Integrated Survivability Assessment(ISA)
in the Systems Engineering Process
David H. HallSURVICE Engineering Company
Carlsbad, CA(760) 382-1618
What is IntegratedSurvivability Assessment?
• ISA is a process for evaluating all aspects of systemsurvivability in a coordinated fashion– Using both M&S and T&E resources where appropriate
• Developed by SURVICE Engineering Company– For the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) with funding
from DOT&E• SURVICE’s Experience in many related areas led to its
selection for this work– Survivability, Effectiveness and Mission Modeling and Analysis– Test and Evaluation Planning, Execution, and Analysis– Model and Simulation Verification, Validation and Accreditation– Systems Safety Engineering and Analysis
What does the IntegratedSurvivability Assessment
Process Do?• Measures system survivability in the context of
missions and scenarios– Ensures that mission and scenario vignettes
“cover the waterfront” to avoid a point design• Ensures consistent treatment of survivability if
applied throughout the system acquisitionlifecycle– Requirements development, AOA, spec
compliance, LFT&E, OT&E, retrofits, SLEP,system mods, training applications…
• Enables trades of Survivability, Effectiveness,and Mission Metrics in a Consistent andDocumented Process
2. CrewProtection
5. DefensiveCountermeasures
10. Jamming9. SEAD &
DEAD
3. DamageResistance
1. DamageTolerance
13. Tactics &Doctrine
12. Policy& ROE
4. SignatureReduction
7. Performance
8. Precision &StandoffWeapons
11. MissionPlanning
6. SituationalAwareness
Susceptibility
Vulnerability
Other
Elements ofSurvivability
OffboardElements
Developing an IntegratedSurvivability Assessment Process
• Develop a checklist of important survivability factors• Define the operational context and environment• Select and evaluate the metrics identified as important to
integrated survivability assessment– Provide a modeling path to measure and quantify those metrics– Identify test range assets and processes to measure those metrics
• Identify assumptions, limitations, and deficiencies in both M&Sand Test resources– And mitigation actions for deficiencies
• Provide for a path to validation of the modeling processes withavailable test range data– Model - test - model
ThreatThreatSuppressionSuppression
DetectionDetectionAvoidanceAvoidance
EngagementEngagementAvoidanceAvoidance
Threat or HitThreat or HitAvoidanceAvoidance
Threat or HitThreat or HitToleranceTolerance
Off PlatformFactors
On PlatformFactors
Tactics, standoff weapons,anti-radiation missiles, selfdefense weapons, off-boardEA, night/all weathercapability, threat warning,situational awareness, C4ISR
Susceptibility:On-board EA, signatures,countermeasures, speed andaltitude, maneuverability,agility (last ditch maneuver),target acquisition(standoff),…
Vulnerability:Fire/explosion protection, self-repairing flightcontrols, redundant and separated hydraulics,multiple engines, no fuel adjacent to air inlets,hydrodynamic ram protection, nonflammablehydraulic fluid, rugged structure, armor, …
The Threat Kill Chain:A Checklist of Survivability Factors
Survivability Metrics
EngagementLevel
Susceptibility
•Threat Envelopes (with and w/o CM)•F-Pole, A-Pole, E-Pole
• Detection Range•Acquisition Range
•Tracking Range•ECM/IRCM Effectiveness
•First Shot Opportunity (Air to Air)
•Threat Shot Opportunities•Situational Awareness: Number ofthreat systems correctly detected,identified and located, with what
location range and accuracy
•Aircraft Pk/h (or damage given a hit or an intercept)•Component Pk/h (or damage given a hit)
•Vulnerable area•List of components vulnerable to various damage mechanisms
•Threat System Pk Envelopes•Hit locations on Aircraft
•Robustness
•Missions Accomplished: percentage ofvignettes that can be accomplished
considering survivability constraints•Force Survivability
