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Inna Hakobyan
University of
Leicester "Peculiarities of Russian-Armenian relations in the
process of democratization in Armenia: why is
Russian influence so strong in Armenia and what
are the limitations of EU influence in Armenia?"
Working paper
Paper prepared for the conference on „The European
Neighbourhood Policy: Aims and Impact‟ , University of
Leicester, 18 June, 2011
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"Peculiarities of Russian-Armenian relations in the
process of democratization in Armenia: why is
Russian influence so strong in Armenia and what
are the limitations of EU influence in Armenia?"
Introduction
Like many other countries of ex Soviet Union, Armenia had little experience with
democracy prior to the 1990s. It has experienced many identity problems relating to
its frequently changing boundaries over the centuries and to its relationships with
other states. As Offe (1991) has argued, creating a new political system is much more
difficult for a country whose boundaries are still contested.
Due to its strategic significance, Armenia was constantly fought over and constantly
passed back and forth by many empires throughout history. Armenia lies in the
highlands surrounding the Biblical mountains of Ararat. The name Armenia was
given to the country by the surrounding states, and it is traditionally derived from
Armenak or Aram. In 301, Armenia became the first nation to adopt Christianity as a
state religion. It established a church that still exists independently of both the
Catholic and the eastern Orthodox churches, having become so in 451 after having
rejected the Council of Chalcedon. Due to its adopted religion Armenia became the
playground for neighbouring countries and was conquered at various stages during
centuries. However the most significant invasion was in 1915, when the Ottoman
Empire systematically carried out the Armenian Genocide. This genocide was
preceded by a wave of massacres in the years 1894 to 1896. In 1915, with World War
1 in progress, the Ottoman Turks accused the (Christian) Armenians as liable to ally
with Russia and treated the entire Armenian population as an enemy within their
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empire in a wave of ethnic cleansing. The events of 1915 to 1923 are regarded by
Armenians and the vast majority of Western historians to have been state-sponsored
mass killings. Turkish authorities, however, maintain that the deaths were the result of
a civil war coupled with disease and famine, with casualties incurred by both sides.
The exact number of deaths is hard to establish, however, it is estimated that close to a
million and a half Armenians perished in camps, which excludes Armenians who may
have died in other ways. Thus between the 4th and 19th centuries, the traditional
Armenia was conquered and ruled by Persians, Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols and
Turks, among others. In 1922, Armenia became part of the Soviet Union as one of
the three republics comprising the Transcaucasian SFSR however this was dissolved
in 1936 and as a result Armenia became a constituent republic of the Soviet Union as
the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. The transition to communism was very
difficult for Armenia, and for most of the other republics in the Soviet Union. The
Soviet authorities placed Armenians under strict surveillance. There was no freedom
of speech, even less so under Joseph Stalin. Any individual who was suspected of
using or introducing nationalist rhetoric or elements in their works were labelled
traitors or propagandists, and were sent to Siberia during Stalinist rule.
Soviet Armenia participated in the World War 2 by sending hundreds of thousands of
soldiers to the frontline in order to defend the “Soviet Motherland”. However, Soviet
rule had some positive aspects, as Armenia benefited from the Soviet economy,
especially when it was at its peak. Provincial villages gradually became towns and
towns became cities. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was reached, albeit
temporarily. During this period, Armenia was populated by a sizeable Azeri minority,
mostly centred in Yerevan. Likewise, Azerbaijan had an Armenian minority,
concentrated in Baku, Kirovabad and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this demographic
would change dramatically during and after Nagorno-Karabakh war.
In the late 1980s, Armenia was suffering from pollution. With Mikhail Gorbachev‟s
introduction of “Glasnost and Perestroyka”, public demonstrations became more
common. Thousand of Armenians demonstrated in Yerevan because of the USSR‟s
inability to address simple ecological concerns. Later on, with the conflict in
Karabakh, the demonstrations obtained a more nationalistic movement. Many
Armenians began to demand statehood and independence.
Armenia declared its sovereignty from the Soviet Union on August 23, 1990. In the
wake of the August Coup, a referendum was held on the question of secession.
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Following an overwhelming vote in favour, full independence was declared on
September 21, 1991. On October 16, 1991, Armenians elected Levon Ter-Petrossian
as their first president. Ter-Petrossian was faced with many challenges, including
economic difficulties caused mainly by the Turkish and Azeri blockade. His
controversial banning of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, one of the main
organised political entities in the Armenian Diaspora, and his apathy toward the
pursuit of recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the Nagorno- Karabakh
Republic made him unpopular with the general public and Diaspora Armenians
during his final years as president. He was forced to resign in February 1998.
Armenia faced many challenges during its first years as a sovereign state. In 1988, the
Spitak Earthquake killed tens of thousands of people and destroyed multiple towns in
northern Armenia, such as Leninakan (modern day Gyumri) and Spitak. Many
families were displaced and were left without basic commodities. The harsh situation
caused by the earthquake and subsequent events made hundreds of thousands of
Armenians leave the country and settle in North America, Western Europe and
Russia. These conditions were made worse when on February 20, 1989, interethnic
fighting between the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region
in Azerbaijan, voted to unify the region with Armenia. Subsequently this became a
long lasting war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia
closed their borders and imposed a blockade which they retain to this day, though in
October 2009 Turkey and Armenia signed a treaty to normalise the relations. These
events severely affected the economy of the fledging republic, and closed off its main
routes to Europe.
It is therefore evident, that Armenia‟s road to establishing itself as an independent
nation with democratic values and ambitions, has been full of obstacles. It is not to
say though that other ex-Soviet Republics have had an easier journey towards
democracy.
