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INTRODUCTION
We, the sovereign Filipino people
The Constitution is opened by this meaningful reminder
that we are not just a political community as Filipinos but
as the fundamental law of the land safeguards, The Filipinos
are sovereign. The Sovereign not only has the right to vote
and to be voted but also has the right to strip a public
officer of the privileges that were vested on him by reason
of his appointment or election through an impeachment
proceeding. This is very much highlighted by Constitution in
Article XI, Section 1 stating that Public office is public
trust.
January 16, 2012 marked the onset of the second
impeachment trial in Philippine history. A few years ago,
the senate proceeded with the impeachment trial of former
President Joseph Estrada, now another figurehead on a
different branch is on the grill- no less than Chief Justice
Renato Corona.
While it has been true that the Constitution reserves
the sole power to the Senate to try and decide impeachment
cases, it is not the dead end. Answers can still be changed
before the final bulwark of justice, the Supreme Court for a
judicial review.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution expanded the power of the Judiciary as it
stated that the same have the duty, not only the power, to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
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discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government
through its expanded certiorari jurisdiction.1
Such being established, the Supreme Court can declare
otherwise a decision of the impeachment court when the same
has produced such decision with grave abuse of discretion.
In its previous cases, the Supreme Court further
specified what grave abuse of discretion. In the case of
Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuko, it is defined as
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack or jurisdiction as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of jurisdiction must be grave as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the same case, it has further defined that, grave
abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of
jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law
and jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for
various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of
facts.
In the impeachment case of Chief Justice Corona, it is
very likely that the defense would resort to seeking a
reversal the moment the impeachment court finds the Chief
1 Aralar, Reynaldo. Separation of Powers and Impeachment. Mandaluyong City: NationalBookstore, 2004.
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Justice guilty of the allegations. As previously stated,
such political question becomes a justiciable one when it
involved grave abuse of discretion.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Can the Chief Justice seek judicial review when the
Impeachment Court finds him guilty of the allegations of the
prosecution?
SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY
This is an exploratory discussion of the probabilities
which could arise out of the impeachment trial courts
decision as to the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato
Corona. This specifically covers criterion on how to measure
grave abuse of discretion using a collation of decided cases
and relating them to the impeachment trial of the Chief
Justice; how the Supreme acquire jurisdiction over decisions
made by the Impeachment Trial Court and probable resolutions
in case of allegations of grave abuse of discretion in both
part of the Supreme Court and the Impeachment Court.
Limitation of this research paper lies on it being
exploratory in nature and the topic being discussed is yet
to happen. For purposes of analysis, the research is limited
to grave abuse of discretion involving misapprehension of
facts. Research materials used are predominantly sourced out
from the internet and the researchers have not adequately
and comprehensively gathered Philippine jurisprudence
pertaining to impeachment. This is otherwise justified by
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the fact that impeachment proceedings in the country is
considerably on its infancy stage as compared with the US.
OBJECTIVES
Major Objective:
This paper aims to set a criterion on how to measure
grave abuse of discretion using a collation of decided cases
and relating them to the current impeachment trial of the
Chief Justice.
Specific Objectives:
1)Discuss how to determine grave abuse of discretionif it is committed by the Impeachment Court and if
it is committed by the Supreme Court.
2)Discuss how the Supreme Court acquire jurisdictionover the decision of the Impeachment Court.
3)Discuss the probable resolution of the issue if theSupreme Court is alleged to have committed grave
abuse of discretion and the impeachment court is
alleged of the same.
METHODOLOGY
Descriptive-analytical research method is used through
utilization of books, e-books, journals, e-journals and
other research materials specifically those found in the law
library of the University of San Agustin and downloadable
relevant articles from the internet. Specifically,
jurisprudence, commentaries of legal luminaries, rules of
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procedure promulgated by the Senate and the Supreme Court to
name a few were utilized.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
a)Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpableerrors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It refers also
to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been
a gross misapprehension of facts. It is also a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack or jurisdiction as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of jurisdiction must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.2
b)Certiorari under Rule 65- refers to a special civilaction that can be initiated on the grounds of lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.3
c)Misapprehension of Facts- refers to a false impressionor incorrect understanding especially of the nature of
situation or a set of facts.4
d)Articles of Impeachment are the set of charges draftedagainst a public official to initiate the impeachment
2 Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuk, 534 SCRA 322, 09/28/073 http://www.1-4-3.net/remedial-law-bar-exams/?p=1864 Microsoft Encarta Dictionary, 2007
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process. The articles of impeachment do not result in
the removal of the official, but instead require the
enacting body to take further action, such as bringing
the articles to a vote before the full body.5
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Looking back at the previous impeachment
proceedings and even impeachment attempts that have
transpired in the previous years, we have witnessed the
medium rare impeachment of former president Joseph E.
