pyHHnr Getting MRCA Airborne I N T E R N A T I O N A L

ncorporating A E R O P L A N E

Thursday 16 October 1969

Number 3162 Volume 96

Founded in 1909. Official organ of the Royal Aero Club. First aeronautical weekly in the world. Published by lliffe Transport Publications Ltd, Dorset House, Stamford Street, London SE1. Telephone 01-928 3333 Telegrams/Telex: Flight lliffepres London 25137 © IPC Business Press Ltd 1969

Editor: J. M. Ramsden Air transport editor: H. A. Taylor Production editor: Roy Casey Assistant editor: Humphrey Wynn, BA Assistant technical editor: Michael Wilson, BSc, CEng, FBIS, AFRAeS Photographic librarian: Ann C. Tilbury

Advertisement manager: David Holmes

Editorial director: Maurice A. Smith, DFC Managing director: H. N. Priaulx, MBE

In this issue

World News 586

A i r Transport 588

Light Commercial and Business 594

Private Flying 596

Britain's Jaguar Emerges 600

Specia l Feature:

British Air l ines Survey 605

Letters 615

Russia's Penetrators 617

Industry International 618

Defence 619

Spacefl ight 622

Straight and Level 624

Front Cover: At Gatwick Airport, London, a focal point of non-scheduled operations in Britain. In the foreground is a BAC One-Eleven of Laker Airways with, behind, a Caledonian Airways Boeing 707-320C. A special survey of British airlines begins on page 605

Although the RAF no longer performs Britain's nuclear deterrent role, it still has a nuclear strike capa­bility for which the Vulcans in Strike Command are chiefly responsible. It is these aircraft which would be replaced by the Multi-role Combat Aircraft if that project turns into hard­ware. If it does not, the RAF will have to look elsewhere for an advanced strike aircraft.

At present, those outside the Govern­ment departments responsible for the MRCA may be forgiven if they regard it with a certain amount of scepticism. Too many cancellations have preceded it, and the morals drawn from the TSR.2 story are of costs rising to unacceptable levels.

In tneir recently published Case Study of the TSR.2, extracts from which were published in Flight last week, Dr Geoffrey Williams and his colleagues made the point that no detailed breakdown of either estimated or actual expenditure on the pro­gramme had yet been given; that it was impossible to discover an accurate assessment of comparative costs of completing the programme or purchas­ing F- l l lKs. Did the cancellation in fact save Britain money and, if so, how much?

In our issue of July 27, 1967, we challenged the Defence Minister's claim that cancellation would save the country £700 million. This, we said, ignored the £200 million already spent on TSR.2 and made a dubious com­parison between TSR.2 and AFVG operating costs over a 15-year period. We commented: "Defence planning and costing like this get the country nowhere."

Now TSR.2, F-111K and AFVG are no more; MoD hopes are pinned on the MRCA. But are there grounds for thinking that this project is likely to be any more successful? Dr Williams and his colleagues are not sure. Referring to what happened over TSR.2 they point to weaknesses in project manage­ment, a lack of frankness by the Government, over-complications in the operational requirement, and an under­estimation of the task which led to under-estimation of costs.

These risks are all potentially inher­ent in the MRCA project, and may be magnified because three governments are involved. Referring to only one (albeit a major) aspect of such a project—that of costs—Dr Williams and his colleagues say that "in view of the nature of the decision-making processes inherent in agreeing specifica­tions and cost figures for multi-national weapons systems projects, one must doubt whether any international pro­jects in which Britain is concerned will undergo an effective process of cost-effectiveness analysis and evaluation."

Specification, in the context of MRCA, means catering for the require­ments of three air forces; it also means that the RAF need is for an aircraft largely to operate in a European environment and only occasionally overseas—because by the end of 1971 Britain will have relinquished her East of Suez commitments.

The RAF requirement therefore can reasonably be scaled down to an air­craft which will have European range only and not a ferry range for Far East deployment. The latter operation involves a large supply of tankers, and the RAF will hardly have enough if its Victor tanker fleet is not increased, which looks unlikely, or unless it pur­chases another type of tanker. An alternative possibility might be a pur­chase of C-5As which, with their ability to carry 100,0001b over 5,000-mile stages, would provide the means of getting RAF MRCA-type aircraft out to an East of Suez theatre without flight refuelling, though this would need considerable engineering back-up.

If the over-detailed operational requirements which were one factor in the demise of TSR.2 can be avoided in the MRCA project, which is not for so complex an aircraft as TSR.2, there is at least a hope that MRCA will actually come into the RAF inventory in the late 1970s. There is a pressing need, both for the Germans and the British, for the MRCA: undoubtedly the former are keen to build it, and on the British side every effort should be made to prevent elaboration of the operational requirement and therefore escalation of cost.