of the PACs are given the right to
refer matters to AG. While only few democracies give PAC the right to have a say in the
appointment of AG.
Jacobs et al. (2006) concluded that significant insights of the political and institutional
influences on PAC can be observed from its enquiries and operations and the judgment
that had control on its agenda. Jacobs et al. raised their apprehension on taking serious
the degree of independence to the functioning of PAC and the need for transparent
oversight, governance and accountability work of the PACs.
2.7 Independence of the PACs
There are other fundamental points of concerns about the independence of the PACs in
commonwealth countries. Jacobs et al. (2007) found that the government chairs in
Australian and New Zealand were 80%, while 70 % of the PACs in their study have a
government party majority. Another big number of PACs were found with ministerial
membership. However, McGee (2002) observed that a more than two third PACs of the
commonwealth countries were chaired by opposition party members. McGee (2002) also
16
noted that government member chair have an effect of lack of independence of PAC from
executive, hence a lack of accountability and efficient oversight. McGee (2002: 66)
however, examined that a government member chair can better influence on the
implementation of PAC recommendation. Obviously, this is a critical question of both
implementation and independence that require a deep study of the activities of a
particular PAC. It might also be constructive to discuss the careers of PAC chairs as is it
often recommended being the chair of a PAC is a facilitating thing to the ministry. This
possibility remained the cornerstone of PAC history in Pakistan, from 1951 to 2000; the
PAC was chaired by Finance Ministers or the Finance Ministers for State. Mr H.U Beg,
Chairman 6th
adhoc PAC was a former Finance Secretary.
2.8 Relationship between Accountability and Governance
Another study of Canadian PACs was carried out by CCAF-FCVI initially in 2004, while
its final research report published in 2006. The report investigated accountability and
governance relationships among public oversight committees, legislative auditors, and
senior government managers, with particular focus on the functioning of PACs in relation
with these institutions. The report comes up with a structure of core powers and practices
to help strengthen the effectiveness of PACs. The report identified four significant factors
in Canadian PACs: i) each PAC is unique; ii) PACs must try to avoid partisanship to be
effective; iii) PACs should operate independently of government and should be curious
enough to ask probing questions; and iv) PAC proceedings can play a meaningful public-
education role. However, the report does not investigate any specific differences at PAC
level leaving it ambiguous that what are the powers of PACs in specific jurisdiction.
Hence, the comparison of individual PACs looks impossible. The report also detects that
there found no single model PAC because of the variances in structures and democratic
cultures of the legislatures and administrations of the diverse jurisdictions. However,
CCAF-FCVI reported a substantial disparity among the relationships between the
legislative auditor and PAC and between Principal Accounting Officers and PAC, in the
mandates of the committee, in the conduct of business, in reporting to the legislatures, in
follow-up of committee’s recommendations and in the rate of compliance.
17
The institutions of PACs are the landmark of effective financial accountability and
governance in the public sector. Public accounts committee is the oldest and the most
significant standing committee in any parliamentary committee system due to its
responsibility and the set of powers it exercise, hence, it has a critical role in ensuring
public sector accountability and effective governance.
2.9 Assessment of PAC Performance
In the recent studies include Stapenhurst et al (2005), a working paper on the assessment
of PAC performance, thus deepening McGee’s (2002) analysis of PACs. The report
explores PAC success and identifies factors affecting its performance. The study was
based on data collected by WBI in 2002, where a survey questionnaire was sent to 51
parliaments in Commonwealth countries in Asia, Australasia, Canada and the United
Kingdom. The WBI report observed that availability of information and non-partisan
were critical success factors of the PACs as ascribed by McGee. The survey also resulted
that two other factors were equally important including the institutional design of the
PAC, and the PAC’s operational model. The report observed the extant of
institutionalization and the nature of powers and mandate of a PAC directly contribute to
its effectiveness. The results of the survey reached to the conclusion that a greater focus
of PACs on government’s financial activity and accountability were important rather on
the assessment of the content of the government’s policies. The study holds that the PAC
empowered to probe all past and present government expenses was at a best practice,
however, PAC better benefit from examining ongoing projects. PACs should also be
empowered to making departments and government implement its directives. Most
importantly, the report pays greater focus on close working relationship of Auditor
General with PAC. The report further proves that the behaviour of PAC members and the
functioning of the committee are successive factor other than the institutional design of a
PAC. The practices identified by Stapenhurst et al, further include, a non-partisan fashion
and consensus among members, preparation of Members prior to a meetings, keeping of
the transcripts of meetings by PAC secretariats and publishing of Committee conclusions
and recommendations on PAC website and in press and involving the public and the
media. The paper also gives in its end the 17 aspects of an ideal committee.
18
Jacobs et al, found that there were three categories on the result of their investigation of
148 reports produced by PACs in around nine Australian Jurisdictions over a period of
four years’ time. The categories comprising firstly, those PACs for which the prime
agenda was the follow-up of Auditor-General reports, secondly, the PACs for which self-
initiated inquiries was the principal activity and thirdly the PACs who pay equal
concentrations to Auditor General reports and the self-initiated inquiries. The third
category being an interesting and exceptional case with a balance between follow-up
enquiries and self-initiated enquiries was regarded the best practice. He concluded that
the inclination of interpreting a balance of activity between both the PAC and the AG is a
positive sign of independence constitutionally provided.
A need assessment report of the USAID (2009) observed that the operations of PAC of
the National Assembly of Pakistan were restricted by a backlog of nine (09) years.
However, the 12th
PAC, previous to the recent one inherited a backlog of twelve (12)
years. The USAID assessed that this “backlog” issue is the mountain which makes the
real forward journey of the PAC difficult to embark upon. The report argued that it
significantly impedes with the committee functioning and absorbs its attention from more
current issues and is likely to continue to do so for some time. The report also added that
the situation causes an overall workload which far exceeds the PAC’s work capacity. The
AGP has expressed concern that this could lead to PAC fatigue, the report described. The
report also found that the use of sub-committees was the best tool to deal with the
backlog. The report also recommended that backlog could also be dealt with by attending
only to those matters which could lead to recovery of monies for the State and by
engaging extra staff to clear the backlog.
2.10 Classification of the range of structures, responsibilities and working
practices of a PAC
A report was published by KPMG jointly with La Trobe University, on PACs of
Australia and New Zealand in 2006. The purpose of the report was to classify the range
of structures, responsibilities and working practices, and is regarded by Rick Stapenhurst
and Cindy Kroon as the first exhaustively comparative work of PACs in all Australian
and New Zealand jurisdictions. Premise of the study is that “one size does not fit all”; the
19
structure, terms of proceedings and the operational models vary from one PAC to another
and there is no set of unique practices to follow in constituting an effective PAC.
However, a number of operations and working practices adopted or developed by
individual jurisdictions can be matching and beneficial to other jurisdictions. The study
group observed a variance in rules, practices, and outcomes, differentiating each PAC
from other.
Stapenhurst and Kroon (2008) conclude after observing various studies that no ideal PAC
exists, but there are a number of good practices of PACs that can be adopted by other
PACs to improve and to be more effective. They also believed that the existing literature
discusses numerous practices, but none of them identifies working practices of individual
PACs. They resulted that there was no study that investigated data of individual PAC and
practices adopted to be unique.
2.11 Governance and Accountability Crisis in Pakistan
International Crisis Group-ICG, in 2004 reported the state of devolution of power in
Pakistan during Musharraf regime. The study reported the political tactics, a military
ruler adopted to enhance his military rule on the cost of state institutions. The overt aim
of the Devolution of Power Plan was to empower the impoverished but in practice, the
plan undercut the established political parties and provincial powers were drained away,
doing no effort for corruption or accountability at local level. The report noted that apart
from strengthening democracy, the reforms, strengthened military rule, raising risks of
internal conflict and institutional clash. The core objective of regime legitimacy and
survival was enriched utilizing the Local governments to; i) depoliticize governance; ii)
create a new political elite to challenge and undermine the political opposition; iii)
demonstrate the democratic credentials of a regime to domestic and external audiences;
iv) undermine federalism by circumventing constitutional provisions for provincial
political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy. ICG also reported that District Nazism
poured public funds and other state resources to boost pro-Musharraf rallies during the
presidential referendum in April 2002 and to support the PML-Q’s parliamentary
candidates in the 2002 national elections. By that time, PAC was somehow functional,
20
but was assigned with a big backlog of past 12 years; no attention was paid to oversight
these mega corruptions scandals.
A recent study from a Pakistani author Ileana Niaz, appeared in 2010. The study is based
on fabulous amount of original sources and a strongly argued analysis of the sixty years
of Pakistan’s governance. The study attempts to enlighten Governance crisis in Pakistan
in historical and philosophical requisites. Niaz argues that the exercise of power has
reasserted and produced deterioration among the attitudes of ruling elites because of
South Asia’s native orientation. He further his argument that during the past sixty years
of independence from British rule the mind set and attitude of state functionaries and
political Jirga’s has been turning out to be more arbitrary, proprietorial and delusional.
Niaz fears the consequential corrosion in the intellectual and ethical superiority of the
state machinery has become a moral hazard to Pakistan. A decline is noticed, author says,
in the capacity of state to prosperous and uphold good governance according to its
described constitutional mandates. The study reported the worse political and
bureaucratic behaviour towards Pakistani state saying that rulers are treating state as their
personal estate while the servants of the state are tuned to be personal servants of the
powerful members of the executive. He concludes that this arbitrary exercise of power
has been materialized as an overriding rule and discouraging the institutional and
psychological moralities and practices originally inherited from British Empire.
Another recent study ‘Political Administrators’ is a story of the civil service of Pakistan,
written by Aminullah Chaudry in 2010. The author, describing the politicization of civil
servants says since everything is possible in Pakistan, it didn’t surprise him, being DG
CAA and Secretary Aviation, performing superhuman feat of hijacking an airborne
aircraft carrying the chief of army staff, on the orders of the then Prime Minister.
Chaudry describes that out of sixty five years since independence, for the thirty-three
years, the country has been ruled by military dictators. For the remaining thirty years, it is
observed that the politicians ranging from the autocratic to the corrupt; from the inept to
the clueless. He augmented that these fluctuations between dictatorship and democracy
could have been absorbed by a country with a functional and reasonably neutral civil
service. He added that Pakistan inherited well-oiled machinery called bureaucracy from
21
British but within no time its Pakistani successors forged an alliance with the army and
actively undermined the democratic process. Chaudry goes ahead saying that after break
up of Pakistan in 1971, the bureaucracy aligned with Zulfqar Ali Bhutto and on the event
of the coup of 1977, putting all its weight behind General Ziaulhaq. He further argues
that this flip-flop continued through the so called democratic regimes of Benazir Bhutto
and Nawaz Sharif, and the military regime of General Pervaiz Musharraf. He concludes
that the institutional decays occasioned by these shenanigans did incalculable and
possibly irreversible damage to the civil service in Pakistan resulting bad governance at
large.
Another story of Pakistan’s dismal governance is written by Saima Iltaf (2011). In her
study, she uncovers the bureaucratic inefficiencies. Her study is about the forces of a
country which are set in motion when huge monies flow into the coffers of countries like
Pakistan whose decision makers never consider themselves accountable to their people.
The story is a routine of government offices, the bureaucrats and their decision making.
She discusses the attitudes of these decision makers towards good governance and
development.
The literature discusses the different traits of different PACs in common wealth and non-
commonwealth jurisdictions but there found a very little work on the functioning of PAC
of the National Assembly especially during the recent government. However, the present
study assessed the comparative performance of PAC during Musharraf regime and the
PPP-led Coalition government. The next chapter is a Methodology and Theoretical
Framework of the study.
22
Chapter 3
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
3.1 Methodology
The present study deals with comparative functioning of the PAC in the selected period
(2002-2011). The Study is based on Qualitative Research and as it is a study of two
consecutive periods, the research design is a Penal Study. Consequently, the approach
adopted was primarily analytical and chronological with an element of interpretation. In
an effort to compare the functioning of 12th
and 13th
PAC to their mandates as set in the
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in National Assembly, 1992, and the Rules
of Procedure and Conduct of Business in National Assembly, 2007, respectively
(National Assembly of Pakistan, 1992 and 2007). The study orients towards explaining
how PAC is working as a probing body rather an accountability institution holding
executive authorities/spending ministries and revenue earning agencies of the
Government accountable for performance in terms of its mandate.
3.1.2. Survey Research
A survey was conducted to articulate comparative views of the parliamentarians of 12th
and 13th
National Assembly adopting World Bank Institute’s instrument used in its
appraisal of 51 democracies in 2002 (Stapenhurst et. al., 2005.) with certain changes
suitable to local parliamentary ambiance. Naturally, the present study being comparative
one, same indictors were chosen for assessing both 12th
and 13th
PAC of the National
Assembly of Pakistan. Hence two Questionnaires were used having same indicators but
different time period; one for 12th
PAC and the other for 13th
PAC. A total of 75
Questionnaires were sent to the whole population consisting Members of PAC, PAC
Staffers, AG Office, Media persons and other stakeholders for this study. However,
greater importance was given to those members who served both PACs, staffer who
served both PACs and media persons who observed the operations of both PACs. The
Questionnaires were personally distributed with the request to fill and return to the whole
population of the 12th
and the 13th
PAC. However the response rate remained 57 per cent.
23
The population and response of the members of 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure
3.1. The maximum response was received from the 13th
PAC which was 54 per cent as of
30 per cent of 12th
PAC.
Figure 3.4. Survey Population and Response Rate
A total population of 75 persons was selected for this study that include 41 MNAs, 10
PAC Secretariat Staff Members, 12 from Auditor General Office, 8 media persons and 4
others. The total response for the whole population remained 57 per cent making a total
of 32 respondents out of which include 13 MNAs, 6 PAC Secretariat Staff, 5 from AG
office, 6 media persons and 2 other.
3.1.3. Interviews
Besides, the questionnaires were distributed to the concerned stakeholders of PAC;
twenty one semi-structured interviews were also conducted from the members of the
PAC, staffers of the PAC, AGP and media persons. The details of the persons
interviewed are as under;
1. Mr. Nadeem Afzal Chan, Chairman PAC
2. Mrs. Yaseem Rehman, MNA, Member PAC
3. Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi, MNA, Member PAC
4. Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, MNA, Member PAC
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
TotalPopulation12th PAC
Response of12th PAC
TotalPopulation13th PAC
Response of13th PAC
TotalPopulation of
Both
Totalresponse of
Both
18
3
23
10
41
13
4 2 6 4
10 6 6
2 6 3
12 5 4 2 4 4
8 6 2 1 2 1 4 2
34
10
41
22
75
32
30% 54% 57%
MNA Staff AG Media Others total % of Total Response rate
24
5. Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, Member PAC
6. Mr. Saeed Ahmed Zafar, MNA, Member PAC
7. Bagum Shahnaz Sheikh, MNA, Member PAC
8. Mr. Moosa Raza Afandi, Additional Secretary, PAC
9. Ms. Najama Saddiqui, Joint Secretary, PAC
10. Mr. Muhammad Mushtaq, Deputy Secretary-Legislation
11. Mr. Muhammad Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Secretary, PAC
12. Sayed Fayyaz Hussain Shah, Deputy Secretary, National Assembly
13. Mr. Muhammad Mohsin Khan Former Controller General of Accounts,
Government of Pakistan and former Advisor to PAC.
14. Mr. Sharafat Ali, Section Officer, PAC
15. Mr. Salamat Ali, Section Officer, PAC
16. Mr. Inamulhaq, Section Officer, PAC
17. Agha Muhammad Asif, Superiendent/ Section Officer, PAC
18. Mr. Muhmamd Shbbir, Assistant, Main PAC Branch
19. Mr. Haji Hattar, Librarian, NA Library
20. Mr.Muhammad Arshad, Audit Officer-PAC Auditor General of Pakistan
21. Mr. Rouf Kalasra, Anchor Person
22. Mr. Tahir Khalil, Media Person
23. Mr. Saddique Sajjid, Media Person
3.1.4. Documentary Sources of Information
The basic sources used for this study are declassified PAC records held by the PAC
Secretariat, private papers, audit report issued by AGP, PAC reports. The study benefited
from a number of reports produced by International Institutions such as WBI, CPA and
USAID on the subject. A number of laws, books, papers, reports, newspapers and other
documents were also surfed and examined to compare the performance of PAC during
selected governments.
25
3.1.5. Focal Discussions and PAC Meetings
PAC meetings were regularly attended during the course of this research to empirically
observe the functioning and operations of PAC and to observe the participation of PAOs
and the AG. Internal Meetings of PAC (Pre-PAC) and its meetings with different
delegations like USAID etc were also attended to better understand its operations. In this
connection, the department of GPP requested the Joint Secretary PAC for a permission to
observe the operations of PAC and to attend its meetings which was permitted by PAC
Secretariat. Later On, Nadeem Afzal Chan, the new Chairman, facilitated a lot in research
activities and made easy access to data and practical activities of PAC during his
Chairmanship.
3.2. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this study is mainly based on two recent and important
works; McGee’s (2002), ‘the Overseers’ and the World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper ‘Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public Accounts
Committees’ written by Stapenhurst et al., (2005). McGee dealt with the two very
important aspects of financial oversight namely the Auditor General and the Public
Accounts Committee, while the World Bank paper further deepened McGee’s analysis of
PAC.
3.2.1 The Overseers- by McGee David
McGee’s work was based on the views of a study group organized by Commonwealth
Parliamentarians Associations (CPA) that investigated practices across the
commonwealth concerning roles and functions of PAC and AG and their relationship.
The Study assessed the working practices of PACs and whether they are delivering as
important guarantors of good governance (McGee, 2002). The main individual
conclusions and recommendations of the Study are annexed (See Annex-I)
The study group tried to distil the practices into checklists of deliberations for
Parliaments, recognizing that there is no one organizational form that a PAC will take
considering social, economic and political factors across countries. The group also
26
discussed and tried to define a modern rationale for PACs which is necessitated by and is
based on the international dimension that results from a greater inter-dependability of
nations that has brought in its wake greater challenges to good government (Stapenhurst
et. al, 2005).
McGee (2002) identified potential courses of action to improve outcomes through more
effective use of PACs. Three major finding of the study include:
Capacity Building: the need to improve the ability of Parliaments and
their PACs to carry out their functions by being provided with adequate
resources, training and access to relevant expertise
Independence: that they be free from political or legal constraints that
could inhibit them from carrying out their duties diligently
Information Exchange: that PACs have the means to exchange
information and ideas so as to keep them up-to-date with important
developments, changing standards and best practices as they emerge
3.2.2 Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public
Accounts Committees by World Bank Institute
World Bank working paper by Stapenhurst, et.al., While, defining the greater successes
of PAC, identifies impending factors effecting PAC performance based on the data
collected by World Bank Institute in 2002 on a Survey Questionnaire sent to 51 PACs of
Commonwealth including UK, Canada, Asia and Australia. The paper identified
imminent factor for a PAC was focus on government’s financial activity rather than its
practices, the power to investigate all past and present government expenditures, the
power to follow up on government actions in response to its recommendations, and its
relationship with the Auditor General. They give a comprehensive framework for
assessment of PAC performance, consisting of very important three dimensions;
Activity level - the measurement of events and input resources used such as:
keeping up to date with legislative auditor’s reports,
costs and time of staff, members, witnesses and others involved.
27
Output level - the immediate visible results of work the committee does like:
recommendations made, followed up and implemented
Outcomes level - durable improvements in public administration such as:
increased economy, efficiency or effectiveness of government programs
better compliance with laws or regulations,
improvements in financial and control structures, such as prosecution of
wrongdoers, stronger powers for legislative auditor
more accurate, timely government information
enhanced public awareness of government programs
enhanced legislative knowledge about the state of the management of
programs
Along with these indicators the study also discussed, whether PAC infect dealt with the
issues of importance reaching to its root cause or it generally investigate the symptoms of
the problems such as corruption. The study also gages the deterrence effect of PAC on
the attitude of PAOs or the departments. They argued this an aspect of performance
“relevance”. They also described an “Ideal Committee” (See Annex-II).
The present study incorporated both these works by McGee and the WBI to check the
performance of 12th
PAC (2002-2006) and 13th
PAC (2008-2011) of the National
Assembly of Pakistan. The study focuses on the comparative functioning of both PACs
during the governments, the Musharraf Regime and the Pakistan People’s Party-led
Coalition Government. The study finds some winning points on the basis of a comparison
on equal indicators and sees whether any of two PACs institutionalized those
developments. The next chapter is the Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC, a guide
for Members PAC, PAC Secretariat, Auditor General, PAOs and other stakeholders.
28
Chapter 4
The Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC
4.1 Introduction
The present chapter the Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC, is a guide for Members
of PAC, PAC Secretariat, Auditor General, PAOs and other stakeholders The Public
Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan (PAC) is an institution that
oversight financial matters of state on parliament’s behalf. PAC carries out examination
of the accounts of the Federal Government, complied by the Controller General of
Accounts (CGA) and the Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP). The present PAC is the 13th
Public Accounts Committee of Pakistan since its formation on 14th
April, 1948 (PAKPK,
2011).
The structure and functioning practices of PAC are primarily patterned after Westminster
approach. In the recent decade, it seemed, the PAC has adopted a number of
internationally recognized best practices to make its working effective. The efficiency of
the current PAC is credited to the practice of the appointment of the Leader of the
Opposition as its Chairman, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, under charter of
democracy signed by the leaders of the two major political parties of Pakistan; Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (Charter of Democracy, Rule 15).
The 18th
amendment have widened the scope of PAC oversight over state corporations,
trading and manufacturing concerns, development schemes and projects, autonomous and
semi-autonomous bodies, putting under the ambit of Auditor- General (Rehman 2012).
4.2 Background
PAC is a standing committee of the lower house, the National Assembly of Pakistan like
many other countries. PAC was established to exercise under rules 51 and 52 of the
Manual of Business in the Legislative Assembly of undivided India adopted as verbatim
in the constitution Assembly (Legislature) Rules with some minor variations in 1948
(NA, 1985). The Rules 51(1) stated;
29
“As soon as may be after the commencement of the first session of the Assembly, a
Committee on Public Accounts shall, subject to the provisions of this rule be
constituted for duration of the Assembly for the purpose of dealing with the
appropriation accounts of the Government of Pakistan and the reports of the
Auditor General thereon and such other matters as the Finance Ministry may
refer to the Committee”. (NA, 1985, P.76)
4.5 Oversight Perspectives
Parliamentary Control over public monies in Pakistan is exercised at two levels (National
Assembly Secretariat, 200?), first is the proposal stage, where government on the end of
every fiscal year comes forth with a budget proposal to get through the financial jiggle of
the public representatives in order to implement its programmes and policies for
upcoming year by overseeing the policy preparation. Second is the control over the
expenditure of public money. Here, PAC plays a watchdog role of oversight and
examines the accounts of the Federal Government compiled by the CGA and audited by
the AGP. The process assigns responsibility to the public representatives to keep a check
on public expenditures by overseeing the execution and implementation of a given
policy. This is an ex post facto responsibility.
In order to assess Parliamentary control over public monies, two inter-related universally
accepted background oversight perspectives of PAC are vital (USAID, 2009).
4.5.1 The nature and extents of the PAC oversight roles
Generally determined a predominant oversight committee in Westminster democracies,
the PAC provides a critical oversight function in the legislative process within its defined
Legislative Oversight ambit to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all
government and public agencies. Key functions include;
Providing a plausible and autonomous review process of public spending
and governments control of public funds through the examination of appropriation
accounts and audit reports
Investigating the use of public assets, resources and funds
30
Making sure the process of enquiry has greater focus on evaluating
financial management performance (rather than on policy)
Ensuring its reports, recommendation and directives are influential, using
its powers and authority
Challenging the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements.
4.6 The Committee System in the Parliament of Pakistan
The best practice around the world is that the legislative oversees the performance of the
executive through a mechanism of Standing Committees. A great number of modern
democracies have provision in their constitutions and parliamentary rules and procedures
for setting up Standing Committees to review the financial and administrative operations
of the executive departments and agencies.
The Committee System in the Parliament of Pakistan is based on the basic structure of
Westminster and the lessons learned from the best practices of committee systems of the
developed democracies (NA, 1985). A good effort remained always there to copy the
American committee system (Hussain 2012). Across the parliamentary democracies,
different committee systems are in practice to lessen the legislative burden of the house
and to provide technical support based on a detailed discussion at committee level. In
Pakistan, the system of Standing Committees is governed by the Rules and procedure and
Conduct of Business in the National Assembly, 2007. The Public Accounts Committee is
a Standing Committee which plays a vital role in financial oversight and accountability of
the executive.
The Committee System in the Parliament of Pakistan consist of thirty five (35) Senate
standing committees and forty six (46) National Assembly standing committees including
PAC, one (01) Select Committees of the National Assembly, nine (09) parliamentary
committees and eleven (11) Special Committees consisting of members both from the
Senate and the National Assembly (NA, n.d) . The number of committee in the
Parliament of Pakistan varies from time to time depending on the need and requirement
of the parliamentary process. The Secretary National Assembly controls all the Standing
31
and other committees, then, there are Joint Secretaries, each one of them control the two
major branches, Standing Committees Branch-I and Standing Committees Branch-II,
sharing the assignment of half of the standing committees of the house.
Legislative committees in the parliamentary system of Pakistan are regarded as the core
functionaries and are contributing a lot in the legislative business.
4.6.1 Difference among PAC and Other Standing Committees
Constitutionally, the Public Accounts Committee is a standing committee like other
standing committees of National Assembly but it has certain powers and responsibilities
which distinguish this committee on other standing committees of the National Assembly
of Pakistan. The major points of distinction include;
All standing committees of National Assembly deal with the affairs of
their respective ministry, while the PAC ambit all ministries/departments/agencies
working under Federal Government. Further, review of performance of
government agencies under the standing committees other than PAC is
discretionary whereas PAC has to look into each audit observation that may
pertain to all the Ministries.
The PAC had a responsibility of legislative oversight of public monies to
regulate spending of ministries/departments/agencies while other standing
committees are concerned with general affairs of ministries. The control over
public monies gives PAC a pre-eminent position in the committee system of the
National Assembly of Pakistan.
The main purpose of the creation of PAC was to ensure the parliamentary
follow up on Auditor General’s reports to regulate public spending (McGee,
2002). The jurisdictions of PAC are more in common with Auditor- General’s
ambit than does that of the other committees (McGee, 2002).
PAC recommendations are regarded its Directives which are binding on
ministries, departments and agencies, while other Standing Committees of
32
National Assembly can only give recommendations to National Assembly which
are not binding rather a set of suggestions.
4.7 PACs in Pakistan
Since its formation in 1948, the recent PAC is the 13th
one. While, six (06) adhoc PACs
have also functioned in Pakistan. The adoption of adhoc PAC shows the importance of
financial oversight in the country. A brief detail of the PAC background is given in the
introduction. The list of Chairs of PAC is annexed (Se Annex-III). PAC have functioned
for a total period of twenty two (22) years, six (06) months and two (02) days, while, the
adhoc PAC remained functional for a total of sixteen (16) years and seven (07) days.6
Although PAC existed across the history of Pakistan, sometimes it remained less
effective. Its development is associated with time and changing circumstances. PAC is
largely transforming its role from a probing body to its supervisory role increasing
efficiency and effectiveness of programs to achieve her defined objectives (Rehman,
2012). Being a standing committee, the PAC has the power to investigate and examine all
the issues referred to it by the legislature and the issues of public importance (Rehman,
2012).
4.8 Audit Reports of PAC
PAC after a complete scrutiny of audit paras prepared by AG and referred to PAC by
National Assembly is laid back to National Assembly in a form of annual audit report of
PAC. Such reports contain directives of PAC for compliance.
4.8.1 Audit Reports completed and laid before the NA
Till to date, PACs and the APACs together have completed and laid before the National
Assembly thirty (30) Audit Reports. The report of the Year 1993-1994 is ready for
printing. The report of monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC for the years
2011 is sent for approval to the main PAC. (See Annex-III)
6 The information is obtained from termination letters of different governments found in the file containing
letters of Assemblies Termination available at Library of the National Assembly of Pakistan and the PAC
reports also available at NA library.
33
4.8.2 Pending Audit Reports
A total of eight (08) audit reports are still pending. Three reports (1998-1999, 2002-2003,
2003-2004) were assigned to Special Committee II, chaired by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA.
While, three reports (2004-2005, 2006-2007 and 2007-2008) were assigned to Special
Committee III chaired by Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA. The audit reports of the years
2009-2010 and 2010-2011 were being examined by the main PAC. (See Annex-IV)
However, another four (04) reports (1981-1982, 1982-1983, 1983-1984 and 1985-1986)
were still in backlog list.
4.9 Role of Adhoc PACs (APAC)
When National Assembly remained dissolved in Pakistan, the Chief Executives, while
realizing the importance of financial oversight of the public monies, introduced proto-
PACs (APAC). Consequently, Adhoc PACs were invariably set up, during the interim
governments to examine the Federal Accounts and the Auditor General Reports (NA,
1985). The First APAC was introduced by Yahya Khan, the then Chief Marshal Law
Administer, on 3rd
march, 1960 (NA, 1985). A minimum of six (06) APAC have
functioned in Pakistan (PAKPK, 2011). The sixth and the last APAC was constituted on
25th
august, 2000 (Finance Division, 2000). It was validated by the Chief Executive
(CEO, 2001). So for APACs have produced four (04) Reports.