Estrada that started officially on December 7, 2000.
The impeachment ended up in a walk out of public
prosecutors, resignation of Senator Pimentel as Senate
President and the massive cry of the public in another
historic event known as EDSA 2. Through the suggestion of
Senator Francisco Tatad, they voted on the opening of the
second envelope containing crucial evidence that would in
fact prove Estradas acts of political corruption. With an
11-10 vote, the Nays have it and the second envelope was
not opened.6
On 17 January 2001, the public prosecutors to Speaker
Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation submitted
a letter. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal
of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul
Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the
5 (http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Articles+of+impeachment)
6 EDSA DOS, http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php?title=Edsa_Dos (2 April2012).
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impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation
of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the
motion. As a result, the impeachment trial never resumed
and was soon pushed back into the publics subconscious,
making it another part of history to be read and studied
again by the coming generations.7
One issue involved in Estradas Impeachment trial was
whether Estrada indeed resigned as President of the
Philippines or otherwise. The resolution of the issue states
that even though ones intent to resign needs to be coupled
with an act of relinquishment whether express or implied,
oral or written. The facts of the case clearly showed that
Estrada did not leave any formal letter stating that he
would resign from the presidency.
In the diary of Executive Secretary Angara which was
serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, his [Estrada]
resignation was implied during the first stage of
negotiation between Estrada and the opposition about a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power.
In the second stage, his resignation was again treated
as a given fact by leaving Malacanang. Justice Renato S.
Puno declared in part for the Court in the Estrada vs.
Arroyo case:
7 Instances of impeachment proceedings/case,http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Impeachment#_note-9 (31 March 2012).
http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representatives -
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In a press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not
say, he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he
was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on
his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The press release was
petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the past tense. 8
Another, impeachment complaint was for Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto for alleged bribery, violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of the public trust that started on November 6,
2001. The complainant, Atty. Ernesto Francisco, claimed that
in the latter part of 1997, his client, Bank of Southeast
Asia, "gifted" the Ombudsman a video equipment, complete
with accessories, worth about P283,000 and P500,000 in cash.
This is allegedly to let the "Petron scam" investigation
"die down" wherein three Petron checks worth P540 million
and intended for payment to the Bureau of Customs were
deposited in a BSA account held by Skybound Realty Holdings
and its owner, Arnulfo Cabalsa, and were subsequently
8 G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
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encashed. The House of Representatives dismissed the
complaint.9
On June 2, 2003, the former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court. The grounds for that impeachment
complaint were "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes ".
On October 13, 2003, the House Committee on Justice
ruled that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form," but voted to dismiss the same for being
insufficient in substance on October 22, 2003.
Article XI, Section 3(5) states that, "No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
This provision was violated in the impeachment case
against Chief Justice Davide. On 23 October 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the
first impeachment complaint, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
9 Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
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one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
The issue raised in this impeachment case was whether
or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. falls within
the one year bar provided in the Constitution.10
It was only four months and three weeks since the
filing of the first impeachment complaint, hence barring the
second impeachment complaint under paragraph 5, Section 3,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.11
On March 22, 2011, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez
was impeached by the House of Representatives after a
marathon plenary discussions that lasted almost seven
hours. The House of Representatives approved (212 in favor,
46 against, 4 abstentions) the articles of impeachment,
contained in House Justice Committee Report No. 778,
against Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her alleged
betrayal of public trust due to the low conviction rates
during her term and her supposed inaction on five high-
profile cases.12
On March 23, Tupas and company, including the two
leading complainants, personally submitted to the Senate the
Articles of Impeachment. Later that day, the Senate adopted
its rules for impeachment, adopting the rules used in the
2000 impeachment of Joseph Estrada with amendments such as
10 Instances of impeachment proceedings/case,
http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Impeachment#_note-9 (31 March 2012).
