I

The Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of

Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Its Functioning during periods;

2002-2006 and 2008-2011

Submitted by

Faisal Hayat

NDU-GPP/M.P-09/F-060

Supervised by

Dr. Usman Mustafa

Department of Government & Public Policy

National Defence University, Islamabad-Pakistan

II

To my parents,

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Acknowledgement

Foremost, my sincere gratitude to my Supervisor, Dr. Usman Mustafa for his continuous

support to my M Phil research for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm and immense

knowledge. Defiantly, it was his guidance that helped me all the course of research and

writing of this Dissertation.

My special gratitude also goes to Dr. Ilhan Niaz, for his unlimited support in reviewing

my initial chapters. My special thanks to Dr. Bashir Hussain, Dr. Sarfraz Hussain Ansari

and Asif Shah for their technical support, encouragement and insightful comments.

My sincere thanks to Honourable Nadeem Afzal Gondal, Chairman PAC, Honourable

Yasmeen Rehman, Member PAC and Honourable Riaz Fatyana, Member PAC for their

precious time and continued support to my research. I am equally thankful to all other

members for their interviews and response to my research questionnaires.

My utmost gratitude to PAC Secretariat, especially Moosa Raza Afandi, Additional

Secretary, Najma Saddiquee, Joint Secretary, Muhammad Mushtaq, DS Legislation,

Roomana Kakar, Deputy Secretary, Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Secretary, Sharafat Ali,

Section Officer, Salamat Ali, Section Officer and Shabbir Ahmed, Assistant, Haji Hattar

Librarian-NA for facilitating my access to PAC, for their briefings and providing with

necessary data.

I am so grateful to Mohammad Mohsin Khan former Controller General of Accounts and

Deputy Auditor General Pakistan for his technical support and guidance. I found him the

best guide with technical knowledge about auditing, financial oversight and PAC

operations among the persons I accessed for this study.

I am so grateful to my friends Hassan Choukhia, Afzal Tarar, Muhammad Maqsood,

Shahzad Rao, Bilal Maghrani, Asad Kamal, Iqbal Haider, Imran Haider and Sohail Ikram

for their encouragement and morale support.

I importantly thank my family especially my parents, brothers, sisters, wife, nephews and

nieces who missed my company most of the time and sometimes on very special

occasions.

In the end I cannot forget to acknowledge the contribution of Ahmed Bilal Mehboob and

Aasiya Riaz (PILDAT) who give me assignment to work for the most effective

committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan and I eventually got the idea to work on

the functioning of PAC. PILDAT assignment was done in a couple of weeks after

counting number of meetings of the National Assembly and Senate standing committees

and declaring PAC the most effective committee of the National Assembly on meeting

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for maximum number of times but my research just started to further investigate the

operations of PAC.

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IV

List of Figures------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VI

List of Abbreviations----------------------------------------------------------------------------------IX

Abstract-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------XI

Chapter 1

Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------------------1

Chapter 2

Literature Review--------------------------------------------------------------------------9

Chapter 3

Methodology and Theoretical Framework-----------------------------------------22

Chapter 4

The Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC -------------------------------------28

Chapter 5

Colliding Facts------------------------------------------------------------------------61

Chapter 6

Challenging the Past-----------------------------------------------------------------101

Chapter 7

The culture of governance in Pakistan--------------------------------------------142

Chapter 8

Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------------160

Chapter 9

Making PAC Effective--------------------------------------------------------------161

Cited References------------------------------------------------------------------------------167

Annexure---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------176

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List of Figures

Figure 3.1. Survey Population and Response Rate 23

Figure 4.2. PAC Organogram 38

Figure 4.3. Channels of supervision 39

Figure. 4.3 Process MAP of PAC 46

Figure 4.4. Sitting Arrangement of PAC Meeting 47

Figure 4.5. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points 49

Figure 4.6. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points 49

Figure 4.7. AG relationship with PAC 54

Figure 5.1. Comparative Delay 60

Figure 5.2. Performance of MIC 64

Figure 5.3. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA 66

Figure 5.4. Details of the Audit Reports examined by

Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA 68

Figure 5.5. Backlog Status 69

Figure 5.6. General Comparison of 12th & 13th PAC 70

Figure 5.7. Excess budget Statements examined by 12th PAC 80

Figure 5.8. Excess budget Statements examined by 13th PAC 84

Figure 5.9. Audit Paras Discussed V/S Directives Passed 89

Figure 5.10. Compliance Rate in Per centage 90

Figure 5.11. Quality of Clearance 90

Table 6.2. A perception of the respondent about the of the Best Chair

of 12th

and 13th

PAC 100

Table 6.3.Tthe perception of the Capacity of Committee Staff of

12th

and 13th

PAC 101

VII

Table 6.4. Availability of Research Facility 101

Table 6.5. Government Response to Committee Recommendations 102

Table 6.6. Government Implements Committee Recommendations 103

Table 6.7. Institutionalization of practices 103

Table 6.8. Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases 104

Table 6.9. Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws 104

Table 6.10. Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene

administrative guidelines 105

Table 6.11. Resistant to Political Pressure 106

Table 6.12. PAOs found hiding facts 106

Table 6.13. Adoption of latest Financial Oversight Developments 107

Table 6.14. The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles

required to meet its objective 107

Table 6.15. Adherence to financial control of resources 108

Table 6.16. The policy of waste prevention 109

Table 6.17. The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources 109

Table 6.18. Representation of Political Parties 110

Table 6.19. Ministerial Exclusion 111

Table 6.20. PAC focus on holding the government accountable for its

spending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets 112

Table 6.21. Committee focus on administration of policy 112

Table 6.22. Reference to examine the Public Accounts 113

Table 6.23. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 114

Table 6.24. Power to call independent witnesses 114

Table 6.25. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed

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expenditures of government Organizations receiving funds from

the government and all state corporations 115

Table 6.26. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specific

reviews or tasks 116

Table 6.27. Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable

for administrative, performance even after they have left office 117

Table 6.28. Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 117

Table 6.29. Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 118

Table 6.30. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 119

Table 6.31. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive

or national security issues 119

Table 6.32. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the

Legislative Auditor’s Act 120

Table 6.33. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 121

Table 6.34. Power to choose subjects for examination without government

direction and advice 121

Table 6.35. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committee 122

Table 6.36. Powers to take Suo-Moto actions 123

Table 6.37. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action 123

Table 6.38. Powers to take action on media review 124

Table 6.39. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate

governance arrangements 124

Table 6.40. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 125

Table 6.41. Close working relationship between members from

different political parties 126

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Table 6.42. Advance preparation of members 126

Table 6.43. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/

Accounts/Grants 127

Table 6.44. Quick and in time decisions 128

Table 6.45. Close working relationship with Auditor General 128

Table 6.46. Provision of independent technical expertise and research

support for hearings 129

Table 6.47. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with Backlog 129

Table 6.48. Strategic prioritization of items for committee review,

with time limits for stages of committee work like consideration of

departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports 130

Table 6.49. Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 131

Table 6.50. Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament

and stays active between sessions 131

Table 6.51. Televised public hearings 132

Table 6.52. Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 133

Table 6.53. Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 133

Table 6.54. Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior

Committee experience 134

Table 6.55. Having committee members with prior administrative or

business experience 134

Table 6.56. Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in

hearings outside the normal legislative session 135

Table 6.57. Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 136

Table 6.58. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee

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recommendations 137

Table 6.59. Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has

been taken to implement the committee’s recommendations 137

Table 6.60. Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms

such as the budget committee 138

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List of Abbreviations

AGP Auditor-General of Pakistan

ANP Awami National Party

APAC Adhoc Public Accounts Committee

CAA Civil Aviation Authority

CCAF-FCVI The Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation-La

Fondation canadienne pour la vérification integrée

CEO Chief Executive Order

CDA Capital Development Authority

CGA Controller General of Accounts

CoD Charter of Democracy

CPA Commonwealth Parliamentary Association

DG Director General

ICG International Crisis Group

JCPA Australian parliament’s Joint Committee of Public

Accounts

KPMG KPMG is a global network of professional services firms

providing Audit, Tax and Advisory services.

MIC Monitoring & Implementation Committee MMA Muthida Majlis-e-Amal

MNA Member of National Assembly of Pakistan

MQM Mutihida Qaumi Movement

NA National Assembly of Pakistan

PAC Public Accounts Committee

PAKPK Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa

PAO Principal Accounting Officer

PML Pakistan Muslim League

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

PPP Pakistan People’s Party

PTA Pakistan Telecommunication Authority

UK United Kingdom

USAID United States Aid for International Development

WBI World Bank Institute

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development)

INTOSAI International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions

RETA Regional Technical Assistance

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Abstract

The Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan (PAC) is a

standing committee of the National Assembly- a legislative oversight committee that

holds the government to account for its use of public funds and resources by examining

the public accounts. Naturally a probing and regulating body, it performs financial

oversight while, examining the effectiveness of government programmes in achieving

their objectives. The PAC has an independent financial oversight role on National

Assembly’s behalf of the government and the public services. In performance of this task,

it is largely dependent on the information provided by the Auditor General in its audit

reports that reach the PAC vide Article 171 of the Constitution. In addition PAC takes

suo motu action on issues of public importance and also written public complaints.

The overall objective of the study is to identify the major problems, discrepancies and

failures relating to the performance of PAC, while counting the successes of PAC. In

order to achieve this objective a comparative study of functioning of the Public Accounts

Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan during the periods: 2002-2006 and

2008-2011 is being done through this study

The study is largely based on McGee’s thought expressed in the Overseers and the

framework as defined by World Bank working paper by Stapenhurst, et.al., “Scrutinizing

Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public Accounts Committees” to

assess the performance of the PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan.

The study revealed that PAC operations were restricted to years of backlog, inefficient

bureaucracy and political posturing. PAC is independent according to its mandate but still

leans heavily on the Auditor-General to prioritize areas of review. PAC has become a

platform to regulate the excess budget grants and to recommend settlement of paras. The

compliance rate is as low as 12 per cent on an average while 88 per cent of actions were

pending. (Monitoring and Implementation Committee 2012) The PAOs or the ministries

are continually violating the directives of PAC thus breaching the privilege of the

parliamentary committee. Leader of the Opposition who was the Chairman of PAC

according to Charter of Democracy resigned (November 27, 2011) on personnel stakes

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while keeping the Office of the Leader of the Opposition burying the best practice of

financial oversight process, a sacred trust put on the shoulders of Opposition under the

Charter of Democracy.

The study also revealed that the state was spending much more on the institutions of audit

and financial oversight than their outputs the reported recoveries, financial management

and the impact on good governance. The study observed that certain audit practices like

highlighting of paras and audit sampling were quite ambiguous, and at the discretion of

the Auditor General.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

The State is a major form of human political organisation that performs the critical

functions of establishing and sustaining order and collecting taxes, which, if not carried

out effectively, can lead to anarchy. Although states were greatly developed in earlier

periods of history with defined political setups, courts, tax systems and administrations,

democratic norms and constitutionalism are relatively recent phenomena (Niaz, 2010). In

South Asia, for example, rulers had a free hand over the resources of the state and the

people that resulted in chaotic conditions and wastage of taxes. In contrast, after

generations of political development, the British realised the importance of the proper

handling of state funds in order to combat fraud and corruption and to get the most from

the tax money. In 1857 a small group of the members of Parliament lead by Sir Francis

Bearing, recommended the creation of a committee to oversee the government accounts

to the parliament. William Gladstone, the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer,

initiated reforms and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was established through a

resolution to structure and function in 1861 (Government of UK 2012). The practice

proved so effective that most of the commonwealth and other countries have adopted it

(McGee 2002).

In India, the Montague-Chelmsford Reform set the first PAC in 1921, chaired by the

Finance Member of the Executive Council and assisted by the finance department to

restrict the contradictory opinion and public criticism of the Executive (McIntyre, 1977).

The system continued till 1949.

In Pakistan, the first PAC was constituted on May 3, 1948 by Presidential approval to

adopt the Pakistan Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Rules (May 3, 1948) under section

38(3) of Government of India Act, 1935, read with the Pakistan Provisional

Constitutional Order, 1947. However, its meeting never took place (NA, 1985). The PAC

of the National Assembly of Pakistan is based on the basic Westminster Model of

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Democracy approach1 whereby the Executive-led government is accountable to

Parliament and the Parliament exercises oversight over the Executive-led Government

(USAID, 2009). The approach is largely based on learning lessons from the best practices

of tried and tested values among different democracies. In such a parliamentary system,

various committees are formed to overcome the legislative burden.

In addition to this, the institution of PAC in Pakistan existed even when parliament

remained dissolved, a minimum of six (6) adhoc PACs have functioned during military

rule which accounts for about half of Pakistan’s history. The PAC was normally chaired

by the Finance Minister till 1977 with the exception of Noor-ul-Amin, MNA,2 who

chaired 5th

PAC and then 2nd

adhoc PAC during Ayub Khan’s Marshal Law period (NA,

1985). In UK, since the origin of PAC, it is a convention that a Treasury Minister sits in

the committee meeting but does not participate in the debate (Government of UK, 2012).

Under General Zia, A.G.N. Kazi and Ghulam Ishaq Khan were the 4th

and 5th

Chairmen of

the adhoc PAC, respectively, Shahibzada M. Ali Shah, MNA, was appointed as the

Chairman PAC when General Zia established a democratic government during his rule

(Saeed, 1998).

Benazir Bhutto came into government in 1989 and appointed Hakim Ali Zardari, MNA,

from government party as the Chairman PAC. During the Benazir-Nawaz governments,

normally the PAC was chaired by the ruling party MNAs. On 25th

August 2000,

Musharraf formed 6th

adhoc PAC and appointed H.U. Beg3 as the chairman. While,

Musharraf held elections to give people a democratic government in 2002. The regime

established a proto-PAC to carry out the functions that would otherwise be performed by

1The Westminster system is a democratic parliamentary system of government modelled after the politics of the

United Kingdom. This term comes from the Palace of Westminster, the seat of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

The term, ‘Westminster model of democracy’ was developed by political scientist Arend Lijphart. The term

Westminster model interchangeably with majoritarian mode is used to refer to a general model of democracy. See

Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999, p.9. This model of democracy is

defined as concentration of executive power in one party and bare majority cabinets, cabinets dominance, two-party

system, majoritarian and disproportional systems of elections, interest groups pluralism, unitary and centralized

government, concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature, constitutional flexibility, absence of judicial

review, a central bank controlled by the executive. 2 Noor-ul-Amin, MNA, was also from government party. He also has been Prime Minister of Pakistan from (December

7, 1971 to December 20, 1971) and Vice President of Pakistan from (1970-72). 3Mr.H.U.Beg had an illustrious career in the civil service, holding various key positions for about five decades. He

served as secretary at several federal ministries and autonomous bodies and was the longest serving finance secretary.

Mr. Beg was a long serving distinguished member of the FAST-NU BoG. He was also chairman of the KASB Bank.

He passed away on December 9, 2009.

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the PAC in a parliamentary environment. Apparently, it was not any ideal condition,

however, being Parliament in abeyance, it is regarded a good practice in International

community. McGee (2002) acknowledges the existing of proto-PAC during Musharraf

regime saying the Government of Pakistan recognises the importance of PAC in good

governance and sound public sector accountability. However, the first Adhoc PAC was

first established in Pakistan in 1962 releasing the importance of public sector

accountability by Gen. Ayub Khan (NA, 1985).

The 12th

PAC was thus formed on 3rd November 2003 and Malik Allah Yar Khan, MNA,

from the government party was appointed chairman (National Assembly Secretariat,

2007). Generally it is observed that having a Government member as a chair could

indicate a lack of independence on the part of PAC from executive and consequently lack

of effective accountability and oversight. However, it is observed that in the Australian

context that a chair from the government can advocate that the PAC’s recommendations

be implemented by the government. Clearly this question of both the independence and

the implementation is empirical and can only be addressed by studying the actual

activities of the PACs (McGee, 2002).

The 13th

National Assembly first met on 17 March, 2008 but the PAC was formed on 19

September, 2008 with a delay of six (6) months and two (2) days. Ch. Nisar Ali, MNA

and the Leader of Opposition in National Assembly of Pakistan, was asked to chair PAC

for the first time in Pakistan as a Leader of the Opposition as is the practice in the

Westminster democracies respecting the Charter of Democracy (NA, 2007:Charter of

Democracy, Rule 15).

The purpose of the PAC in the parliamentary system of Pakistan is to identify wastage of

national wealth, tackling poor performance of departments and making the best use of

public funds, but the committee has become a probing body. Reports of the Auditor

General of Pakistan (AGP) and accounts of the Federal Government are referred to it for

a review. The review was not conducted in a timely and efficient manner causing a big

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backlog.4The big backlog diverted the focus of successive PACs towards violations

concerning the previous government rather than focusing on the present one. The modern

democracies benefit from PAC in over-sighting their on-going projects and policies to

boost their delivery in a more efficient way but the case in Pakistan is different due to the

backlog and lopsided accountability meted out to the previous government’s projects. As

an example, the PAC of British Parliament has issued 62 reports in 2006-07 which

mainly include the work of government from major projects such as the Thames Gateway

and the preparations for the 2012 Olympics, administrative processes like helping

companies achieve their tax obligations and the implementation of child support reforms,

social issues like legal aid and anti-social behaviour, as well as timeless value for money

concerns such as procurement and employment programmes. These democracies are

working on Value for Money and Audit Performance concepts with a 90% of compliance

rate (Government of UK, 2012).

In case of Pakistan, during every period of democratic government the political leaders

politicised the civil servants for mostly ulterior motives. The original breaches in the

functional divisions of the state were made by elected representatives during the early

years of Pakistan. Heedless, the politicians used and abused the apparatus to secure their

personal power and wealth and drew the higher bureaucracy and the armed forces into

politics while punishing opposition leaders and dissenters through repressive legislation,

ordinances and the repeated imposition of governor’s rule (Niaz, 2010).With the

elevation of Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat to cabinet post and the rise of Ayub Khan,

to the post of army chief, the politicians opened the corridors of corruption, mal-

practices, poor governance and the worse of all welcoming military to enter the politics

(Bhutto, 1973).

The three military takeovers, bureaucratic overstretch, introduction of local government

system at the cost of civil administration and unstable political governments of 1990s,

caused lasting harm to the state machinery. All these circumstances and the events

undermined the purpose of creation of PAC to oversight the institutions. The

4PAC had formed three sub committees to deal this backlog of the last PAC. When Ch. Nisar Ali resigned as a

Chairman of PAC, they were up-to 2008 in dealing with the AGP reports and paras. (Please check the exact date that

they had cleared the back log to.

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politicisation of civil servants and the institutions badly affected the good governance;

hence, PAC remained ineffective across the history of Pakistan always struck with big

backlogs, on the mercy of inefficient civil servants and political posturing. The Study

will, however, focus the functioning of the PAC during the governments from 2002 to

2011.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

It is the responsibility of a state to provide its citizens with freedom from poverty,

freedom from servitude and a quality of life free from injustice and tyranny. Corruption is

the worse obstacle in achieving these objectives. It hampers development process of a

country. Once in practice, corruption encircles all sectors of state into its sphere on the

cost of citizen’s rights. Transparency International reported a loss of Rs. 8500 billion in

corruption, tax evasion and bad governance during the first four (04) years of recent PPP-

led coalition government (The Jang 2012). While, during the Musharraf period such

losses reported were Rs. 2576 billion only in five scams of Privatization, Bank of Punjab,

Petroleum, Stock Exchange and Sugar Scandal only (APSN 2009). These figures create a

terrible impression of governments when state institutions like PAC, the legislative

oversight body, were functioning. Why were these losses not avoided or minimised? The

Musharraf regime formed adhoc PAC realising the importance of financial oversight over

institution in time when National Assembly remained dissolved but does it meant

anything. In a scenario, the functioning of PAC in both eras is important to be discussed

under this study.

1.3. Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this study is that under both governments, the Musharraf Regime and

the Pakistan People’s Party-led Coalition Government, the operations of the PAC were

restrained by years of backlog, bureaucratic inefficiency and political posturing.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

The overall objective is to identify the major problems, discrepancies and failures, while

listing the successes of PAC keeping in mind its mandate according to the Rules and

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Procedures of the National Assembly of Pakistan. The effort is to achieve this objective

through conducting a comparative study of functioning of the Public Accounts

Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan during the periods: 2002-2006 and

2008-2011. However the specific objectives are;

To explore which one of the selected PAC remained most active/effective during

its respective periods based on quality of clearance provided its capacity

To outline obstacles in review process of public spending and government control

of public funds which PAC performs in cases related to the use of public assets,

resources and funds under two selected governments

To study the process of enquiry on evaluating financial management performance

to identify wastes and poor governance

To ascertain whether reports, recommendation and directives of PAC have any

influence in improving the performance of the institutions, strengthening internal

control and preventing re-occurrence (addressing of the weaknesses pointed out

on the system by AGP, PAC, PAO)

To formulate a set of policy recommendations on the basis of major findings, in

the end to help make the process of legislative oversight effective enhancing

accountability and transparency

1.6. Significance of the study

After a thorough review of the relevant data, it is observed that there is little work

available on the functioning of PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan, while, it’s

functioning is requisitely public, awareness of the performance of state organs concerning

accountability and oversight of state institutions can restore public confidence in

Government. A thorough study of the comparative functioning of PAC in the selected

periods is significant to this study. After the completion of this study, the research will be

able to fill the gaps in the existing literature on functioning, especially comparative

functioning, of PAC during two comparative/consecutive governments.

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Secondly, major findings and recommendations of this research will be helpful for the

institutions specially governmental and non-governmental organisations working and

interested in good governance and the operation of PAC in Pakistani jurisdictions.

1.7. Justification of the Study

Although, PAC is working for the last 64 years, it has achieved few of the assigned

objectives given its mandate. The idea of good governance in the state has largely faded

away; political institutions have weakened as a result of adversities and unethical

practices of insincere and disloyal leaders across the history of Pakistan. Constitutional

democracy was never given a chance to flourish while the political leaders politicised the

civil servants to use them for illegal and abusive practices. On the other hand, state

resources and properties were competitively grabbed by one or the other among the

circles of politicians. Those in power had tried their best to get the most from their

position and access to the state resources. The PAC, in the previous governments

remained under government control5, so was its oversight over state finances. Under the

present government, PAC only functioned to criticise the political rivals and policies of

the previous government. The moment, it cleared the back log and was ready to start

taking up issues that arose during the tenure of the present government, the AGP was

changed and Ch. Nisar Ali Khan resigned as a Chairman PAC leaving the committee to

its fate.

1.8. Limitations of the study

Although PAC is working since 1948 but the main aim of this research is to compare and

identify the better functioning of one government over other during year 2002-2006 and

2008- 2011. The study do not systematically examine the functioning of PAC during the

other governments in different times other than selected for this study and terminates

with the resignation of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan as its Chairman on November 27, 2011.

5PAC was mostly chaired by Finance Ministers or the Members of Parliament who belong to government party or the

trusted and obliged persons of the government (Bureaucrats etc.). While, in Commonwealth and other countries, it is a

practice that PAC will be chaired by the Opposition Leader which happened for the first time during recent PPPP-led

government, Who give a chance to Opposition Leader Ch. Nisar Ahmed, respecting international practices to chair the

Committee.

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1.9. Organisation of the study

Chapter 1 is a Brief Background of the study. Chapter 2 is a Literature Review and

provide the sum of net practices related to the functioning of PAC. Chapter 3 is

Methodology and the Theoretical Framework of the study. Chapter 4 discusses the

Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC and is a brief guide for Members, Secretariat,

Auditor General, PAOs and general public to know about the process of PAC operations.

Chapter 5 & 6 examine and compare different traits of the PAC during two periods.

Chapter 5 in detail consists of major observations of the study during selected period

while Chapter 6 is the discussion of the results of the survey conducted for this study and

provides the perception of the respondents. Chapter 7 is a discussion of the major

findings bases on the theoretical framework set in the Methodology. Chapter 8 is a

Conclusion of the study and Chapter 9 is a set of Recommendations for making the

process of legislative financial oversight effective while enhancing transparency and

accountability. The next chapter is a detailed review of the literature.

9

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Although there is big accumulation of literature pertaining to the formation, functioning

and operations of Public Accounts Committees (PACs) across commonwealth and non-

commonwealth (McGee 2002; Wehner 2003, Gay and Winetrobe 2003, Stapenhurst,

Sahgal, Woodley and Pelizzo 2005; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2007; Jacobs, Jones and

Smith 2007; Jacobs and Jones 2009), very little investigation is made of the comparative

functioning of PAC in Pakistan. The study observes the comparative functioning of 12th

(2002-2006) and 13th

(2008-11) PACs of the National Assembly of Pakistan realizing the

gap existing in the entire literature. PAC, primarily being a financial oversight committee

of any Parliament, plays a vital role in implementing Public Sector Accountability being

a significant component of the parliamentary machine ensuring governments functions,

their working practices, policies, actions, course of execution and use of public monies

(McGee 2002:31). No democratic government can properly function unless an

appropriate accountability is not carry out (Funnell and Cooper 1998; Watson 2004).

However, Jones and Stewart (2008).deemed accountability could be an outcome of the

allocation of praise or blame.

PAC in Pakistan has always been an important standing committee of the legislature (NA

1885), realizing the importance of financial oversight of public monies, adhoc PACs

were constituted when National Assembly remained dissolved in Pakistan. However, the

operations of PACs across the history of Pakistan were only formalities (NA 1885). A

review of literature (ICG 2010, 2004; Shafqat 2010; Niaz 2010; Chaudry 2011 and Altaf

2011) holds that arbitrary transfers of state servants, bureaucratic inefficiency and

political posturing were major restrictions in the way of good governance in Pakistan.

This weak structure of governance never allowed oversight and accountability institutions

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like Public Accounts Committee to properly function in order to strengthen parliamentary

oversight of resources and the governance.

2.2 PAC Role as an Institution

Aldons (1985); and Griffiths (2006) described PAC, naturally a standing committee of

the parliament, is regarded as a key financial legislative oversight committee assigned the

job of compliance of its directives and maintaining efficiency and good governance of

departments and agencies under its ambit. PAC’s major responsibility has been to

investigate the financial oversight of the resources allocated to a programme at budget

proposal level. Whereas the PAC plays an ex post facto oversight process at a secondary

level to check the regularity in spending of allocated monies as Wehner (2003) describes.

During the early nineteenth, the PACs were associated entirely with the public finances;

to examine government expenditures, mainly based on the information provided in the

Auditor General Reports, naturally working in close relationship with the Auditor

General, making certain that public money sectioned by the legislature had been

appropriately, economically and efficiently spent on defined projects and programmes.

PAC had another obligation of the non-enforcement limitations of PAC especially in

Pakistan due to absence of supportive financial legislation under Article 79 of the

Constitution, like the Financial Management Practices Act that exists in South Africa

where a government agency can be fined or an official jailed for violation for financial

rules. The audit courts in Europe and African countries are good examples of

enforcement of financial oversight.

2.3 Modern Methods of Accountability- Audit Performance and Value for

Money

Mulgan (2001) and Guthrie and Parker (1999), have introduced the development of

performance auditing for the purpose of getting rid of old technical accounting methods,

while focusing on its prospective of resistance to political influences. They started

undertaking performance auditing work, while, other are exercising powers to examine

budget estimates, described as an ex-ante facto. Now, they better spotlight modern

concepts like value for money which is economy; the minimizing of costs of resources

11

utilized for an activity with regard to appropriate quality, efficiency; is the ratio between

outputs and inputs, the maximum outputs from minimum inputs, and effectiveness; is the

relationship between the intended impact and the actual impact of an activity or product

(Johnson, 2010 and The House of Commons, 2005). However, the concept of

parliamentary accountability somehow remained a controversy and debate. Among the

conventional forms of accountability, was the concept of ministerial responsibility, where

ministers were directly accountable to parliamentary inquiries. Walter (2006).holds that

the concept remained under political test as governments re-defined and to a larger

degree abated the ministerial responsibility. The reason for lack of appropriate focus on

performance audit is the AGP’s concentration on compliance with authority audits that

have to be done in absence of an effective internal audit structure in the Governance set

up in Pakistan.

2.4 Conventional Accountability

The findings reported by CCAF-FCVI are consistent to the finding of Simon McInnes

research during the mid-1970s. In his research, McInnes examined the provincial

experience regarding legislative scrutiny of public expenditures. His study focused on the

standard functioning and proceeding of PAC, the role of AG in accountability process

and the relationship between PAC and AG, while discussing external factors which

influence PAC in performing its activities. McInnes (1977:39) significantly found that

PAC of one province was varying from the PAC of other province in many ways.

McInnes added that most of the PACs were functioning on conventional methods in 1975

and there was not any established system of proceedings.

Mulgan (1997) also challenged this concept, according to him, this is a pluralistic model

of accountability where accountability is a multi-dimensional phenomenon starting with

the new public management theory during the late 20th

century. However, regardless of

both the value of financial oversight committees to public sector accountability and the

varying political and administrative atmosphere that facilitates its function and

strengthens governance, there is a big gap in academic research on the functioning of

PACs in this prospective, including both common wealth and non-common wealth

countries, particularly in Pakistan. Normally, the existing works available are of a

12

descriptive nature compiled by practitioners and politicians engaged in the PAC process

(McGee, 2002 and Watson, 2004) or by surveys conducted in the fields (KPMG, 2006

and Stapenhurst et al., 2005).

In a broader sense, a very significant academic study was by Degeling, Anderson and

Guthrie (1996) who carried out a content analysis of reports of the Australian

parliament’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) between the period 1914 and

1932 to study the activities involved in constituting the status and focus of a PAC. They

established that it was difficult to understand activities and outcomes of a PAC simply

with regard to purposes of its progenitors. They concluded that future studies are building

a link among accountability, accounting practices and PACs may be studied in an

analytical context of the concerned social and political environments (Degeling et al.,

1996: 47 and Jacobs and Jones 2009). While comprehending the earlier analysis of JCPA

into a study of demise in the early 1930s of JCPA and Victorian PAC, the study group

holds that both functionaries glided significantly from their deliberated job of financial

oversight to a legitimizing role.

Wehner (2003) and Newberry and Pallot (2005), in their studies highlighted the effects of

external factor on the functioning of PACs. Wehner (2003) arguments that regardless of

being a significant part of parliamentary structure and scrutiny process, the PACs are

largely dependent on external factors like political environment and resource provided.

The work of Newberry and Pallot (2005) recommended a pessimistic liaison among

PACs, accounting practice, and issues of parliamentary accountability. They further

argue that the introduction of the Public Finance Bill in New Zealand diluted

parliamentary oversight and control of spending in New Zealand. It highlighted a

significant question on the nature and independence of parliamentary finances and the

functions of PAC. A WBI survey of 51 PACs conducted by Pelizzo et. al., (2006)

resulted that broader mandate and freedom to set agenda were the successive factors of a

PAC. They also reported that 90% of Chairs acknowledged the authority of self-initiation

of agenda and choosing issues without any government meddling, was a successive factor

in PAC practices.

13

2.5 Relationship of PAC and Auditor General

McGee (2002) produced a very effective publication on financial oversight and

accountability discussing the role of PAC and Auditor General with support of

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. He worked to come-up with possible ways to

improve upshots through an effective use of PACs, while strengthening Auditor General.

His core identifications include; capacity building, independence, and information

exchange. Realizing the significance of the departmental capacity of the overseers for an

effective financial oversight of the government expenses, He upholds that the ability of

the three prime oversight institutions including the Parliament, the PAC and the Auditor

General to accomplish their oversight functions should be strengthened to the maximum.

He further says that it is also under the procedural ambit of PAC to work on the

strengthening of AG office to ensure effective accountability. AG office is regarded as

the main source of information for PAC working was also endorsed by Wehner (2003).

McGee (2002:31) also described that initially, PACs were constituted to ensure the

parliamentary follow up of Audit reports and compliance of its own Directives because of

a more common remit of PAC legal jurisdictions with Auditor General. He further

endorsed, while identifying the weakness of all three institutions involved in the financial

oversight process that better results can be achieved with the provision of required

staffing, resources, trainings and in time information. McGee also emphasizes that the

independent role of Auditors General from partisan and political influence is a successive

factor in its business. In order to perform its duties impartially, independence is the core

value for the Auditor General. McGee focused that availability of information and its

exchange among stakeholders was a successive factor in carrying out the business of a

PAC, he further stresses on the need of information exchange and sharing ideas while

keeping PAC fashioned with latest developments, changing standards and best practices.

The PAC and the Auditor General have a critical relationship in the course of public

sector accountability (Coghill, 2004; Jones and Jacobs, 2006; McGee, 2002; Stapenhurst

et al., 2005). Across the common wealth and non-common wealth jurisdictions PAC and

the Auditor General operate in coincidence and both are critical to financial oversight and

accountability holds (Jacobs and Jones 2006). Coghill (2004) argued that while

14

accommodating rapport between PAC and an Auditor General are indispensable. He says

that this relationship might not overlap, necessarily transpiring effective governance as a

result when AG listen the views of PAC but never claim a caption of such views.

However, the point of significance is the trust of both Auditor General and PAC in

implementing and upholding a nonpartisan behaviour in their mutual trades. PAC should

be independent of the AGP in so far as the process of determining the nature of review

process prioritization. PAC can seek advice but decide on its own criteria rather than

AGPs irrespective of agreement or disagreement. In fact PAC should dictate the criteria

of prioritization. An effective decision support MIS is required in this case.

2.6 Agenda Setting-Who are the main Actors

This study also profited from the studies of Kingdon (1984 and 2003). He describes that

setting of policy agenda can leave critical inferences on the successive policy debaters

and the out springs. It is of significant that the agenda setter or the resource provider or

the source of inquiry to PAC has a greater role in shaping its role and it behaves as a tool

of governance and accountability of that political set up. It is very important to reason out

its focus of sources of inquiry necessarily in time. Despite a big resurgence in PAC

functioning in Pakistan since the late 2000, such activities have a limited scope because

of restraint resource supply or local political culture.