•Targets at risk•Targets not engaged (leakers) (air to air)
•Robustness
Primary Metric (MOE) – RedSub-Metric (MOP) - Black
EffectivenessRecoverability
EngagementLevel
Survivability
•Expected # casualtiesgiven a hit
•Probability of personnelsurvival given loss of
aircraft control due to hit
Mission LevelSurvivability
PersonnelSurvivability
Vulnerability
Metrics and the Checklist
Links in theThreat KillChain
ISA Metrics Potential Survivability Enhancement FeaturesAlong the Kill Chain
MissionSurvivability
Missions Accomplished; robustness All features combine to support mission levelsurvivability
ThreatSuppression
Threat Shot opportunities; situational awareness(number, timeliness and accuracy of threatsdetected)
Tactics, Precision Guided Munitions, mission planning, lowsignatures, fighter escort, ARM, self defense weapons
DetectionAvoidance
Threat Detection & Acquisition Envelopes SOWs, Night Capability, on-board Electronic Attack (EA),stand-off EA, low signatures, good target acquisition, TerrainFollowing, Situational Awareness (SA), chaff, threat warning,tactics, mission planning
EngagementAvoidance
Threat Tracking envelopes; F-Pole, A-Pole, E-Pole; ECM effectiveness
SOWs, Onboard EA, Off-board EA, low signatures, goodtarget acquisition, SA, chaff and flares, threat warning, speedand altitude, mission planning
Threat orHitavoidance
Threat Intercept Envelopes; ECM/IRCMeffectiveness
On-board EA, low signatures, chaff and flares, threatwarning, speed and altitude, maneuverability, agility
Threat or hittolerance
Threat system Pk envelopes; Aircraft Pk/h;Component Pk/h; VA; Vulnerable Components;Casualties given a hit; hit locations on aircraft
Fire/explosion protection, self-repairing flight controls,redundant and separated hydraulics, multiple engines, no fueladjacent to air inlets, hydrodynamic ram protection,nonflammable hydraulic fluid, rugged structure, armor
The SurvivabilityAssessment Process
Susceptibility Assessment
Signatures
Countermeasures
ThreatSensors
EnvironmentalEffects
Vulnerability Assessment
System SurvivabilityAssessment
LasersAAM
GunsSAM
EW/EC
Engagement Assessment
Air-to-AirCombat
Air-to-GroundMissions
MissionAssessment
VehicleGeometry
DMEA
Flight &Mission
EssentialComponents
VulnerabilityIndices
ComponentPK/H
Mission-ThreatAnalysis
Mission and SystemMetrics
Data Sources for a Typical SurvivabilityAssessment
PK/E = PA/E*PT/A*PL/T*PI/L*PF/I*PH/F*PK/H
DT/OT&E M&S LFT&E
E = EngagementA = AcquisitionT = TrackL = Launch
I = InterceptF = FuzingH = Hit
K = Kill
System Survivability ina Network EnvironmentConnectivity Targeting
ConnectivityTargeting
Connectivityand Targeting
How does loss of a UAS element affect the network?
Network Fault Tree Approach
External Connectivity
UAV #2UAV #1
Ground Platform
Targeting
UAV #2
Ground Platform
TargetingExternal Connectivity
UAV #2
Ground Platform
Prior toloss of
UAV #1
Afterloss of
UAV #1
DevelopDetailed Test Plans
Program Documents(TEMP, ORD, etc.)
Library of M&S (incl.Credibility Info.)
Existing Fixed Data(Terrain, Threat, etc.)
Existing Data(System Specific)
Characteristics ofSystem Under Test
Create VignettesApplicable to System
Under Test
Assess M&SNeeds
Select M&S SuiteBest-Suited to System
Under Test
Execute M&S(Pre-Test Analyses)
Execute M&S(Post-Test, i.e., Using
LFT&E and OT&E Data)
Conduct AnalysisTo Yield
Survivability Metrics
Assess T&ENeeds
Select T&E Site(s)Best-Suited to System
Under Test
Conduct T&ECollect LFT&E data Collect OT&E data
Testresultsdictatemajor
programchange
Integrated Survivability Assessment Process:Model-Test-Model Concept
ModelModel
TestTest
ModelModel
•Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS) withthe following characteristics:Role: CAS, battlefield interdiction, SEAD/DEAD, etc.Dimensions:Weight:Speed:Range:
•To be determined:RCS:IR signature:DECM/IRCM:Vulnerability:etc.