11 Francisco vs. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44, Nov. 10, 200312 (Instances of impeachment proceedings/case,http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Impeachment#_note-9 (31 March 2012))
http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Ombudsmanhttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Ombudsmanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Estradahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Estradahttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Ombudsmanhttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Ombudsmanhttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representatives -
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maintaining the silence of the visitors and neutrality among
the senators.
Finally, Gutierrez resigned on April 29, just ten days
before the impeachment trial. She personally handed her
resignation letter to President Aquino; the president
accepted the ombudsman's resignation. The senate then
canceled the impeachment trial and the senators thanked the
ombudsman for "sparing" the country from a "tedious,
divisive, and painful" impeachment process. Senate
President even thanked her as the senate can now concentrate
on legislative matters. 13
The current impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato
Corona has several controversies. First, the appointment of
the Chief justice was a midnight appointment of the Arroyo
administration just two (2) months before the former
President ends her term. This is definitely contrary to
what the constitution mandates stating that two months
immediately before the next presidential election and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.14
Since the last trial before the Lenten season started,
Chief Justice Corona has been pressured to take the witness
13 (Impeachment of Merceditas Gutierrez,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment_of_Merceditas_Gutierrez, 2 April 2012).14 Article VII, Section 15, 1987 Constitution
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stand because the House Prosecutors and even the Senator-
judges believe that:
1) It would be a wise move for him to testify so he maygive light to the issues regarding the entries in his
SALNs, including the acquisition costs of his various
properties, and source of the P32.6 million withdrawn
from his account on Dec. 12, 2011; and the sale of
their properties to a daughter, inter alia.
2) According to Marikina Rep. Romero Federico Quimbo, theprosecutions official spokesperson, the trial, being
political in nature, demands that the accused take the
witness stand and answer questions from the senator-
judges. Otherwise, this will be taken against him.15
In the course of the trial, Chief Justice Corona sought
relief before his home turf when he alleged that the
impeachment court committed grave abuse of discretion in
depriving him of constitutional rights.
How can the Supreme Court acquire jurisdiction over a
decision of the impeachment court?
As previously discussed, a political question becomes a
justiciable one if it involves grave abuse of discretion.
But since the Supreme Court could not motu proprio initiate
such proceeding, there should be a valid petition invoking
the same.
15 Burgonio, TJ, Corona risks conviction by not testifying, prosecutors say, PhilippineDaily Inquirer, 31 March 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/170207/corona-risks-conviction-by-not-testifying-prosecutors-say (1 April 2012).
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Considering that forwarding the matter of dispute is
not within the Judiciary, it follows a different procedure.
In the regular course of things, forwarding a matter to the
Supreme Court would only need a certiorari as a mode of
appeal it is from the Regional Trial Courts, the
Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals. Such is within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. If the matter
is from a different branch of the government, the same could
be forwarded before the Supreme Court via certiorari as an
original action under rule 65. The same can only be filed on
the grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to/tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. This is very much applicable in cases wherein
an aggrieved party seeks for a reversal of an opinion before
the final arbiter of all disputes alleging the presence of
grave abuse of discretion. So much so in impeachment
proceedings.
In the case of the impeachment trial of the Chief
Justice, assuming that the impeachment court would render a
decision unfavorable to the defense, it would be very
probable that the same would resort to the above-stated
course of action. One of the grounds for grave abuse of
discretion they could possibly raise is the misapprehension
of facts since the evidences presented by the prosecution
are currently just marked. The evidences still have to be
weighed by the impeachment court.
The impeachment court could also have the power as
watchdog to allege that the Supreme Court committed grave
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abuse of discretion. As previously defined, grave abuse of
discretion also involves a render by passion. The Canons of
Judicial Conduct clearly states that the judges should not
only be impartial but must be perceived to be impartial by a
reasonable viewer. Even the cloak of the presumption of
regularity appears to be transparent considering that no
less that the Chief Justice is on trial and the Supreme
Court is his home turf. Such scenario is a fertile ground to
sow doubts regarding a possible reversal of an unfavorable
decision from the impeachment court.
