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pyHHnr Getting MRCA Airborne I N T E R N A T I O N A L
ncorporating A E R O P L A N E
Thursday 16 October 1969
Number 3162 Volume 96
Founded in 1909. Official organ of the Royal Aero Club. First aeronautical weekly in the world. Published by lliffe Transport Publications Ltd, Dorset House, Stamford Street, London SE1. Telephone 01-928 3333 Telegrams/Telex: Flight lliffepres London 25137 © IPC Business Press Ltd 1969
Editor: J. M. Ramsden Air transport editor: H. A. Taylor Production editor: Roy Casey Assistant editor: Humphrey Wynn, BA Assistant technical editor: Michael Wilson, BSc, CEng, FBIS, AFRAeS Photographic librarian: Ann C. Tilbury
Advertisement manager: David Holmes
Editorial director: Maurice A. Smith, DFC Managing director: H. N. Priaulx, MBE
In this issue
World News 586
A i r Transport 588
Light Commercial and Business 594
Private Flying 596
Britain's Jaguar Emerges 600
Specia l Feature:
British Air l ines Survey 605
Letters 615
Russia's Penetrators 617
Industry International 618
Defence 619
Spacefl ight 622
Straight and Level 624
Front Cover: At Gatwick Airport, London, a focal point of non-scheduled operations in Britain. In the foreground is a BAC One-Eleven of Laker Airways with, behind, a Caledonian Airways Boeing 707-320C. A special survey of British airlines begins on page 605
Although the RAF no longer performs Britain's nuclear deterrent role, it still has a nuclear strike capability for which the Vulcans in Strike Command are chiefly responsible. It is these aircraft which would be replaced by the Multi-role Combat Aircraft if that project turns into hardware. If it does not, the RAF will have to look elsewhere for an advanced strike aircraft.
At present, those outside the Government departments responsible for the MRCA may be forgiven if they regard it with a certain amount of scepticism. Too many cancellations have preceded it, and the morals drawn from the TSR.2 story are of costs rising to unacceptable levels.
In tneir recently published Case Study of the TSR.2, extracts from which were published in Flight last week, Dr Geoffrey Williams and his colleagues made the point that no detailed breakdown of either estimated or actual expenditure on the programme had yet been given; that it was impossible to discover an accurate assessment of comparative costs of completing the programme or purchasing F- l l lKs. Did the cancellation in fact save Britain money and, if so, how much?
In our issue of July 27, 1967, we challenged the Defence Minister's claim that cancellation would save the country £700 million. This, we said, ignored the £200 million already spent on TSR.2 and made a dubious comparison between TSR.2 and AFVG operating costs over a 15-year period. We commented: "Defence planning and costing like this get the country nowhere."
Now TSR.2, F-111K and AFVG are no more; MoD hopes are pinned on the MRCA. But are there grounds for thinking that this project is likely to be any more successful? Dr Williams and his colleagues are not sure. Referring to what happened over TSR.2 they point to weaknesses in project management, a lack of frankness by the Government, over-complications in the operational requirement, and an underestimation of the task which led to under-estimation of costs.
These risks are all potentially inherent in the MRCA project, and may be magnified because three governments are involved. Referring to only one (albeit a major) aspect of such a project—that of costs—Dr Williams and his colleagues say that "in view of the nature of the decision-making processes inherent in agreeing specifications and cost figures for multi-national weapons systems projects, one must doubt whether any international projects in which Britain is concerned will undergo an effective process of cost-effectiveness analysis and evaluation."
Specification, in the context of MRCA, means catering for the requirements of three air forces; it also means that the RAF need is for an aircraft largely to operate in a European environment and only occasionally overseas—because by the end of 1971 Britain will have relinquished her East of Suez commitments.
The RAF requirement therefore can reasonably be scaled down to an aircraft which will have European range only and not a ferry range for Far East deployment. The latter operation involves a large supply of tankers, and the RAF will hardly have enough if its Victor tanker fleet is not increased, which looks unlikely, or unless it purchases another type of tanker. An alternative possibility might be a purchase of C-5As which, with their ability to carry 100,0001b over 5,000-mile stages, would provide the means of getting RAF MRCA-type aircraft out to an East of Suez theatre without flight refuelling, though this would need considerable engineering back-up.
If the over-detailed operational requirements which were one factor in the demise of TSR.2 can be avoided in the MRCA project, which is not for so complex an aircraft as TSR.2, there is at least a hope that MRCA will actually come into the RAF inventory in the late 1970s. There is a pressing need, both for the Germans and the British, for the MRCA: undoubtedly the former are keen to build it, and on the British side every effort should be made to prevent elaboration of the operational requirement and therefore escalation of cost.