4.10 Functions of PAC
PAC performs its functions under powers as given by the Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business in the National Assembly (2007) and the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan.
4.10.1 Powers of PAC
The PAC scrutinizes the Appropriation Accounts of the Government provided in the
reports of the Auditor General of Pakistan. It is the duty of the committee to satisfy itself
while doing so according to the current mandate of the PAC under the Rules of Procedure
and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly (2007) ( See Annex-IV). PAC has
additional and more specific powers to perform its tasks, such as power to examine the
34
public accounts, the comments on the public accounts, and all reports drafted by the
auditor general. The PAC has the power to conduct, directly or indirectly, investigations;
to receive all documentation it considers necessary to adequately perform its functions; to
invite government members to attend its meetings and to respond to PAC members’
questions; to publicize its own conclusions; to report to the legislature; and to suggest to
government how to modify its course of action when necessary.
4.10.2 Basis of PAC Functioning
The PAC is designed to better examines the accounts for the appropriation of sums
granted by the National Assembly for the expenditure of the government policies and
programmes for the annual finance accounts, the report of the Auditor-General of
Pakistan and other matters of public importance referred by the Minister for Finance
(NA, Rule 203(1)). The PAC scrutinizes the appropriation accounts of the government
and the reports of the Auditor-General of Pakistan to its best satisfaction that the moneys
disbursed in the accounts were legally available and applicable to the service or purpose
to which they have been applied or charged (NA, Rule 203(2)a). The PAC also confirms
that the appropriate authority is governing the expenditure (NA, Rule 203(2)b). The PAC
ensures while its oversight process that every re-appropriation has been made in
accordance with the provisions made in this behalf under rules framed by Ministry of
Finance (NA, Rule 203(2)c).
4.10.3 Examining the Statement of the Accounts
The PAC is mandated to examine the statement of the accounts showing the income and
expenditure of state corporation, trading and manufacturing schemes, concerns and
projects together with the balance sheets and the statements of the profit and loss
accounts which the president may have required to be prepared or are prepared under the
provision of the statutory rules regulating the financing of a particular corporation trading
or manufacturing scheme or concern or projects under the report of the Auditor-General
of Pakistan (NA, Rule 203(3)a). It is also under its constitutional mandate to examine the
statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-
autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the Auditor-General of
35
Pakistan either under the directions of the president or under the act of Parliament (NA,
Rule 203(3)b).
4.10.4 Annual Financial Statements (Finance Accounts of the Federal Government)
Finance Accounts are required to be reviewed by PAC (NA Rule 203) now called Annual
Financial Statements of the Federal Government. The two key accounts prepared by the
Controller General of Accounts, certified by the Auditor-General and submitted to the
President are (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 171):
1. Appropriation Accounts
2. Annual Financial Statements of the Federal Government (former Finance
Accounts).
These accounts are certified by the Auditor-General. The AGP gives an Opinion on both
the accounts. The opinion on the Finance Accounts/Annual Financial Statements has also
to be reviewed by PAC conforming to international best practice. The AGP can give the
following types of opinion on both the accounts.
a) Unqualified Opinion: The accounts present a true and fair picture of the
government account balances shown in these accounts.
b) Qualified Opinion: The accounts present a true and fair picture subject to the
following observations: (These are stated)
c) Adverse Opinion: The accounts do not present a true and fair picture and as
such cannot be relied upon.
d) Disclaimer: AGP is unable to give an opinion because (various reasons
given) e.g. non-production of record or other inabilities. This is a serious
situation that PAC needs to look into like the previous one.
Important points to note regarding Finance Accounts/Annual Financial Statements are:
a) They are prepared every year by Controller General of Accounts and submitted by
the Auditor-General every year under Article 171 to the President and laid before
the Parliament.
b) They are forwarded to PAC by AGP for review under Article 203 of the PAC
Rules.
c) They have to be examined by the PAC but have not been examined so far except
perhaps once. There is no reason for this although PAC has been verbally advised
in the past that these must be reviewed.
d) The Annual Financial Statements, as against the Appropriation Accounts that
contain only an account of the expenditure under various grants contain the
following information:
36
i) Statement of Cash Receipts and Payments
This contains Total Receipts in Federal Consolidated Funds and Public
Account as well as Payments out of both Federal Consolidated Fund and
Public Account. It contains the opening cash balance of the Government plus
receipts minus disbursements and the closing cash balance.
ii) Statement of Cash Flows (during the financial year)
This contains:
a) Cash Flows from Operating Activities
b) Cash Flows from Investing Activities
c) Cash Flow from Financing Activities
d) Net increase/decrease in cash
iii) Statement of Comparison of Budgeted and Actual amounts of Receipts
(Revenue and capital) and payments by the Functions ( General Public
Service, Defence Affairs, Economic Affairs, Public Order & Safety Affairs,
Education Affairs and Services, Health affairs and Services, Housing and
Community Amenities, Recreation Culture and Religion, Social Protection,
Environmental Protection).
iv) Statement of Comparison of Budget & Actual Expenditure by Divisions of
the Federal Ministries.
v) Statement of Appropriation of grants by OBJECT DIVISION-WISE (Pay
and allowances, operating expenses, purchase of assets, repairs/maintenance,
loans write-off, retirement benefits etc.)
vi) Statement of Appropriation of Grants by OBJECT on accounts of expenditure
charged upon the Federal Consolidated Fund.
vii) A Balance Sheet of the Federal Government is also available in the Annual
Financial Statements.
viii) In note 30 of the Annual Financial Statements the Auditor-General has stated
that these are one of the principal accounts certified by him and submitted
under Article 171 of the Constitution to the President.
37
4.10.5 Presidential Obligation
The PAC also consider the report of the Auditor–General of Pakistan in case where the
president may have required him to conduct the audit of any receipt or to examine the
accounts of stores and stocks (NA, Rule 203(3)c).
4.10.6 Excess Spending
In a case when any amount of money is spent on any service during a financial year
greater than the actual amount granted by the National Assembly for that purpose, PAC
examine and scrutinize such matters on the basis of related facts according to
circumstances of that excess and issue its recommendations (NA, Rule 203(4)). PAC
work on zero saving, zero excess basis which means appropriate money should be
allocated to policies and programmes (PAC Officer, 2011). The practice of wrong
estimates given by ministries at proposal level and excess allocation to supplementary
grants that is not spent to the concerned program in due time is regarded as an aspect of
bad governance.
4.10.7 Time period for submission of Reports
The PAC is obligatory to submit its reports to the Parliament within a period of one year
from the date of its reference to the committee by the same house (NA, Rule 203(5). The
committee can also seek its extension from the National Assembly up to certain period
and if granted then to submit on the extended date specified in the motion. However,
PAC will request for an extension in the time for the presentation of the report to be
asked for before the expiry of the time allowed under the rule. In practice, it happens very
rare. A general condemnation may be given is by the house on submission of delayed
report (PAC Officer, 2011).
4.10.8 Continuity of the Proceedings
In case of dissolution of the assembly, any report, memorandum or note that the
Committee may have prepared, or any evidence that the Committee may have taken
before dissolution, shall be liable to be made available to the new Committee (NA, Rule
204). However, other than anything contained in mandate, the public Accounts
38
Committee will proceed from the stage where the previous Committee left the
proceedings before the dissolution of the Assembly (NA, Rule 205).
4.10.9 Magisterial Powers of PAC
In general provision of the standing committees of the National Assembly, PAC has
certain magisterial powers:
Powers to take evidence or call for papers, records or documents;
PAC have power to require the attendance of persons, production of documents or
records if it is considered necessary for the discharge of its duties considering it
has no harm to national security. In case of a question of the relevancy of a
document or a person, the final authority is speaker of NA to decide (NA, Rule
227(1)).
Summoning a Witness; PAC have the power to summon a witness by an
order signed by Secretary to appear before the committee (NA, Rule 227(2)).
Invitation or Summon to a member or Person; PAC have power to
invite any member or person relevant or who has an interest in relation to any
matter under consideration in PAC and to hear expert evidence and to hold public
hearing (NA, Rule 227(3).
Power of Civil Court; PAC have powers, subject to clause (3) of Article
66, vested in civil court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1998 (Act V of 1908) for
enforcing the attendance of any person and compelling the production of
document (NA, Rule 227(4).
These powers enable PAC to fix responsibility on any person or department to produce
witness or to appear before PAC. In case of non-implementation, PAC has certain powers
to refer such cases to NAB, FIA or police or to write displeasure against concerned
department/PAO to Prime Minister.
39
4.10.10 Rule Position
General rules of standing committees of the National Assembly along with the specific
rules provided to PAC are practiced for its functioning given in the Rules of Procedure
and Conduct of business in the National assembly, 2007 and the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 as amended time by time.
4.10.11 Status of PAC
Ideally, PAC is regarded as an important standing committee of parliament as it has the
responsibility of financial and audit oversight; therefore, it plays an effective role in
curbing corruption and recovering amounts wrongly spent by the Ministry/Division. The
importance of PAC has grown over the time due to the responsibility assigned to it being
highly technical, specialized and sensitive in nature.
Figure 4.5. PAC Organogram
Source: PAC Organogram as discussed with PAC Officers
Secretary
National Assembly
Addl. Secretary
( Committees)
Addl. Secretary (PAC)
Joint Secretary
(PAC )
Implementation Cell
DS
SO SO
Branch
PAC
(Main Branch)
DS
SO SO
Branch
Special Committee II
DS
SO
Branch
Special Committee III
DS
SO
Branch
Addl. Secretary (Admin)
Addl. Secretary
(Ligeslature)
Addl. Wings of PAC Addl. Wings of PAC
40
4.10.12 Constitutional Link-Reference to PAC
Annual Audit Reports along with Accounts are submitted by the Auditor- General of
Pakistan to the President under Article 171 of the Constitution. X The Federal Minister
for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs then presents the report to the National
Assembly (NA, Rule 171). The Speaker of the National Assembly refers them for a
detailed scrutiny to the PAC (NA, Rule 177). The AGP refers such reports to the
President on an annual basis.
4.11 Sub-Committees of PAC
The PAC is empowered to appoint one or more Sub-Committees, each having the powers
of the whole committee, to examine any matter referred to it (NA, Rule 224).
Subsequently, the report of sub-committee after approval by the whole committee will be
considered to be the report of PAC.
Sub-committees of PAC are sometimes assigned a whole report to review, while, many
sub-committees are constituted to review only few paras who meet once or twice. Sub-
committees of PAC have been useful tools to update its business. The culture of
inheritance of big backlog to every committee has been a practice in Pakistan. The use of
committees and especially the sub-committees in parliamentary system of Pakistan is
gaining importance.
Although the 12th
PAC constituted many sub-committees but their role remained less
effective. They were expected to be the major tools in clearing the backlog of twelve
years but the sub-committees of the 12th
PAC produced only one report for the year 1995-
1996.
4.11.1 Constitutions of Sub Committees
The sub-committees of the PAC work on the same Rules of NA and the Constitution of
Pakistan which provide for functioning of PAC.
41
4.11.2 Channels of Supervision
The channel of supervision of the PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan is as under
and is depicted at Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.6. Channels of supervision
Source:. Channels of supervision as discussed with PAC Officers
4.11.3 PAC relationship with the Auditor-General
PAC is a tool of parliament to ensure governmental accountability. The information
required for the functioning of PAC is provided by Auditor- General that ensures the
adequate use of public resources by its audit. The relationship between PAC and Auditor
General is intertwined and both are essential components of the democratic
accountability (McGee, 2002). Despite their close working, Auditor- General sends its
reports to the President being the office of the Executive. President refers its reports to
Parliament from where they are referred to PAC. McGee Study Group (2002) expressed
that the Auditor General should be a Parliament’s office due to its working association,
independent from Executive.
Nevertheless, PAC is not confined only to Auditor General Reports. PAC can pursue
matters of public concern regardless of the consideration that these matters are the subject
of Auditor General Report or not.
Speaker
Chairman (PAC)
Secretary
Additional Secretary
Joint Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Section Officer
Superidentent
Assistant
42
4.12 Assessment of PAC Mandate
The Mandate of PAC (See Annex-IV) is largely consistent with a common practice that
the apprehensions heaved in the reports of Auditor General, the Supreme Audit
Institutions, are regarded as the main basis of PACs work and mainly established
oversight concerns about the spending of public monies by the government or its
agencies. The mandate necessitates certain practices and procedures by the PAC which
conform in fundamental respects with established international practices (USAID, 2009).
Considering a very short democratic history of Pakistan, generally the PAC’s operational
rules are sufficient for its ability to perform as an efficient and effective Public Accounts
Committee (USAID, 2009). An important function of the Committee is to determine that
money granted by Parliament has been spent by Government within the scope of the
demand. The implications of this phrase are that any money spent against some grant
must not be more than the actual amount granted, the expenditure brought to account
against a particular grant must be of such a nature as to warrant its record against the
grant only, and the grants should be spent on purposes which are set out in the detailed
demand and they cannot be spent on any new service not contemplated in the demand
(USAID, 2009). The functions of the Committee extend, however, beyond the formality
of expenditure to its wisdom, faithfulness and economy. The Committee thus examines
cases involving losses, nugatory expenditure and financial irregularities. When any case
of proved negligence resulting in loss or extravagance is brought to the notice of the
Committee, it calls upon the Ministry/Department concerned to explain what action,
disciplinary or otherwise, it had taken to prevent a recurrence (PAC officer, 2011). In
such a case it can also record its opinion in the form of disapproval or pass strictures
against the extravagance or lack of proper control by the Ministry or Department
concerned.
The Committee is not concerned with questions of policy in the broad sense though it is
within its jurisdiction to point out whether there has been extravagance or waste in
carrying out that policy (USAID, 2009). While, as for as modern practices are concerned,
PACs are working to introduce efficient policies to save national resources (McGee,
2002).
43
While scrutinizing the Reports of the AGP on Revenues Receipts, the Committee
examines various aspects of Government’s tax administration. The Committee, thus,
examines cases involving under-assessments, tax-evasion, non-levy of duties, mis-
classifications etc., identifies the loopholes in the taxation laws and procedures and
makes recommendations in order to check leakage of revenue.
4.13 General Practices of PAC
4.13.1 The Chair of PAC
PAC has a chairperson to preside over its meeting and to perform other functions.
4.13.1.1 Method of Appointment of Chairman PAC
The chairman of a standing committee is elected by the committee amongst its members
within thirty days of its election in the presence of the Secretary National Assembly (NA,
Rule 216).
4.13.1.2 Government/ Opposition Chairman
Since its formation in Pakistan, PAC was normally chaired by Finance Ministers,
Chairman State Bank, (Conflict of interest situations) members of parliament from the
government party. However, in the last decades, PAC remained active up to its extent but
as the notion in Australia is that chair from a government is more likely to make
department implement committee recommendations, was not a case in Pakistan. Under
the Charter of Democracy signed by the Leaders of major political parties of Pakistan, it
was also agreed that in future the Chairman of PAC would be the leader of the opposition
(Charter of Democracy, Rule 15). Respecting an international convention practiced
around the commonwealth countries, Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA, Leader of the opposition
was honoured to chair 13th
PAC for the first time in Pakistan as a Leader of the
Opposition. He has a versatile personality with an excellent experience of being members
of PAC in the last governments.
44
4.13.1.3 Role of Chairman
The Chair is extremely important in ensuring the effective operation of PAC (McGee,
2002). Apart from his formal powers of the position, the chair is a principle
representative of the PAC to the house and the public (McGee, 2002). His role in PAC is
much further than his duties of presiding over the PAC meetings. He is regarded a public
figure and his statements are expected in that prospective even outside parliament.
4.13.1.4 Resignation / Removal of Chairman/Members PAC
The rules provided for the removal of the PAC chair are the same as provided for other
standing committees of National Assembly under its rules. A members or chairman can
resign from his membership by submitting a written resign to the Speaker National
Assembly (NA, Rule 218).
4.13.2 Membership of PAC
The Committee consists of 23 Members; all are the members of the National Assembly,
lower house in the Parliament of Pakistan and the Minister for Finance as its ex-officio
members (NA, Rule 202), who is normally the Federal Minister of Finance and Revenue.
The membership is usually proportionate to party membership in the house with its chair
from the opposition, the Leader of the House. The distribution of seats depends on the
distribution of seats in the legislature that mean PPP-led governments along with its
alliances occupy more seats in PAC than Opposition. However, a cabinet members being
a member of the committee is not regarded a good practice in common wealth (Syed,
2007).
An international convention that counter balance the majority by giving the
Chairpersonship to Leader of the Opposition is practiced for the first time in Pakistan by
the present government. This was the case in two-thirds of the PACs studied by McGee
(2002). The chairpersonship of the PAC to the opposition implies two basic functions;
firstly, it re-equilibrates the balance of power between the government and the
opposition. Secondly, their symbolic function is the fact that the chair of the PAC being
member of the opposition indicates the willingness of both the majority and the minority
to operate within the PAC in a perfectly bipartisan manner (Syed, 2007). However,
45
making implementation of PAC recommendation is a challenge for Leader of the
Opposition which is his core duty to make sure (McGee 2002).
4.14 Implementation Cell of PAC
The sixth Adhoc PAC chaired by Mr. H.U Beg forwarded a set of recommendations in its
report for the year 1999-2000. The APAC realized the lack of any mechanism that
evolves to ensure follow up of the decision made by the committee. The report
recommended setting up an Implementation section temporarily to monitor the
implementation of PAC directives further to give it permanent status by incorporation
necessary provisions in the relevant law (APAC, 2002).
Implementation Cell of PAC was formed by Gen. Musharraf in December, 2002 to
ensure the implementation of PAC recommendations and directives.
4.14.1 Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC
A sub-Committee was constituted by the 13th
PAC to review the compliance on PAC
directives under the Convenership of Dr. Azra Fazal Pechuho, MNA. Later the
Convenership was shifted on to Yasmeen Rehman, MNA to carry forward the follow up
process of monitoring and implementation. The MIC focused more on implementation
and compliance.
4.14.2 Present Tenure of PAC
The PAC is formed to work along with the recent government for a period of five (05)
years. The PAC will dissolve with the termination of National Assembly.
4.15 Process Mapping of PAC
PAC wing works as secretariat of PAC. The process mapping of PAC is depicted at
Figure 4.3. The main steps in the processing of PAC include:
Scheduling and holding PAC Meetings
Issuing agenda for PAC Meetings
Handling of briefs for PAC Members sent by AG
46
Sending of PAC directives to concerned departments/agencies and ,
recording of feedback on compliance
Keeping record of the proceedings of PAC
Maintaining record of recoveries
Maintaining of data of members
Referring of cases by PAC to FIA and NAB
Handling of correspondence with PAOs, AGP, CGA and other agencies.
4.15.1 Role of PAC Wing
Pac wing plays a vital role in the carrying out of PAC functioning. PAC wing facilitate its
meeting, provide Members necessary research, coordinate with AG office, PAO of
Ministries and follow up to PAC directives for compliance.
4.15.2 Meeting Procedures
Different steps of PAC meeting procedures are as given in details below. Also see Figure
4.3.
4.15.3 Meeting Schedule
PAC wing categorize paras of different ministries on alphabetical order for an
examination by PAC. The list is finalized and sent to Chairman. On the instruction of
Chairman, the Additional/Joint Secretary makes a consensus with Auditor General Office
and PAO of concerned ministry on their availability for a meeting on issue of importance
or important paras. A date of the meeting is decided as per the agreed scheduled. The
Section Officer issues notices for the meeting.
4.15.4 Pre-PAC at PAC
Members of PAC and the staff hold informal pre-meetings to set the agenda of the PAC
meetings. Such meetings are regarded significant in mutual discussions, agenda setting of
PAC and preparation of members for meeting ahead.
47
Pre-PAC at AG
Figure. 4.3 Process MAP of PAC
PAC Reports after NA Debate Audit Reports Audit Reports
Parliament President AGP
Finance Ministry
Other Committees
Public Complaints
(Suo-Moto)
Media Review
Ministry
Implementation
Further
Information
Implementation of PAC
Directions
PAC Secretariat
Follow up on Directives and PAC Reports
Au
dit R
epo
rts for P
AC
Rev
iew
PAC Chairman & Members
DAC
PAO/Ministry
Schedule PAC Meeting Update Briefs
Highlighted Paras
Fo
rtnig
ht
Up
date
PAC Meeting PA
C R
epo
rts
Issue Notifications
of Meetings
Pre-PAC at PAC
Report
Prepared
Report
Received
Actionable
Points
Source: Process Mapping [the Diagram is adopted with minor changes from ASP-Aid, USAID briefing to PAC Members on May 17, 2012]
Nex
t
PA
C
Meetin
g
48
4.15.5 Pre-PAC meeting at Auditor General Office
The Auditor General and PAO of the concerned Ministry hold a pre-PAC meeting to
develop understanding prior to actually appearing before PAC. This is the last stage of
consensus building between AG and the Ministry (PAC Officer, 2012).
4.15.6 Agenda for PAC Meetings
PAC Wing, on instructions of Chairman, drafts an agenda of a meeting to be distributed
among the participants. The agenda carry the detail business of the meeting. In practice
Agenda is pre-decided by AG office.
4.15.7 Meeting Set up
The Chairman sits in a very prominent chair along with members sitting on his both
sides. PAO sits in opposite to Chairman along with his staff. While the AG sits on one
side joined by his staff and opposite to his sits PAC staff. The Media, Visitors and
additional staff of any party sits on the back chairs. The existing sitting arrangement of
Pac meetings is depicted in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4. Sitting Arrangement of PAC Meeting
4.15.8 Proceedings of Meeting
When the meeting starts, The Auditor General is ordered by Chairman to read the audit
paras and the Chairman gives chance to PAO to reply. The PAO have to make the PAC
CGP
49
members satisfy by his argument, failing to what he will prove guilty. The PAC
sometimes give a second chance to PAO to make his argument clear in next meeting,
normally audit paras are decided in the first meeting.
4.15.9 Meeting in Public or Private
PAC has a greater influence on ministries and departments. In cases, when it is difficult
to hold any meeting at PAC secretariat (Parliament House), PAC members and staff
travel to different department to hold more efficient meeting during the availability of
more witness and documentations.
4.15.10 Minutes of the Meetings / Actionable Points
During the meeting, PAC wing, normally the Section Officer takes the minutes of the
meetings / Actionable Points. The actionable points of the meeting finalized by the PAC
wing are sent to Chairman for a review. The actionable points include;
Audit Paras
Answers of PAO and the Auditor General
Decisions of the Committee
4.15.11 Official Procedure for approval of Actionable Points
In case of a main PAC meeting, Section Officer (SO) of Main PAC takes the
minutes/Actionable Points of the meeting. After finalizing the minutes/Actionable Points
of meeting, these are referred to Deputy Secretary (DS) for a review. The DS review the
Actionable Points and send to Joint Secretary (JS). The JS finalize and send to Additional
Secretary (AS). The finally reviewed Actionable Points by the AS are sent to the Auditor
General office for Vetting. After vetting from the Audit, the Actionable Points are sent to
the Chairman PAC for approval for issuing to all concerned ministries etc. The official
procedure of approval of Actionable Points in Main PAC is depicted at Figure 4.5.
50
Figure 4.5. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points at Main PAC
Source: Discussion with PAC Officers
In case of a Special Committee meeting, Section Officer (SO) of that committee takes the
minutes/Actionable Points of the meeting. After finalizing the minutes/Actionable Points
of meeting, these are referred to concerned DS for a review. The DS review the
/Actionable Points and forward to JS. The JS finalize and forward to AS. The Points of
Action finally reviewed Actionable Points by the AS are sent to the Auditor General
office for Vetting. After vetting from the Audit, the Actionable Points are sent to the
Convener Special Committee PAC. The Actionable Points finally reviewed by the
Convener Special Committee PAC are sent to the Chairman PAC for approval for issuing
to all concerned. The official procedure of approval of Actionable Points in Sub-
Committee is depicted at Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points at Sub-Committee
Source: Discussion with PAC Officers
4.15.12 Finalization of Report
When all the paras of a year are examined and Actionable Points finalized, the
Actionable Points are given the shape of an annual PAC report. Internal meeting of PAC
are called to discuss the prepared report in detail to examine errors before it is sent to the
House. When in an internal meeting, the members have reviewed the report to their
satisfaction. It is sent to AG office for his Vetting. The AG office gives its Vetting report
and the report is printed and laid before the National Assembly.
SO DS JS AS Vetting Report
of Audit Chairman PAC
SO DS JS AS Vetting Report of
Auidit
Convener
Special COmmittee PAC
Chairman
PAC
51
4.16 Departmental Accounts Committee (DAC) for PAC
DAC was established by Ministry of Finance on 4th
December, 1984 and re-established
on 13th
February, 1998. DACs were activated and de-activated by different governments
on need basis. DAC are established in all government ministries, departments and
agencies to overcome the burden of PAC. DAC meetings are held among the following
representatives;
PAO of the concerned Ministry
Audit Representative
Representative of the Ministry of Finance
4.16.1 Role of DAC
The Ministry of Finance defines the role of DAC to watch the processing of relevant
Audit Inspector Reports (AIR) and decide upon appropriate measures to accelerate their
finalization (APAC, 2002). DAC meetings settle maximum paras in case action has been
taken on audit observations, to the satisfaction of AGP, to lesson burden on PAC to
examine only paras of vital concern and recoveries of huge amounts or punishments to
higher officers (NAS, 200?). DAC are working at both federal and provincial levels.
DACs help Auditee organization clearly identify potential paras in AIR with increased
concentration in preparing response to draft paras on urgent basis (PAC Brief, 95). The
results of DAC meetings have been encouraging and are proving to useful screening
forums (APAC, 2002).
4.16.2 Role of Principal Accounting Officer (PAO)
PAO is the focal person and competent authority in the process of financial oversight and
accountability. PAOs are the head of DAC and chair its meetings to settle paras of lesser
importance. The effective role of POAs can help overcome corruption, hence, very
important to PAC functioning. PAC schedules its meeting after a consensus with POA of
their availability. He is regarded as the implementation pillar in the process. While
releasing their importance in financial oversight, the Prime Minister has strictly directed
52
POAs to regularly appear at PAC meeting in a well prepared fashion (PM Secretariat,
2009).
4.17 Resources allocated to PAC
There are two sets of resources available to PAC for its operations; finances and staffing
allocated and the resources of information to carry the business of PAC. The first sort of
resources include the number of staff, the research facilitators and the equipment’s,
particularly computer facilities, need to be made available (McGee, 2002)
Secondly, the resources of information available to PAC include;
Audit reports
Media
Suo-moto Actions
Public Complaints
In the above resources, Audit reports are the main basis of PAC functioning and provide
about ninety five per cent (95 per cent) of information (PAC, 2009). PAC continuality
monitors the daily press and electronic media and takes sou-moto action of issues of
greater public concern. Ch. Nisar Ali, during his Chairmanship of PAC give ear to many
public complaints sent to PAC by the citizen of Pakistan.
4.18 Audit Briefs for PAC Members
This is audit document prepared by Auditor General Office. This is to facilitate the
Members of PAC for the meeting ahead. A brief contain:
Subject of Audit Para
Audit Objectives in detail
Ministry’s updated replies
Minutes of Current DAC meeting
Audit Comments
53
The Audit Briefs are regarded very helpful to members, who have less time to study the
paras and related information in details. In routine, the Briefs are provided to the PAC on
the prior evening to a meeting. The members normally get them on the day of meeting.
The Members when interviewed replied that briefs could be helpful if provided at least
two weeks earlier to a meeting (PAC officer, 2012).
4.19 Directives/Recommendations in PAC Reports
The main PAC and its sub-committees after a thorough discussion on each Audit para
give their directions which as per rule are called recommendation of the committee.
These recommendations after approval from the House are considered as directions of the
committee.
4.19.1 Types of PAC Directives
As for as the recent practices of PAC are concerned, audit reports of PAC are mainly
based on audit paras and PAC directives are largely issued on these paras other than
grants. The PAC give different sorts of directives to PAOs/ministries;
1. To recover the amount
2. To further inquire into the matter
3. To constitute an IDC on the issue
4. To fix responsibility
5. To pursue the court case
6. To hold another DAC
7. Can constitute a Sub-Committee
8. Can refer the case to FIA/NAB/Police
9. To place the name of a person in ECL
10. To pend/defer the audit para
11. To take disciplinary actions against person accused
12. To settle the audit paras
13. To provide the original record of any issue
14. To summon the concerned persons
15. To invite the special invitees concerning the issue
54
16. To lodge an FIR
17. Can recommend to the Prime Minister
18. To blacklist the Companies
19. To regularize the excess grants
20. To settle the saving of grants
21. To direct for Special Audit of any organization
22. To take Suo-motu action on any issue
23. Can recommend sever action for non-compliance
24. To implement the recommendations of DAC
25. To take action on public complaints
26. Take action on media review
27. And many other that suits the nature of case and legal point of view.
4.20 Follow-up of PAC Reports
The 6th
Adhac PAC started the process for follow up to its directives. They use to write
letters to ministries and received replies. During the 12th
PAC, follow up process also
continued and the MI Cell remained functional. However, the proper follow up started
during 13th
PAC. A review committee convened by Dr. Azra Fazal Bachehou, MNA, was
formed for this purpose that worked for nearly six month. Its Convenership was shifted to
Yasmen Rehman, MNA and rapid meetings took place. The committee strategized the
follow up for compliance on PAC directives. The committee held its meeting outside
Parliament premises at the offices of CDA, PTA in Islamabad and for some departments
at Lahore and Karachi. The process of preparation of Actionable Points for Follow up
Committee is the same as of the Main PAC or Special Committees of PAC. The
Committee had laid its report for the year 2010 before the National Assembly.
