1

Inna Hakobyan

University of

Leicester "Peculiarities of Russian-Armenian relations in the

process of democratization in Armenia: why is

Russian influence so strong in Armenia and what

are the limitations of EU influence in Armenia?"

Working paper

Paper prepared for the conference on „The European

Neighbourhood Policy: Aims and Impact‟ , University of

Leicester, 18 June, 2011

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"Peculiarities of Russian-Armenian relations in the

process of democratization in Armenia: why is

Russian influence so strong in Armenia and what

are the limitations of EU influence in Armenia?"

Introduction

Like many other countries of ex Soviet Union, Armenia had little experience with

democracy prior to the 1990s. It has experienced many identity problems relating to

its frequently changing boundaries over the centuries and to its relationships with

other states. As Offe (1991) has argued, creating a new political system is much more

difficult for a country whose boundaries are still contested.

Due to its strategic significance, Armenia was constantly fought over and constantly

passed back and forth by many empires throughout history. Armenia lies in the

highlands surrounding the Biblical mountains of Ararat. The name Armenia was

given to the country by the surrounding states, and it is traditionally derived from

Armenak or Aram. In 301, Armenia became the first nation to adopt Christianity as a

state religion. It established a church that still exists independently of both the

Catholic and the eastern Orthodox churches, having become so in 451 after having

rejected the Council of Chalcedon. Due to its adopted religion Armenia became the

playground for neighbouring countries and was conquered at various stages during

centuries. However the most significant invasion was in 1915, when the Ottoman

Empire systematically carried out the Armenian Genocide. This genocide was

preceded by a wave of massacres in the years 1894 to 1896. In 1915, with World War

1 in progress, the Ottoman Turks accused the (Christian) Armenians as liable to ally

with Russia and treated the entire Armenian population as an enemy within their

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empire in a wave of ethnic cleansing. The events of 1915 to 1923 are regarded by

Armenians and the vast majority of Western historians to have been state-sponsored

mass killings. Turkish authorities, however, maintain that the deaths were the result of

a civil war coupled with disease and famine, with casualties incurred by both sides.

The exact number of deaths is hard to establish, however, it is estimated that close to a

million and a half Armenians perished in camps, which excludes Armenians who may

have died in other ways. Thus between the 4th and 19th centuries, the traditional

Armenia was conquered and ruled by Persians, Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols and

Turks, among others. In 1922, Armenia became part of the Soviet Union as one of

the three republics comprising the Transcaucasian SFSR however this was dissolved

in 1936 and as a result Armenia became a constituent republic of the Soviet Union as

the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. The transition to communism was very

difficult for Armenia, and for most of the other republics in the Soviet Union. The

Soviet authorities placed Armenians under strict surveillance. There was no freedom

of speech, even less so under Joseph Stalin. Any individual who was suspected of

using or introducing nationalist rhetoric or elements in their works were labelled

traitors or propagandists, and were sent to Siberia during Stalinist rule.

Soviet Armenia participated in the World War 2 by sending hundreds of thousands of

soldiers to the frontline in order to defend the “Soviet Motherland”. However, Soviet

rule had some positive aspects, as Armenia benefited from the Soviet economy,

especially when it was at its peak. Provincial villages gradually became towns and

towns became cities. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was reached, albeit

temporarily. During this period, Armenia was populated by a sizeable Azeri minority,

mostly centred in Yerevan. Likewise, Azerbaijan had an Armenian minority,

concentrated in Baku, Kirovabad and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this demographic

would change dramatically during and after Nagorno-Karabakh war.

In the late 1980s, Armenia was suffering from pollution. With Mikhail Gorbachev‟s

introduction of “Glasnost and Perestroyka”, public demonstrations became more

common. Thousand of Armenians demonstrated in Yerevan because of the USSR‟s

inability to address simple ecological concerns. Later on, with the conflict in

Karabakh, the demonstrations obtained a more nationalistic movement. Many

Armenians began to demand statehood and independence.

Armenia declared its sovereignty from the Soviet Union on August 23, 1990. In the

wake of the August Coup, a referendum was held on the question of secession.

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Following an overwhelming vote in favour, full independence was declared on

September 21, 1991. On October 16, 1991, Armenians elected Levon Ter-Petrossian

as their first president. Ter-Petrossian was faced with many challenges, including

economic difficulties caused mainly by the Turkish and Azeri blockade. His

controversial banning of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, one of the main

organised political entities in the Armenian Diaspora, and his apathy toward the

pursuit of recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the Nagorno- Karabakh

Republic made him unpopular with the general public and Diaspora Armenians

during his final years as president. He was forced to resign in February 1998.

Armenia faced many challenges during its first years as a sovereign state. In 1988, the

Spitak Earthquake killed tens of thousands of people and destroyed multiple towns in

northern Armenia, such as Leninakan (modern day Gyumri) and Spitak. Many

families were displaced and were left without basic commodities. The harsh situation

caused by the earthquake and subsequent events made hundreds of thousands of

Armenians leave the country and settle in North America, Western Europe and

Russia. These conditions were made worse when on February 20, 1989, interethnic

fighting between the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region

in Azerbaijan, voted to unify the region with Armenia. Subsequently this became a

long lasting war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia

closed their borders and imposed a blockade which they retain to this day, though in

October 2009 Turkey and Armenia signed a treaty to normalise the relations. These

events severely affected the economy of the fledging republic, and closed off its main

routes to Europe.

It is therefore evident, that Armenia‟s road to establishing itself as an independent

nation with democratic values and ambitions, has been full of obstacles. It is not to

say though that other ex-Soviet Republics have had an easier journey towards

democracy.