A central point of investigation in the PAC is how and by whom the agenda of PAC

proceedings is set and managed. It is also equally important to be aware of how different

institutional actors took part in the operations of efficient and effective public sector

governance and accountability, the roles of individual actors and their effects on

outcomes (Kingdon 2003; Ryan 1998). Kingdon (2003) describes that there are two

important factors which facilitate agendas to be set; the actors themselves, and the

processes involved in agenda setting. Deepening Kingdon’s (1984) work, Ryan

(1998:520) differentiate between the political agenda and the policy agenda, while,

defining political agenda as comprising on the broad issues which comes under the

jurisdictions of government functionaries and which are the basis of their functions, the

policy agenda relates to matters concerning policy formulation. In the Pakistani financial

reporting ambit, the main actors are PAC and the Auditor-General, while in developed

15

countries like Canada and Australia main actors include PACs, AG, and the organized

accounting professionals, all of whom seek to influence the Australian or Canadian

political agenda, describes Ryan (1998). Political agenda is one of the significant areas

because PACs rarely address matters of policy overtly although; their activities are

patiently impinged on public policies.

An important question raised in this study is of the key actors that influence the political

agenda ‘who sets the agenda with respect to public sector accountability?’ The scope and

mandate of the PAC has a prospective that the agenda might be set by a number of

dissimilar sources. KPMG (2006) reported that other than a routine role of following up

of Auditor General’s Reports and the matters sometimes referred by the parliament ,

certain PACs took suo-moto actions on major issues of public importance, public

complaints, media reviews, showing powers to initiate self-enquiries. However Jacobs et

al. (2007) observed the relationship between AG and PAC largely depends on the

jurisdiction of that democratic setup. He also observed that PACs have the powers of

parliamentary review of audit reports but nearly half of the PACs are given the right to

refer matters to AG. While only few democracies give PAC the right to have a say in the

appointment of AG.

Jacobs et al. (2006) concluded that significant insights of the political and institutional

influences on PAC can be observed from its enquiries and operations and the judgment

that had control on its agenda. Jacobs et al. raised their apprehension on taking serious

the degree of independence to the functioning of PAC and the need for transparent

oversight, governance and accountability work of the PACs.

2.7 Independence of the PACs

There are other fundamental points of concerns about the independence of the PACs in

commonwealth countries. Jacobs et al. (2007) found that the government chairs in

Australian and New Zealand were 80%, while 70 % of the PACs in their study have a

government party majority. Another big number of PACs were found with ministerial

membership. However, McGee (2002) observed that a more than two third PACs of the

commonwealth countries were chaired by opposition party members. McGee (2002) also

16

noted that government member chair have an effect of lack of independence of PAC from

executive, hence a lack of accountability and efficient oversight. McGee (2002: 66)

however, examined that a government member chair can better influence on the

implementation of PAC recommendation. Obviously, this is a critical question of both

implementation and independence that require a deep study of the activities of a

particular PAC. It might also be constructive to discuss the careers of PAC chairs as is it

often recommended being the chair of a PAC is a facilitating thing to the ministry. This

possibility remained the cornerstone of PAC history in Pakistan, from 1951 to 2000; the

PAC was chaired by Finance Ministers or the Finance Ministers for State. Mr H.U Beg,

Chairman 6th

adhoc PAC was a former Finance Secretary.

2.8 Relationship between Accountability and Governance

Another study of Canadian PACs was carried out by CCAF-FCVI initially in 2004, while

its final research report published in 2006. The report investigated accountability and

governance relationships among public oversight committees, legislative auditors, and

senior government managers, with particular focus on the functioning of PACs in relation

with these institutions. The report comes up with a structure of core powers and practices

to help strengthen the effectiveness of PACs. The report identified four significant factors

in Canadian PACs: i) each PAC is unique; ii) PACs must try to avoid partisanship to be

effective; iii) PACs should operate independently of government and should be curious

enough to ask probing questions; and iv) PAC proceedings can play a meaningful public-

education role. However, the report does not investigate any specific differences at PAC

level leaving it ambiguous that what are the powers of PACs in specific jurisdiction.

Hence, the comparison of individual PACs looks impossible. The report also detects that

there found no single model PAC because of the variances in structures and democratic

cultures of the legislatures and administrations of the diverse jurisdictions. However,

CCAF-FCVI reported a substantial disparity among the relationships between the

legislative auditor and PAC and between Principal Accounting Officers and PAC, in the

mandates of the committee, in the conduct of business, in reporting to the legislatures, in

follow-up of committee’s recommendations and in the rate of compliance.

17

The institutions of PACs are the landmark of effective financial accountability and

governance in the public sector. Public accounts committee is the oldest and the most

significant standing committee in any parliamentary committee system due to its

responsibility and the set of powers it exercise, hence, it has a critical role in ensuring

public sector accountability and effective governance.

2.9 Assessment of PAC Performance

In the recent studies include Stapenhurst et al (2005), a working paper on the assessment

of PAC performance, thus deepening McGee’s (2002) analysis of PACs. The report

explores PAC success and identifies factors affecting its performance. The study was

based on data collected by WBI in 2002, where a survey questionnaire was sent to 51

parliaments in Commonwealth countries in Asia, Australasia, Canada and the United

Kingdom. The WBI report observed that availability of information and non-partisan

were critical success factors of the PACs as ascribed by McGee. The survey also resulted

that two other factors were equally important including the institutional design of the

PAC, and the PAC’s operational model. The report observed the extant of

institutionalization and the nature of powers and mandate of a PAC directly contribute to

its effectiveness. The results of the survey reached to the conclusion that a greater focus

of PACs on government’s financial activity and accountability were important rather on

the assessment of the content of the government’s policies. The study holds that the PAC

empowered to probe all past and present government expenses was at a best practice,

however, PAC better benefit from examining ongoing projects. PACs should also be

empowered to making departments and government implement its directives. Most

importantly, the report pays greater focus on close working relationship of Auditor

General with PAC. The report further proves that the behaviour of PAC members and the

functioning of the committee are successive factor other than the institutional design of a

PAC. The practices identified by Stapenhurst et al, further include, a non-partisan fashion

and consensus among members, preparation of Members prior to a meetings, keeping of

the transcripts of meetings by PAC secretariats and publishing of Committee conclusions

and recommendations on PAC website and in press and involving the public and the

media. The paper also gives in its end the 17 aspects of an ideal committee.

18

Jacobs et al, found that there were three categories on the result of their investigation of

148 reports produced by PACs in around nine Australian Jurisdictions over a period of

four years’ time. The categories comprising firstly, those PACs for which the prime

agenda was the follow-up of Auditor-General reports, secondly, the PACs for which self-

initiated inquiries was the principal activity and thirdly the PACs who pay equal

concentrations to Auditor General reports and the self-initiated inquiries. The third

category being an interesting and exceptional case with a balance between follow-up

enquiries and self-initiated enquiries was regarded the best practice. He concluded that

the inclination of interpreting a balance of activity between both the PAC and the AG is a

positive sign of independence constitutionally provided.

A need assessment report of the USAID (2009) observed that the operations of PAC of

the National Assembly of Pakistan were restricted by a backlog of nine (09) years.

However, the 12th

PAC, previous to the recent one inherited a backlog of twelve (12)

years. The USAID assessed that this “backlog” issue is the mountain which makes the

real forward journey of the PAC difficult to embark upon. The report argued that it

significantly impedes with the committee functioning and absorbs its attention from more

current issues and is likely to continue to do so for some time. The report also added that

the situation causes an overall workload which far exceeds the PAC’s work capacity. The

AGP has expressed concern that this could lead to PAC fatigue, the report described. The

report also found that the use of sub-committees was the best tool to deal with the

backlog. The report also recommended that backlog could also be dealt with by attending

only to those matters which could lead to recovery of monies for the State and by

engaging extra staff to clear the backlog.

2.10 Classification of the range of structures, responsibilities and working

practices of a PAC

A report was published by KPMG jointly with La Trobe University, on PACs of

Australia and New Zealand in 2006. The purpose of the report was to classify the range

of structures, responsibilities and working practices, and is regarded by Rick Stapenhurst

and Cindy Kroon as the first exhaustively comparative work of PACs in all Australian

and New Zealand jurisdictions. Premise of the study is that “one size does not fit all”; the

19

structure, terms of proceedings and the operational models vary from one PAC to another

and there is no set of unique practices to follow in constituting an effective PAC.

However, a number of operations and working practices adopted or developed by

individual jurisdictions can be matching and beneficial to other jurisdictions. The study

group observed a variance in rules, practices, and outcomes, differentiating each PAC

from other.

Stapenhurst and Kroon (2008) conclude after observing various studies that no ideal PAC

exists, but there are a number of good practices of PACs that can be adopted by other

PACs to improve and to be more effective. They also believed that the existing literature

discusses numerous practices, but none of them identifies working practices of individual

PACs. They resulted that there was no study that investigated data of individual PAC and

practices adopted to be unique.

2.11 Governance and Accountability Crisis in Pakistan

International Crisis Group-ICG, in 2004 reported the state of devolution of power in

Pakistan during Musharraf regime. The study reported the political tactics, a military

ruler adopted to enhance his military rule on the cost of state institutions. The overt aim

of the Devolution of Power Plan was to empower the impoverished but in practice, the

plan undercut the established political parties and provincial powers were drained away,

doing no effort for corruption or accountability at local level. The report noted that apart

from strengthening democracy, the reforms, strengthened military rule, raising risks of

internal conflict and institutional clash. The core objective of regime legitimacy and

survival was enriched utilizing the Local governments to; i) depoliticize governance; ii)

create a new political elite to challenge and undermine the political opposition; iii)

demonstrate the democratic credentials of a regime to domestic and external audiences;

iv) undermine federalism by circumventing constitutional provisions for provincial

political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy. ICG also reported that District Nazism

poured public funds and other state resources to boost pro-Musharraf rallies during the

presidential referendum in April 2002 and to support the PML-Q’s parliamentary

candidates in the 2002 national elections. By that time, PAC was somehow functional,

20

but was assigned with a big backlog of past 12 years; no attention was paid to oversight

these mega corruptions scandals.

A recent study from a Pakistani author Ileana Niaz, appeared in 2010. The study is based

on fabulous amount of original sources and a strongly argued analysis of the sixty years

of Pakistan’s governance. The study attempts to enlighten Governance crisis in Pakistan

in historical and philosophical requisites. Niaz argues that the exercise of power has

reasserted and produced deterioration among the attitudes of ruling elites because of

South Asia’s native orientation. He further his argument that during the past sixty years

of independence from British rule the mind set and attitude of state functionaries and

political Jirga’s has been turning out to be more arbitrary, proprietorial and delusional.

Niaz fears the consequential corrosion in the intellectual and ethical superiority of the

state machinery has become a moral hazard to Pakistan. A decline is noticed, author says,

in the capacity of state to prosperous and uphold good governance according to its

described constitutional mandates. The study reported the worse political and

bureaucratic behaviour towards Pakistani state saying that rulers are treating state as their

personal estate while the servants of the state are tuned to be personal servants of the

powerful members of the executive. He concludes that this arbitrary exercise of power

has been materialized as an overriding rule and discouraging the institutional and

psychological moralities and practices originally inherited from British Empire.

Another recent study ‘Political Administrators’ is a story of the civil service of Pakistan,

written by Aminullah Chaudry in 2010. The author, describing the politicization of civil

servants says since everything is possible in Pakistan, it didn’t surprise him, being DG

CAA and Secretary Aviation, performing superhuman feat of hijacking an airborne

aircraft carrying the chief of army staff, on the orders of the then Prime Minister.

Chaudry describes that out of sixty five years since independence, for the thirty-three

years, the country has been ruled by military dictators. For the remaining thirty years, it is

observed that the politicians ranging from the autocratic to the corrupt; from the inept to

the clueless. He augmented that these fluctuations between dictatorship and democracy

could have been absorbed by a country with a functional and reasonably neutral civil

service. He added that Pakistan inherited well-oiled machinery called bureaucracy from

21

British but within no time its Pakistani successors forged an alliance with the army and

actively undermined the democratic process. Chaudry goes ahead saying that after break

up of Pakistan in 1971, the bureaucracy aligned with Zulfqar Ali Bhutto and on the event

of the coup of 1977, putting all its weight behind General Ziaulhaq. He further argues

that this flip-flop continued through the so called democratic regimes of Benazir Bhutto

and Nawaz Sharif, and the military regime of General Pervaiz Musharraf. He concludes

that the institutional decays occasioned by these shenanigans did incalculable and

possibly irreversible damage to the civil service in Pakistan resulting bad governance at

large.

Another story of Pakistan’s dismal governance is written by Saima Iltaf (2011). In her

study, she uncovers the bureaucratic inefficiencies. Her study is about the forces of a

country which are set in motion when huge monies flow into the coffers of countries like

Pakistan whose decision makers never consider themselves accountable to their people.

The story is a routine of government offices, the bureaucrats and their decision making.

She discusses the attitudes of these decision makers towards good governance and

development.

The literature discusses the different traits of different PACs in common wealth and non-

commonwealth jurisdictions but there found a very little work on the functioning of PAC

of the National Assembly especially during the recent government. However, the present

study assessed the comparative performance of PAC during Musharraf regime and the

PPP-led Coalition government. The next chapter is a Methodology and Theoretical

Framework of the study.

22

Chapter 3

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

3.1 Methodology

The present study deals with comparative functioning of the PAC in the selected period

(2002-2011). The Study is based on Qualitative Research and as it is a study of two

consecutive periods, the research design is a Penal Study. Consequently, the approach

adopted was primarily analytical and chronological with an element of interpretation. In

an effort to compare the functioning of 12th

and 13th

PAC to their mandates as set in the

Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in National Assembly, 1992, and the Rules

of Procedure and Conduct of Business in National Assembly, 2007, respectively

(National Assembly of Pakistan, 1992 and 2007). The study orients towards explaining

how PAC is working as a probing body rather an accountability institution holding

executive authorities/spending ministries and revenue earning agencies of the

Government accountable for performance in terms of its mandate.

3.1.2. Survey Research

A survey was conducted to articulate comparative views of the parliamentarians of 12th

and 13th

National Assembly adopting World Bank Institute’s instrument used in its

appraisal of 51 democracies in 2002 (Stapenhurst et. al., 2005.) with certain changes

suitable to local parliamentary ambiance. Naturally, the present study being comparative

one, same indictors were chosen for assessing both 12th

and 13th

PAC of the National

Assembly of Pakistan. Hence two Questionnaires were used having same indicators but

different time period; one for 12th

PAC and the other for 13th

PAC. A total of 75

Questionnaires were sent to the whole population consisting Members of PAC, PAC

Staffers, AG Office, Media persons and other stakeholders for this study. However,

greater importance was given to those members who served both PACs, staffer who

served both PACs and media persons who observed the operations of both PACs. The

Questionnaires were personally distributed with the request to fill and return to the whole

population of the 12th

and the 13th

PAC. However the response rate remained 57 per cent.

23

The population and response of the members of 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure

3.1. The maximum response was received from the 13th

PAC which was 54 per cent as of

30 per cent of 12th

PAC.

Figure 3.4. Survey Population and Response Rate

A total population of 75 persons was selected for this study that include 41 MNAs, 10

PAC Secretariat Staff Members, 12 from Auditor General Office, 8 media persons and 4

others. The total response for the whole population remained 57 per cent making a total

of 32 respondents out of which include 13 MNAs, 6 PAC Secretariat Staff, 5 from AG

office, 6 media persons and 2 other.

3.1.3. Interviews

Besides, the questionnaires were distributed to the concerned stakeholders of PAC;

twenty one semi-structured interviews were also conducted from the members of the

PAC, staffers of the PAC, AGP and media persons. The details of the persons

interviewed are as under;

1. Mr. Nadeem Afzal Chan, Chairman PAC

2. Mrs. Yaseem Rehman, MNA, Member PAC

3. Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi, MNA, Member PAC

4. Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, MNA, Member PAC

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

TotalPopulation12th PAC

Response of12th PAC

TotalPopulation13th PAC

Response of13th PAC

TotalPopulation of

Both

Totalresponse of

Both

18

3

23

10

41

13

4 2 6 4

10 6 6

2 6 3

12 5 4 2 4 4

8 6 2 1 2 1 4 2

34

10

41

22

75

32

30% 54% 57%

MNA Staff AG Media Others total % of Total Response rate

24

5. Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, Member PAC

6. Mr. Saeed Ahmed Zafar, MNA, Member PAC

7. Bagum Shahnaz Sheikh, MNA, Member PAC

8. Mr. Moosa Raza Afandi, Additional Secretary, PAC

9. Ms. Najama Saddiqui, Joint Secretary, PAC

10. Mr. Muhammad Mushtaq, Deputy Secretary-Legislation

11. Mr. Muhammad Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Secretary, PAC

12. Sayed Fayyaz Hussain Shah, Deputy Secretary, National Assembly

13. Mr. Muhammad Mohsin Khan Former Controller General of Accounts,

Government of Pakistan and former Advisor to PAC.

14. Mr. Sharafat Ali, Section Officer, PAC

15. Mr. Salamat Ali, Section Officer, PAC

16. Mr. Inamulhaq, Section Officer, PAC

17. Agha Muhammad Asif, Superiendent/ Section Officer, PAC

18. Mr. Muhmamd Shbbir, Assistant, Main PAC Branch

19. Mr. Haji Hattar, Librarian, NA Library

20. Mr.Muhammad Arshad, Audit Officer-PAC Auditor General of Pakistan

21. Mr. Rouf Kalasra, Anchor Person

22. Mr. Tahir Khalil, Media Person

23. Mr. Saddique Sajjid, Media Person

3.1.4. Documentary Sources of Information

The basic sources used for this study are declassified PAC records held by the PAC

Secretariat, private papers, audit report issued by AGP, PAC reports. The study benefited

from a number of reports produced by International Institutions such as WBI, CPA and

USAID on the subject. A number of laws, books, papers, reports, newspapers and other

documents were also surfed and examined to compare the performance of PAC during

selected governments.

25

3.1.5. Focal Discussions and PAC Meetings

PAC meetings were regularly attended during the course of this research to empirically

observe the functioning and operations of PAC and to observe the participation of PAOs

and the AG. Internal Meetings of PAC (Pre-PAC) and its meetings with different

delegations like USAID etc were also attended to better understand its operations. In this

connection, the department of GPP requested the Joint Secretary PAC for a permission to

observe the operations of PAC and to attend its meetings which was permitted by PAC

Secretariat. Later On, Nadeem Afzal Chan, the new Chairman, facilitated a lot in research

activities and made easy access to data and practical activities of PAC during his

Chairmanship.

3.2. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this study is mainly based on two recent and important

works; McGee’s (2002), ‘the Overseers’ and the World Bank Policy Research Working

Paper ‘Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public Accounts

Committees’ written by Stapenhurst et al., (2005). McGee dealt with the two very

important aspects of financial oversight namely the Auditor General and the Public

Accounts Committee, while the World Bank paper further deepened McGee’s analysis of

PAC.

3.2.1 The Overseers- by McGee David

McGee’s work was based on the views of a study group organized by Commonwealth

Parliamentarians Associations (CPA) that investigated practices across the

commonwealth concerning roles and functions of PAC and AG and their relationship.

The Study assessed the working practices of PACs and whether they are delivering as

important guarantors of good governance (McGee, 2002). The main individual

conclusions and recommendations of the Study are annexed (See Annex-I)

The study group tried to distil the practices into checklists of deliberations for

Parliaments, recognizing that there is no one organizational form that a PAC will take

considering social, economic and political factors across countries. The group also

26

discussed and tried to define a modern rationale for PACs which is necessitated by and is

based on the international dimension that results from a greater inter-dependability of

nations that has brought in its wake greater challenges to good government (Stapenhurst

et. al, 2005).

McGee (2002) identified potential courses of action to improve outcomes through more

effective use of PACs. Three major finding of the study include:

Capacity Building: the need to improve the ability of Parliaments and

their PACs to carry out their functions by being provided with adequate

resources, training and access to relevant expertise

Independence: that they be free from political or legal constraints that

could inhibit them from carrying out their duties diligently

Information Exchange: that PACs have the means to exchange

information and ideas so as to keep them up-to-date with important

developments, changing standards and best practices as they emerge

3.2.2 Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public

Accounts Committees by World Bank Institute

World Bank working paper by Stapenhurst, et.al., While, defining the greater successes

of PAC, identifies impending factors effecting PAC performance based on the data

collected by World Bank Institute in 2002 on a Survey Questionnaire sent to 51 PACs of

Commonwealth including UK, Canada, Asia and Australia. The paper identified

imminent factor for a PAC was focus on government’s financial activity rather than its

practices, the power to investigate all past and present government expenditures, the

power to follow up on government actions in response to its recommendations, and its

relationship with the Auditor General. They give a comprehensive framework for

assessment of PAC performance, consisting of very important three dimensions;

Activity level - the measurement of events and input resources used such as:

keeping up to date with legislative auditor’s reports,

costs and time of staff, members, witnesses and others involved.

27

Output level - the immediate visible results of work the committee does like:

recommendations made, followed up and implemented

Outcomes level - durable improvements in public administration such as:

increased economy, efficiency or effectiveness of government programs

better compliance with laws or regulations,

improvements in financial and control structures, such as prosecution of

wrongdoers, stronger powers for legislative auditor

more accurate, timely government information

enhanced public awareness of government programs

enhanced legislative knowledge about the state of the management of

programs

Along with these indicators the study also discussed, whether PAC infect dealt with the

issues of importance reaching to its root cause or it generally investigate the symptoms of

the problems such as corruption. The study also gages the deterrence effect of PAC on

the attitude of PAOs or the departments. They argued this an aspect of performance

“relevance”. They also described an “Ideal Committee” (See Annex-II).

The present study incorporated both these works by McGee and the WBI to check the

performance of 12th

PAC (2002-2006) and 13th

PAC (2008-2011) of the National

Assembly of Pakistan. The study focuses on the comparative functioning of both PACs

during the governments, the Musharraf Regime and the Pakistan People’s Party-led

Coalition Government. The study finds some winning points on the basis of a comparison

on equal indicators and sees whether any of two PACs institutionalized those

developments. The next chapter is the Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC, a guide

for Members PAC, PAC Secretariat, Auditor General, PAOs and other stakeholders.

28

Chapter 4

The Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC

4.1 Introduction

The present chapter the Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC, is a guide for Members

of PAC, PAC Secretariat, Auditor General, PAOs and other stakeholders The Public

Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan (PAC) is an institution that

oversight financial matters of state on parliament’s behalf. PAC carries out examination

of the accounts of the Federal Government, complied by the Controller General of

Accounts (CGA) and the Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP). The present PAC is the 13th

Public Accounts Committee of Pakistan since its formation on 14th

April, 1948 (PAKPK,

2011).

The structure and functioning practices of PAC are primarily patterned after Westminster

approach. In the recent decade, it seemed, the PAC has adopted a number of

internationally recognized best practices to make its working effective. The efficiency of

the current PAC is credited to the practice of the appointment of the Leader of the

Opposition as its Chairman, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, under charter of

democracy signed by the leaders of the two major political parties of Pakistan; Benazir

Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (Charter of Democracy, Rule 15).

The 18th

amendment have widened the scope of PAC oversight over state corporations,

trading and manufacturing concerns, development schemes and projects, autonomous and

semi-autonomous bodies, putting under the ambit of Auditor- General (Rehman 2012).

4.2 Background

PAC is a standing committee of the lower house, the National Assembly of Pakistan like

many other countries. PAC was established to exercise under rules 51 and 52 of the

Manual of Business in the Legislative Assembly of undivided India adopted as verbatim

in the constitution Assembly (Legislature) Rules with some minor variations in 1948

(NA, 1985). The Rules 51(1) stated;

29

“As soon as may be after the commencement of the first session of the Assembly, a

Committee on Public Accounts shall, subject to the provisions of this rule be

constituted for duration of the Assembly for the purpose of dealing with the

appropriation accounts of the Government of Pakistan and the reports of the

Auditor General thereon and such other matters as the Finance Ministry may

refer to the Committee”. (NA, 1985, P.76)

4.5 Oversight Perspectives

Parliamentary Control over public monies in Pakistan is exercised at two levels (National

Assembly Secretariat, 200?), first is the proposal stage, where government on the end of

every fiscal year comes forth with a budget proposal to get through the financial jiggle of

the public representatives in order to implement its programmes and policies for

upcoming year by overseeing the policy preparation. Second is the control over the

expenditure of public money. Here, PAC plays a watchdog role of oversight and

examines the accounts of the Federal Government compiled by the CGA and audited by

the AGP. The process assigns responsibility to the public representatives to keep a check

on public expenditures by overseeing the execution and implementation of a given

policy. This is an ex post facto responsibility.

In order to assess Parliamentary control over public monies, two inter-related universally

accepted background oversight perspectives of PAC are vital (USAID, 2009).

4.5.1 The nature and extents of the PAC oversight roles

Generally determined a predominant oversight committee in Westminster democracies,

the PAC provides a critical oversight function in the legislative process within its defined

Legislative Oversight ambit to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all

government and public agencies. Key functions include;

Providing a plausible and autonomous review process of public spending

and governments control of public funds through the examination of appropriation

accounts and audit reports

Investigating the use of public assets, resources and funds

30

Making sure the process of enquiry has greater focus on evaluating

financial management performance (rather than on policy)

Ensuring its reports, recommendation and directives are influential, using

its powers and authority

Challenging the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements.

4.6 The Committee System in the Parliament of Pakistan

The best practice around the world is that the legislative oversees the performance of the

executive through a mechanism of Standing Committees. A great number of modern

democracies have provision in their constitutions and parliamentary rules and procedures

for setting up Standing Committees to review the financial and administrative operations

of the executive departments and agencies.

The Committee System in the Parliament of Pakistan is based on the basic structure of

Westminster and the lessons learned from the best practices of committee systems of the

developed democracies (NA, 1985). A good effort remained always there to copy the

American committee system (Hussain 2012). Across the parliamentary democracies,

different committee systems are in practice to lessen the legislative burden of the house

and to provide technical support based on a detailed discussion at committee level. In

Pakistan, the system of Standing Committees is governed by the Rules and procedure and

Conduct of Business in the National Assembly, 2007. The Public Accounts Committee is

a Standing Committee which plays a vital role in financial oversight and accountability of

the executive.

The Committee System in the Parliament of Pakistan consist of thirty five (35) Senate

standing committees and forty six (46) National Assembly standing committees including

PAC, one (01) Select Committees of the National Assembly, nine (09) parliamentary

committees and eleven (11) Special Committees consisting of members both from the

Senate and the National Assembly (NA, n.d) . The number of committee in the

Parliament of Pakistan varies from time to time depending on the need and requirement

of the parliamentary process. The Secretary National Assembly controls all the Standing

31

and other committees, then, there are Joint Secretaries, each one of them control the two

major branches, Standing Committees Branch-I and Standing Committees Branch-II,

sharing the assignment of half of the standing committees of the house.

Legislative committees in the parliamentary system of Pakistan are regarded as the core

functionaries and are contributing a lot in the legislative business.

4.6.1 Difference among PAC and Other Standing Committees

Constitutionally, the Public Accounts Committee is a standing committee like other

standing committees of National Assembly but it has certain powers and responsibilities

which distinguish this committee on other standing committees of the National Assembly

of Pakistan. The major points of distinction include;

All standing committees of National Assembly deal with the affairs of

their respective ministry, while the PAC ambit all ministries/departments/agencies

working under Federal Government. Further, review of performance of

government agencies under the standing committees other than PAC is

discretionary whereas PAC has to look into each audit observation that may

pertain to all the Ministries.

The PAC had a responsibility of legislative oversight of public monies to

regulate spending of ministries/departments/agencies while other standing

committees are concerned with general affairs of ministries. The control over

public monies gives PAC a pre-eminent position in the committee system of the

National Assembly of Pakistan.

The main purpose of the creation of PAC was to ensure the parliamentary

follow up on Auditor General’s reports to regulate public spending (McGee,

2002). The jurisdictions of PAC are more in common with Auditor- General’s

ambit than does that of the other committees (McGee, 2002).

PAC recommendations are regarded its Directives which are binding on

ministries, departments and agencies, while other Standing Committees of

32

National Assembly can only give recommendations to National Assembly which

are not binding rather a set of suggestions.

4.7 PACs in Pakistan

Since its formation in 1948, the recent PAC is the 13th

one. While, six (06) adhoc PACs

have also functioned in Pakistan. The adoption of adhoc PAC shows the importance of

financial oversight in the country. A brief detail of the PAC background is given in the

introduction. The list of Chairs of PAC is annexed (Se Annex-III). PAC have functioned

for a total period of twenty two (22) years, six (06) months and two (02) days, while, the

adhoc PAC remained functional for a total of sixteen (16) years and seven (07) days.6

Although PAC existed across the history of Pakistan, sometimes it remained less

effective. Its development is associated with time and changing circumstances. PAC is

largely transforming its role from a probing body to its supervisory role increasing

efficiency and effectiveness of programs to achieve her defined objectives (Rehman,

2012). Being a standing committee, the PAC has the power to investigate and examine all

the issues referred to it by the legislature and the issues of public importance (Rehman,

2012).

4.8 Audit Reports of PAC

PAC after a complete scrutiny of audit paras prepared by AG and referred to PAC by

National Assembly is laid back to National Assembly in a form of annual audit report of

PAC. Such reports contain directives of PAC for compliance.

4.8.1 Audit Reports completed and laid before the NA

Till to date, PACs and the APACs together have completed and laid before the National

Assembly thirty (30) Audit Reports. The report of the Year 1993-1994 is ready for

printing. The report of monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC for the years

2011 is sent for approval to the main PAC. (See Annex-III)

6 The information is obtained from termination letters of different governments found in the file containing

letters of Assemblies Termination available at Library of the National Assembly of Pakistan and the PAC

reports also available at NA library.

33

4.8.2 Pending Audit Reports

A total of eight (08) audit reports are still pending. Three reports (1998-1999, 2002-2003,

2003-2004) were assigned to Special Committee II, chaired by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA.

While, three reports (2004-2005, 2006-2007 and 2007-2008) were assigned to Special

Committee III chaired by Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA. The audit reports of the years

2009-2010 and 2010-2011 were being examined by the main PAC. (See Annex-IV)

However, another four (04) reports (1981-1982, 1982-1983, 1983-1984 and 1985-1986)

were still in backlog list.

4.9 Role of Adhoc PACs (APAC)

When National Assembly remained dissolved in Pakistan, the Chief Executives, while

realizing the importance of financial oversight of the public monies, introduced proto-

PACs (APAC). Consequently, Adhoc PACs were invariably set up, during the interim

governments to examine the Federal Accounts and the Auditor General Reports (NA,

1985). The First APAC was introduced by Yahya Khan, the then Chief Marshal Law

Administer, on 3rd

march, 1960 (NA, 1985). A minimum of six (06) APAC have

functioned in Pakistan (PAKPK, 2011). The sixth and the last APAC was constituted on

25th

august, 2000 (Finance Division, 2000). It was validated by the Chief Executive

(CEO, 2001). So for APACs have produced four (04) Reports.

4.10 Functions of PAC

PAC performs its functions under powers as given by the Rules of Procedure and

Conduct of Business in the National Assembly (2007) and the Constitution of the Islamic

Republic of Pakistan.

4.10.1 Powers of PAC

The PAC scrutinizes the Appropriation Accounts of the Government provided in the

reports of the Auditor General of Pakistan. It is the duty of the committee to satisfy itself

while doing so according to the current mandate of the PAC under the Rules of Procedure

and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly (2007) ( See Annex-IV). PAC has

additional and more specific powers to perform its tasks, such as power to examine the

34

public accounts, the comments on the public accounts, and all reports drafted by the

auditor general. The PAC has the power to conduct, directly or indirectly, investigations;

to receive all documentation it considers necessary to adequately perform its functions; to

invite government members to attend its meetings and to respond to PAC members’

questions; to publicize its own conclusions; to report to the legislature; and to suggest to

government how to modify its course of action when necessary.

4.10.2 Basis of PAC Functioning

The PAC is designed to better examines the accounts for the appropriation of sums

granted by the National Assembly for the expenditure of the government policies and

programmes for the annual finance accounts, the report of the Auditor-General of

Pakistan and other matters of public importance referred by the Minister for Finance

(NA, Rule 203(1)). The PAC scrutinizes the appropriation accounts of the government

and the reports of the Auditor-General of Pakistan to its best satisfaction that the moneys

disbursed in the accounts were legally available and applicable to the service or purpose

to which they have been applied or charged (NA, Rule 203(2)a). The PAC also confirms

that the appropriate authority is governing the expenditure (NA, Rule 203(2)b). The PAC

ensures while its oversight process that every re-appropriation has been made in

accordance with the provisions made in this behalf under rules framed by Ministry of

Finance (NA, Rule 203(2)c).

4.10.3 Examining the Statement of the Accounts

The PAC is mandated to examine the statement of the accounts showing the income and

expenditure of state corporation, trading and manufacturing schemes, concerns and

projects together with the balance sheets and the statements of the profit and loss

accounts which the president may have required to be prepared or are prepared under the

provision of the statutory rules regulating the financing of a particular corporation trading

or manufacturing scheme or concern or projects under the report of the Auditor-General

of Pakistan (NA, Rule 203(3)a). It is also under its constitutional mandate to examine the

statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-

autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the Auditor-General of

35

Pakistan either under the directions of the president or under the act of Parliament (NA,

Rule 203(3)b).

4.10.4 Annual Financial Statements (Finance Accounts of the Federal Government)

Finance Accounts are required to be reviewed by PAC (NA Rule 203) now called Annual

Financial Statements of the Federal Government. The two key accounts prepared by the

Controller General of Accounts, certified by the Auditor-General and submitted to the

President are (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 171):

1. Appropriation Accounts

2. Annual Financial Statements of the Federal Government (former Finance

Accounts).