Despite these problems, when it comes to conditions generally thought to be
conducive to democratization, Armenia has many positive aspects as well as negative.
Thus, the post-communist transition of the former-Soviet republics has been as
differentiated process as the heterogeneity of the former Soviet empire itself. Moving
at different paces and in divergent directions, the transition course of these republics
has been mixed. The processes of democratisation have neither been linear nor
irreversible. Situated between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran in the Caucasus
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region, Armenian policies have reflected its search for a place in what it considers to
be a hostile regional environment. Overcoming domestic constraints and reinventing
power structures to accommodate democratic and development needs is, however, a
difficult task.
This paper looks at the Armenian transition towards democracy, focusing on these
internal and external dimensions of the process. Internally, consider the decision-
making structures, with particular emphasis on the role of leadership, the development
of political parties, changes in civil society and most importantly the Russian
influence during this process. Externally, the attention is focused on neighbourly
relations and external parties, including the role of international organisations,
particularly the European Union (EU) and its privileged instrument, the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and most recently the European Partnership (EaP). The
duration of the transition process and its differentiated phases are also considered of
relevance to understanding the choices of the political actors and the outcomes of
foreign and domestic policies. This analysis is framed within a conceptualisation of
democracy, which includes the holding of multi-party elections (the minimal
understanding of democracy according to Schumpeter), political and institutional
accountability, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, as well as the development of a strong civil society.
How does the relationship between Brussels and Yerevan affect the transition
process? Does the ENP function as a catalyst, or does it generate opposition? And
how does the regional context affect this process? By seeking answers to these and
other questions, this paper aims to clarify the democratisation process in Armenia, and
the role of Russia and EU in this complex process.
Peculiarities of Russian- Armenian relations on the
road to democracy and the role of neighbouring
countries
Russia and Armenia have long shared a close relationship, with defence as a critical
dimension. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were Soviet bases in
all three countries of the Caucasus, but Azerbaijan and Georgia subsequently
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engineered the departure of the Russian military presence. Armenia, though, wanted
to keep Russian boots on Armenian territory. Russia currently maintains a base with
several thousand troops in the city of Gyumri. This agreement has now been extended
until 2044. Russian and Armenian forces are jointly responsible for the defence of
Armenia's borders. In the bigger picture, the Russian presence has been a critical
source of support for Armenia against the possible threat of any heightened tension
with Turkey and, in particular, with Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue remains
a source of continued contention, and Armenia‟s relations with Turkey and
Azerbaijan are still fragile. So Armenia has long been in a tenuous position
geopolitically, economically and militarily and has looked to Russia for support.
The most recent deal highlights Russian commitment to Armenia, and solidifies
Russia's role as Armenia's big brother. That said Russia has long tried to walk a fine
line, as it is not in Russia's interest to alienate Azerbaijan -- which is economically far
more important to Russia than Armenia because of its oil resources. Critics of the deal
question whether -- if push came to shove -- Russia would go to the wall for Armenia
against Turkey and/or Azerbaijan, and whether the agreement may give Armenia a
false sense of security. (This is highlighted by the rumoured sale by Russia of anti-
aircraft rocket launchers to Azerbaijan.) Also, the extension of the base deal limits
Armenia's scope for manoeuvre; it in effect further reduces the chances of Armenia
joining NATO, for example. Any change in heart, or policy, on the part of Russia vis-
à-vis its objectives in the Caucasus, or the broader region, could be dangerous for
Armenia. However, there is unlikely to be any real impact on the regional balance of
power. The deal further strengthens Russia's position in Armenia -- and the region in
general -- but it doesn‟t represent a significant shift in the balance of power. The level
of Russian military commitment is unchanged, and there is no shift in Russia's
position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, or Armenia's relations with Turkey and
Azerbaijan.
Armenian- Turkish Relations
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Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence in 1991.
Despite this, for most of the 20th century and early 21st century, relations remain
tense and there are no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries for
numerous reasons. Some bones of contention include the unresolved Karabakh
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the treatment of Armenians in Turkey, the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Armenian claim of Turkey's holding of
historic Armenian lands (ceded to them in the Treaty of Kars, a treaty which Armenia
refuses to recognize to this day since it was signed between the Soviet Union and
Turkey, and not between Armenia and Turkey proper). At the forefront of all disputes,
however, is the issue surrounding the Armenian Genocide. The killing and
deportation of between one and one-and-a-half million Armenians from eastern
Anatolian lands of the Ottoman Empire orchestrated by the Young Turks is a taboo
subject in Turkey itself as the Turkish government refuses to acknowledge that a
genocide ever happened. However, since Turkey has become a candidate to join the
European Union, limited discussion of the event is now taking place in Turkey. Some
in the European Parliament have even suggested that one of the provisions for Turkey
to join the E.U. should be the full recognition of the event as genocide.
On June 5, 2005, Armenian President Robert Kocharian announced that he was
ready” to continue dialogue with Azerbaijan for the settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and with Turkey on establishing relations without any
preconditions." Armenia has also stated that as a legal successor to the Armenian
SSR, it is loyal to the Treaty of Kars and all agreements inherited by the former
Soviet Armenian government. Yet Turkey continues to lay preconditions on relations,
insisting that Armenia abandon its efforts to have the Genocide recognized, which
official Yerevan is not willing to do.
In the wake of the 2008 South Ossetia war between Russia and Georgia, Armenia and
Turkey have shown signs of an inclination to reconsider their relationship. According
to The Economist magazine, 70% of Armenia's imports enter via Georgia. Because of
the apparently belligerent posture of the Russian state, economic ties with Turkey
appear especially attractive. However, during this conflict Turkey was expected to
take a side with the majority of Western countries that condemned Russia‟s actions in
South Ossetia. Surprisingly, Turkey has suggested the establishment of the Caucasus
Alliance or the so-called “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”. Some
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sources argue that Turkey‟s sharp entry into the Caucasian arena was planned in detail
and Turkey used the aggravation of the situation in the South Caucasus to launch the
implementation of its old plan of penetration into the region that had been a” tough
nut to crack for the Turkish elite for a long time”.