Despite these problems, when it comes to conditions generally thought to be

conducive to democratization, Armenia has many positive aspects as well as negative.

Thus, the post-communist transition of the former-Soviet republics has been as

differentiated process as the heterogeneity of the former Soviet empire itself. Moving

at different paces and in divergent directions, the transition course of these republics

has been mixed. The processes of democratisation have neither been linear nor

irreversible. Situated between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran in the Caucasus

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region, Armenian policies have reflected its search for a place in what it considers to

be a hostile regional environment. Overcoming domestic constraints and reinventing

power structures to accommodate democratic and development needs is, however, a

difficult task.

This paper looks at the Armenian transition towards democracy, focusing on these

internal and external dimensions of the process. Internally, consider the decision-

making structures, with particular emphasis on the role of leadership, the development

of political parties, changes in civil society and most importantly the Russian

influence during this process. Externally, the attention is focused on neighbourly

relations and external parties, including the role of international organisations,

particularly the European Union (EU) and its privileged instrument, the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and most recently the European Partnership (EaP). The

duration of the transition process and its differentiated phases are also considered of

relevance to understanding the choices of the political actors and the outcomes of

foreign and domestic policies. This analysis is framed within a conceptualisation of

democracy, which includes the holding of multi-party elections (the minimal

understanding of democracy according to Schumpeter), political and institutional

accountability, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms, as well as the development of a strong civil society.

How does the relationship between Brussels and Yerevan affect the transition

process? Does the ENP function as a catalyst, or does it generate opposition? And

how does the regional context affect this process? By seeking answers to these and

other questions, this paper aims to clarify the democratisation process in Armenia, and

the role of Russia and EU in this complex process.

Peculiarities of Russian- Armenian relations on the

road to democracy and the role of neighbouring

countries

Russia and Armenia have long shared a close relationship, with defence as a critical

dimension. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were Soviet bases in

all three countries of the Caucasus, but Azerbaijan and Georgia subsequently

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engineered the departure of the Russian military presence. Armenia, though, wanted

to keep Russian boots on Armenian territory. Russia currently maintains a base with

several thousand troops in the city of Gyumri. This agreement has now been extended

until 2044. Russian and Armenian forces are jointly responsible for the defence of

Armenia's borders. In the bigger picture, the Russian presence has been a critical

source of support for Armenia against the possible threat of any heightened tension

with Turkey and, in particular, with Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue remains

a source of continued contention, and Armenia‟s relations with Turkey and

Azerbaijan are still fragile. So Armenia has long been in a tenuous position

geopolitically, economically and militarily and has looked to Russia for support.

The most recent deal highlights Russian commitment to Armenia, and solidifies

Russia's role as Armenia's big brother. That said Russia has long tried to walk a fine

line, as it is not in Russia's interest to alienate Azerbaijan -- which is economically far

more important to Russia than Armenia because of its oil resources. Critics of the deal

question whether -- if push came to shove -- Russia would go to the wall for Armenia

against Turkey and/or Azerbaijan, and whether the agreement may give Armenia a

false sense of security. (This is highlighted by the rumoured sale by Russia of anti-

aircraft rocket launchers to Azerbaijan.) Also, the extension of the base deal limits

Armenia's scope for manoeuvre; it in effect further reduces the chances of Armenia

joining NATO, for example. Any change in heart, or policy, on the part of Russia vis-

à-vis its objectives in the Caucasus, or the broader region, could be dangerous for

Armenia. However, there is unlikely to be any real impact on the regional balance of

power. The deal further strengthens Russia's position in Armenia -- and the region in

general -- but it doesn‟t represent a significant shift in the balance of power. The level

of Russian military commitment is unchanged, and there is no shift in Russia's

position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, or Armenia's relations with Turkey and

Azerbaijan.

Armenian- Turkish Relations

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Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence in 1991.

Despite this, for most of the 20th century and early 21st century, relations remain

tense and there are no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries for

numerous reasons. Some bones of contention include the unresolved Karabakh

conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the treatment of Armenians in Turkey, the

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Armenian claim of Turkey's holding of

historic Armenian lands (ceded to them in the Treaty of Kars, a treaty which Armenia

refuses to recognize to this day since it was signed between the Soviet Union and

Turkey, and not between Armenia and Turkey proper). At the forefront of all disputes,

however, is the issue surrounding the Armenian Genocide. The killing and

deportation of between one and one-and-a-half million Armenians from eastern

Anatolian lands of the Ottoman Empire orchestrated by the Young Turks is a taboo

subject in Turkey itself as the Turkish government refuses to acknowledge that a

genocide ever happened. However, since Turkey has become a candidate to join the

European Union, limited discussion of the event is now taking place in Turkey. Some

in the European Parliament have even suggested that one of the provisions for Turkey

to join the E.U. should be the full recognition of the event as genocide.

On June 5, 2005, Armenian President Robert Kocharian announced that he was

ready” to continue dialogue with Azerbaijan for the settlement of the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict and with Turkey on establishing relations without any

preconditions." Armenia has also stated that as a legal successor to the Armenian

SSR, it is loyal to the Treaty of Kars and all agreements inherited by the former

Soviet Armenian government. Yet Turkey continues to lay preconditions on relations,

insisting that Armenia abandon its efforts to have the Genocide recognized, which

official Yerevan is not willing to do.

In the wake of the 2008 South Ossetia war between Russia and Georgia, Armenia and

Turkey have shown signs of an inclination to reconsider their relationship. According

to The Economist magazine, 70% of Armenia's imports enter via Georgia. Because of

the apparently belligerent posture of the Russian state, economic ties with Turkey

appear especially attractive. However, during this conflict Turkey was expected to

take a side with the majority of Western countries that condemned Russia‟s actions in

South Ossetia. Surprisingly, Turkey has suggested the establishment of the Caucasus

Alliance or the so-called “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”. Some

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sources argue that Turkey‟s sharp entry into the Caucasian arena was planned in detail

and Turkey used the aggravation of the situation in the South Caucasus to launch the

implementation of its old plan of penetration into the region that had been a” tough

nut to crack for the Turkish elite for a long time”.