These accounts are certified by the Auditor-General. The AGP gives an Opinion on both

the accounts. The opinion on the Finance Accounts/Annual Financial Statements has also

to be reviewed by PAC conforming to international best practice. The AGP can give the

following types of opinion on both the accounts.

a) Unqualified Opinion: The accounts present a true and fair picture of the

government account balances shown in these accounts.

b) Qualified Opinion: The accounts present a true and fair picture subject to the

following observations: (These are stated)

c) Adverse Opinion: The accounts do not present a true and fair picture and as

such cannot be relied upon.

d) Disclaimer: AGP is unable to give an opinion because (various reasons

given) e.g. non-production of record or other inabilities. This is a serious

situation that PAC needs to look into like the previous one.

Important points to note regarding Finance Accounts/Annual Financial Statements are:

a) They are prepared every year by Controller General of Accounts and submitted by

the Auditor-General every year under Article 171 to the President and laid before

the Parliament.

b) They are forwarded to PAC by AGP for review under Article 203 of the PAC

Rules.

c) They have to be examined by the PAC but have not been examined so far except

perhaps once. There is no reason for this although PAC has been verbally advised

in the past that these must be reviewed.

d) The Annual Financial Statements, as against the Appropriation Accounts that

contain only an account of the expenditure under various grants contain the

following information:

36

i) Statement of Cash Receipts and Payments

This contains Total Receipts in Federal Consolidated Funds and Public

Account as well as Payments out of both Federal Consolidated Fund and

Public Account. It contains the opening cash balance of the Government plus

receipts minus disbursements and the closing cash balance.

ii) Statement of Cash Flows (during the financial year)

This contains:

a) Cash Flows from Operating Activities

b) Cash Flows from Investing Activities

c) Cash Flow from Financing Activities

d) Net increase/decrease in cash

iii) Statement of Comparison of Budgeted and Actual amounts of Receipts

(Revenue and capital) and payments by the Functions ( General Public

Service, Defence Affairs, Economic Affairs, Public Order & Safety Affairs,

Education Affairs and Services, Health affairs and Services, Housing and

Community Amenities, Recreation Culture and Religion, Social Protection,

Environmental Protection).

iv) Statement of Comparison of Budget & Actual Expenditure by Divisions of

the Federal Ministries.

v) Statement of Appropriation of grants by OBJECT DIVISION-WISE (Pay

and allowances, operating expenses, purchase of assets, repairs/maintenance,

loans write-off, retirement benefits etc.)

vi) Statement of Appropriation of Grants by OBJECT on accounts of expenditure

charged upon the Federal Consolidated Fund.

vii) A Balance Sheet of the Federal Government is also available in the Annual

Financial Statements.

viii) In note 30 of the Annual Financial Statements the Auditor-General has stated

that these are one of the principal accounts certified by him and submitted

under Article 171 of the Constitution to the President.

37

4.10.5 Presidential Obligation

The PAC also consider the report of the Auditor–General of Pakistan in case where the

president may have required him to conduct the audit of any receipt or to examine the

accounts of stores and stocks (NA, Rule 203(3)c).

4.10.6 Excess Spending

In a case when any amount of money is spent on any service during a financial year

greater than the actual amount granted by the National Assembly for that purpose, PAC

examine and scrutinize such matters on the basis of related facts according to

circumstances of that excess and issue its recommendations (NA, Rule 203(4)). PAC

work on zero saving, zero excess basis which means appropriate money should be

allocated to policies and programmes (PAC Officer, 2011). The practice of wrong

estimates given by ministries at proposal level and excess allocation to supplementary

grants that is not spent to the concerned program in due time is regarded as an aspect of

bad governance.

4.10.7 Time period for submission of Reports

The PAC is obligatory to submit its reports to the Parliament within a period of one year

from the date of its reference to the committee by the same house (NA, Rule 203(5). The

committee can also seek its extension from the National Assembly up to certain period

and if granted then to submit on the extended date specified in the motion. However,

PAC will request for an extension in the time for the presentation of the report to be

asked for before the expiry of the time allowed under the rule. In practice, it happens very

rare. A general condemnation may be given is by the house on submission of delayed

report (PAC Officer, 2011).

4.10.8 Continuity of the Proceedings

In case of dissolution of the assembly, any report, memorandum or note that the

Committee may have prepared, or any evidence that the Committee may have taken

before dissolution, shall be liable to be made available to the new Committee (NA, Rule

204). However, other than anything contained in mandate, the public Accounts

38

Committee will proceed from the stage where the previous Committee left the

proceedings before the dissolution of the Assembly (NA, Rule 205).

4.10.9 Magisterial Powers of PAC

In general provision of the standing committees of the National Assembly, PAC has

certain magisterial powers:

Powers to take evidence or call for papers, records or documents;

PAC have power to require the attendance of persons, production of documents or

records if it is considered necessary for the discharge of its duties considering it

has no harm to national security. In case of a question of the relevancy of a

document or a person, the final authority is speaker of NA to decide (NA, Rule

227(1)).

Summoning a Witness; PAC have the power to summon a witness by an

order signed by Secretary to appear before the committee (NA, Rule 227(2)).

Invitation or Summon to a member or Person; PAC have power to

invite any member or person relevant or who has an interest in relation to any

matter under consideration in PAC and to hear expert evidence and to hold public

hearing (NA, Rule 227(3).

Power of Civil Court; PAC have powers, subject to clause (3) of Article

66, vested in civil court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1998 (Act V of 1908) for

enforcing the attendance of any person and compelling the production of

document (NA, Rule 227(4).

These powers enable PAC to fix responsibility on any person or department to produce

witness or to appear before PAC. In case of non-implementation, PAC has certain powers

to refer such cases to NAB, FIA or police or to write displeasure against concerned

department/PAO to Prime Minister.

39

4.10.10 Rule Position

General rules of standing committees of the National Assembly along with the specific

rules provided to PAC are practiced for its functioning given in the Rules of Procedure

and Conduct of business in the National assembly, 2007 and the Constitution of the

Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 as amended time by time.

4.10.11 Status of PAC

Ideally, PAC is regarded as an important standing committee of parliament as it has the

responsibility of financial and audit oversight; therefore, it plays an effective role in

curbing corruption and recovering amounts wrongly spent by the Ministry/Division. The

importance of PAC has grown over the time due to the responsibility assigned to it being

highly technical, specialized and sensitive in nature.

Figure 4.5. PAC Organogram

Source: PAC Organogram as discussed with PAC Officers

Secretary

National Assembly

Addl. Secretary

( Committees)

Addl. Secretary (PAC)

Joint Secretary

(PAC )

Implementation Cell

DS

SO SO

Branch

PAC

(Main Branch)

DS

SO SO

Branch

Special Committee II

DS

SO

Branch

Special Committee III

DS

SO

Branch

Addl. Secretary (Admin)

Addl. Secretary

(Ligeslature)

Addl. Wings of PAC Addl. Wings of PAC

40

4.10.12 Constitutional Link-Reference to PAC

Annual Audit Reports along with Accounts are submitted by the Auditor- General of

Pakistan to the President under Article 171 of the Constitution. X The Federal Minister

for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs then presents the report to the National

Assembly (NA, Rule 171). The Speaker of the National Assembly refers them for a

detailed scrutiny to the PAC (NA, Rule 177). The AGP refers such reports to the

President on an annual basis.

4.11 Sub-Committees of PAC

The PAC is empowered to appoint one or more Sub-Committees, each having the powers

of the whole committee, to examine any matter referred to it (NA, Rule 224).

Subsequently, the report of sub-committee after approval by the whole committee will be

considered to be the report of PAC.

Sub-committees of PAC are sometimes assigned a whole report to review, while, many

sub-committees are constituted to review only few paras who meet once or twice. Sub-

committees of PAC have been useful tools to update its business. The culture of

inheritance of big backlog to every committee has been a practice in Pakistan. The use of

committees and especially the sub-committees in parliamentary system of Pakistan is

gaining importance.

Although the 12th

PAC constituted many sub-committees but their role remained less

effective. They were expected to be the major tools in clearing the backlog of twelve

years but the sub-committees of the 12th

PAC produced only one report for the year 1995-

1996.

4.11.1 Constitutions of Sub Committees

The sub-committees of the PAC work on the same Rules of NA and the Constitution of

Pakistan which provide for functioning of PAC.

41

4.11.2 Channels of Supervision

The channel of supervision of the PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan is as under

and is depicted at Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.6. Channels of supervision

Source:. Channels of supervision as discussed with PAC Officers

4.11.3 PAC relationship with the Auditor-General

PAC is a tool of parliament to ensure governmental accountability. The information

required for the functioning of PAC is provided by Auditor- General that ensures the

adequate use of public resources by its audit. The relationship between PAC and Auditor

General is intertwined and both are essential components of the democratic

accountability (McGee, 2002). Despite their close working, Auditor- General sends its

reports to the President being the office of the Executive. President refers its reports to

Parliament from where they are referred to PAC. McGee Study Group (2002) expressed

that the Auditor General should be a Parliament’s office due to its working association,

independent from Executive.

Nevertheless, PAC is not confined only to Auditor General Reports. PAC can pursue

matters of public concern regardless of the consideration that these matters are the subject

of Auditor General Report or not.

Speaker

Chairman (PAC)

Secretary

Additional Secretary

Joint Secretary

Deputy Secretary

Section Officer

Superidentent

Assistant

42

4.12 Assessment of PAC Mandate

The Mandate of PAC (See Annex-IV) is largely consistent with a common practice that

the apprehensions heaved in the reports of Auditor General, the Supreme Audit

Institutions, are regarded as the main basis of PACs work and mainly established

oversight concerns about the spending of public monies by the government or its

agencies. The mandate necessitates certain practices and procedures by the PAC which

conform in fundamental respects with established international practices (USAID, 2009).

Considering a very short democratic history of Pakistan, generally the PAC’s operational

rules are sufficient for its ability to perform as an efficient and effective Public Accounts

Committee (USAID, 2009). An important function of the Committee is to determine that

money granted by Parliament has been spent by Government within the scope of the

demand. The implications of this phrase are that any money spent against some grant

must not be more than the actual amount granted, the expenditure brought to account

against a particular grant must be of such a nature as to warrant its record against the

grant only, and the grants should be spent on purposes which are set out in the detailed

demand and they cannot be spent on any new service not contemplated in the demand

(USAID, 2009). The functions of the Committee extend, however, beyond the formality

of expenditure to its wisdom, faithfulness and economy. The Committee thus examines

cases involving losses, nugatory expenditure and financial irregularities. When any case

of proved negligence resulting in loss or extravagance is brought to the notice of the

Committee, it calls upon the Ministry/Department concerned to explain what action,

disciplinary or otherwise, it had taken to prevent a recurrence (PAC officer, 2011). In

such a case it can also record its opinion in the form of disapproval or pass strictures

against the extravagance or lack of proper control by the Ministry or Department

concerned.

The Committee is not concerned with questions of policy in the broad sense though it is

within its jurisdiction to point out whether there has been extravagance or waste in

carrying out that policy (USAID, 2009). While, as for as modern practices are concerned,

PACs are working to introduce efficient policies to save national resources (McGee,

2002).

43

While scrutinizing the Reports of the AGP on Revenues Receipts, the Committee

examines various aspects of Government’s tax administration. The Committee, thus,

examines cases involving under-assessments, tax-evasion, non-levy of duties, mis-

classifications etc., identifies the loopholes in the taxation laws and procedures and

makes recommendations in order to check leakage of revenue.

4.13 General Practices of PAC

4.13.1 The Chair of PAC

PAC has a chairperson to preside over its meeting and to perform other functions.

4.13.1.1 Method of Appointment of Chairman PAC

The chairman of a standing committee is elected by the committee amongst its members

within thirty days of its election in the presence of the Secretary National Assembly (NA,

Rule 216).

4.13.1.2 Government/ Opposition Chairman

Since its formation in Pakistan, PAC was normally chaired by Finance Ministers,

Chairman State Bank, (Conflict of interest situations) members of parliament from the

government party. However, in the last decades, PAC remained active up to its extent but

as the notion in Australia is that chair from a government is more likely to make

department implement committee recommendations, was not a case in Pakistan. Under

the Charter of Democracy signed by the Leaders of major political parties of Pakistan, it

was also agreed that in future the Chairman of PAC would be the leader of the opposition

(Charter of Democracy, Rule 15). Respecting an international convention practiced

around the commonwealth countries, Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA, Leader of the opposition

was honoured to chair 13th

PAC for the first time in Pakistan as a Leader of the

Opposition. He has a versatile personality with an excellent experience of being members

of PAC in the last governments.

44

4.13.1.3 Role of Chairman

The Chair is extremely important in ensuring the effective operation of PAC (McGee,

2002). Apart from his formal powers of the position, the chair is a principle

representative of the PAC to the house and the public (McGee, 2002). His role in PAC is

much further than his duties of presiding over the PAC meetings. He is regarded a public

figure and his statements are expected in that prospective even outside parliament.

4.13.1.4 Resignation / Removal of Chairman/Members PAC

The rules provided for the removal of the PAC chair are the same as provided for other

standing committees of National Assembly under its rules. A members or chairman can

resign from his membership by submitting a written resign to the Speaker National

Assembly (NA, Rule 218).

4.13.2 Membership of PAC

The Committee consists of 23 Members; all are the members of the National Assembly,

lower house in the Parliament of Pakistan and the Minister for Finance as its ex-officio

members (NA, Rule 202), who is normally the Federal Minister of Finance and Revenue.

The membership is usually proportionate to party membership in the house with its chair

from the opposition, the Leader of the House. The distribution of seats depends on the

distribution of seats in the legislature that mean PPP-led governments along with its

alliances occupy more seats in PAC than Opposition. However, a cabinet members being

a member of the committee is not regarded a good practice in common wealth (Syed,

2007).

An international convention that counter balance the majority by giving the

Chairpersonship to Leader of the Opposition is practiced for the first time in Pakistan by

the present government. This was the case in two-thirds of the PACs studied by McGee

(2002). The chairpersonship of the PAC to the opposition implies two basic functions;

firstly, it re-equilibrates the balance of power between the government and the

opposition. Secondly, their symbolic function is the fact that the chair of the PAC being

member of the opposition indicates the willingness of both the majority and the minority

to operate within the PAC in a perfectly bipartisan manner (Syed, 2007). However,

45

making implementation of PAC recommendation is a challenge for Leader of the

Opposition which is his core duty to make sure (McGee 2002).

4.14 Implementation Cell of PAC

The sixth Adhoc PAC chaired by Mr. H.U Beg forwarded a set of recommendations in its

report for the year 1999-2000. The APAC realized the lack of any mechanism that

evolves to ensure follow up of the decision made by the committee. The report

recommended setting up an Implementation section temporarily to monitor the

implementation of PAC directives further to give it permanent status by incorporation

necessary provisions in the relevant law (APAC, 2002).

Implementation Cell of PAC was formed by Gen. Musharraf in December, 2002 to

ensure the implementation of PAC recommendations and directives.

4.14.1 Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC

A sub-Committee was constituted by the 13th

PAC to review the compliance on PAC

directives under the Convenership of Dr. Azra Fazal Pechuho, MNA. Later the

Convenership was shifted on to Yasmeen Rehman, MNA to carry forward the follow up

process of monitoring and implementation. The MIC focused more on implementation

and compliance.

4.14.2 Present Tenure of PAC

The PAC is formed to work along with the recent government for a period of five (05)

years. The PAC will dissolve with the termination of National Assembly.

4.15 Process Mapping of PAC

PAC wing works as secretariat of PAC. The process mapping of PAC is depicted at

Figure 4.3. The main steps in the processing of PAC include:

Scheduling and holding PAC Meetings

Issuing agenda for PAC Meetings

Handling of briefs for PAC Members sent by AG

46

Sending of PAC directives to concerned departments/agencies and ,

recording of feedback on compliance

Keeping record of the proceedings of PAC

Maintaining record of recoveries

Maintaining of data of members

Referring of cases by PAC to FIA and NAB

Handling of correspondence with PAOs, AGP, CGA and other agencies.

4.15.1 Role of PAC Wing

Pac wing plays a vital role in the carrying out of PAC functioning. PAC wing facilitate its

meeting, provide Members necessary research, coordinate with AG office, PAO of

Ministries and follow up to PAC directives for compliance.

4.15.2 Meeting Procedures

Different steps of PAC meeting procedures are as given in details below. Also see Figure

4.3.

4.15.3 Meeting Schedule

PAC wing categorize paras of different ministries on alphabetical order for an

examination by PAC. The list is finalized and sent to Chairman. On the instruction of

Chairman, the Additional/Joint Secretary makes a consensus with Auditor General Office

and PAO of concerned ministry on their availability for a meeting on issue of importance

or important paras. A date of the meeting is decided as per the agreed scheduled. The

Section Officer issues notices for the meeting.

4.15.4 Pre-PAC at PAC

Members of PAC and the staff hold informal pre-meetings to set the agenda of the PAC

meetings. Such meetings are regarded significant in mutual discussions, agenda setting of

PAC and preparation of members for meeting ahead.

47

Pre-PAC at AG

Figure. 4.3 Process MAP of PAC

PAC Reports after NA Debate Audit Reports Audit Reports

Parliament President AGP

Finance Ministry

Other Committees

Public Complaints

(Suo-Moto)

Media Review

Ministry

Implementation

Further

Information

Implementation of PAC

Directions

PAC Secretariat

Follow up on Directives and PAC Reports

Au

dit R

epo

rts for P

AC

Rev

iew

PAC Chairman & Members

DAC

PAO/Ministry

Schedule PAC Meeting Update Briefs

Highlighted Paras

Fo

rtnig

ht

Up

date

PAC Meeting PA

C R

epo

rts

Issue Notifications

of Meetings

Pre-PAC at PAC

Report

Prepared

Report

Received

Actionable

Points

Source: Process Mapping [the Diagram is adopted with minor changes from ASP-Aid, USAID briefing to PAC Members on May 17, 2012]

Nex

t

PA

C

Meetin

g

48

4.15.5 Pre-PAC meeting at Auditor General Office

The Auditor General and PAO of the concerned Ministry hold a pre-PAC meeting to

develop understanding prior to actually appearing before PAC. This is the last stage of

consensus building between AG and the Ministry (PAC Officer, 2012).

4.15.6 Agenda for PAC Meetings

PAC Wing, on instructions of Chairman, drafts an agenda of a meeting to be distributed

among the participants. The agenda carry the detail business of the meeting. In practice

Agenda is pre-decided by AG office.

4.15.7 Meeting Set up

The Chairman sits in a very prominent chair along with members sitting on his both

sides. PAO sits in opposite to Chairman along with his staff. While the AG sits on one

side joined by his staff and opposite to his sits PAC staff. The Media, Visitors and

additional staff of any party sits on the back chairs. The existing sitting arrangement of

Pac meetings is depicted in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4. Sitting Arrangement of PAC Meeting

4.15.8 Proceedings of Meeting

When the meeting starts, The Auditor General is ordered by Chairman to read the audit

paras and the Chairman gives chance to PAO to reply. The PAO have to make the PAC

CGP

49

members satisfy by his argument, failing to what he will prove guilty. The PAC

sometimes give a second chance to PAO to make his argument clear in next meeting,

normally audit paras are decided in the first meeting.

4.15.9 Meeting in Public or Private

PAC has a greater influence on ministries and departments. In cases, when it is difficult

to hold any meeting at PAC secretariat (Parliament House), PAC members and staff

travel to different department to hold more efficient meeting during the availability of

more witness and documentations.

4.15.10 Minutes of the Meetings / Actionable Points

During the meeting, PAC wing, normally the Section Officer takes the minutes of the

meetings / Actionable Points. The actionable points of the meeting finalized by the PAC

wing are sent to Chairman for a review. The actionable points include;

Audit Paras

Answers of PAO and the Auditor General

Decisions of the Committee

4.15.11 Official Procedure for approval of Actionable Points

In case of a main PAC meeting, Section Officer (SO) of Main PAC takes the

minutes/Actionable Points of the meeting. After finalizing the minutes/Actionable Points

of meeting, these are referred to Deputy Secretary (DS) for a review. The DS review the

Actionable Points and send to Joint Secretary (JS). The JS finalize and send to Additional

Secretary (AS). The finally reviewed Actionable Points by the AS are sent to the Auditor

General office for Vetting. After vetting from the Audit, the Actionable Points are sent to

the Chairman PAC for approval for issuing to all concerned ministries etc. The official

procedure of approval of Actionable Points in Main PAC is depicted at Figure 4.5.

50

Figure 4.5. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points at Main PAC

Source: Discussion with PAC Officers

In case of a Special Committee meeting, Section Officer (SO) of that committee takes the

minutes/Actionable Points of the meeting. After finalizing the minutes/Actionable Points

of meeting, these are referred to concerned DS for a review. The DS review the

/Actionable Points and forward to JS. The JS finalize and forward to AS. The Points of

Action finally reviewed Actionable Points by the AS are sent to the Auditor General

office for Vetting. After vetting from the Audit, the Actionable Points are sent to the

Convener Special Committee PAC. The Actionable Points finally reviewed by the

Convener Special Committee PAC are sent to the Chairman PAC for approval for issuing

to all concerned. The official procedure of approval of Actionable Points in Sub-

Committee is depicted at Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points at Sub-Committee

Source: Discussion with PAC Officers

4.15.12 Finalization of Report

When all the paras of a year are examined and Actionable Points finalized, the

Actionable Points are given the shape of an annual PAC report. Internal meeting of PAC

are called to discuss the prepared report in detail to examine errors before it is sent to the

House. When in an internal meeting, the members have reviewed the report to their

satisfaction. It is sent to AG office for his Vetting. The AG office gives its Vetting report

and the report is printed and laid before the National Assembly.

SO DS JS AS Vetting Report

of Audit Chairman PAC

SO DS JS AS Vetting Report of

Auidit

Convener

Special COmmittee PAC

Chairman

PAC

51

4.16 Departmental Accounts Committee (DAC) for PAC

DAC was established by Ministry of Finance on 4th

December, 1984 and re-established

on 13th

February, 1998. DACs were activated and de-activated by different governments

on need basis. DAC are established in all government ministries, departments and

agencies to overcome the burden of PAC. DAC meetings are held among the following

representatives;

PAO of the concerned Ministry

Audit Representative

Representative of the Ministry of Finance

4.16.1 Role of DAC

The Ministry of Finance defines the role of DAC to watch the processing of relevant

Audit Inspector Reports (AIR) and decide upon appropriate measures to accelerate their

finalization (APAC, 2002). DAC meetings settle maximum paras in case action has been

taken on audit observations, to the satisfaction of AGP, to lesson burden on PAC to

examine only paras of vital concern and recoveries of huge amounts or punishments to

higher officers (NAS, 200?). DAC are working at both federal and provincial levels.

DACs help Auditee organization clearly identify potential paras in AIR with increased

concentration in preparing response to draft paras on urgent basis (PAC Brief, 95). The

results of DAC meetings have been encouraging and are proving to useful screening

forums (APAC, 2002).

4.16.2 Role of Principal Accounting Officer (PAO)

PAO is the focal person and competent authority in the process of financial oversight and

accountability. PAOs are the head of DAC and chair its meetings to settle paras of lesser

importance. The effective role of POAs can help overcome corruption, hence, very

important to PAC functioning. PAC schedules its meeting after a consensus with POA of

their availability. He is regarded as the implementation pillar in the process. While

releasing their importance in financial oversight, the Prime Minister has strictly directed

52

POAs to regularly appear at PAC meeting in a well prepared fashion (PM Secretariat,

2009).

4.17 Resources allocated to PAC

There are two sets of resources available to PAC for its operations; finances and staffing

allocated and the resources of information to carry the business of PAC. The first sort of

resources include the number of staff, the research facilitators and the equipment’s,

particularly computer facilities, need to be made available (McGee, 2002)

Secondly, the resources of information available to PAC include;

Audit reports

Media

Suo-moto Actions

Public Complaints

In the above resources, Audit reports are the main basis of PAC functioning and provide

about ninety five per cent (95 per cent) of information (PAC, 2009). PAC continuality

monitors the daily press and electronic media and takes sou-moto action of issues of

greater public concern. Ch. Nisar Ali, during his Chairmanship of PAC give ear to many

public complaints sent to PAC by the citizen of Pakistan.

4.18 Audit Briefs for PAC Members

This is audit document prepared by Auditor General Office. This is to facilitate the

Members of PAC for the meeting ahead. A brief contain:

Subject of Audit Para

Audit Objectives in detail

Ministry’s updated replies

Minutes of Current DAC meeting

Audit Comments

53

The Audit Briefs are regarded very helpful to members, who have less time to study the

paras and related information in details. In routine, the Briefs are provided to the PAC on

the prior evening to a meeting. The members normally get them on the day of meeting.

The Members when interviewed replied that briefs could be helpful if provided at least

two weeks earlier to a meeting (PAC officer, 2012).

4.19 Directives/Recommendations in PAC Reports

The main PAC and its sub-committees after a thorough discussion on each Audit para

give their directions which as per rule are called recommendation of the committee.

These recommendations after approval from the House are considered as directions of the

committee.

4.19.1 Types of PAC Directives

As for as the recent practices of PAC are concerned, audit reports of PAC are mainly

based on audit paras and PAC directives are largely issued on these paras other than

grants. The PAC give different sorts of directives to PAOs/ministries;

1. To recover the amount

2. To further inquire into the matter

3. To constitute an IDC on the issue

4. To fix responsibility

5. To pursue the court case

6. To hold another DAC

7. Can constitute a Sub-Committee

8. Can refer the case to FIA/NAB/Police

9. To place the name of a person in ECL

10. To pend/defer the audit para

11. To take disciplinary actions against person accused

12. To settle the audit paras

13. To provide the original record of any issue

14. To summon the concerned persons

15. To invite the special invitees concerning the issue

54

16. To lodge an FIR

17. Can recommend to the Prime Minister

18. To blacklist the Companies

19. To regularize the excess grants

20. To settle the saving of grants

21. To direct for Special Audit of any organization

22. To take Suo-motu action on any issue

23. Can recommend sever action for non-compliance

24. To implement the recommendations of DAC

25. To take action on public complaints

26. Take action on media review

27. And many other that suits the nature of case and legal point of view.

4.20 Follow-up of PAC Reports

The 6th

Adhac PAC started the process for follow up to its directives. They use to write

letters to ministries and received replies. During the 12th

PAC, follow up process also

continued and the MI Cell remained functional. However, the proper follow up started

during 13th

PAC. A review committee convened by Dr. Azra Fazal Bachehou, MNA, was

formed for this purpose that worked for nearly six month. Its Convenership was shifted to

Yasmen Rehman, MNA and rapid meetings took place. The committee strategized the

follow up for compliance on PAC directives. The committee held its meeting outside

Parliament premises at the offices of CDA, PTA in Islamabad and for some departments

at Lahore and Karachi. The process of preparation of Actionable Points for Follow up

Committee is the same as of the Main PAC or Special Committees of PAC. The

Committee had laid its report for the year 2010 before the National Assembly.

4.21 Responses by Ministries/PAOs

The Follow up by the MI Committee has accelerated the recovery process and ministries

are seen active and responsible to respond to PAC Directives. They appear at PAC

meeting and answer questions.

55

4.22 Recovery Status

As a result of continuous follow up, PAC has recovered 115 billion rupees which is

regarded remarkable recovery so for effected (PAC, 2011) (See Annex-VI).

4.23 Module of PAC

The proposed introduction of a computerized Management Information System (MIS)

module to be used for the PAC is a significant development. It will promote the

Committee’s efforts to improve its levels of efficiency. This system, once introduced and

fully implemented, will become the operating centre of the PAC Branch with nearly over

half of its work being facilitated through the module. The Computer qualified staff and

the members will better benefit from the system (Mughal, 2012).

4.24 Auditor General relationship with PAC

Auditor General of Pakistan is the basic source of information to PAC. The committee

relies about 95per cent on the information provided by the AG office in the form of Audit

Reports. Historically, the PAC was created to ensure parliamentary follow up on Auditor

General’s reports (McGee, 2002).

The AG submits its reports to the President being an executive officer. (Intention is not to

submit to him for accountability but perform a post office function under the

Constitution) The Federal Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary affairs, on behalf

of President causes the accounts and reports to be laid t in the National Assembly. The

Speaker thus refers the report to Secretary PAC for its scrutiny (AG Office, 2012). The

AG relationship with PAC is depicted at Figure 4.7. The relationship between AG and

PAC is exclusively reciprocal, the AG reporting solely to the PAC and the PAC relying

exclusively on AG’s reports as a source of its inquiries (McGee, 2002).

56

Figure 4.7. AG relationship with PAC

Source: As discussed with AG office Officer

In General, regardless of the closeness of the relationship, the principal way in which

expression is given to the Auditor General’s position as an Officer of Parliament is the

working relationship with the PAC. This involve providing PAC with material that forms

the basis of its inquiry work, being the source of information to committee, in turn

receiving suggestions from PAC as to the work programme that Auditor General may

undertake and report to PAC the compliance and the recoveries.

4.24.1 Reporting by Auditor General

The field officers of Auditor General pay audit to ministries/departments/agencies to

oversee their financial handlings. The information provided by these field officers is the

main basis of audit paras of Auditor General Reports. Due to lack of capacity, it is

difficult for AG office to audit 100 per cent cases. It took target sampling of high risk

cases and a sample of 2-5 for process. A higher level officer of Ag office is responsible

for identifying high risk cases, hence the sampling. However, the officers at AG office

responded their sample was always representative.

4.24.2 Highlighting of Audit Paras for PAC review

Out of all the paras published in the audit reports, the AG office put an effort to highlight

some of the important paras to lessen the work of PAC. The criteria for highlighting and

unhighlighting of audit paras are based on a manual process taking place at DAC and

Pre-PAC meeting at AG. .

AG President National Assembly PAC

57

4.24.3 Role of Audit General in PAC Meetings

Other than audit reports, the Auditor General provides an update before a PAC meeting

through the Audit Briefs based on the findings of DAC meetings and the Pre-PAC

meeting at AG office. The AG is the sole witness to illustrate the details of audit paras

and defend the PAOs before PAC.

4.24.4 Implementation Cells of Audit Department

Compliance Cells of Audit Department were established at Federal and Provincial level

for the compliance, implementation and follow up of the directives/actionable Points of

Public Accounts Committees. The Implementation Cell at Federal Auditor General was

established to play its role as follow (PAC 2012: F.1(1)/2012/PAC.Imp/Follow

up/(Audit):

Monitoring of outstanding PAC directives shall be a continuous process

requiring close liaison with the Departments/Ministries/Organizations

The Compliance Cell Shall function under the direct supervision of

Deputy Director PAC of AG

The Compliance Cell shall prepare computerized lists of all the

outstanding PAC directives and reconcile the same with respective auditee

department

On the basis of information data prepared by the Compliance Cell, action

plan shall be prepared and circulated to the concerned PAOs/Executive Heads to

arrange DAC meetings to review implementation status of PAC’s

directives/actionable points

PAC’s directives not promptly responded by the auditees shall be

incorporated in the compliance reports to be submitted to PAC Secretariat/PAOs

concerned

58

The Compliance Cell shall maintain a Register for all PAC’s

outstanding/current directives (year wise) for the purpose of regular monitoring

and supervising the implementation

Monthly progress report shall be submitted by the Compliance Cell

through Deputy Director (PAC) to Director General for implementation/further

orders

Monthly report shall be included in the Calendar of returns for submission

to Deputy Director PM & E Cell of the Director General in the first week of each

calendar month for approval and onward transmittal to Apex office.

On the basis of above functioning, the Implementation Cell of Audit Department may

keep PAC aware of the compliance of its directives. PAC can also ask for a compliance

report any time to be submitted.

4.25 PAC Staff

Recently, PAC is headed by an Additional Secretary. The next in command include a

Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretaries, Section Officers, Assistants, Clerks, computer

operators and Naib-Qasids. The staff members know well about PAC functioning.

4.25.1 The powers and duties of PAC officers and employees

Officers and employees of PAC provide secretarial assistance to the committee. The

terms of reference of PAC staff are as under:-

To arrange to convene sittings of the Committee after seeking convenience

of the Chairman or as per directions from the Chairman

Obtaining / gathering of information including preliminary material/ brief

notes on the relevant subjects from different sources including Office of AGPR,

the concerned Ministry, Public Sector Undertakings, newspaper clippings,

Internet, etc.

Sending intimations/agenda papers for the sittings of the Committee to the

Chairman and Members of the Committee

59

Correspondence with concerned Ministry / Organisations on relevant

matters

To study/examine the replies to Parliamentary Questions, relevant

newspaper clippings, material gathered from the Internet and other sources on the

subjects under examination

To prepare Lists of Points on the relevant subjects for written

replies/evidence/post-evidence purposes

To draft Original Reports on subjects selected and examined by the

Committee

To arrange for consideration/ adoption, presentation, printing and

circulation of such Reports

To scrutinize Action Taken Replies received from the Ministry, draft

Action Taken Reports and arrange for their consideration/ adoption, presentation,

printing and circulation

To arrange for putting of various Reports presented to the House, on the

Internet

To prepare Action Taken Statements for the purpose of laying of the same

in the Houses

To process the representations received from Members/ Agencies and

individuals as per existing practice

Day-to-day work relating to the Committee Secretariat.

The next chapter is a detail of observations of the two selected periods the 12th

and 13th

PAC called the colliding facts.

60

Chapter 5

Colliding Facts

5.1 Introduction

The present chapter Colliding Facts deals with the major comparative facts of 12th

and

13th

PAC. As the chapter go ahead it counts down PAC working practices, successes,

failures and results while highlighting the obstacles and hurdles that PAC faced in the

way of review process of financial oversight of appropriation accounts/financial

statements. These facts and practices exercised by two selected PAC show the efficiency

level of one committee over the other committee. This chapter will discuss when both

PAC were allocated almost equal inputs (resources), why there is a difference in output.