The idea of the platform is to bring together the three south Caucasian states of
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with Turkey and Russia and to enable them to
mediate and solve their conflicts among themselves. In the words of Recep Tayyip
Erdogan the purpose and content of the Caucasus Alliance is the following:
“Its main objective is to establish permanent peace and security in the region by
bringing all regional states together in a joint formation. To this end, it envisages a
structure in which regional states together are expected once again to reassure each
other of respect and state sovereignty, restraint from the use and threat of force, the
inviolability of state borders and non-harmful economic and energy security in their
common space of Caucasus: principles such as state sovereignty, inviolability of
borders and so on in the formation will take the main references from the charter of
the OSCE, of which Russia, Turkey and all other Caucasus states are members.”
Erdogan believes that lasting peace and security is the principal aim here and this can
be achieved through the increase of economic operation among regional states. In
order to better present this idea, he gave examples of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzrum and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars projects as economic necessity to develop more
such projects and to expand them in such a way that would connect all peoples of the
Caucasus. The idea of creating an alliance is based on the idea of “complex
interdependence”, which assumes that improved trade relations and joint economic
projects in a particular region will eventually decrease the use of military force in the
region. Guner Ozkan goes on to introduce the realist perspective of that issue,
contending that complex interdependence can only work so long all parties are
satisfied, and yet this is often impossible to succeed in situations when there is
competition for power and domination over scarce resources. Thus, she concludes that
intergovernmental organisations, for the realists, are not more than instruments in the
hands of states to promote their national and security interests.
Indeed, looking realistically, the proposed Caucasus platform primarily requires a
restoration of some sort of dialogue between both Armenia and Turkey and Armenia
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and Azerbaijan. Turkey realises this and that is one of the reasons that Turkish
officials had hoped that Armenia would definitely become a part of the proposed
platform and the and formalities of the dialogue with Yerevan would be decided after
further talks with Moscow thus raising expectations that Moscow could foster and/or
mediate that dialogue. Moreover, the Turkish side is particularly hopeful that the
Caucasus Alliance in the offing will resolve the other most important regional security
issue, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Baku and Yerevan.
The normalisation of ties with Armenia accordingly depend on Armenia accepting the
fact that policy of recognition of Armenian genocide will not take place also the
unilateral concessions on the Karabakh issue and the recognition of Turkey‟s
territorial integrity with reconfirmation of the Kars Treaty to which Armenia is not
prepared.
The Armenian side on the other hand has been pursuing the delinking Armenian-
Turkish normalisation from the NK peace process; keeping the question of Genocide
away from the Armenian-Turkish diplomatic agenda, and relying more on practical
rather than legal solutions while addressing border issues.
However, Russia‟s positive approach to SCP is only of a tactical character as it is
difficult to imagine that country‟s geostrategic perspective involving another active
player in South Caucasus beside itself. This circumstance makes a ground to
characterise the SCP as hardly ever accomplishable.
Recently Armenian-Turkish relations have been directly connected to the Russian-
Georgian conflict and to the changes that resulted from the conflict in South
Caucasian geopolitical region. To review the issue comprehensively it is necessary to
present the fundamental factual basis, official position and echoes of the analytic and
public political scopes concerning the matter. Certainly, the development dynamics of
mutual relations mostly fall to the second half of 2008 and first half of 2009, but it
must be mentioned that Armenia had put forward the principal provisions of its
official position on regulation of Armenian-Turkish relations back in 2007 in the
National Security Strategy. It was prescribed in the strategy that “Armenia addresses
Turkey without any preconditions in hope to establish diplomatic relations and is
going to undertake appropriate steps to overcome the problems to improve the mutual
relations”.
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The new development of Armenian-Turkish relations in 2008 can be marked by 3
important events; the visit of Turkish President to Armenia, “The Football diplomacy”
initiated by the visit of A. Gyul, and the joint statement on the “road map”. The Road
Map initiated negative reaction in Azerbaijan and rumours started to spread in Turkey
that the “Road Map” did not only improve the Armenian-Turkish relations but instead
seriously damaged the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. In response to such accusations
the president of Turkey said that each country builds its politics independently and at
the moment Turkey‟s diplomacy towards Armenia is both for Turkey and Azerbaijan.
It is also very important to take into account the view points of other political players
that may have a definite influence on the territorial procedure. So, according to M.
Brayse, even though the meeting of S. Sargsyan and A. Gyul did not solve the issues
at hand, it formed a new atmosphere in the relations of the two countries. The USA
also praised the statement about the “Road map”, insisting that “The relations
between Armenia and Turkey should be affirmed without any preconditions and in a
sensible time span”.
The normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations is thought to continue but we should
not expect any global changes in the diplomacy between the two countries in the near
future.
Armenia- Iran strategic partnership
The Armenian Republic today has a lot of important strategic and political decisions
to make. It is currently contemplating the impact of its relationship with its allies,
particularly its close multilateral alliance with Russia and Iran. Armenia and Iran
enjoy cultural and historical ties that go back thousands of years. There are no border
disputes between the two countries and the Christian Armenian minority in Iran
enjoys official recognition .Many politicians and ordinary people see it as a way of
mitigating the effects of the continuing Turkish and Azeri blockades. Stepan Safaryan
of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies has said "Given this
geopolitical environment, Armenia has the legitimate right to cooperate with Iran for
ensuring its security...Besides, Armenia has an energy surplus and its only major
export market at present is Iran...So there is also a lot of economic interest involved."