The idea of the platform is to bring together the three south Caucasian states of

Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with Turkey and Russia and to enable them to

mediate and solve their conflicts among themselves. In the words of Recep Tayyip

Erdogan the purpose and content of the Caucasus Alliance is the following:

“Its main objective is to establish permanent peace and security in the region by

bringing all regional states together in a joint formation. To this end, it envisages a

structure in which regional states together are expected once again to reassure each

other of respect and state sovereignty, restraint from the use and threat of force, the

inviolability of state borders and non-harmful economic and energy security in their

common space of Caucasus: principles such as state sovereignty, inviolability of

borders and so on in the formation will take the main references from the charter of

the OSCE, of which Russia, Turkey and all other Caucasus states are members.”

Erdogan believes that lasting peace and security is the principal aim here and this can

be achieved through the increase of economic operation among regional states. In

order to better present this idea, he gave examples of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-

Tbilisi-Erzrum and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars projects as economic necessity to develop more

such projects and to expand them in such a way that would connect all peoples of the

Caucasus. The idea of creating an alliance is based on the idea of “complex

interdependence”, which assumes that improved trade relations and joint economic

projects in a particular region will eventually decrease the use of military force in the

region. Guner Ozkan goes on to introduce the realist perspective of that issue,

contending that complex interdependence can only work so long all parties are

satisfied, and yet this is often impossible to succeed in situations when there is

competition for power and domination over scarce resources. Thus, she concludes that

intergovernmental organisations, for the realists, are not more than instruments in the

hands of states to promote their national and security interests.

Indeed, looking realistically, the proposed Caucasus platform primarily requires a

restoration of some sort of dialogue between both Armenia and Turkey and Armenia

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and Azerbaijan. Turkey realises this and that is one of the reasons that Turkish

officials had hoped that Armenia would definitely become a part of the proposed

platform and the and formalities of the dialogue with Yerevan would be decided after

further talks with Moscow thus raising expectations that Moscow could foster and/or

mediate that dialogue. Moreover, the Turkish side is particularly hopeful that the

Caucasus Alliance in the offing will resolve the other most important regional security

issue, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Baku and Yerevan.

The normalisation of ties with Armenia accordingly depend on Armenia accepting the

fact that policy of recognition of Armenian genocide will not take place also the

unilateral concessions on the Karabakh issue and the recognition of Turkey‟s

territorial integrity with reconfirmation of the Kars Treaty to which Armenia is not

prepared.

The Armenian side on the other hand has been pursuing the delinking Armenian-

Turkish normalisation from the NK peace process; keeping the question of Genocide

away from the Armenian-Turkish diplomatic agenda, and relying more on practical

rather than legal solutions while addressing border issues.

However, Russia‟s positive approach to SCP is only of a tactical character as it is

difficult to imagine that country‟s geostrategic perspective involving another active

player in South Caucasus beside itself. This circumstance makes a ground to

characterise the SCP as hardly ever accomplishable.

Recently Armenian-Turkish relations have been directly connected to the Russian-

Georgian conflict and to the changes that resulted from the conflict in South

Caucasian geopolitical region. To review the issue comprehensively it is necessary to

present the fundamental factual basis, official position and echoes of the analytic and

public political scopes concerning the matter. Certainly, the development dynamics of

mutual relations mostly fall to the second half of 2008 and first half of 2009, but it

must be mentioned that Armenia had put forward the principal provisions of its

official position on regulation of Armenian-Turkish relations back in 2007 in the

National Security Strategy. It was prescribed in the strategy that “Armenia addresses

Turkey without any preconditions in hope to establish diplomatic relations and is

going to undertake appropriate steps to overcome the problems to improve the mutual

relations”.

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The new development of Armenian-Turkish relations in 2008 can be marked by 3

important events; the visit of Turkish President to Armenia, “The Football diplomacy”

initiated by the visit of A. Gyul, and the joint statement on the “road map”. The Road

Map initiated negative reaction in Azerbaijan and rumours started to spread in Turkey

that the “Road Map” did not only improve the Armenian-Turkish relations but instead

seriously damaged the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. In response to such accusations

the president of Turkey said that each country builds its politics independently and at

the moment Turkey‟s diplomacy towards Armenia is both for Turkey and Azerbaijan.

It is also very important to take into account the view points of other political players

that may have a definite influence on the territorial procedure. So, according to M.

Brayse, even though the meeting of S. Sargsyan and A. Gyul did not solve the issues

at hand, it formed a new atmosphere in the relations of the two countries. The USA

also praised the statement about the “Road map”, insisting that “The relations

between Armenia and Turkey should be affirmed without any preconditions and in a

sensible time span”.

The normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations is thought to continue but we should

not expect any global changes in the diplomacy between the two countries in the near

future.

Armenia- Iran strategic partnership

The Armenian Republic today has a lot of important strategic and political decisions

to make. It is currently contemplating the impact of its relationship with its allies,

particularly its close multilateral alliance with Russia and Iran. Armenia and Iran

enjoy cultural and historical ties that go back thousands of years. There are no border

disputes between the two countries and the Christian Armenian minority in Iran

enjoys official recognition .Many politicians and ordinary people see it as a way of

mitigating the effects of the continuing Turkish and Azeri blockades. Stepan Safaryan

of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies has said "Given this

geopolitical environment, Armenia has the legitimate right to cooperate with Iran for

ensuring its security...Besides, Armenia has an energy surplus and its only major

export market at present is Iran...So there is also a lot of economic interest involved."