5.2 Composition of PAC

Generally, the PAC is composed of a set of members and a Chairman with extensive

experience or a man with an ability to conduct the financial oversight business.

5.2.1 Membership of 12th & 13th

PACs

The 12th

PAC consisted of a total of nineteen (19) members and an Ex-officio member

the Minister of State for Finance (PAC, 2007). The committee was dominated with ten

(10) Government Members and the Chairman was also from the Government party. The

other Members include four (04) from PPPP, three (03) from MMAP, One (01) each

from MQM and PML-N (PAC 2012).

The 13th

PAC consisted of a total of twenty two (22) members and an Ex-officio member,

the Minister –in-Charge for Finance and Revenue. The membership consists of five (05)

members from PML-N, seven (07) from PPPP, four (04) members from PML, two (02)

from MQM, two (02) independent, and 0ne (01) each from ANP and MMAP (PAC

2006). The members seem to be derived on equal proportion of all parties present in the

house. (for complete list of 12th

and 13th

PAC ( See Annex-V). The turnover in

membership is noticed but most of the members in the recent PAC are found associated

since its formation.

61

5.2.2 Delay in Composition of PAC

The 12th

PAC first meet on April 10, 2004 with a delay of twenty three (23) days, four

(04) months and one (01) year from the day of Government formation on November 16,

2002 (PAC 2004).

The 13th

PAC first meet on September 19, 2008 with a delay of three (03) days and five

(05) months from the day of Government formation on March 16, 2008(PAC 2008). The

comparative delay of 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.61. Comparative Delay

5.2.3 Sub-Committees / Special Committees

In Pakistani jurisdiction where every PAC inherited years of backlog, the tool to use Sub-

Committees/Special Committee proved very helpful to clear the backlog. Particularly in

Pakistani PAC scenario, the backlog has been a major concern for the two selected

Committee although none of them was successful to clear this menace. The idea was to

make a maximum use of sub-committees to clear the backlog in order to update the

operations of PAC. Hence, both 12th

and 13th

PAC constituted sub-committees for this

purpose.

5.2.4 Sub-Committees of 12th

PAC

In order to deal with the inherited backlog, the 12th

PAC constituted four (04) Sub-

Committees (National Assembly Secretariat, 2007a). The sub Committees were convened

by;

Kanwar Khalid Younis, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee I

0

5

10

15

20

25

12th PAC 13th PAC

Days

Months

Year

62

Lt. Col (R) Ghulam Rasool Sahi, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee II

Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee III

Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee IV

Sub-Committee I, on its formation was convened by Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan Jatoi,

MNA, but later on Dr. Abdul Ghaffar became a Federal Minister and the convenership

was shifted on to Kanwar Khalid Younis, MNA (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004b).

The Committee consisted of five (05) members and was assigned to clear the backlog of

two (02) years for the years 1990-91 and 1998-99 (National Assembly of Pakistan,

2004a). However, this sub-committee remained unable to complete her assignment. The

report for the year 1990-91, was later completed by a Special Committee constituted

under 13 PAC and Convened by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA. The report for the year 1998-

99 was also assigned to Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, and was under review process the

moment Ch. Nisar abolished Special Committees two month earlier to his resignation.

While talking about the performance of PAC in Pakistan, it was generally observed that

many audit report appeared before three to four PACs but didn’t reach to any conclusion.

Sub-Committee II, on its formation was convened by Mr. Muhammad Wasi Zafar, MNA,

but later becoming a Federal Minister, the covenership was shifted on to Lt. Col (R)

Ghulam Rasool Sahi, MNA (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004c). The Committee

consisted of five (05) members. This sub-committee was assigned to clear the backlog of

two (02) years; 1991-92 and 1997-98 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a) but the

assignment was not completed during 12th

PAC. These reports were later completed by

the 13th

PAC. The report for the year 1991-92, was later reviewed by 13th

PAC under

chairmanship of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan. However the report for the year 1997-98 was later

completed by a Special Committee formed by the 13 PAC under Convenership of Mian

Riaz Hussain Perzada, MNA.

Sub-Committee III of the 12th

PAC was convened by Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, (National

Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a) who has been very active member in both 12th

and 13th

PAC. This Sub-Committee remained, although it was assigned a backlog of two (02)

years 1992-93 and 1995-96 on June 21, 2004 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a) but

it successfully finalized the deliberations of only one report for the year 1995-96 on

63

September 18, 2007 (PAC, 2007 b) till the dissolution of National Assembly, hence, the

PAC tenure. The Sub-Committee III has four (04) members and it held 72 meetings much

more than any other Sub-Committee of 12th

PAC.

Sub-Committee IV was formed under Convenership of Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA

and three (03) other members (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2005). Earlier this Sub-

Committee was formed under the Convenership of Ch. Wajahat Hussain, MNA (National

Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a). The Sub-Committee was assigned to clear the backlog for

the year 1994-95 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a). He, however, never attended a

single meeting. Under his Convenership this Sub-Committee remained inactive when it

was later on shifted to Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA, who continued its working but

didn’t completed a single report. Its assignment for the year 1994-95 was later completed

by a Special Committee of 13th

PAC under Convenership of Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada,

MNA.

5.2.5 Sub-Committees of 13th

PAC

In order to deal with the inherited backlog of twelve (12) years Audit Reports, the 13th

PAC constituted three sub-committees; Special PAC-I or the Implementation Committee,

Special PAC-II and Special PAC-III (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011a) other than

some short term Sub-Committee formed for specific issues and maximum for three to

four meetings.

The Special Committees of 13th

PAC were convened by;

Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA

Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA

Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA

Dr. Azra Fazal Pechuho, MNA

Special PAC-I, Convened by Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, was assigned the responsibility of

eighteen (18) Ministries, the Committee worked as a Monitoring and Implementation

Cell of PAC, the task has been completed (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b). This

Committee had functioned as a Monitoring and Implementation Committee of 13th

PAC.

Special PAC-II, Convened by Zahid Hamid, MNA, and Special PAC-III, Convened by

64

Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, MNA, with responsibility to clear the backlog of three years

each. The reports for which were submitted (Ahmed, 2011). Both Special Committees are

again assigned to clear the backlog of three years each for the years 1998-1999, 2002-

2003, 2003-2004 to Special Committee II and 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2007-2008 to

Special Committee III (Ahmed, 2011). Special Committees are good tools of PAC to

update its business.

Other than the above said Special Committees formed, the 13th

PAC also constituted

twenty five (25) other committees to examine 4-5 paras for a two-three meetings (Ali,

2011).

5.3 Performance of Sub-Committees

5.3.1 Sub-Committees of 12th

PAC

Out of four (04) Sub-Committees constituted by 12 PAC, only the sub-Committee

convened by Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, completed its report assigned to it on June 21,

2004 for the Years 1995-96 and finalized its deliberations on September 18, 2007

(National Assembly of Pakistan, 2007b).

In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the year 1995-96, the committee

reviewed one hundred and Eighty Six (186) grants and took up a total of One Thousand

and Sixty Nine (1069) Audit Paras (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-

02).

The remaining three Sub-committees examined some paras of their assignments but none

of the report was completed. The remaining work was shifted to the 13th

PAC as per the

Rules of Procedures and Conduct of Business of the National Assembly 2007 (NA, Rule

205).

5.3.2 Sub-Committees of 13th

PAC

Out of four (04) sub-committees constituted by 13th

PAC, the first Monitoring and

implementation committee convened by Dr. Azra Fazal Pachuho, MNA with three other

members on January 13, 2009 was given the time span of six (06) months to review

65

compliance on Actionable Points but the committee never meet for a single time when

the task was assigned to Mrs. Yaseem Rehman, MNA (PAC, 2011. 2010).

5.3.3 The Monitoring & Implementation Committee (MIC) Convened by Mrs.

Yasmeen Rehman, MNA reported

The Committee held a total of sixty (60) meetings and examined sixty six (66) Grants and

1678 Audit Paras in its two (02) reports for the years 2010 and 2011 (PAC, 2011:V-VI

(2010) and 2011). The report contained Paras discussed during the Calendar year 2010

and 2011 and Actionable Points of this committee (National Assembly of Pakistan,

2011b). The performance of MIC is depicted at Figure 5.2 as given below.

Figure 5.2. Performance of MIC

The Committee formulated a strategic plan to make it more effective, meaningful and

purposeful. The salient points include:-

To name Committee as the Monitoring & Implementation Committee of PAC

To review the compliance of nine years PAC Reports for the years 2005-2006,

2000-2001, 1999-2000, 1996-1997, 1995-1996, 1988-1989, 1987-1988, 1986-

1987, 1985-1986

To direct the Principal Accounting Officers (PAOs) to ensure their presence in the

meetings of this Committee

24 36 60 58 8 66

928

750

1678

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2010 2011 Total

Meetings Grants Audit Paras

66

To call the concerned agencies (NAB, FIA, Police) to attend the meetings and

respond on the Audit Paras of any Ministry/Division/Department which are

already under their investigation

To direct all the ministries to submit lists of the Audit Paras which are under

investigation by NAB/FIA/Police.

To directed each Ministry/Division/Department to nominate a focal person for

NAB/FIA/Police cases to enhance speedy communication on such issues

To ensure recoveries be made from the defaulting Ex-Parliamentarians and

Government Officers/Officials well in time

5.3.4 Implementation on Directives of MIC on Suo-Moto Actions

The Directives issued by MIC on Suo-Moto Actions were implemented in a number of

cases; In case of misbehaviour of Secretary Communication to a Members of Parliament,

the Secretary apologized before the Committee (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b).

The FBR has instituted an inquiry to look the issue of missing of 2500 containers from

Karachi without payment of duty & taxes by FBR (National Assembly of Pakistan,

2011b). The Secretary railway was transferred from his position on non-compliance of

PAC Directive and non-cooperation to Audit Department on Robbery of Pakistan

Railways scraps material case, Concerned agencies like NAB/FIA/Police were called in

relation to every Ministry where the Audit Paras are under investigation (National

Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b). Special Audit of PTA was in Process because of

Committee’s instructions to Auditor General (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b).

Focal persons for NAB and FIA cases have been nominated in all

Ministries/Divisions/Departments and import of diesel oil in the garb of lube oil by the

FBR were implemented.

5.3.5 The Special PAC-II Convened by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, Reported

This Committee examined Audit Reports for the years 1990-91, 1992-93, and 2001-02

(National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-02). The committee constituted on

June 1, 2010 and meet for 45 days (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-

02).

67

The Committee as a whole reviewed a total of Five Hundred and Forty Three (543)

grants and a total of Three Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty five (3745) Audit Paras to

complete its three reports (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-02).

In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1990-91, the committee

reviewed One Hundred Ninety Seven (197) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011,

V-III (2001-02), 2011, V-I (1990-91). The committee took up a total of Twelve Hundred

and Eighty Five (1285) Audit Paras.

Figure 5.3. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA

In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1992-93, the committee

reviewed One Hundred Ninety (190) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-II

(1992-93). The committee took up a total of Fourteen Hundred and Sixty Six (1466)

Audit Paras.

In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 2001-02, the committee

reviewed one hundred and fifty six (156) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011,

V-III (2001-02). The committee took up a total of Nine Hundred and Ninety Four (994)

Audit Paras. The details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, are

depicted at Figure 5.3.

197 190 156

543

1285 1466

994

3745

45 45 45 135

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

1990-91 1992-93 2001-02 Total of Three Years

Number of Grants Audit Paras No of Meetings

68

5.3.6 Special Committee III Convened by Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA,

Reported

This Committee examined Audit Reports for the years 1994-95 and 1997-98 (National

Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV (1994-95). The committee constituted on June 1, 2010

and meet for sixty five (65) days to complete its reports (National Assembly of Pakistan,

2011, V-IV (1994-95).

The Committee as a whole reviewed a total of Three Hundred and Forty Eight (348)

grants and a total of Two Thousand Six Hundred and Forty Two (2642) Audit Paras to

complete its three reports (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV (1994-95).

In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the years 1994-95, the committee

received a total of One Hundred Eighty Six (186) grants and Three Hundred and Nine

(309) paras of which Fifty Six (56) paras and two (02) grants were referred to Monitoring

and Implementation Committee of PAC (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV

(1994-95).

In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1997-98, the committee

received a total of One Hundred Sixty Six (166) grants and Two Thousand, Four

Hundred and Forty Five (2445) paras of which Fifty Six (56) paras and two (02) grants

were referred to Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC (National Assembly

of Pakistan, 2011, V-V (1997-98). During the course of completion of report the

committee meets for 65 days (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-V (1997-98). The

details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA, are depicted

at Figure 5.4.

5.4 Backlog

Backlog in PAC, are the pending Audit Reports of previous years need to be reviewed by

the committee.

69

5.4.1 Total Backlog Inherited

The 12th

PAC inherited a backlog of nine years Audit Reports (PAC, 2007 b). While, the

13th

PAC inherited a backlog of twelve (12) years Audit Reports containing more than

24000 audit paras to deal with (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011 (2008-09) as is

depicted in Figure 5.5.

Figure 5.4. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA

5.4.2 Total backlog dealt with

The 12th

PAC dealt with only a Backlog of two (02) years for the years 1995-96 and 200-

2001 as is depicted in Figure 5.5. Its other report were still pending, the moment

government dissolved and the backlog was shifted to 13th

PAC as per the Rules of

procedures and Conduct of Business 2007 of the National Assembly (NA, Rule 205).

The 13th

PAC inherited a backlog of 12 years. The committee devised its strategy to deal

with this big backlog and constituted three sub-committees of four to five members

assigning them separate years of pending paras to review. The 12th

PAC dealt with a

backlog of nine (09) years as is depicted in Figure 5.5.

184 164 348

2 2 4 253

2389 2642

56 56 112 65 65 130

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

1994-95 1997-98 Total of Three Years

Number of Grants Reviewed Number of Grants Referred to MIC

Number of Audit Paras Number of Audit Paras Referred to MIC

No of Meetings

70

Figure 5.5. Backlog Status

5.4.3 Reports Examined, laid in the house and debated upon

The Audit Reports which are referred to PAC by the National Assembly are examined by

PAC, the final reports of PAC are laid back in the National Assembly for a debate.

5.4.3.1 Reports Examined by 12th

PAC

The 12th

PAC finalized a total of Two (02) Audit Reports for the Years 1995-96 and

2000-01. The 12th

PAC laid these reports on the floor of the house but none of them was

debated see Figure 5.6.

5.4.3.2 Reports Examined by 13th

PAC

The 13th

PAC examined a total of nine (09) Audit Reports for the years 1990-91, 1991-

92, 1992-93, 1994-95, 1997-98, 2001-02, 2005-06, 2008-09 and 2010. The 13th

PAC laid

all the nine reports on the floor of the house but only one report was debated upon see

Figure 5.6.

Figure 5.6. General Comparison of 12th & 13th PAC

9 12

2

9

0

10

20

12th 13th

Backlog Inherted Backlog Dealt With

1 1 2 3 6 9 170 186 356 370 1162 1532

6308

1069

7377

3038

6697

9735

86 72 158 56 282 338 0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

Main PAC Sub-Committees Total Main PAC Sub-Committees Total

12th PAC 13th PAC

Audit Reports Examined Total Grants Examined Paras Discussed Meeting Held

71

5.5 Number of PAC meetings held/ Sub-Committees

PAC is the most active Standing Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan.

During the recent two governments, the PAC remained very active and efficient to clear

big backlogs and workloads.

The 12th

PAC meets for a total of eighty six (86) days in its four years term. While it’s

Sub-Committees meet for seventy two (72) days making a total of one hundred and fifty

eight (158) days see Figure 5.6.

The 13th

PAC meets for a total of fifty six (56) days in the last four years. While its Sub-

Committees meet for two hundred and eighty two (282) days making a total of three

hundred and thirty eight (338) days see Figure 5.6.

5.6 Role of Chair

The position of the Chair of the PAC requires a very active and technical person with

prior experience of financial oversight and accountability. In an interview for this study,

Rizvi (2012) said the chairman of the PAC should have a balanced approach, having no

political biasness, must be up straight and honest to his job and most importantly have a

high level of integrity. Same views were expressed by Rehman (2011), she said that

Chair must be a very neutral person, nonpartisan and perform his duties honestly. She

also said that Chairman should behave in an integral manner, being equal to all as he is

the Guardian of the State Exchequer. Fatyana (2011) said the role of the Chairman should

be very transparent and he must be a courageous, decisive, bold, impartial and

importantly the most senior opposition party parliamentarian.

5.6.1 Malik Allah Yar Khan, Chairman, 12th

PAC

The 12th

PAC was chaired by Malik Allah Yar Khan (NA-58, Attock-II, Punjab, PML)

who was a very noble person, wise and a simple Parliamentarian. The survey result

showed he was a very regular to PAC meeting and attended 93 per cent of the total

meeting. However, under his Chairmanship PAC scrutiny speed of budget

statements/appropriation Accounts/grants was very slow. A minimum of 41 per cent of

the respondents responded somehow sufficient while another 59 per cent of the

72

respondents said the scrutiny speed was insufficient as it was required to clear the

backlog. While talking about the quality of clearance, the 12th

PAC meets for 54 per cent

more than the 13th

PAC but it recovered only Rs. 100 Million, it produced only two audit

reports, it took a few sou-moto actions on the issues of Stock Exchange Crisis-2005 and

Suger Crisis-2006. Under his chairmanship, members were reluctant to financial

oversight. The whole process was a formality. The Government seemed involved in

influencing the PAC operations and the relationship between PAC and AG was not much

strong. The Chairman seemed less acquainted with the international oversight practices,

even a member of that period said the Chair was not well aware of the functions and

powers of PAC provided by the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the

National Assembly. A media person who use to observe the proceedings of 12th

PAC

while showing his dissatisfaction said that a moment there was some worse things from

PAOs or AG, he used to say “hum to gee aap k huq main dua her ker sakty hainn” mean

he can do nothing but to pray for their rightful or good. Only 35 per cent of the

respondents seemed satisfactory of his leadership qualities. Out of the 19 Excess Budget

Grants examined for the years 2000-01, 17 were regulated and only two differed.

5.6.2 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman, 13th

PAC

The 13th

PAC was chaired by Ch. Nisar Ali Khan (NA-53, Rawalpindi-IV, Punjab, PML-

N). Ch. Nisar is regarded as a very active, vibrant and a man with prior PAC experience.

He has already served six (06) PACs and was the most senior opposition party

parliamentarian, ideally considered the best man during the 13th

PAC period for this job.

Under Charter of Democracy, it was decided that chairman of the PAC would be the

Leader of the Opposition. The practice was for the first time adopted in Pakistan which

proved so effective, 100 per cent of the respondent showed their satisfaction.

Ch. Nisar Ali was very regular to PAC meetings he attend 80 per cent of committee

meetings during his chairmanship. When asked about confidence in chair 75 per cent of

the respondents believed in his leadership. However, under his chairmanship PAC

scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriation Accounts/grants remained very fast. A

minimum of 61 per cent responded sufficient while another 39 per cent of the

respondents said the scrutiny speed was somehow sufficient as it was required to clear the

73

backlog. He made a best use of Special Committees he constituted to clear the backlog.

While talking about the quality of clearance, the 13th

PAC meets for 54 per cent less than

the 12th

PAC but it recovered Rs. 115 Billion (See Annex-VI) as compared to only 100

million recovered by the 12th

PAC. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, however, took many suo-moto

notices on the issues of public important such as alleged corruption in EOBI, under

precedent price hike of oil and gas, CDA projects, Military Land Act 1937 (A-1 Land

issue), Purchase and misuse of vehicles by government departments, Missing of record of

allotments of plots, written off of loans during last 8 years and disregard of rules,

procedures and regulation for their award, irregular appointments by various departments,

Illegal occupation of Railways land by forces, allotment of railways land to Royal Palm

Club, Hajj Scandal, National Assembly/Senate Co-operative Housing Society Scam,

Land Scam of CDA land allotments, irregular payments of Steel Mill for housing

allowances, un-authorized occupation of Government accommodations and sale of

Embassy Building in Tokyo. He also took notice of certain public complaints and media

issues. He was a good team leader and had a good control over the committee room. The

direct observation of the PAC proceeding show that Ch. Nisar had a hand on experience

and knowledge of PAC mandate, international practices and PAC powers. As it was

observed in PAC functioning during his tenure, he seemed applying every best practice of

the Commonwealth and other non-commonwealth countries rather some practices like

suo-moto which are rare in the world, remained a business of PAC remained a working

practice during his period. Generally, a big number of Members felt comfortable in

working with him from different parties. Rehman (2012) said she learned a lot from his

chairmanship and wished him to re-take the charge of his position. She also said that if he

has not resigned, till now, PAC would have dealt with the remaining backlog. She also

told that he trusted all of the members and always agreed with what other members

suggest him. Rizvi (2012) said that Ch. Nisar Ali enjoyed a full monopoly over the rest of

members. He never cares for any consensus of members and his decisions were a single

man decisions.

Ch. Nisar Ali also abolished Special Committees of PAC without any consensus of other

members, it was observed (Ahmed 2012). The Special Committees were a good tool to

74

clear backlog. The abolishing of Special Committees was a start of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan’s

reverse role for PAC, finally the resignation.

General public shared their novel experiences of Ch. Nisar period. A media person said

he had excellent auditing skill and can easily judge gaps or discrepancies of a paras.

Many people expressed that he is the one who can force PAOs to implement PAC

directives and was a man of courage who can take actions. But his resignation raised very

critical questions, if he has been chairing, despite there have been no action, no

recoveries but at least he would have done one good thing to this nation and the state of

clearing big backlog which was absolute to be finished during his period. Such backlog

gives nothing but waste PAC time and resources further diverts PAC attention from the

undated bad governance issues. Even worse of all, the entire backlog is keeping PAC

restricted to discuss ongoing projects, to work on concepts like value for money and

performance auditing.

Ch. Nisar Ali, as a chairman PAC has played very effective role. He pays special

attention to public complaints sent to the PAC, the practice has become a convention of

PAC. He is regarded bold in taking individual decision of National Interest. He has good

grip on accountability. While, being a leader of the opposition, he has a counter check on

the government.

5.7 PAC Wing Capacity

PAC wing capacity comparatively remained the same during both periods. It most of the

time depended on the formation of Sub-Committees and staff was provided according to

the requirements. The 13th

PAC had a total staff of thirty four (34). Whereas ten (10) of

them are officials of BPS-17 and the rest of the twenty four (24) are officers of BPS-16 or

below. The survey results showed a minimum of 30per cent of the respondents seemed

satisfied with the committee staff to support PAC during the 12th

PAC while 22.7per cent

found satisfied during the 13th

PAC. Another 40.9per cent of respondent were somehow

satisfied during the 13th

PAC. However, 70.0 per cent of respondent were dissatisfied

with the staff available to support the committee during 12th

PAC and 36.4 per cent were

of the same view during the 13th

PAC. Across the tenure of both PACs in this study, 25.0

75

per cent asked the staff was sufficient, 28.1 per cent said that the staff was somehow

sufficient and 46.9 per cent said the staff as a whole was insufficient to support the PAC.

Talking about the research capacity of PAC secretariat, only 10.0 per cent of the

respondent seemed satisfied with the research facility provided to PAC members during

12th

PAC. A majority of 90.0 per cent respondent grieved that there was no such facility

available. While responding to the same question for the 13th

PAC, 22.7 per cent

responded the research facility was sufficient, 4.5 per cent found it somehow and 72.7 per

cent experienced the research facility as insufficient. Overall 18.8 per cent of the

respondents believe it was sufficient, 3.1 per cent argued the facility was somehow

provided while 78.1 per cent across both the eras lacked any research availability to

perform their job effectively. It was noted that there were no special researchers available

for PAC to help members prepare for meeting.

The response to the question of provision of independent technical expertise and research

support to Members for hearings during the 12th

PAC remained largely negative 10.0 per

cent saying not important while 90.0 per cent saying not applicable at all. However,

during the 13th

PAC period it somehow improves 36.4 per cent saying very important, 4.5

per cent saying somehow important, 22.7 per cent saying not important while 36.4 per

cent saying the practice is still not applicable. Jointly talking about both PAC periods

25.0 per cent responded saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important,

18.8 per cent saying not important while 53.1 per cent saying the practice was not

applicable.

Although during the 13th

PAC period survey results say the provision of research and

technical expertise was somehow important in practice there was no such facility.

Members study the Audit Briefs and Ministries replies during the meeting which were

less fruitful. Moreover, few of the PAC staff had good audit skill to technically find faults

in audit briefs and to set PAC meeting agenda at PAC Secretariat. PAC staff found very

hard working, industrious, dedicated and experienced and can fruitfully contribute to a

successful PAC if it is utilized properly.

76

5.8 Role of Audit Department for PAC

The Audit Department has a key role as a major source of information to PAC for its

operations (McGee, 2002). However, the role of AG for PAC is very much dependant on

the role of Chairman of PAC. During the periods of less effective Chairman like Malik

Allah Yar Khan, the role of AG remained less effective, while during the Chairmanship

of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan the AG played a very active role.

The role of AG during the 12th

PAC was more a routine and smooth. AG enjoyed a

monopoly over the agenda setting and leading PAC on its desired path. Along with the

Chairman, the members were also less experienced and less active to understand and

judge the bureaucratic tactics of AG and the PAOs. The 12th

PAC held more meetings

than the 13th

PAC excluding the sub-committees meetings which were more during 13th

PAC, the performance of 12th

PAC remained restricted to bureaucratic tactics of AG

along with the political posturing, bureaucratic inefficiency and years of backlog. The

effectiveness of AG speaks its volume in the reports of the 12th

PAC. In a single sitting of

12th

PAC for the report of the year 1995-96, 180 paras were settled for ministry of

Information Technology and Telecom Division (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2007).

The AG in routine give short details of the paras under discussion, the members were

never briefed of the condition, criteria, cause, effect, conclusion and recommendations of

the bad governance in certain cases rather AG always aimed at getting through the

weakest paras of small amounts before the committee.

During the 13th

PAC period, the role of AG for PAC remained effective because of the

effective role of Chairman and the Members. The Monitoring and Implementation

Committee of the 13th

PAC played an effective role to control the monopoly of AG over

PAC operations. The committee focused more on compliance and frequently asked for

compliance reports. As a result, AG established Compliance Cells at Federal and

Provincial Levels for full compliance of PACs directives. Moreover, the 13th

PAC

established three (03) special committees and the main committee called frequent

meetings and AG was required to respond to these meetings. It required a lot of home

77

work of AG office to support these meetings. The AG office managed to hold DAC, pre-

PAC at AG office, preparing of Audit Briefs and to attend PAC meetings was a

burdensome for AG office to deal with nine (09) year backlog. The PAC members and

staff showed their confident in AG successfully accomplishing all tasks of PAC. The

services of AG were also acknowledged when Prime Minister of Pakistan, Chairman

PAC and a couple of Members visited AG office and appreciated its efforts and services

to parliamentary oversight of federal funding.

Till 12th

PAC, actionable points were sent to concerned DGs for vetting that take time,

actionable points were delayed as long as three months period and in most of the cases

these actionable points were sent back with no changes. These delaying tactics were

checked by a senior officer of AG office who himself took the initiative and started

vetting actionable points himself during the 13th

PAC period (Ahmed 2012).

The AG always had tried to limit the operations of PAC to the minimum and to exert its

pressure through different tactics to maintain its monopoly (Ahmed 2012). The tactics

normally played by AG include sending Audit Briefs late to PAC Secretariat, big role of

AG in un-highlighting of valuable paras and expert presentation skills of presenting facts

in a way things go unnoticed to members.

5.9 Number of issues other than audit reports dealt with

Both PACs are observed dealing with issues of public importance other than the issues

that appeared in the Audit Reports.

5.9.1 Issues other than audit reports dealt with by 12th

PAC

The 12th

PAC took notice of issues of Public importance

5.9.1.1 Stock Exchange Crisis-2005

The PAC noticed all the stakeholders majorly the chairman and MGs of three Stock

exchanges, Chairman, SECP and the Representative from Investment department of

Ministry of Finance to brief the Committee about the crisis. The Secretary SECP, briefed

the PAC that the reason behind the market decline was the deliberate manipulation that

78

need a probing. It was also revealed that the down fall in the index was due to substantial

decline in share prices of OGDC, PTCL, PSO, POL, NBP and PPL. The push reported

was OGDC 44 per cent, PTCL 15 per cent, PSO 3 per cent, POL 2 per cent and NBP 4

per cent (PAC, 2007. 2000-01)

The PAC suggested that the proposed task force will determine the factors that caused

crash identifying the persons and institutions responsible. The PAC seems eager to take

action against the accused persons found involved in malpractices.

The PAC directed that the matter should be submitted to the standing committee on

Finance and revenue for further deliberations (PAC, 2007. 2000-01). The PAC also

directed SECP to revisit its rules and procedure to avoid such happening in future (PAC,

2007. 2000-01).

5.9.1.2 Sugar Crisis-2006

The PAC took up the Sugar crisis prevailing in 2006. The Secretary, Ministry of Food,

Agriculture and Livestock briefed the PAC that the consecutive decline in Sugar can

yield of about 12 per cent in 2004-05 and 6 per cent in 2005-06 was the main reason. The

yield of sugar cane in 2005-06 was about 48.8 million tons, whereas on average its yield

remained 47.6 million tons between 1996-2006 (National Assembly Secretariat, 2007.

2000-01).

Secondly, the rapid increase in Sugar prices in local as well as in International market has

sprouted the crisis. The other reasons attributed to the Sugar prices in Pakistan include

increase in ex-mill price aligned with import parity, increase in raw material by 40 per

cent, reluctant importers.

The PAC observed that Economic Coordination Committee-ECC allowed mill owners to

import duty free sugar and 20 owners imported 400,000 tons duty free raw sugar., after

purification, it casted Rs 21022 per kg that can be easily sold on market price. While, the

Millers sold this sugar at a price exceeding Rs. 42 per kg and use to pay tax at control rate

of Rs. 29 per kg, violating ECC decision.

79

5.9.2 Issues other than audit reports dealt with by 13th

PAC

The 13th

PAC remained very active in taking notice of issues of Public importance.

Besides examination of Auditor General‘s Reports, the 13th

PAC took notice of issues of

public importance pertaining to following Ministries/Division:-

Missing of files/record regarding allotment of Plots/Flats (M/o Housing and

Works)

Purchase and misuse of vehicles by Government Departments

Written off loans during last 8 years and disregard of procedure, rules and

regulation for awarding of loans by the commercial Banks/National Bank of

Pakistan, including under Saeban Loan Scheme

Irregular Appointment of Consultants by various organizations

Misuse of Military Land Act 1937 (A-1 Land issues)

Land Scams regarding CDA allotment of Plots/Encroachment etc

Hajj arrangements for Pakistan Pilgrims in Makkah & Madina in 2010

Reported sale of Pakistan Embassy building Tokyo, Japan in 2007 on a

throwaway price

Un-authorized occupation of Government accommodation

Irregular payment in Steel Mills of House Rent Allowance in addition to

provision of official accommodation

Alleged corruption in EOBI

Unprecedented price hike of Oil and Gas

Construction of Islamabad Expressway and installation of five overhead bridges

Pakistan Railway Land under illegal occupation of Army/Rangers/Janbaz force

etc.

Allotment of Railway land to Royal Palm Club

National Assembly/ Senate Co-operative Housing Society Scam

80

5.10 Excess Budget Statements Examined

5.10.1 Excess Budget Statements examined by 12th

PAC

The 12th

PAC examined a total of fifty four (54) excess grants for its two reports for the

years 1995-96 and 2000-2001 see Figure 5.7. The Committee successfully regulated sixty

three (63) per cent, a total of thirty four (34) excess grants during its entire period of

functioning. The Committee also regulated another thirteen (13) per cent, a total of seven

(07) excess grants subject to verification of figures by the Audit Department. However,

the Committee differed twenty four (24) per cent, a total of thirteen (13) excess demands

as is depicted at Figure 5.7.

The 12th

PAC as a whole for its two (02) reports regulated a total of Rs.

121,770,163,750/- and regulated another sum of Rs. 101,418,692/- subject to

reconciliation of figures from Audit Department and differed a total amount of Rs.

4,152,085,486/-.

Figure 5.7. Excess Budget Statements examined by 12th PAC

5.10.1.1 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2000-2001

Out of nineteen (19) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 12th PAC for the

year 2000-2001, the Committee regulated sixty eight (68) per cent, a total of thirteen (13)

excess grants see Figure 5.7. The Committee also regulated twenty one (21) per cent, a

19

35

54

13 21

34

4 3 7 2

11 13

0

20

40

60

Main PAC (2000-01) Sub-Committee (1995-96) Total of 12th PAC

Total Excess Grants Examined

Total Excess Grants Regulated

Total Excess Grants Regulated Subject to Verification of Audit Dept.

Total Excess Grants Differed

81

sum of four (04) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. On the other

hand, the Committee differed eleven (11) per cent, making a total of two (02) excess

grants. The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 83,720,275,327/- against thirteen (13)

excess grants of seven (07) ministries including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of

Commerce, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of Information

Technology & Telecommunication, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs & Northern Areas,

Finance Division and Economic Affairs Division. The Committee also regulated a total

amount of Rs. 81,951,700/-, subject to verification of figures by the Audit Department for

another for (04) excess grants for three (03) ministries including the Ministry of

Commerce, Kashmir Affairs & Northern Areas Division and State & Frontier Regions

Division. While it differed a total amount of Rs. 3,246,530,526/-, against two (02) excess

grants demanded by two (02) ministries including the Ministry of Pakistan Railways and

the Ministry of State and Frontier Regions.