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Of special importance is the cooperation in the field of energy security which lowers
Armenia's dependence on Russia and can in the future also supply Iranian gas to
Europe through Georgia and the Black Sea. In addition to a pipeline that will bring
Iranian natural gas into Armenia, the two nations have also implemented other multi-
million dollar energy projects. These include the construction of two hydro-electric
plants on the Arax River that marks the Armenian-Iranian border, a third high-voltage
transmission line linking their power grids and dams, among other projects.
In July, 2007, a memorandum was signed on the start of feasibility studies on the
ideas of building an Armenian-Iranian railway and a Russian-owned oil refinery that
would process Iranian crude. In addition, the Armenian and Iranian governments have
been working on a bilateral free trade agreement.
The Armenian government is building a second, bigger highway leading to the Iranian
border in the hope of boosting trade with Iran. In 2009, Armenia‟s trade with Iran
totalled a modest $105 million. However, this has increased dramatically in the past
year or so. Having a warm rapport with Iran has always been a matter of virtual
national consensus in Armenia.
President Ahmadinejad of Iran has been quoted as saying "The Islamic Republic of
Iran welcomes and supports the development of ties with Armenia in various areas,
particularly in energy as well as transportation, sports, and tourism."
Obviously, Armenia also needs to maintain close ties with the West. However, when
it comes to the West, Armenians should 'never' think that Armenia's national
prosperity, or national existence for that matter, is a subject of concern for Brussels or
Washington. In this regard, it is no secret that many within Russia's political and
military elite realize that Armenia's existence as an independent pro-Russian nation
within the south Caucasus is crucially important for Russia's long-term national
interests. For the foreseeable future, Armenia will be a vulnerable state.
Russia and Iran have both had a long history of rivalry against regional Turks. Even
today, Moscow and Tehran do not wish to see the rise of Azeri and/or Turkish power
in the Caucasus region. Thus, Armenia can serve as a natural buffer against Turks and
their western supporters. This is precisely how Armenia has become a geo-
strategically pivotal nation for Moscow and Tehran. Nevertheless, it is firmly believed
that without the Russian/Soviet factor in Armenia's national historiography there
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would not have been an Armenian Republic today. A point to emphasize here is that
as long as true Russian (Slav/Orthodox) nationalists are in power in Moscow the
Armenian Republic has not much to be concerned about. Although relations between
Russia and Armenia today are close and strategic in nature, Moscow‟s relations with
Yerevan were not always so cohesive. Relations between Yerevan and Moscow were
not very stable during the 1990s. There was a real threat back then that Armenia
would break away from Moscow's orbit. Some have even claimed that the
parliamentary assassinations in Armenia secured Russia's dominance in Armenia's
internal affairs. Reality is that Moscow can make or break nations in the Caucasus,
especially now that they have been roaring back to life - with a vengeance. Let's take
a close look at Georgia and Azerbaijan; they have both essentially become hostages to
Moscow. Neither Baku nor Tbilisi is able to resist Russian pressure even though they
both have direct access to the outside world, and very close alliances/relations with
Turkey, EU, USA and Israel. How an impoverished and landlocked Armenia would
have fared had official Yerevan opposed Moscow's overtures in Armenia? Is it
because Armenia was forced to compliance due to poverty and economic reliance on
Moscow?
Armenia today is in no position to call the shots with Moscow. In other words,
Moscow does not want to place hope in Armenian politicians making the right
decisions every few years. By controlling a nation's infrastructure, its lifeline, you
secure its allegiance. At this stage in our national development, especially in the
Caucasus, Armenia can't allow its citizenry to decide sensitive geopolitical matters.
Consequently, due to the geopolitical nature of the region in question the Armenian
Republic has no other choice but to remain firmly by Moscow‟s side. In many
experts‟ opinion, in this day in age, when battle-lines are already being drawn within
various geopolitical theatres around the world, the Armenian Republic 'must' seek to
become a Russian outpost, mainly due to the fact that Armenia is seeking economic
and political reassurance from Russia. Armenia's best bet, its only option today, is to
remain as close as possible to the Russian Federation and their regional apparatus
according to Hanrapetutyun Political Party with Armenian President Serj Sarkissian
as its leader. This is the main political party in Armenia and has so far been
successful in convincing its people about the importance of strong Russian Armenian
relations. They believe that ideologically and geopolitically Armenia's rightful place
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is with the Russian Federation. However, Armenia should appreciate Mother Russia
for practical reasons as well. In their opinion, the future potentially belongs to Russia.
Russia controls the largest oil and gas reserves on earth; Russia controls the largest
landmass on earth; Russia controls the largest amounts of natural resources on earth;
Russia has managed to monopolize virtually the entire gas/oil distribution of central
Asia; Russia has finally been able to brake the shackles of their western antagonists;
Russians are now on a fast pace resurgence militarily, politically and economically;
Russia controls the politics of the Caucasus; Russia controls the politics of Central
Asia; Russia controls the politics of eastern Europe to a large extent.
What's more, Russia is Armenia's largest and most lucrative trading partner. Annual
trade between Moscow and Yerevan is currently over $500 million and it will most
probably reach somewhere around one billion in the near future. What's more,
Armenia's most affordable source for gas and oil is Russia. Armenia's only source for
affordable and modern military hardware is Russia. What's more, Armenia's only
source for nuclear fuel is Russia. And Armenia's only hope in fending off Turkish
and/or Azeri aggression in the Caucasus is Yerevan's continuing alliance with the
Russian Federation. The only other strategically vital nation for Armenia is Iran. The
ruling administration in Yerevan, for various reasons, personal and political, has
decided that the best way for Armenia is by continuing friendly relations with Russia.