Power of the Supreme Court to Review vis--vis Power of
Legislative to Impeach
Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall;
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.
All the King's horses
And all the King's men
Couldn't put Humpty together again!
The on-going impeachment trial of Chief Justice Corona
is a reminder that history repeats itself. As the nursery
rhyme Humpty Dumpty goes, the on-going trial is like the
tale of Charles I (Humpty Dumpty) of England whom the
Puritan majority overthrow in the Parliament during his
days. The Kings army could not restore his power and
unluckily the Roundheads executed him.
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Will this Humpty Dumpty be the Chief Justice of the
Philippines as he is subjected on impeachment trial lately?
The sovereign Filipino people are witnesses of the on-
going impeachment trial of the highest magistrate of the
Philippine Supreme Court-Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Impeachment trial is a means not to overthrow a King on this
regard but rather it is a powerful check and balance weapon
of the legislative department to oust the erring impeachable
officials when proved to be guilty of the allegations in the
Articles of Impeachment.
Impeachment does not necessarily mean removal from
office. It means that once an impeachable public official
goes into an impeachment trial it shall be construed to
mean that he is given due process to prove that he deserves
the office rather than being be removed from the office
automatically. It is only a formal statement of charges,
which is akin to an indictment in criminal law. It is,
therefore, only the first step towards removal from
office.16
The word impeach is derived from the Middle English
term "empechen" which means "to impede" or "to accuse." It
also comes from the Latin word "impedicare" which means "to
entangle" or "to put in fetters." From these, it can,
therefore, be inferred that the "person impeached is not
16 UST LAW Review December 2004
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necessarily adjudged guilty as impeachment only means that
he has been formally charged of an impeachable offense."17
Once a public official is impeached, he or she faces
the probability of conviction by means of a legislative
vote. Conviction, on this aspect, is equal to removal from
the public office. It requires 2/3 vote of all the Senator
judges in order to sustain the conviction of the impeachable
officials given that the removal from public office presents
an overturning of normal constitutional procedures by
which an individual may achieve high office like in cases of
election or appointment. Impeachment is usually reserved
for those who are deemed to have committed abuses in the
discharge of the public office trusted to them.
The reason why the impeachment court is also called as
the people's court is because the proceeding is initiated by
the House of Representatives. In fact, the initiation of the
same is reserved by the Constitution solely to the House of
Representatives.18 It being more in number compared to the
upper house, it is considered to be representative of the
people.
A verified complaint may be filed by any member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any member thereof.19 Such will be
17 Carmelo V. Sison and Florin T. Hilbay, ImpeachmentQ & A (Quezon City, Philippines:
University of the Philippines Law Complex, 2000), 1.
18 See Section 3 (1), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
19 The Supreme Court decision in Francisco et al. vs. House of Representatives (GR No.160261, 10 November 2003), states that Impeachment proceedings are initiated upon filing of thecomplaint and/or resolution and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
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included in the Order of Business of the House within ten
session days from receipt of the impeachment complaint. It
must be referred to the proper committee within three
session days thereafter.
The members shall submit its report to the house with
the corresponding resolution. Such resolution shall be
calendared by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary to affirm a favorable
resolution within the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.20
However, even without the House Committee Report or the
Articles of the Committee, the Constitution provides that:
"In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
if filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed."21
Therefore, there are two ways to transmit the Articles
of Impeachment to the Senate for trial without need of a
report: 1. By means of a complaint for impeachment verified
by at least one-third of the Members of the House; 2. By
means of a resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-
third of the Members of the House. The verified complaint or
20 Refer to the RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
promulgated by the 15th Congress of theHOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES and adopted last August 3, 2010.21 See Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2), Article XI, 1987 Constitution
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the resolution filed accordingly shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment.22 The constitution also requires
that the votes of those who are for and against the
impeachment have to be recorded.