4.21 Responses by Ministries/PAOs
The Follow up by the MI Committee has accelerated the recovery process and ministries
are seen active and responsible to respond to PAC Directives. They appear at PAC
meeting and answer questions.
55
4.22 Recovery Status
As a result of continuous follow up, PAC has recovered 115 billion rupees which is
regarded remarkable recovery so for effected (PAC, 2011) (See Annex-VI).
4.23 Module of PAC
The proposed introduction of a computerized Management Information System (MIS)
module to be used for the PAC is a significant development. It will promote the
Committee’s efforts to improve its levels of efficiency. This system, once introduced and
fully implemented, will become the operating centre of the PAC Branch with nearly over
half of its work being facilitated through the module. The Computer qualified staff and
the members will better benefit from the system (Mughal, 2012).
4.24 Auditor General relationship with PAC
Auditor General of Pakistan is the basic source of information to PAC. The committee
relies about 95per cent on the information provided by the AG office in the form of Audit
Reports. Historically, the PAC was created to ensure parliamentary follow up on Auditor
General’s reports (McGee, 2002).
The AG submits its reports to the President being an executive officer. (Intention is not to
submit to him for accountability but perform a post office function under the
Constitution) The Federal Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary affairs, on behalf
of President causes the accounts and reports to be laid t in the National Assembly. The
Speaker thus refers the report to Secretary PAC for its scrutiny (AG Office, 2012). The
AG relationship with PAC is depicted at Figure 4.7. The relationship between AG and
PAC is exclusively reciprocal, the AG reporting solely to the PAC and the PAC relying
exclusively on AG’s reports as a source of its inquiries (McGee, 2002).
56
Figure 4.7. AG relationship with PAC
Source: As discussed with AG office Officer
In General, regardless of the closeness of the relationship, the principal way in which
expression is given to the Auditor General’s position as an Officer of Parliament is the
working relationship with the PAC. This involve providing PAC with material that forms
the basis of its inquiry work, being the source of information to committee, in turn
receiving suggestions from PAC as to the work programme that Auditor General may
undertake and report to PAC the compliance and the recoveries.
4.24.1 Reporting by Auditor General
The field officers of Auditor General pay audit to ministries/departments/agencies to
oversee their financial handlings. The information provided by these field officers is the
main basis of audit paras of Auditor General Reports. Due to lack of capacity, it is
difficult for AG office to audit 100 per cent cases. It took target sampling of high risk
cases and a sample of 2-5 for process. A higher level officer of Ag office is responsible
for identifying high risk cases, hence the sampling. However, the officers at AG office
responded their sample was always representative.
4.24.2 Highlighting of Audit Paras for PAC review
Out of all the paras published in the audit reports, the AG office put an effort to highlight
some of the important paras to lessen the work of PAC. The criteria for highlighting and
unhighlighting of audit paras are based on a manual process taking place at DAC and
Pre-PAC meeting at AG. .
AG President National Assembly PAC
57
4.24.3 Role of Audit General in PAC Meetings
Other than audit reports, the Auditor General provides an update before a PAC meeting
through the Audit Briefs based on the findings of DAC meetings and the Pre-PAC
meeting at AG office. The AG is the sole witness to illustrate the details of audit paras
and defend the PAOs before PAC.
4.24.4 Implementation Cells of Audit Department
Compliance Cells of Audit Department were established at Federal and Provincial level
for the compliance, implementation and follow up of the directives/actionable Points of
Public Accounts Committees. The Implementation Cell at Federal Auditor General was
established to play its role as follow (PAC 2012: F.1(1)/2012/PAC.Imp/Follow
up/(Audit):
Monitoring of outstanding PAC directives shall be a continuous process
requiring close liaison with the Departments/Ministries/Organizations
The Compliance Cell Shall function under the direct supervision of
Deputy Director PAC of AG
The Compliance Cell shall prepare computerized lists of all the
outstanding PAC directives and reconcile the same with respective auditee
department
On the basis of information data prepared by the Compliance Cell, action
plan shall be prepared and circulated to the concerned PAOs/Executive Heads to
arrange DAC meetings to review implementation status of PAC’s
directives/actionable points
PAC’s directives not promptly responded by the auditees shall be
incorporated in the compliance reports to be submitted to PAC Secretariat/PAOs
concerned
58
The Compliance Cell shall maintain a Register for all PAC’s
outstanding/current directives (year wise) for the purpose of regular monitoring
and supervising the implementation
Monthly progress report shall be submitted by the Compliance Cell
through Deputy Director (PAC) to Director General for implementation/further
orders
Monthly report shall be included in the Calendar of returns for submission
to Deputy Director PM & E Cell of the Director General in the first week of each
calendar month for approval and onward transmittal to Apex office.
On the basis of above functioning, the Implementation Cell of Audit Department may
keep PAC aware of the compliance of its directives. PAC can also ask for a compliance
report any time to be submitted.
4.25 PAC Staff
Recently, PAC is headed by an Additional Secretary. The next in command include a
Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretaries, Section Officers, Assistants, Clerks, computer
operators and Naib-Qasids. The staff members know well about PAC functioning.
4.25.1 The powers and duties of PAC officers and employees
Officers and employees of PAC provide secretarial assistance to the committee. The
terms of reference of PAC staff are as under:-
To arrange to convene sittings of the Committee after seeking convenience
of the Chairman or as per directions from the Chairman
Obtaining / gathering of information including preliminary material/ brief
notes on the relevant subjects from different sources including Office of AGPR,
the concerned Ministry, Public Sector Undertakings, newspaper clippings,
Internet, etc.
Sending intimations/agenda papers for the sittings of the Committee to the
Chairman and Members of the Committee
59
Correspondence with concerned Ministry / Organisations on relevant
matters
To study/examine the replies to Parliamentary Questions, relevant
newspaper clippings, material gathered from the Internet and other sources on the
subjects under examination
To prepare Lists of Points on the relevant subjects for written
replies/evidence/post-evidence purposes
To draft Original Reports on subjects selected and examined by the
Committee
To arrange for consideration/ adoption, presentation, printing and
circulation of such Reports
To scrutinize Action Taken Replies received from the Ministry, draft
Action Taken Reports and arrange for their consideration/ adoption, presentation,
printing and circulation
To arrange for putting of various Reports presented to the House, on the
Internet
To prepare Action Taken Statements for the purpose of laying of the same
in the Houses
To process the representations received from Members/ Agencies and
individuals as per existing practice
Day-to-day work relating to the Committee Secretariat.
The next chapter is a detail of observations of the two selected periods the 12th
and 13th
PAC called the colliding facts.
60
Chapter 5
Colliding Facts
5.1 Introduction
The present chapter Colliding Facts deals with the major comparative facts of 12th
and
13th
PAC. As the chapter go ahead it counts down PAC working practices, successes,
failures and results while highlighting the obstacles and hurdles that PAC faced in the
way of review process of financial oversight of appropriation accounts/financial
statements. These facts and practices exercised by two selected PAC show the efficiency
level of one committee over the other committee. This chapter will discuss when both
PAC were allocated almost equal inputs (resources), why there is a difference in output.
5.2 Composition of PAC
Generally, the PAC is composed of a set of members and a Chairman with extensive
experience or a man with an ability to conduct the financial oversight business.
5.2.1 Membership of 12th & 13th
PACs
The 12th
PAC consisted of a total of nineteen (19) members and an Ex-officio member
the Minister of State for Finance (PAC, 2007). The committee was dominated with ten
(10) Government Members and the Chairman was also from the Government party. The
other Members include four (04) from PPPP, three (03) from MMAP, One (01) each
from MQM and PML-N (PAC 2012).
The 13th
PAC consisted of a total of twenty two (22) members and an Ex-officio member,
the Minister –in-Charge for Finance and Revenue. The membership consists of five (05)
members from PML-N, seven (07) from PPPP, four (04) members from PML, two (02)
from MQM, two (02) independent, and 0ne (01) each from ANP and MMAP (PAC
2006). The members seem to be derived on equal proportion of all parties present in the
house. (for complete list of 12th
and 13th
PAC ( See Annex-V). The turnover in
membership is noticed but most of the members in the recent PAC are found associated
since its formation.
61
5.2.2 Delay in Composition of PAC
The 12th
PAC first meet on April 10, 2004 with a delay of twenty three (23) days, four
(04) months and one (01) year from the day of Government formation on November 16,
2002 (PAC 2004).
The 13th
PAC first meet on September 19, 2008 with a delay of three (03) days and five
(05) months from the day of Government formation on March 16, 2008(PAC 2008). The
comparative delay of 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.61. Comparative Delay
5.2.3 Sub-Committees / Special Committees
In Pakistani jurisdiction where every PAC inherited years of backlog, the tool to use Sub-
Committees/Special Committee proved very helpful to clear the backlog. Particularly in
Pakistani PAC scenario, the backlog has been a major concern for the two selected
Committee although none of them was successful to clear this menace. The idea was to
make a maximum use of sub-committees to clear the backlog in order to update the
operations of PAC. Hence, both 12th
and 13th
PAC constituted sub-committees for this
purpose.
5.2.4 Sub-Committees of 12th
PAC
In order to deal with the inherited backlog, the 12th
PAC constituted four (04) Sub-
Committees (National Assembly Secretariat, 2007a). The sub Committees were convened
by;
Kanwar Khalid Younis, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee I
0
5
10
15
20
25
12th PAC 13th PAC
Days
Months
Year
62
Lt. Col (R) Ghulam Rasool Sahi, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee II
Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee III
Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee IV
Sub-Committee I, on its formation was convened by Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan Jatoi,
MNA, but later on Dr. Abdul Ghaffar became a Federal Minister and the convenership
was shifted on to Kanwar Khalid Younis, MNA (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004b).
The Committee consisted of five (05) members and was assigned to clear the backlog of
two (02) years for the years 1990-91 and 1998-99 (National Assembly of Pakistan,
2004a). However, this sub-committee remained unable to complete her assignment. The
report for the year 1990-91, was later completed by a Special Committee constituted
under 13 PAC and Convened by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA. The report for the year 1998-
99 was also assigned to Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, and was under review process the
moment Ch. Nisar abolished Special Committees two month earlier to his resignation.
While talking about the performance of PAC in Pakistan, it was generally observed that
many audit report appeared before three to four PACs but didn’t reach to any conclusion.
Sub-Committee II, on its formation was convened by Mr. Muhammad Wasi Zafar, MNA,
but later becoming a Federal Minister, the covenership was shifted on to Lt. Col (R)
Ghulam Rasool Sahi, MNA (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004c). The Committee
consisted of five (05) members. This sub-committee was assigned to clear the backlog of
two (02) years; 1991-92 and 1997-98 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a) but the
assignment was not completed during 12th
PAC. These reports were later completed by
the 13th
PAC. The report for the year 1991-92, was later reviewed by 13th
PAC under
chairmanship of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan. However the report for the year 1997-98 was later
completed by a Special Committee formed by the 13 PAC under Convenership of Mian
Riaz Hussain Perzada, MNA.
Sub-Committee III of the 12th
PAC was convened by Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, (National
Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a) who has been very active member in both 12th
and 13th
PAC. This Sub-Committee remained, although it was assigned a backlog of two (02)
years 1992-93 and 1995-96 on June 21, 2004 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a) but
it successfully finalized the deliberations of only one report for the year 1995-96 on
63
September 18, 2007 (PAC, 2007 b) till the dissolution of National Assembly, hence, the
PAC tenure. The Sub-Committee III has four (04) members and it held 72 meetings much
more than any other Sub-Committee of 12th
PAC.
Sub-Committee IV was formed under Convenership of Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA
and three (03) other members (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2005). Earlier this Sub-
Committee was formed under the Convenership of Ch. Wajahat Hussain, MNA (National
Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a). The Sub-Committee was assigned to clear the backlog for
the year 1994-95 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a). He, however, never attended a
single meeting. Under his Convenership this Sub-Committee remained inactive when it
was later on shifted to Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA, who continued its working but
didn’t completed a single report. Its assignment for the year 1994-95 was later completed
by a Special Committee of 13th
PAC under Convenership of Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada,
MNA.
5.2.5 Sub-Committees of 13th
PAC
In order to deal with the inherited backlog of twelve (12) years Audit Reports, the 13th
PAC constituted three sub-committees; Special PAC-I or the Implementation Committee,
Special PAC-II and Special PAC-III (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011a) other than
some short term Sub-Committee formed for specific issues and maximum for three to
four meetings.
The Special Committees of 13th
PAC were convened by;
Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA
Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA
Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA
Dr. Azra Fazal Pechuho, MNA
Special PAC-I, Convened by Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, was assigned the responsibility of
eighteen (18) Ministries, the Committee worked as a Monitoring and Implementation
Cell of PAC, the task has been completed (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b). This
Committee had functioned as a Monitoring and Implementation Committee of 13th
PAC.
Special PAC-II, Convened by Zahid Hamid, MNA, and Special PAC-III, Convened by
64
Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, MNA, with responsibility to clear the backlog of three years
each. The reports for which were submitted (Ahmed, 2011). Both Special Committees are
again assigned to clear the backlog of three years each for the years 1998-1999, 2002-
2003, 2003-2004 to Special Committee II and 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2007-2008 to
Special Committee III (Ahmed, 2011). Special Committees are good tools of PAC to
update its business.
Other than the above said Special Committees formed, the 13th
PAC also constituted
twenty five (25) other committees to examine 4-5 paras for a two-three meetings (Ali,
2011).
5.3 Performance of Sub-Committees
5.3.1 Sub-Committees of 12th
PAC
Out of four (04) Sub-Committees constituted by 12 PAC, only the sub-Committee
convened by Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, completed its report assigned to it on June 21,
2004 for the Years 1995-96 and finalized its deliberations on September 18, 2007
(National Assembly of Pakistan, 2007b).
In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the year 1995-96, the committee
reviewed one hundred and Eighty Six (186) grants and took up a total of One Thousand
and Sixty Nine (1069) Audit Paras (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-
02).
The remaining three Sub-committees examined some paras of their assignments but none
of the report was completed. The remaining work was shifted to the 13th
PAC as per the
Rules of Procedures and Conduct of Business of the National Assembly 2007 (NA, Rule
205).
5.3.2 Sub-Committees of 13th
PAC
Out of four (04) sub-committees constituted by 13th
PAC, the first Monitoring and
implementation committee convened by Dr. Azra Fazal Pachuho, MNA with three other
members on January 13, 2009 was given the time span of six (06) months to review
65
compliance on Actionable Points but the committee never meet for a single time when
the task was assigned to Mrs. Yaseem Rehman, MNA (PAC, 2011. 2010).
5.3.3 The Monitoring & Implementation Committee (MIC) Convened by Mrs.
Yasmeen Rehman, MNA reported
The Committee held a total of sixty (60) meetings and examined sixty six (66) Grants and
1678 Audit Paras in its two (02) reports for the years 2010 and 2011 (PAC, 2011:V-VI
(2010) and 2011). The report contained Paras discussed during the Calendar year 2010
and 2011 and Actionable Points of this committee (National Assembly of Pakistan,
2011b). The performance of MIC is depicted at Figure 5.2 as given below.
Figure 5.2. Performance of MIC
The Committee formulated a strategic plan to make it more effective, meaningful and
purposeful. The salient points include:-
To name Committee as the Monitoring & Implementation Committee of PAC
To review the compliance of nine years PAC Reports for the years 2005-2006,
2000-2001, 1999-2000, 1996-1997, 1995-1996, 1988-1989, 1987-1988, 1986-
1987, 1985-1986
To direct the Principal Accounting Officers (PAOs) to ensure their presence in the
meetings of this Committee
24 36 60 58 8 66
928
750
1678
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2010 2011 Total
Meetings Grants Audit Paras
66
To call the concerned agencies (NAB, FIA, Police) to attend the meetings and
respond on the Audit Paras of any Ministry/Division/Department which are
already under their investigation
To direct all the ministries to submit lists of the Audit Paras which are under
investigation by NAB/FIA/Police.
To directed each Ministry/Division/Department to nominate a focal person for
NAB/FIA/Police cases to enhance speedy communication on such issues
To ensure recoveries be made from the defaulting Ex-Parliamentarians and
Government Officers/Officials well in time
5.3.4 Implementation on Directives of MIC on Suo-Moto Actions
The Directives issued by MIC on Suo-Moto Actions were implemented in a number of
cases; In case of misbehaviour of Secretary Communication to a Members of Parliament,
the Secretary apologized before the Committee (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b).
The FBR has instituted an inquiry to look the issue of missing of 2500 containers from
Karachi without payment of duty & taxes by FBR (National Assembly of Pakistan,
2011b). The Secretary railway was transferred from his position on non-compliance of
PAC Directive and non-cooperation to Audit Department on Robbery of Pakistan
Railways scraps material case, Concerned agencies like NAB/FIA/Police were called in
relation to every Ministry where the Audit Paras are under investigation (National
Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b). Special Audit of PTA was in Process because of
Committee’s instructions to Auditor General (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b).
Focal persons for NAB and FIA cases have been nominated in all
Ministries/Divisions/Departments and import of diesel oil in the garb of lube oil by the
FBR were implemented.
5.3.5 The Special PAC-II Convened by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, Reported
This Committee examined Audit Reports for the years 1990-91, 1992-93, and 2001-02
(National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-02). The committee constituted on
June 1, 2010 and meet for 45 days (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-
02).
67
The Committee as a whole reviewed a total of Five Hundred and Forty Three (543)
grants and a total of Three Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty five (3745) Audit Paras to
complete its three reports (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-02).
In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1990-91, the committee
reviewed One Hundred Ninety Seven (197) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011,
V-III (2001-02), 2011, V-I (1990-91). The committee took up a total of Twelve Hundred
and Eighty Five (1285) Audit Paras.
Figure 5.3. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA
In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1992-93, the committee
reviewed One Hundred Ninety (190) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-II
(1992-93). The committee took up a total of Fourteen Hundred and Sixty Six (1466)
Audit Paras.
In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 2001-02, the committee
reviewed one hundred and fifty six (156) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011,
V-III (2001-02). The committee took up a total of Nine Hundred and Ninety Four (994)
Audit Paras. The details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, are
depicted at Figure 5.3.
197 190 156
543
1285 1466
994
3745
45 45 45 135
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1990-91 1992-93 2001-02 Total of Three Years
Number of Grants Audit Paras No of Meetings
68
5.3.6 Special Committee III Convened by Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA,
Reported
This Committee examined Audit Reports for the years 1994-95 and 1997-98 (National
Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV (1994-95). The committee constituted on June 1, 2010
and meet for sixty five (65) days to complete its reports (National Assembly of Pakistan,
2011, V-IV (1994-95).
The Committee as a whole reviewed a total of Three Hundred and Forty Eight (348)
grants and a total of Two Thousand Six Hundred and Forty Two (2642) Audit Paras to
complete its three reports (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV (1994-95).
In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the years 1994-95, the committee
received a total of One Hundred Eighty Six (186) grants and Three Hundred and Nine
(309) paras of which Fifty Six (56) paras and two (02) grants were referred to Monitoring
and Implementation Committee of PAC (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV
(1994-95).
In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1997-98, the committee
received a total of One Hundred Sixty Six (166) grants and Two Thousand, Four
Hundred and Forty Five (2445) paras of which Fifty Six (56) paras and two (02) grants
were referred to Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC (National Assembly
of Pakistan, 2011, V-V (1997-98). During the course of completion of report the
committee meets for 65 days (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-V (1997-98). The
details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA, are depicted
at Figure 5.4.
5.4 Backlog
Backlog in PAC, are the pending Audit Reports of previous years need to be reviewed by
the committee.
69
5.4.1 Total Backlog Inherited
The 12th
PAC inherited a backlog of nine years Audit Reports (PAC, 2007 b). While, the
13th
PAC inherited a backlog of twelve (12) years Audit Reports containing more than
24000 audit paras to deal with (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011 (2008-09) as is
depicted in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.4. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA
5.4.2 Total backlog dealt with
The 12th
PAC dealt with only a Backlog of two (02) years for the years 1995-96 and 200-
2001 as is depicted in Figure 5.5. Its other report were still pending, the moment
government dissolved and the backlog was shifted to 13th
PAC as per the Rules of
procedures and Conduct of Business 2007 of the National Assembly (NA, Rule 205).
The 13th
PAC inherited a backlog of 12 years. The committee devised its strategy to deal
with this big backlog and constituted three sub-committees of four to five members
assigning them separate years of pending paras to review. The 12th
PAC dealt with a
backlog of nine (09) years as is depicted in Figure 5.5.
184 164 348
2 2 4 253
2389 2642
56 56 112 65 65 130
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1994-95 1997-98 Total of Three Years
Number of Grants Reviewed Number of Grants Referred to MIC
Number of Audit Paras Number of Audit Paras Referred to MIC
No of Meetings
70
Figure 5.5. Backlog Status
5.4.3 Reports Examined, laid in the house and debated upon
The Audit Reports which are referred to PAC by the National Assembly are examined by
PAC, the final reports of PAC are laid back in the National Assembly for a debate.
5.4.3.1 Reports Examined by 12th
PAC
The 12th
PAC finalized a total of Two (02) Audit Reports for the Years 1995-96 and
2000-01. The 12th
PAC laid these reports on the floor of the house but none of them was
debated see Figure 5.6.
5.4.3.2 Reports Examined by 13th
PAC
The 13th
PAC examined a total of nine (09) Audit Reports for the years 1990-91, 1991-
92, 1992-93, 1994-95, 1997-98, 2001-02, 2005-06, 2008-09 and 2010. The 13th
PAC laid
all the nine reports on the floor of the house but only one report was debated upon see
Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6. General Comparison of 12th & 13th PAC
9 12
2
9
0
10
20
12th 13th
Backlog Inherted Backlog Dealt With
1 1 2 3 6 9 170 186 356 370 1162 1532
6308
1069
7377
3038
6697
9735
86 72 158 56 282 338 0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
Main PAC Sub-Committees Total Main PAC Sub-Committees Total
12th PAC 13th PAC
Audit Reports Examined Total Grants Examined Paras Discussed Meeting Held
71
5.5 Number of PAC meetings held/ Sub-Committees
PAC is the most active Standing Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan.
During the recent two governments, the PAC remained very active and efficient to clear
big backlogs and workloads.
The 12th
PAC meets for a total of eighty six (86) days in its four years term. While it’s
Sub-Committees meet for seventy two (72) days making a total of one hundred and fifty
eight (158) days see Figure 5.6.
The 13th
PAC meets for a total of fifty six (56) days in the last four years. While its Sub-
Committees meet for two hundred and eighty two (282) days making a total of three
hundred and thirty eight (338) days see Figure 5.6.
5.6 Role of Chair
The position of the Chair of the PAC requires a very active and technical person with
prior experience of financial oversight and accountability. In an interview for this study,
Rizvi (2012) said the chairman of the PAC should have a balanced approach, having no
political biasness, must be up straight and honest to his job and most importantly have a
high level of integrity. Same views were expressed by Rehman (2011), she said that
Chair must be a very neutral person, nonpartisan and perform his duties honestly. She
also said that Chairman should behave in an integral manner, being equal to all as he is
the Guardian of the State Exchequer. Fatyana (2011) said the role of the Chairman should
be very transparent and he must be a courageous, decisive, bold, impartial and
importantly the most senior opposition party parliamentarian.
5.6.1 Malik Allah Yar Khan, Chairman, 12th
PAC
The 12th
PAC was chaired by Malik Allah Yar Khan (NA-58, Attock-II, Punjab, PML)
who was a very noble person, wise and a simple Parliamentarian. The survey result
showed he was a very regular to PAC meeting and attended 93 per cent of the total
meeting. However, under his Chairmanship PAC scrutiny speed of budget
statements/appropriation Accounts/grants was very slow. A minimum of 41 per cent of
the respondents responded somehow sufficient while another 59 per cent of the
72
respondents said the scrutiny speed was insufficient as it was required to clear the
backlog. While talking about the quality of clearance, the 12th
PAC meets for 54 per cent
more than the 13th
PAC but it recovered only Rs. 100 Million, it produced only two audit
reports, it took a few sou-moto actions on the issues of Stock Exchange Crisis-2005 and
Suger Crisis-2006. Under his chairmanship, members were reluctant to financial
oversight. The whole process was a formality. The Government seemed involved in
influencing the PAC operations and the relationship between PAC and AG was not much
strong. The Chairman seemed less acquainted with the international oversight practices,
even a member of that period said the Chair was not well aware of the functions and
powers of PAC provided by the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the
National Assembly. A media person who use to observe the proceedings of 12th
PAC
while showing his dissatisfaction said that a moment there was some worse things from
PAOs or AG, he used to say “hum to gee aap k huq main dua her ker sakty hainn” mean
he can do nothing but to pray for their rightful or good. Only 35 per cent of the
respondents seemed satisfactory of his leadership qualities. Out of the 19 Excess Budget
Grants examined for the years 2000-01, 17 were regulated and only two differed.
5.6.2 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman, 13th
PAC
The 13th
PAC was chaired by Ch. Nisar Ali Khan (NA-53, Rawalpindi-IV, Punjab, PML-
N). Ch. Nisar is regarded as a very active, vibrant and a man with prior PAC experience.
He has already served six (06) PACs and was the most senior opposition party
parliamentarian, ideally considered the best man during the 13th
PAC period for this job.
Under Charter of Democracy, it was decided that chairman of the PAC would be the
Leader of the Opposition. The practice was for the first time adopted in Pakistan which
proved so effective, 100 per cent of the respondent showed their satisfaction.
Ch. Nisar Ali was very regular to PAC meetings he attend 80 per cent of committee
meetings during his chairmanship. When asked about confidence in chair 75 per cent of
the respondents believed in his leadership. However, under his chairmanship PAC
scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriation Accounts/grants remained very fast. A
minimum of 61 per cent responded sufficient while another 39 per cent of the
respondents said the scrutiny speed was somehow sufficient as it was required to clear the
73
backlog. He made a best use of Special Committees he constituted to clear the backlog.
While talking about the quality of clearance, the 13th
PAC meets for 54 per cent less than
the 12th
PAC but it recovered Rs. 115 Billion (See Annex-VI) as compared to only 100
million recovered by the 12th
PAC. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, however, took many suo-moto
notices on the issues of public important such as alleged corruption in EOBI, under
precedent price hike of oil and gas, CDA projects, Military Land Act 1937 (A-1 Land
issue), Purchase and misuse of vehicles by government departments, Missing of record of
allotments of plots, written off of loans during last 8 years and disregard of rules,
procedures and regulation for their award, irregular appointments by various departments,
Illegal occupation of Railways land by forces, allotment of railways land to Royal Palm
Club, Hajj Scandal, National Assembly/Senate Co-operative Housing Society Scam,
Land Scam of CDA land allotments, irregular payments of Steel Mill for housing
allowances, un-authorized occupation of Government accommodations and sale of
Embassy Building in Tokyo. He also took notice of certain public complaints and media
issues. He was a good team leader and had a good control over the committee room. The
direct observation of the PAC proceeding show that Ch. Nisar had a hand on experience
and knowledge of PAC mandate, international practices and PAC powers. As it was
observed in PAC functioning during his tenure, he seemed applying every best practice of
the Commonwealth and other non-commonwealth countries rather some practices like
suo-moto which are rare in the world, remained a business of PAC remained a working
practice during his period. Generally, a big number of Members felt comfortable in
working with him from different parties. Rehman (2012) said she learned a lot from his
chairmanship and wished him to re-take the charge of his position. She also said that if he
has not resigned, till now, PAC would have dealt with the remaining backlog. She also
told that he trusted all of the members and always agreed with what other members
suggest him. Rizvi (2012) said that Ch. Nisar Ali enjoyed a full monopoly over the rest of
members. He never cares for any consensus of members and his decisions were a single
man decisions.
Ch. Nisar Ali also abolished Special Committees of PAC without any consensus of other
members, it was observed (Ahmed 2012). The Special Committees were a good tool to
74
clear backlog. The abolishing of Special Committees was a start of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan’s
reverse role for PAC, finally the resignation.
General public shared their novel experiences of Ch. Nisar period. A media person said
he had excellent auditing skill and can easily judge gaps or discrepancies of a paras.
Many people expressed that he is the one who can force PAOs to implement PAC
directives and was a man of courage who can take actions. But his resignation raised very
critical questions, if he has been chairing, despite there have been no action, no
recoveries but at least he would have done one good thing to this nation and the state of
clearing big backlog which was absolute to be finished during his period. Such backlog
gives nothing but waste PAC time and resources further diverts PAC attention from the
undated bad governance issues. Even worse of all, the entire backlog is keeping PAC
restricted to discuss ongoing projects, to work on concepts like value for money and
performance auditing.
Ch. Nisar Ali, as a chairman PAC has played very effective role. He pays special
attention to public complaints sent to the PAC, the practice has become a convention of
PAC. He is regarded bold in taking individual decision of National Interest. He has good
grip on accountability. While, being a leader of the opposition, he has a counter check on
the government.