Nevertheless, the Armenian Republic is not able to utilize its industry effectively. The
fact of the matter is, Armenia does not have the resources, it does not have unhindered
access routes, it does not have the money, nor does it have the international contacts
for its industry to operate independently and efficiently. What's more, Armenia needs
to import its energy - gas, oil and nuclear fuel. As I highlighted above, the Russian
Federation has more-or-less a monopoly of the region's energy resources and its
distribution. As a result, if not Russia, who is Armenia going to rely on for its
domestic energy needs? Yes, Armenia has begun dealing with Iran regarding energy,
but Iran has serious problems. As we can see, Iran is virtually under siege and if the
West could have its way they would cut off Yerevan from Iran in a heartbeat. What's
more, due to Russia's strategic concerns, Moscow does not want to see Yerevan
relying on anyone else but Russia. As a result, they are forcing Armenia to allow
Moscow to get in on the deal with Iran. So, what can Armenia do at this stage ? What
options does Yerevan have? Play hardball with Russia by dealing with Azerbaijan and
Turkey?
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For better example of pragmatic vision on Russian foreign policy, we may quote a
commonly used expression by Lenin - "We can ignore the interests of small states for
the sake of interests of the large ones". Some experts think that Russia is a state with a
truly positive attitude towards Armenia. Armenian experts suppose that in the nearest
future the new geopolitical distribution in the South Caucasus will look like this:
politically unstable Georgia will be weakened by the consequences of the Russian
armed invasion, confused Azerbaijan will be projected on the existing situation in
Karabakh of the results of the hostilities at the separatist regions of Georgia and
Armenia, which will attempt to establish its place within the existing situation in the
way not to get injured from this regional political processes.
Dynamics of Russian-Armenian relations
Let's consider the dynamics of Russian-Armenian relations upon the background of
the latest historical transformation: collapse of the Soviet Union and appearance of
three independent Transcaucasian states - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan has
created a cardinally new military and political situation in the South Caucasus.
Countries of the region have faced totally new challenges in the process of ensuring
their own security. Ensuing from that, all the aforesaid countries have, in their own
ways, defined their level of participation in various regional and international
organizations, including the military and political ones, as well as in the process of
settling the relations with the leading states.
Armenia started to build the policy of securing their national safety in a different way
than Georgia and Azerbaijan, which, immediately after gaining their independence,
have taken a maximally distant course from Russia and are trying to cooperate mainly
with western countries in the military and political fields, particularly with the US,
and also with Turkey. Whereas for Armenia, Russia has become the main partner
within the military and political field, and we may estimate the level of bilateral
relations existing between these two countries, as quite an established strategic
cooperation.
From the very beginning the process of military and political cooperation between
Russia and Armenia was not confined by bilateral relations solely. This can be
explained by the multi- level integration processes created at the territory of the
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former Soviet Union. The process of the military integration of the CIS member states
has gradually turned into a three-level structure: within the borders of the
Commonwealth, within the frames of the collective security format and on the
grounds of the bilateral relations. The given multilevel integration system marked
peculiarities for each post-soviet state to influence over the South Caucasus regional
security problems, both through the bilateral aspect as well as the multilateral level.
On February 14, 1992 decision was made to establish the Council of Ministers of
Defence and Central Management of Joint Armed Forces of CIS, and on March 20,
1992 treaty on the joint Armed Forces in the period of transition was signed and the
above mentioned “Collective Security Agreement” was signed on March 15, 1992, in
Tashkent with Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Belarus joined them later. From the very beginning, this agreement was
aimed as a military constituent of Commonwealth of Independent States, also it was
meant to become a part of security system of Europe and Asia. However, due to
different reasons, not every CIS State joined it and it appeared impossible to retain
joint Armed Forces on the base of transformation of the existing Soviet Army.
As it is evident from the above, all the attempts made by Russia to retain its grasp on
most ex Soviet countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has proven
impossible. Therefore, Russia has had to resort to establishing close allies in various
regions; one of these allies in the Caucasus is Armenia.
The limitations of EU influence on the
democratization process in Armenia
The EU is broadly engaged with the South Caucasus states through the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). These regional
initiatives are aimed at economic development, trade, fostering democracy and
strengthening human rights credentials but, aside from a few border control
initiatives, mostly overlook security dimension and this is one of the reasons that
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Armenia is still reluctant to break away from Russia. The most recent addition to EU
engagement in the South Caucasus region was the launch of the EaP on the 7th of
May, 2009.
This unprecedented Summit assembled the Heads of the State or Heads of
Government of all EU countries and of the EU‟s “Eastern Neighbours”: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
According to the Summit declaration, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is to “bring the
relationship between the EU and partner countries to a new level” and aims to
accelerate political association between them and to deepen the integration of partner
countries into the EU. The EaP is explicitly not a roadmap for EU accession however,
and is developed “without prejudice to individual countries‟ aspirations for their
future relationship with the EU.” Among other innovations, the EaP proposes to bring
about deep free-trade areas, combining open borders and regulatory approximation,
through bilateral agreements at first, and through multilateral frameworks later on. It
will also aim to increase mobility between EU and partner countries by introducing
visa facilitation agreements. These, and other measures envisaged by the EaP, could
provide the tangible and demonstrable benefits that would help build political
momentum in favour of further EU integration and EU-inspired reform in Armenia.