The impeachment proceeding is sui generis in nature. It
would seem that the existence of an impeachment court is
either an overlapping of the powers of the Senate or an
establishment of a fourth branch of the government. Such
point is somewhat strengthened since the impeachment court
is sui generis which is Latin for a class in itself. It is
very unique, very different from judicial courts that do not
follow strictly the Rules on Procedure. In this case, the
Senate, seating as an impeachment court, can use the same as
suppletory in case it be needed.23
Therefore, proving the guilt is less demanding since
it will not follow the quantum of evidence required in
criminal cases which is proof beyond reasonable doubt. It
follows also that the Senator Judges can ask questions for
clarification in case there is vagueness in the presentation
all in the interest of justice. The impeachment court is a
fact-finding body that examines, tests or tries whether the
one holding a high level government position has the
necessary high level qualities needed for that position.
This disproves the speculation that the impeachment court is
an overlapping to the powers of the Senate or an
22 Section 3 (4), Article XI, 1987 Constitution23 http://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-senate-of-the-philippines/
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establishment of a fourth branch of the government since it
is an affirmation of the sovereignty of the Filipino people
in the search for truth. It has been lenient in the
application of rules to give way for clarification.
The impeachable offenses are political offenses in
nature as distinguished from criminal ones. As such, the
subject of impeachment are "those which proceed from the
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse
or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature,
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated, political,
as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the
society itself. 24
In the Philippines, the 1987 Constitution Article XI
Sec.2 states that The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Furthermore, Section 3 par. 1 provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment. It shall be noted that the power
to impeach or not to impeach lies solely on the discretion
24 Antonio R. Tupaz and A. Edsel c.F. Tupaz, Fundamentals on Impeachment (MetroManila, Philippines:Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Ine., 2001), quoting Alexander Hamilton
(emphasis in the original), 6.
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of the legislature as what the present Constitution in its
chapter on Accountability of Public Officers.
The Senate shall have the sole power to try and to
decide all cases of impeachment.25 If it is the President
who is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside but shall not vote although he has the power
to rule on questions relating to evidence presented
including, but not limited to, materiality, relevancy,
competency or admissibility. When impeachable officials
other than the President are tried, the Senate President
presides over the trial. In either, case, the Senators
shall act as Judges, hence the term "Senator-Judges." The
concurrence of two-thirds of all Members of the Senate is
required in order to sustain a conviction.
However, it was held, that even if the power of
impeachment has been solely vested by the Constitution on
the Legislative Department of the government, it shall never
be interpreted that all acts related to the impeachment
trial goes out of the ambit of judicial review primarily
because of the averment that it is a political question. The
Supreme Court, as part of the democratic society, has been
mandated by the Fundamental Law of the land that it has been
vested a judicial power. This judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights that are legally demandable and
25 Art. XI. Sec.3 (6) ,1987 Constitution
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enforceable, and to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.26
Thus, where the House of Representatives, through its
conduct or through the rules it promulgates, transgresses,
in any way, the detailed procedure prescribed in the
Constitution, the issue is far removed from the sphere of a
"political question," which arises with the exercise of a
conferred discretion, and transformed into a constitutional
issue falling squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of
the Supreme Court as being the interpreter of the
fundamental law.27
The impeachment trial, on this case at hand, marks a
new stage to the infant status of the Philippine Legislature
to act as an Impeachment Court for the first time to hear
and decide the case of the Chief justice. This is a fresh
alarm for the legislature to exercise impeachment as a
formal inquiry aimed ultimately at making Chief Justice
Renato Corona accountable to the people based on the
principle that public office is a public trust.
On February 8, 2012, Corona filed a 39-page urgent
petition for certiorari that sought from the high court a
26 Art.VII. Sec 1 (2),1987 Constitution27 Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug in the case of Francisco, Jr. vs. House of
Representatives,November 10, 2003.
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temporary restraining order as well as a writ of preliminary
injunction during the pendency of the case, claiming that
his right to due process was violated and that the Senate,
as an impeachment court, committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Petitioner has suffered grave and irreparable injury
due to the continuing violation of his constitutional rights
by respondents. Unless a TRO is issued forthwith, the trial
shall continue and banks and their representatives will
produce and disclose the confidential statements, documents
and accounts of petitioner, amounting to irreparable injury
from which petitioner has not appeal or other plain, speedy
and adequately remedy. 28
Fr. Joaquin Bernas opined that the Supreme has the
jurisdiction over petitions involving cases with grave abuse
of discretion in any proceedings like the impeachment trial
of Corona.