5.7 PAC Wing Capacity
PAC wing capacity comparatively remained the same during both periods. It most of the
time depended on the formation of Sub-Committees and staff was provided according to
the requirements. The 13th
PAC had a total staff of thirty four (34). Whereas ten (10) of
them are officials of BPS-17 and the rest of the twenty four (24) are officers of BPS-16 or
below. The survey results showed a minimum of 30per cent of the respondents seemed
satisfied with the committee staff to support PAC during the 12th
PAC while 22.7per cent
found satisfied during the 13th
PAC. Another 40.9per cent of respondent were somehow
satisfied during the 13th
PAC. However, 70.0 per cent of respondent were dissatisfied
with the staff available to support the committee during 12th
PAC and 36.4 per cent were
of the same view during the 13th
PAC. Across the tenure of both PACs in this study, 25.0
75
per cent asked the staff was sufficient, 28.1 per cent said that the staff was somehow
sufficient and 46.9 per cent said the staff as a whole was insufficient to support the PAC.
Talking about the research capacity of PAC secretariat, only 10.0 per cent of the
respondent seemed satisfied with the research facility provided to PAC members during
12th
PAC. A majority of 90.0 per cent respondent grieved that there was no such facility
available. While responding to the same question for the 13th
PAC, 22.7 per cent
responded the research facility was sufficient, 4.5 per cent found it somehow and 72.7 per
cent experienced the research facility as insufficient. Overall 18.8 per cent of the
respondents believe it was sufficient, 3.1 per cent argued the facility was somehow
provided while 78.1 per cent across both the eras lacked any research availability to
perform their job effectively. It was noted that there were no special researchers available
for PAC to help members prepare for meeting.
The response to the question of provision of independent technical expertise and research
support to Members for hearings during the 12th
PAC remained largely negative 10.0 per
cent saying not important while 90.0 per cent saying not applicable at all. However,
during the 13th
PAC period it somehow improves 36.4 per cent saying very important, 4.5
per cent saying somehow important, 22.7 per cent saying not important while 36.4 per
cent saying the practice is still not applicable. Jointly talking about both PAC periods
25.0 per cent responded saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important,
18.8 per cent saying not important while 53.1 per cent saying the practice was not
applicable.
Although during the 13th
PAC period survey results say the provision of research and
technical expertise was somehow important in practice there was no such facility.
Members study the Audit Briefs and Ministries replies during the meeting which were
less fruitful. Moreover, few of the PAC staff had good audit skill to technically find faults
in audit briefs and to set PAC meeting agenda at PAC Secretariat. PAC staff found very
hard working, industrious, dedicated and experienced and can fruitfully contribute to a
successful PAC if it is utilized properly.
76
5.8 Role of Audit Department for PAC
The Audit Department has a key role as a major source of information to PAC for its
operations (McGee, 2002). However, the role of AG for PAC is very much dependant on
the role of Chairman of PAC. During the periods of less effective Chairman like Malik
Allah Yar Khan, the role of AG remained less effective, while during the Chairmanship
of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan the AG played a very active role.
The role of AG during the 12th
PAC was more a routine and smooth. AG enjoyed a
monopoly over the agenda setting and leading PAC on its desired path. Along with the
Chairman, the members were also less experienced and less active to understand and
judge the bureaucratic tactics of AG and the PAOs. The 12th
PAC held more meetings
than the 13th
PAC excluding the sub-committees meetings which were more during 13th
PAC, the performance of 12th
PAC remained restricted to bureaucratic tactics of AG
along with the political posturing, bureaucratic inefficiency and years of backlog. The
effectiveness of AG speaks its volume in the reports of the 12th
PAC. In a single sitting of
12th
PAC for the report of the year 1995-96, 180 paras were settled for ministry of
Information Technology and Telecom Division (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2007).
The AG in routine give short details of the paras under discussion, the members were
never briefed of the condition, criteria, cause, effect, conclusion and recommendations of
the bad governance in certain cases rather AG always aimed at getting through the
weakest paras of small amounts before the committee.
During the 13th
PAC period, the role of AG for PAC remained effective because of the
effective role of Chairman and the Members. The Monitoring and Implementation
Committee of the 13th
PAC played an effective role to control the monopoly of AG over
PAC operations. The committee focused more on compliance and frequently asked for
compliance reports. As a result, AG established Compliance Cells at Federal and
Provincial Levels for full compliance of PACs directives. Moreover, the 13th
PAC
established three (03) special committees and the main committee called frequent
meetings and AG was required to respond to these meetings. It required a lot of home
77
work of AG office to support these meetings. The AG office managed to hold DAC, pre-
PAC at AG office, preparing of Audit Briefs and to attend PAC meetings was a
burdensome for AG office to deal with nine (09) year backlog. The PAC members and
staff showed their confident in AG successfully accomplishing all tasks of PAC. The
services of AG were also acknowledged when Prime Minister of Pakistan, Chairman
PAC and a couple of Members visited AG office and appreciated its efforts and services
to parliamentary oversight of federal funding.
Till 12th
PAC, actionable points were sent to concerned DGs for vetting that take time,
actionable points were delayed as long as three months period and in most of the cases
these actionable points were sent back with no changes. These delaying tactics were
checked by a senior officer of AG office who himself took the initiative and started
vetting actionable points himself during the 13th
PAC period (Ahmed 2012).
The AG always had tried to limit the operations of PAC to the minimum and to exert its
pressure through different tactics to maintain its monopoly (Ahmed 2012). The tactics
normally played by AG include sending Audit Briefs late to PAC Secretariat, big role of
AG in un-highlighting of valuable paras and expert presentation skills of presenting facts
in a way things go unnoticed to members.
5.9 Number of issues other than audit reports dealt with
Both PACs are observed dealing with issues of public importance other than the issues
that appeared in the Audit Reports.
5.9.1 Issues other than audit reports dealt with by 12th
PAC
The 12th
PAC took notice of issues of Public importance
5.9.1.1 Stock Exchange Crisis-2005
The PAC noticed all the stakeholders majorly the chairman and MGs of three Stock
exchanges, Chairman, SECP and the Representative from Investment department of
Ministry of Finance to brief the Committee about the crisis. The Secretary SECP, briefed
the PAC that the reason behind the market decline was the deliberate manipulation that
78
need a probing. It was also revealed that the down fall in the index was due to substantial
decline in share prices of OGDC, PTCL, PSO, POL, NBP and PPL. The push reported
was OGDC 44 per cent, PTCL 15 per cent, PSO 3 per cent, POL 2 per cent and NBP 4
per cent (PAC, 2007. 2000-01)
The PAC suggested that the proposed task force will determine the factors that caused
crash identifying the persons and institutions responsible. The PAC seems eager to take
action against the accused persons found involved in malpractices.
The PAC directed that the matter should be submitted to the standing committee on
Finance and revenue for further deliberations (PAC, 2007. 2000-01). The PAC also
directed SECP to revisit its rules and procedure to avoid such happening in future (PAC,
2007. 2000-01).
5.9.1.2 Sugar Crisis-2006
The PAC took up the Sugar crisis prevailing in 2006. The Secretary, Ministry of Food,
Agriculture and Livestock briefed the PAC that the consecutive decline in Sugar can
yield of about 12 per cent in 2004-05 and 6 per cent in 2005-06 was the main reason. The
yield of sugar cane in 2005-06 was about 48.8 million tons, whereas on average its yield
remained 47.6 million tons between 1996-2006 (National Assembly Secretariat, 2007.
2000-01).
Secondly, the rapid increase in Sugar prices in local as well as in International market has
sprouted the crisis. The other reasons attributed to the Sugar prices in Pakistan include
increase in ex-mill price aligned with import parity, increase in raw material by 40 per
cent, reluctant importers.
The PAC observed that Economic Coordination Committee-ECC allowed mill owners to
import duty free sugar and 20 owners imported 400,000 tons duty free raw sugar., after
purification, it casted Rs 21022 per kg that can be easily sold on market price. While, the
Millers sold this sugar at a price exceeding Rs. 42 per kg and use to pay tax at control rate
of Rs. 29 per kg, violating ECC decision.
79
5.9.2 Issues other than audit reports dealt with by 13th
PAC
The 13th
PAC remained very active in taking notice of issues of Public importance.
Besides examination of Auditor General‘s Reports, the 13th
PAC took notice of issues of
public importance pertaining to following Ministries/Division:-
Missing of files/record regarding allotment of Plots/Flats (M/o Housing and
Works)
Purchase and misuse of vehicles by Government Departments
Written off loans during last 8 years and disregard of procedure, rules and
regulation for awarding of loans by the commercial Banks/National Bank of
Pakistan, including under Saeban Loan Scheme
Irregular Appointment of Consultants by various organizations
Misuse of Military Land Act 1937 (A-1 Land issues)
Land Scams regarding CDA allotment of Plots/Encroachment etc
Hajj arrangements for Pakistan Pilgrims in Makkah & Madina in 2010
Reported sale of Pakistan Embassy building Tokyo, Japan in 2007 on a
throwaway price
Un-authorized occupation of Government accommodation
Irregular payment in Steel Mills of House Rent Allowance in addition to
provision of official accommodation
Alleged corruption in EOBI
Unprecedented price hike of Oil and Gas
Construction of Islamabad Expressway and installation of five overhead bridges
Pakistan Railway Land under illegal occupation of Army/Rangers/Janbaz force
etc.
Allotment of Railway land to Royal Palm Club
National Assembly/ Senate Co-operative Housing Society Scam
80
5.10 Excess Budget Statements Examined
5.10.1 Excess Budget Statements examined by 12th
PAC
The 12th
PAC examined a total of fifty four (54) excess grants for its two reports for the
years 1995-96 and 2000-2001 see Figure 5.7. The Committee successfully regulated sixty
three (63) per cent, a total of thirty four (34) excess grants during its entire period of
functioning. The Committee also regulated another thirteen (13) per cent, a total of seven
(07) excess grants subject to verification of figures by the Audit Department. However,
the Committee differed twenty four (24) per cent, a total of thirteen (13) excess demands
as is depicted at Figure 5.7.
The 12th
PAC as a whole for its two (02) reports regulated a total of Rs.
121,770,163,750/- and regulated another sum of Rs. 101,418,692/- subject to
reconciliation of figures from Audit Department and differed a total amount of Rs.
4,152,085,486/-.
Figure 5.7. Excess Budget Statements examined by 12th PAC
5.10.1.1 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2000-2001
Out of nineteen (19) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 12th PAC for the
year 2000-2001, the Committee regulated sixty eight (68) per cent, a total of thirteen (13)
excess grants see Figure 5.7. The Committee also regulated twenty one (21) per cent, a
19
35
54
13 21
34
4 3 7 2
11 13
0
20
40
60
Main PAC (2000-01) Sub-Committee (1995-96) Total of 12th PAC
Total Excess Grants Examined
Total Excess Grants Regulated
Total Excess Grants Regulated Subject to Verification of Audit Dept.
Total Excess Grants Differed
81
sum of four (04) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. On the other
hand, the Committee differed eleven (11) per cent, making a total of two (02) excess
grants. The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 83,720,275,327/- against thirteen (13)
excess grants of seven (07) ministries including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of
Commerce, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of Information
Technology & Telecommunication, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs & Northern Areas,
Finance Division and Economic Affairs Division. The Committee also regulated a total
amount of Rs. 81,951,700/-, subject to verification of figures by the Audit Department for
another for (04) excess grants for three (03) ministries including the Ministry of
Commerce, Kashmir Affairs & Northern Areas Division and State & Frontier Regions
Division. While it differed a total amount of Rs. 3,246,530,526/-, against two (02) excess
grants demanded by two (02) ministries including the Ministry of Pakistan Railways and
the Ministry of State and Frontier Regions.
5.10.1.2 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1995-96
The report for the year 1995-96, reviewed by Sub-Committee Convened by Mr. Riaz
Fatyana, MNA, regulated sixty (60) per cent, making a total of twenty one (21) excess
grants from a total thirty five (35) excess grants examined see Figure 5.7. The Committee
also regulated another nine (09) per cent, making a total of three (03) excess grants
subject to verification of Audit Department. However, this Committee differed twenty
nine (29) of per cent, making a total eleven (11) excess grants. The Committee regulated
a total of Rs. 38,049,888,423/- against twenty one (21) excess grants for twelve (12)
ministries including the Ministry of Culture Sports and Tourism, Ministry of Defence,
Economic Affairs Division, Election Commission of Pakistan, Ministry of Environment,
Finance Division, Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas-KANA Division,
Ministry of Railways and SAFRAN Division. The Committee also regulated another
amount of Rs. 1,946,699/-, subject to verification of figures from the Audit Department
for three departments including Housing & Works, Interior and Population Welfare
Division. While, the Committee differed a total amount of Rs. 905,554,960/- against
eleven (11) grants demanded by six (06) ministries including Commerce Division,
82
Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,
Ministry of Labour & Manpower, SAFRAN Division and Ministry of Social Welfare &
Special Education.
5.10.2 Excess Budget Statements examined by 13th
PAC
The 13th
PAC reviewed a total of four hundred and thirty six (436) excess grants during
the examination of its nine (09) reports. The Committee successfully regulated ninety
(90) per cent, a total of three hundred and ninety one (391) excess grants see Figure 5.8.
Another seven (07) per cent of excess grants, making a total of thirty (30) excess grants
were recommended to be regulated subject to verification of record by Audit Department
which is very likely. However, the 13th
PAC differed three (03) per cent of excess grants,
making a total of fifteen (15) excess grants as is depicted at Figure 5.8.
The 13th
PAC as a whole for its eight reports regulated a total of Rs. 280,337,016,700/-
and regulated another sum of Rs. 30,580,047,216/- subject to reconciliation of figures
from Audit Department and differed an amount of Rs. 224,043,621,257/-.
5.10.2.1 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1991-1992
Out of eighty seven (87) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC for
the year 1991-1992, the Committee regulated seventy seven (77) per cent, a total of sixty
seven (67) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated fifteen (15) per
cent, a sum of thirteen (13) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.
Although, the Committee differed eight (08) per cent, making a total of seven (07) excess
grants.
The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 22,465,163,445/- against sixty seven (67) excess
grants demanded by twenty six (26) ministries including Ministry of Interior, Ministry of
Education, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Federal Board of Revenues,
Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Ports & Shipping, Ministry of Food,
Agriculture and Livestock, Wafaqi Mohtasib, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of
Commerce, Cabinet Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry
of Housing & Works, Ministry of States & Frontier Regions, Ministry of Industries &
83
Production, Special Education & Social Welfare Division, Ministry of Culture, Ministry
of Kashmir & Northern Affairs, Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development,
Establishment Division, Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Environment, Ministry
of Population Welfare, Prime Minister Secretariat and Planning & Development
Division.
The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 4,391,480,534 /-, subject to
verification of figures by the Audit Department against thirteen (13) excess grants for six
(06) ministries including the Ministry of Water & Power, Ministry of Labour, Manpower
& Overseas Pakistanis, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Religious
Affairs & Minorities Affairs, Ministry of Labour & Manpower. While it differed a total
amount of Rs. 1,813,385,337/-, against seven (07) excess grants demanded by for (04)
ministries including the Ministry of Water & Power, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of
States & Frontier Regions and Ministry of Railways.
5.10.2.2 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2005-06
Out of seventy two (72) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC for
the year 2005-06, the Committee regulated ninety three (93) per cent, a total of sixty
seven (67) excess grants see Figure 5.8. However, the Committee differed seven (07) per
cent, making a total of five (05) excess grants.
The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 19,205,310,742/- against sixty seven (67) excess
grants demanded by thirty seven (37) ministries including the Ministry of Commerce,
Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs, Ministry of Defence,
Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Education, Establishment Division, Ministry of
Environment, Civil Secretariat, Federal Board of Revenue, Federal Tax Ombudsman
Secretariat, Finance Division, Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry of
Industries, Production and Special Initiatives, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,
Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications, Ministry of Interior,
Board of Investment, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry of
Labour and Manpower, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Ministry
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of Minorities Affairs, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Planning and
Development Division, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Science and Technology,
Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education, Ministry of States and Frontier
Regions, Statistics Division, Ministry of Textile Industry, Ministry of Tourism, Wafaqi
Mohtasib Secretariat and Ministry of Water and Power.
While the committee differed a total amount of Rs. 24,403,185,812/-, against five (05)
excess grants demanded by five (05) ministries including the Ministry of
Communications, Economic Affairs Division, Earthquake Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA), Postal Services and Supreme Court of Pakistan.
5.10.2.3 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2008-09
Out of fifty seven (57) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC for
the year 2008-09, the Committee regulated eighty four (84) per cent, a total of forty eight
(48) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated fourteen (14) per cent, a
sum of eight (08) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. However, the
Committee differed two (02) per cent, making a total of one (01) excess grants.
The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 197,187,406,880/- against forty eight (48) excess
grants demanded by twenty seven (27) ministries including the Ministry of
Communications, Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Defence, Ministry
of Education, Establishment Division, Federal Board of Revenue, Federal Tax
Ombudsman Secretariat, Finance Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of
Industries & Production, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior,
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas,
Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources,
Planning and Development Division, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Science and
Technology, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Statistics Division, Ministry of
Textile Industry, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Pakistan
Atomic Energy Commission, National Accountability Bureau and Ministry of Overseas
Pakistanis.
85
Figure 5.8. Excess Budget Statements examined by 13th PAC
87 72 57
216
66 54 35
155
49 16
65
436
67 67 48
182
64 47 33
144
49 16
65
391
7 5 1 13 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 15 13 0 8 21 2 5 2 9 0 0 0 30
174 144 114
432
132 108 70
310
98 32
130
872
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1991-92 2005-06 2008-09 Total 1990-91 1992-93 2001-02 Total 1994-95 1997-98 Total GrandTotal
Main PAC Special PAC-II Special PAC-III Total of13th PAC
Total Excess Grants Examined
Total Excess Grants Regulated
Total Excess Grants Differed
Total Excess Grants Regulated Subject to Verification of Audit Dept.
Grand Total
86
The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 25,670,336,632/-, subject to
verification of figures by the Audit Department against eight (08) excess grants for only
five (05) ministries including the Ministry of Food & Agriculture Economic Affairs
Division, Establishment Division, FATA Secretariat and Social Welfare and Special
Education.. While it differed a total amount of Rs. 197,187,406,880/- against one (01)
excess grants demanded by Ministry of Postal Services.
5.10.2.4 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1990-91
Out of sixty six (66) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for the
year 1990-91, the Committee regulated ninety seven (97) per cent, a total of sixty four
(64) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated three (03) per cent, a
sum of two (02) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.
The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 7,985,797,173/- against sixty four (64) excess
grants demanded by twenty for (24) ministries including the Ministry of
Communications, Central Board of Revenue, Civil Secretariat (FATA), Ministry of
Commerce, Council of Islamic Ideology, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs,
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Establishment Division, Finance Division,
Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of
Health, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry of Industries & Production, Ministry of
Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and
Northern Areas, Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Ministry of Population Welfar,
Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minorities
Affairs, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Ministry of Social Welfare and Special
Education, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat and Ministry of Water and Power.
The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 78,135,866 /-, subject to verification
of figures by the Audit Department against two (02) excess grants for the Ministry of
Health and Economic Affairs Division.
87
5.10.2.5 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1992-93
Out of fifty four (54) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for the
year 1992-93, the Committee regulated eighty seven (87) per cent, a total of forty seven
(47) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated nine (09) per cent, a sum
of five (05) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. However, the
Committee differed four (04) per cent, making a total of two (02) excess grants.
The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 8,070,578,131/- against forty seven (47) excess
grants demanded by twenty four (24) ministries including the Ministry of Cabinet
Division, Central Board of Revenue, Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ministry of
Tourism, Ministry of Defence, Economics Affairs Division, Ministry of Education,
Establishment Division, Civil Secretariat (FATA), Finance Division, Ministry of Food,
Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of
Housing & Works, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior,
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Labour, Manpower and Overseas
Pakistanis Division, Planning and Development Division, Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Resources, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of States and Frontier
Regions, Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat
and Ministry of Water and Power.
The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 25,670,336,632/-, subject to
verification of figures by the Audit Department against five (05) excess grants for three
ministries including the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Social
Welfare and Special Education, . However, it differed a total amount of Rs.
197,187,406,880/- against two (02) excess grants demanded by Ministry of
Communications and Ministry of Defence.
5.10.2.6 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2001-02
Out of thirty five (35) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for the
year 2001-02, the Committee regulated ninety four (94) per cent, a total of thirty three
(33) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated six (06) per cent, a sum
of two (02) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.
88
The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 3,326,246,701/- against thirty three (33) excess
grants for only fifteen ministries including the Ministry of Cabinet Division, Ministry of
Commerce, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Food, Agriculture &
Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry of
Industries & Production, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Ministry of
Interior, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry of Labour, Manpower
and Overseas, Ministry of Population Welfare, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Zakat and
Ushr and Ministry of Water and Power.
The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 290,620,020/-, subject to verification
of figures by the Audit Department against two (02) excess grants for the Central Board
of Revenue and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas,
5.10.2.7 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1994-95
Out of forty nine (49) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-III of 13th PAC for the
year 1994-95, the Committee regulated hundred (100) per cent, a total of forty seven
(49) excess grants see Figure 5.8.
The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 5,035,910,874/- for excess grants for twenty one
(21) ministries including Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Sports & Tourism,
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Local
Government and Rural Development, Economic Affairs Division, FATA Secretariat,
Finance Division, Foreign Affairs Division¸ Ministry of Health, Ministry of Information
& Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Industries and Production, Ministry of
Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas
Pakistanis Division, Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs,
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Narcotics Control Division,
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and Ministry of Special Education and Social
Welfare.
89
5.10.2.8 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1997-98
Out of fifty four (16) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-III of 13th PAC for the
year 1997-98, the Committee regulated hundred (100) per cent, a total of sixteen (16)
excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 17,060,602,754/-
against excess grants of thirteen (13) ministries including Ministry of Commerce,
Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of
Local Government and Rural Development, Economic Affairs Division, FATA
Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finance Division, Labour, Manpower and
Overseas Pakistanis Division, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Zakat, Ushr and Minorities
Affairs, Ministry of Postal Services and Ministry of States and Frontier Regions.
5.11 Quality of Clearance
As the PAC in Pakistan during the last many years have been dealing with backlog, the
clearance of backlog remained the main concern. Another aspect of it is that such backlog
diverts the attention of PAC in paying its attention to the misappropriations in the on-
going recent projects. The practical approach could be to deal with selective backlog, the
issue of greater value where big amounts of monies are involved and the chances of more
recoveries. Hence, the quality of clearance stands how wisely one committee deals with
years of backlog considering the importance of time and the work pending.
5.11.1 Number of Audit Paras Discussed
The main committee of the 12th
PAC discussed a total of 6308 audit paras whereas it sub-
committee discussed a total of 1069 audit paras. Hence, the 12th
PAC discussed a total of
7377 audit paras during its tenure as is depicted at Figure 5.9.
The main committee of the 13th
PAC discussed a total of 3038 audit paras, where as its
sub-committees discussed a total of 6697 audit paras making a total of 9735 audit paras
discussed during the 13th
PAC period as is depicted at Figure 5.9.
90
Figure 5.9. Audit Paras Discussed V/S Directives Passed
5.11.2 Directive Passed
The Main PAC of the 12th
PAC passed a total of 967 directives - its sub-committee
passed a total of 456 directives. The 12th
PAC as a whole passed a total of 1423 directives
with a per centage rate of only 19. While, the Main PAC of the 13th
PAC passed a total of
1681 directives, its sub-committee passed a total of 3238 directives. The 13th
PAC as a
whole passed a total of 4919 directives with a per centage rate of 51 as is depicted at
Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.10. Compliance Rate in Per centage
5.11.3 Per centage of directives implemented by institution concerned
The rate of compliance during both 12th
and the 13th
PAC periods remained very low.
During the 12th
PAC, the compliance rate observed at rate of less than 10 per cent while
7377
9735
1423
4919
19 51 0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
12th PAC 13th PAC
Audit Paras Discussed Directives Passed % of Directives Passed
9 14
91 86
0
20
40
60
80
100
12th PAC 13th PAC
% of Directives Implemented % of Action Pending
91
the compliance rate for 13th
PAC little more than 12th
PAC being 14 per cent (AGP
2011). The Compliance rate is depicted at Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11. Quality of Clearance
5.11.4 Per centage of Actions Pending
Assessing the PAC compliance record, it was found that more than 90 per cent of actions
were pending till the point of time 12th
PAC was dissolved. While, on assessing the
reports of the Compliance Cell of Audit Department, on an average 86 per cent of actions
were still pending to the end of 2011 (AGP 2011) as is depicted in Figure 5.10 and Figure
5.11.
5.12 Amount of money saved or recovered
Being the guardians of good governance and financial control over resources, amounts of
money saved or recovered remained the main objective of any PAC.
5.12.1 Recoveries Made by 12th PAC
The 12th
PAC directed recovery amount of Rs 169.775 million out of which a sum of Rs
101.492 million was realized (PAC, 2007. 2000-01).
5.12.2 Recoveries Made by 13th PAC
The efficiency of the PAC in recent years may also be gauged from the fact, the amount
of recoveries made from various Government Organization, which were Rs. 5.12 billion
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
Audit ParasDiscussed
DirectivesPassed
DirectivesImplemented
Rate ofCompliance in
%
ActionPending
12th PAC
13th PAC
92
in 2000-2001 and only Rs.3.93 billion in 2006-07, have gone up to Rs.19.43 billion in the
year 2008-09 and Rs. 24.967 billion in 2009-2010. For the 1st & 2nd quarters, 2010-11
recovery is Rs. 17.723 billion and for the month of January, 2011 only it is Rs. 6.06
billion. Approximately, Rs.115 Billion have been recovered so far as a result of PAC
directives(PAC 2011) (Annex-VI).
5.12.3 Major Areas of Recoveries
Loss due to investment in Stock Exchange in violation of Prime Minister‘s
instructions – Rs 4.14 Billion (M/o Planning and Development)
Un-necessary purchase of LPG plant by OGDCL- Rs. 576 million (M/o
Petroleum and Natural Resources)
Misappropriation of PC poles - Rs. 39.685 million (M/o Water and Power)
Undue advantage of US $. 1244 million allowed to a contractor (M/o Water and
Power)
Non-recovery of standard rent from un-authorized occupants Rs. 83.3 million
(M/o Housing and Works)
Expenditure on account of pay and allowances of work charged establishment of
Pak-PWD in excess of the permissible limit Rs. 160.1 million. (M/o Housing and
Works)
Non-recovery of water charges from the residents Rs. 158.4 million (M/o Housing
and Works)
Non-retrieval of 20,000 acres of land costing – Rs. 100 billion (M/o Housing and
Works) xii
Loss of Rs. 12.742 million on account of short recovery of Railway‘s dues owing
to irregular adjustment of school fund (M/o Railways)
Un-justified procurement of imported vehicles Rs. 16 million (M/o
Communications)
Non-taxation of commission/interest income under normal law Rs. 9.543 million
(Federal Board of Revenues)
Loss of revenue due to non-initiation of timely proceedings Rs. 1,063.543 million
(Federal Board of Revenues)
93
fraudulent drawl of sales tax refund Rs. 20.00 billion (Federal Board of Revenues)
Non/short-realization of sales tax, additional tax and penalty Rs. 1352.088 million
(Federal Board of Revenues)
Inadmissible refund of sales tax Rs. 140.002 million (Federal Board of Revenues)
Loss of potential earning of Rs. 1,889 million due to unnecessary detention of a
Wagon in Heavy Mechanical Complex, Taxila (M/o Railways)
5.13 PAC Meeting out of Parliament Premises
During 12th
PAC, no PAC meeting was held outside parliamentary premises, however,
during the 13th
PAC, the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of the PAC
Convened by Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, held meetings out of Parliament House,
such meetings were held at the department of Capital Development Authority (CDA),
Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) and a couple of meetings at Lahore and
Karachi. Yasmeen Rehman, Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview for this study that
now PAC meetings are open to media and general public and they are doing efforts to
solve entry problem of those interested.
5.14 Average Attendance of Members
On an average the attendance of members during the 12th
PAC remained 10.46 members
per sitting. Normally the 12th
PAC consisted of 18 members. Some of the members
remained members across the tenure, while some came and left the committee after short
time.
While, on an average the attendance of the members during the 13th
PAC remained 10.35
members per sitting. Normally the 13th
PAC consisted of 22 to 23 members. Most of the
members seemed consistent while some attended one are two meetings.
5.14.1 Effective Members
There are many factors in the functioning of a PAC to check the effectiveness of a
member. During both of the committees being observed in this study, on an average
members seemed effective both in term of their participation and contribution in the
quality of clearance. However, a member can be judged on the basis of his or her
94
attendance in the committee meetings, participation in committee debates, membership in
sub-committees and the financial oversight capacity.
5.14.1.1 Members Effectiveness of 12th
PAC
While discussing the effectiveness of members, Malik Allah Yar Khan, Chairman PAC,
remained the most active participant, hence most effective in the main PAC. He attended
a total of eighty (80) meetings out of eighty six (86) meetings held across the committee
tenure with a per centage of ninety three (93) meetings.
Prof. Aasiya Azeem, Member, stood second effective members; she attended seventy one
(71) meeting with a per centage of eighty two (82) meetings. Syed Qurban Ali Shah,
Member, remained the third most effective members, who attended sixty five (65)
meetings, a seventy six (76) per cent of total meeting.