The EaP also introduces a novel multilateral framework at governmental level to
promote dialogue and cooperation among Eastern partner countries and to develop
common initiatives. Four “platforms” will focus on democracy and governance issues,
economic cooperation and convergence with EU law, contacts between people and
energy security. This multilateral framework should not be restricted to governmental
dialogue alone however. The Summit also proposed to develop a Civil Society Forum
and an EU Parliamentary Assembly to accompany this process. The EaP is
complementary to the European Neighbourhood Policy in existence since 2003,
whose geographical coverage is broader and which has more modest goals. Like the
EaP however, it seeks a balance between the regional approach and individual
treatment of partner countries, and remains non-committal on the issue of eventual
EU membership. A conference of officials and political analysts convened at the
initiative of the EU‟s Czech Presidency acknowledged that “hopes and expectations
had been unreasonably high” following the revolutions in the Ukraine and Georgia,
and that the EaP marked a “new beginning” and was an ambitious project”.
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From Armenia‟s point of view, the EaP was undoubtedly a significant step forward.
Armenia had been seeking to maximize the EU‟s contribution to political and
economic reforms in the country. EU integration is furthermore overwhelmingly
popular in the country, but successive governments have taken a pragmatic, gradualist
approach to European integration due to its strategic partnership with Russia as
mentioned above.
All the above developments had been welcomed by all and it had been hoped that
new changes were to take place. However, the EU has failed to use either the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Eastern Partnership (EaP) to leverage
reform in Armenia. Armenia saw its inclusion in the EaP as a path to gaining EU
membership and a way of resolving ongoing problems with its neighbours. However
the EU is still neither actively involved in conflict resolution nor strongly committed
to closer political integration with its Eastern partners. Its vague policy stipulations
have done little to shore up its own position in the South Caucasus.
Armenia is often over-looked, compared to Georgia‟s more dramatic events in recent
years and Azerbaijan‟s pivotal energy role. But the country is also important to South
Caucasus security. Relations with Turkey continue to be uneasy. The „frozen‟ conflict
with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is on the verge of becoming more active.
Blocked democratic reforms breed social frustration. Given Armenia‟s landlocked
position, the closed border with Turkey, the recently closed Russian-Georgian border,
and the ongoing half-frozen conflict with Azerbaijan, regional cooperation focused on
reconciliation is essential to EU interests. The EU needs to upgrade its political
engagement in order to head off probable instability in all these areas of Armenian
politics.
PROGRESS AND CRISIS
According to the EaP Ministerial Council of December 2010, EU-Armenia relations
have intensified considerably in the EaP‟s bilateral and multilateral tracks. The first
meeting of the EU-Armenia Human Rights dialogue took place in December 2009.
The Commission is working on draft visa facilitation and readmission agreements.
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Negotiations for an EU-Armenia Association Agreement began in July 2010 with the
third and latest plenary round on 15 December 2010. This accord includes the
possibility to start negotiating a deep and comprehensive free trade area.
But Armenia has been hit hard by the economic crisis. The global financial crisis
reduced state revenues, harming the economic and social reform process in Armenia,
including implementation of the ENP Action Plan. After years of double-digit
economic growth, Armenia‟s GDP fell by a dramatic 15 per cent in 2009. In the same
year, EU exports to Armenia fell by 20 per cent, while exports of Armenian products
to the EU fell by a remarkable 50 per cent. The EaP is supposed to alleviate economic
problems and foster commercial relations however these figures suggest its
impotence.
To help lessen the impact of the financial crisis, in November 2009 the Council
agreed to provide macro-financial assistance to Armenia, in the form of a loan of
EUR 65 million and a grant of EUR 35 million. Yet, the question remains of whether
the injection of such funding into the state budget can contribute to the desired
„stability and prosperity‟ while some of the borders are closed and an adjacent conflict
persists. It certainly does not seem to have had any tangible impact. The plethora of
European loans and grants are unlikely to secure the EU‟s position in the Russian
dominated Armenian economy. Russian capital dominates Armenian
telecommunications, electricity networks, banking and gas distribution. In the latter
sector Russia provides a de facto subsidy and prevents the price of gas from doubling:
an offer that the EU cannot match. Thus, a primarily economic led policy does not
play to the EU‟s comparative advantage. Armenians look to the EU more for a role in
promoting democratic progress, conflict resolution and support for civil society.
POLITICAL TURMOIL
Association Agreements are supposed to be signed with functioning electoral
democracies only. However, the EU seems not to have applied this condition in
Armenia or other South Caucasus countries which are part of the EaP. The binding
nature of these agreements should increase the likelihood of a successful
implementation. But the EU‟s inconsistency regarding political conditions reduces its
credibility and future bargaining power.
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The May 2010 report on Armenia‟s progress in implementing the ENP Action Plan
states that Armenia has made progress in several areas. It has launched a regular
human rights dialogue with the EU, improved its legislative framework in the area of
anti-corruption and strengthened the role of the Human Rights Defender. The report
also insists that it has taken positive steps to address the internal political crisis
following the violence-marred presidential elections in February 2008. It additionally
mentions further reforms in justice and rule of law.
In fact, democracy indices show that democracy has not progressed since the launch
of the ENP in Armenia, and has even deteriorated in several areas. In 2008, the
outgoing president Kocharyan was expected to emulate Putin‟s conversion to being
prime-minister; however, mired in scandal he left politics. In an orchestrated hand-
over the prime minister ship went instead to the technocratic head of the central bank,
Tigran Sargsyan. Violent protests erupted. Ten days of demonstrations ensued against
regime-orchestrated ballot box stuffing, the attacks suffered by local observers and the
patent bias of the electoral commission. The protests ended with the violent dispersal
of the protesters. This was followed by a 20-day state of emergency.
