Integrated Survivability Assessment(ISA)

in the Systems Engineering Process

David H. HallSURVICE Engineering Company

Carlsbad, CA(760) 382-1618

Dave.Hall@SURVICE.comwww.survice.com

What is IntegratedSurvivability Assessment?

• ISA is a process for evaluating all aspects of systemsurvivability in a coordinated fashion– Using both M&S and T&E resources where appropriate

• Developed by SURVICE Engineering Company– For the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) with funding

from DOT&E• SURVICE’s Experience in many related areas led to its

selection for this work– Survivability, Effectiveness and Mission Modeling and Analysis– Test and Evaluation Planning, Execution, and Analysis– Model and Simulation Verification, Validation and Accreditation– Systems Safety Engineering and Analysis

What does the IntegratedSurvivability Assessment

Process Do?• Measures system survivability in the context of

missions and scenarios– Ensures that mission and scenario vignettes

“cover the waterfront” to avoid a point design• Ensures consistent treatment of survivability if

applied throughout the system acquisitionlifecycle– Requirements development, AOA, spec

compliance, LFT&E, OT&E, retrofits, SLEP,system mods, training applications…

• Enables trades of Survivability, Effectiveness,and Mission Metrics in a Consistent andDocumented Process

2. CrewProtection

5. DefensiveCountermeasures

10. Jamming9. SEAD &

DEAD

3. DamageResistance

1. DamageTolerance

13. Tactics &Doctrine

12. Policy& ROE

4. SignatureReduction

7. Performance

8. Precision &StandoffWeapons

11. MissionPlanning

6. SituationalAwareness

Susceptibility

Vulnerability

Other

Elements ofSurvivability

OffboardElements

Developing an IntegratedSurvivability Assessment Process

• Develop a checklist of important survivability factors• Define the operational context and environment• Select and evaluate the metrics identified as important to

integrated survivability assessment– Provide a modeling path to measure and quantify those metrics– Identify test range assets and processes to measure those metrics

• Identify assumptions, limitations, and deficiencies in both M&Sand Test resources– And mitigation actions for deficiencies

• Provide for a path to validation of the modeling processes withavailable test range data– Model - test - model

ThreatThreatSuppressionSuppression

DetectionDetectionAvoidanceAvoidance

EngagementEngagementAvoidanceAvoidance

Threat or HitThreat or HitAvoidanceAvoidance

Threat or HitThreat or HitToleranceTolerance

Off PlatformFactors

On PlatformFactors

Tactics, standoff weapons,anti-radiation missiles, selfdefense weapons, off-boardEA, night/all weathercapability, threat warning,situational awareness, C4ISR

Susceptibility:On-board EA, signatures,countermeasures, speed andaltitude, maneuverability,agility (last ditch maneuver),target acquisition(standoff),…

Vulnerability:Fire/explosion protection, self-repairing flightcontrols, redundant and separated hydraulics,multiple engines, no fuel adjacent to air inlets,hydrodynamic ram protection, nonflammablehydraulic fluid, rugged structure, armor, …

The Threat Kill Chain:A Checklist of Survivability Factors

Survivability Metrics

EngagementLevel

Susceptibility

•Threat Envelopes (with and w/o CM)•F-Pole, A-Pole, E-Pole

• Detection Range•Acquisition Range

•Tracking Range•ECM/IRCM Effectiveness

•First Shot Opportunity (Air to Air)

•Threat Shot Opportunities•Situational Awareness: Number ofthreat systems correctly detected,identified and located, with what

location range and accuracy

•Aircraft Pk/h (or damage given a hit or an intercept)•Component Pk/h (or damage given a hit)

•Vulnerable area•List of components vulnerable to various damage mechanisms

•Threat System Pk Envelopes•Hit locations on Aircraft

•Robustness

•Missions Accomplished: percentage ofvignettes that can be accomplished

considering survivability constraints•Force Survivability

•Targets at risk•Targets not engaged (leakers) (air to air)