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Of special importance is the cooperation in the field of energy security which lowers

Armenia's dependence on Russia and can in the future also supply Iranian gas to

Europe through Georgia and the Black Sea. In addition to a pipeline that will bring

Iranian natural gas into Armenia, the two nations have also implemented other multi-

million dollar energy projects. These include the construction of two hydro-electric

plants on the Arax River that marks the Armenian-Iranian border, a third high-voltage

transmission line linking their power grids and dams, among other projects.

In July, 2007, a memorandum was signed on the start of feasibility studies on the

ideas of building an Armenian-Iranian railway and a Russian-owned oil refinery that

would process Iranian crude. In addition, the Armenian and Iranian governments have

been working on a bilateral free trade agreement.

The Armenian government is building a second, bigger highway leading to the Iranian

border in the hope of boosting trade with Iran. In 2009, Armenia‟s trade with Iran

totalled a modest $105 million. However, this has increased dramatically in the past

year or so. Having a warm rapport with Iran has always been a matter of virtual

national consensus in Armenia.

President Ahmadinejad of Iran has been quoted as saying "The Islamic Republic of

Iran welcomes and supports the development of ties with Armenia in various areas,

particularly in energy as well as transportation, sports, and tourism."

Obviously, Armenia also needs to maintain close ties with the West. However, when

it comes to the West, Armenians should 'never' think that Armenia's national

prosperity, or national existence for that matter, is a subject of concern for Brussels or

Washington. In this regard, it is no secret that many within Russia's political and

military elite realize that Armenia's existence as an independent pro-Russian nation

within the south Caucasus is crucially important for Russia's long-term national

interests. For the foreseeable future, Armenia will be a vulnerable state.

Russia and Iran have both had a long history of rivalry against regional Turks. Even

today, Moscow and Tehran do not wish to see the rise of Azeri and/or Turkish power

in the Caucasus region. Thus, Armenia can serve as a natural buffer against Turks and

their western supporters. This is precisely how Armenia has become a geo-

strategically pivotal nation for Moscow and Tehran. Nevertheless, it is firmly believed

that without the Russian/Soviet factor in Armenia's national historiography there

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would not have been an Armenian Republic today. A point to emphasize here is that

as long as true Russian (Slav/Orthodox) nationalists are in power in Moscow the

Armenian Republic has not much to be concerned about. Although relations between

Russia and Armenia today are close and strategic in nature, Moscow‟s relations with

Yerevan were not always so cohesive. Relations between Yerevan and Moscow were

not very stable during the 1990s. There was a real threat back then that Armenia

would break away from Moscow's orbit. Some have even claimed that the

parliamentary assassinations in Armenia secured Russia's dominance in Armenia's

internal affairs. Reality is that Moscow can make or break nations in the Caucasus,

especially now that they have been roaring back to life - with a vengeance. Let's take

a close look at Georgia and Azerbaijan; they have both essentially become hostages to

Moscow. Neither Baku nor Tbilisi is able to resist Russian pressure even though they

both have direct access to the outside world, and very close alliances/relations with

Turkey, EU, USA and Israel. How an impoverished and landlocked Armenia would

have fared had official Yerevan opposed Moscow's overtures in Armenia? Is it

because Armenia was forced to compliance due to poverty and economic reliance on

Moscow?

Armenia today is in no position to call the shots with Moscow. In other words,

Moscow does not want to place hope in Armenian politicians making the right

decisions every few years. By controlling a nation's infrastructure, its lifeline, you

secure its allegiance. At this stage in our national development, especially in the

Caucasus, Armenia can't allow its citizenry to decide sensitive geopolitical matters.

Consequently, due to the geopolitical nature of the region in question the Armenian

Republic has no other choice but to remain firmly by Moscow‟s side. In many

experts‟ opinion, in this day in age, when battle-lines are already being drawn within

various geopolitical theatres around the world, the Armenian Republic 'must' seek to

become a Russian outpost, mainly due to the fact that Armenia is seeking economic

and political reassurance from Russia. Armenia's best bet, its only option today, is to

remain as close as possible to the Russian Federation and their regional apparatus

according to Hanrapetutyun Political Party with Armenian President Serj Sarkissian

as its leader. This is the main political party in Armenia and has so far been

successful in convincing its people about the importance of strong Russian Armenian

relations. They believe that ideologically and geopolitically Armenia's rightful place

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is with the Russian Federation. However, Armenia should appreciate Mother Russia

for practical reasons as well. In their opinion, the future potentially belongs to Russia.

Russia controls the largest oil and gas reserves on earth; Russia controls the largest

landmass on earth; Russia controls the largest amounts of natural resources on earth;

Russia has managed to monopolize virtually the entire gas/oil distribution of central

Asia; Russia has finally been able to brake the shackles of their western antagonists;

Russians are now on a fast pace resurgence militarily, politically and economically;

Russia controls the politics of the Caucasus; Russia controls the politics of Central

Asia; Russia controls the politics of eastern Europe to a large extent.