“Case Study” Example
High Altitude,Rough TerrainConventional
Threat
Flat Terrain,Clear Wx
High Threat
IADS, Wx,Target
AcquisitionAdvanced
Threat
TargetAcquisition
DifficultConventional
Threat
Driving Factors
ЖXXXCSAR
XXXЖAll Weather,Night Strike
XXЖC2
XXЖXSEADDEAD
XXЖXForceProtection
XXXЖISR
3rd WorldMountains
ConventionalThreat,Desert
AdvancedThreat,
Forested
3rd WorldUrban
EXAMPLE: UCAS VIGNETTES
Ж = MoststressingScenario
Example: SEAD/DEAD Vignette
-450
-400
-350
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
-250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200
37th cmd_post
4 long_sam
strike1 ucav
strike2 ucav
8 close_sam_cdr
3rd close_sam
5th close_sam
7th close_sam
soj1 ucav
soj2 ucav
soj3 ucav
33 med_sam
31 med_sam32 med_sam
harm1 ucav
harm2 ucavTOT -12TOT -5TOT -4TOT -3TOT -2TOT -1TOT -0TOT +1
Checkpoint αDecoys on @ β2 x HARMs2 x HARMs2 x HARMsWeapons awayWeapons impact2 x HARMs
Timeline
β
α
Example Integrated Survivability Results :Impact of IRCM Improvements on UAS
600
615
630
2
4
6
40
20
60
LIFE
CYC
L EC
OST
$M
UN
ITC
OST
$M
LOS S
ES
NONE ALQ-144 DIRECTEDENERGY
CM
ADVANCEDCONVENTIONAL
JAMMERS
Fewest losses,highest unit cost
Lowest LifeCycle Cost
NOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY
Example Integrated Survivability Result:Impact of IR Signature Reduction on UAS
600
700
800
2
4
6
40
20
60
LIFE
CY C
L EC
OS T
$ M
UN
ITC
OST
$M
L OS S
E S
50 W/Sr 5 W/Sr 1 W/Sr
Fewest losses,highest unit cost
Lowest LifeCycle Cost
NOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY
Integrated Survivability AssessmentApplications
RequirementsRequirementsDefinitionDefinition
AOAAOA
OT&E/LFT&EOT&E/LFT&E
SpecificationSpecificationComplianceCompliance
MissionMissionPlanningPlanning
TrainingTraining
Susceptibility Assessment
Signatures
Countermeasures
ThreatSensors
EnvironmentalEffects
Vulnerability Assessment
System SurvivabilityAssessment
LasersAAM
GunsSAM
EW/EC
Engagement Assessment
Air-to-AirCombat
Air-to-GroundMissions
MissionAssessment
VehicleGeometry
DMEA
Flight &Mission
EssentialComponents
VulnerabilityIndices
ComponentPK/H
Mission-ThreatAnalysis
Summary
• Integrated Survivability Assessmentincorporates survivability into the systemsengineering process for all phases of systemdevelopment– Supports both individual platform and network
system assessment• JASP has funded the development of a
baseline ISA capability focused on air systems– ISA process is extensible to ground, shipboard and
space systems as well
ISA Demonstrations
• JASP is co-funding demonstrations of the ISAprocess for two acquisition programs
• Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)– Demo began in FY04
• Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)– To begin in FY06
Supplemental Material
Example: SEAD/DEAD Vignette
• SEAD/DEAD mission• SOJ• HARM• Part of Battlefield Interdiction (Strike)
•Command Post target• Scenario:
• Unclassified scenario taken from Joint IntegratedMission Model (JIMM) dataset
• Threats:• Surface-to-air RF and IR missiles only
ALARM
SIGNATUREPREDICTION, MEASUREMENT
ESAMS(RF SAMS)
RADGUNS(ADA)
DREAM(HPM)
LELAWS(LEL)
RF Detection, AcquisitionRange Contours