•Robustness

Primary Metric (MOE) – RedSub-Metric (MOP) - Black

EffectivenessRecoverability

EngagementLevel

Survivability

•Expected # casualtiesgiven a hit

•Probability of personnelsurvival given loss of

aircraft control due to hit

Mission LevelSurvivability

PersonnelSurvivability

Vulnerability

Metrics and the Checklist

Links in theThreat KillChain

ISA Metrics Potential Survivability Enhancement FeaturesAlong the Kill Chain

MissionSurvivability

Missions Accomplished; robustness All features combine to support mission levelsurvivability

ThreatSuppression

Threat Shot opportunities; situational awareness(number, timeliness and accuracy of threatsdetected)

Tactics, Precision Guided Munitions, mission planning, lowsignatures, fighter escort, ARM, self defense weapons

DetectionAvoidance

Threat Detection & Acquisition Envelopes SOWs, Night Capability, on-board Electronic Attack (EA),stand-off EA, low signatures, good target acquisition, TerrainFollowing, Situational Awareness (SA), chaff, threat warning,tactics, mission planning

EngagementAvoidance

Threat Tracking envelopes; F-Pole, A-Pole, E-Pole; ECM effectiveness

SOWs, Onboard EA, Off-board EA, low signatures, goodtarget acquisition, SA, chaff and flares, threat warning, speedand altitude, mission planning

Threat orHitavoidance

Threat Intercept Envelopes; ECM/IRCMeffectiveness

On-board EA, low signatures, chaff and flares, threatwarning, speed and altitude, maneuverability, agility

Threat or hittolerance

Threat system Pk envelopes; Aircraft Pk/h;Component Pk/h; VA; Vulnerable Components;Casualties given a hit; hit locations on aircraft

Fire/explosion protection, self-repairing flight controls,redundant and separated hydraulics, multiple engines, no fueladjacent to air inlets, hydrodynamic ram protection,nonflammable hydraulic fluid, rugged structure, armor

The SurvivabilityAssessment Process

Susceptibility Assessment

Signatures

Countermeasures

ThreatSensors

EnvironmentalEffects

Vulnerability Assessment

System SurvivabilityAssessment

LasersAAM

GunsSAM

EW/EC

Engagement Assessment

Air-to-AirCombat

Air-to-GroundMissions

MissionAssessment

VehicleGeometry

DMEA

Flight &Mission

EssentialComponents

VulnerabilityIndices

ComponentPK/H

Mission-ThreatAnalysis

Mission and SystemMetrics

Data Sources for a Typical SurvivabilityAssessment

PK/E = PA/E*PT/A*PL/T*PI/L*PF/I*PH/F*PK/H

DT/OT&E M&S LFT&E

E = EngagementA = AcquisitionT = TrackL = Launch

I = InterceptF = FuzingH = Hit

K = Kill

System Survivability ina Network EnvironmentConnectivity Targeting

ConnectivityTargeting

Connectivityand Targeting

How does loss of a UAS element affect the network?

Network Fault Tree Approach

External Connectivity

UAV #2UAV #1

Ground Platform

Targeting

UAV #2

Ground Platform

TargetingExternal Connectivity

UAV #2

Ground Platform

Prior toloss of

UAV #1

Afterloss of

UAV #1

DevelopDetailed Test Plans

Program Documents(TEMP, ORD, etc.)

Library of M&S (incl.Credibility Info.)

Existing Fixed Data(Terrain, Threat, etc.)

Existing Data(System Specific)

Characteristics ofSystem Under Test

Create VignettesApplicable to System

Under Test

Assess M&SNeeds

Select M&S SuiteBest-Suited to System

Under Test

Execute M&S(Pre-Test Analyses)

Execute M&S(Post-Test, i.e., Using

LFT&E and OT&E Data)

Conduct AnalysisTo Yield

Survivability Metrics

Assess T&ENeeds

Select T&E Site(s)Best-Suited to System

Under Test

Conduct T&ECollect LFT&E data Collect OT&E data

Testresultsdictatemajor

programchange

Integrated Survivability Assessment Process:Model-Test-Model Concept

ModelModel

TestTest

ModelModel

•Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS) withthe following characteristics:Role: CAS, battlefield interdiction, SEAD/DEAD, etc.Dimensions:Weight:Speed:Range:

•To be determined:RCS:IR signature:DECM/IRCM:Vulnerability:etc.