Five (05) members attended 60-75 per cent meetings, seven (07) members attended 40-59
per cent meetings, four (04) members attended 10-39 per cent meetings and one (01)
attended less than 10 per cent meetings. While, Ch. Wajahat Hussain, Member, remained
members of the committee across its tenure but he never attended any single (01)
meeting.
Riaz Fatyana, Member, attended fifty eight (58) meeting of Main PAC. He was also the
Convener of a sub-committee and attended its 72 meeting. Overall he attended 130
Meetings during the 12th
PAC period. He also produced a report of its sub-committee for
the years 1995-96.
5.14.1.2 Effective Members of 13th
PAC
Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, Members, 13th
PAC, remained the most effective members in the
main PAC. She attended fifty four (54) meetings out of fifty six (56) meeting of main
PAC with an attendance of ninety six (96) per cent. She also remained the Convener of
Special Committee-I of PAC and attended its nine (09) meetings. She also attended thirty
seven (37) Meeting of the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC. Hence,
she attended a total of one hundred (100) meetings in all. She also contributed two (02)
reports of the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC. She took six
95
international study tours and represented PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan at
different international forums, workshops and conferences.
Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman and Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, Member, stood second,
each of them attended forty five (45) meetings, making eighty (80) per cent of all
meetings held. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman, being the Leader of the Opposition
remained most effective and active chairman. Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, was also the
Convener of Special Committee-III. He attended its forty five (45) meeting. Hence, he
attended a total of ninety (90) meetings.
Mr. Zahid Hamid, Member, remained third most effective member, who attended forty
three (43) meeting making seventy seven (77) per cent of all meeting held so for 13th
PAC. He was also the Convener of Special Committee-II and attended its fifty four (54)
meetings. Overall, he attended a total of ninety seven (97) meetings.
A total of six (06) members attended 50-75 meetings, another four (04) members
attended 20-49 per cent meetings, five (05) members attended 15-19 per cent meetings
and twelve (12) members attended less than ten (10) per cent meetings. While, ten (10)
members attended less than five (05) meeting, of what three (03) members attended only
two (02) meetings and five (05) members of them attended only a single (01) meeting.
Sardar Ali Muhammad Khan Mahar was the member of 13th
PAC who never attended a
single meeting.
5.15 Performance of Monitoring & Implementation Committee
Performance of any PAC can be measured on the basis of rate of compliance and the
implementation of its directives. Hence, Monitoring and Implementation Committees are
important to measure the output of a committee.
5.15.1 Formation of Implementation Cell
On its constitution during the 6th
Adhoc PAC under H.U. Beg, the Implementation Cell
was merely a correspondence office. The Cell wrote letters to ministries and departments
for compliance on PAC Directives but this correspondence was never taken serious. The
formation of mere Implementation Cell without a Monitoring Committee was naturally
96
less effective. However, it was a start on the way to implementation or compliance of
PAC directives.
5.15.2 Implementation Cell under 12th
PAC
During the 12th
PAC period, Implementation Cell was headed by a Section Officer, but
the operations of Implementation Cell were restrained with an additional assignment of
assisting two sub-committees each headed by Riaz Fatyana, MNA and Kanwar Khalid
Younis, MNA. Due to its work load of two sub-committees, the implementation Cell was
unable to perform its basic functioning. The implementation Cell spent as less as 10 per
cent of its time to implementation follow up and 90 per cent of its time to Sub-
Committees in its effort to clear backlog and preparing audit reports (Shah 2012). The
Staff seems in trouble and the status of Implementation Cell fading while its staff
performing the duties of supporting other committees who were working on clearing
backlog. To perform both duties realizing the importance and sensitivity of
implementation work and the dedication required to clear the backlog was undermining
the importance of Implementation Cell said the officer who was on duty that time. On
making Cell operational, only 10 per cent of implementation work was impossible
depending on the resources and political setup of that time. Overall the Cell, lack any
power to take action to implement PAC directives, he embarked. However, the
compliance rate during the 12th
PAC period was as low as below 5 per cent which was
only because of non-existing of Monitoring and Implementation Committee.
5.15.3 Review Committee of the 13th
PAC
The 13th
PAC on its constitution formed a review committee on 13th
January, 2009 for
period of six (06) month, the review committee was Convened by Dr. Azra Fazal
Pechecho, MNA, to review the compliance of actionable points of PAC (National
Assembly Secretariat, 2010:VI(2010). However, under this committee no meeting was
held till the termination of its period. Hence, no progress was made under this committee
(PAC 2011).
97
5.15.4 Monitoring and Implementation Committee of 13th PAC
On formation of Monitoring and Implementation Committee on 5th October, 2009,
Under the Convenership of Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, the implementation and
compliance process accelerated. The MIC took internal meeting to formulate strategic
plan for an effective follow up and implementation process. The MIC took dozens of suo-
moto actions and most of them were implemented with positive responses as a whole.
MIC, naturally lack authority to give its directive, however, in certain cases it passed
directives which include i) in case of full recovery, the committee settles the audit para,
ii) in case of full compliance, the committee settles the audit para, iii) in case of non-
compliance, the committee deferred the para till next meeting with directions to PAO to
make compliance during the given period.
The MIC made a follow up strategy for an effective compliance, under this strategy, the
MIC or the Implementation Cell wrote regular letters to the ministries for compliance to
certain directives and calls were made. The Compliance Cell of Audit Department also
reported the rate of compliance to MIC on need basis as there were only lists of non-
compliance which was the only performance of these Compliance Cells of Audit
Department. However, the MIC was a sword of domical always hanging over the AG and
Ministries.
The MIC had prepared its two (02) reports; the report for the year 2010 laid before the
National Assembly while the report for the year 2011 is ready to be laid. The MIC held a
total of twenty four (24) meetings, examined fifty eight (58) grants and nine hundred and
twenty eight (928) audit paras (PAC, 2011. V-VI (2010) for its report for the 2010, while
it held a total of thirty six (36) meetings, examined eight (08) grants and seven hundred
and fifty (750) audit paras.
5.16 Impact of Foreign Tours
During both selected PACs periods members and secretariat staff went on different
foreign study tours and benefited a lot out of them. During the 12th
PAC, there were rare
98
study tours. A minimum of 3-4 study tours were noted to be held to different countries
including UK and Canada.
However, the 13th
PAC took a number of study tours to attend international conferences,
briefings or workshops to different courtiers including Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lanka
and UK. The Members and staff who went on these study tours responded that they have
benefited a lot out of these tours. Chan (2012) says that we were able to present our
successes at international forum when we attended a PAC related Conference at Thailand
and got our work acknowledged there which give us confidence and courage to work
more. Rehman (2012) said that she learned the concepts of Value for Money and Audit
Performance only when she attended PAC workshops at UK. However, she told there is
no such idea in our PAC. She also astonished that for the first time she realized that our
compliance rate was very low and we were mere on traditional methods of follow up
when she was told by Britain PAC Chair that they have 90 per cent compliance rate and
they use very modern methods and there was no question of non-compliance. They
further told that 10 per cent non-compliance was reasoned and there were some technical
problems in that said Yasmeen Rehman, a PAC member.
Ahmed (2011) a staff member of PAC and head of MIC who have been on study trips to
Bangladesh and Thailand told that the trips boosted his explore of follow up strategies
and better understanding of PAC operations.
5.17 Donor Assistant
The practice of donor assistant to PAC was rarely noted. The only funding during the
entire selected period of study was received by World Bank of an amount of US 240000
$ during the 12th
PAC period (Shabbir 2012). The funding was purposed to be spent on
four areas including conducting of workshops, study tours of members and staff to
abroad, hiring of consultant and purchase of equipment’s like computers, laptops, printer,
multimedia projectors and other related necessaries.
Under this project, a 2-3 days’ workshop was conducted, two (02) members including the
Chairman Malik Allah Yar Khan went on a study tour and the PAC purchased three (03)
99
laptops, three (03) printers, four (04) desktop computers and one (01) multimedia
projector (Shabbir 2012).
However, due to lack of consensus between PAC and the World Bank on hiring of
consultant, the project was cancelled and the remaining money was returned back. While,
USAID provided with some computers. printers and laptops during 12th
and 13th
PAC
periods (Shabbir 2012).
5.18 IT progress of PAC
There is a proposal of introducing a latest computerized MIS module for the use of PAC,
the programme can enhance the efficiency of the committee. While during the 12th
PAC
period, there was no IT progress except some computers for typing notices for
meetings(Shabbir 2012).
The chapter ahead is based on the perceptions of the respondents to a survey conducted to
assess the performance of PAC during two different governments.
100
Chapter 6
Challenging the Past
6.1 Introduction
A survey was conducted for this study adopting World Bank Institute’s instrument used
in its survey of 51 democracies in 2002 with certain changes suitable to local
parliamentary ambiance. Naturally the present study being comparative one, same
indictors were chosen for assessing both 12th
and 13th
PAC of the National Assembly of
Pakistan. Hence two Questionnaires were used having same indicators but different time
period; one for 12th
PAC and the other for 13th
PAC. The population for these
Questionnaires includes the Members of selected PACs, PAC Secretariat Staff, Auditor
General Office and Media. However, greater importance was given to those members
who served both of the selected PACs like Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA, and Riaz Fatyana,
MNA, staffer who served both PACs and media persons who observed the operations of
both PACs. The Questionnaires were sent to whole population however the response rate
remained 57 per cent.
The questionnaires briefly discuss the structure, powers and practices of PAC during two
selected periods. The responses to the questionnaires describe the performance of two
selected PACs on winning points providing hints to analyse whether these winning points
were according to the PAC mandate and if not? Did the winning PAC put its effort to
institutionalize them?
The chapter is based on the results of the survey Questionnaires distributed to obtain the
perception of the stakeholders of the 12th
and the 13th
PAC. (See Annex-VII for 12th
PAC
and Annex-VIII for 13th
PAC Survey Instruments)
6.1. General Structure of PAC
This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair
of the PAC regarding the general structure of 12th
and 13th
PACs.
101
6.1.1. The best Chair of the PAC
When a question was asked about the best Chair, 20 per cent of the total respondent
during 12th PAC and 18.2 per cent of the total respondent during the 13th PAC
responded that Governing Party Chair was the best one, while, 80 per cent during the
12th PAC and 81.8 per cent during the 13th PAC responded that an Opposition Party
Chair was the best. However, an overall of 18.8 per cent favoured the Governing party
Chair and 81.2 per cent showed their confidence in an Opposition Party Chair during
both the 12th PAC and the 13th PAC. The population and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.1.
Table 6.62. A perception of the respondent about the of the Best Chair of 12th and 13th PAC
Difference Era Governing Party Chair Opposition Party Chair
12th PAC 20.0% 80.0%
13th PAC 18.2% 81.8%
12th & 13th PAC 18.8% 81.2%
6.1.2. The Capacity of the PAC staff
A minimum of 30 per cent of the respondents seemed satisfied with the committee staff
to support PAC during the 12th
PAC while 22.7 per cent found satisfied during the 13th
PAC. Another 40.9 per cent of respondent were somehow satisfied during the 13th
PAC.
However, 70.0 per cent of respondent were dissatisfied with the staff available to support
the committee during 12th
PAC and 36.4 per cent were of the same view during the 13th
PAC. Across the tenure of both PACs under this study, 26.0 per cent asked the staff was
sufficient, 28.1 per cent said that the staff was somehow sufficient and 46.9 per cent said
the staff as a whole was insufficient to support the PAC. The population and response of
the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.2.
102
Table 6.63.Tthe perception of the Capacity of Committee Staff of 12th and 13th PAC
Difference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient
12th PAC 30.0% 0% 70.0%
13th PAC 22.7% 40.9% 36.4%
12th & 13th PAC 25.0% 28.1% 46.9%
6.1.3. Research Facility available
Only 10.0% of the respondent seemed satisfied with the research facility provided to
PAC members during 12th
PAC. A majority of 90.0 per cent respondent grieved that there
was no such facility available. While responding to the same question for the 13th
PAC,
22.7 per cent found the research facility sufficient, 4.5 per cent found it somehow and
72.7 per cent experienced the research facility as insufficient. Overall 18.8 per cent of the
respondents believe it was sufficient, 3.1 per cent argued the facility was somehow
provided while 78.1 per cent across both the eras lacked any research availability to
perform their job effectively. The population and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is
depicted at Figure 6.3.
Table 6.64. Availability of Research Facility
Difference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient
12th PAC 10.0% 0% 90.0%
13th PAC 22.7% 4.5% 72.7%
12th & 13th PAC 18.8% 3.1% 78.1%
6.2. Successes of PAC
This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair
of the PAC regarding the successes of 12th
and 13th
PACs.
103
6.2.1. Government responds to committee recommendations
A minimum of 20.0 per cent of the response to the 12th
PAC was that government
responds favourably to Committee recommendations, 70.0 per cent said government
seldom respond to committee recommendations and 10.0 per cent said that government
never respond at all. In a response to this question for 13th
PAC, 81.8 per cent said
government favourably responds to committee recommendations and 18.2 per cent said it
responds seldom. The overall response for both the governments remained 62.5 per cent
said government respond frequently, 34.4 per cent said seldom and 3.1 per cent said that
govern never favourably responds to PAC recommendations. The population and
response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.4.
Table 6.65. Government Response to Committee Recommendations
Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never
12th PAC 20.0% 70.0% 10.0%
13th PAC 81.8% 18.2% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 34.4% 3.1%
6.2.2 Compliance rate of PACs recommendations
On a question whether government implements committee recommendations, for the 12th
PAC, 30.0 per cent said governments implements on committee recommendations
frequently and 70.0 per cent said it implements seldom. In case of 13th
PAC, 45.5 per
cent said frequently and 54.5 per cent said seldom. In an overall response, 40.6 per cent
said frequently and 59.4 per cent said government seldom implements on PAC
recommendations. The population and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at
Figure 6.5.
104
Table 6.66. Government Implements Committee Recommendations
Difference Era Frequently Seldom
12th PAC 30.0 % 70.0%
13th PAC 45.5% 54.5%
12th & 13th PAC 40.6% 59.4%
6.2.3 Changes in legislation as a result of PAC recommendation
This factor remains seldom across both the PACs. Only a minimum of 10.0 per cent
responded it was frequent for 12th
PAC, 70.0 per cent said it was seldom and 20.0 per
cent said never any changes were adopted as result of committee work. Another very low
rate of 18.2 per cent responded it was frequent during the 13th
PAC, 59.1 per cent
responded seldom and 22.7 per cent responded it was never observed. Jointly for both the
PACs, 15.6 per cent observed such adoption frequently, 62.5 per cent observed seldom
but 21.9 per cent never observed any such change being adopted. The population and
response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.6.
Table 6.67. Institutionalization of practices
Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never
12th PAC 10.0 % 70.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 18.2% 59.1% 22.7%
12th & 13th PAC 15.6% 62.5% 21.9%
6.2.4 Rate of improvements in the integrity of government information or data
bases
Hundred per cent of the respondents for the 12th
PAC said that improvements in the
integrity of government information or data bases were seldom. In case of 13th
PAC, 63.6
105
per cent said such improvements were frequent and 36.4 per cent said it was seldom. The
population and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.7.
Table 6.68. Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases
Difference Era Frequently Seldom
12th PAC 0% 100.0%
13th PAC 63.6% 36.4%
12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 56.2%
6.2.5. Legal action taken against officials who contravene laws
Considering the response rate for the 12th
PAC, 22.2 per cent said that legal action was
frequently taken against officials who contravene laws, 55.6 per cent said that such action
was taken seldom and 22.2 per cent said that such action were never taken. In case of 13th
PAC, 45.5 per cent said frequently but 54.5 per cent said seldom. As a whole, for the two
consecutive governments during 12th PAC and 13th PAC, 38.7 per cent said such action
were taken frequently, 54.8 per cent said seldom and 6.5 per cent said there were no such
action taken. The population and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure
6.8.
Table 6.69. Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws
Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never
12th PAC 22.2% 55.6% 22.2%
13th PAC 45.5% 54.5% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 38.7% 54.8% 6.5%
106
6.2.6 Disciplinary action taken against officials who contravene administrative
guidelines
During the 12th PAC and the 12th
PAC, 20.0 per cent responded that disciplinary action
was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines were frequently
observed while 80.0 per cent said such actions were seldom observed. However, during
the 13th PAC and the 13th
PAC, 59.1 per cent frequently observed such actions to be
taken and 40.9 per cent seldom observed. An overall response for both Governments
remained 46.9 per cent frequently observed, 53.1 per cent seldom observed. However, the
practice was observed. The population and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted
at Figure 6.9.
Table 6.70. Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines
Difference Era Frequently Seldom
20.012th PAC 0% 80.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%
12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%
6.2.7. Resistance to political pressure
Under Musharraf Government, the 12th
PAC, 30.0 per cent of the respondents said the
committee frequently resisted political pressure exerted on it, 50.0 per cent said it seldom
resisted and 20.0 per cent said committee never successfully resisted. While, 59.1 per
cent respondent to the 13th
PAC said during the 13th PAC, PAC successfully resisted to
political pressure if any time it was exerted on it. Another 40.9 per cent said such
resistant was seldom. As a whole for both PACs, 50.0 per cent say that PAC strongly and
successfully resisted to any political pressure exerted on it, 43.8 per cent said it was
seldom but 6.2 per cent said PAC lack capacity to resist political pressure. The population
and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.10.
107
Table 6.71. Resistant to Political Pressure
Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never
12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 40.9% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 43.8% 6.2%
6.2.8. Rate of avoiding facts by Principal Accounting Officers
The survey resulted 70.0 per cent of PAOs were found hiding facts before PAC during
the 12th
PAC but 30.0 per cent responded PAOs were fair and they never hide facts
before the committee. During the 13th
PAC, 54.5 per cent argued PAOs frequently hide
facts, 27.3 per cent said PAOs hide facts seldom but 18.2 per cent showed a full belief in
PAOs saying that they were fair and transparent. The overall survey result showed that
59.4 per cent of the respondents say the PAOs frequently hide facts, 18.8 per cent say
seldom while 21.9 per cent voted in the favouring fair attitude of PAOs. The population
and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.11.
Table 6.72. PAOs found hiding facts
Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never
12th PAC 70.0% 0% 30.0%
13th PAC 54.5% 27.3% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 59.4% 18.8% 21.9%
6.2.9. Adoption of latest oversight developments
During the 12th
PAC, the survey observed that there was a practice of adopting latest
oversight practices but rarely frequent as 30.0 per cent say it but the practice was
observed seldom by 70.0 per cent of the respondents. During the 13th
PAC, latest
108
oversight developments were mostly practiced as 77.3 per cent responded so, another
22.7 per cent said it happens seldom. Jointly for both PACs, 62.5 per cent said it happens
frequently while 37.5 per cent said the practice was seldom. The population and response
of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.12.
Table 6.73. Adoption of latest Financial Oversight Developments
Difference Era Frequently Seldom
12th PAC 30.0% 70.0%
13th PAC 77.3% 22.7%
12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%
6.2.10. Institutionalized of guiding principles
During the 12th
PAC period, 50.0 per cent responded the Committee frequently
institutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective and
rest of the 50.0 per cent said the practice was seldom. While, during the 13th
PAC 72.7
per cent believed the practice was frequent but 27.3 per cent said the practice was
seldom. However, the survey resulted that since 2002-2011, 65.6 per cent believed
practice was frequent but 34.4 per cent believe it was seldom. The population and
response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.13.
Table 6.74. The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles required to meet its objective
Difference Era Frequently Seldom
12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%
13th PAC 72.7% 27.3%
12th & 13th PAC 65.6% 34.4%
109
6.2.11. Adherence to financial control of resources
The survey resulted that there was an adherence to financial control of resources during
12th
PAC but response was 50.0 per cent as frequent and 50.0 per cent as seldom.
However, committee’s adherence to financial control was more frequent as 90.9 per cent
said so while 9.1 per cent said it was seldom. As a whole, 78.1 per cent responded the
practice was frequent but 21.9 per cent believe it was seldom. The population and
response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.14.
Table 6.75. Adherence to financial control of resources
Difference Era Frequently Seldom
12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%
13th PAC 90.9% 9.1%
12th & 13th PAC 78.1% 21.9%
6.2.12. Policy of waste prevention
A total of 30.0 per cent responded the Committee frequently follows the policy of waste
prevention, 50.0 per cent responded the practice was seldom and 20.0 per cent responded
as there was no such practice during the 12th
PAC. The survey resulted there was such
practice during the period of 13th
PAC but 54.5 per cent responded as frequent and 45.5
per cent as seldom. As a whole, 46.9 per cent observed the practice frequently, 46.9 per
cent seldom and 6.2 per cent responded PAC lack such practice during the entire period
under this study. The population and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at
Figure 6.15.
110
Table 6.76. The policy of waste prevention
Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never
12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 54.5% 45.5% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 46.9% 6.2%
6.2.13. Economical use of resources
The survey result for the 12th
PAC promoted the practice of economical use of resources
but response rate was 50.0 per cent as frequent and 50.0 per cent as seldom. However, the
survey found that practice was frequent during the 13th
PAC as 95.5 per cent say so while
only 4.5 per cent said the practice was seldom. The population and response of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.16.
Table 6.77. The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources
Difference Era Frequently Seldom
12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%
13th PAC 95.5% 4.5%
12th & 13th PAC 81.2% 18.8%
6.3. Composition of PAC
This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair
of the PAC regarding the composition of 12th
and 13th
PACs.
6.3.1. Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee
Balanced representation of all major parties in the house remained the major concern of
PAC during both governments. During the 12th
PAC survey, 81.8 per cent responded the
111
practice was very important while 18.2 per cent responded the practice was somewhat
important. However, during the 13th
PAC, response rate was hundred per cent as being
very important. Overall for both PACs, 90.9 per cent response was very important and
9.1 per cent was somewhat important. The response to the balanced representation of all
major political parties on the committee of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure
6.17.
Table 6.78. Representation of Political Parties
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 81.8% 18.2%
13th PAC 100% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 90.9% 9.1%
6.3.2. Exclusion of ministerial membership
An important factor was having a membership of PAC being a minister. During the 12th
PAC 80.0% of the respondents believe the practice was very important while 20.0 per
cent respondent it was not important factor to an effective PAC. During the 13th
PAC,
72.7 per cent of respondents believed the practice was very important, 4.5 per cent said it
was somehow important but 22.7 per cent believed the factor was not much important.
Overall 75.0 per cent responded the practice was very important, 3.1 per cent said
somehow important while 21.9 per cent thought the practice was not important to any
parliamentary oversight. The response to the ministerial membership of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.18.
112
Table 6.79. Ministerial Exclusion
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat Important Not
Important
12th PAC 80.0% 0% 20.0%
13th PAC 72.7% 4.5% 22.7%
12th & 13th PAC 75.0% 3.1% 21.9%
6.4. Powers of PAC
This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair
of the PAC regarding the powers of 12th
and 13th
PACs.
5.4.1. Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of
taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets
The response to the question of PAC’s Clear focus on holding the government
accountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets
during the 12th
PAC remained 40.0 per cent said it was very important and 60.0 per cent
said it was somehow important. While, response during the 13th
PAC was; 81.8 per cent
very important and 18.2 per cent somehow important. As a whole for the Pakistani PAC
during the selected period of this study for the years (2002-2011) remained as 68.8 per
cent very important and 31.2 per cent as somehow important. The population and
response to committee’s focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of
taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is
depicted at Figure 6.19.
113
Table 6.80. PAC focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and its
stewardship over public assets
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 40.0% 60.0%
13th PAC 81.8% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 68.8% 31.2%
6.4.2. PAC focus on administration of policy
While responding to a question 30.0 per cent of the respondent replies as the practice of
Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad was
somehow important, 50.0 per cent replied it was not an important and 20.0 per cent said
the practice was not applicable at all for the 12th
PAC. However, in the case of 13th
PAC,
63.6 per cent responded it was an important practice and 36.4 per cent responded it was
somehow important. The survey as a whole resulted for both PACs remained as 43.8 per
cent very important, 34.4 per cent somehow important, 15.6 per cent not important and
6.2 per cent not applicable. The population and response to the committee focus on
administration of policy of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.20.
Table 6.81. Committee focus on administration of policy
Difference
Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not
Applicable
12th PAC 0% 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 63.6% 36.4% 0% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 34.4% 15.6% 6.2%
114
6.4.3. Reference to examine the Public Accounts
Survey response to the question of having a permanent reference to examine the Public
Accounts during the 12th
PAC remained as 40.0 per cent responded as very important,
60.0 per cent responded as somehow important. During the 13th
PAC response for the
same practice was observed very important by 71.6 per cent and somehow important by
28.4 per cent. Overall the response for both periods was 55.8 per cent very important t
and 44.2 per cent as somehow important. The population and response to the power to
have a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is
depicted at Figure 6.21.
Table 6.82. Reference to examine the Public Accounts
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 40.0% 60.0%
13th PAC 71.6% 28.4%
12th & 13th PAC 55.8% 44.2%
6.4.4. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor
While investigating committee’s permanent reference to examine all reports of the
Legislative Auditor, the survey resulted as 91.8% responded as very important factor,
8.2% as somehow important factor for the 12th
PAC. However, during the 13th
PAC,
80.0% responded very important factor and 20.0% responded as somehow important
factor. The overall response for two PACs remained 85.9% very important and 14.1%
somehow important. The population and response to the power to have a permanent
reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is
depicted at Figure 6.22.
115
Table 6.83. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 91.8% 8.2%
13th PAC 80.0% 20.0%
12th & 13th PAC 85.9% 14.1%
6.4.5. Power to call independent witnesses
On a question of power to call independent witnesses, 30.0 per cent of the respondent
said was very important factor, 50.0 per cent said it was not an important factor while
20.0 per cent said it not an applicable factor during the 12th
PAC. While observing this
power during the 13th
PAC, 77.3 per cent said the factor was very important, 18.2 per
cent said somehow important and 4.5 per cent said not applicable. The overall resultant
for both periods remained 62.5 per cent very important, 12.5 per cent somehow
important, 15.6 per cent not important and 9.4 per cent believed the practice was not
applicable at all. The population and response to the power to call independent witnesses
of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.23.
Table 6.84. Power to call independent witnesses
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 30.0% 0% 50.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 77.3% 18.2% 0% 4.5%
12th & 13th
PAC 62.5% 12.5% 15.6% 9.4%
116
6.4.6. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures
of government Organizations receiving funds from the government and all
state corporations
A maximum of 90.0 per cent of the respondents for the 12th
PAC responded the factor
was very important and 10.0 per cent said the power factor was somehow important. The
response for the 13th
PAC for the same question remained as 81.8 per cent said the power
factor was very important and 18.2 per cent said somehow important. The overall
resultant for both PACs remained 85.9 per cent as very important and 14.1 per cent as
somehow important. The population and response to the committee power to investigate
or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government Organizations
receiving funds from the government and all state corporations of the 12th
and 13th
PAC
is depicted at Figure 6.24.
Table 6.85. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government
Organizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporations
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 90.0% 10.0%
13th PAC 81.8% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 85.9% 14.1%
6.4.7. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks
The response to the question of power of a PAC to request the legislative auditor to
perform specific reviews or tasks remained as 10.0 per cent said somehow important,
70.0 per cent not important and 20.0 per cent responded as not applicable for the 12th
PAC. However, the response for the 13th
PAC remained 59.1 per cent responded as very
important, 22.7 per cent somehow important and 18.2 per cent responded as not
important. On the other hand, a total of 40.6 per cent responded the practice was very
important, 18.8 per cent responded somehow important, 34.4 per cent responded not
important and 6.2 per cent responded the practice was not applicable at all. The
117
population and response to the committee power to request the legislative auditor to
perform specific reviews or tasks of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.25.
Table 6.86. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 0% 10.0% 70.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2% 0%
12th & 13th
PAC
40.6% 18.8% 34.4% 6.2%
6.4.8. Compelling officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative
performance
The responses to this question of power to compel officials to attend and be held
accountable for administrative, performance even after they have left office for the 12th
PAC were mixed one 50.0 per cent said it was very important awhile another 50.0 per
cent regarded it not important. While responses for the 13th
PAC remained 81.8 per cent
saying it very important power of the committee and another 18.2 per cent saying it
somehow important. The overall 71.9 per cent said the practice was very important to
committee powers, 12.5 per cent regarded it somewhat important and 15.6 per cent
thought it of no importance to PAC powers. The population and response to the
committee power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative,
performance even after they have left office of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure
6.26.
118
Table 6.87. Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, performance even
after they have left office
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important
12th PAC 50.0% 0% 50.0%
13th PAC 81.8% 18.2% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 71.9% 12.5% 15.6%
6.4.9. Power to compel witnesses to answer questions
Responding to the question of PAC power to compel witnesses to answer questions, 65.0
per cent said it was very important, 35.0 per cent said it was somehow important in case
of 12th
PAC. While in case of 13th
PAC 87.3 per cent said it was very important and 12.7
per cent said it was somehow important. On a whole, 76.1 per cent said it important
during both PACs and another 23.9 per cent said it somehow important. The population
and response to the committee power to compel witnesses to answer questions of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.27.