What's more, Russia is Armenia's largest and most lucrative trading partner. Annual

trade between Moscow and Yerevan is currently over $500 million and it will most

probably reach somewhere around one billion in the near future. What's more,

Armenia's most affordable source for gas and oil is Russia. Armenia's only source for

affordable and modern military hardware is Russia. What's more, Armenia's only

source for nuclear fuel is Russia. And Armenia's only hope in fending off Turkish

and/or Azeri aggression in the Caucasus is Yerevan's continuing alliance with the

Russian Federation. The only other strategically vital nation for Armenia is Iran. The

ruling administration in Yerevan, for various reasons, personal and political, has

decided that the best way for Armenia is by continuing friendly relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, the Armenian Republic is not able to utilize its industry effectively. The

fact of the matter is, Armenia does not have the resources, it does not have unhindered

access routes, it does not have the money, nor does it have the international contacts

for its industry to operate independently and efficiently. What's more, Armenia needs

to import its energy - gas, oil and nuclear fuel. As I highlighted above, the Russian

Federation has more-or-less a monopoly of the region's energy resources and its

distribution. As a result, if not Russia, who is Armenia going to rely on for its

domestic energy needs? Yes, Armenia has begun dealing with Iran regarding energy,

but Iran has serious problems. As we can see, Iran is virtually under siege and if the

West could have its way they would cut off Yerevan from Iran in a heartbeat. What's

more, due to Russia's strategic concerns, Moscow does not want to see Yerevan

relying on anyone else but Russia. As a result, they are forcing Armenia to allow

Moscow to get in on the deal with Iran. So, what can Armenia do at this stage ? What

options does Yerevan have? Play hardball with Russia by dealing with Azerbaijan and

Turkey?

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For better example of pragmatic vision on Russian foreign policy, we may quote a

commonly used expression by Lenin - "We can ignore the interests of small states for

the sake of interests of the large ones". Some experts think that Russia is a state with a

truly positive attitude towards Armenia. Armenian experts suppose that in the nearest

future the new geopolitical distribution in the South Caucasus will look like this:

politically unstable Georgia will be weakened by the consequences of the Russian

armed invasion, confused Azerbaijan will be projected on the existing situation in

Karabakh of the results of the hostilities at the separatist regions of Georgia and

Armenia, which will attempt to establish its place within the existing situation in the

way not to get injured from this regional political processes.

Dynamics of Russian-Armenian relations

Let's consider the dynamics of Russian-Armenian relations upon the background of

the latest historical transformation: collapse of the Soviet Union and appearance of

three independent Transcaucasian states - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan has

created a cardinally new military and political situation in the South Caucasus.

Countries of the region have faced totally new challenges in the process of ensuring

their own security. Ensuing from that, all the aforesaid countries have, in their own

ways, defined their level of participation in various regional and international

organizations, including the military and political ones, as well as in the process of

settling the relations with the leading states.

Armenia started to build the policy of securing their national safety in a different way

than Georgia and Azerbaijan, which, immediately after gaining their independence,

have taken a maximally distant course from Russia and are trying to cooperate mainly

with western countries in the military and political fields, particularly with the US,

and also with Turkey. Whereas for Armenia, Russia has become the main partner

within the military and political field, and we may estimate the level of bilateral

relations existing between these two countries, as quite an established strategic

cooperation.

From the very beginning the process of military and political cooperation between

Russia and Armenia was not confined by bilateral relations solely. This can be

explained by the multi- level integration processes created at the territory of the

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former Soviet Union. The process of the military integration of the CIS member states

has gradually turned into a three-level structure: within the borders of the

Commonwealth, within the frames of the collective security format and on the

grounds of the bilateral relations. The given multilevel integration system marked

peculiarities for each post-soviet state to influence over the South Caucasus regional

security problems, both through the bilateral aspect as well as the multilateral level.

On February 14, 1992 decision was made to establish the Council of Ministers of

Defence and Central Management of Joint Armed Forces of CIS, and on March 20,

1992 treaty on the joint Armed Forces in the period of transition was signed and the

above mentioned “Collective Security Agreement” was signed on March 15, 1992, in

Tashkent with Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan,

Georgia and Belarus joined them later. From the very beginning, this agreement was

aimed as a military constituent of Commonwealth of Independent States, also it was

meant to become a part of security system of Europe and Asia. However, due to

different reasons, not every CIS State joined it and it appeared impossible to retain

joint Armed Forces on the base of transformation of the existing Soviet Army.

As it is evident from the above, all the attempts made by Russia to retain its grasp on

most ex Soviet countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has proven

impossible. Therefore, Russia has had to resort to establishing close allies in various

regions; one of these allies in the Caucasus is Armenia.

The limitations of EU influence on the

democratization process in Armenia

The EU is broadly engaged with the South Caucasus states through the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). These regional

initiatives are aimed at economic development, trade, fostering democracy and

strengthening human rights credentials but, aside from a few border control

initiatives, mostly overlook security dimension and this is one of the reasons that

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Armenia is still reluctant to break away from Russia. The most recent addition to EU

engagement in the South Caucasus region was the launch of the EaP on the 7th of

May, 2009.

This unprecedented Summit assembled the Heads of the State or Heads of

Government of all EU countries and of the EU‟s “Eastern Neighbours”: Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

According to the Summit declaration, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is to “bring the

relationship between the EU and partner countries to a new level” and aims to

accelerate political association between them and to deepen the integration of partner

countries into the EU. The EaP is explicitly not a roadmap for EU accession however,

and is developed “without prejudice to individual countries‟ aspirations for their

future relationship with the EU.” Among other innovations, the EaP proposes to bring

about deep free-trade areas, combining open borders and regulatory approximation,

through bilateral agreements at first, and through multilateral frameworks later on. It

will also aim to increase mobility between EU and partner countries by introducing

visa facilitation agreements. These, and other measures envisaged by the EaP, could

provide the tangible and demonstrable benefits that would help build political

momentum in favour of further EU integration and EU-inspired reform in Armenia.