“Case Study” Example

High Altitude,Rough TerrainConventional

Threat

Flat Terrain,Clear Wx

High Threat

IADS, Wx,Target

AcquisitionAdvanced

Threat

TargetAcquisition

DifficultConventional

Threat

Driving Factors

ЖXXXCSAR

XXXЖAll Weather,Night Strike

XXЖC2

XXЖXSEADDEAD

XXЖXForceProtection

XXXЖISR

3rd WorldMountains

ConventionalThreat,Desert

AdvancedThreat,

Forested

3rd WorldUrban

EXAMPLE: UCAS VIGNETTES

Ж = MoststressingScenario

Example: SEAD/DEAD Vignette

-450

-400

-350

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

-250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200

37th cmd_post

4 long_sam

strike1 ucav

strike2 ucav

8 close_sam_cdr

3rd close_sam

5th close_sam

7th close_sam

soj1 ucav

soj2 ucav

soj3 ucav

33 med_sam

31 med_sam32 med_sam

harm1 ucav

harm2 ucavTOT -12TOT -5TOT -4TOT -3TOT -2TOT -1TOT -0TOT +1

Checkpoint αDecoys on @ β2 x HARMs2 x HARMs2 x HARMsWeapons awayWeapons impact2 x HARMs

Timeline

β

α

Example Integrated Survivability Results :Impact of IRCM Improvements on UAS

600

615

630

2

4

6

40

20

60

LIFE

CYC

L EC

OST

$M

UN

ITC

OST

$M

LOS S

ES

NONE ALQ-144 DIRECTEDENERGY

CM

ADVANCEDCONVENTIONAL

JAMMERS

Fewest losses,highest unit cost

Lowest LifeCycle Cost

NOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY

Example Integrated Survivability Result:Impact of IR Signature Reduction on UAS

600

700

800

2

4

6

40

20

60

LIFE

CY C

L EC

OS T

$ M

UN

ITC

OST

$M

L OS S

E S

50 W/Sr 5 W/Sr 1 W/Sr

Fewest losses,highest unit cost

Lowest LifeCycle Cost

NOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY

Integrated Survivability AssessmentApplications

RequirementsRequirementsDefinitionDefinition

AOAAOA

OT&E/LFT&EOT&E/LFT&E

SpecificationSpecificationComplianceCompliance

MissionMissionPlanningPlanning

TrainingTraining

Susceptibility Assessment

Signatures

Countermeasures

ThreatSensors

EnvironmentalEffects

Vulnerability Assessment

System SurvivabilityAssessment

LasersAAM

GunsSAM

EW/EC

Engagement Assessment

Air-to-AirCombat

Air-to-GroundMissions

MissionAssessment

VehicleGeometry

DMEA

Flight &Mission

EssentialComponents

VulnerabilityIndices

ComponentPK/H

Mission-ThreatAnalysis

Summary

• Integrated Survivability Assessmentincorporates survivability into the systemsengineering process for all phases of systemdevelopment– Supports both individual platform and network

system assessment• JASP has funded the development of a

baseline ISA capability focused on air systems– ISA process is extensible to ground, shipboard and

space systems as well

ISA Demonstrations

• JASP is co-funding demonstrations of the ISAprocess for two acquisition programs

• Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)– Demo began in FY04

• Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)– To begin in FY06

Supplemental Material

Example: SEAD/DEAD Vignette

• SEAD/DEAD mission• SOJ• HARM• Part of Battlefield Interdiction (Strike)

•Command Post target• Scenario:

• Unclassified scenario taken from Joint IntegratedMission Model (JIMM) dataset

• Threats:• Surface-to-air RF and IR missiles only

ALARM

SIGNATUREPREDICTION, MEASUREMENT

ESAMS(RF SAMS)

RADGUNS(ADA)

DREAM(HPM)

LELAWS(LEL)

RF Detection, AcquisitionRange Contours

MOSAIC(IR SAMS)