5.10.1.2 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1995-96

The report for the year 1995-96, reviewed by Sub-Committee Convened by Mr. Riaz

Fatyana, MNA, regulated sixty (60) per cent, making a total of twenty one (21) excess

grants from a total thirty five (35) excess grants examined see Figure 5.7. The Committee

also regulated another nine (09) per cent, making a total of three (03) excess grants

subject to verification of Audit Department. However, this Committee differed twenty

nine (29) of per cent, making a total eleven (11) excess grants. The Committee regulated

a total of Rs. 38,049,888,423/- against twenty one (21) excess grants for twelve (12)

ministries including the Ministry of Culture Sports and Tourism, Ministry of Defence,

Economic Affairs Division, Election Commission of Pakistan, Ministry of Environment,

Finance Division, Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas-KANA Division,

Ministry of Railways and SAFRAN Division. The Committee also regulated another

amount of Rs. 1,946,699/-, subject to verification of figures from the Audit Department

for three departments including Housing & Works, Interior and Population Welfare

Division. While, the Committee differed a total amount of Rs. 905,554,960/- against

eleven (11) grants demanded by six (06) ministries including Commerce Division,

82

Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,

Ministry of Labour & Manpower, SAFRAN Division and Ministry of Social Welfare &

Special Education.

5.10.2 Excess Budget Statements examined by 13th

PAC

The 13th

PAC reviewed a total of four hundred and thirty six (436) excess grants during

the examination of its nine (09) reports. The Committee successfully regulated ninety

(90) per cent, a total of three hundred and ninety one (391) excess grants see Figure 5.8.

Another seven (07) per cent of excess grants, making a total of thirty (30) excess grants

were recommended to be regulated subject to verification of record by Audit Department

which is very likely. However, the 13th

PAC differed three (03) per cent of excess grants,

making a total of fifteen (15) excess grants as is depicted at Figure 5.8.

The 13th

PAC as a whole for its eight reports regulated a total of Rs. 280,337,016,700/-

and regulated another sum of Rs. 30,580,047,216/- subject to reconciliation of figures

from Audit Department and differed an amount of Rs. 224,043,621,257/-.

5.10.2.1 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1991-1992

Out of eighty seven (87) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC for

the year 1991-1992, the Committee regulated seventy seven (77) per cent, a total of sixty

seven (67) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated fifteen (15) per

cent, a sum of thirteen (13) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.

Although, the Committee differed eight (08) per cent, making a total of seven (07) excess

grants.

The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 22,465,163,445/- against sixty seven (67) excess

grants demanded by twenty six (26) ministries including Ministry of Interior, Ministry of

Education, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Federal Board of Revenues,

Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Ports & Shipping, Ministry of Food,

Agriculture and Livestock, Wafaqi Mohtasib, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of

Commerce, Cabinet Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry

of Housing & Works, Ministry of States & Frontier Regions, Ministry of Industries &

83

Production, Special Education & Social Welfare Division, Ministry of Culture, Ministry

of Kashmir & Northern Affairs, Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development,

Establishment Division, Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Environment, Ministry

of Population Welfare, Prime Minister Secretariat and Planning & Development

Division.

The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 4,391,480,534 /-, subject to

verification of figures by the Audit Department against thirteen (13) excess grants for six

(06) ministries including the Ministry of Water & Power, Ministry of Labour, Manpower

& Overseas Pakistanis, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Religious

Affairs & Minorities Affairs, Ministry of Labour & Manpower. While it differed a total

amount of Rs. 1,813,385,337/-, against seven (07) excess grants demanded by for (04)

ministries including the Ministry of Water & Power, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of

States & Frontier Regions and Ministry of Railways.

5.10.2.2 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2005-06

Out of seventy two (72) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC for

the year 2005-06, the Committee regulated ninety three (93) per cent, a total of sixty

seven (67) excess grants see Figure 5.8. However, the Committee differed seven (07) per

cent, making a total of five (05) excess grants.

The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 19,205,310,742/- against sixty seven (67) excess

grants demanded by thirty seven (37) ministries including the Ministry of Commerce,

Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs, Ministry of Defence,

Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Education, Establishment Division, Ministry of

Environment, Civil Secretariat, Federal Board of Revenue, Federal Tax Ombudsman

Secretariat, Finance Division, Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry of

Industries, Production and Special Initiatives, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,

Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications, Ministry of Interior,

Board of Investment, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry of

Labour and Manpower, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Ministry

84

of Minorities Affairs, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Planning and

Development Division, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Science and Technology,

Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education, Ministry of States and Frontier

Regions, Statistics Division, Ministry of Textile Industry, Ministry of Tourism, Wafaqi

Mohtasib Secretariat and Ministry of Water and Power.

While the committee differed a total amount of Rs. 24,403,185,812/-, against five (05)

excess grants demanded by five (05) ministries including the Ministry of

Communications, Economic Affairs Division, Earthquake Reconstruction and

Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA), Postal Services and Supreme Court of Pakistan.

5.10.2.3 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2008-09

Out of fifty seven (57) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC for

the year 2008-09, the Committee regulated eighty four (84) per cent, a total of forty eight

(48) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated fourteen (14) per cent, a

sum of eight (08) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. However, the

Committee differed two (02) per cent, making a total of one (01) excess grants.

The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 197,187,406,880/- against forty eight (48) excess

grants demanded by twenty seven (27) ministries including the Ministry of

Communications, Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Defence, Ministry

of Education, Establishment Division, Federal Board of Revenue, Federal Tax

Ombudsman Secretariat, Finance Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of

Industries & Production, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior,

Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas,

Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources,

Planning and Development Division, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Science and

Technology, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Statistics Division, Ministry of

Textile Industry, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Pakistan

Atomic Energy Commission, National Accountability Bureau and Ministry of Overseas

Pakistanis.

85

Figure 5.8. Excess Budget Statements examined by 13th PAC

87 72 57

216

66 54 35

155

49 16

65

436

67 67 48

182

64 47 33

144

49 16

65

391

7 5 1 13 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 15 13 0 8 21 2 5 2 9 0 0 0 30

174 144 114

432

132 108 70

310

98 32

130

872

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1991-92 2005-06 2008-09 Total 1990-91 1992-93 2001-02 Total 1994-95 1997-98 Total GrandTotal

Main PAC Special PAC-II Special PAC-III Total of13th PAC

Total Excess Grants Examined

Total Excess Grants Regulated

Total Excess Grants Differed

Total Excess Grants Regulated Subject to Verification of Audit Dept.

Grand Total

86

The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 25,670,336,632/-, subject to

verification of figures by the Audit Department against eight (08) excess grants for only

five (05) ministries including the Ministry of Food & Agriculture Economic Affairs

Division, Establishment Division, FATA Secretariat and Social Welfare and Special

Education.. While it differed a total amount of Rs. 197,187,406,880/- against one (01)

excess grants demanded by Ministry of Postal Services.

5.10.2.4 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1990-91

Out of sixty six (66) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for the

year 1990-91, the Committee regulated ninety seven (97) per cent, a total of sixty four

(64) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated three (03) per cent, a

sum of two (02) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.

The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 7,985,797,173/- against sixty four (64) excess

grants demanded by twenty for (24) ministries including the Ministry of

Communications, Central Board of Revenue, Civil Secretariat (FATA), Ministry of

Commerce, Council of Islamic Ideology, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs,

Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Establishment Division, Finance Division,

Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of

Health, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry of Industries & Production, Ministry of

Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and

Northern Areas, Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Ministry of Population Welfar,

Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minorities

Affairs, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Ministry of Social Welfare and Special

Education, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat and Ministry of Water and Power.

The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 78,135,866 /-, subject to verification

of figures by the Audit Department against two (02) excess grants for the Ministry of

Health and Economic Affairs Division.

87

5.10.2.5 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1992-93

Out of fifty four (54) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for the

year 1992-93, the Committee regulated eighty seven (87) per cent, a total of forty seven

(47) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated nine (09) per cent, a sum

of five (05) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. However, the

Committee differed four (04) per cent, making a total of two (02) excess grants.

The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 8,070,578,131/- against forty seven (47) excess

grants demanded by twenty four (24) ministries including the Ministry of Cabinet

Division, Central Board of Revenue, Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ministry of

Tourism, Ministry of Defence, Economics Affairs Division, Ministry of Education,

Establishment Division, Civil Secretariat (FATA), Finance Division, Ministry of Food,

Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of

Housing & Works, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior,

Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Labour, Manpower and Overseas

Pakistanis Division, Planning and Development Division, Ministry of Petroleum and

Natural Resources, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of States and Frontier

Regions, Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat

and Ministry of Water and Power.

The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 25,670,336,632/-, subject to

verification of figures by the Audit Department against five (05) excess grants for three

ministries including the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Social

Welfare and Special Education, . However, it differed a total amount of Rs.

197,187,406,880/- against two (02) excess grants demanded by Ministry of

Communications and Ministry of Defence.

5.10.2.6 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2001-02

Out of thirty five (35) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for the

year 2001-02, the Committee regulated ninety four (94) per cent, a total of thirty three

(33) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated six (06) per cent, a sum

of two (02) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.

88

The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 3,326,246,701/- against thirty three (33) excess

grants for only fifteen ministries including the Ministry of Cabinet Division, Ministry of

Commerce, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Food, Agriculture &

Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry of

Industries & Production, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Ministry of

Interior, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry of Labour, Manpower

and Overseas, Ministry of Population Welfare, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Zakat and

Ushr and Ministry of Water and Power.

The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 290,620,020/-, subject to verification

of figures by the Audit Department against two (02) excess grants for the Central Board

of Revenue and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas,

5.10.2.7 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1994-95

Out of forty nine (49) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-III of 13th PAC for the

year 1994-95, the Committee regulated hundred (100) per cent, a total of forty seven

(49) excess grants see Figure 5.8.

The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 5,035,910,874/- for excess grants for twenty one

(21) ministries including Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Sports & Tourism,

Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Local

Government and Rural Development, Economic Affairs Division, FATA Secretariat,

Finance Division, Foreign Affairs Division¸ Ministry of Health, Ministry of Information

& Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Industries and Production, Ministry of

Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas

Pakistanis Division, Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs,

Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Narcotics Control Division,

Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and Ministry of Special Education and Social

Welfare.

89

5.10.2.8 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1997-98

Out of fifty four (16) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-III of 13th PAC for the

year 1997-98, the Committee regulated hundred (100) per cent, a total of sixteen (16)

excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 17,060,602,754/-

against excess grants of thirteen (13) ministries including Ministry of Commerce,

Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of

Local Government and Rural Development, Economic Affairs Division, FATA

Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finance Division, Labour, Manpower and

Overseas Pakistanis Division, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Zakat, Ushr and Minorities

Affairs, Ministry of Postal Services and Ministry of States and Frontier Regions.

5.11 Quality of Clearance

As the PAC in Pakistan during the last many years have been dealing with backlog, the

clearance of backlog remained the main concern. Another aspect of it is that such backlog

diverts the attention of PAC in paying its attention to the misappropriations in the on-

going recent projects. The practical approach could be to deal with selective backlog, the

issue of greater value where big amounts of monies are involved and the chances of more

recoveries. Hence, the quality of clearance stands how wisely one committee deals with

years of backlog considering the importance of time and the work pending.

5.11.1 Number of Audit Paras Discussed

The main committee of the 12th

PAC discussed a total of 6308 audit paras whereas it sub-

committee discussed a total of 1069 audit paras. Hence, the 12th

PAC discussed a total of

7377 audit paras during its tenure as is depicted at Figure 5.9.

The main committee of the 13th

PAC discussed a total of 3038 audit paras, where as its

sub-committees discussed a total of 6697 audit paras making a total of 9735 audit paras

discussed during the 13th

PAC period as is depicted at Figure 5.9.

90

Figure 5.9. Audit Paras Discussed V/S Directives Passed

5.11.2 Directive Passed

The Main PAC of the 12th

PAC passed a total of 967 directives - its sub-committee

passed a total of 456 directives. The 12th

PAC as a whole passed a total of 1423 directives

with a per centage rate of only 19. While, the Main PAC of the 13th

PAC passed a total of

1681 directives, its sub-committee passed a total of 3238 directives. The 13th

PAC as a

whole passed a total of 4919 directives with a per centage rate of 51 as is depicted at

Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.11.

Figure 5.10. Compliance Rate in Per centage

5.11.3 Per centage of directives implemented by institution concerned

The rate of compliance during both 12th

and the 13th

PAC periods remained very low.

During the 12th

PAC, the compliance rate observed at rate of less than 10 per cent while

7377

9735

1423

4919

19 51 0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

12th PAC 13th PAC

Audit Paras Discussed Directives Passed % of Directives Passed

9 14

91 86

0

20

40

60

80

100

12th PAC 13th PAC

% of Directives Implemented % of Action Pending

91

the compliance rate for 13th

PAC little more than 12th

PAC being 14 per cent (AGP

2011). The Compliance rate is depicted at Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11.

Figure 5.11. Quality of Clearance

5.11.4 Per centage of Actions Pending

Assessing the PAC compliance record, it was found that more than 90 per cent of actions

were pending till the point of time 12th

PAC was dissolved. While, on assessing the

reports of the Compliance Cell of Audit Department, on an average 86 per cent of actions

were still pending to the end of 2011 (AGP 2011) as is depicted in Figure 5.10 and Figure

5.11.

5.12 Amount of money saved or recovered

Being the guardians of good governance and financial control over resources, amounts of

money saved or recovered remained the main objective of any PAC.

5.12.1 Recoveries Made by 12th PAC

The 12th

PAC directed recovery amount of Rs 169.775 million out of which a sum of Rs

101.492 million was realized (PAC, 2007. 2000-01).

5.12.2 Recoveries Made by 13th PAC

The efficiency of the PAC in recent years may also be gauged from the fact, the amount

of recoveries made from various Government Organization, which were Rs. 5.12 billion

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

Audit ParasDiscussed

DirectivesPassed

DirectivesImplemented

Rate ofCompliance in

%

ActionPending

12th PAC

13th PAC

92

in 2000-2001 and only Rs.3.93 billion in 2006-07, have gone up to Rs.19.43 billion in the

year 2008-09 and Rs. 24.967 billion in 2009-2010. For the 1st & 2nd quarters, 2010-11

recovery is Rs. 17.723 billion and for the month of January, 2011 only it is Rs. 6.06

billion. Approximately, Rs.115 Billion have been recovered so far as a result of PAC

directives(PAC 2011) (Annex-VI).

5.12.3 Major Areas of Recoveries

Loss due to investment in Stock Exchange in violation of Prime Minister‘s

instructions – Rs 4.14 Billion (M/o Planning and Development)

Un-necessary purchase of LPG plant by OGDCL- Rs. 576 million (M/o

Petroleum and Natural Resources)

Misappropriation of PC poles - Rs. 39.685 million (M/o Water and Power)

Undue advantage of US $. 1244 million allowed to a contractor (M/o Water and

Power)

Non-recovery of standard rent from un-authorized occupants Rs. 83.3 million

(M/o Housing and Works)

Expenditure on account of pay and allowances of work charged establishment of

Pak-PWD in excess of the permissible limit Rs. 160.1 million. (M/o Housing and

Works)

Non-recovery of water charges from the residents Rs. 158.4 million (M/o Housing

and Works)

Non-retrieval of 20,000 acres of land costing – Rs. 100 billion (M/o Housing and

Works) xii

Loss of Rs. 12.742 million on account of short recovery of Railway‘s dues owing

to irregular adjustment of school fund (M/o Railways)

Un-justified procurement of imported vehicles Rs. 16 million (M/o

Communications)

Non-taxation of commission/interest income under normal law Rs. 9.543 million

(Federal Board of Revenues)

Loss of revenue due to non-initiation of timely proceedings Rs. 1,063.543 million

(Federal Board of Revenues)

93

fraudulent drawl of sales tax refund Rs. 20.00 billion (Federal Board of Revenues)

Non/short-realization of sales tax, additional tax and penalty Rs. 1352.088 million

(Federal Board of Revenues)

Inadmissible refund of sales tax Rs. 140.002 million (Federal Board of Revenues)

Loss of potential earning of Rs. 1,889 million due to unnecessary detention of a

Wagon in Heavy Mechanical Complex, Taxila (M/o Railways)

5.13 PAC Meeting out of Parliament Premises

During 12th

PAC, no PAC meeting was held outside parliamentary premises, however,

during the 13th

PAC, the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of the PAC

Convened by Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, held meetings out of Parliament House,

such meetings were held at the department of Capital Development Authority (CDA),

Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) and a couple of meetings at Lahore and

Karachi. Yasmeen Rehman, Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview for this study that

now PAC meetings are open to media and general public and they are doing efforts to

solve entry problem of those interested.

5.14 Average Attendance of Members

On an average the attendance of members during the 12th

PAC remained 10.46 members

per sitting. Normally the 12th

PAC consisted of 18 members. Some of the members

remained members across the tenure, while some came and left the committee after short

time.

While, on an average the attendance of the members during the 13th

PAC remained 10.35

members per sitting. Normally the 13th

PAC consisted of 22 to 23 members. Most of the

members seemed consistent while some attended one are two meetings.

5.14.1 Effective Members

There are many factors in the functioning of a PAC to check the effectiveness of a

member. During both of the committees being observed in this study, on an average

members seemed effective both in term of their participation and contribution in the

quality of clearance. However, a member can be judged on the basis of his or her

94

attendance in the committee meetings, participation in committee debates, membership in

sub-committees and the financial oversight capacity.

5.14.1.1 Members Effectiveness of 12th

PAC

While discussing the effectiveness of members, Malik Allah Yar Khan, Chairman PAC,

remained the most active participant, hence most effective in the main PAC. He attended

a total of eighty (80) meetings out of eighty six (86) meetings held across the committee

tenure with a per centage of ninety three (93) meetings.

Prof. Aasiya Azeem, Member, stood second effective members; she attended seventy one

(71) meeting with a per centage of eighty two (82) meetings. Syed Qurban Ali Shah,

Member, remained the third most effective members, who attended sixty five (65)

meetings, a seventy six (76) per cent of total meeting.

Five (05) members attended 60-75 per cent meetings, seven (07) members attended 40-59

per cent meetings, four (04) members attended 10-39 per cent meetings and one (01)

attended less than 10 per cent meetings. While, Ch. Wajahat Hussain, Member, remained

members of the committee across its tenure but he never attended any single (01)

meeting.

Riaz Fatyana, Member, attended fifty eight (58) meeting of Main PAC. He was also the

Convener of a sub-committee and attended its 72 meeting. Overall he attended 130

Meetings during the 12th

PAC period. He also produced a report of its sub-committee for

the years 1995-96.

5.14.1.2 Effective Members of 13th

PAC

Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, Members, 13th

PAC, remained the most effective members in the

main PAC. She attended fifty four (54) meetings out of fifty six (56) meeting of main

PAC with an attendance of ninety six (96) per cent. She also remained the Convener of

Special Committee-I of PAC and attended its nine (09) meetings. She also attended thirty

seven (37) Meeting of the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC. Hence,

she attended a total of one hundred (100) meetings in all. She also contributed two (02)

reports of the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC. She took six

95

international study tours and represented PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan at

different international forums, workshops and conferences.

Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman and Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, Member, stood second,

each of them attended forty five (45) meetings, making eighty (80) per cent of all

meetings held. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman, being the Leader of the Opposition

remained most effective and active chairman. Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, was also the

Convener of Special Committee-III. He attended its forty five (45) meeting. Hence, he

attended a total of ninety (90) meetings.

Mr. Zahid Hamid, Member, remained third most effective member, who attended forty

three (43) meeting making seventy seven (77) per cent of all meeting held so for 13th

PAC. He was also the Convener of Special Committee-II and attended its fifty four (54)

meetings. Overall, he attended a total of ninety seven (97) meetings.

A total of six (06) members attended 50-75 meetings, another four (04) members

attended 20-49 per cent meetings, five (05) members attended 15-19 per cent meetings

and twelve (12) members attended less than ten (10) per cent meetings. While, ten (10)

members attended less than five (05) meeting, of what three (03) members attended only

two (02) meetings and five (05) members of them attended only a single (01) meeting.

Sardar Ali Muhammad Khan Mahar was the member of 13th

PAC who never attended a

single meeting.

5.15 Performance of Monitoring & Implementation Committee

Performance of any PAC can be measured on the basis of rate of compliance and the

implementation of its directives. Hence, Monitoring and Implementation Committees are

important to measure the output of a committee.

5.15.1 Formation of Implementation Cell

On its constitution during the 6th

Adhoc PAC under H.U. Beg, the Implementation Cell

was merely a correspondence office. The Cell wrote letters to ministries and departments

for compliance on PAC Directives but this correspondence was never taken serious. The

formation of mere Implementation Cell without a Monitoring Committee was naturally

96

less effective. However, it was a start on the way to implementation or compliance of

PAC directives.

5.15.2 Implementation Cell under 12th

PAC

During the 12th

PAC period, Implementation Cell was headed by a Section Officer, but

the operations of Implementation Cell were restrained with an additional assignment of

assisting two sub-committees each headed by Riaz Fatyana, MNA and Kanwar Khalid

Younis, MNA. Due to its work load of two sub-committees, the implementation Cell was

unable to perform its basic functioning. The implementation Cell spent as less as 10 per

cent of its time to implementation follow up and 90 per cent of its time to Sub-

Committees in its effort to clear backlog and preparing audit reports (Shah 2012). The

Staff seems in trouble and the status of Implementation Cell fading while its staff

performing the duties of supporting other committees who were working on clearing

backlog. To perform both duties realizing the importance and sensitivity of

implementation work and the dedication required to clear the backlog was undermining

the importance of Implementation Cell said the officer who was on duty that time. On

making Cell operational, only 10 per cent of implementation work was impossible

depending on the resources and political setup of that time. Overall the Cell, lack any

power to take action to implement PAC directives, he embarked. However, the

compliance rate during the 12th

PAC period was as low as below 5 per cent which was

only because of non-existing of Monitoring and Implementation Committee.

5.15.3 Review Committee of the 13th

PAC

The 13th

PAC on its constitution formed a review committee on 13th

January, 2009 for

period of six (06) month, the review committee was Convened by Dr. Azra Fazal

Pechecho, MNA, to review the compliance of actionable points of PAC (National

Assembly Secretariat, 2010:VI(2010). However, under this committee no meeting was

held till the termination of its period. Hence, no progress was made under this committee

(PAC 2011).

97

5.15.4 Monitoring and Implementation Committee of 13th PAC

On formation of Monitoring and Implementation Committee on 5th October, 2009,

Under the Convenership of Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, the implementation and

compliance process accelerated. The MIC took internal meeting to formulate strategic

plan for an effective follow up and implementation process. The MIC took dozens of suo-

moto actions and most of them were implemented with positive responses as a whole.

MIC, naturally lack authority to give its directive, however, in certain cases it passed

directives which include i) in case of full recovery, the committee settles the audit para,

ii) in case of full compliance, the committee settles the audit para, iii) in case of non-

compliance, the committee deferred the para till next meeting with directions to PAO to

make compliance during the given period.

The MIC made a follow up strategy for an effective compliance, under this strategy, the

MIC or the Implementation Cell wrote regular letters to the ministries for compliance to

certain directives and calls were made. The Compliance Cell of Audit Department also

reported the rate of compliance to MIC on need basis as there were only lists of non-

compliance which was the only performance of these Compliance Cells of Audit

Department. However, the MIC was a sword of domical always hanging over the AG and

Ministries.

The MIC had prepared its two (02) reports; the report for the year 2010 laid before the

National Assembly while the report for the year 2011 is ready to be laid. The MIC held a

total of twenty four (24) meetings, examined fifty eight (58) grants and nine hundred and

twenty eight (928) audit paras (PAC, 2011. V-VI (2010) for its report for the 2010, while

it held a total of thirty six (36) meetings, examined eight (08) grants and seven hundred

and fifty (750) audit paras.

5.16 Impact of Foreign Tours

During both selected PACs periods members and secretariat staff went on different

foreign study tours and benefited a lot out of them. During the 12th

PAC, there were rare

98

study tours. A minimum of 3-4 study tours were noted to be held to different countries

including UK and Canada.

However, the 13th

PAC took a number of study tours to attend international conferences,

briefings or workshops to different courtiers including Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lanka

and UK. The Members and staff who went on these study tours responded that they have

benefited a lot out of these tours. Chan (2012) says that we were able to present our

successes at international forum when we attended a PAC related Conference at Thailand

and got our work acknowledged there which give us confidence and courage to work

more. Rehman (2012) said that she learned the concepts of Value for Money and Audit

Performance only when she attended PAC workshops at UK. However, she told there is

no such idea in our PAC. She also astonished that for the first time she realized that our

compliance rate was very low and we were mere on traditional methods of follow up

when she was told by Britain PAC Chair that they have 90 per cent compliance rate and

they use very modern methods and there was no question of non-compliance. They

further told that 10 per cent non-compliance was reasoned and there were some technical

problems in that said Yasmeen Rehman, a PAC member.

Ahmed (2011) a staff member of PAC and head of MIC who have been on study trips to

Bangladesh and Thailand told that the trips boosted his explore of follow up strategies

and better understanding of PAC operations.

5.17 Donor Assistant

The practice of donor assistant to PAC was rarely noted. The only funding during the

entire selected period of study was received by World Bank of an amount of US 240000

$ during the 12th

PAC period (Shabbir 2012). The funding was purposed to be spent on

four areas including conducting of workshops, study tours of members and staff to

abroad, hiring of consultant and purchase of equipment’s like computers, laptops, printer,

multimedia projectors and other related necessaries.

Under this project, a 2-3 days’ workshop was conducted, two (02) members including the

Chairman Malik Allah Yar Khan went on a study tour and the PAC purchased three (03)

99

laptops, three (03) printers, four (04) desktop computers and one (01) multimedia

projector (Shabbir 2012).

However, due to lack of consensus between PAC and the World Bank on hiring of

consultant, the project was cancelled and the remaining money was returned back. While,

USAID provided with some computers. printers and laptops during 12th

and 13th

PAC

periods (Shabbir 2012).

5.18 IT progress of PAC

There is a proposal of introducing a latest computerized MIS module for the use of PAC,

the programme can enhance the efficiency of the committee. While during the 12th

PAC

period, there was no IT progress except some computers for typing notices for

meetings(Shabbir 2012).

The chapter ahead is based on the perceptions of the respondents to a survey conducted to

assess the performance of PAC during two different governments.

100

Chapter 6

Challenging the Past

6.1 Introduction

A survey was conducted for this study adopting World Bank Institute’s instrument used

in its survey of 51 democracies in 2002 with certain changes suitable to local

parliamentary ambiance. Naturally the present study being comparative one, same

indictors were chosen for assessing both 12th

and 13th

PAC of the National Assembly of

Pakistan. Hence two Questionnaires were used having same indicators but different time

period; one for 12th

PAC and the other for 13th

PAC. The population for these

Questionnaires includes the Members of selected PACs, PAC Secretariat Staff, Auditor

General Office and Media. However, greater importance was given to those members

who served both of the selected PACs like Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA, and Riaz Fatyana,

MNA, staffer who served both PACs and media persons who observed the operations of

both PACs. The Questionnaires were sent to whole population however the response rate

remained 57 per cent.

The questionnaires briefly discuss the structure, powers and practices of PAC during two

selected periods. The responses to the questionnaires describe the performance of two

selected PACs on winning points providing hints to analyse whether these winning points

were according to the PAC mandate and if not? Did the winning PAC put its effort to

institutionalize them?

The chapter is based on the results of the survey Questionnaires distributed to obtain the

perception of the stakeholders of the 12th

and the 13th

PAC. (See Annex-VII for 12th

PAC

and Annex-VIII for 13th

PAC Survey Instruments)

6.1. General Structure of PAC

This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair

of the PAC regarding the general structure of 12th

and 13th

PACs.

101

6.1.1. The best Chair of the PAC

When a question was asked about the best Chair, 20 per cent of the total respondent

during 12th PAC and 18.2 per cent of the total respondent during the 13th PAC

responded that Governing Party Chair was the best one, while, 80 per cent during the

12th PAC and 81.8 per cent during the 13th PAC responded that an Opposition Party

Chair was the best. However, an overall of 18.8 per cent favoured the Governing party

Chair and 81.2 per cent showed their confidence in an Opposition Party Chair during

both the 12th PAC and the 13th PAC. The population and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.1.

Table 6.62. A perception of the respondent about the of the Best Chair of 12th and 13th PAC

Difference Era Governing Party Chair Opposition Party Chair

12th PAC 20.0% 80.0%

13th PAC 18.2% 81.8%

12th & 13th PAC 18.8% 81.2%

6.1.2. The Capacity of the PAC staff

A minimum of 30 per cent of the respondents seemed satisfied with the committee staff

to support PAC during the 12th

PAC while 22.7 per cent found satisfied during the 13th

PAC. Another 40.9 per cent of respondent were somehow satisfied during the 13th

PAC.

However, 70.0 per cent of respondent were dissatisfied with the staff available to support

the committee during 12th

PAC and 36.4 per cent were of the same view during the 13th

PAC. Across the tenure of both PACs under this study, 26.0 per cent asked the staff was

sufficient, 28.1 per cent said that the staff was somehow sufficient and 46.9 per cent said

the staff as a whole was insufficient to support the PAC. The population and response of

the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.2.

102

Table 6.63.Tthe perception of the Capacity of Committee Staff of 12th and 13th PAC

Difference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient

12th PAC 30.0% 0% 70.0%

13th PAC 22.7% 40.9% 36.4%

12th & 13th PAC 25.0% 28.1% 46.9%

6.1.3. Research Facility available

Only 10.0% of the respondent seemed satisfied with the research facility provided to

PAC members during 12th

PAC. A majority of 90.0 per cent respondent grieved that there

was no such facility available. While responding to the same question for the 13th

PAC,

22.7 per cent found the research facility sufficient, 4.5 per cent found it somehow and

72.7 per cent experienced the research facility as insufficient. Overall 18.8 per cent of the

respondents believe it was sufficient, 3.1 per cent argued the facility was somehow

provided while 78.1 per cent across both the eras lacked any research availability to

perform their job effectively. The population and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is

depicted at Figure 6.3.

Table 6.64. Availability of Research Facility

Difference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient

12th PAC 10.0% 0% 90.0%

13th PAC 22.7% 4.5% 72.7%

12th & 13th PAC 18.8% 3.1% 78.1%

6.2. Successes of PAC

This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair

of the PAC regarding the successes of 12th

and 13th

PACs.

103

6.2.1. Government responds to committee recommendations

A minimum of 20.0 per cent of the response to the 12th

PAC was that government

responds favourably to Committee recommendations, 70.0 per cent said government

seldom respond to committee recommendations and 10.0 per cent said that government

never respond at all. In a response to this question for 13th

PAC, 81.8 per cent said

government favourably responds to committee recommendations and 18.2 per cent said it

responds seldom. The overall response for both the governments remained 62.5 per cent

said government respond frequently, 34.4 per cent said seldom and 3.1 per cent said that

govern never favourably responds to PAC recommendations. The population and

response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.4.

Table 6.65. Government Response to Committee Recommendations

Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never

12th PAC 20.0% 70.0% 10.0%

13th PAC 81.8% 18.2% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 34.4% 3.1%

6.2.2 Compliance rate of PACs recommendations

On a question whether government implements committee recommendations, for the 12th

PAC, 30.0 per cent said governments implements on committee recommendations

frequently and 70.0 per cent said it implements seldom. In case of 13th

PAC, 45.5 per

cent said frequently and 54.5 per cent said seldom. In an overall response, 40.6 per cent

said frequently and 59.4 per cent said government seldom implements on PAC

recommendations. The population and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at

Figure 6.5.

104

Table 6.66. Government Implements Committee Recommendations

Difference Era Frequently Seldom

12th PAC 30.0 % 70.0%

13th PAC 45.5% 54.5%

12th & 13th PAC 40.6% 59.4%

6.2.3 Changes in legislation as a result of PAC recommendation

This factor remains seldom across both the PACs. Only a minimum of 10.0 per cent

responded it was frequent for 12th

PAC, 70.0 per cent said it was seldom and 20.0 per

cent said never any changes were adopted as result of committee work. Another very low

rate of 18.2 per cent responded it was frequent during the 13th

PAC, 59.1 per cent

responded seldom and 22.7 per cent responded it was never observed. Jointly for both the

PACs, 15.6 per cent observed such adoption frequently, 62.5 per cent observed seldom

but 21.9 per cent never observed any such change being adopted. The population and

response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.6.

Table 6.67. Institutionalization of practices

Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never

12th PAC 10.0 % 70.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 18.2% 59.1% 22.7%

12th & 13th PAC 15.6% 62.5% 21.9%

6.2.4 Rate of improvements in the integrity of government information or data

bases

Hundred per cent of the respondents for the 12th

PAC said that improvements in the

integrity of government information or data bases were seldom. In case of 13th

PAC, 63.6

105

per cent said such improvements were frequent and 36.4 per cent said it was seldom. The

population and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.7.

Table 6.68. Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases

Difference Era Frequently Seldom

12th PAC 0% 100.0%

13th PAC 63.6% 36.4%

12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 56.2%

6.2.5. Legal action taken against officials who contravene laws

Considering the response rate for the 12th

PAC, 22.2 per cent said that legal action was

frequently taken against officials who contravene laws, 55.6 per cent said that such action

was taken seldom and 22.2 per cent said that such action were never taken. In case of 13th

PAC, 45.5 per cent said frequently but 54.5 per cent said seldom. As a whole, for the two

consecutive governments during 12th PAC and 13th PAC, 38.7 per cent said such action

were taken frequently, 54.8 per cent said seldom and 6.5 per cent said there were no such

action taken. The population and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure

6.8.