MOSAIC(IR SAMS)
Output Metrics:Detection, Acquisition Range
Tracking Range ContoursThreat Envelopes
ECM/IRCM Effectiveness
BLUEMAX
Flight Paths
Open Air Test Range Tracking,Acquisition Data
Single Threat EngagementAssessment
ECM/IRCM Effects(Test Data -
Open air, HWIL, CaptiveFlight)
Example Susceptibility Results:Impact of RCS and Terrain on
Detection
Detection range vs. RCS Effects of Terrain Maskingon Detection Contour
A/C Flight Paths
-50-40-30-20-10
01020304050
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Detection Range (km)
RC
S (d
Bsm
)
Radar A Radar B Radar C
Example Results:Impact of ECM on Miss Distance
7570656055
50454035
30252015
1050-5-10
-15-20-25-30
-35-40-45-50
-55-60-65-70-75
100-150
50-100
0-50
-50-0
-100--50
75706560555045403530
2520151050-5-10-15-20-25
-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75
900-1000
800-900
700-800
600-700
500-600
400-500
300-400
200-300
100-200
0-100
-100-0
No ECM With ECM
A/C Flight Paths
Threat System
A/C Flight Paths
Miss Distances in MetersLocations in KM
CriticalFunctionsAnalysis
FMECA(FMEA/DMEA)
GeometricModel
COVART,AJEM
Pd/hFunctions
Fault Trees OUTPUT METRICS:
Pk/h (Aircraft andComponent)
Vulnerable Area
OUTPUT METRIC:
List of vulnerablecomponents by damage
mechanism
LFT&E Data
Vulnerability Assessment
FUZEMODEL
GTD (RF)
FUZEMODEL
GTD (RF)
INTERCEPTPARAMETERS/DISTRIBUTIONS
(from threatperformance
assessment M&S)
INTERCEPTPARAMETERS/DISTRIBUTIONS
(from threatperformance
assessment M&S)
TARGETVULNERABILITY
MODEL(COVART)
TARGETVULNERABILITY
MODEL(COVART)
WARHEADMODEL
WARHEADMODEL
TARGETNEAR-FIELDSIGNATURE
MODEL
TARGETNEAR-FIELDSIGNATURE
MODEL
SHAZAM, JSEMBlast, Direct Hit, Fragmentation
SHAZAM, JSEMBlast, Direct Hit, Fragmentation
PK
LFT&E DataTest RangeMeasurement
Data
Threat Missile Endgame (Pk)Assessment
Example Engagement SurvivabilityResults: Effect of ECM on PK
-75-70-65-60-55-50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5051015202530354045505560657075
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
-35
-40
-45
-50
-55
-60
-65
-70
-75
-75-70-65-60-55-50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5051015202530354045505560657075
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
-35
-40
-45
-50
-55
-60
-65
-70
-75
No ECM With ECMA/C Flight Paths A/C Flight PathsHigh PK
Region Threat System
Mission SurvivabilityAssessment
ESAMS(RF SAMS)
RADGUNS(ADA)
DREAM(HPM)
LELAWS(LEL)
MOSAIC(IR SAMS)
Engagement Level ResultsDetection, Tracking Range
ContoursThreat Pk Envelopes
ECM/IRCM Effectiveness
ECM/IRCM Effects(Test Data)
Man-in-the-loop simulatorsDIADS
Blue C4ISR Threat C3
MISSION LEVEL MODELS(JIMM, SUPPRESSOR, EADSIM)
Flight Paths(MultipleAircraft)
MISSIONPLANNINGSYSTEMS
OUTPUT METRICS:•Mission Accomplishment: percent ofvignettes that can be accomplishedconsidering survivability constraints•Force Survivability•Targets at risk•Robustness•Threat Shot Opportunities•Situational Awareness: Number of threatsystems correctly detected, identified andlocated, with what location range andaccuracy
Blue WeaponsEffects(JMEM)
Limited Open-Air RangeTesting
Multiple Threat SystemsMultiple Air Vehicles