The EaP also introduces a novel multilateral framework at governmental level to

promote dialogue and cooperation among Eastern partner countries and to develop

common initiatives. Four “platforms” will focus on democracy and governance issues,

economic cooperation and convergence with EU law, contacts between people and

energy security. This multilateral framework should not be restricted to governmental

dialogue alone however. The Summit also proposed to develop a Civil Society Forum

and an EU Parliamentary Assembly to accompany this process. The EaP is

complementary to the European Neighbourhood Policy in existence since 2003,

whose geographical coverage is broader and which has more modest goals. Like the

EaP however, it seeks a balance between the regional approach and individual

treatment of partner countries, and remains non-committal on the issue of eventual

EU membership. A conference of officials and political analysts convened at the

initiative of the EU‟s Czech Presidency acknowledged that “hopes and expectations

had been unreasonably high” following the revolutions in the Ukraine and Georgia,

and that the EaP marked a “new beginning” and was an ambitious project”.

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From Armenia‟s point of view, the EaP was undoubtedly a significant step forward.

Armenia had been seeking to maximize the EU‟s contribution to political and

economic reforms in the country. EU integration is furthermore overwhelmingly

popular in the country, but successive governments have taken a pragmatic, gradualist

approach to European integration due to its strategic partnership with Russia as

mentioned above.

All the above developments had been welcomed by all and it had been hoped that

new changes were to take place. However, the EU has failed to use either the

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Eastern Partnership (EaP) to leverage

reform in Armenia. Armenia saw its inclusion in the EaP as a path to gaining EU

membership and a way of resolving ongoing problems with its neighbours. However

the EU is still neither actively involved in conflict resolution nor strongly committed

to closer political integration with its Eastern partners. Its vague policy stipulations

have done little to shore up its own position in the South Caucasus.

Armenia is often over-looked, compared to Georgia‟s more dramatic events in recent

years and Azerbaijan‟s pivotal energy role. But the country is also important to South

Caucasus security. Relations with Turkey continue to be uneasy. The „frozen‟ conflict

with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is on the verge of becoming more active.

Blocked democratic reforms breed social frustration. Given Armenia‟s landlocked

position, the closed border with Turkey, the recently closed Russian-Georgian border,

and the ongoing half-frozen conflict with Azerbaijan, regional cooperation focused on

reconciliation is essential to EU interests. The EU needs to upgrade its political

engagement in order to head off probable instability in all these areas of Armenian

politics.

PROGRESS AND CRISIS

According to the EaP Ministerial Council of December 2010, EU-Armenia relations

have intensified considerably in the EaP‟s bilateral and multilateral tracks. The first

meeting of the EU-Armenia Human Rights dialogue took place in December 2009.

The Commission is working on draft visa facilitation and readmission agreements.

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Negotiations for an EU-Armenia Association Agreement began in July 2010 with the

third and latest plenary round on 15 December 2010. This accord includes the

possibility to start negotiating a deep and comprehensive free trade area.

But Armenia has been hit hard by the economic crisis. The global financial crisis

reduced state revenues, harming the economic and social reform process in Armenia,

including implementation of the ENP Action Plan. After years of double-digit

economic growth, Armenia‟s GDP fell by a dramatic 15 per cent in 2009. In the same

year, EU exports to Armenia fell by 20 per cent, while exports of Armenian products

to the EU fell by a remarkable 50 per cent. The EaP is supposed to alleviate economic

problems and foster commercial relations however these figures suggest its

impotence.

To help lessen the impact of the financial crisis, in November 2009 the Council

agreed to provide macro-financial assistance to Armenia, in the form of a loan of

EUR 65 million and a grant of EUR 35 million. Yet, the question remains of whether

the injection of such funding into the state budget can contribute to the desired

„stability and prosperity‟ while some of the borders are closed and an adjacent conflict

persists. It certainly does not seem to have had any tangible impact. The plethora of

European loans and grants are unlikely to secure the EU‟s position in the Russian

dominated Armenian economy. Russian capital dominates Armenian

telecommunications, electricity networks, banking and gas distribution. In the latter

sector Russia provides a de facto subsidy and prevents the price of gas from doubling:

an offer that the EU cannot match. Thus, a primarily economic led policy does not

play to the EU‟s comparative advantage. Armenians look to the EU more for a role in

promoting democratic progress, conflict resolution and support for civil society.

POLITICAL TURMOIL

Association Agreements are supposed to be signed with functioning electoral

democracies only. However, the EU seems not to have applied this condition in

Armenia or other South Caucasus countries which are part of the EaP. The binding

nature of these agreements should increase the likelihood of a successful

implementation. But the EU‟s inconsistency regarding political conditions reduces its

credibility and future bargaining power.

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The May 2010 report on Armenia‟s progress in implementing the ENP Action Plan

states that Armenia has made progress in several areas. It has launched a regular

human rights dialogue with the EU, improved its legislative framework in the area of

anti-corruption and strengthened the role of the Human Rights Defender. The report

also insists that it has taken positive steps to address the internal political crisis

following the violence-marred presidential elections in February 2008. It additionally

mentions further reforms in justice and rule of law.

In fact, democracy indices show that democracy has not progressed since the launch

of the ENP in Armenia, and has even deteriorated in several areas. In 2008, the

outgoing president Kocharyan was expected to emulate Putin‟s conversion to being

prime-minister; however, mired in scandal he left politics. In an orchestrated hand-

over the prime minister ship went instead to the technocratic head of the central bank,

Tigran Sargsyan. Violent protests erupted. Ten days of demonstrations ensued against

regime-orchestrated ballot box stuffing, the attacks suffered by local observers and the

patent bias of the electoral commission. The protests ended with the violent dispersal

of the protesters. This was followed by a 20-day state of emergency.