Table 6.69. Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws

Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never

12th PAC 22.2% 55.6% 22.2%

13th PAC 45.5% 54.5% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 38.7% 54.8% 6.5%

106

6.2.6 Disciplinary action taken against officials who contravene administrative

guidelines

During the 12th PAC and the 12th

PAC, 20.0 per cent responded that disciplinary action

was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines were frequently

observed while 80.0 per cent said such actions were seldom observed. However, during

the 13th PAC and the 13th

PAC, 59.1 per cent frequently observed such actions to be

taken and 40.9 per cent seldom observed. An overall response for both Governments

remained 46.9 per cent frequently observed, 53.1 per cent seldom observed. However, the

practice was observed. The population and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted

at Figure 6.9.

Table 6.70. Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines

Difference Era Frequently Seldom

20.012th PAC 0% 80.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%

12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%

6.2.7. Resistance to political pressure

Under Musharraf Government, the 12th

PAC, 30.0 per cent of the respondents said the

committee frequently resisted political pressure exerted on it, 50.0 per cent said it seldom

resisted and 20.0 per cent said committee never successfully resisted. While, 59.1 per

cent respondent to the 13th

PAC said during the 13th PAC, PAC successfully resisted to

political pressure if any time it was exerted on it. Another 40.9 per cent said such

resistant was seldom. As a whole for both PACs, 50.0 per cent say that PAC strongly and

successfully resisted to any political pressure exerted on it, 43.8 per cent said it was

seldom but 6.2 per cent said PAC lack capacity to resist political pressure. The population

and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.10.

107

Table 6.71. Resistant to Political Pressure

Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never

12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 40.9% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 43.8% 6.2%

6.2.8. Rate of avoiding facts by Principal Accounting Officers

The survey resulted 70.0 per cent of PAOs were found hiding facts before PAC during

the 12th

PAC but 30.0 per cent responded PAOs were fair and they never hide facts

before the committee. During the 13th

PAC, 54.5 per cent argued PAOs frequently hide

facts, 27.3 per cent said PAOs hide facts seldom but 18.2 per cent showed a full belief in

PAOs saying that they were fair and transparent. The overall survey result showed that

59.4 per cent of the respondents say the PAOs frequently hide facts, 18.8 per cent say

seldom while 21.9 per cent voted in the favouring fair attitude of PAOs. The population

and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.11.

Table 6.72. PAOs found hiding facts

Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never

12th PAC 70.0% 0% 30.0%

13th PAC 54.5% 27.3% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 59.4% 18.8% 21.9%

6.2.9. Adoption of latest oversight developments

During the 12th

PAC, the survey observed that there was a practice of adopting latest

oversight practices but rarely frequent as 30.0 per cent say it but the practice was

observed seldom by 70.0 per cent of the respondents. During the 13th

PAC, latest

108

oversight developments were mostly practiced as 77.3 per cent responded so, another

22.7 per cent said it happens seldom. Jointly for both PACs, 62.5 per cent said it happens

frequently while 37.5 per cent said the practice was seldom. The population and response

of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.12.

Table 6.73. Adoption of latest Financial Oversight Developments

Difference Era Frequently Seldom

12th PAC 30.0% 70.0%

13th PAC 77.3% 22.7%

12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%

6.2.10. Institutionalized of guiding principles

During the 12th

PAC period, 50.0 per cent responded the Committee frequently

institutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective and

rest of the 50.0 per cent said the practice was seldom. While, during the 13th

PAC 72.7

per cent believed the practice was frequent but 27.3 per cent said the practice was

seldom. However, the survey resulted that since 2002-2011, 65.6 per cent believed

practice was frequent but 34.4 per cent believe it was seldom. The population and

response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.13.

Table 6.74. The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles required to meet its objective

Difference Era Frequently Seldom

12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%

13th PAC 72.7% 27.3%

12th & 13th PAC 65.6% 34.4%

109

6.2.11. Adherence to financial control of resources

The survey resulted that there was an adherence to financial control of resources during

12th

PAC but response was 50.0 per cent as frequent and 50.0 per cent as seldom.

However, committee’s adherence to financial control was more frequent as 90.9 per cent

said so while 9.1 per cent said it was seldom. As a whole, 78.1 per cent responded the

practice was frequent but 21.9 per cent believe it was seldom. The population and

response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.14.

Table 6.75. Adherence to financial control of resources

Difference Era Frequently Seldom

12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%

13th PAC 90.9% 9.1%

12th & 13th PAC 78.1% 21.9%

6.2.12. Policy of waste prevention

A total of 30.0 per cent responded the Committee frequently follows the policy of waste

prevention, 50.0 per cent responded the practice was seldom and 20.0 per cent responded

as there was no such practice during the 12th

PAC. The survey resulted there was such

practice during the period of 13th

PAC but 54.5 per cent responded as frequent and 45.5

per cent as seldom. As a whole, 46.9 per cent observed the practice frequently, 46.9 per

cent seldom and 6.2 per cent responded PAC lack such practice during the entire period

under this study. The population and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at

Figure 6.15.

110

Table 6.76. The policy of waste prevention

Difference Era Frequently Seldom Never

12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 54.5% 45.5% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 46.9% 6.2%

6.2.13. Economical use of resources

The survey result for the 12th

PAC promoted the practice of economical use of resources

but response rate was 50.0 per cent as frequent and 50.0 per cent as seldom. However, the

survey found that practice was frequent during the 13th

PAC as 95.5 per cent say so while

only 4.5 per cent said the practice was seldom. The population and response of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.16.

Table 6.77. The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources

Difference Era Frequently Seldom

12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%

13th PAC 95.5% 4.5%

12th & 13th PAC 81.2% 18.8%

6.3. Composition of PAC

This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair

of the PAC regarding the composition of 12th

and 13th

PACs.

6.3.1. Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee

Balanced representation of all major parties in the house remained the major concern of

PAC during both governments. During the 12th

PAC survey, 81.8 per cent responded the

111

practice was very important while 18.2 per cent responded the practice was somewhat

important. However, during the 13th

PAC, response rate was hundred per cent as being

very important. Overall for both PACs, 90.9 per cent response was very important and

9.1 per cent was somewhat important. The response to the balanced representation of all

major political parties on the committee of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure

6.17.

Table 6.78. Representation of Political Parties

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 81.8% 18.2%

13th PAC 100% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 90.9% 9.1%

6.3.2. Exclusion of ministerial membership

An important factor was having a membership of PAC being a minister. During the 12th

PAC 80.0% of the respondents believe the practice was very important while 20.0 per

cent respondent it was not important factor to an effective PAC. During the 13th

PAC,

72.7 per cent of respondents believed the practice was very important, 4.5 per cent said it

was somehow important but 22.7 per cent believed the factor was not much important.

Overall 75.0 per cent responded the practice was very important, 3.1 per cent said

somehow important while 21.9 per cent thought the practice was not important to any

parliamentary oversight. The response to the ministerial membership of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.18.

112

Table 6.79. Ministerial Exclusion

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat Important Not

Important

12th PAC 80.0% 0% 20.0%

13th PAC 72.7% 4.5% 22.7%

12th & 13th PAC 75.0% 3.1% 21.9%

6.4. Powers of PAC

This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair

of the PAC regarding the powers of 12th

and 13th

PACs.

5.4.1. Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of

taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets

The response to the question of PAC’s Clear focus on holding the government

accountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets

during the 12th

PAC remained 40.0 per cent said it was very important and 60.0 per cent

said it was somehow important. While, response during the 13th

PAC was; 81.8 per cent

very important and 18.2 per cent somehow important. As a whole for the Pakistani PAC

during the selected period of this study for the years (2002-2011) remained as 68.8 per

cent very important and 31.2 per cent as somehow important. The population and

response to committee’s focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of

taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is

depicted at Figure 6.19.

113

Table 6.80. PAC focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and its

stewardship over public assets

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 40.0% 60.0%

13th PAC 81.8% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 68.8% 31.2%

6.4.2. PAC focus on administration of policy

While responding to a question 30.0 per cent of the respondent replies as the practice of

Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad was

somehow important, 50.0 per cent replied it was not an important and 20.0 per cent said

the practice was not applicable at all for the 12th

PAC. However, in the case of 13th

PAC,

63.6 per cent responded it was an important practice and 36.4 per cent responded it was

somehow important. The survey as a whole resulted for both PACs remained as 43.8 per

cent very important, 34.4 per cent somehow important, 15.6 per cent not important and

6.2 per cent not applicable. The population and response to the committee focus on

administration of policy of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.20.

Table 6.81. Committee focus on administration of policy

Difference

Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not

Applicable

12th PAC 0% 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 63.6% 36.4% 0% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 34.4% 15.6% 6.2%

114

6.4.3. Reference to examine the Public Accounts

Survey response to the question of having a permanent reference to examine the Public

Accounts during the 12th

PAC remained as 40.0 per cent responded as very important,

60.0 per cent responded as somehow important. During the 13th

PAC response for the

same practice was observed very important by 71.6 per cent and somehow important by

28.4 per cent. Overall the response for both periods was 55.8 per cent very important t

and 44.2 per cent as somehow important. The population and response to the power to

have a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is

depicted at Figure 6.21.

Table 6.82. Reference to examine the Public Accounts

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 40.0% 60.0%

13th PAC 71.6% 28.4%

12th & 13th PAC 55.8% 44.2%

6.4.4. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor

While investigating committee’s permanent reference to examine all reports of the

Legislative Auditor, the survey resulted as 91.8% responded as very important factor,

8.2% as somehow important factor for the 12th

PAC. However, during the 13th

PAC,

80.0% responded very important factor and 20.0% responded as somehow important

factor. The overall response for two PACs remained 85.9% very important and 14.1%

somehow important. The population and response to the power to have a permanent

reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is

depicted at Figure 6.22.

115

Table 6.83. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 91.8% 8.2%

13th PAC 80.0% 20.0%

12th & 13th PAC 85.9% 14.1%

6.4.5. Power to call independent witnesses

On a question of power to call independent witnesses, 30.0 per cent of the respondent

said was very important factor, 50.0 per cent said it was not an important factor while

20.0 per cent said it not an applicable factor during the 12th

PAC. While observing this

power during the 13th

PAC, 77.3 per cent said the factor was very important, 18.2 per

cent said somehow important and 4.5 per cent said not applicable. The overall resultant

for both periods remained 62.5 per cent very important, 12.5 per cent somehow

important, 15.6 per cent not important and 9.4 per cent believed the practice was not

applicable at all. The population and response to the power to call independent witnesses

of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.23.

Table 6.84. Power to call independent witnesses

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 30.0% 0% 50.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 77.3% 18.2% 0% 4.5%

12th & 13th

PAC 62.5% 12.5% 15.6% 9.4%

116

6.4.6. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures

of government Organizations receiving funds from the government and all

state corporations

A maximum of 90.0 per cent of the respondents for the 12th

PAC responded the factor

was very important and 10.0 per cent said the power factor was somehow important. The

response for the 13th

PAC for the same question remained as 81.8 per cent said the power

factor was very important and 18.2 per cent said somehow important. The overall

resultant for both PACs remained 85.9 per cent as very important and 14.1 per cent as

somehow important. The population and response to the committee power to investigate

or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government Organizations

receiving funds from the government and all state corporations of the 12th

and 13th

PAC

is depicted at Figure 6.24.

Table 6.85. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government

Organizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporations

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 90.0% 10.0%

13th PAC 81.8% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 85.9% 14.1%

6.4.7. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks

The response to the question of power of a PAC to request the legislative auditor to

perform specific reviews or tasks remained as 10.0 per cent said somehow important,

70.0 per cent not important and 20.0 per cent responded as not applicable for the 12th

PAC. However, the response for the 13th

PAC remained 59.1 per cent responded as very

important, 22.7 per cent somehow important and 18.2 per cent responded as not

important. On the other hand, a total of 40.6 per cent responded the practice was very

important, 18.8 per cent responded somehow important, 34.4 per cent responded not

important and 6.2 per cent responded the practice was not applicable at all. The

117

population and response to the committee power to request the legislative auditor to

perform specific reviews or tasks of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.25.

Table 6.86. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 0% 10.0% 70.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2% 0%

12th & 13th

PAC

40.6% 18.8% 34.4% 6.2%

6.4.8. Compelling officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative

performance

The responses to this question of power to compel officials to attend and be held

accountable for administrative, performance even after they have left office for the 12th

PAC were mixed one 50.0 per cent said it was very important awhile another 50.0 per

cent regarded it not important. While responses for the 13th

PAC remained 81.8 per cent

saying it very important power of the committee and another 18.2 per cent saying it

somehow important. The overall 71.9 per cent said the practice was very important to

committee powers, 12.5 per cent regarded it somewhat important and 15.6 per cent

thought it of no importance to PAC powers. The population and response to the

committee power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative,

performance even after they have left office of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure

6.26.

118

Table 6.87. Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, performance even

after they have left office

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important

12th PAC 50.0% 0% 50.0%

13th PAC 81.8% 18.2% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 71.9% 12.5% 15.6%

6.4.9. Power to compel witnesses to answer questions

Responding to the question of PAC power to compel witnesses to answer questions, 65.0

per cent said it was very important, 35.0 per cent said it was somehow important in case

of 12th

PAC. While in case of 13th

PAC 87.3 per cent said it was very important and 12.7

per cent said it was somehow important. On a whole, 76.1 per cent said it important

during both PACs and another 23.9 per cent said it somehow important. The population

and response to the committee power to compel witnesses to answer questions of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.27.

Table 6.88. Power to compel witnesses to answer questions

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 65.0% 35.0%

13th PAC 87.3% 12.7%

12th & 13th PAC 76.1% 23.9%

6.4.10. Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions

Coming to the question of powers to make recommendations and direct action, 40.0 per

cent said it was very important, 10.0 per cent said somehow important and 50.0 per cent

said the practice was not applicable during the 12th

PAC as the committee only pass

119

recommendations but it rarely took direct actions. In case of 13th

PAC, 45.5 per cent

responded as very important, 36.4 per cent somehow and 18.2 per cent regarded not

applicable due to lack of direct action. However, overall for both PACs, 43.8 per cent

responded as very important, 28.1 per cent somehow important and 28.1 per cent

regarded not applicable. The population and response to the committee power to make

recommendations and direct actions of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.28.

Table 6.89. Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 40.0 % 10.0% 50.0%

13th PAC 45.5% 36.4% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 28.1% 28.1%

6.4.11. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases

On the matter of power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 20.0 per cent

said it was very important, 30.0 per cent somehow and 50.0 per cent responded there

were never any press conferences or press releases issued during the 12th

PAC period.

However, during the period of 13th

PAC, 63.6 per cent responded the practice was very

important, 18.2 per cent responded somehow important and another 18.2 per cent

responded not important practice. As a whole, 50.0 per cent say the practice was

important, 21.9 per cent say the practice somehow important, 12.5 per cent say the

practice was not important and 15.6 per cent regarded the practice was irreverent. The

population and response to the committee power to hold press conferences and issue

press releases of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.29.

120

Table 6.90. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 20.0% 30.0% 0% 50.0%

13th PAC 63.6% 18.2% 18.2% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 21.9% 12.5% 15.6%

6.4.12. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national

security issues

Survey response for the 12th

PAC remained as 40.0 per cent said it was very important,

50.0 per cent said as somewhat important and 10.0 per cent said it was not important. In

case of 13th

PAC, 77.3 per cent said it very important, 18.2 per cent said it somehow

important while 4.5 per cent said it not at all important factor. In the case of Both PACs

the response remained 58.7 per cent saying very important, 34.1 per cent saying

somehow important and 7.2 per cent saying not at all important. The population and

response to the committee power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or

national security issues of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.30.

Table 6.91. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important

12th PAC 40.0% 50.0% 10.0%

13th PAC 77.3% 18.2% 4.5%

12th & 13th PAC 58.7% 34.1% 7.2%

121

6.4.13. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative

Auditor’s Act

The survey response to the question of PAC power to review proposed legislation or

amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act remained 60.0 per cent saying very

important and 40.0 per cent saying somehow important while talking about the 12th

PAC.

However, in case of 13th

PAC, the response remained as 81.1 per cent saying very

important and 18.9 per cent saying somehow important. While talking jointly about both

PACs, 70.6 per cent of the respondents said the practice was very important and 29.4 per

cent said the practice was somehow important. The population and response to the

committee power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative

Auditor’s Act of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.31.

Table 6.92. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 60.0 % 40.0%

13th PAC 81.1% 18.9%

12th & 13th PAC 70.6% 29.4%

6.4.14. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget

While responding to the question of PAC powers to review the Auditor’s budget, 20.0 per

cent the respondents said the practice was very important, 30.0 per cent said it was

somehow important while 50.0 per cent said the practice was never given any

importance. In case of 13th

PAC, 40.9 per cent said the practice was very important, 22.7

per cent said somehow important, 18.2 per cent said not important and another 18.2 per

cent said the practice was not applicable. Jointly talking about both the PACs, 34.4 per

cent said very important, 25.0 per cent said somehow important, 12.5 per cent said not

important and 28.1 per cent said the practice was never applicable. The population and

response to the committee power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.32.

122

Table 6.93. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 20.0% 30.0% 0% 50.0%

13th PAC 40.9% 22.7% 18.2% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 34.4% 25.0% 12.5% 28.1%

6.4.15. Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and

advice

Calculating the response to the question of PAC power to choose subjects for

examination without government direction and advice, the response for the 12th

PAC

remained 70.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent saying somehow important

and 20.0 per cent saying not important. On the other hand, while talking about the 13th

PAC, the response remained 81.8 per cent saying very important and 18.2 per cent saying

not important at all. However, the joint response for both selected periods remains as 78.1

per cent saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important and 18.8 per cent

saying not important. The population and response to the committee power to choose

subjects for examination without government direction and advice of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.33.

Table 6.94. Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important

12th PAC 70.0% 10.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 81.8% 0% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 78.1% 3.1% 18.8%

123

6.4.16. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committee

While responding to the question of PAC power to compel ministers to appear before the

committee for the 12th

PAC, 50.0 per cent said the practice was very important, 10.0 per

cent said as somehow important and 40.0 per cent said the practice was never applicable.

In case of 13th

PAC, 63.6 per cent said the practice was very important while 36.4 per

cent said the practice was at all not applicable to the Pakistani jurisdictions. Looking at a

joint result for both selected PACs, 59.4 per cent said very important, 3.1 per cent said

somehow important while 37.5 per cent said the practice was never important at all. The

population and response to the committee power to compel ministers to appear before the

committee of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.34.

Table 6.95. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committee

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 50.0% 10.0% 40.0%

13th PAC 63.6% 0% 36.4%

12th & 13th PAC 59.4% 3.1% 37.5%

6.4.17. Powers to take Suo-Motu actions

The question of PAC powers to take Suo-Motu actions the response meet with 90.0 per

cent saying it very important and 10.0 per cent saying somehow important during the

period of 12th

PAC. While in the case of 13th

PAC, the response remained 95.5 per cent

saying very important, 4.5 per cent saying somehow important. Looking at the joint

resultant for both PACs 92.8 per cent said the practice was very important and 7.2 per

cent said somehow important. The population and response to the committee powers to

take Suo-Motu actions of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.35.

124

Table 6.96. Powers to take Suo-Motu actions

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 90.0 %t 10.0%

13th PAC 95.5% 4.5%

12th & 13th PAC 92.8% 7.2%

6.4.18. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action

In a response to the question of powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action

during the 12th

PAC 59.1 per cent said the practice was very important while another 40.9

per cent said it was not important. In case of 13th

PAC 70.0 per cent said very important

while 30 per cent said the practice was not important. The accumulative response of both

PAC resulted 62.5 per cent saying very important while 37.5 per cent saying not

important. The population and response to the committee powers to listen to Public

Complaints and take action during the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.36.

Table 6.97. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action

Difference Era Very Important Not Important

12th PAC 59.1% 40.9%

13th PAC 70.0% 30.0%

12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%

6.4.19. Powers to take action on media review

On clicking option to answer question of powers to take action on media review 20.0 per

cent regarded it very important, 20.0 per cent somehow important while 60.0 per cent

saying not important to 12th

PAC practices. On the other hand responses for the 13th

PAC

remained as 59.1% saying very important, 36.4% saying somehow important and 4.5%

125

saying practice was not important. Jointly, in case of both PACs 46.9% saying it very

important, 31.2% saying it somehow important while 21.9 per cent saying it not

important to PAC practices. The population and response to the committee powers to take

action on media review of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.37.

Table 6.98. Powers to take action on media review

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important

12th PAC 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 36.4% 4.5%

12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 31.2% 21.9%

6.4.20. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements

As much of 40.0 per cent responded the influence of PAC on the adequacy of the

corporate governance arrangements was very important practice during the 12th

PAC

period while 60.0 per cent said it was not important. In case of 13th

PAC 59.1 per cent

said the practice was very important, 22.7 per cent saying somehow important while 18.2

per cent saying it not important.

Table 6.99. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important

12th PAC 40.0% 0% 60.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 53.1% 15.6% 31.2%

Discussing results for both PACs 53.1 per cent found saying very important, 15.6 per

cent saying somehow important while 31.2 per cent saying not important at all. The

126

population and response to the influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate

governance arrangements of the 12th

and 13th

PAC are depicted at Figure 6.38.

6.4.21. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions

In a response to the question of influence of PAC recommendations/ directives on

institutions during the 12th

PAC period 20.0 per cent said the practice was very important,

20.0 per cent said somehow important and 60.0 per cent said the practice was no more

important. In case of 13th

PAC period 59.1 per cent said the practice was very important

and 40.9 per cent said the practice was somehow important. While talking jointly about

both PACs 46.9 per cent said the practice was very important, 34.4 per cent said

somehow important while 18.8 per cent said the practice was not important as is depicted

at Figure 6.39.

Table 6.100. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important

12th PAC 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 40.9% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 34.4% 18.8%

6.5. General Practices of PAC

This section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chair

of the PAC regarding the general practices of 12th

and 13th

PACs.

6.5.1. Close working relationship between members from different political parties

The response rate for the question of close working relationship between members from

different political parties during the 12th

PAC 90.0 per cent said the practice was very

important while 10.0 per cent regarded it not important. In case of the 13th

PAC period

77.3 per cent said the practice was very important and 22.7 per cent said somehow

127

important. The joint response rate for both PACs remained 81.2 per cent said very

important, 15.6 per cent said somehow important while 3.1 per cent said the existing of

close working relationship among different political parties was never important as is

depicted at Figure 6.40.

Table 6.101. Close working relationship between members from different political parties

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important

12th PAC 90.0% 0% 10.0%

13th PAC 77.3% 22.7% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 81.2% 15.6% 3.1%

6.5.2. Advance preparation of members

Survey results for the 12th

PAC showing response for the above question remained 20.0

per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent saying somehow important, 20.0 per cent

not important while 50.0 per cent saying the practice not applicable at all. Looking at the

results for 13th

PAC, 22.7 per cent said the practice was very important, 18.2 per cent said

somehow important, 54.5 per cent saying not important while 4.5 per cent saying the

practice is still not applicable at all as is depicted at Figure 6.41.

Table 6.102. Advance preparation of members

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not

Applicable

12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 50.0%

13th PAC 22.7% 18.2% 54.5% 4.5%

12th & 13th PAC 21.4% 14.1% 37.3% 27.2%

128

6.5.3. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants

During the 12th

PAC, 40.0 per cent of the respondents responded committee scrutiny

speed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants was sufficient and another

60.0 per cent responded it was somehow better. In views of the respondents for the 13th

PAC, 59.1 per cent respondent sufficient and 40.9 per cent responded the scrutiny speed

of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants was somehow sufficient. As a

whole for both PACs, 46.9 per cent said it was sufficient and 53.1 per cent said it was

somehow better as is depicted at Figure 6.42.

Table 6.103. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants

Difference Era Sufficient Somehow

12th PAC 49.9% 59.1%

13th PAC 60% 40%

12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%

6.5.4. Quick and in time decisions

A minimum of 30.0 per cent of respondent to a questionnaire for 12th

PAC against the

same questions as for 13th

PAC think, PAC took quick and in time decisions, 50.0 per

cent think it took somehow decisions and 20.0 per cent think it didn’t took any in time

decision. In case of 13th

PAC, the response remained as 59.1 per cent think it sufficient,

22.7 per cent think somehow and 18.2 per cent think it was not like that. Overall for both

the tenures 50.0 per cent said it was sufficient, 31.2 per cent said somehow it was

sufficient and 18.8 per cent seemed dissatisfied. The population and responses to the

question, Does the PAC took quick and in time decisions during the 12th

and 13th

PAC is

depicted at Figure 6.43.

129

Table 6.104. Quick and in time decisions

Difference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient

12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 31.2% 18.8%

6.5.5. Close working relationship with Auditor General

While answering to the question of relationship of PAC with AG the responses for the

12th

PAC remained 70.0 per cent saying very important and 30.0 per cent saying

somehow important. During the 13th

PAC the relationship seemed deteriorating as 59.1

per cent said the relations was very important and 40.9 per cent said somehow important.

Jointly overall during the two PACs the response remained as 62.5 per cent saying very

important and 37.5 per cent saying somehow important. The population and responses to

the working relationship of PAC with Auditor General during the 12th

and 13th

PAC is

depicted at Figure 6.44.

Table 6.105. Close working relationship with Auditor General

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 70.0 per cent 30.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%

12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%

6.5.6. Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for

hearings

The response to this question during the 12th

PAC remained largely negative 10.0 per

cent saying not important while 90.0 per cent saying not applicable at all. However,

130

during the 13th

PAC period it somehow improves 36.4 per cent saying very important, 4.5

per cent saying somehow important, 22.7 per cent saying not important while 36.4 per

cent saying the practice is still not applicable. Jointly talking about both PAC periods

25.0 per cent responded saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important,

18.8 per cent saying not important while 53.1 per cent saying the practice was not

applicable. The population and responses to the question of provision of independent

technical expertise and research support for hearings of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted

at Figure 6.45.

Table 6.106. Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearings

Difference Era

Very

Important

Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 0% 0% 10.0% 90.0%

13th PAC 36.4% 4.5% 22.7% 36.4%

12th & 13th

PAC 25.0% 3.1% 18.8% 53.1%

6.5.7. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with Backlog

The response to the formation of sub-committees to deal with backlog for 12th

PAC meet

with 20.0 per cent saying very important and 80.0 per cent saying somehow important.

During the 13th

PAC responses remained 59.1 per cent saying very important and 40.9

per cent saying somehow important.

Table 6.107. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with Backlog

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 20.0% 80.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%

12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%

131

While talking about both PAC periods, survey meet the responses 46.9 per cent saying

very important and 53.1 per cent saying somehow important. The population and

responses to the question of formation of Sub-Committees to deal with backlog of the

12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.46.

6.5.8 Strategic prioritization of items for committee review

In terms of 12th

PAC, only 20.0 per cent of the respondents said the strategic

prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of committee

work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports was

very important while responding to the question of strategic prioritization of items for

committee review however 80.0 per cent said the practice was not important. On the

other hand in terms of 13th

PAC period 40 per cent responded very important, 18.2 per

cent said somehow important while 40.9 per cent said the practice was not important. A

joint response for both selected PAC periods remained 34.4 per cent said very important,

12.5 per cent said somehow important and 53.1 per cent said the practice was no more

important. The population and responses to the question of strategic prioritization of

items for committee review, with time limits for stages of committee work like

consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports of the 12th

and

13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.47.

Table 6.108. Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of committee work

like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important

12th PAC 20.0% 0% 80.0%

13th PAC 40% 18.2% 40.9%

12th & 13th PAC 34.4% 12.5% 53.1%

132

6.5.9. Transcripts keeping of hearings and meetings

The response to the question of keeping transcripts of all hearings and meetings meet

with 100.0 per cent across both PAC periods. The population and responses to the

question of keeping transcripts of all hearings and meetings of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is

depicted at Figure 6.48.

Table 6.109. Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important

12th PAC 100.0% 0%

13th PAC 100.0% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 100.0% 0%

6.5.10. PAC tenure

Although there was always a big delay in the formation of PAC, the responses to the

question of committee life and staying active between the session meet with a mix

response of 20.0 per cent saying very important, 60.0 per cent saying somehow important

and 20.0 per cent saying not important at all during the 12th

PAC period. For the 13th

PAC the response was 100.0 per cent saying the practice was very important. The

population and responses to the question of Committee appointed for the life of the

Legislature or Parliament and stays active between sessions of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is

depicted at Figure 6.49.

Table 6.110. Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament and stays active between sessions

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 100.0% 0% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 75.0% 18.8% 6.2%

133

6.5.11. Televised public hearings

Televised public hearing was never very important during both PAC periods however, for

the 12th

PAC 10.0 per cent of the respondents said the practice was somehow important

while other 90.0 per cent said it was not applicable at all. In case of 13th

PAC period 18.2

per cent said the practice was somehow important while 18.2 per cent it was not

applicable. The Joint response for both PAC periods meet with 15.6 per cent responding

somehow important while 85.9 per cent said not applicable in Pakistani PAC set up. The

population and responses to the question of televised public hearings of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.50.

Table 6.111. Televised public hearings

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 0% 10.0% 90.0%

13th PAC 0% 18.2% 81.8%

12th & 13th PAC 0% 15.6% 85.9%

6.5.12. Report to the legislature annually and debate on Report

During the period of 12th

PAC, 50.0 per cent of the respondents believed the practice was

somehow important while 10.0 per cent said it was not important, another 40.0 per cent

the practice was not applicable at all. While during the 13th

PAC period 77.3 per cent

regarded the practice very important, 4.5 per cent somehow important while on the other

hand 18.2 per cent found saying the practice was given no important. The joint response

remained 53.1 per cent saying very important, 18.8 per cent saying somehow important,

15.6 per cent not important while 12.5 per cent saying the practice was not applicable

across both PACs of the selected periods. The population and responses to the question of

report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.51.

134

Table 6.112. Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 0% 50.0% 10.0% 40.0%

13th PAC 77.3% 4.5% 18.2% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 53.1% 18.8% 15.6% 12.5%

6.5.13. Response to recommendations from the government

The responses to the 12th

PAC period say there was never any comprehensive response to

recommendations from the government regarding very important however 30.0 per cent

of them say it was somehow important but 70.0 per cent grieved the practice was never

important. While turning to the 13th

PAC 22.7 per cent of the responses clicked for very

important, 59.1 per cent somehow important but still 18.2 per cent were critical saying

not important. Looking at joint responses 18.2 per cent found saying very important, 50.0

per cent saying somehow important while 34.4 per cent saying not important. The

population and responses to the comprehensive response to recommendations from the

government of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.52.

Table 6.113. Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important

12th PAC 0% 30.0% 70.0%

13th PAC 22.7% 59.1% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 18.2% 50.0% 34.4%

6.5.14. Prior experience of Committee Members

The practice was somehow important during the 12th

PAC period as 20.0 per cent of the

respondents said so, on the other hand 30.0 per cent saying not important and 50.0 per

135

cent saying practice was not applicable. During the 13th

PAC period 4.5 per cent said

very important, 36.4 per cent somehow important and 59.1 per cent not important. On an

average for both PAC periods 3.1 per cent said very important, 31.2 per cent said

somehow important, 50.0 per cent said not important and 15.6 per cent said the practice

was not applicable. The population and responses to having committee members with at

least 2 years of prior Committee experience of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure

6.53.

Table 6.114. Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 0% 20.0% 30.0% 50.0%

13th PAC 4.5% 36.4% 59.1% 0%

12th & 13th PAC 3.1% 31.2% 50.0% 15.6%

6.5.15. Prior administrative or business experience of Members

A total of 80.0 per cent of the respondents for the 12th

PAC period responded the practice

of have a minimum of two years prior experience as somehow important while 20.0 per

cent saying it was not important. In case of 13th

PAC period 22.7 per cent of the

respondents said it was somehow important, 54.5 per cent said not important while 22.7

per cent even the practice was not applicable.

Table 6.115. Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience

Difference Era Somewhat Important Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 80.0 per cent 20.0% 0%

13th PAC 22.7% 54.5% 22.7%

12th & 13th PAC 40.6% 43.8% 15.6%

136

A joint response to this question remained 40.6 per cent saying somehow important, 43.8

per cent saying not important while 15.6 per cent saying it a not applicable practice. The

population and responses to having committee members with prior administrative or

business experience of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.54.

6.5.16. Incentives for members

Only 10.0 per cent of the total respondents for 12th

PAC period said the practice of extra

pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside the normal

legislative session while 90.0 per cent said the practice was not applicable. Responses to

the 13th

PAC practices maintained 36.4 per cent saying somehow important and another

63.6 per cent saying not applicable. The joint response concluded at 28.1 per cent saying

somehow important but 71.9 per cent saying not applicable. The population and

responses to the question of extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in

hearings outside the normal legislative session of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at

Figure 6.55.

Table 6.116. Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside the normal legislative

session

Difference Era Somewhat Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 10.0% 90.0%

13th PAC 36.4% 63.6%

12th & 13th PAC 28.1% 71.9%

6.5.17. Suitable meeting place for media and public

About half of the respondent making 50.0 per cent of all saying the suitability of meeting

place was very important during 12th

PAC period, 10.0 per cent saying somehow

important, 20.0 per cent saying not important while another 20.0 per cent saying the

practice was not applicable. However, during the 13th

PAC period 54.5 per cent saying

the practice was very important, 22.7 per cent saying somehow important, 18.2 per cent

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saying not important while 4.5 per cent saying not important. Joint response for both

PAC periods under this study remained 53.1 per cent saying very important, 18.8 per cent

saying somehow important, another 18.8 per cent saying not important and 9.4 per cent

saying not applicable. Yasmeen Rehman, Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview for

this study that now PAC meetings are open to media and general public and they are

doing efforts to solve entry problem of those interested. Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,

Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview for this study that now PAC meetings are open

to media and general public and they are doing efforts to solve entry problem of those

interested. The population and responses to question of meeting place suitable for media

and public access to hearings of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.56.