Output Metrics:Detection, Acquisition Range

Tracking Range ContoursThreat Envelopes

ECM/IRCM Effectiveness

BLUEMAX

Flight Paths

Open Air Test Range Tracking,Acquisition Data

Single Threat EngagementAssessment

ECM/IRCM Effects(Test Data -

Open air, HWIL, CaptiveFlight)

Example Susceptibility Results:Impact of RCS and Terrain on

Detection

Detection range vs. RCS Effects of Terrain Maskingon Detection Contour

A/C Flight Paths

-50-40-30-20-10

01020304050

0 200 400 600 800 1000

Detection Range (km)

RC

S (d

Bsm

)

Radar A Radar B Radar C

Example Results:Impact of ECM on Miss Distance

7570656055

50454035

30252015

1050-5-10

-15-20-25-30

-35-40-45-50

-55-60-65-70-75

100-150

50-100

0-50

-50-0

-100--50

75706560555045403530

2520151050-5-10-15-20-25

-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75

900-1000

800-900

700-800

600-700

500-600

400-500

300-400

200-300

100-200

0-100

-100-0

No ECM With ECM

A/C Flight Paths

Threat System

A/C Flight Paths

Miss Distances in MetersLocations in KM

CriticalFunctionsAnalysis

FMECA(FMEA/DMEA)

GeometricModel

COVART,AJEM

Pd/hFunctions

Fault Trees OUTPUT METRICS:

Pk/h (Aircraft andComponent)

Vulnerable Area

OUTPUT METRIC:

List of vulnerablecomponents by damage

mechanism

LFT&E Data

Vulnerability Assessment

FUZEMODEL

GTD (RF)

FUZEMODEL

GTD (RF)

INTERCEPTPARAMETERS/DISTRIBUTIONS

(from threatperformance

assessment M&S)

INTERCEPTPARAMETERS/DISTRIBUTIONS

(from threatperformance

assessment M&S)

TARGETVULNERABILITY

MODEL(COVART)

TARGETVULNERABILITY

MODEL(COVART)

WARHEADMODEL

WARHEADMODEL

TARGETNEAR-FIELDSIGNATURE

MODEL

TARGETNEAR-FIELDSIGNATURE

MODEL

SHAZAM, JSEMBlast, Direct Hit, Fragmentation

SHAZAM, JSEMBlast, Direct Hit, Fragmentation

PK

LFT&E DataTest RangeMeasurement

Data

Threat Missile Endgame (Pk)Assessment

Example Engagement SurvivabilityResults: Effect of ECM on PK

-75-70-65-60-55-50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5051015202530354045505560657075

75

70

65

60

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

-15

-20

-25

-30

-35

-40

-45

-50

-55

-60

-65

-70

-75

-75-70-65-60-55-50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5051015202530354045505560657075

75

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45

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25

20

15

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5

0

-5

-10

-15

-20

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-30

-35

-40

-45

-50

-55

-60

-65

-70

-75

No ECM With ECMA/C Flight Paths A/C Flight PathsHigh PK

Region Threat System

Mission SurvivabilityAssessment

ESAMS(RF SAMS)

RADGUNS(ADA)

DREAM(HPM)

LELAWS(LEL)

MOSAIC(IR SAMS)

Engagement Level ResultsDetection, Tracking Range

ContoursThreat Pk Envelopes

ECM/IRCM Effectiveness

ECM/IRCM Effects(Test Data)

Man-in-the-loop simulatorsDIADS

Blue C4ISR Threat C3

MISSION LEVEL MODELS(JIMM, SUPPRESSOR, EADSIM)

Flight Paths(MultipleAircraft)

MISSIONPLANNINGSYSTEMS

OUTPUT METRICS:•Mission Accomplishment: percent ofvignettes that can be accomplishedconsidering survivability constraints•Force Survivability•Targets at risk•Robustness•Threat Shot Opportunities•Situational Awareness: Number of threatsystems correctly detected, identified andlocated, with what location range andaccuracy

Blue WeaponsEffects(JMEM)

Limited Open-Air RangeTesting

Multiple Threat SystemsMultiple Air Vehicles