Table 6.88. Power to compel witnesses to answer questions
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 65.0% 35.0%
13th PAC 87.3% 12.7%
12th & 13th PAC 76.1% 23.9%
6.4.10. Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions
Coming to the question of powers to make recommendations and direct action, 40.0 per
cent said it was very important, 10.0 per cent said somehow important and 50.0 per cent
said the practice was not applicable during the 12th
PAC as the committee only pass
119
recommendations but it rarely took direct actions. In case of 13th
PAC, 45.5 per cent
responded as very important, 36.4 per cent somehow and 18.2 per cent regarded not
applicable due to lack of direct action. However, overall for both PACs, 43.8 per cent
responded as very important, 28.1 per cent somehow important and 28.1 per cent
regarded not applicable. The population and response to the committee power to make
recommendations and direct actions of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.28.
Table 6.89. Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 40.0 % 10.0% 50.0%
13th PAC 45.5% 36.4% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 28.1% 28.1%
6.4.11. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases
On the matter of power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 20.0 per cent
said it was very important, 30.0 per cent somehow and 50.0 per cent responded there
were never any press conferences or press releases issued during the 12th
PAC period.
However, during the period of 13th
PAC, 63.6 per cent responded the practice was very
important, 18.2 per cent responded somehow important and another 18.2 per cent
responded not important practice. As a whole, 50.0 per cent say the practice was
important, 21.9 per cent say the practice somehow important, 12.5 per cent say the
practice was not important and 15.6 per cent regarded the practice was irreverent. The
population and response to the committee power to hold press conferences and issue
press releases of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.29.
120
Table 6.90. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 20.0% 30.0% 0% 50.0%
13th PAC 63.6% 18.2% 18.2% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 21.9% 12.5% 15.6%
6.4.12. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national
security issues
Survey response for the 12th
PAC remained as 40.0 per cent said it was very important,
50.0 per cent said as somewhat important and 10.0 per cent said it was not important. In
case of 13th
PAC, 77.3 per cent said it very important, 18.2 per cent said it somehow
important while 4.5 per cent said it not at all important factor. In the case of Both PACs
the response remained 58.7 per cent saying very important, 34.1 per cent saying
somehow important and 7.2 per cent saying not at all important. The population and
response to the committee power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or
national security issues of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.30.
Table 6.91. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important
12th PAC 40.0% 50.0% 10.0%
13th PAC 77.3% 18.2% 4.5%
12th & 13th PAC 58.7% 34.1% 7.2%
121
6.4.13. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative
Auditor’s Act
The survey response to the question of PAC power to review proposed legislation or
amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act remained 60.0 per cent saying very
important and 40.0 per cent saying somehow important while talking about the 12th
PAC.
However, in case of 13th
PAC, the response remained as 81.1 per cent saying very
important and 18.9 per cent saying somehow important. While talking jointly about both
PACs, 70.6 per cent of the respondents said the practice was very important and 29.4 per
cent said the practice was somehow important. The population and response to the
committee power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative
Auditor’s Act of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.31.
Table 6.92. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 60.0 % 40.0%
13th PAC 81.1% 18.9%
12th & 13th PAC 70.6% 29.4%
6.4.14. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget
While responding to the question of PAC powers to review the Auditor’s budget, 20.0 per
cent the respondents said the practice was very important, 30.0 per cent said it was
somehow important while 50.0 per cent said the practice was never given any
importance. In case of 13th
PAC, 40.9 per cent said the practice was very important, 22.7
per cent said somehow important, 18.2 per cent said not important and another 18.2 per
cent said the practice was not applicable. Jointly talking about both the PACs, 34.4 per
cent said very important, 25.0 per cent said somehow important, 12.5 per cent said not
important and 28.1 per cent said the practice was never applicable. The population and
response to the committee power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.32.
122
Table 6.93. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 20.0% 30.0% 0% 50.0%
13th PAC 40.9% 22.7% 18.2% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 34.4% 25.0% 12.5% 28.1%
6.4.15. Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and
advice
Calculating the response to the question of PAC power to choose subjects for
examination without government direction and advice, the response for the 12th
PAC
remained 70.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent saying somehow important
and 20.0 per cent saying not important. On the other hand, while talking about the 13th
PAC, the response remained 81.8 per cent saying very important and 18.2 per cent saying
not important at all. However, the joint response for both selected periods remains as 78.1
per cent saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important and 18.8 per cent
saying not important. The population and response to the committee power to choose
subjects for examination without government direction and advice of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.33.
Table 6.94. Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important
12th PAC 70.0% 10.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 81.8% 0% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 78.1% 3.1% 18.8%
123
6.4.16. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committee
While responding to the question of PAC power to compel ministers to appear before the
committee for the 12th
PAC, 50.0 per cent said the practice was very important, 10.0 per
cent said as somehow important and 40.0 per cent said the practice was never applicable.
In case of 13th
PAC, 63.6 per cent said the practice was very important while 36.4 per
cent said the practice was at all not applicable to the Pakistani jurisdictions. Looking at a
joint result for both selected PACs, 59.4 per cent said very important, 3.1 per cent said
somehow important while 37.5 per cent said the practice was never important at all. The
population and response to the committee power to compel ministers to appear before the
committee of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.34.
Table 6.95. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committee
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 50.0% 10.0% 40.0%
13th PAC 63.6% 0% 36.4%
12th & 13th PAC 59.4% 3.1% 37.5%
6.4.17. Powers to take Suo-Motu actions
The question of PAC powers to take Suo-Motu actions the response meet with 90.0 per
cent saying it very important and 10.0 per cent saying somehow important during the
period of 12th
PAC. While in the case of 13th
PAC, the response remained 95.5 per cent
saying very important, 4.5 per cent saying somehow important. Looking at the joint
resultant for both PACs 92.8 per cent said the practice was very important and 7.2 per
cent said somehow important. The population and response to the committee powers to
take Suo-Motu actions of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.35.
124
Table 6.96. Powers to take Suo-Motu actions
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 90.0 %t 10.0%
13th PAC 95.5% 4.5%
12th & 13th PAC 92.8% 7.2%
6.4.18. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action
In a response to the question of powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action
during the 12th
PAC 59.1 per cent said the practice was very important while another 40.9
per cent said it was not important. In case of 13th
PAC 70.0 per cent said very important
while 30 per cent said the practice was not important. The accumulative response of both
PAC resulted 62.5 per cent saying very important while 37.5 per cent saying not
important. The population and response to the committee powers to listen to Public
Complaints and take action during the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.36.
Table 6.97. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action
Difference Era Very Important Not Important
12th PAC 59.1% 40.9%
13th PAC 70.0% 30.0%
12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%
6.4.19. Powers to take action on media review
On clicking option to answer question of powers to take action on media review 20.0 per
cent regarded it very important, 20.0 per cent somehow important while 60.0 per cent
saying not important to 12th
PAC practices. On the other hand responses for the 13th
PAC
remained as 59.1% saying very important, 36.4% saying somehow important and 4.5%
125
saying practice was not important. Jointly, in case of both PACs 46.9% saying it very
important, 31.2% saying it somehow important while 21.9 per cent saying it not
important to PAC practices. The population and response to the committee powers to take
action on media review of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.37.
Table 6.98. Powers to take action on media review
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important
12th PAC 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 36.4% 4.5%
12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 31.2% 21.9%
6.4.20. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements
As much of 40.0 per cent responded the influence of PAC on the adequacy of the
corporate governance arrangements was very important practice during the 12th
PAC
period while 60.0 per cent said it was not important. In case of 13th
PAC 59.1 per cent
said the practice was very important, 22.7 per cent saying somehow important while 18.2
per cent saying it not important.
Table 6.99. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important
12th PAC 40.0% 0% 60.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 53.1% 15.6% 31.2%
Discussing results for both PACs 53.1 per cent found saying very important, 15.6 per
cent saying somehow important while 31.2 per cent saying not important at all. The
126
population and response to the influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate
governance arrangements of the 12th
and 13th
PAC are depicted at Figure 6.38.
6.4.21. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions
In a response to the question of influence of PAC recommendations/ directives on
institutions during the 12th
PAC period 20.0 per cent said the practice was very important,
20.0 per cent said somehow important and 60.0 per cent said the practice was no more
important. In case of 13th
PAC period 59.1 per cent said the practice was very important
and 40.9 per cent said the practice was somehow important. While talking jointly about
both PACs 46.9 per cent said the practice was very important, 34.4 per cent said
somehow important while 18.8 per cent said the practice was not important as is depicted
at Figure 6.39.
Table 6.100. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important
12th PAC 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 40.9% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 34.4% 18.8%
6.5. General Practices of PAC
This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair
of the PAC regarding the general practices of 12th
and 13th
PACs.
6.5.1. Close working relationship between members from different political parties
The response rate for the question of close working relationship between members from
different political parties during the 12th
PAC 90.0 per cent said the practice was very
important while 10.0 per cent regarded it not important. In case of the 13th
PAC period
77.3 per cent said the practice was very important and 22.7 per cent said somehow
127
important. The joint response rate for both PACs remained 81.2 per cent said very
important, 15.6 per cent said somehow important while 3.1 per cent said the existing of
close working relationship among different political parties was never important as is
depicted at Figure 6.40.
Table 6.101. Close working relationship between members from different political parties
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important
12th PAC 90.0% 0% 10.0%
13th PAC 77.3% 22.7% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 81.2% 15.6% 3.1%
6.5.2. Advance preparation of members
Survey results for the 12th
PAC showing response for the above question remained 20.0
per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent saying somehow important, 20.0 per cent
not important while 50.0 per cent saying the practice not applicable at all. Looking at the
results for 13th
PAC, 22.7 per cent said the practice was very important, 18.2 per cent said
somehow important, 54.5 per cent saying not important while 4.5 per cent saying the
practice is still not applicable at all as is depicted at Figure 6.41.
Table 6.102. Advance preparation of members
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not
Applicable
12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 50.0%
13th PAC 22.7% 18.2% 54.5% 4.5%
12th & 13th PAC 21.4% 14.1% 37.3% 27.2%
128
6.5.3. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants
During the 12th
PAC, 40.0 per cent of the respondents responded committee scrutiny
speed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants was sufficient and another
60.0 per cent responded it was somehow better. In views of the respondents for the 13th
PAC, 59.1 per cent respondent sufficient and 40.9 per cent responded the scrutiny speed
of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants was somehow sufficient. As a
whole for both PACs, 46.9 per cent said it was sufficient and 53.1 per cent said it was
somehow better as is depicted at Figure 6.42.
Table 6.103. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants
Difference Era Sufficient Somehow
12th PAC 49.9% 59.1%
13th PAC 60% 40%
12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%
6.5.4. Quick and in time decisions
A minimum of 30.0 per cent of respondent to a questionnaire for 12th
PAC against the
same questions as for 13th
PAC think, PAC took quick and in time decisions, 50.0 per
cent think it took somehow decisions and 20.0 per cent think it didn’t took any in time
decision. In case of 13th
PAC, the response remained as 59.1 per cent think it sufficient,
22.7 per cent think somehow and 18.2 per cent think it was not like that. Overall for both
the tenures 50.0 per cent said it was sufficient, 31.2 per cent said somehow it was
sufficient and 18.8 per cent seemed dissatisfied. The population and responses to the
question, Does the PAC took quick and in time decisions during the 12th
and 13th
PAC is
depicted at Figure 6.43.
129
Table 6.104. Quick and in time decisions
Difference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient
12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 31.2% 18.8%
6.5.5. Close working relationship with Auditor General
While answering to the question of relationship of PAC with AG the responses for the
12th
PAC remained 70.0 per cent saying very important and 30.0 per cent saying
somehow important. During the 13th
PAC the relationship seemed deteriorating as 59.1
per cent said the relations was very important and 40.9 per cent said somehow important.
Jointly overall during the two PACs the response remained as 62.5 per cent saying very
important and 37.5 per cent saying somehow important. The population and responses to
the working relationship of PAC with Auditor General during the 12th
and 13th
PAC is
depicted at Figure 6.44.
Table 6.105. Close working relationship with Auditor General
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 70.0 per cent 30.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%
12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%
6.5.6. Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for
hearings
The response to this question during the 12th
PAC remained largely negative 10.0 per
cent saying not important while 90.0 per cent saying not applicable at all. However,
130
during the 13th
PAC period it somehow improves 36.4 per cent saying very important, 4.5
per cent saying somehow important, 22.7 per cent saying not important while 36.4 per
cent saying the practice is still not applicable. Jointly talking about both PAC periods
25.0 per cent responded saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important,
18.8 per cent saying not important while 53.1 per cent saying the practice was not
applicable. The population and responses to the question of provision of independent
technical expertise and research support for hearings of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted
at Figure 6.45.
Table 6.106. Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearings
Difference Era
Very
Important
Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 0% 0% 10.0% 90.0%
13th PAC 36.4% 4.5% 22.7% 36.4%
12th & 13th
PAC 25.0% 3.1% 18.8% 53.1%
6.5.7. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with Backlog
The response to the formation of sub-committees to deal with backlog for 12th
PAC meet
with 20.0 per cent saying very important and 80.0 per cent saying somehow important.
During the 13th
PAC responses remained 59.1 per cent saying very important and 40.9
per cent saying somehow important.
Table 6.107. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with Backlog
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 20.0% 80.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%
12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%
131
While talking about both PAC periods, survey meet the responses 46.9 per cent saying
very important and 53.1 per cent saying somehow important. The population and
responses to the question of formation of Sub-Committees to deal with backlog of the
12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.46.
6.5.8 Strategic prioritization of items for committee review
In terms of 12th
PAC, only 20.0 per cent of the respondents said the strategic
prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of committee
work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports was
very important while responding to the question of strategic prioritization of items for
committee review however 80.0 per cent said the practice was not important. On the
other hand in terms of 13th
PAC period 40 per cent responded very important, 18.2 per
cent said somehow important while 40.9 per cent said the practice was not important. A
joint response for both selected PAC periods remained 34.4 per cent said very important,
12.5 per cent said somehow important and 53.1 per cent said the practice was no more
important. The population and responses to the question of strategic prioritization of
items for committee review, with time limits for stages of committee work like
consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports of the 12th
and
13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.47.
Table 6.108. Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of committee work
like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important
12th PAC 20.0% 0% 80.0%
13th PAC 40% 18.2% 40.9%
12th & 13th PAC 34.4% 12.5% 53.1%
132
6.5.9. Transcripts keeping of hearings and meetings
The response to the question of keeping transcripts of all hearings and meetings meet
with 100.0 per cent across both PAC periods. The population and responses to the
question of keeping transcripts of all hearings and meetings of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is
depicted at Figure 6.48.
Table 6.109. Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important
12th PAC 100.0% 0%
13th PAC 100.0% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 100.0% 0%
6.5.10. PAC tenure
Although there was always a big delay in the formation of PAC, the responses to the
question of committee life and staying active between the session meet with a mix
response of 20.0 per cent saying very important, 60.0 per cent saying somehow important
and 20.0 per cent saying not important at all during the 12th
PAC period. For the 13th
PAC the response was 100.0 per cent saying the practice was very important. The
population and responses to the question of Committee appointed for the life of the
Legislature or Parliament and stays active between sessions of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is
depicted at Figure 6.49.
Table 6.110. Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament and stays active between sessions
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 100.0% 0% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 75.0% 18.8% 6.2%
133
6.5.11. Televised public hearings
Televised public hearing was never very important during both PAC periods however, for
the 12th
PAC 10.0 per cent of the respondents said the practice was somehow important
while other 90.0 per cent said it was not applicable at all. In case of 13th
PAC period 18.2
per cent said the practice was somehow important while 18.2 per cent it was not
applicable. The Joint response for both PAC periods meet with 15.6 per cent responding
somehow important while 85.9 per cent said not applicable in Pakistani PAC set up. The
population and responses to the question of televised public hearings of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.50.
Table 6.111. Televised public hearings
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 0% 10.0% 90.0%
13th PAC 0% 18.2% 81.8%
12th & 13th PAC 0% 15.6% 85.9%
6.5.12. Report to the legislature annually and debate on Report
During the period of 12th
PAC, 50.0 per cent of the respondents believed the practice was
somehow important while 10.0 per cent said it was not important, another 40.0 per cent
the practice was not applicable at all. While during the 13th
PAC period 77.3 per cent
regarded the practice very important, 4.5 per cent somehow important while on the other
hand 18.2 per cent found saying the practice was given no important. The joint response
remained 53.1 per cent saying very important, 18.8 per cent saying somehow important,
15.6 per cent not important while 12.5 per cent saying the practice was not applicable
across both PACs of the selected periods. The population and responses to the question of
report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.51.
134
Table 6.112. Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 0% 50.0% 10.0% 40.0%
13th PAC 77.3% 4.5% 18.2% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 53.1% 18.8% 15.6% 12.5%
6.5.13. Response to recommendations from the government
The responses to the 12th
PAC period say there was never any comprehensive response to
recommendations from the government regarding very important however 30.0 per cent
of them say it was somehow important but 70.0 per cent grieved the practice was never
important. While turning to the 13th
PAC 22.7 per cent of the responses clicked for very
important, 59.1 per cent somehow important but still 18.2 per cent were critical saying
not important. Looking at joint responses 18.2 per cent found saying very important, 50.0
per cent saying somehow important while 34.4 per cent saying not important. The
population and responses to the comprehensive response to recommendations from the
government of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.52.
Table 6.113. Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important
12th PAC 0% 30.0% 70.0%
13th PAC 22.7% 59.1% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 18.2% 50.0% 34.4%
6.5.14. Prior experience of Committee Members
The practice was somehow important during the 12th
PAC period as 20.0 per cent of the
respondents said so, on the other hand 30.0 per cent saying not important and 50.0 per
135
cent saying practice was not applicable. During the 13th
PAC period 4.5 per cent said
very important, 36.4 per cent somehow important and 59.1 per cent not important. On an
average for both PAC periods 3.1 per cent said very important, 31.2 per cent said
somehow important, 50.0 per cent said not important and 15.6 per cent said the practice
was not applicable. The population and responses to having committee members with at
least 2 years of prior Committee experience of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure
6.53.
Table 6.114. Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 0% 20.0% 30.0% 50.0%
13th PAC 4.5% 36.4% 59.1% 0%
12th & 13th PAC 3.1% 31.2% 50.0% 15.6%
6.5.15. Prior administrative or business experience of Members
A total of 80.0 per cent of the respondents for the 12th
PAC period responded the practice
of have a minimum of two years prior experience as somehow important while 20.0 per
cent saying it was not important. In case of 13th
PAC period 22.7 per cent of the
respondents said it was somehow important, 54.5 per cent said not important while 22.7
per cent even the practice was not applicable.
Table 6.115. Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience
Difference Era Somewhat Important Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 80.0 per cent 20.0% 0%
13th PAC 22.7% 54.5% 22.7%
12th & 13th PAC 40.6% 43.8% 15.6%
136
A joint response to this question remained 40.6 per cent saying somehow important, 43.8
per cent saying not important while 15.6 per cent saying it a not applicable practice. The
population and responses to having committee members with prior administrative or
business experience of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.54.
6.5.16. Incentives for members
Only 10.0 per cent of the total respondents for 12th
PAC period said the practice of extra
pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside the normal
legislative session while 90.0 per cent said the practice was not applicable. Responses to
the 13th
PAC practices maintained 36.4 per cent saying somehow important and another
63.6 per cent saying not applicable. The joint response concluded at 28.1 per cent saying
somehow important but 71.9 per cent saying not applicable. The population and
responses to the question of extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in
hearings outside the normal legislative session of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at
Figure 6.55.
Table 6.116. Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside the normal legislative
session
Difference Era Somewhat Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 10.0% 90.0%
13th PAC 36.4% 63.6%
12th & 13th PAC 28.1% 71.9%
6.5.17. Suitable meeting place for media and public
About half of the respondent making 50.0 per cent of all saying the suitability of meeting
place was very important during 12th
PAC period, 10.0 per cent saying somehow
important, 20.0 per cent saying not important while another 20.0 per cent saying the
practice was not applicable. However, during the 13th
PAC period 54.5 per cent saying
the practice was very important, 22.7 per cent saying somehow important, 18.2 per cent
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saying not important while 4.5 per cent saying not important. Joint response for both
PAC periods under this study remained 53.1 per cent saying very important, 18.8 per cent
saying somehow important, another 18.8 per cent saying not important and 9.4 per cent
saying not applicable. Yasmeen Rehman, Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview for
this study that now PAC meetings are open to media and general public and they are
doing efforts to solve entry problem of those interested. Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,
Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview for this study that now PAC meetings are open
to media and general public and they are doing efforts to solve entry problem of those
interested. The population and responses to question of meeting place suitable for media
and public access to hearings of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.56.
Table 6.117. Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 50.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0%
13th PAC 54.5% 22.7% 18.2% 4.5%
12th & 13th
PAC 53.1% 18.8% 18.8% 9.4%
6.5.18. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee
recommendations
When asked about the incentives to encourage administrative action on committee
recommendations 30.0 per cent of the respondents said the practice was not important
during the 12th
PAC period while another 70.0 per cent said it was not applicable at all.
However, when asked about the 13th
PAC period 40.9 per cent said the practice was not
any more important while 59.1 per cent said the practice was overall not applicable. On
the other hand in a joint response for both PAC periods 35.5 per cent holds the practice
was not important and 64.5 per cent the practice was never applicable. The population
and responses to question of incentives to encourage administrative action on committee
recommendations of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.57.
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Table 6.118. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations
Difference Era Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 30.0% 70.0%
13th PAC 40.9% 59.1%
12th & 13th PAC 35.5% 64.5%
6.5.19. Follow-up procedures
Although the effective follow up is very essential the response rate for 12th
PAC period
particularly remained very low 20.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent saying
somehow important and 70.0 per cent saying not important. During the 13th
PAC period
59.1 per cent of the respondents found saying effective follow up was very important,
22.7 per cent saying somehow important and 18.2 per cent saying not important. The
joint resultant of the survey of both PACs remained 46.9 per cent saying very important
18.7 per cent saying somehow important and 34.4 per cent saying not important. The
population and responses to question of effective follow-up procedures to determine if
action has been taken to implement the committee’s recommendations of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.58.
Table 6.119. Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken to implement the committee’s
recommendations
Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important
12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 70.0%
13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%
12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 18.7% 34.4%
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6.5.20. Relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms
While talking about 12th
PAC good relations with other parliamentary oversight
mechanisms such as the budget committee 20.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 per
cent saying somehow important, 20.0 per cent saying not important and 50.0 per cent
saying not applicable at all. While discussing the same question for 13th
PAC period 40.9
per cent of the respondents found saying very important, 4.5 per cent somewhat
important, 18.2 per cent saying not important while 36.4 per cent saying not applicable at
all. The joint responses for both PAC periods under this study showed 34.4 per cent
saying very important, 6.2 per cent saying somehow important, 18.8 per cent saying not
important and 40.6 per cent saying the practice was not applicable. The population and
responses to question of good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms
such as the budget committee of the 12th
and 13th
PAC is depicted at Figure 6.59.
Table 6.120. Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms such as the budget committee
Difference Era
Very Important Somewhat
Important
Not Important Not Applicable
12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 50.0%
13th PAC 40.9% 4.5% 18.2% 36.4%
12th & 13th
PAC 34.4% 6.2% 18.8% 40.6%
6.6. Conclusion
The survey results clearly indicated performance difference on win-lose criteria basis
between two selected PAC periods. The survey demonstrates major event such as the
change of government, under the charter of democracy, leader of the opposition chairing
the PAC for the first time in Pakistan, public awareness and international political
influences. In almost all the questions, there is a clear difference in committee practices
and exercise of power. The results also show the 13th
PAC under PPP-led Coalition
140
Government performed better than the 12th
PAC under Musharraf regime. However, the
detailed discussion on the findings of this study is provided in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7
The Culture of Governance in Pakistan
7.1 Introduction
The chapter ‘The culture of Governance in Pakistan’ is a discussion about the attitude of
those rulers and the servants of the state who on every mistake and wrong done blame the
state being an innocent democracy of only 65 years. Hence, these mistakes and blunders
are natural to happen. They forget that they are living in a global village where every
experience and practice is shared and it requires leadership and political will to change
the attitudes and the political system not centuries of evaluation. Having well awareness
to a political system, the concepts of democracy, the makeup of institutions, the economic
systems, the bureaucratic styles, the judicial systems and importantly for this study the
auditing systems and the financial oversight patterns, what it requires is the
implementation of the state rules and compliance to law for good governance.
Most of the institution of the state and systems like democracy and good governance are
never entertained on the basis of this misperception that Pakistan is an innocent
democracy. The rulers of the state and the servants of the state both kept themselves in
the learning process across their careers, many of them came and many like them went
but very few learned from the history and the ruthless experiences (Niaz 2010) and
delivered to state. The big chunk of them played with the state resources and institutions
mare to get maximum benefit out of it and to strengthen their powers and strong hold of
authorities for themselves and to let their out springs penetrate into the culture of power
of Pakistan.
The culture of financial oversights in Pakistan has not properly flourished due to unstable
civil governments and frequent military rules (Chaudry 2011). However, all of them
acknowledged the need of a financial oversight; the first PAC was established in 1951
and all the military rulers introduced proto-type PACs called Adhoc PACs in their
respective periods (NA 1985). But the Institution of PAC remained a white elephant for a
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state where rulers and the servants lived above the law and institution. The concepts of
transparency and accountability were a distant dream. According to a recognized
practice, the financial oversight took place at two levels; firstly at budget level when
annual budget is passed in the legislature is an ex-ante oversight process and secondly at
PAC level when financial oversight took place during the life of a project or when the
project is complete as an ex-post oversight process as discussed in chapter 4 page 2-3.
The second level of financial oversight is as important as is the first level that is a budget
level. Pakistan is such a state where extra spending is allowed other than the initial
budget allocated and the supplementary grants. Here PAC works as a supporting
institution to regulate the extra spending grants which are excess grants of departments
and agencies and not as an institution to recover such extra spending while setting
measures for good governance in future what is the actual purpose of the institution. The
study observed that the operations of the institution of PAC in Pakistan were mere a
formality. The compliance rate observed on an average of ten per cent (AGP 2012) that is
equal to none and the recovery rate was as low as only 100 million rupees recovered
during the 12th
PAC (PAC 2007) and 115 billion recovered during the 13th
PAC as were
claimed by both of them (PAC 2011). However, in actual, these amounts were no more
any tangible recoveries. While in international corruption rankings, Pakistan appears in
the bottom ten countries.
7.2 Application of McGee Thoughts
This section applies McGee’s school of thoughts to the PAC of Pakistani jurisdiction to
check the success factor of the 12th
and the 13th
PAC.
7.2.1 Capacity Building
The financial oversight capacity of both the members and the staff is somehow traditional
based on manual methods. The members investigate issues on the basis of their common
logic and wisdom. There was no programme to train the members and the staff about the
modern developments of financial oversight, computer skills, agenda setting skills and
the investigating skills like reaching to the root cause of the problem. The USAID and the
World Bank occasionally arrange trainings or workshops for the capacity building of
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PAC Secretariat and the Members but both the members and the staff responded they
benefited little out of these trainings. Trainings conducted include computers and IT
skills, basic concepts and processes in public financial management and auditing. Across
the two selected periods of 12th
and 13th
PAC, there were only 8 to 10 trainings arranged
for the secretariat staff and only 2 or 3 such trainings for members.
7.2.2 Independence
The impartiality and non-partisanship of the chairman is the sign of independence of any
PAC, during the period of 12th
PAC, the committee was chaired by a Government
member, who was comparatively less independent as was the chairman of the 13th
PAC,
who was an opposition party member and leader of the opposition. Another factor that
restricted the independence of the 12th
PAC was being three (03) ministers as its
members, however, during the 13th
PAC, the same factor was found as Mian Riaz
Hussain Pirzada became a minister but he still continued the committee membership and
two (02) parliamentary secretary remained the members.
However, another factor completely ensures independence as the both the 12th
and the
13th
PACs had an equal party proportion of members. Overtly, these is no political
pressure because both of the selected PACs for this study have equal proportion of
political parties and in case of 13th
PAC, Leader of the Opposition was the chair but
covertly, there seem many political pressures on members and the chairman. The 13th
PAC was operating on a very fast speed to clear the backlog in order to update its
operations but suddenly, it stopped its working, dissolved the special committee
constituted for this purpose and Ch. Nisar Ali Khan resigned the chairmanship of the
committee. His sudden resignation was a result of political pressure to restrain PAC
operations.
However, till the end of the selected period of this study, no court of the state ever took
any Suo-Motu or challenge to PAC decision. Federal Services Tribunal-FST, also respect
PAC directives. PAC recommendations or directives are final and never changeable.
Although, the National Assembly have started debating PAC reports but still the house
have not challenged the directive of this committee. PAC had a stable prestige, the
144
committee is never blackmailed and never any case of bribing of PAC staff or
approaching members is reported so for.
However, the PAC is least independent in agenda setting for its meeting. In practice the
PAC Chairman only select the year of a report to be discussed and the ministry. The rest
of the business of agenda setting is finalized by Auditor General. The Auditor General is
the sole authority to select paras, AGP is the sole authority of highlighting or un-
highlighting of paras. The process of highlighting or un-highlighting of paras is the core
tactic that Auditor General uses to undermine the transparent financial oversight process.
There is no defined criterion of highlighting or un-highlighting of paras. The population
and sampling that Auditor General took in case of Pakistan for Federal Auditing is as low
as 2-5 per cent but the question is whether this 2-5 per cent of sampling is representative
or not. The worse of all is that highlighting or un-highlighting of paras is among that 2-5
per cent and highlighted paras are of trees robbery, stolen Television and of few
thousands amount. In a way the prestigious committee that works on behalf of the
National Assembly of Pakistan and its each meeting cost no less that 4.5 to 5 million
waste resources and time of members and other stakeholders discussing paras sometime
of 5 thousand only or in routine less than a million. It was observed that the paras
amounting one billion or near one billion were un-highlighted.