Nevertheless, the Impeachment Court presided by the
Senate President, Juan Ponce Enrile averred that the Supreme
Court, in spite of the fact that it has the judicial power
to review actions of different branches of the government,
cannot assume jurisdiction over the power, solely vested on
28 Opinion made by Chief Justice Renato Corona posted inhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenas
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenas -
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the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court to try and to
decide impeachment cases.
Thus, it can be construed that the Impeachment Court
submits and follows to the mandate of the Highest Law of the
land and laws enacted of duly constituted authorities, but
it cannot let the Supreme Court assume jurisdiction in
handling the impeachment proceedings. This is in consonance
with the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution on
1987 Constitution in Article XI Sec 3 Par.6 to try and
decide all cases of impeachment now and unless the
Constitutional provision is changed.
Furthermore, it can be inferred that the Supreme Court
can also be charged of committing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction should it assume the
Senates power to try the impeachment case of the Chief
Justice.
Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner because of passion and hostility.
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The Constitutional grant that the Legislative
Department has the vested power of impeachment cannot deny
the provision embodied in the same Constitution that the
Supreme Court has the power to review actions of the
branches of the government if there is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to either lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the judicial power of the Supreme Court
to review erring actions of each department of the
government is not absolute. It shall also be exercised
within the scope of its authority; otherwise, it might
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, as the case may be.
The standard of grave abuse of discretion is of
remedial law origin and has acquired well-known parameters
in that field distillable to two alternative propositions:
(1) it connotes arbitrary conduct or (2) conduct that is
more than mere error.29
If, in reviewing acts of any tribunal . . . exercising
judicial . . .functions in petitions for certiorari, the
Court does not overturn rulings of judges, who are under its
supervision and control, for mere errors of judgment or for
non-arbitrary conduct, there is more reason to let lie
undisturbed the non-jurisdictional errors committed by any
29 Applicable to special actions for the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
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branch or instrumentality of the Government, done in the
exercise of their discretionary powers. 30
The officials in these branches are neither under the
control nor under supervision of the Court. As Justice Irene
R. Cortes had opined:
The [grave abuse of discretion] test . . . should apply
with greater cogency to the executive and legislative branches of
government. As to [them], the exercise of the power and duty of
judicial review would call for a higher degree of self-restraint
and circumspection. Should no grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction taint thechallenged acts of the
executive or the legislature the courts must necessarily uphold
them.
For the expanded constitutional power of judicial review
cannot be read to place in the judicial branch of government the
prerogative to substitute its judgment for that of the branch of
government in which the discretion has been reposed.
Indeed, every time judges loosely construe the grave
abuse of discretion standard in applyingthe second clause
of Article VIII Sec. 1, par. 2, they defeat the purpose
for which this stringent doctrinal standard was embedded in
the power granted, giving fresh outlet for protests of
Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling ormodifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs aslaw and justice may require.
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judicial overreaching to surface, undermining, however
infinitesimally, the legitimacy of the impugned judicial
act.31
The Impeachment Court could be guilty of grave abuse of
discretion if there is capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion and
hostility.
For instance, when the Impeachment Court, would go
beyond the mandated procedural and substantive provision of
the Constitution with regard to the impeachment proceedings
(i.e. as to the number of votes necessary to convict an
impeachable public official, denial of due process to the
public officer facing impeachment trial, and other violation
on the Rules in Impeachment Proceeding), the Senate could be
guilty of grave abuse of discretion. On this regard, the
Supreme Court can review such actions made by the
Impeachment Court.
31 In the field of constitutional interpretation, jurists have advocated a double standard to
review questions involving personal rights and economic policy as interpretive tool to easestructural tensions occasioned by the exercise of judicial review. See e.g. Vicente V. Mendoza, The
Nature and Function of JudicialReview, 31 IBP JOURNAL 6 (2005).