Table 6.117. Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 50.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0%

13th PAC 54.5% 22.7% 18.2% 4.5%

12th & 13th

PAC 53.1% 18.8% 18.8% 9.4%

6.5.18. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee

recommendations

When asked about the incentives to encourage administrative action on committee

recommendations 30.0 per cent of the respondents said the practice was not important

during the 12th

PAC period while another 70.0 per cent said it was not applicable at all.

However, when asked about the 13th

PAC period 40.9 per cent said the practice was not

any more important while 59.1 per cent said the practice was overall not applicable. On

the other hand in a joint response for both PAC periods 35.5 per cent holds the practice

was not important and 64.5 per cent the practice was never applicable. The population

and responses to question of incentives to encourage administrative action on committee

recommendations of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.57.

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Table 6.118. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations

Difference Era Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 30.0% 70.0%

13th PAC 40.9% 59.1%

12th & 13th PAC 35.5% 64.5%

6.5.19. Follow-up procedures

Although the effective follow up is very essential the response rate for 12th

PAC period

particularly remained very low 20.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent saying

somehow important and 70.0 per cent saying not important. During the 13th

PAC period

59.1 per cent of the respondents found saying effective follow up was very important,

22.7 per cent saying somehow important and 18.2 per cent saying not important. The

joint resultant of the survey of both PACs remained 46.9 per cent saying very important

18.7 per cent saying somehow important and 34.4 per cent saying not important. The

population and responses to question of effective follow-up procedures to determine if

action has been taken to implement the committee’s recommendations of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.58.

Table 6.119. Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken to implement the committee’s

recommendations

Difference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important

12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 70.0%

13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%

12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 18.7% 34.4%

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6.5.20. Relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms

While talking about 12th

PAC good relations with other parliamentary oversight

mechanisms such as the budget committee 20.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 per

cent saying somehow important, 20.0 per cent saying not important and 50.0 per cent

saying not applicable at all. While discussing the same question for 13th

PAC period 40.9

per cent of the respondents found saying very important, 4.5 per cent somewhat

important, 18.2 per cent saying not important while 36.4 per cent saying not applicable at

all. The joint responses for both PAC periods under this study showed 34.4 per cent

saying very important, 6.2 per cent saying somehow important, 18.8 per cent saying not

important and 40.6 per cent saying the practice was not applicable. The population and

responses to question of good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms

such as the budget committee of the 12th

and 13th

PAC is depicted at Figure 6.59.

Table 6.120. Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms such as the budget committee

Difference Era

Very Important Somewhat

Important

Not Important Not Applicable

12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 50.0%

13th PAC 40.9% 4.5% 18.2% 36.4%

12th & 13th

PAC 34.4% 6.2% 18.8% 40.6%

6.6. Conclusion

The survey results clearly indicated performance difference on win-lose criteria basis

between two selected PAC periods. The survey demonstrates major event such as the

change of government, under the charter of democracy, leader of the opposition chairing

the PAC for the first time in Pakistan, public awareness and international political

influences. In almost all the questions, there is a clear difference in committee practices

and exercise of power. The results also show the 13th

PAC under PPP-led Coalition

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Government performed better than the 12th

PAC under Musharraf regime. However, the

detailed discussion on the findings of this study is provided in the next chapter.

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Chapter 7

The Culture of Governance in Pakistan

7.1 Introduction

The chapter ‘The culture of Governance in Pakistan’ is a discussion about the attitude of

those rulers and the servants of the state who on every mistake and wrong done blame the

state being an innocent democracy of only 65 years. Hence, these mistakes and blunders

are natural to happen. They forget that they are living in a global village where every

experience and practice is shared and it requires leadership and political will to change

the attitudes and the political system not centuries of evaluation. Having well awareness

to a political system, the concepts of democracy, the makeup of institutions, the economic

systems, the bureaucratic styles, the judicial systems and importantly for this study the

auditing systems and the financial oversight patterns, what it requires is the

implementation of the state rules and compliance to law for good governance.

Most of the institution of the state and systems like democracy and good governance are

never entertained on the basis of this misperception that Pakistan is an innocent

democracy. The rulers of the state and the servants of the state both kept themselves in

the learning process across their careers, many of them came and many like them went

but very few learned from the history and the ruthless experiences (Niaz 2010) and

delivered to state. The big chunk of them played with the state resources and institutions

mare to get maximum benefit out of it and to strengthen their powers and strong hold of

authorities for themselves and to let their out springs penetrate into the culture of power

of Pakistan.

The culture of financial oversights in Pakistan has not properly flourished due to unstable

civil governments and frequent military rules (Chaudry 2011). However, all of them

acknowledged the need of a financial oversight; the first PAC was established in 1951

and all the military rulers introduced proto-type PACs called Adhoc PACs in their

respective periods (NA 1985). But the Institution of PAC remained a white elephant for a

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state where rulers and the servants lived above the law and institution. The concepts of

transparency and accountability were a distant dream. According to a recognized

practice, the financial oversight took place at two levels; firstly at budget level when

annual budget is passed in the legislature is an ex-ante oversight process and secondly at

PAC level when financial oversight took place during the life of a project or when the

project is complete as an ex-post oversight process as discussed in chapter 4 page 2-3.

The second level of financial oversight is as important as is the first level that is a budget

level. Pakistan is such a state where extra spending is allowed other than the initial

budget allocated and the supplementary grants. Here PAC works as a supporting

institution to regulate the extra spending grants which are excess grants of departments

and agencies and not as an institution to recover such extra spending while setting

measures for good governance in future what is the actual purpose of the institution. The

study observed that the operations of the institution of PAC in Pakistan were mere a

formality. The compliance rate observed on an average of ten per cent (AGP 2012) that is

equal to none and the recovery rate was as low as only 100 million rupees recovered

during the 12th

PAC (PAC 2007) and 115 billion recovered during the 13th

PAC as were

claimed by both of them (PAC 2011). However, in actual, these amounts were no more

any tangible recoveries. While in international corruption rankings, Pakistan appears in

the bottom ten countries.

7.2 Application of McGee Thoughts

This section applies McGee’s school of thoughts to the PAC of Pakistani jurisdiction to

check the success factor of the 12th

and the 13th

PAC.

7.2.1 Capacity Building

The financial oversight capacity of both the members and the staff is somehow traditional

based on manual methods. The members investigate issues on the basis of their common

logic and wisdom. There was no programme to train the members and the staff about the

modern developments of financial oversight, computer skills, agenda setting skills and

the investigating skills like reaching to the root cause of the problem. The USAID and the

World Bank occasionally arrange trainings or workshops for the capacity building of

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PAC Secretariat and the Members but both the members and the staff responded they

benefited little out of these trainings. Trainings conducted include computers and IT

skills, basic concepts and processes in public financial management and auditing. Across

the two selected periods of 12th

and 13th

PAC, there were only 8 to 10 trainings arranged

for the secretariat staff and only 2 or 3 such trainings for members.

7.2.2 Independence

The impartiality and non-partisanship of the chairman is the sign of independence of any

PAC, during the period of 12th

PAC, the committee was chaired by a Government

member, who was comparatively less independent as was the chairman of the 13th

PAC,

who was an opposition party member and leader of the opposition. Another factor that

restricted the independence of the 12th

PAC was being three (03) ministers as its

members, however, during the 13th

PAC, the same factor was found as Mian Riaz

Hussain Pirzada became a minister but he still continued the committee membership and

two (02) parliamentary secretary remained the members.

However, another factor completely ensures independence as the both the 12th

and the

13th

PACs had an equal party proportion of members. Overtly, these is no political

pressure because both of the selected PACs for this study have equal proportion of

political parties and in case of 13th

PAC, Leader of the Opposition was the chair but

covertly, there seem many political pressures on members and the chairman. The 13th

PAC was operating on a very fast speed to clear the backlog in order to update its

operations but suddenly, it stopped its working, dissolved the special committee

constituted for this purpose and Ch. Nisar Ali Khan resigned the chairmanship of the

committee. His sudden resignation was a result of political pressure to restrain PAC

operations.

However, till the end of the selected period of this study, no court of the state ever took

any Suo-Motu or challenge to PAC decision. Federal Services Tribunal-FST, also respect

PAC directives. PAC recommendations or directives are final and never changeable.

Although, the National Assembly have started debating PAC reports but still the house

have not challenged the directive of this committee. PAC had a stable prestige, the

144

committee is never blackmailed and never any case of bribing of PAC staff or

approaching members is reported so for.

However, the PAC is least independent in agenda setting for its meeting. In practice the

PAC Chairman only select the year of a report to be discussed and the ministry. The rest

of the business of agenda setting is finalized by Auditor General. The Auditor General is

the sole authority to select paras, AGP is the sole authority of highlighting or un-

highlighting of paras. The process of highlighting or un-highlighting of paras is the core

tactic that Auditor General uses to undermine the transparent financial oversight process.

There is no defined criterion of highlighting or un-highlighting of paras. The population

and sampling that Auditor General took in case of Pakistan for Federal Auditing is as low

as 2-5 per cent but the question is whether this 2-5 per cent of sampling is representative

or not. The worse of all is that highlighting or un-highlighting of paras is among that 2-5

per cent and highlighted paras are of trees robbery, stolen Television and of few

thousands amount. In a way the prestigious committee that works on behalf of the

National Assembly of Pakistan and its each meeting cost no less that 4.5 to 5 million

waste resources and time of members and other stakeholders discussing paras sometime

of 5 thousand only or in routine less than a million. It was observed that the paras

amounting one billion or near one billion were un-highlighted.

The PAC mandate also ensures its independence (NA, Rule 205) providing continuity of

its agenda. The agenda of all the standing committees lapses on dissolution of National

Assembly but the agenda of PAC is considered continuous and the coming PAC will start

where the previous left the business. The unfinished work of one PAC is continued by the

second to complete it.

All Federal Departments and Institutions give supreme justification to PAC, appear

before it on its call and respond to its directives. Investigating Agenizes like FIA, NAB,

Police appear for PAC hearings and respond to its directives.

7.2.3 Information Exchange

The PAC had a weak structure of information exchange, its secretariat staff and members

get rare chance of attending any national or international workshops where Chair and

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Members or staff are invited to share information. The PAC of the National Assembly of

Pakistan is a poor member to international caucuses or financial oversight forums like

CPA. On an average PAC receives two to three invites annually from international

workshop or conference. PAC rarely organized any forum to invite other partners or

democracies to share experiences. PAC also lack any research set up where researchers

can search out latest developments and inform to members and staff to apply in local

jurisdictions. Hence, there is no proper set up of providing information about the new

developments and international practices.

PAC has a manual and traditional ways of working, new practices and developments are

adopted on need basis which mostly arise in the minds of Members or the Chair.

However, across both the selected periods, there was no organized structure of

information sharing except some members went to study tours abroad. They learned

many new practices from there and shared their working practices which were

acknowledged at Thailand, UK, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. These study tours were

supported by donors and PAC secretariat do not have any such programme.

Other factor of information sharing like IT system, IT wing, IT module systematic record

room and researchers were not properly available rather most of them were missing.

7.3 Application of Stapenhurst at.al Framework of PAC Performance Analysis

This section applies Stapenhurst at.al Framework of PAC Performance Analysis to the

PAC of Pakistani jurisdiction to check the success factor of the 12th

and the 13th

PAC.

7.3.1 Activity level

The 12th

PAC inherited a backlog of twelve (12) years while, in contrast, the 13th

PAC

inherited a total of nine (09) years of backlog. This backlog is a big hurdle to update the

operations of PAC. The PAC proceedings in this concern require dedicated chairman and

members furnished with a diligent staff. The 12th

PAC held a total of eighty six (86)

meetings in its four years period. While it’s Sub-Committee meet for seventy two (72)

days making a total of one hundred and fifty eight (158) days of meetings see Figure 5.6.

While, the 13th

PAC held meetings for a total of fifty six (56) days till November, 2011

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when Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, resigned from its chairmanship. While its Sub-Committees

meet for two hundred and eighty two (282) days making a total of three hundred and

thirty eight (338) days of meetings see Figure 5.6. The PAC during both the selected

periods have extensive staff and resources to carry the business although less technical

but able to perform required duties.

7.3.1.1 Keeping up to date with legislative auditor’s reports

Although the 12th

PAC meet more times than the 13th

PAC but it dealt with only two (02)

audit reports. While on contrast, the 13th

PAC, dealt with nine (09) years of backlog. The

13th

PAC took dozens of sou-moto actions on issues of public importance as compared to

12th

PAC that took only two (02) Suo-Motu actions on the issues of sugar crisis and stock

exchange crisis. The pace of 13th

PAC can be admired if Ch. Nisar has not resigned it

have finished the total of twelve (12) years backlog till the end of this government. Each

PACs constituted four (04) sub-committees to clear the backlog and 13th

PAC benefited a

lot out of them its sub-committees finalized six (06) audit reports. While, only one report

was finalized by a sub-committee of 12th

PAC for the year 1995-96.

7.3.1.2 Costs and time of staff, members, witnesses and others involved

On an average, a meeting of PAC cost as much as 4.5 to 5 million of rupees that include

traveling, hotel stays, dining, one day salaries of all participants, TA/DAs and the value

of work which these individuals have done if meeting is not held. On an average, a

minimum of two hundred (200) people attend a meeting. It is to concern that does PAC

make recoveries that cover its spending or these meeting are another blessing in disguise

to PAO or ministries. Realizing the importance of institutions like PAC, all the

stakeholders to this process pay least attention to the waste of resources that is its very

low compliance rate 13 per cent on an average for the last two PACs from 2002 to 2011.

7.3.2 Output level

The outcomes of PAC circles of business is the quality of clearance which include the

immediate visible results of work the committee does like recommendations made,

147

directives issued, Suo-Motu actions taken on public complaints, follow up and

implementation or rate of compliance.

The 12th

PAC discussed a total of 7377 audit paras out of which the committee passed

1423 directives. While the 13th

PAC discussed a total of 9735 audit paras and passed a

total of 4942 directives. Collectively, the PAC for both selected periods for this study

discussed a total of 17112 audit paras and passed 6342 directives as a whole.

After a continued follow up of MIC of PAC by writing direct letters to ministries and

through phone calls, as much as 128 PAC directives were implemented during the 12th

PAC whereas the 13th

PAC was successful in making implementation of 688 of its

directives. Hence, a total of 816 directives were implemented. In a way the compliance

rate for the 12th

PAC period remained 9 per cent and the same remained for the 13th

PAC

as 14 per cent. However, the 1295 actions were pending when 12th

PAC dissolved with

the dissolution of 12th

national Assembly and 4231 actions were pending when Ch. Nisar

Ali resigned the PAC in November, 2011. The 13th

PAC took dozens of sou-moto actions

on issues of public importance as compared to 12th

PAC that took only two (02) Suo-

Motu actions on the issues of sugar crisis and stock exchange crisis.

Hence, the output level for the PAC in Pakistani jurisdiction remained very low, its main

output factor, the compliance rate is as low as an average of 12 per cent for the entire

time periods for the years 2002 to 2011(AGP 2011).

7.3.3 Outcomes level

As an outcome of PAC operations there seemed very little improvements in public

administration on a shorter period of time. The state require from the existence of

institutions like PAC to operate in a way as its mandate provides to increase economy,

efficiency and effectiveness of government programme where federal funds are spent.

The transparent and efficient operations of PAC can defiantly strengthen economy of a

country but such institutions in Pakistan have been subject to taboos. These inviolable

practices have restrained the core institution that work for good governance, transparency

and accountability. Durable improvements in public administration for a shorter period of

time are as under;

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The 13th

PAC made a total recovery of Rs.115 Billion in its four years period

while the 12th

PAC make as much as Rs. 100 Million of recovery during its

regime. While the corruption level in Pakistan is 1000 times higher than these

little amounts that recovered. Transparency International reported a loss of Rs.

8500 billion in corruption, tax evasion and bad governance during the first four

(04) years of recent PPP-led coalition government (The Jang, 2012). While,

during the Musharraf period such losses reported were Rs. 2576 billion only in

five scams of Privatization, Bank of Punjab, Petroleum, Stock Exchange and

Sugar Scandal only (APSN , 2009). The corruption level during the previous

governments of Nawaz Shareef and Banizeer Bhutto were no less than their

fellow governments the Musharraf regime and the PPP-led Coalition government.

Departmental Accounts Committee (DAC) was established7 to discuss audit paras

between the representatives of audit office and the concerned ministry for arriving

on an agreed position. The DAC is a development in financial oversight process

to help PAC quickly accomplishing the conclusion. DAC meetings have been

considered encouraging and proving to be useful filtering point. The

representative of the DAC meeting includes a representative from Audit

department, a representative from the Ministry of Finance and the PAO of the

concerned ministry. However, DAC without a representative of PAC is

ineffective.

The PAOs/ Ministries are now rather regular to appear before PAC for hearings.

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gailani also wrote a letters to all ministries/PAOs

with instruction to regularly appear before PAC is a sign of improvement in

public administration.

The Auditor General created Federal and Provincial Implementation Cells for

compliance on PAC directives, follow up and recoveries. However, the results of

these Cells are still pathetic considering the compliance rate of 12 per cent.

7 The DAC was constituted on the instruction of Ministry of Finance orders issued on December 12, 1984 and February

13, 1998.

149

PAC give directions of Special Audit of National Rural support programme

(NRSP) and Rural Support Programmes Network (RSPN). Both of these National

Programmes were earlier not under the ambit of audit.

PAC took a number of Suo-Motu actions on issues of public concern against high

ups of the country.

NAB and FIA were called to PAC meeting.

7.3.3.1 Better compliance with laws or regulations

The culture of arbitrary transfers of PAO/concerned official of ministries had a bad

impact on the rate of compliance of PAC directives. These officials are deployed for a

shorter period of few months and very rare more than a year. This arbitrariness overlaps

the sense of responsibility and bureaucrats are less concerned with compliance. It is very

rare that an official appeared twice before PAC for the same ministry. The newly

appointed bureaucrats had a definite excuse of being ignorant of the previous cases of bad

governance in a newly joined department or ministry. Hence, there is no trend of

compliance, the average 12 per cent compliance for the period of 2002 to 2011 is very

low rate but it is still better given circumstances of arbitrariness.

The major stakeholder in the financial oversight process, the Auditor General also found

a hurdle in compliance of PAC directives. It created its compliance Cells but there is no

result out of them. It is the inability of Audit Office while having Implementation Cells

filled with staff but no compliance. In case Auditor General do audit transparently,

highlight and un-highlight paras on fair basis there is no reason that PAOs or ministries

go an inch ahead of PAC directive. Auditor General in Pakistan rather being an executive

officer of the legislature had become a party to the bad governance. The Auditor General

had time and again tried to suppress the committee by having a full control of agenda

setting for PAC and sometimes as in case of 12th

PAC of Malik Allah Yar Khan, AG

envoys come to chairman for his preparation for PAC meeting ahead. The practice is very

dangerous. The AG office uses this practice a good tool to influence the chairman.

Another continued effort of AG office during every government remained to send Audit

office staff to PAC secretariat on deputation to completely dominate the PAC secretariat.

150

On the other hand, PAC is always busy in discussing and reviewing audit reports.

However, Ch. Nisar had promoted MIC under Yasmeen Rehman who made the process

accelerate; prior to her the follow up process was restricted only to correspondence.

7.3.3.2 Improvements in financial control structures, such as prosecution of

wrongdoers, stronger powers for legislative auditor

The improvements in financial control structure were very weak. The PAC always set

poor deterrence on ministries while its powers mandated by National Assembly are rather

strong. The PAC can pose a good deterrence and can refer cases of wrong doers to NAB

or FIA for detailed investigation. The role and credibility of NAB, FIA and Police are

ambiguous in the financial oversight matters. The PAC has big lists of directives that

PAC give to these inquiring agencies to prosecute certain accused but the compliance rate

is again very low. Auditor General sent a minimum of fifty (50) cases to NAB for an

inquiry without consulting PAC for what it had not drafted audit paras (Ahmed 2012). It

is again a monopoly over the powers of PAC and AG cannot directly refer these cases to

NAB till they are brought to PAC. Hence, these institutions do not transparently

cooperate with PAC. While being the officers of these institutions senior bureaucrats,

their presentation methods are mostly confusing PAC members and they can easily hide

facts.

Although, Auditor General in Pakistani Jurisdictions is a strong institution, and a source

of information to the parliament about transparency in money spent the parliament

sectioned during the annual budget. However, the Auditor General’s role is not meeting

out the level of corruption of Pakistan. Its sampling method and the highlighting criteria

are ambiguous and not public. Even the PAC members are not aware of the method the

Auditor General adopts for these two function. The audit officers are bribed at field level

for high value paras and the paras are settled at different level from the field audit to the

DAC. These settlements are mostly negative and the 2 per cent or 5 per cent as the audit

office say is drawn from the remaining cases which are not settled. On its final stage, at

DAC level and during the preparation of audit briefs at Pre-PAC level at AG office, the

officers mutually decide the fate of a para being highlighted or un-highlighted.

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7.3.3.3 Strict directions to NAB and FIA of no excuse to wrong doers / criminals for

financial issues

PAC issues it directives on behalf of National Assembly, the supreme legislative body of

the state; there is no reason that any department or institution goes an inch ahead of its

directives. Generally speaking, the directives of PAC are final and un-changeable.

Logically there is no excuse in any directive to favour any person or department but these

is a question of credibility of institutions like NAB, FIA and Police that most of the time

ignore these directives.

7.3.3.4 Accurate, timely government information

There is another aspect that there are no proper investigation procedures available to

investigate financial scams. These institutions lack enough forensic accountants and

special prosecutors to deal with financial matters with special criminal training who know

what exactly to look for. These investigating agencies require well trained and

specialized professional prosecutor staff who can find proof and evidences. Despite

existing of all these institutions and departments, most of the big corruption scams never

come to surface. The white collar crime has become so suffocated that prosecuting

agencies fail to identify the criminals.

7.3.3.5 Enhanced public awareness of government programs

An effective and efficient PAC can enhance public awareness of government programme

but the case is contrary in Pakistan. PAC meetings are nearly restricted to public

especially after the Musharraf Regime Emergencies and Marshal Law period had created

the Red-Zone and No Go Area for general public. Media is playing good role to unleash

thing to public but still common man is partially informed of government programme.

The Good Governance strengthening institutions like PAC is always dealing with big

backlogs. This backlog never let PAC investigate or discuss government programme,

PAC discussed only audit paras which are related to previous governments, hence of no

use to common man.

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7.3.3.6 Enhanced legislative knowledge about the state of the management of

programs

Since PAC is always dealing with previous backlog and it never discussed the state of

management of government programme. The people never know the status of on-going

programmes. Hence, thing are always strange and common man only hear the scams of

previous government while strengthening solidarity with the ruling elite and mocking at

the previous government.

PAC can enhance people with legislative knowledge about the state of the management

of government programs only when it had finished with the backlog and would be

working on value for money and audit performance. The idea looks a distance dream to

coming governments.

7.3.4 Impact

Across the history the operations of PAC had merely been a formalities and fools play.

However, the 13th

PAC took a good start and deepened PAC operations and

institutionalized many practices to strengthen its practices. PAC under Ch. Nisar Ali, as

its Chairman, hardly was able to finish the backlog if Ch. Nisar had not resigned but his

resignation put PAC back to the point zero. To discuss under this framework, one can say

that PAC in Pakistan is still at activity level and there is no output, outcomes are still

awaited in the coming government if there is some efficient Chairman and the good

impact of PAC operations is a distance dream in Pakistan.

7.4 Points of Winning

The observations of PAC functioning and the survey conducted showed that 13th

PAC

remained ahead of 12th

PAC. Some of the critical points are as under;

7.4.1 Successes of PAC

While talking about the successes of PAC, 81.8 per cent responded the

Government responds favourably to 13th

PAC recommendations while only 20.0

per cent said the 12th

PAC received such response from government.

153

45.5 per cent responded the Government frequently implemented 13th

PAC

recommendations while 30 per cent responded government frequently

implemented on 12th

PAC recommendations.

18.2 per cent responded the 13th

PAC institutionalized certain practices as a result

of its working but only 10 per cent responded saying the 12th

PAC frequently did

so.

63.6 per cent of the respondents for 13th

PAC said there were frequent

improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases but none

said so for 12th

PAC.

45.5 per cent of the respondents to a question for 13th

Pac said legal action were

frequently taken against officials who contravene laws while only 22.2 per cent

said it was frequent for 12th

PAC.

59.1 per cent responded disciplinary action was taken against officials who

contravene administrative guidelines during 13th

PAC period while only 20.0 per

cent said the practice was frequent during 12th

PAC.

Another 59.1 per cent said the 13th

PAC successfully resisted political pressure

exerted on it but only 30 per cent responded it was frequent during 12th

PAC.

54.5 per cent of respondents said the Principal Accounting Officers found hiding

facts before 13th

PAC while 70 per cent responded the practice was frequent

during 12th

PAC.

77.3 per cent the 13th

PAC adopted and practiced latest oversight developments

but only 30.0 per cent responded the practice was frequent during 12th

PAC

period.

72.7 per cent of the respondent said the 13th

PAC institutionalized certain guiding

principles which were required to meet its objective while 50.0 per cent of the

respondent said for 12th

PAC.

90.9 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC is adherence to financial

control of resources while only 50.0 per cent said so for 12th

PAC.

54.5 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC follows the policy of waste

prevention while 30.0 per cent believed the 12th

PAC did so.

154

95.5 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC promotes practices of

economical use of resources but only 50.0 per cent said it was the quality of 12th

PAC.

7.4.2 Composition of PAC

A total of hundred per cent of respondents believed that 13th

PAC had a balanced

representation of all major political parties on the committee while 81.8 per cent

said it was the case in 12th

PAC.

72.2 per cent of the respondents said the membership of the 13th

PAC exclude

ministers of the Government while as much as 80 per cent said so in case of 12th

PAC.

7.4.3 Powers of PAC

81.8 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC had clear focus on holding the

government accountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardship

over public assets while only 40 per cent said it was so during 12th

PAC.

63.3 per cent of the respondents said clear focus on administration of 7policy and

not on whether policies are good or bad was very important during 13th

PAC

while no one said it was an important practice during 12th

PAC.

71.6 per cent of the respondents found saying 13th

PAC have a permanent

reference to examine the Public Accounts while only 40.0 per cent believed the

12th

PAC do so.

77.3 per cent of the respondents said power to call independent witnesses was

very important to 13th

PAC while only 30.0 per cent said that the practice was

important to 12th

PAC.

59.1 per cent of the respondents believed the 13th

PAC had power to request (but

not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks but none

said it was very important to 12th

PAC.

81.8 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC had power to compel officials

to attend and be held accountable for administrative, performance even after they

155

have left office while only 50.0 per cent of the respondents said so in case of 12th

PAC.

87.3 per cent of the respondents said that 13th

enjoyed power to compel witnesses

to answer questions while 65.0 per cent said it an important practice during 12th

PAC.

63.6 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC had power to hold press

conferences and issue press releases while only 20.0 per cent said this power was

very important to 12th

PAC.

77.3 per cent of the respondents believed it was very important to the 13th

PAC

having power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national

security issues while 40 per cent said for in case of 12th

PAC.

81.1 per cent responded the power to review proposed legislation or amendments

to the Legislative Auditor’s Act was very important to 13th

PAC while 60 per cent

said it was also very important to 12th

PAC.

40.9 per cent responded that the power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget

was very important to 13th

PAC while only 20 per cent said it very important case

to 12th

PAC.

81.1 per cent of the respondents believed the power to choose subjects for

examination without government direction and advice was very important to 13th

PAC while 70.0 per cent said so for 12th

PAC.

95.9 per cent of the respondents believed the powers to take Suo-Motu actions

were very important to the 13th

PAC while 90 per cent said so for the 12th

PAC.

70 per cent of the respondents said the powers to listen to Public Complaints and

take action was very important to 13th

PAC while 59.1 per cent same was a case

to 12th

PAC.

59.1 per cent of the respondent regarded the powers to take action on media

review was very important to 13th

PAC while only 20 per cent said so for 12th

PAC.

59.1 per cent of the respondents said the influence of 13th

PAC on the adequacy of

the corporate governance arrangements was very important while 40 per cent said

so for 12th

PAC.

156

59.1 per cent of the respondents said the influence of 13th

PAC

recommendations/Directives on institutions while 20 per cent said this factor was

very important to 12th

PAC.

7.4.4 General Practices of PAC

77.3 per cent of the respondents said close working relationship between members

from different political parties were very important during 13th

PAC however, 90

per cent of the respondents said it was very important during 12th

PAC.

22.7 per cent of the respondents said the practice of advance preparation of

members before hearings, Members receives Audit Briefs well in time was very

important to 13th

PAC while 20 per cent said it was so to 12th

PAC.

60 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget

statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants were sufficient while 40 per cent of

the respondents said so to 12th

PAC.

59.3 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC took quick and in time

decisions while 30 per cent said it was sufficient to 12th

PAC.

59.1 per cent of the respondents said the 13th

PAC had close working relationship

with Auditor General while 70 per cent said so during the 12th

PAC.

59.9 per cent responded formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog was

very important to 13th

PAC while 20 per cent said it was very important to 12th

PAC.

40 per cent of the respondents said the strategic prioritization of items for

committee review, with time limits for stages of committee work like

consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports was very

important to 13th

PAC while only 20 per cent said it was a case of greater

importance to 12th

PAC.

100 per cent of the respondents said that it was very important to 13th

PAC the

committee should be appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament and

stays active between sessions while only 20 per cent said so for 12th

PAC.

157

77.3 per cent of the respondents said that it was very important to 13th

PAC to

report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated while there

was no such practice during 12th

PAC.

22 per cent of the respondent believed the 13th

PAC received comprehensive

response to recommendations from the government but the no respondent for 12th

PAC was sure to this practice.

Only 4.5 per cent of the respondents said having committee members with at least

2 years of prior Committee experience was very important to 13th

PAC while

there was no response to this question for 12th

PAC being very important.

22.7 per cent of the respondents of 13th

PAC said having committee members

with prior administrative or business experience was very important while 80 per

cent of the respondents of the 12th

PAC believed it was very important.

36.6 per cent of the respondents believed in extra pay or other incentives for

members to participate in hearings outside the normal legislative session were

very important to 13th

PAC while only 10 per cent responded it was important to

12th

PAC.

40.9 per cent of the respondents said the incentives to encourage administrative

action on committee recommendations were not important to 13th

PAC while 30

per cent of the respondent to 12th

PAC said the practice was not important.

59.1 per cent of the respondents believed the effective follow-up procedures to

determine if action has been taken to implement the committee’s

recommendations were very important to 13th

PAC while only 20 per cent of 12th

PAC think it was very important.

40.9 per cent of the respondents believed good relations with other parliamentary

oversight mechanisms such as the budget committee were very important to 13th

PAC while 20 per cent believed it was also very important to 12th

PAC.

7.5 Institutionalization of Winning Points.

Ch, Nisar Ali khan, Chairman 13th

PAC seemed acquainted with latest development and

modern practices. He knows the peculiar function of PAC and occasionally applies every

suitable practice but unfortunately these developments and practices were not made a

158

permanent part of PAC operations. However, as a convention most of the practices are

working in the recent PAC under Nadeem Afzal Chan the new Chairman. The next

chapter is a conclusion of this study.

159

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The study concludes that the PAC operations are always restrained to years of backlog,

inefficient bureaucracy and political posturing. The institutions like PAC are the core

functionaries of good governance of a country and in the recent years this institution has

scored extensive prestige and status while maintaining its deterrence on other

departments and ministries. The financial oversight is the basis of transparency and

accountability of a state but in Pakistan, the operations of PAC have merely been

formalities.

It seems part of political tactics that PAC is always dealing with previous backlog. The

Charter of Democracy gives another benefit to major political parties of this country by

giving the Chairmanship of PAC to the Leader of the Opposition. It is a good practice but

it had two dimensions depending on the culture of power and governance in Pakistan; the

opposition party will oversee only the audit reports of their respective government and

secondly, the government can easily complete its programmes as the performance of

these programmes will be discussed during the coming government when ruling party

will be sitting on opposition bunches.

The arbitrary transfers of the servants of the state are reason of non-compliance to PAC

directives. None of the civil servants is worried about the PAC inquiries and the

directives as most probably he would be transferred to some other position before the

second meeting of PAC. Besides civil servants, the implementation cell of PAC and the

Implementation Cells of auditor department are an eye wash. The follow up process is

generally correspondence and the use of phone calls is rare. Till the time compliance rate

is raised to above 50 per cent PAC operations are considered failing.

An independent and transparent PAC can have a good financial control over state

resources but strengthening of institutions like PAC would leave deterrence for weak

departments and ministries.

160

Chapter 9

Making PAC Effective

This chapter is a set of recommendations for making the process of legislative financial

oversight effective to enhance the process of accountability and transparency. The major

areas to be strengthened for an effective PAC include learning skills on how to evaluate

the Audit Paras? How to grill down the facts? How to strengthen management system of

PAC? How to choose valued paras and important issues? A list of recommendations is as

under;

1. The PAC members may adopt CCCER Model, while discussion any audit objections.

PAC can play an effective role in applying CCCER Model in its proceedings in ways

given below;

That all criteria are mentioned very clearly in the audit para (Which rules etc.

have been violated?)

The systemic cause of the condition/irregularity is indicated. This aspects

concerns looking into failure of internal controls.

The effect is also mentioned especially when it has a rolling impact (e.g. delay

in one project causing delays in linked projects).

Recommendations in the audit report are systemic, measurable and

implementable; and are stated to enable the PAO to take specific focused

action.

The CCCER Model is annexed as Annex-X.

2. Controlling arbitrary transfers of PAOs /civil servants would help increase the rate of

compliance. PAOs may be given security of tenure of minimum of three years to

realize the responsibility. The arbitrary transfers are a big excuse of PAOs for

violating PAC directives. PAOs should be there to face their inquiries them self not

their substitutes mates.