The PAC mandate also ensures its independence (NA, Rule 205) providing continuity of
its agenda. The agenda of all the standing committees lapses on dissolution of National
Assembly but the agenda of PAC is considered continuous and the coming PAC will start
where the previous left the business. The unfinished work of one PAC is continued by the
second to complete it.
All Federal Departments and Institutions give supreme justification to PAC, appear
before it on its call and respond to its directives. Investigating Agenizes like FIA, NAB,
Police appear for PAC hearings and respond to its directives.
7.2.3 Information Exchange
The PAC had a weak structure of information exchange, its secretariat staff and members
get rare chance of attending any national or international workshops where Chair and
145
Members or staff are invited to share information. The PAC of the National Assembly of
Pakistan is a poor member to international caucuses or financial oversight forums like
CPA. On an average PAC receives two to three invites annually from international
workshop or conference. PAC rarely organized any forum to invite other partners or
democracies to share experiences. PAC also lack any research set up where researchers
can search out latest developments and inform to members and staff to apply in local
jurisdictions. Hence, there is no proper set up of providing information about the new
developments and international practices.
PAC has a manual and traditional ways of working, new practices and developments are
adopted on need basis which mostly arise in the minds of Members or the Chair.
However, across both the selected periods, there was no organized structure of
information sharing except some members went to study tours abroad. They learned
many new practices from there and shared their working practices which were
acknowledged at Thailand, UK, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. These study tours were
supported by donors and PAC secretariat do not have any such programme.
Other factor of information sharing like IT system, IT wing, IT module systematic record
room and researchers were not properly available rather most of them were missing.
7.3 Application of Stapenhurst at.al Framework of PAC Performance Analysis
This section applies Stapenhurst at.al Framework of PAC Performance Analysis to the
PAC of Pakistani jurisdiction to check the success factor of the 12th
and the 13th
PAC.
7.3.1 Activity level
The 12th
PAC inherited a backlog of twelve (12) years while, in contrast, the 13th
PAC
inherited a total of nine (09) years of backlog. This backlog is a big hurdle to update the
operations of PAC. The PAC proceedings in this concern require dedicated chairman and
members furnished with a diligent staff. The 12th
PAC held a total of eighty six (86)
meetings in its four years period. While it’s Sub-Committee meet for seventy two (72)
days making a total of one hundred and fifty eight (158) days of meetings see Figure 5.6.
While, the 13th
PAC held meetings for a total of fifty six (56) days till November, 2011
146
when Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, resigned from its chairmanship. While its Sub-Committees
meet for two hundred and eighty two (282) days making a total of three hundred and
thirty eight (338) days of meetings see Figure 5.6. The PAC during both the selected
periods have extensive staff and resources to carry the business although less technical
but able to perform required duties.
7.3.1.1 Keeping up to date with legislative auditor’s reports
Although the 12th
PAC meet more times than the 13th
PAC but it dealt with only two (02)
audit reports. While on contrast, the 13th
PAC, dealt with nine (09) years of backlog. The
13th
PAC took dozens of sou-moto actions on issues of public importance as compared to
12th
PAC that took only two (02) Suo-Motu actions on the issues of sugar crisis and stock
exchange crisis. The pace of 13th
PAC can be admired if Ch. Nisar has not resigned it
have finished the total of twelve (12) years backlog till the end of this government. Each
PACs constituted four (04) sub-committees to clear the backlog and 13th
PAC benefited a
lot out of them its sub-committees finalized six (06) audit reports. While, only one report
was finalized by a sub-committee of 12th
PAC for the year 1995-96.
7.3.1.2 Costs and time of staff, members, witnesses and others involved
On an average, a meeting of PAC cost as much as 4.5 to 5 million of rupees that include
traveling, hotel stays, dining, one day salaries of all participants, TA/DAs and the value
of work which these individuals have done if meeting is not held. On an average, a
minimum of two hundred (200) people attend a meeting. It is to concern that does PAC
make recoveries that cover its spending or these meeting are another blessing in disguise
to PAO or ministries. Realizing the importance of institutions like PAC, all the
stakeholders to this process pay least attention to the waste of resources that is its very
low compliance rate 13 per cent on an average for the last two PACs from 2002 to 2011.
7.3.2 Output level
The outcomes of PAC circles of business is the quality of clearance which include the
immediate visible results of work the committee does like recommendations made,
147
directives issued, Suo-Motu actions taken on public complaints, follow up and
implementation or rate of compliance.
The 12th
PAC discussed a total of 7377 audit paras out of which the committee passed
1423 directives. While the 13th
PAC discussed a total of 9735 audit paras and passed a
total of 4942 directives. Collectively, the PAC for both selected periods for this study
discussed a total of 17112 audit paras and passed 6342 directives as a whole.
After a continued follow up of MIC of PAC by writing direct letters to ministries and
through phone calls, as much as 128 PAC directives were implemented during the 12th
PAC whereas the 13th
PAC was successful in making implementation of 688 of its
directives. Hence, a total of 816 directives were implemented. In a way the compliance
rate for the 12th
PAC period remained 9 per cent and the same remained for the 13th
PAC
as 14 per cent. However, the 1295 actions were pending when 12th
PAC dissolved with
the dissolution of 12th
national Assembly and 4231 actions were pending when Ch. Nisar
Ali resigned the PAC in November, 2011. The 13th
PAC took dozens of sou-moto actions
on issues of public importance as compared to 12th
PAC that took only two (02) Suo-
Motu actions on the issues of sugar crisis and stock exchange crisis.
Hence, the output level for the PAC in Pakistani jurisdiction remained very low, its main
output factor, the compliance rate is as low as an average of 12 per cent for the entire
time periods for the years 2002 to 2011(AGP 2011).
7.3.3 Outcomes level
As an outcome of PAC operations there seemed very little improvements in public
administration on a shorter period of time. The state require from the existence of
institutions like PAC to operate in a way as its mandate provides to increase economy,
efficiency and effectiveness of government programme where federal funds are spent.
The transparent and efficient operations of PAC can defiantly strengthen economy of a
country but such institutions in Pakistan have been subject to taboos. These inviolable
practices have restrained the core institution that work for good governance, transparency
and accountability. Durable improvements in public administration for a shorter period of
time are as under;
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The 13th
PAC made a total recovery of Rs.115 Billion in its four years period
while the 12th
PAC make as much as Rs. 100 Million of recovery during its
regime. While the corruption level in Pakistan is 1000 times higher than these
little amounts that recovered. Transparency International reported a loss of Rs.
8500 billion in corruption, tax evasion and bad governance during the first four
(04) years of recent PPP-led coalition government (The Jang, 2012). While,
during the Musharraf period such losses reported were Rs. 2576 billion only in
five scams of Privatization, Bank of Punjab, Petroleum, Stock Exchange and
Sugar Scandal only (APSN , 2009). The corruption level during the previous
governments of Nawaz Shareef and Banizeer Bhutto were no less than their
fellow governments the Musharraf regime and the PPP-led Coalition government.
Departmental Accounts Committee (DAC) was established7 to discuss audit paras
between the representatives of audit office and the concerned ministry for arriving
on an agreed position. The DAC is a development in financial oversight process
to help PAC quickly accomplishing the conclusion. DAC meetings have been
considered encouraging and proving to be useful filtering point. The
representative of the DAC meeting includes a representative from Audit
department, a representative from the Ministry of Finance and the PAO of the
concerned ministry. However, DAC without a representative of PAC is
ineffective.
The PAOs/ Ministries are now rather regular to appear before PAC for hearings.
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gailani also wrote a letters to all ministries/PAOs
with instruction to regularly appear before PAC is a sign of improvement in
public administration.
The Auditor General created Federal and Provincial Implementation Cells for
compliance on PAC directives, follow up and recoveries. However, the results of
these Cells are still pathetic considering the compliance rate of 12 per cent.
7 The DAC was constituted on the instruction of Ministry of Finance orders issued on December 12, 1984 and February
13, 1998.
149
PAC give directions of Special Audit of National Rural support programme
(NRSP) and Rural Support Programmes Network (RSPN). Both of these National
Programmes were earlier not under the ambit of audit.
PAC took a number of Suo-Motu actions on issues of public concern against high
ups of the country.
NAB and FIA were called to PAC meeting.
7.3.3.1 Better compliance with laws or regulations
The culture of arbitrary transfers of PAO/concerned official of ministries had a bad
impact on the rate of compliance of PAC directives. These officials are deployed for a
shorter period of few months and very rare more than a year. This arbitrariness overlaps
the sense of responsibility and bureaucrats are less concerned with compliance. It is very
rare that an official appeared twice before PAC for the same ministry. The newly
appointed bureaucrats had a definite excuse of being ignorant of the previous cases of bad
governance in a newly joined department or ministry. Hence, there is no trend of
compliance, the average 12 per cent compliance for the period of 2002 to 2011 is very
low rate but it is still better given circumstances of arbitrariness.
The major stakeholder in the financial oversight process, the Auditor General also found
a hurdle in compliance of PAC directives. It created its compliance Cells but there is no
result out of them. It is the inability of Audit Office while having Implementation Cells
filled with staff but no compliance. In case Auditor General do audit transparently,
highlight and un-highlight paras on fair basis there is no reason that PAOs or ministries
go an inch ahead of PAC directive. Auditor General in Pakistan rather being an executive
officer of the legislature had become a party to the bad governance. The Auditor General
had time and again tried to suppress the committee by having a full control of agenda
setting for PAC and sometimes as in case of 12th
PAC of Malik Allah Yar Khan, AG
envoys come to chairman for his preparation for PAC meeting ahead. The practice is very
dangerous. The AG office uses this practice a good tool to influence the chairman.
Another continued effort of AG office during every government remained to send Audit
office staff to PAC secretariat on deputation to completely dominate the PAC secretariat.
150
On the other hand, PAC is always busy in discussing and reviewing audit reports.
However, Ch. Nisar had promoted MIC under Yasmeen Rehman who made the process
accelerate; prior to her the follow up process was restricted only to correspondence.
7.3.3.2 Improvements in financial control structures, such as prosecution of
wrongdoers, stronger powers for legislative auditor
The improvements in financial control structure were very weak. The PAC always set
poor deterrence on ministries while its powers mandated by National Assembly are rather
strong. The PAC can pose a good deterrence and can refer cases of wrong doers to NAB
or FIA for detailed investigation. The role and credibility of NAB, FIA and Police are
ambiguous in the financial oversight matters. The PAC has big lists of directives that
PAC give to these inquiring agencies to prosecute certain accused but the compliance rate
is again very low. Auditor General sent a minimum of fifty (50) cases to NAB for an
inquiry without consulting PAC for what it had not drafted audit paras (Ahmed 2012). It
is again a monopoly over the powers of PAC and AG cannot directly refer these cases to
NAB till they are brought to PAC. Hence, these institutions do not transparently
cooperate with PAC. While being the officers of these institutions senior bureaucrats,
their presentation methods are mostly confusing PAC members and they can easily hide
facts.
Although, Auditor General in Pakistani Jurisdictions is a strong institution, and a source
of information to the parliament about transparency in money spent the parliament
sectioned during the annual budget. However, the Auditor General’s role is not meeting
out the level of corruption of Pakistan. Its sampling method and the highlighting criteria
are ambiguous and not public. Even the PAC members are not aware of the method the
Auditor General adopts for these two function. The audit officers are bribed at field level
for high value paras and the paras are settled at different level from the field audit to the
DAC. These settlements are mostly negative and the 2 per cent or 5 per cent as the audit
office say is drawn from the remaining cases which are not settled. On its final stage, at
DAC level and during the preparation of audit briefs at Pre-PAC level at AG office, the
officers mutually decide the fate of a para being highlighted or un-highlighted.
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7.3.3.3 Strict directions to NAB and FIA of no excuse to wrong doers / criminals for
financial issues
PAC issues it directives on behalf of National Assembly, the supreme legislative body of
the state; there is no reason that any department or institution goes an inch ahead of its
directives. Generally speaking, the directives of PAC are final and un-changeable.
Logically there is no excuse in any directive to favour any person or department but these
is a question of credibility of institutions like NAB, FIA and Police that most of the time
ignore these directives.
7.3.3.4 Accurate, timely government information
There is another aspect that there are no proper investigation procedures available to
investigate financial scams. These institutions lack enough forensic accountants and
special prosecutors to deal with financial matters with special criminal training who know
what exactly to look for. These investigating agencies require well trained and
specialized professional prosecutor staff who can find proof and evidences. Despite
existing of all these institutions and departments, most of the big corruption scams never
come to surface. The white collar crime has become so suffocated that prosecuting
agencies fail to identify the criminals.
7.3.3.5 Enhanced public awareness of government programs
An effective and efficient PAC can enhance public awareness of government programme
but the case is contrary in Pakistan. PAC meetings are nearly restricted to public
especially after the Musharraf Regime Emergencies and Marshal Law period had created
the Red-Zone and No Go Area for general public. Media is playing good role to unleash
thing to public but still common man is partially informed of government programme.
The Good Governance strengthening institutions like PAC is always dealing with big
backlogs. This backlog never let PAC investigate or discuss government programme,
PAC discussed only audit paras which are related to previous governments, hence of no
use to common man.
152
7.3.3.6 Enhanced legislative knowledge about the state of the management of
programs
Since PAC is always dealing with previous backlog and it never discussed the state of
management of government programme. The people never know the status of on-going
programmes. Hence, thing are always strange and common man only hear the scams of
previous government while strengthening solidarity with the ruling elite and mocking at
the previous government.
PAC can enhance people with legislative knowledge about the state of the management
of government programs only when it had finished with the backlog and would be
working on value for money and audit performance. The idea looks a distance dream to
coming governments.
7.3.4 Impact
Across the history the operations of PAC had merely been a formalities and fools play.
However, the 13th
PAC took a good start and deepened PAC operations and
institutionalized many practices to strengthen its practices. PAC under Ch. Nisar Ali, as
its Chairman, hardly was able to finish the backlog if Ch. Nisar had not resigned but his
resignation put PAC back to the point zero. To discuss under this framework, one can say
that PAC in Pakistan is still at activity level and there is no output, outcomes are still
awaited in the coming government if there is some efficient Chairman and the good
impact of PAC operations is a distance dream in Pakistan.
7.4 Points of Winning
The observations of PAC functioning and the survey conducted showed that 13th
PAC
remained ahead of 12th
PAC. Some of the critical points are as under;
7.4.1 Successes of PAC
While talking about the successes of PAC, 81.8 per cent responded the
Government responds favourably to 13th
PAC recommendations while only 20.0
per cent said the 12th
PAC received such response from government.
153
45.5 per cent responded the Government frequently implemented 13th
PAC
recommendations while 30 per cent responded government frequently
implemented on 12th
PAC recommendations.
18.2 per cent responded the 13th
PAC institutionalized certain practices as a result
of its working but only 10 per cent responded saying the 12th
PAC frequently did
so.
63.6 per cent of the respondents for 13th
PAC said there were frequent
improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases but none
said so for 12th
PAC.
45.5 per cent of the respondents to a question for 13th
Pac said legal action were
frequently taken against officials who contravene laws while only 22.2 per cent
said it was frequent for 12th
PAC.
59.1 per cent responded disciplinary action was taken against officials who
contravene administrative guidelines during 13th
PAC period while only 20.0 per
cent said the practice was frequent during 12th
PAC.
Another 59.1 per cent said the 13th
PAC successfully resisted political pressure
exerted on it but only 30 per cent responded it was frequent during 12th
PAC.
54.5 per cent of respondents said the Principal Accounting Officers found hiding
facts before 13th
PAC while 70 per cent responded the practice was frequent
during 12th
PAC.
77.3 per cent the 13th
PAC adopted and practiced latest oversight developments
but only 30.0 per cent responded the practice was frequent during 12th
PAC
period.
72.7 per cent of the respondent said the 13th
PAC institutionalized certain guiding
principles which were required to meet its objective while 50.0 per cent of the
respondent said for 12th
PAC.
90.9 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC is adherence to financial
control of resources while only 50.0 per cent said so for 12th
PAC.
54.5 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC follows the policy of waste
prevention while 30.0 per cent believed the 12th
PAC did so.
154
95.5 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC promotes practices of
economical use of resources but only 50.0 per cent said it was the quality of 12th
PAC.
7.4.2 Composition of PAC
A total of hundred per cent of respondents believed that 13th
PAC had a balanced
representation of all major political parties on the committee while 81.8 per cent
said it was the case in 12th
PAC.
72.2 per cent of the respondents said the membership of the 13th
PAC exclude
ministers of the Government while as much as 80 per cent said so in case of 12th
PAC.
7.4.3 Powers of PAC
81.8 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC had clear focus on holding the
government accountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardship
over public assets while only 40 per cent said it was so during 12th
PAC.
63.3 per cent of the respondents said clear focus on administration of 7policy and
not on whether policies are good or bad was very important during 13th
PAC
while no one said it was an important practice during 12th
PAC.
71.6 per cent of the respondents found saying 13th
PAC have a permanent
reference to examine the Public Accounts while only 40.0 per cent believed the
12th
PAC do so.
77.3 per cent of the respondents said power to call independent witnesses was
very important to 13th
PAC while only 30.0 per cent said that the practice was
important to 12th
PAC.
59.1 per cent of the respondents believed the 13th
PAC had power to request (but
not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks but none
said it was very important to 12th
PAC.
81.8 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC had power to compel officials
to attend and be held accountable for administrative, performance even after they
155
have left office while only 50.0 per cent of the respondents said so in case of 12th
PAC.
87.3 per cent of the respondents said that 13th
enjoyed power to compel witnesses
to answer questions while 65.0 per cent said it an important practice during 12th
PAC.
63.6 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC had power to hold press
conferences and issue press releases while only 20.0 per cent said this power was
very important to 12th
PAC.
77.3 per cent of the respondents believed it was very important to the 13th
PAC
having power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national
security issues while 40 per cent said for in case of 12th
PAC.
81.1 per cent responded the power to review proposed legislation or amendments
to the Legislative Auditor’s Act was very important to 13th
PAC while 60 per cent
said it was also very important to 12th
PAC.
40.9 per cent responded that the power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget
was very important to 13th
PAC while only 20 per cent said it very important case
to 12th
PAC.
81.1 per cent of the respondents believed the power to choose subjects for
examination without government direction and advice was very important to 13th
PAC while 70.0 per cent said so for 12th
PAC.
95.9 per cent of the respondents believed the powers to take Suo-Motu actions
were very important to the 13th
PAC while 90 per cent said so for the 12th
PAC.
70 per cent of the respondents said the powers to listen to Public Complaints and
take action was very important to 13th
PAC while 59.1 per cent same was a case
to 12th
PAC.
59.1 per cent of the respondent regarded the powers to take action on media
review was very important to 13th
PAC while only 20 per cent said so for 12th
PAC.
59.1 per cent of the respondents said the influence of 13th
PAC on the adequacy of
the corporate governance arrangements was very important while 40 per cent said
so for 12th
PAC.
156
59.1 per cent of the respondents said the influence of 13th
PAC
recommendations/Directives on institutions while 20 per cent said this factor was
very important to 12th
PAC.
7.4.4 General Practices of PAC
77.3 per cent of the respondents said close working relationship between members
from different political parties were very important during 13th
PAC however, 90
per cent of the respondents said it was very important during 12th
PAC.
22.7 per cent of the respondents said the practice of advance preparation of
members before hearings, Members receives Audit Briefs well in time was very
important to 13th
PAC while 20 per cent said it was so to 12th
PAC.
60 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget
statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants were sufficient while 40 per cent of
the respondents said so to 12th
PAC.
59.3 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC took quick and in time
decisions while 30 per cent said it was sufficient to 12th
PAC.
59.1 per cent of the respondents said the 13th
PAC had close working relationship
with Auditor General while 70 per cent said so during the 12th
PAC.
59.9 per cent responded formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog was
very important to 13th
PAC while 20 per cent said it was very important to 12th
PAC.
40 per cent of the respondents said the strategic prioritization of items for
committee review, with time limits for stages of committee work like
consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports was very
important to 13th
PAC while only 20 per cent said it was a case of greater
importance to 12th
PAC.
100 per cent of the respondents said that it was very important to 13th
PAC the
committee should be appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament and
stays active between sessions while only 20 per cent said so for 12th
PAC.
157
77.3 per cent of the respondents said that it was very important to 13th
PAC to
report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated while there
was no such practice during 12th
PAC.
22 per cent of the respondent believed the 13th
PAC received comprehensive
response to recommendations from the government but the no respondent for 12th
PAC was sure to this practice.
Only 4.5 per cent of the respondents said having committee members with at least
2 years of prior Committee experience was very important to 13th
PAC while
there was no response to this question for 12th
PAC being very important.
22.7 per cent of the respondents of 13th
PAC said having committee members
with prior administrative or business experience was very important while 80 per
cent of the respondents of the 12th
PAC believed it was very important.
36.6 per cent of the respondents believed in extra pay or other incentives for
members to participate in hearings outside the normal legislative session were
very important to 13th
PAC while only 10 per cent responded it was important to
12th
PAC.
40.9 per cent of the respondents said the incentives to encourage administrative
action on committee recommendations were not important to 13th
PAC while 30
per cent of the respondent to 12th
PAC said the practice was not important.
59.1 per cent of the respondents believed the effective follow-up procedures to
determine if action has been taken to implement the committee’s
recommendations were very important to 13th
PAC while only 20 per cent of 12th
PAC think it was very important.
40.9 per cent of the respondents believed good relations with other parliamentary
oversight mechanisms such as the budget committee were very important to 13th
PAC while 20 per cent believed it was also very important to 12th
PAC.
7.5 Institutionalization of Winning Points.
Ch, Nisar Ali khan, Chairman 13th
PAC seemed acquainted with latest development and
modern practices. He knows the peculiar function of PAC and occasionally applies every
suitable practice but unfortunately these developments and practices were not made a
158
permanent part of PAC operations. However, as a convention most of the practices are
working in the recent PAC under Nadeem Afzal Chan the new Chairman. The next
chapter is a conclusion of this study.
159
Chapter 8
Conclusion
The study concludes that the PAC operations are always restrained to years of backlog,
inefficient bureaucracy and political posturing. The institutions like PAC are the core
functionaries of good governance of a country and in the recent years this institution has
scored extensive prestige and status while maintaining its deterrence on other
departments and ministries. The financial oversight is the basis of transparency and
accountability of a state but in Pakistan, the operations of PAC have merely been
formalities.
It seems part of political tactics that PAC is always dealing with previous backlog. The
Charter of Democracy gives another benefit to major political parties of this country by
giving the Chairmanship of PAC to the Leader of the Opposition. It is a good practice but
it had two dimensions depending on the culture of power and governance in Pakistan; the
opposition party will oversee only the audit reports of their respective government and
secondly, the government can easily complete its programmes as the performance of
these programmes will be discussed during the coming government when ruling party
will be sitting on opposition bunches.
The arbitrary transfers of the servants of the state are reason of non-compliance to PAC
directives. None of the civil servants is worried about the PAC inquiries and the
directives as most probably he would be transferred to some other position before the
second meeting of PAC. Besides civil servants, the implementation cell of PAC and the
Implementation Cells of auditor department are an eye wash. The follow up process is
generally correspondence and the use of phone calls is rare. Till the time compliance rate
is raised to above 50 per cent PAC operations are considered failing.
An independent and transparent PAC can have a good financial control over state
resources but strengthening of institutions like PAC would leave deterrence for weak
departments and ministries.
160
Chapter 9
Making PAC Effective
This chapter is a set of recommendations for making the process of legislative financial
oversight effective to enhance the process of accountability and transparency. The major
areas to be strengthened for an effective PAC include learning skills on how to evaluate
the Audit Paras? How to grill down the facts? How to strengthen management system of
PAC? How to choose valued paras and important issues? A list of recommendations is as
under;
1. The PAC members may adopt CCCER Model, while discussion any audit objections.
PAC can play an effective role in applying CCCER Model in its proceedings in ways
given below;
That all criteria are mentioned very clearly in the audit para (Which rules etc.
have been violated?)
The systemic cause of the condition/irregularity is indicated. This aspects
concerns looking into failure of internal controls.
The effect is also mentioned especially when it has a rolling impact (e.g. delay
in one project causing delays in linked projects).
Recommendations in the audit report are systemic, measurable and
implementable; and are stated to enable the PAO to take specific focused
action.
The CCCER Model is annexed as Annex-X.
2. Controlling arbitrary transfers of PAOs /civil servants would help increase the rate of
compliance. PAOs may be given security of tenure of minimum of three years to
realize the responsibility. The arbitrary transfers are a big excuse of PAOs for
violating PAC directives. PAOs should be there to face their inquiries them self not
their substitutes mates.
3. A Federal Investigation Services may be established with its officers recruited
through CSS exam. The professionals of this group may be trained the skills of how
to prove the white collar crime.
161
4. Specialised Criminal Training Institute should be formed to give special trainings and
to produce professional prosecutors with technical knowledge to exactly reach to the
root cause and they should know what exactly need to be look for. Such training
institutions should give training like Francis Accountant, Criminology and Financial
Prosecutions.
5. Special Committee consisting of separate members of Technocrats from Senate and
the Senators who have interest in Financial Oversight should be constituted to deal
with the Backlog and the Main PAC of the National Assembly would work on the
Value for Money, Audit Performance and more focus on implementation and
compliance on the update cases of corruption.
6. Looking at the compliance rate and the years of PAC activity wasted in dealing with
backlog, PAC should revisit legal requirement and considerations that cause the PAC
to engage backlog issue. It could be done by investigating only the issues of greater
value for money. National Assembly can be requested to grant a criteria-based
immunity from the pre-2008 era on the justification that this otherwise compromises
the PAC’s effectiveness in dealing with current issues and concepts of value for
money and audit performance.
7. Audit Department should send the Audit Briefs directly to PAC members, concerned
PAOs, media and PAC Secretariat. The Audit Briefs should also be uploaded on both
Auditor General and National Assembly website for public knowledge and
awareness. The practice will help members better understand the technicalities of
paras. The important issue will be discussed on media and newspapers prior to
meeting. This mechanism will make PAC more transparent and accountable.
8. It should be the responsibility of relevant ministry to prepare draft Actionable Points
and provide to PAC within three (03) days. The suggested process can evolve drafting
of Actionable Points at ministry level, correction by PAC, vetting by AG and
finalization of report of PAC. The Ministry of Railways do this practice on voluntary
basis and send draft Actionable Points to PAC Secretariat. The study observed that
162
due to overwork of preparation of Actionable Points, the PAC staff cannot efficiently
perform their defined work of getting compliance on PAC Directives.
9. Non-compliance related major issues (the list is already prepared at PAC Secretariat)
should be put on PAC agenda as soon as possible and disseminated among members,
ministries, media and public while putting it on Auditor General and PAC website.
It is also suggested that all subjugated cases should be mentioned in the list of
pending major issues. After completing these lists, a group of PAC Members may
meet with Chief Justice of Supreme Court to discuss the urgency of cases. Supreme
Court may be requested to put such cases on priority basis.
10. All the CFAOs-Chief Finance & Accounts Officers should regularly submit their
monthly recovery statements to PAC.
11. Attendance of Auditor General should be made compulsory and mandatory.
12. PAC needs to develop its secretariat with organized system of researchers, IT experts,
strong administration and an Implementation Cell, etc. Rather having Implementation
Cell it’s good to create Monitoring and Implementation Committee that looks more
powerful and threatening to criminals.
13. All letters issued from PAC Secretariat should be signed by the head of PAC. There
are two benefits attached to this suggestion; one that Head may be well aware of
every correspondence among PAC Secretariat and other institutions, second, it will
regulate PAC agenda.
14. Actionable Points may be properly approved by the Chairman PAC rather at a lateral
stage of approving the whole report. The suggestion will help eliminate the chances
of wrong interpretation of Directives.
15. Approved copies of all Actionable Points should be sent to All PAC members, AG
and concerned ministries/departments for compliance.
16. PAC officers/staff should hold Pre-PAC meeting at least three (03) days prior to PAC
meeting. It was observed as Auditor General and PAOs hold DAC and Pre-PAC
163
meetings at AG office, they are well prepared to better present them. It was observed
that Members and PAC staffs in most cases pay a look at Audit Briefs during the
meeting facilitating AG and PAOs strengthening their argument.
17. PAC staff may never be demoralised at meeting places especially the lower one. In
order to boost their confidence and role in oversight process. It is also suggested that
Members hold frequent meetings with staff to discuss issues faced by them and to
resolve them at earliest. The demoralised and depressed staff can badly effect the
transparent operations of PAC.
18. The electronic media should be allowed for live coverage of PAC proceedings. In
case live coverage not possible at Parliament premises, the better place for PAC
meeting is Jinnah Convention Centre. The place is accessible for both media and
public.
19. The practice of Public Question/Answer Session in PAC meetings can prove fruitful
in addressing public grievances. The practice however, will make PAC an effective
public accountability forum as for as a threat for PAOs of facing the actual victim.
20. All the notifications of PAC should be written/issues after a consensus of all members
or at least of a quorum and not only the decision of Chairman.