Since 2008 dissent has grown over the nondemocratic transfer of power. The
Armenian opposition is far from united. The most visible opposition factions are the
Heritage party and the Communist party; but the latter did not pass the electoral
threshold in 2008 and its support base is dwindling. The leader of the 2008 protests,
former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan, is currently calling for Armenians to emulate
the events in Tunisia and Egypt. However, his post-2008 silence and association with
the country‟s problems of the 1990s undermine his ability to inspire the masses.
Meanwhile, the coalitional government is trying to secure the 2013 presidential bid
for the incumbent Serzh Sargsyan, with others predicting the comeback of Kocharyan
as his main rival. Armenians remain bitterly disappointed with the nepotism of
politics and predict an unstable period ahead. The post-elections crisis of 2008 has
received little critical attention from the EU, which preferred to distance itself and
take a wait and see approach. The EU deemed the 2008 elections broadly democratic -
despite all the evidence to the contrary and the anger of democratic opposition parties.
The EU urged the Armenian authorities to end the state of emergency, launch an
independent investigation on the violence and release political prisoners. However,
the regime ignored these requests and the state of emergency was not lifted before the
planned date of 20 March.
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The broadcast media has been under constant pressure from the government since the
elections. Restrictions have been placed on the freedom of assembly and the
opposition has been denied permission to hold demonstrations. A June 2009 amnesty
freed 30 protesters from jail and many more activists were released in another June
amnesty in 2011. The police officers accused of brutality during the post-election
events have not been charged. Despite all these negative trends and the Armenian
government‟s rejection of EU strictures, no policy change occurred under the rubric
of the ENP Action Plan and Armenia was safely granted a place within the EaP.
Armenians struggle to understand how the EU can classify their country as
democratic. Europe has turned a blind-eye to Armenia‟s authoritarian clampdown.
REGIONAL SECURITY AND CONFLICT
The EU has retained its efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a separate
priority. The EU prefers to distance itself on Nagorno- Karabakh and channel its
limited activities through promoting the OSCE Minsk Group. EU governments have
been largely reactive in the face of Russian diplomacy and influence. The unresolved
conflict compounds Russia‟s military and economic pre-eminence in the region and
reduces the chances of EU access to Azerbaijan‟s energy supplies. Instead of merely
„morally‟ supporting the OSCE Minsk Group, which includes seven different EU
governments, the Union should substitute these representatives with its own. These
should be the heads of EU delegations to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The creation of the
External Action Service and EU ambition to project a united front renders this step
both urgent and logical. It also has the potential to improve the image of the OSCE
Mink Group itself which is regarded as of little use by both the Armenian and
Azerbaijani sides. Progress on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is essential to ground
the EU‟s position in the region. Given its economic and security interests, it would be
problematic for the EU explicitly to take sides in the conflict. However, insisting on
stricter arms control, and even an arms embargo, would help to diminish the
possibility of a renewed war. Higher level political and economic involvement from
the EU should be combined with the setting of a deadline for resolution of the dispute
and pressure on both sides to avoid low level skirmishes. The EU‟s focus on non-
conflictive issues will keep the spotlight on Russia as the regional player. To
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safeguard its security, Armenia signed a new defence agreement with Russia in
August 2010, extending Russia‟s military base lease until 2044, further increasing
Russian influence in the region. But skirting difficult political questions will only
harm the EU‟s longer term role and interests. The EU has had clear opportunities to
contribute to resolving Armenia‟s conflictive relations with its two neighbours and
win over more EU enthusiasts, given the pro-European aspirations of the government
and the high level of public support for the Union. However, Armenia‟s parallel
foreign policies complicate the EU‟s agenda, as it has to deal with Armenia‟s close
security and economic relationship with Russia and developmental ties with the
United States. The long-awaited rapprochement in Armenian- Turkish relations
resulted in the signing of the Zurich accord. The EU played virtually no role in this
advance. Shortly afterwards the Turkish government reiterated that ratification would
depend on resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia responded by
officially suspending the accord‟s ratification process. The most publicised of
occasional hostilities, resulted in Armenia and Azerbaijan blaming each other and
demonstrated the lack of security in the region. Though the incident directly
undermined its conflict resolution commitments, the EU delegation in Armenia did
not officially react. Given the close relations of the South Caucasus countries with
some of their out-of-region neighbours, there is also a need for increased engagement
with regional players such as Turkey and Russia in the development of cooperation
policies. Though these states cannot be regarded as neutral, neither can they be
ignored. The EU should particularly encourage and contribute to incipient civil
society links between Armenia and Turkey. However, when encouraging civil society
links, the EU should be careful with the influential Armenian Diaspora, which pursues
a hard-line opposition to the rapprochement with Turkey. Civil society links have the
potential to transcend the historical baggage of the Armenian population and
encourage the latter to focus more pragmatically on the future and the need for
prosperity. To increase the effectiveness of its policies in the region, the EU needs to
address both the region‟s and Russia‟s interests. At the same time, the EU should not
underestimate Russia‟s „great power‟ ambitions. The EU needs to tie its further
economic engagement with Russia to the latter‟s acceptance of the sovereignty of
South Caucasus states.
