Download - HuismanG Design for embodied interaction
E M B O D I E D I N T E R A C T I O N G I J S H UI S MA N , P h D
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T U DE L F T 0 7/ 0 7/ 2 0
D E S I G N F O R
@_Gijs [email protected]
gijshuisman.com
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A SPONGE IS NOT SOFT
GH
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A SPONGE IS NOT SOFT
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KISSING IS HARD
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A SPONGE IS NOT SOFT
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KISSING IS HARD
INTERACTION SHOULD BE LIKE DANCING
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Xerox PARC (1970s) WIMP
iPhone (2007) Touch screen
Dourish (2001)GH
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Mind
Body
Dourish (2001), Newell (1980) Simon (1980)
Software
Hardware
GH
‘TRADITIONAL’ COGNITION PA
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The mind is ‘software’ that runs on the body’s ‘hardware’.
Mind
Body
Dourish (2001), Newell (1980) Simon (1980)
Software
Hardware
GH
‘TRADITIONAL’ COGNITION PA
GE
04
The mind is ‘software’ that runs on the body’s ‘hardware’.
Mind
Body
Dourish (2001), Newell (1980) Simon (1980)
Software
Hardware
Cognition is processing of information in mental models in the mind that represent the outside world.
GH
‘TRADITIONAL’ COGNITION PA
GE
04
The mind is ‘software’ that runs on the body’s ‘hardware’.
Mind
Body
Dourish (2001), Newell (1980) Simon (1980)
Software
Hardware
Cognition is processing of information in mental models in the mind that represent the outside world.
The mind explains behavior, the body is an ‘output device’.
GH
‘TRADITIONAL’ COGNITION PA
GE
04
The mind is ‘software’ that runs on the body’s ‘hardware’.
Mind
Body
Dourish (2001), Newell (1980) Simon (1980)
Software
Hardware
Cognition is processing of information in mental models in the mind that represent the outside world.
The mind explains behavior, the body is an ‘output device’.
GH
‘TRADITIONAL’ COGNITION PA
GE
04
Smartphone Homunculus - Nan Zhao
Skill development
Relation to the ‘real world’
Relation to others
(Mental) Health and well-being
Image of ourselves
Inclusiveness, (neuro-) diversity
CONCERNS
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Skill development
Relation to the ‘real world’
Relation to others
(Mental) Health and well-being
Image of ourselves
Inclusiveness, (neuro-) diversity
CONCERNS
Office worker of the future ‘Emma’
GH
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“ Do we manage because of, or despite the way we design our interactive technology?
GH
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Mind
Body
Dissolve the mind/body split.
Cognition is in the relation between mind, body, and environment.
We think through action/movement.
EMBODIED COGNITION
GH Wilson (2002)
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Mind
Body
Dissolve the mind/body split.
Cognition is in the relation between mind, body, and environment.
We think through action/movement.
EMBODIED COGNITION
GH Wilson (2002)
PA
GE
08
Environment
Mind
Body
Dissolve the mind/body split.
Cognition is in the relation between mind, body, and environment.
We think through action/movement.