21. PAC should reserve some time for the agenda of Non-Compliance/Implementation
Cell of PAC to be discussed in the first hours of every meeting.
22. Office of the Auditor General should also be accountable as a
Ministry/Division/Department before PAC.
23. Individual public complaints should be given top priority to resolve their problems. A
Public Complaints Cell with tool free may be established to listen to public
grievances.
24. PAC should have record room with organised cataloguing of files for an easy access
of members and staff.
25. PAC staff should at least be computer literate.
164
26. PAC Secretariat staff of Grade 1-16 may also be sent abroad on study tours along
with members and senior staff.
27. A minimum of 10 per cent of the money recovered should be given to PAC staff as
incentive to accelerate the recovery process as it is in NAB, FIA or Traffic Police.
The practice will develop interest and competition among officers to work more to
effect recoveries.
28. PAC may take notice of the expenditures of PAC meetings. It may count expenses of
each meeting on the end and shift on to the responsible along with other recoveries.
29. The Chairman PAC may hold meetings with all Federal Secretaries/PAOs every three
month to discuss the implementation status of PAC recommendations/Directives.
These meetings will help building liaison among PAC and PAOs.
30. Experienced PAC staff may never be arbitrarily transferred substituting new one. The
staffs require rich and deep experience of auditing and oversight.
31. PAC need to engage sufficiently qualified financial oversight experts to keep
Members and PAC Secretariat abreast with the latest financial oversight and
accountability practices.
32. PAC need an advanced automation Centre, donor help can be sought for this purpose
to boost automation system of PAC.
33. PAC should strengthen its working relations especially with Budget Committees and
others related to financial matters or the matters related to PAC operations. This
relationship will help ensure continuous and efficient working of committee system in
the National Assembly of Pakistan.
34. Reports of the PAC, when laid before the house may be thoroughly discussed upon
for house recommendations and an effective parliamentary review.
35. Effort should be made to transparent Anti-Corruption institutions like FIA, NAB and
PMIC.
165
36. Donor agencies and other capacity building organisation focus more on the capacity
building of members. Arranging capacity building workshops and distributing
briefing papers carrying best audit and accountability practices, telling them audit
skilled and technicalities of financial matters.
37. Along with the members of PAC, the staff of the PAC secretariat also requires to
trained on modern financial oversight practices and required IT skills to facilitate
PAC operations. Pac staffing should be career oriented that mean officials with PAC
experiences and knowhow should be employed to PAC secretariat and they should be
worked upon for capacity building and professionalism.
38. No PAO/ Ministry may be allowed to appear before the PAC unless it held DAC.
39. PAOs should appear before PAC while well prepared to answers PAC questions.
40. The DAC meetings should also include a representative of the PAC along with the
representative of Ministry of Finance, AG and PAC.
166
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175
Annex-I
The main individual conclusions and recommendations of McGee
The International Dimension:
There should be greater direct contact between Parliaments, especially PACs, and international financial institutions.
The CPA include good government as a subject of the theme or sub-theme of its conferences
Auditors General:
The Auditor General should be an Officer of Parliament independent of the Executive
The appointment process for an Auditor General should involve consultation with a wide range of stakeholders
An Auditor General should only be removed from office on limited grounds that are specified in advance by law
Auditors General should actively participate in international Auditors General associations
Auditors General should actively introduce themselves and their services to all parliamentary committees, not just PACs
Auditors General have a role in approving internal audit standards
Central banks should be subject to the Auditor General’s audit mandate in the same way as other public sector agencies
The Auditor General should take account of the views of PACs in framing their work programs
Parliaments should be involved at the pre-Budget stage in determining the resources to be allocated to the Auditor General
Auditors General and their staff must have appropriate legal protections conferred on them to enable them to carry out their duties
PACs should keep under review any proposals to change the Auditor General’s audit mandate
Any company receiving public funding to deliver public services should be subject to the Auditor General’s audit mandate
in respect of those services
Auditors General should present their reports in an attractive form and devise active communications strategies
Auditors General should take steps to measure their own performance
The main of PACs work should be guided by the work of the Auditor General
Public Accounts Committees:
Parliaments should regard the PAC as their pre-eminent committee
Senior opposition figures must be associated with the PAC’s work
There should always be sufficient experience and seniority among the membership of the PAC
Specially structured training be provided to PAC members
It is crucial that the Chairperson of the PAC has the qualities to ensure that the PAC works effectively
PACs must be adequately resourced to carry out their functions
PACs, while not being bound to act unanimously, should strive for some consensus in their reports
PACs should promote greater public awareness of their role
PACs should consider using subcommittees for specific inquiries
The Internet should be used to disseminate information on PACs
Procedures for follow-up action in recommendations in PAC reports are critical
Parliament should hold an annual debate on the work of the PAC
PACs in smaller and developing parliaments need improved access to information technology
A rational local method of allocating funding to PACs needs to be put in place to ensure that they have adequate resources
Smaller Parliaments need to take innovative steps to expand the pool of personnel available to serve on the PAC
Special attendance allowances, rather than a special salary, should be considered for PAC attendance
Links between PAC websites should be developed
The CPA should explore the potential for the use of a news group to encourage information exchange on PAC matters
The CPA should examine what options exist for conferences of associations of PACs
A compendium of Commonwealth PAC practice be established to be managed by a CPA branch or Parliament
Research should be undertaken into establishing a basis for making international comparisons of PAC performance
176
Annex-II
An “Ideal Committee” by Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance
of Public Accounts Committees by World Bank Institute
• The Committee is small; committees seem to work well with 5-11 members, none of whom should be
government Ministers;
• Senior opposition figures are associated with the PAC’s work, and probably chair the Committee;
• The Chair is a senior parliamentarian, fair minded and respected by parliament;
• The Committee is appointed for the full term of the parliament;
• The Committee is adequately resourced, with an experienced clerk and a competent researcher(s)
• There is clarity on the Committee’s role and responsibilities;
• The Committee meets frequently and regularly;
• Hearings are open to the public; a full verbatim transcript and summary minutes are quickly available for
public distribution;
• A steering committee plans the Committee’s work in advance and prepares an agenda for each meeting to
the full Committee;
• The typical witness is a senior public servant (the “accounting officer”) accompanied by the officials that
have a detailed understanding of the issues under examination;
• The Auditor’s Report is automatically referred to the Committee and the Auditor meets with the
Committee to go over the highlights of the report;
• In addition to issues raised by the Auditor, the Committee occasionally decides to investigate other
matters;
• Committee strives for some consensus in their reports;
• The Committee issues formal substantive reports to parliament at least annually;
• The Committee has established a procedure with the government for following up its recommendations
and is informed about what, if any, action has been taken;
• In all its deliberations, the Committee uses the Auditor as an expert advisor;
• Parliaments hold an annual debate on the work of the Committee.
177
Annex-III
List of Chairmen PAC (1947-2011)
National Assembly of Pakistan
Sr # Name of Chair Date of
Constitution
Date of
Termination
Duration
DD-MM-
YY
1st PAC Never meet
2nd
PAC Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,
MoS for Finance
05-09-1952 21-10-1954 16-01-02
3rd
PAC Mr. Mohammad Ali,
Finance Minister
14-12-1954 07-06-1955 21-06-00
4th
PAC Syed Amjad Ali, Finance
Minister
05-11-1956 27-10-1958 22-11-01
1st Adhoc
PAC
Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,
Finance Minister
03-03-1960 00-00-1962 27-09-01
5th
PAC Mr. Noor-ul-Amin, MNA 13-07-1965 13-11-1965 00-04-00
2nd
Adhoc
PAC
Mr. Noor-ul-Amin, MNA 13-11-1965 25-03-1969 12-04-04
3rd
Adhoc
PAC
Mr. Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash,
Finance Minister
10-08-1970 14-04-1972 04-08-01
6th
PAC i) Dr. Mubashir Hassan,
Finance Minister
ii)Rana M. Hanif Khan,
Finance Minister
22-06-1974 10-06-1977 18-00-03
4th
Adhoc
PAC
Mr. A.G. Kazi, Governor
SBP
19-11-1978 16-04-1981 27-05-02
5th
Adhoc
PAC
Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan 25-08-1982 00-12-1985 05-04-03
7th
PAC Sahibzada M. Ali Shah,
MNA
18-08-1985 29-05-1988 11-09-02
8th
PAC Mr. Hakim Ali Zardari,
MNA
05-03-1989 06-08-1990 01-05-01
9th
Mr. Hamza, MNA 28-08-1991 18-07-1993 20-11-01
10th Rao M. Hashim Khan, MNA 28-08-1995 05-08-1996 08-00-01
11th
Mr. Hamza, MNA 12-05-1997 12-10-1999 00-05-02
6th
Adhoc Mr. H.U. Beg 25-08-2000 16-11-2002 22-03-02
12th
Malik Allah Yar Khan,
MNA
10-04-2004 07-11-2007 27-07-03
13th
Chaudry Nisar Ali, MNA 19-09-2008 27-11-2011 08-02-03
Total Duration of Adhoc PACs 07 Days and 16 Years
Total Duration of PAC 02 Days-06 Months and 22
Years
178
Annex-IV
Reports of the PAC (1947-2011)
Sr # Report Year Chairman Year of
Publication Report Status
1. 1947-48 to 1979-80 Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,
MoS for Finance 1985 Laid
2. 1947-48 Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,
MoS for Finance 1985 Laid
3. 1948-49 Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,
MoS for Finance 1985 Laid
4. 1949-50 Mr. M Ali, Finance Minister - Laid
5. 1950-51 Mr. M Ali, Finance Minister - Laid
6. 1951-52 Syed Amjad Ali, Minister
for Finance - Laid
7. 1952-53 Syed Amjad Ali, Minister
for Finance - Laid
8. 1953-54 Syed Amjad Ali, Minister
for Finance - Laid
9. 1954-55, 1955-56 and
1956-57
Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,
Minister for Finance -
1957-58 and 1958-59 Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,
Minister for Finance - Laid
1959-60 and 1961-62 Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,
Minister for Finance - Laid
10. 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65 Mr. Noor ul Aminn, MNA - Laid
11. 1965-66
Mr. Muzaffar Ali
Qizilbash, Minister for
Finance
-
12. 1966-67, 1967-68
Mr. Muzaffar Ali
Qizilbash, Minister for
Finance
1971 Laid
13. 1968-69, 1969-70 Dr. Mubashir Hassan,
Minister for Finance - Laid
14. 1970-71 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan -
15. 1971-72 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan - Laid
16. 1972-73 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan - Laid
17. 1973-74 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan - Laid
18. 1974-75 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan - Laid
19. 1975-76 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan - Laid
20. 1976-77 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan Laid
21. 1977-78 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan - Laid
179
22. 1978-79 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor
State Bank of Pakistan - Laid
23. 1979-80 Ghulam Ishaq Khan 1985 Laid
24. 1980-81 Ghulam Ishaq Khan - Laid
25. 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-
84, 1984-85 Sardar Muhammad Ali Shah 1987 Laid
26. 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88 Mr. Hamza, MNA - Laid
27. 1988-89 Mr. Hamza, MNA - Laid
28. 1989-90 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leader
of the Opposition - Laid
29. 1990-91 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid
30. 1991-92 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA 2010 Laid
31. 1992-93 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid
32. 1993-94 Mr. Hamza, MNA Complete Ready for Printing
33. 1994-95 Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,
Convener 2011 Laid
34. 1995-96 Mr. Riaz Fatyana, Convener 2007 Laid
35. 1996-97 Mr. H.U. Beg 2001 Laid
36. 1997-98 Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,
Convener 2011 Laid
37. 1998-99 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending Referred to Special
Committee II
38. 1999-2000 Mr. H.U. Beg 2002 Laid
39. 2000-01 Malik Allah Yar Khan,
MNA 2007 Laid
40. 2001-02 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid
41. 2002-03 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending
Referred to Special
Committee
II/Pending
42. 2003-04 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending Referred to Special
Committee II
43. 2004-05 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending Referred to Special
Committee II
44. 2005-06 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leader
of the Opposition 2010 Laid
45. 2006-07 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending Referred to Special
Committee II
46. 2007-08 Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,
Convener Pending
Referred to Special
Committee III
47. 2008-09 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leader
of the Opposition 2011 Laid
48. 2009-10 Pending Under review process
of Main PAC
49. 2010-11 Pending Under review process
of Main PAC
50.
Monitoring &
Implementation Committee
Report 2010
Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,
Convener 2011 Laid
51.
Monitoring &
Implementation Committee
Report 2011
Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,
Convener Complete Ready for Printing
180
Annex-V
PAC Mandate-Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly
202 Composition: The standing Committee on Public accounts shall consist of not more than twenty three
members to be elected by the Assembly and the Minister for Finance shall be its ex-officio member.
203. Functions; (1) The committee shall examine the accounts showing the appropriations of sums
granted by the Assembly for the expenditure of the Government, the annual finance accounts of the Government, the
report of the AGP and such other matters as the Minister for Finance may refer to it.
(2) In Scrutinizing the appropriation accounts of the Government and the reports of the AGP thereon it shall be
the duty of the Committee to satisfy itself
(a) that the money shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were legally available for, and applicable to
the service or purpose to which they have been applied or charged
(b) that the expenditure confirms to the authority which governs it; and
(c) that every re-appropriation has been made in accordance with the provisions made in this behalf under rules
framed by the Ministry of Finance
(3) It shall also be the duty of the Committee
(a) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of state corporations, trading and
manufacturing schemes, concerns and projects together with the balance sheets and statements of profit and loss
accounts which the President may have required to be prepared or are prepared under the provision of the statutory
rules regarding the functioning of a particular cooperation trading or manufacturing scheme or concern or project and
the report of the AGP thereon
(b) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-
autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the AGP either under the directions of the President or
under an Act of Parliament; and
(c) to consider the report of the AGP in cases the president may have required to conduct the audit of any receipt
or to examine the accounts of stores and stocks.
(4) of any money has been spent on any service during a financial years in excess of eth amount granted by the
Assembly for that purpose, the Committee shall examine with reference to the facts of each case the circumstances
leading to such an excess and make such recommendation as it may deem fit
(5) the report of the Committee shall be presented within a period of one year from the date on which reference
was made to it by the Assembly unless the Assembly, on a motion being made, directs that the time for the presentation
of the report be extended to a date specified in the motion;
Provided that extension in the time for the presentation of the report shall be asked for before the expiry of eth time
allowed under the rule.
204 Unfinished work of the Committee:- Any report, memorandum or note that the Committee may have
prepared, or any evidence that the Committee may have taken before the dissolution of the assembly, shall be made
available to the new Committee.
205 Continuity of the Proceedings:- Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the public Accounts
Committee may proceed from the stage where the previous Committee left the proceedings before the dissolution of the
Assembly
181
Annex-VI
List of Members of 12th
and 13th
PAC
Sr. 12th
PAC 13th
PAC Position
Name of Member Pol. Party Name of Member Pol. Party
1. Malik Allah Yar Khan,
MNA
PML Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA PML-N Chairman
2. Lt. Col. (R) Ghulam Rasul
Sahi, MNA
PML Mr. Nadeem Afzal Chan,
MNA
PPPP Member
3. RAi Mansab Ali Khan,
MNA
PML Mr. Noor Alam Khan, MNA PPPP Member
4. Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan
Jatoi, MNA
PML Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah,
MNA
PPPP Member
5. Sardar Ashiq Hussain
Gopang, MNA
PML Mrs. Rukhsana Bangash,
MNA
PPPP Member
6. Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA PML Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,
MNA
PPPP Member
7. Mr. Muhammad Safdar
Shakir, MNA
PML Rana Muhammad Farooq
Saeed Khan, MNA
PPPP Member
8. Mr. Ali Akbar Mazhar
Wains, MNA
PML Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira,
MNA
PPPP Member
9. Maj. (R) Tanvir Hussain
Syed, MNA
PPPP Begum Shehnaz Sheikh,
MNA
PML Member
10. Prof. Aasiya Azeem, MNA PML Khawaja Mohammad Asif,
MNA
PML-N Member
11. Ch. Wajahat Hussain PML Mr. Zahid Hamid PML-N Member
12. Mr. Kunwar Khalid
Younus, MNA
MQM Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, MNA PML-N Member
13. Makhdoom Shah
Mahmood Hussain
Qureshi, MNA
PPPP Mr. Muhammad Pervaiz
Malik, MNA
PML-N Member
14. Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira,
MNA
PPPP Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA PML Member
15. Syed Qurban Ali Shah,
MNA
PPPP Mr. Hamid Yar Hiraj, MNA PML Member
16. Mr. Liaqat Baloch, MNA MMAP Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi,
MNA
MQM Member
17. Hafiz Hussain Ahmed,
MNA
MMAP Mr. Asfandyar Wali, MNA ANP Member
18. Maulana Abdul Ghafoor
Haidri, MNA
MMAP Mrs. Asyia Nisar, MNA MMAP Member
19. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA PML-N Mr. Saeed Ahmed Zafar,
MNA
IND Member
20. -- -- Mian Riaz Hussian Pirzada,
MNA
PML Member
21. -- -- Mr. Wasim Akhtar, MNA MQM Member
22. -- -- Mr. Noor-ul-Haq Qadri,
MNA
IND Member
23. Mr. Omer Ayub Khan
Minister of State for
Finance
PML Minister-in-Charge for
Finance & Revenue
-- Ex-Officio
182
Annex-VII
Recovery Status since 2000-2011
183
Annex-VIII
Survey Questionnaire
Assessment of 12th
PAC (2004-07)
Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan
The purpose of this questionnaire is to compare the functioning of 12th and 13th
PAC, identify factors that can improve the success of the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC) of the legislature in monitoring the financial accountability of the Government of Pakistan.
1. Who was the best Chair of the PAC from (Please check one): the Governing Party? (____) or an Opposition Party? (____)
2. Is the Committee staff sufficient to support PAC? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____
3. Is there sufficient Research Facility available to Members Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____
4. Do you think, PAC took quick and in time decisions? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____
5. Are you satisfied with the PAC‘s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____
Accounts/Grants
6. What were the causes of delay in the formation of 12th
PAC? ..............................................................................................
7. Did the 12th
PAC achieve any of the following types of results or successes? If so, please indicate how often:
7.1 Government responds favorably to Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.2 Government implements Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.3 Changes in legislation were adopted as a result of Committee work: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.4 Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.5 Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.6 Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.7 The Committee successfully resisted political pressure exerted on it frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.8 The Principal Accounting Officers found hiding facts before PAC frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.9 The Committee adopted and practiced latest oversight developments frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.10 The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.11 The Committee is adherence to financial control of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.12 The Committee follows the policy of waste prevention frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.13 The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
8. Some suggest the following factors contribute to the success of a Public Accounts Committee. With reference to the powers and practices of
Committee, how important do you think each of the following factors has been during the 12 PAC? Please circle the appropriate number rating each
184
factor as either: 1 - very important; 2 - somewhat important; 3 - not important; or 4 - not applicable. You are welcome to add any other factors that are
missing in the space at the end of this question.
Some possible success factors 1=Very important
2=Somewhat important
3=Not Important
4=Not Applicable
Composition of the Committee
8.1 Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee 1 2 3 4
8.2 Membership should exclude ministers of the Government 1 2 3 4
Committee Powers
8.3 Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of 1 2 3 4
taxpayers‘ money and its stewardship over public assets
8.4 Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad 1 2 3 4
8.5 Having a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts 1 2 3 4
8.6 Having a permanent reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 1 2 3 4
8.7 Power to call independent witnesses 1 2 3 4
8.8 Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government, 1 2 3 4
Organizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporations
8.9 Power to request (but not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks 1 2 3 4
8.10 Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, 1 2 3 4
performance even after they have left office
8.11 Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 1 2 3 4
8.12 Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 1 2 3 4
8.13 Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 1 2 3 4
8.14 Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues 1 2 3 4
8.16 Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act 1 2 3 4
8.17 Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 1 2 3 4
8.18 Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice 1 2 3 4
8.19 Power to compel Ministers to appear before the committee: 1 2 3 4
8.20 Powers to take Suo-Motu actions 1 2 3 4
8.21 Powers to listen Public Complaints and take action 1 2 3 4
8.22 Powers to take action on media review 1 2 3 4
185
8.23 Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements 1 2 3 4
8.24 Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 1 2 3 4
Committee Practices
8.25 Close working relationship between members from different political parties 1 2 3 4
8.26 Advance preparation of members before hearings 1 2 3 4
Members receives Audit Briefs well in time
8.27 Close working relationship with Auditor General 1 2 3 4
8.28 Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearings 1 2 3 4
8.29 Formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog 1 2 3 4
8.30 Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of 1 2 3 4
committee work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports
8.31 Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 1 2 3 4
8.32 Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament 1 2 3 4
and stays active between sessions
8.33 Televised public hearings 1 2 3 4
8.34 Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 1 2 3 4
8.35 Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 1 2 3 4
8.36 Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience 1 2 3 4
8.37 Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience 1 2 3 4
8.38 Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside 1 2 3 4
the normal legislative session
8.39 Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 1 2 3 4
8.40 Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations 1 2 3 4
8.41 Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken 1 2 3 4
to implement the committee’s recommendations
8.42 Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms 1 2 3 4
such as the budget committee
Other important success factors for 12th PAC:
8.43…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4
8.44………………………….…........................................................ 1 2 3 4
8.45…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4
186
9. Of those factors you rated “1 - very important” in question 9, which three have been most crucial in achieving successful results during the 12th
PAC?
Why?
#1 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………..............................................................................................
#2 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………........................................................... .................................
#3 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………........................................................... ..................................
10. Of those factors in Question 9 that do not currently apply to 12th PAC (i.e. those you rated “4”), do you think that any of these powers and practices
might make committee more effective? Please list them, and explain why.
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ..............
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ..................
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ......................
11. Are there any documents that describe the strength of 12th
PAC, best practice on a winning ground in comparison with 13th
PAC? If so, could you
please attach copies, or list them and let me know where they can be obtained?
………………………………................................................................................................................. ..................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
......................................…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
12. Please describe the Role of Chair in two or three lines.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
13. Please feel free to add or attach any additional comments that you would like to make.
………………………………................................................................................................................. ..................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................………………………………................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................
Thank you very much for your time and assistance. The results of this survey will be summarized and a copy sent to all those who respond, after the
study is completed
187
Annex-IX
Survey Questionnaire
Assessment of 13th
PAC (2008-11)
Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan
The purpose of this questionnaire is to compare the functioning of 12th
and 13th
PAC, identify factors that can improve the success of the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC) of the legislature in monitoring the financial accountability of the Government of Pakistan. The time period of this study terminates with the
resignation of Ch. Nisar Ali khan on 27th
November, 2011.
1. Who was the best Chair of the PAC from (Please check one): the Governing Party? (____) or an Opposition Party? (____)
2. Is the Committee staff sufficient to support PAC? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____
3. Is there sufficient Research Facility available to Members Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____
4. Do you think, PAC took quick and in time decisions? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____
5. Are you satisfied with the PAC‘s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____
Accounts/Grants
6 What were the causes of delay in the formation of 13th
PAC? .............................................................................................
7. Did the 13th
PAC achieve any of the following types of results or successes? If so, please indicate how often:
7.1 Government responds favourably to Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.2 Government implements Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.3 Changes in legislation were adopted as a result of Committee work: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.4 Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.5 Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.6 Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines: frequently_____ seldom_____ never___--
7.7 The Committee successfully resisted political pressure exerted on it frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.8 The Principal Accounting Officers found hiding facts before PAC frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.9 The Committee adopted and practiced latest oversight developments frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.10 The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.11 The Committee is adherence to financial control of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.12 The Committee follows the policy of waste prevention frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
7.13 The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
188
8. Some suggest the following factors contribute to the success of a Public Accounts Committee. With reference to the powers and practices of
Committee, how important do you think each of the following factors has been during the 13th
PAC? Please circle the appropriate number rating each
factor as either: 1 - very important; 2 - somewhat important; 3 - not important; or 4 - not applicable. You are welcome to add any other factors that are
missing in the space at the end of this question.
Some possible success factors 1=Very important
2=Somewhat important
3=Not Important
4=Not Applicable
Composition of the Committee
8.1 Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee 1 2 3 4
8.2 Membership should exclude ministers of the Government 1 2 3 4
Committee Powers
8.3 Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of 1 2 3 4
taxpayers‘ money and its stewardship over public assets
8.4 Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad 1 2 3 4
8.5 Having a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts 1 2 3 4
8.6 Having a permanent reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 1 2 3 4
8.7 Power to call independent witnesses 1 2 3 4
8.8 Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government, 1 2 3 4
Organizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporations
8.9 Power to request (but not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks 1 2 3 4
8.10 Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, 1 2 3 4
performance even after they have left office
8.11 Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 1 2 3 4
8.12 Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 1 2 3 4
8.13 Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 1 2 3 4
8.14 Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues 1 2 3 4
8.16 Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act 1 2 3 4
8.17 Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 1 2 3 4
8.18 Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice 1 2 3 4
8.19 Power to compel Ministers to appear before the committee: 1 2 3 4
8.20 Powers to take Suo-Motu actions 1 2 3 4
189
8.21 Powers to listen Public Complaints and take action 1 2 3 4
8.22 Powers to take action on media review 1 2 3 4
8.23 Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements 1 2 3 4
8.24 Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 1 2 3 4
Committee Practices
8.25 Close working relationship between members from different political parties 1 2 3 4
8.26 Advance preparation of members before hearings 1 2 3 4
Members receives Audit Briefs well in time
8.27 Close working relationship with Auditor General 1 2 3 4
8.28 Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearings 1 2 3 4
8.29 Formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog 1 2 3 4
8.30 Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of 1 2 3 4
committee work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports
8.31 Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 1 2 3 4
8.32 Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament 1 2 3 4
and stays active between sessions
8.33 Televised public hearings 1 2 3 4
8.34 Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 1 2 3 4
8.35 Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 1 2 3 4
8.36 Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience 1 2 3 4
8.37 Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience 1 2 3 4
8.38 Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside 1 2 3 4
the normal legislative session
8.39 Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 1 2 3 4
8.40 Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations 1 2 3 4
8.41 Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken 1 2 3 4
to implement the committee’s recommendations
8.42 Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms 1 2 3 4
such as the budget committee
Other important success factors for 13th PAC:
8.43…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4
8.44………………………….…........................................................ 1 2 3 4
190
8.45…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4
9. Of those factors you rated “1 - very important” in question 9, which three have been most crucial in achieving successful results during the 13th
PAC? Why?
1 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………......................................................................................... .
2 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………............................................................ ..............................
3 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………............................................................ ..............................
10. Of those factors in Question 9 that do not currently apply to 13th PAC (i.e. those you rated “4”), do you think that any of these powers and practices
might make committee more effective? Please list them, and explain why.
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ........................................
11. Are there any documents that describe the strength of 13th PAC, best practice on a winning ground in comparison with 12th
PAC? If so, could you
please attach copies, or list them and let me know where they can be obtained?
………………………………........................................................................................................ ...........................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
......................................…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
12. Please describe the Role of Chair in two or three lines.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
13. Please feel free to add or attach any additional comments that you would like to make.
………………………………................................................................................................................. ............................................................................................ ......
...................................................................................................................................………………………………................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .........
Thank you very much for your time and assistance. The results of this survey will be summarized and a copy sent to all those who respond, after the
study is completed
191
Annex-X
CCCER MODEL
Condition: Assertion of facts based on evidence (Oral, documentary, testimonial, visual) reflecting an
undesirable state of affairs, a violation of criteria, in the organization being audited and that comes
within the purview of audit. A favorable condition can also be reflected in the audit findings as a
reason for audit opinion. In such cases auditors may like to give recommendations the implementation
of which would be necessary for sustaining those conditions. Condition takes the form of audit finding.
Criteria: Primary and secondary legislation (Constitution, Enactments, Presidential Orders, Orders of
the Governors), rules, codes, procedures, standards, professional norms, best practice, principles,
concepts, policy statements, plans, vision, objectives, goals ,targets, benchmarks, anything that
provides a guideline or direction to certain course of action.
Cause: Cause is the reason for the existence of condition with reference to a systemic situation
like failure of internal controls. Cause of a condition could also be an immediate cause like for
example a theft taking place because the security person was sleeping. The auditor should be more
interested in what led to such a situation. It could be one person operating three or two shifts and
absence of: any control procedures or better management practice like outsourcing security.
Sometimes, even when procedures exist, lack of effective communication can become cause of control
failure.
Effect: Effect relates to the issue of materiality and significance of audit finding or condition. Material
finding may not always relate to a monetary limit. A failure of a disaster recovery program or a critical
illness or disease or epidemic prevention program is critical, irrespective of monetary values or the
population it is effecting. Effect is however the most important stepping stone towards creating an
impact of the auditing finding and gives relevance to the recommendation also.
Conclusion: Conclusion is basically the opinion the auditor forms about the condition on which to
base the suggested a course of action. The opinion should be based on well considered evidence that
should surface after the application of the criteria, cause and effect relating to the condition.
Conclusion is the most sensitive area of audit reporting and should be thoroughly discussed with the
auditee. It is the conclusion that has to be ultimately justified and defended in the PAC. The conclusion
must be clearly related to the other elements of cause, criteria reflecting the condition.
Recommendation: The recommendation should specific and not vague e.g. Improve controls. It
means nothing., identify measurable actions, should generally specify timelines One criteria is that the
PAO should take the recommendations forward to come up with an implementation plan with action
stations and timelines.