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On the other hand, when the Supreme Court goes outside
of its constitutionally mandated jurisdiction (as such
reviewing a purely political question with regard the
decision of the Senator Judges), the Supreme might commit
grave abuse of the discretion and can be alleged of such by
the impeachment court.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
If one is fated to be ousted, there is no point of
holding a cavalcade and arming oneself with petitions to
review the judges verdict for the constellation in the sky
commands an immutable order to surrender that throne as the
superior judge of the highest tribunal. Hence one has to bid
goodbye to that office. Nonetheless, fate or things other
than what the constitution or applicable laws provide to
overthrow a Chief Justice has no bearing, we are a
government of laws and not of men and the body politic does
not always conform to what fate, destiny or luck has to
offer. The state has legal means to protect the rights and
interests of each individual which means that everyone even
the Chief Justice should be accorded the right to be tried
impartially.
If after days and months of heated arguments in the
impeachment court, the judges had come into a decision
affirming the allegations of the prosecution that indeed the
Chief Justice had betrayed the public trust and had violated
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any other basis for impeachment, what more can the Chief
Justice do?
Given that his credibility, integrity and not to
mention source income are on the line, most probably he
would exhaust all possible means to modify the judges
decision. What would he do then? One pretty obvious remedy
is to seek refuge from the Supreme Court via certiorari
under Rule 65 alleging that the verdict is unreasonable,
excessive, unwarranted, inequitable or undeserved because he
would allege that there were misapprehension of facts on the
part of the senator judges and the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings were not adhered to which had
immensely affected the judgment.
The Chief Justice then would feel aggrieved and as a
result, he would file a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Last Resort. As a result, our Supreme Court would
eventually take cognizance of his petition because the
Constitution so mandates as evident on Article VIII, Section
1 expressly stating that Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.32
32 Lawas , Hector. SC has power to review actions of the impeachment court, February 12,2012.
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Renowned constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin Bernas stated
that the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over petitions
involving cases with grave abuse of discretion in any
proceedings like the impeachment trial of our Chief Justice
and his statement was further affirmed by Fr. Ranhilo
Aquino, dean of the San Beda Graduate School of Law. Dean
Aquino stressed that the impeachment court is not an
independent republic and it remains part of our government,
thus still subject to the powerful claws and scrutiny of our
Highest Magistrate. However, the petitioner is no other
than the Chief Justice, the members of the Supreme Courts
comrade in the administration of justice, and so the
question of partiality would be a deafening concern. Though
the Supreme Court Justices are not infallible because they
are just like ushuman and subject to temptations still the
researchers find the issue untenable because they are the
care takers of justice and they are also subject to the
prying eyes of the public considering that they too are
impeachable officers, the tendency is, they would be more
careful on their every move and cautious in deliberating and
deciding the case.
Basing on the aforementioned contentions, the Supreme
Court may review the verdict of the impeachment court. On
the other hand, the legislative department particularly the
senator judges, as envoy and voice of the Filipino people
would not concur on the precept that the Supreme Court may
review their decisions because of the provision on article
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XI, section III, paragraph VI that states The Senate shall
have the sole power to decide all cases of impeachment...
and paragraph IX of said section The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.
A statement quoted by Senator Pia Cayetano from Michael
Gerhardt Judicial review of such an impeachment procedure
would undermine the impeachments effectiveness especially
judicial abuse of power.
Judicial review of the impeachment process would give
judges of the Supreme Court the last word on the propriety
of the procedure for their own removal, and thus the chance
to make their own, or their colleagues removal virtually
impossible by ensuring that Congress could achieve such
outcome solely to the most complex and time-consuming
ways.33 Simply stated, the impeachment court would not
accede to favor the decision of the Supreme Court in case it
would overrule their verdict or decision on the impeachment
case of the Chief Justice by reason of grave abuse of
discretion.
It could therefore be inferred that the two branches of
government would collide on the central issue of whose voice
should be echoed to the public and whose decision should be
followed. If the scenario would continue to be as chaotic as
this controversial trial of our Chief Justice then the fight
for truth and justice would never be won, the case would be
33 Philippine Daily Inquirer, Haunting Questions, February 18, 2012.
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left unresolved and it would give birth to a new dispute and
argument.