EMBODIED COGNITION
GH Wilson (2002)
PA
GE
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Baggs, E., & Chemero, A. (2018), Di Paolo & De Jaegher (2015), Menary (2010), Newen et al. (2018)
Embodied Extended Embedded Enactive Ecological Situated
Phenomenology
Learning LanguageSocial cognition Emotions
Tool use
Evolution
MemorySchizophrenia Shame Autism Play
Participatory sense-making
GH
PA
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Baggs, E., & Chemero, A. (2018), Di Paolo & De Jaegher (2015), Menary (2010), Newen et al. (2018)
Embodied Extended Embedded Enactive Ecological Situated
Phenomenology
Learning LanguageSocial cognition Emotions
Tool use
Evolution
MemorySchizophrenia Shame Autism Play
Participatory sense-making
GH
PA
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09
Baggs, E., & Chemero, A. (2018), Di Paolo & De Jaegher (2015), Menary (2010), Newen et al. (2018)
Embodied Extended Embedded Enactive Ecological Situated
Phenomenology
Learning LanguageSocial cognition Emotions
Tool use
Evolution
MemorySchizophrenia Shame Autism Play
Participatory sense-making
GH
PA
GE
09
Baggs, E., & Chemero, A. (2018), Di Paolo & De Jaegher (2015), Menary (2010), Newen et al. (2018)
Embodied Extended Embedded Enactive Ecological Situated
Phenomenology
Learning LanguageSocial cognition Emotions
Tool use
Evolution
MemorySchizophrenia Shame Autism Play
Participatory sense-making
GH
PA
GE
09
Di Paolo et al. (2010), Thompson & Stapleton (2009), Varela et al. (1991)GH
ENACTIVISM
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Di Paolo et al. (2010), Thompson & Stapleton (2009), Varela et al. (1991)GH
ENACTIVISM
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Originally a biological theory looking at the cell.
As living beings we are more process than thing.
Di Paolo et al. (2010), Thompson & Stapleton (2009), Varela et al. (1991)GH
ENACTIVISM
PA
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Originally a biological theory looking at the cell.
As living beings we are more process than thing.
Di Paolo et al. (2010), Thompson & Stapleton (2009), Varela et al. (1991)GH
These processes create a self-maintaining structure that separates us from the external world.
ENACTIVISM
PA
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Originally a biological theory looking at the cell.
As living beings we are more process than thing.
Di Paolo et al. (2010), Thompson & Stapleton (2009), Varela et al. (1991)GH
These processes create a self-maintaining structure that separates us from the external world.
ENACTIVISM
This structure means that we have certain needs and constraints.
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Originally a biological theory looking at the cell.
GH
SENSE-MAKING: A SPONGE IS NOT SOFT
“Simply being alive means that an agent is coordinating its own activity with that of its environment. […] An event, process, or object in the world only exists for the agent insofar as it affects and can be brought into coordination with the agent’s own on-going activity – it is the world made sense of by the organism.”
- McGann (2014), p.2
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GH
SENSE-MAKING: A SPONGE IS NOT SOFT
“Simply being alive means that an agent is coordinating its own activity with that of its environment. […] An event, process, or object in the world only exists for the agent insofar as it affects and can be brought into coordination with the agent’s own on-going activity – it is the world made sense of by the organism.”
- McGann (2014), p.2
Sense-making is relational. We actively participate in generating meaning in what matters to us; we enact a world.
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PARTICIPATORY SENSE-MAKING
“the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own.”
- De Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007), p.497
GH
PARTICIPATORY SENSE-MAKING
When sense-makers meet: My sense-making of your sense-making affects your sense-making of my sense-making etc.
“the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own.”
- De Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007), p.497
GH
PARTICIPATORY SENSE-MAKING
When sense-makers meet: My sense-making of your sense-making affects your sense-making of my sense-making etc.
“the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own.”
- De Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007), p.497
: KISSING IS HARD
GH
PARTICIPATORY SENSE-MAKING THROUGH TOUCH
In Touch Brave & Dahley (1997)
Distributed Rope Pulling Beelen et al. (2013)
Tovertafel (Active Cues)
GH
INTERACTION SHOULD BE LIKE DANCING
Auvray et al. (2009), De Jaegher et al. (2010), Klemmer et al. (2006)GH
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INTERACTION SHOULD BE LIKE DANCING
Auvray et al. (2009), De Jaegher et al. (2010), Klemmer et al. (2006)GH
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Take the active body seriously in interaction design.
INTERACTION SHOULD BE LIKE DANCING
Research through design can be a great method to study participatory sense-making.
Auvray et al. (2009), De Jaegher et al. (2010), Klemmer et al. (2006)GH
PA
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15
Take the active body seriously in interaction design.