Since 2008 dissent has grown over the nondemocratic transfer of power. The

Armenian opposition is far from united. The most visible opposition factions are the

Heritage party and the Communist party; but the latter did not pass the electoral

threshold in 2008 and its support base is dwindling. The leader of the 2008 protests,

former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan, is currently calling for Armenians to emulate

the events in Tunisia and Egypt. However, his post-2008 silence and association with

the country‟s problems of the 1990s undermine his ability to inspire the masses.

Meanwhile, the coalitional government is trying to secure the 2013 presidential bid

for the incumbent Serzh Sargsyan, with others predicting the comeback of Kocharyan

as his main rival. Armenians remain bitterly disappointed with the nepotism of

politics and predict an unstable period ahead. The post-elections crisis of 2008 has

received little critical attention from the EU, which preferred to distance itself and

take a wait and see approach. The EU deemed the 2008 elections broadly democratic -

despite all the evidence to the contrary and the anger of democratic opposition parties.

The EU urged the Armenian authorities to end the state of emergency, launch an

independent investigation on the violence and release political prisoners. However,

the regime ignored these requests and the state of emergency was not lifted before the

planned date of 20 March.

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The broadcast media has been under constant pressure from the government since the

elections. Restrictions have been placed on the freedom of assembly and the

opposition has been denied permission to hold demonstrations. A June 2009 amnesty

freed 30 protesters from jail and many more activists were released in another June

amnesty in 2011. The police officers accused of brutality during the post-election

events have not been charged. Despite all these negative trends and the Armenian

government‟s rejection of EU strictures, no policy change occurred under the rubric

of the ENP Action Plan and Armenia was safely granted a place within the EaP.

Armenians struggle to understand how the EU can classify their country as

democratic. Europe has turned a blind-eye to Armenia‟s authoritarian clampdown.

REGIONAL SECURITY AND CONFLICT

The EU has retained its efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a separate

priority. The EU prefers to distance itself on Nagorno- Karabakh and channel its

limited activities through promoting the OSCE Minsk Group. EU governments have

been largely reactive in the face of Russian diplomacy and influence. The unresolved

conflict compounds Russia‟s military and economic pre-eminence in the region and

reduces the chances of EU access to Azerbaijan‟s energy supplies. Instead of merely

„morally‟ supporting the OSCE Minsk Group, which includes seven different EU

governments, the Union should substitute these representatives with its own. These

should be the heads of EU delegations to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The creation of the

External Action Service and EU ambition to project a united front renders this step

both urgent and logical. It also has the potential to improve the image of the OSCE

Mink Group itself which is regarded as of little use by both the Armenian and

Azerbaijani sides. Progress on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is essential to ground

the EU‟s position in the region. Given its economic and security interests, it would be

problematic for the EU explicitly to take sides in the conflict. However, insisting on

stricter arms control, and even an arms embargo, would help to diminish the

possibility of a renewed war. Higher level political and economic involvement from

the EU should be combined with the setting of a deadline for resolution of the dispute

and pressure on both sides to avoid low level skirmishes. The EU‟s focus on non-

conflictive issues will keep the spotlight on Russia as the regional player. To

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safeguard its security, Armenia signed a new defence agreement with Russia in

August 2010, extending Russia‟s military base lease until 2044, further increasing

Russian influence in the region. But skirting difficult political questions will only

harm the EU‟s longer term role and interests. The EU has had clear opportunities to

contribute to resolving Armenia‟s conflictive relations with its two neighbours and

win over more EU enthusiasts, given the pro-European aspirations of the government

and the high level of public support for the Union. However, Armenia‟s parallel

foreign policies complicate the EU‟s agenda, as it has to deal with Armenia‟s close

security and economic relationship with Russia and developmental ties with the

United States. The long-awaited rapprochement in Armenian- Turkish relations

resulted in the signing of the Zurich accord. The EU played virtually no role in this

advance. Shortly afterwards the Turkish government reiterated that ratification would

depend on resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia responded by

officially suspending the accord‟s ratification process. The most publicised of

occasional hostilities, resulted in Armenia and Azerbaijan blaming each other and

demonstrated the lack of security in the region. Though the incident directly

undermined its conflict resolution commitments, the EU delegation in Armenia did

not officially react. Given the close relations of the South Caucasus countries with

some of their out-of-region neighbours, there is also a need for increased engagement

with regional players such as Turkey and Russia in the development of cooperation

policies. Though these states cannot be regarded as neutral, neither can they be

ignored. The EU should particularly encourage and contribute to incipient civil

society links between Armenia and Turkey. However, when encouraging civil society

links, the EU should be careful with the influential Armenian Diaspora, which pursues

a hard-line opposition to the rapprochement with Turkey. Civil society links have the

potential to transcend the historical baggage of the Armenian population and

encourage the latter to focus more pragmatically on the future and the need for

prosperity. To increase the effectiveness of its policies in the region, the EU needs to

address both the region‟s and Russia‟s interests. At the same time, the EU should not

underestimate Russia‟s „great power‟ ambitions. The EU needs to tie its further

economic engagement with Russia to the latter‟s acceptance of the sovereignty of

South Caucasus states.