3. A Federal Investigation Services may be established with its officers recruited

through CSS exam. The professionals of this group may be trained the skills of how

to prove the white collar crime.

161

4. Specialised Criminal Training Institute should be formed to give special trainings and

to produce professional prosecutors with technical knowledge to exactly reach to the

root cause and they should know what exactly need to be look for. Such training

institutions should give training like Francis Accountant, Criminology and Financial

Prosecutions.

5. Special Committee consisting of separate members of Technocrats from Senate and

the Senators who have interest in Financial Oversight should be constituted to deal

with the Backlog and the Main PAC of the National Assembly would work on the

Value for Money, Audit Performance and more focus on implementation and

compliance on the update cases of corruption.

6. Looking at the compliance rate and the years of PAC activity wasted in dealing with

backlog, PAC should revisit legal requirement and considerations that cause the PAC

to engage backlog issue. It could be done by investigating only the issues of greater

value for money. National Assembly can be requested to grant a criteria-based

immunity from the pre-2008 era on the justification that this otherwise compromises

the PAC’s effectiveness in dealing with current issues and concepts of value for

money and audit performance.

7. Audit Department should send the Audit Briefs directly to PAC members, concerned

PAOs, media and PAC Secretariat. The Audit Briefs should also be uploaded on both

Auditor General and National Assembly website for public knowledge and

awareness. The practice will help members better understand the technicalities of

paras. The important issue will be discussed on media and newspapers prior to

meeting. This mechanism will make PAC more transparent and accountable.

8. It should be the responsibility of relevant ministry to prepare draft Actionable Points

and provide to PAC within three (03) days. The suggested process can evolve drafting

of Actionable Points at ministry level, correction by PAC, vetting by AG and

finalization of report of PAC. The Ministry of Railways do this practice on voluntary

basis and send draft Actionable Points to PAC Secretariat. The study observed that

162

due to overwork of preparation of Actionable Points, the PAC staff cannot efficiently

perform their defined work of getting compliance on PAC Directives.

9. Non-compliance related major issues (the list is already prepared at PAC Secretariat)

should be put on PAC agenda as soon as possible and disseminated among members,

ministries, media and public while putting it on Auditor General and PAC website.

It is also suggested that all subjugated cases should be mentioned in the list of

pending major issues. After completing these lists, a group of PAC Members may

meet with Chief Justice of Supreme Court to discuss the urgency of cases. Supreme

Court may be requested to put such cases on priority basis.

10. All the CFAOs-Chief Finance & Accounts Officers should regularly submit their

monthly recovery statements to PAC.

11. Attendance of Auditor General should be made compulsory and mandatory.

12. PAC needs to develop its secretariat with organized system of researchers, IT experts,

strong administration and an Implementation Cell, etc. Rather having Implementation

Cell it’s good to create Monitoring and Implementation Committee that looks more

powerful and threatening to criminals.

13. All letters issued from PAC Secretariat should be signed by the head of PAC. There

are two benefits attached to this suggestion; one that Head may be well aware of

every correspondence among PAC Secretariat and other institutions, second, it will

regulate PAC agenda.

14. Actionable Points may be properly approved by the Chairman PAC rather at a lateral

stage of approving the whole report. The suggestion will help eliminate the chances

of wrong interpretation of Directives.

15. Approved copies of all Actionable Points should be sent to All PAC members, AG

and concerned ministries/departments for compliance.

16. PAC officers/staff should hold Pre-PAC meeting at least three (03) days prior to PAC

meeting. It was observed as Auditor General and PAOs hold DAC and Pre-PAC

163

meetings at AG office, they are well prepared to better present them. It was observed

that Members and PAC staffs in most cases pay a look at Audit Briefs during the

meeting facilitating AG and PAOs strengthening their argument.

17. PAC staff may never be demoralised at meeting places especially the lower one. In

order to boost their confidence and role in oversight process. It is also suggested that

Members hold frequent meetings with staff to discuss issues faced by them and to

resolve them at earliest. The demoralised and depressed staff can badly effect the

transparent operations of PAC.

18. The electronic media should be allowed for live coverage of PAC proceedings. In

case live coverage not possible at Parliament premises, the better place for PAC

meeting is Jinnah Convention Centre. The place is accessible for both media and

public.

19. The practice of Public Question/Answer Session in PAC meetings can prove fruitful

in addressing public grievances. The practice however, will make PAC an effective

public accountability forum as for as a threat for PAOs of facing the actual victim.

20. All the notifications of PAC should be written/issues after a consensus of all members

or at least of a quorum and not only the decision of Chairman.

21. PAC should reserve some time for the agenda of Non-Compliance/Implementation

Cell of PAC to be discussed in the first hours of every meeting.

22. Office of the Auditor General should also be accountable as a

Ministry/Division/Department before PAC.

23. Individual public complaints should be given top priority to resolve their problems. A

Public Complaints Cell with tool free may be established to listen to public

grievances.

24. PAC should have record room with organised cataloguing of files for an easy access

of members and staff.

25. PAC staff should at least be computer literate.

164

26. PAC Secretariat staff of Grade 1-16 may also be sent abroad on study tours along

with members and senior staff.

27. A minimum of 10 per cent of the money recovered should be given to PAC staff as

incentive to accelerate the recovery process as it is in NAB, FIA or Traffic Police.

The practice will develop interest and competition among officers to work more to

effect recoveries.

28. PAC may take notice of the expenditures of PAC meetings. It may count expenses of

each meeting on the end and shift on to the responsible along with other recoveries.

29. The Chairman PAC may hold meetings with all Federal Secretaries/PAOs every three

month to discuss the implementation status of PAC recommendations/Directives.

These meetings will help building liaison among PAC and PAOs.

30. Experienced PAC staff may never be arbitrarily transferred substituting new one. The

staffs require rich and deep experience of auditing and oversight.

31. PAC need to engage sufficiently qualified financial oversight experts to keep

Members and PAC Secretariat abreast with the latest financial oversight and

accountability practices.

32. PAC need an advanced automation Centre, donor help can be sought for this purpose

to boost automation system of PAC.

33. PAC should strengthen its working relations especially with Budget Committees and

others related to financial matters or the matters related to PAC operations. This

relationship will help ensure continuous and efficient working of committee system in

the National Assembly of Pakistan.

34. Reports of the PAC, when laid before the house may be thoroughly discussed upon

for house recommendations and an effective parliamentary review.

35. Effort should be made to transparent Anti-Corruption institutions like FIA, NAB and

PMIC.

165

36. Donor agencies and other capacity building organisation focus more on the capacity

building of members. Arranging capacity building workshops and distributing

briefing papers carrying best audit and accountability practices, telling them audit

skilled and technicalities of financial matters.

37. Along with the members of PAC, the staff of the PAC secretariat also requires to

trained on modern financial oversight practices and required IT skills to facilitate

PAC operations. Pac staffing should be career oriented that mean officials with PAC

experiences and knowhow should be employed to PAC secretariat and they should be

worked upon for capacity building and professionalism.

38. No PAO/ Ministry may be allowed to appear before the PAC unless it held DAC.

39. PAOs should appear before PAC while well prepared to answers PAC questions.

40. The DAC meetings should also include a representative of the PAC along with the

representative of Ministry of Finance, AG and PAC.

166

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175

Annex-I

The main individual conclusions and recommendations of McGee

The International Dimension:

There should be greater direct contact between Parliaments, especially PACs, and international financial institutions.

The CPA include good government as a subject of the theme or sub-theme of its conferences

Auditors General:

The Auditor General should be an Officer of Parliament independent of the Executive

The appointment process for an Auditor General should involve consultation with a wide range of stakeholders

An Auditor General should only be removed from office on limited grounds that are specified in advance by law

Auditors General should actively participate in international Auditors General associations

Auditors General should actively introduce themselves and their services to all parliamentary committees, not just PACs

Auditors General have a role in approving internal audit standards

Central banks should be subject to the Auditor General’s audit mandate in the same way as other public sector agencies

The Auditor General should take account of the views of PACs in framing their work programs

Parliaments should be involved at the pre-Budget stage in determining the resources to be allocated to the Auditor General

Auditors General and their staff must have appropriate legal protections conferred on them to enable them to carry out their duties

PACs should keep under review any proposals to change the Auditor General’s audit mandate

Any company receiving public funding to deliver public services should be subject to the Auditor General’s audit mandate

in respect of those services

Auditors General should present their reports in an attractive form and devise active communications strategies

Auditors General should take steps to measure their own performance

The main of PACs work should be guided by the work of the Auditor General

Public Accounts Committees:

Parliaments should regard the PAC as their pre-eminent committee

Senior opposition figures must be associated with the PAC’s work

There should always be sufficient experience and seniority among the membership of the PAC

Specially structured training be provided to PAC members

It is crucial that the Chairperson of the PAC has the qualities to ensure that the PAC works effectively

PACs must be adequately resourced to carry out their functions

PACs, while not being bound to act unanimously, should strive for some consensus in their reports

PACs should promote greater public awareness of their role

PACs should consider using subcommittees for specific inquiries

The Internet should be used to disseminate information on PACs

Procedures for follow-up action in recommendations in PAC reports are critical

Parliament should hold an annual debate on the work of the PAC

PACs in smaller and developing parliaments need improved access to information technology

A rational local method of allocating funding to PACs needs to be put in place to ensure that they have adequate resources

Smaller Parliaments need to take innovative steps to expand the pool of personnel available to serve on the PAC

Special attendance allowances, rather than a special salary, should be considered for PAC attendance

Links between PAC websites should be developed

The CPA should explore the potential for the use of a news group to encourage information exchange on PAC matters

The CPA should examine what options exist for conferences of associations of PACs

A compendium of Commonwealth PAC practice be established to be managed by a CPA branch or Parliament

Research should be undertaken into establishing a basis for making international comparisons of PAC performance

176

Annex-II

An “Ideal Committee” by Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance

of Public Accounts Committees by World Bank Institute

• The Committee is small; committees seem to work well with 5-11 members, none of whom should be

government Ministers;

• Senior opposition figures are associated with the PAC’s work, and probably chair the Committee;

• The Chair is a senior parliamentarian, fair minded and respected by parliament;

• The Committee is appointed for the full term of the parliament;

• The Committee is adequately resourced, with an experienced clerk and a competent researcher(s)

• There is clarity on the Committee’s role and responsibilities;

• The Committee meets frequently and regularly;

• Hearings are open to the public; a full verbatim transcript and summary minutes are quickly available for

public distribution;

• A steering committee plans the Committee’s work in advance and prepares an agenda for each meeting to

the full Committee;

• The typical witness is a senior public servant (the “accounting officer”) accompanied by the officials that

have a detailed understanding of the issues under examination;

• The Auditor’s Report is automatically referred to the Committee and the Auditor meets with the

Committee to go over the highlights of the report;

• In addition to issues raised by the Auditor, the Committee occasionally decides to investigate other

matters;

• Committee strives for some consensus in their reports;

• The Committee issues formal substantive reports to parliament at least annually;

• The Committee has established a procedure with the government for following up its recommendations

and is informed about what, if any, action has been taken;

• In all its deliberations, the Committee uses the Auditor as an expert advisor;

• Parliaments hold an annual debate on the work of the Committee.

177

Annex-III

List of Chairmen PAC (1947-2011)

National Assembly of Pakistan

Sr # Name of Chair Date of

Constitution

Date of

Termination

Duration

DD-MM-

YY

1st PAC Never meet

2nd

PAC Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,

MoS for Finance

05-09-1952 21-10-1954 16-01-02

3rd

PAC Mr. Mohammad Ali,

Finance Minister

14-12-1954 07-06-1955 21-06-00

4th

PAC Syed Amjad Ali, Finance

Minister

05-11-1956 27-10-1958 22-11-01

1st Adhoc

PAC

Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,

Finance Minister

03-03-1960 00-00-1962 27-09-01

5th

PAC Mr. Noor-ul-Amin, MNA 13-07-1965 13-11-1965 00-04-00

2nd

Adhoc

PAC

Mr. Noor-ul-Amin, MNA 13-11-1965 25-03-1969 12-04-04

3rd

Adhoc

PAC

Mr. Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash,

Finance Minister

10-08-1970 14-04-1972 04-08-01

6th

PAC i) Dr. Mubashir Hassan,

Finance Minister

ii)Rana M. Hanif Khan,

Finance Minister

22-06-1974 10-06-1977 18-00-03

4th

Adhoc

PAC

Mr. A.G. Kazi, Governor

SBP

19-11-1978 16-04-1981 27-05-02

5th

Adhoc

PAC

Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan 25-08-1982 00-12-1985 05-04-03

7th

PAC Sahibzada M. Ali Shah,

MNA

18-08-1985 29-05-1988 11-09-02

8th

PAC Mr. Hakim Ali Zardari,

MNA

05-03-1989 06-08-1990 01-05-01

9th

Mr. Hamza, MNA 28-08-1991 18-07-1993 20-11-01

10th Rao M. Hashim Khan, MNA 28-08-1995 05-08-1996 08-00-01

11th

Mr. Hamza, MNA 12-05-1997 12-10-1999 00-05-02

6th

Adhoc Mr. H.U. Beg 25-08-2000 16-11-2002 22-03-02

12th

Malik Allah Yar Khan,

MNA

10-04-2004 07-11-2007 27-07-03

13th

Chaudry Nisar Ali, MNA 19-09-2008 27-11-2011 08-02-03

Total Duration of Adhoc PACs 07 Days and 16 Years

Total Duration of PAC 02 Days-06 Months and 22

Years

178

Annex-IV

Reports of the PAC (1947-2011)

Sr # Report Year Chairman Year of

Publication Report Status

1. 1947-48 to 1979-80 Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,

MoS for Finance 1985 Laid

2. 1947-48 Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,

MoS for Finance 1985 Laid

3. 1948-49 Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,

MoS for Finance 1985 Laid

4. 1949-50 Mr. M Ali, Finance Minister - Laid

5. 1950-51 Mr. M Ali, Finance Minister - Laid

6. 1951-52 Syed Amjad Ali, Minister

for Finance - Laid

7. 1952-53 Syed Amjad Ali, Minister

for Finance - Laid

8. 1953-54 Syed Amjad Ali, Minister

for Finance - Laid

9. 1954-55, 1955-56 and

1956-57

Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,

Minister for Finance -

1957-58 and 1958-59 Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,

Minister for Finance - Laid

1959-60 and 1961-62 Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,

Minister for Finance - Laid

10. 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65 Mr. Noor ul Aminn, MNA - Laid

11. 1965-66

Mr. Muzaffar Ali

Qizilbash, Minister for

Finance

-

12. 1966-67, 1967-68

Mr. Muzaffar Ali

Qizilbash, Minister for

Finance

1971 Laid

13. 1968-69, 1969-70 Dr. Mubashir Hassan,

Minister for Finance - Laid

14. 1970-71 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan -

15. 1971-72 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan - Laid

16. 1972-73 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan - Laid

17. 1973-74 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan - Laid

18. 1974-75 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan - Laid

19. 1975-76 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan - Laid

20. 1976-77 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan Laid

21. 1977-78 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan - Laid

179

22. 1978-79 A.G. N. Kazi, Governor

State Bank of Pakistan - Laid

23. 1979-80 Ghulam Ishaq Khan 1985 Laid

24. 1980-81 Ghulam Ishaq Khan - Laid

25. 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-

84, 1984-85 Sardar Muhammad Ali Shah 1987 Laid

26. 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88 Mr. Hamza, MNA - Laid

27. 1988-89 Mr. Hamza, MNA - Laid

28. 1989-90 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leader

of the Opposition - Laid

29. 1990-91 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid

30. 1991-92 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA 2010 Laid

31. 1992-93 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid

32. 1993-94 Mr. Hamza, MNA Complete Ready for Printing

33. 1994-95 Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,

Convener 2011 Laid

34. 1995-96 Mr. Riaz Fatyana, Convener 2007 Laid

35. 1996-97 Mr. H.U. Beg 2001 Laid

36. 1997-98 Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,

Convener 2011 Laid

37. 1998-99 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending Referred to Special

Committee II

38. 1999-2000 Mr. H.U. Beg 2002 Laid

39. 2000-01 Malik Allah Yar Khan,

MNA 2007 Laid

40. 2001-02 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid

41. 2002-03 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending

Referred to Special

Committee

II/Pending

42. 2003-04 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending Referred to Special

Committee II

43. 2004-05 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending Referred to Special

Committee II

44. 2005-06 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leader

of the Opposition 2010 Laid

45. 2006-07 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener Pending Referred to Special

Committee II

46. 2007-08 Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,

Convener Pending

Referred to Special

Committee III

47. 2008-09 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leader

of the Opposition 2011 Laid

48. 2009-10 Pending Under review process

of Main PAC

49. 2010-11 Pending Under review process

of Main PAC

50.

Monitoring &

Implementation Committee

Report 2010

Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,

Convener 2011 Laid

51.

Monitoring &

Implementation Committee

Report 2011

Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,

Convener Complete Ready for Printing

180

Annex-V

PAC Mandate-Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly

202 Composition: The standing Committee on Public accounts shall consist of not more than twenty three

members to be elected by the Assembly and the Minister for Finance shall be its ex-officio member.

203. Functions; (1) The committee shall examine the accounts showing the appropriations of sums

granted by the Assembly for the expenditure of the Government, the annual finance accounts of the Government, the

report of the AGP and such other matters as the Minister for Finance may refer to it.

(2) In Scrutinizing the appropriation accounts of the Government and the reports of the AGP thereon it shall be

the duty of the Committee to satisfy itself

(a) that the money shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were legally available for, and applicable to

the service or purpose to which they have been applied or charged

(b) that the expenditure confirms to the authority which governs it; and

(c) that every re-appropriation has been made in accordance with the provisions made in this behalf under rules

framed by the Ministry of Finance

(3) It shall also be the duty of the Committee

(a) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of state corporations, trading and

manufacturing schemes, concerns and projects together with the balance sheets and statements of profit and loss

accounts which the President may have required to be prepared or are prepared under the provision of the statutory

rules regarding the functioning of a particular cooperation trading or manufacturing scheme or concern or project and

the report of the AGP thereon

(b) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-

autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the AGP either under the directions of the President or

under an Act of Parliament; and

(c) to consider the report of the AGP in cases the president may have required to conduct the audit of any receipt

or to examine the accounts of stores and stocks.

(4) of any money has been spent on any service during a financial years in excess of eth amount granted by the

Assembly for that purpose, the Committee shall examine with reference to the facts of each case the circumstances

leading to such an excess and make such recommendation as it may deem fit

(5) the report of the Committee shall be presented within a period of one year from the date on which reference

was made to it by the Assembly unless the Assembly, on a motion being made, directs that the time for the presentation

of the report be extended to a date specified in the motion;

Provided that extension in the time for the presentation of the report shall be asked for before the expiry of eth time

allowed under the rule.

204 Unfinished work of the Committee:- Any report, memorandum or note that the Committee may have

prepared, or any evidence that the Committee may have taken before the dissolution of the assembly, shall be made

available to the new Committee.

205 Continuity of the Proceedings:- Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the public Accounts

Committee may proceed from the stage where the previous Committee left the proceedings before the dissolution of the

Assembly

181

Annex-VI

List of Members of 12th

and 13th

PAC

Sr. 12th

PAC 13th

PAC Position

Name of Member Pol. Party Name of Member Pol. Party

1. Malik Allah Yar Khan,

MNA

PML Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA PML-N Chairman

2. Lt. Col. (R) Ghulam Rasul

Sahi, MNA

PML Mr. Nadeem Afzal Chan,

MNA

PPPP Member

3. RAi Mansab Ali Khan,

MNA

PML Mr. Noor Alam Khan, MNA PPPP Member

4. Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan

Jatoi, MNA

PML Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah,

MNA

PPPP Member

5. Sardar Ashiq Hussain

Gopang, MNA

PML Mrs. Rukhsana Bangash,

MNA

PPPP Member

6. Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA PML Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,

MNA

PPPP Member

7. Mr. Muhammad Safdar

Shakir, MNA

PML Rana Muhammad Farooq

Saeed Khan, MNA

PPPP Member

8. Mr. Ali Akbar Mazhar

Wains, MNA

PML Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira,

MNA

PPPP Member

9. Maj. (R) Tanvir Hussain

Syed, MNA

PPPP Begum Shehnaz Sheikh,

MNA

PML Member

10. Prof. Aasiya Azeem, MNA PML Khawaja Mohammad Asif,

MNA

PML-N Member

11. Ch. Wajahat Hussain PML Mr. Zahid Hamid PML-N Member

12. Mr. Kunwar Khalid

Younus, MNA

MQM Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, MNA PML-N Member

13. Makhdoom Shah

Mahmood Hussain

Qureshi, MNA

PPPP Mr. Muhammad Pervaiz

Malik, MNA

PML-N Member

14. Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira,

MNA

PPPP Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA PML Member

15. Syed Qurban Ali Shah,

MNA

PPPP Mr. Hamid Yar Hiraj, MNA PML Member

16. Mr. Liaqat Baloch, MNA MMAP Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi,

MNA

MQM Member

17. Hafiz Hussain Ahmed,

MNA

MMAP Mr. Asfandyar Wali, MNA ANP Member

18. Maulana Abdul Ghafoor

Haidri, MNA

MMAP Mrs. Asyia Nisar, MNA MMAP Member

19. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA PML-N Mr. Saeed Ahmed Zafar,

MNA

IND Member

20. -- -- Mian Riaz Hussian Pirzada,

MNA

PML Member

21. -- -- Mr. Wasim Akhtar, MNA MQM Member

22. -- -- Mr. Noor-ul-Haq Qadri,

MNA

IND Member

23. Mr. Omer Ayub Khan

Minister of State for

Finance

PML Minister-in-Charge for

Finance & Revenue

-- Ex-Officio

182

Annex-VII

Recovery Status since 2000-2011

183

Annex-VIII

Survey Questionnaire

Assessment of 12th

PAC (2004-07)

Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan

The purpose of this questionnaire is to compare the functioning of 12th and 13th

PAC, identify factors that can improve the success of the Public Accounts

Committee (PAC) of the legislature in monitoring the financial accountability of the Government of Pakistan.

1. Who was the best Chair of the PAC from (Please check one): the Governing Party? (____) or an Opposition Party? (____)

2. Is the Committee staff sufficient to support PAC? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____

3. Is there sufficient Research Facility available to Members Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____

4. Do you think, PAC took quick and in time decisions? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____

5. Are you satisfied with the PAC‘s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____

Accounts/Grants

6. What were the causes of delay in the formation of 12th

PAC? ..............................................................................................

7. Did the 12th

PAC achieve any of the following types of results or successes? If so, please indicate how often:

7.1 Government responds favorably to Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.2 Government implements Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.3 Changes in legislation were adopted as a result of Committee work: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.4 Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.5 Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.6 Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.7 The Committee successfully resisted political pressure exerted on it frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.8 The Principal Accounting Officers found hiding facts before PAC frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.9 The Committee adopted and practiced latest oversight developments frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.10 The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.11 The Committee is adherence to financial control of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.12 The Committee follows the policy of waste prevention frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.13 The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

8. Some suggest the following factors contribute to the success of a Public Accounts Committee. With reference to the powers and practices of

Committee, how important do you think each of the following factors has been during the 12 PAC? Please circle the appropriate number rating each

184

factor as either: 1 - very important; 2 - somewhat important; 3 - not important; or 4 - not applicable. You are welcome to add any other factors that are

missing in the space at the end of this question.

Some possible success factors 1=Very important

2=Somewhat important

3=Not Important

4=Not Applicable

Composition of the Committee

8.1 Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee 1 2 3 4

8.2 Membership should exclude ministers of the Government 1 2 3 4

Committee Powers

8.3 Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of 1 2 3 4

taxpayers‘ money and its stewardship over public assets

8.4 Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad 1 2 3 4

8.5 Having a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts 1 2 3 4

8.6 Having a permanent reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 1 2 3 4

8.7 Power to call independent witnesses 1 2 3 4

8.8 Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government, 1 2 3 4

Organizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporations

8.9 Power to request (but not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks 1 2 3 4

8.10 Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, 1 2 3 4

performance even after they have left office

8.11 Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 1 2 3 4

8.12 Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 1 2 3 4

8.13 Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 1 2 3 4

8.14 Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues 1 2 3 4

8.16 Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act 1 2 3 4

8.17 Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 1 2 3 4

8.18 Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice 1 2 3 4

8.19 Power to compel Ministers to appear before the committee: 1 2 3 4

8.20 Powers to take Suo-Motu actions 1 2 3 4

8.21 Powers to listen Public Complaints and take action 1 2 3 4

8.22 Powers to take action on media review 1 2 3 4

185

8.23 Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements 1 2 3 4

8.24 Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 1 2 3 4

Committee Practices

8.25 Close working relationship between members from different political parties 1 2 3 4

8.26 Advance preparation of members before hearings 1 2 3 4

Members receives Audit Briefs well in time

8.27 Close working relationship with Auditor General 1 2 3 4

8.28 Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearings 1 2 3 4

8.29 Formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog 1 2 3 4

8.30 Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of 1 2 3 4

committee work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports

8.31 Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 1 2 3 4

8.32 Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament 1 2 3 4

and stays active between sessions

8.33 Televised public hearings 1 2 3 4

8.34 Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 1 2 3 4

8.35 Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 1 2 3 4

8.36 Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience 1 2 3 4

8.37 Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience 1 2 3 4

8.38 Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside 1 2 3 4

the normal legislative session

8.39 Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 1 2 3 4

8.40 Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations 1 2 3 4

8.41 Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken 1 2 3 4

to implement the committee’s recommendations

8.42 Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms 1 2 3 4

such as the budget committee

Other important success factors for 12th PAC:

8.43…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4

8.44………………………….…........................................................ 1 2 3 4

8.45…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4

186

9. Of those factors you rated “1 - very important” in question 9, which three have been most crucial in achieving successful results during the 12th

PAC?

Why?

#1 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………..............................................................................................

#2 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………........................................................... .................................

#3 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………........................................................... ..................................

10. Of those factors in Question 9 that do not currently apply to 12th PAC (i.e. those you rated “4”), do you think that any of these powers and practices

might make committee more effective? Please list them, and explain why.

..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ..............

................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ..................

............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ......................

11. Are there any documents that describe the strength of 12th

PAC, best practice on a winning ground in comparison with 13th

PAC? If so, could you

please attach copies, or list them and let me know where they can be obtained?

………………………………................................................................................................................. ..................................................................................................

...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

......................................…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

12. Please describe the Role of Chair in two or three lines.

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

13. Please feel free to add or attach any additional comments that you would like to make.

………………………………................................................................................................................. ..................................................................................................

...................................................................................................................................………………………………................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................

....................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................

Thank you very much for your time and assistance. The results of this survey will be summarized and a copy sent to all those who respond, after the

study is completed

187

Annex-IX

Survey Questionnaire

Assessment of 13th

PAC (2008-11)

Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan

The purpose of this questionnaire is to compare the functioning of 12th

and 13th

PAC, identify factors that can improve the success of the Public Accounts

Committee (PAC) of the legislature in monitoring the financial accountability of the Government of Pakistan. The time period of this study terminates with the

resignation of Ch. Nisar Ali khan on 27th

November, 2011.

1. Who was the best Chair of the PAC from (Please check one): the Governing Party? (____) or an Opposition Party? (____)

2. Is the Committee staff sufficient to support PAC? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____

3. Is there sufficient Research Facility available to Members Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____

4. Do you think, PAC took quick and in time decisions? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____

5. Are you satisfied with the PAC‘s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____

Accounts/Grants

6 What were the causes of delay in the formation of 13th

PAC? .............................................................................................

7. Did the 13th

PAC achieve any of the following types of results or successes? If so, please indicate how often:

7.1 Government responds favourably to Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.2 Government implements Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.3 Changes in legislation were adopted as a result of Committee work: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.4 Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.5 Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.6 Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines: frequently_____ seldom_____ never___--

7.7 The Committee successfully resisted political pressure exerted on it frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.8 The Principal Accounting Officers found hiding facts before PAC frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.9 The Committee adopted and practiced latest oversight developments frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.10 The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.11 The Committee is adherence to financial control of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.12 The Committee follows the policy of waste prevention frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

7.13 The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____

188

8. Some suggest the following factors contribute to the success of a Public Accounts Committee. With reference to the powers and practices of

Committee, how important do you think each of the following factors has been during the 13th

PAC? Please circle the appropriate number rating each

factor as either: 1 - very important; 2 - somewhat important; 3 - not important; or 4 - not applicable. You are welcome to add any other factors that are

missing in the space at the end of this question.

Some possible success factors 1=Very important

2=Somewhat important

3=Not Important

4=Not Applicable

Composition of the Committee

8.1 Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee 1 2 3 4

8.2 Membership should exclude ministers of the Government 1 2 3 4

Committee Powers

8.3 Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of 1 2 3 4

taxpayers‘ money and its stewardship over public assets

8.4 Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad 1 2 3 4

8.5 Having a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts 1 2 3 4

8.6 Having a permanent reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 1 2 3 4

8.7 Power to call independent witnesses 1 2 3 4

8.8 Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government, 1 2 3 4

Organizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporations

8.9 Power to request (but not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks 1 2 3 4

8.10 Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, 1 2 3 4

performance even after they have left office

8.11 Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 1 2 3 4

8.12 Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 1 2 3 4

8.13 Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 1 2 3 4

8.14 Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues 1 2 3 4

8.16 Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act 1 2 3 4

8.17 Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 1 2 3 4

8.18 Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice 1 2 3 4

8.19 Power to compel Ministers to appear before the committee: 1 2 3 4

8.20 Powers to take Suo-Motu actions 1 2 3 4

189

8.21 Powers to listen Public Complaints and take action 1 2 3 4

8.22 Powers to take action on media review 1 2 3 4

8.23 Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements 1 2 3 4

8.24 Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 1 2 3 4

Committee Practices

8.25 Close working relationship between members from different political parties 1 2 3 4

8.26 Advance preparation of members before hearings 1 2 3 4

Members receives Audit Briefs well in time

8.27 Close working relationship with Auditor General 1 2 3 4

8.28 Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearings 1 2 3 4

8.29 Formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog 1 2 3 4

8.30 Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of 1 2 3 4

committee work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports

8.31 Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 1 2 3 4

8.32 Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament 1 2 3 4

and stays active between sessions

8.33 Televised public hearings 1 2 3 4

8.34 Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 1 2 3 4

8.35 Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 1 2 3 4

8.36 Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience 1 2 3 4

8.37 Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience 1 2 3 4

8.38 Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside 1 2 3 4

the normal legislative session

8.39 Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 1 2 3 4

8.40 Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations 1 2 3 4

8.41 Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken 1 2 3 4

to implement the committee’s recommendations

8.42 Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms 1 2 3 4

such as the budget committee

Other important success factors for 13th PAC:

8.43…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4

8.44………………………….…........................................................ 1 2 3 4

190

8.45…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4

9. Of those factors you rated “1 - very important” in question 9, which three have been most crucial in achieving successful results during the 13th

PAC? Why?

1 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………......................................................................................... .

2 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………............................................................ ..............................

3 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………............................................................ ..............................

10. Of those factors in Question 9 that do not currently apply to 13th PAC (i.e. those you rated “4”), do you think that any of these powers and practices

might make committee more effective? Please list them, and explain why.

................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ................................

...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ........................................

11. Are there any documents that describe the strength of 13th PAC, best practice on a winning ground in comparison with 12th

PAC? If so, could you

please attach copies, or list them and let me know where they can be obtained?

………………………………........................................................................................................ ...........................................................................................................

...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

......................................…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

12. Please describe the Role of Chair in two or three lines.

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

13. Please feel free to add or attach any additional comments that you would like to make.

………………………………................................................................................................................. ............................................................................................ ......

...................................................................................................................................………………………………................................................................................

.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .........

Thank you very much for your time and assistance. The results of this survey will be summarized and a copy sent to all those who respond, after the

study is completed

191

Annex-X

CCCER MODEL

Condition: Assertion of facts based on evidence (Oral, documentary, testimonial, visual) reflecting an

undesirable state of affairs, a violation of criteria, in the organization being audited and that comes

within the purview of audit. A favorable condition can also be reflected in the audit findings as a

reason for audit opinion. In such cases auditors may like to give recommendations the implementation

of which would be necessary for sustaining those conditions. Condition takes the form of audit finding.

Criteria: Primary and secondary legislation (Constitution, Enactments, Presidential Orders, Orders of

the Governors), rules, codes, procedures, standards, professional norms, best practice, principles,

concepts, policy statements, plans, vision, objectives, goals ,targets, benchmarks, anything that

provides a guideline or direction to certain course of action.

Cause: Cause is the reason for the existence of condition with reference to a systemic situation

like failure of internal controls. Cause of a condition could also be an immediate cause like for

example a theft taking place because the security person was sleeping. The auditor should be more

interested in what led to such a situation. It could be one person operating three or two shifts and

absence of: any control procedures or better management practice like outsourcing security.

Sometimes, even when procedures exist, lack of effective communication can become cause of control

failure.

Effect: Effect relates to the issue of materiality and significance of audit finding or condition. Material

finding may not always relate to a monetary limit. A failure of a disaster recovery program or a critical

illness or disease or epidemic prevention program is critical, irrespective of monetary values or the

population it is effecting. Effect is however the most important stepping stone towards creating an

impact of the auditing finding and gives relevance to the recommendation also.

Conclusion: Conclusion is basically the opinion the auditor forms about the condition on which to

base the suggested a course of action. The opinion should be based on well considered evidence that

should surface after the application of the criteria, cause and effect relating to the condition.

Conclusion is the most sensitive area of audit reporting and should be thoroughly discussed with the

auditee. It is the conclusion that has to be ultimately justified and defended in the PAC. The conclusion

must be clearly related to the other elements of cause, criteria reflecting the condition.

Recommendation: The recommendation should specific and not vague e.g. Improve controls. It

means nothing., identify measurable actions, should generally specify timelines One criteria is that the

PAO should take the recommendations forward to come up with an implementation plan with action

stations and timelines.