An EU-funded opinion poll shows that 96 per cent of Armenian respondents want the
EU to be more active in developing regional cooperation. The ineffectiveness of ENP
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regional cooperation in military-security issues is explained not only by the divergent
interests of the regional players but also by the EU‟s reluctance to take specific,
concrete actions – as opposed to vague propositions and encouragements. The
respondents‟ bear analogy coincides with the European Parliament‟s view which
acknowledges the need for a comprehensive strategy for the South Caucasus that
would „combine soft power with a firm approach‟. The neglect of conflicts in the
South Caucasus will jeopardise the EU‟s attempts to reduce its energy dependence on
Russia. The outstanding conflicts will continue to be used to justify the concentrating
of power in the hands of a small elite group when facing criticism on the state of
democracy. Currently, the EU‟s approach to Armenia and other EaP members is an
accumulation of overlapping policies, which do not fully address the needs of the
partner country and hinder the proclaimed goals of the EU. The EU should end its
tendency to treat countries in the region with simplistic uniformity. Though some
differences are acknowledged on paper, the politically diverse countries of the South
Caucasus are included in the same policies and have similar priority areas in the ENP
Action Plans. Such an approach renders its policies less efficient as it fails to reward
its best aspirants and over-rewards the worst intractable.
2011 offers the EU an opportunity to act rather than react, given the US‟s declining
interest in the region and over-stretched involvement in other conflicts. The upgrading
of the EU‟s policies towards Armenia should be connected to progress in the
implementation of previous and current projects. Otherwise, the EU will end up with
a pile of expensive but eventually ineffective initiatives.
Conclusion
This paper has looked at the Armenian road to democracy, understanding it as a
tortuous process defined by internal and external dynamics. These two dimensions –
internal policies and external factors – have both fostered and hampered the process,
which from its very beginning has been defined in terms of the Western liberal
democracy model. Understanding democracy in its broader formulation, the
Armenian transition course has revealed many difficulties in implementation.
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Internally, the consolidation of democratic practices at the institutional and decision-
making levels has shown limits, in a society used to a strong leadership, and where
the power of the local elite in political and economic terms is substantial. These old-
style practices render the development of a civil society and the enhancement of rules
regarding transparency and accountability very difficult. The recurrent use of violence
to suppress dissidence and opposition is a clear example of political and economic
allegiances and of the difficulty to establish an independent judiciary. Armenia is thus
an incomplete democracy in a regional context where democracy as a model has
mostly been the exception. Surrounded by authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, the
so-called „managed democracy‟ in Russia and the arbitrariness in neighbouring
countries, with the possible exception of Georgia, underlines a view that Armenia‟s
efforts at reform, such as the recently adopted Constitutional amendments, should be
acknowledged and supported.
It is undeniable that there are many internal obstacles to this process. Nevertheless,
Armenia‟s relations with neighbouring countries and the influence of external actors
in the area are central elements that need to be taken into account. The lack of
regional cooperation, due to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and
competition for resources and influence in the area, render the geostrategic and
political-economic setting highly complex. The lack of diplomatic relations with
Azerbaijan and difficult relations with Turkey and Georgia; and cooperative relations
with Iran and Russia, despite elements of divergence, render the whole picture bleak.
In addition, the EU and the US have also become engaged in the South Caucasus,
providing economic, political and even military assistance. From this wide
involvement, a complex net of bargaining, concessions and trading of power has
emerged. The reconciliation of divergent interests and competing opportunities, along
with the challenge of fostering positive cooperative dynamics has proven very hard
indeed. In this context, the ENP might be an important catalyst for change both within
Armenia and regarding regional cooperation, since the approach in Yerevan is
„benefit driven‟, through a rational assessment, and not simply a feeling of euphoria.
By enhancing economic cooperation based on a set of agreed principles shared by all
ENP countries, it might establish a common platform to translate minimal shared
procedures into action, with positive input. Implementing a set of norms and practices
according to the EU model, as earlier defined – Europeanization – establishes
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common patterns and consists of a simple download of „ways of doing‟ that might in
the end turn out to be too removed from present Armenian political dynamics.
The scenarios are therefore varied, but an optimistic stance can be taken. Transition
should be understood as a long-term process, which takes time to take root but which
might assist in stabilising the region. By bringing with it deep reforms and the goal of
developing regional cooperation, it might constitute an important confidence-building
measure to end the Karabakh conflict, which is a fundamental obstacle to the
normalisation of relations in the area. In the process, the role of the elites in power
should not be underestimated as a blocking force to reforms that might undermine
particular interests. However, offering prospects of new economic opportunities might
also constitute an enhancing factor. Russia‟s influence in the South Caucasus has
diminished, particularly in Georgia, but also in Azerbaijan. This has been mostly due
to the perception of new options for the region, such as the Euro-Atlantic institutions,
understood in Moscow as a counterweight to its influence. Armenian leaders have
sought to keep all options open by their policy of complementarity, often linking
strategies of personal political survival to the fate of the Armenian nation in a
perceived hostile environment.
Russia can thus be seen as a maintainer of the status quo, namely regarding conflict
resolution issues, though to what extent this plays to its advantage in the long-run is
not clear. The US is another relevant player, and its military and energy interests in
the Caucasian countries have worked as a solid and credible basis for EU engagement
in the region, aligning the Euro- Atlantic partnership. However, issues concerning US
military intervention in Iraq and the management of the Iranian crisis are still major
problems that can affect the strategic engagement of the West in the South Caucasus.
In addition, US relations with Russia and with Turkey are also of much relevance
regarding the region‟s balance of power, and for the EU.
In a nutshell, the complexity of interactions, interests and necessary reforms has
rendered democratisation a difficult process in Armenia. The commitment to western
liberal democracy, though appearing to be highly rhetorical has, nevertheless, been
supported by Armenia‟s participation in international organisations, such as the
Council of Europe and OSCE, and in the neighbourhood policy of the EU.
Expectations are therefore rising as to the effective results of Armenia‟s post-
communist transition and to the role external players can have in the wider strategic
setting in the Caucasus. The Armenian democratisation process looks troubled, with
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such a complex set of divergent and competing interests, but there are nevertheless
identifiable areas for cooperation, which if exploited might open new windows of
opportunity, for Armenia might just be opening one of these windows.