An EU-funded opinion poll shows that 96 per cent of Armenian respondents want the

EU to be more active in developing regional cooperation. The ineffectiveness of ENP

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regional cooperation in military-security issues is explained not only by the divergent

interests of the regional players but also by the EU‟s reluctance to take specific,

concrete actions – as opposed to vague propositions and encouragements. The

respondents‟ bear analogy coincides with the European Parliament‟s view which

acknowledges the need for a comprehensive strategy for the South Caucasus that

would „combine soft power with a firm approach‟. The neglect of conflicts in the

South Caucasus will jeopardise the EU‟s attempts to reduce its energy dependence on

Russia. The outstanding conflicts will continue to be used to justify the concentrating

of power in the hands of a small elite group when facing criticism on the state of

democracy. Currently, the EU‟s approach to Armenia and other EaP members is an

accumulation of overlapping policies, which do not fully address the needs of the

partner country and hinder the proclaimed goals of the EU. The EU should end its

tendency to treat countries in the region with simplistic uniformity. Though some

differences are acknowledged on paper, the politically diverse countries of the South

Caucasus are included in the same policies and have similar priority areas in the ENP

Action Plans. Such an approach renders its policies less efficient as it fails to reward

its best aspirants and over-rewards the worst intractable.

2011 offers the EU an opportunity to act rather than react, given the US‟s declining

interest in the region and over-stretched involvement in other conflicts. The upgrading

of the EU‟s policies towards Armenia should be connected to progress in the

implementation of previous and current projects. Otherwise, the EU will end up with

a pile of expensive but eventually ineffective initiatives.

Conclusion

This paper has looked at the Armenian road to democracy, understanding it as a

tortuous process defined by internal and external dynamics. These two dimensions –

internal policies and external factors – have both fostered and hampered the process,

which from its very beginning has been defined in terms of the Western liberal

democracy model. Understanding democracy in its broader formulation, the

Armenian transition course has revealed many difficulties in implementation.

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Internally, the consolidation of democratic practices at the institutional and decision-

making levels has shown limits, in a society used to a strong leadership, and where

the power of the local elite in political and economic terms is substantial. These old-

style practices render the development of a civil society and the enhancement of rules

regarding transparency and accountability very difficult. The recurrent use of violence

to suppress dissidence and opposition is a clear example of political and economic

allegiances and of the difficulty to establish an independent judiciary. Armenia is thus

an incomplete democracy in a regional context where democracy as a model has

mostly been the exception. Surrounded by authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, the

so-called „managed democracy‟ in Russia and the arbitrariness in neighbouring

countries, with the possible exception of Georgia, underlines a view that Armenia‟s

efforts at reform, such as the recently adopted Constitutional amendments, should be

acknowledged and supported.

It is undeniable that there are many internal obstacles to this process. Nevertheless,

Armenia‟s relations with neighbouring countries and the influence of external actors

in the area are central elements that need to be taken into account. The lack of

regional cooperation, due to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and

competition for resources and influence in the area, render the geostrategic and

political-economic setting highly complex. The lack of diplomatic relations with

Azerbaijan and difficult relations with Turkey and Georgia; and cooperative relations

with Iran and Russia, despite elements of divergence, render the whole picture bleak.

In addition, the EU and the US have also become engaged in the South Caucasus,

providing economic, political and even military assistance. From this wide

involvement, a complex net of bargaining, concessions and trading of power has

emerged. The reconciliation of divergent interests and competing opportunities, along

with the challenge of fostering positive cooperative dynamics has proven very hard

indeed. In this context, the ENP might be an important catalyst for change both within

Armenia and regarding regional cooperation, since the approach in Yerevan is

„benefit driven‟, through a rational assessment, and not simply a feeling of euphoria.

By enhancing economic cooperation based on a set of agreed principles shared by all

ENP countries, it might establish a common platform to translate minimal shared

procedures into action, with positive input. Implementing a set of norms and practices

according to the EU model, as earlier defined – Europeanization – establishes

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common patterns and consists of a simple download of „ways of doing‟ that might in

the end turn out to be too removed from present Armenian political dynamics.

The scenarios are therefore varied, but an optimistic stance can be taken. Transition

should be understood as a long-term process, which takes time to take root but which

might assist in stabilising the region. By bringing with it deep reforms and the goal of

developing regional cooperation, it might constitute an important confidence-building

measure to end the Karabakh conflict, which is a fundamental obstacle to the

normalisation of relations in the area. In the process, the role of the elites in power

should not be underestimated as a blocking force to reforms that might undermine

particular interests. However, offering prospects of new economic opportunities might

also constitute an enhancing factor. Russia‟s influence in the South Caucasus has

diminished, particularly in Georgia, but also in Azerbaijan. This has been mostly due

to the perception of new options for the region, such as the Euro-Atlantic institutions,

understood in Moscow as a counterweight to its influence. Armenian leaders have

sought to keep all options open by their policy of complementarity, often linking

strategies of personal political survival to the fate of the Armenian nation in a

perceived hostile environment.

Russia can thus be seen as a maintainer of the status quo, namely regarding conflict

resolution issues, though to what extent this plays to its advantage in the long-run is

not clear. The US is another relevant player, and its military and energy interests in

the Caucasian countries have worked as a solid and credible basis for EU engagement

in the region, aligning the Euro- Atlantic partnership. However, issues concerning US

military intervention in Iraq and the management of the Iranian crisis are still major

problems that can affect the strategic engagement of the West in the South Caucasus.

In addition, US relations with Russia and with Turkey are also of much relevance

regarding the region‟s balance of power, and for the EU.

In a nutshell, the complexity of interactions, interests and necessary reforms has

rendered democratisation a difficult process in Armenia. The commitment to western

liberal democracy, though appearing to be highly rhetorical has, nevertheless, been

supported by Armenia‟s participation in international organisations, such as the

Council of Europe and OSCE, and in the neighbourhood policy of the EU.

Expectations are therefore rising as to the effective results of Armenia‟s post-

communist transition and to the role external players can have in the wider strategic

setting in the Caucasus. The Armenian democratisation process looks troubled, with

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such a complex set of divergent and competing interests, but there are nevertheless

identifiable areas for cooperation, which if exploited might open new windows of

opportunity, for Armenia might just be opening one of these windows.