INTERACTION SHOULD BE LIKE DANCING
Research through design can be a great method to study participatory sense-making.
We can design artifacts to mediate participatory sense-making.
Auvray et al. (2009), De Jaegher et al. (2010), Klemmer et al. (2006)GH
PA
GE
15
Take the active body seriously in interaction design.
INTERACTION SHOULD BE LIKE DANCING
Research through design can be a great method to study participatory sense-making.
We can design artifacts to mediate participatory sense-making.
Auvray et al. (2009), De Jaegher et al. (2010), Klemmer et al. (2006)GH
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This way we can study how design decisions impact the ‘choreography of the dance’.
Take the active body seriously in interaction design.
A SPONGE IS NOT SOFTCognition is sense-making; a relational process where we participate in the generation of meaning through interaction with the environment.
GH
A SPONGE IS NOT SOFTCognition is sense-making; a relational process where we participate in the generation of meaning through interaction with the environment.
KISSING IS HARDWhen sense-makers meet the coordination of activity can create an interaction that is self-sustaining.
GH
A SPONGE IS NOT SOFTCognition is sense-making; a relational process where we participate in the generation of meaning through interaction with the environment.
KISSING IS HARDWhen sense-makers meet the coordination of activity can create an interaction that is self-sustaining.
INTERACTION SHOULD BE LIKE DANCINGInteraction should not be an exchange of messages, but should support participatory sense-making.
GH
T H A N K S ! G I J S H UI S MA N , P h D
GH
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17T U DE L F T 0 7/ 0 7/ 2 0
@_Gijs [email protected]
gijshuisman.com
Auvray, M., Lenay, C., & Stewart, J. (2009). Perceptual interactions in a minimalist virtual environment. New ideas in psychology, 27(1), 32-47.
Baggs, E., & Chemero, A. (2018). Radical embodiment in two directions. Synthese, 1-16.
Beelen, T., Blaauboer, R., Bovenmars, N., Loos, B., Zielonka, L., Van Delden, R., ... & Reidsma, D. (2013, November). The art of tug of war: investigating the influence of remote touch on social presence in a distributed rope pulling game. In International Conference on Advances in Computer Entertainment Technology (pp. 246-257). Springer.
Brave, S., & Dahley, A. (1997). inTouch: a medium for haptic interpersonal communication. In CHI'97 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 363-364).
Di Paolo, E. A., & De Jaegher, H. (2015). Toward an embodied science of intersubjectivity: widening the scope of social understanding research. Frontiers in psychology, 6, 234.
Di Paolo, E., Rohde, M., & De Jaegher, H. (2010). Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play. In Enaction: Towards a new paradigm for cognitive science.
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 6(4), 485-507.
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010). Can social interaction constitute social cognition?. Trends in cognitive sciences, 14(10), 441-447.
Dourish, P. (2001). Where the action is. Cambridge: MIT press.
Froese, T., Iizuka, H., & Ikegami, T. (2014). Using minimal human-computer interfaces for studying the interactive development of social awareness. Frontiers in psychology, 5, 1061.
Klemmer, S. R., Hartmann, B., & Takayama, L. (2006, June). How bodies matter: five themes for interaction design. In Proceedings of the 6th conference on Designing Interactive systems (pp. 140-149).
McGann, M. (2014). Enacting a social ecology: radically embodied intersubjectivity. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1321.
Menary, R. (2010). Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 459-463.
Newell, A. (1980). Physical symbol systems. Cognitive science, 4(2), 135-183.
Newen, A., De Bruin, L., & Gallagher, S. (Eds.). (2018). The Oxford handbook of 4E cognition. Oxford University Press.
Simon, H. A. (1980). Cognitive science: The newest science of the artificial. Cognitive science, 4(1), 33-46.
Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2009). Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories. Topoi, 28(1), 23-30.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT press.
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9(4), 625-636.
Bonus: Sidi Larbi Cherkaoui (choreographer)