There is therefore a need to draw a clear and fine line
that would define the functions of the two gnashing
independent bodies of the government, the Judiciary through
Supreme Court and the Legislative due to the Impeachment
Court. As previously ruled by the Supreme Court, the grant
of the power to impeach upon the Legislature by the
Constitution is not without limitations. For instance, its
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by
the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. Therefore, the rules promulgated by the
Legislature cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which aid rules intended to effectively carry
out and when they do, they begin to fall within the ambit of
the expanded concept of judicial review as embodied in the
1987 Constitution and hence, the Supreme Court may look into
their legality.34 The Supreme Court can only review the
technicalities of the impeachment proceedings which would
mean that the courts jurisdiction would be limited to the
procedural aspect that would make sure that both parties had
been accorded their constitutional rights and the Supreme
Court can only intervene if their jurisdiction is invoked.
They could not therefore question the decision of the
impeachment court for if the Supreme Court would do that,
they would be circumventing the Constitution because they
acted beyond their powers. This would entail that we should
34 Janice G. Ayson, Intricacies of the Impeachment Process.
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always go back to the intention of the Constitution that
recognizes public office as public trust. The sound
discretion and verdict of the senator judges speaking in
behalf of the Sovereign Filipino people should therefore be
upheld without the intervention of the Supreme Court.
Conclusion
The Doctrine of Separation of Powers guarantees that
each of the branches of the government is sovereign in its
own jurisdiction. Although that is provided by no less than
the Constitution, intricate webs of encroachment or
interference cannot be helped.
In the impeachment case of Chief Justice Corona, one
can speculate that it is very likely that a constitutional
crisis is an incident waiting to happen. The Supreme Court
has the power to determine grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the impeachment court when invoked by an aggrieved
party, and the impeachment court also has the power to
allege that the Supreme Court committed grave abuse of
discretion. It appears that there will be an endless
bouncing of assertions between the two courts. Such will
only constitute of an exchange of how powerful they are or
how a certain matter is under its jurisdiction backed up by
legal basis or by jurisprudence.
The researchers would like to give a distinction on the
extent of judicial review on the part of the Supreme Court.
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The Supreme Court can review the procedural facets of
the impeachment trial vis-a-vis the mandates of the
constitution however the court should not review the
decision of the impeachment court in this case. It being sui
generis, it is supreme in its own jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court can only get into the picture if the matter forwarded
before it involves grave abuse of discretion and if, and
only if, an aggrieved party invokes it. Without these twin
requirements, the impeachment court is untouchable. It also
follows that anything that it has decided, given it is not
forwarded for judicial review, is final.
The researchers would offer a resolution. While it is
true that the Supreme Court can decide on matters involving
the grave abuse of discretion from any branch or
instrumentality of the government, the impeachment court is
the court of the sovereign Filipino people. If the same has
rendered a decision, the researchers suggest it is best to
be respected because it is no less than the sovereign
Filipino people that have given the verdict.
REFERENCES
a)BooksHutchinson, Greg. Hot Money, Warm Bodies: The Downfall
of President Joseph Estrada. Pasig City, Philippines: Anvil
Publishing, 2001.
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34 | P a g e TORRE, LLANTINO, TAMBA, MENTINO, ARCONES, Ll.B.-1, UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, COLLEGE OF LAW
Wilkinson, Earl and Atkins, Alan. Trial of the Century:
The Impeachment of Philippine President Joseph E. Estrada.
University of Michigan: Book of Dreams, 2001.
Sison, Carmelo and Hilbay, Florin. Impeachment Q and A.
Quezon City: Philippine law Complex, 2000.
Aralar, Reynaldo. Separation of Powers and Impeachment.
Mandaluyong City: National Bookstore, 2004.
Aguilar, Narciso. Through the Eyes of the Law: Deja Vu
at EDSA : an Account of the Legal Consequence of People
Power 2. Quezon City: Central law Books, 2003.
Mendoza, Vicente. The Nature and Function of Judicial
Review, 31 IBP JOURNAL 6 (2005).
1987 Philippine Constitution
b)Jurisprudence Francisco vs. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44,
Nov. 10, 2003
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2,2001
Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuk, 534 SCRA 322,09/28/07
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001G.R. No. 146738March 2, 2001. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
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c)Electronic Sources http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Certiorari.asp
x
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