measuring grave abuse of discretion in the chief justice's impeachment trial

7/29/2019 Measuring Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Chief Justice's Impeachment Trial

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How Deep is the Grave: Measuring Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Chief Justices

Impeachment Trial

2012

1 | P a g e TORRE, LLANTINO, TAMBA, MENTINO, ARCONES, Ll.B.-1, UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, COLLEGE OF LAW

INTRODUCTION

We, the sovereign Filipino people

The Constitution is opened by this meaningful reminder

that we are not just a political community as Filipinos but

as the fundamental law of the land safeguards, The Filipinos

are sovereign. The Sovereign not only has the right to vote

and to be voted but also has the right to strip a public

officer of the privileges that were vested on him by reason

of his appointment or election through an impeachment

proceeding. This is very much highlighted by Constitution in

Article XI, Section 1 stating that Public office is public

trust.

January 16, 2012 marked the onset of the second

impeachment trial in Philippine history. A few years ago,

the senate proceeded with the impeachment trial of former

President Joseph Estrada, now another figurehead on a

different branch is on the grill- no less than Chief Justice

Renato Corona.

While it has been true that the Constitution reserves

the sole power to the Senate to try and decide impeachment

cases, it is not the dead end. Answers can still be changed

before the final bulwark of justice, the Supreme Court for a

judicial review.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the

1987 Constitution expanded the power of the Judiciary as it

stated that the same have the duty, not only the power, to

determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of


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discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government

through its expanded certiorari jurisdiction.1

Such being established, the Supreme Court can declare

otherwise a decision of the impeachment court when the same

has produced such decision with grave abuse of discretion.

In its previous cases, the Supreme Court further

specified what grave abuse of discretion. In the case of

Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuko, it is defined as

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack or jurisdiction as is equivalent to lack

of jurisdiction. The abuse of jurisdiction must be grave as

where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic

manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must

be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of

positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty

enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In the same case, it has further defined that, grave

abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of

jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law

and jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for

various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of

facts.

In the impeachment case of Chief Justice Corona, it is

very likely that the defense would resort to seeking a

reversal the moment the impeachment court finds the Chief

1 Aralar, Reynaldo. Separation of Powers and Impeachment. Mandaluyong City: NationalBookstore, 2004.


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Justice guilty of the allegations. As previously stated,

such political question becomes a justiciable one when it

involved grave abuse of discretion.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Can the Chief Justice seek judicial review when the

Impeachment Court finds him guilty of the allegations of the

prosecution?

SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This is an exploratory discussion of the probabilities

which could arise out of the impeachment trial courts

decision as to the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato

Corona. This specifically covers criterion on how to measure

grave abuse of discretion using a collation of decided cases

and relating them to the impeachment trial of the Chief

Justice; how the Supreme acquire jurisdiction over decisions

made by the Impeachment Trial Court and probable resolutions

in case of allegations of grave abuse of discretion in both

part of the Supreme Court and the Impeachment Court.

Limitation of this research paper lies on it being

exploratory in nature and the topic being discussed is yet

to happen. For purposes of analysis, the research is limited

to grave abuse of discretion involving misapprehension of

facts. Research materials used are predominantly sourced out

from the internet and the researchers have not adequately

and comprehensively gathered Philippine jurisprudence

pertaining to impeachment. This is otherwise justified by


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the fact that impeachment proceedings in the country is

considerably on its infancy stage as compared with the US.

OBJECTIVES

Major Objective:

This paper aims to set a criterion on how to measure

grave abuse of discretion using a collation of decided cases

and relating them to the current impeachment trial of the

Chief Justice.

Specific Objectives:

1)Discuss how to determine grave abuse of discretionif it is committed by the Impeachment Court and if

it is committed by the Supreme Court.

2)Discuss how the Supreme Court acquire jurisdictionover the decision of the Impeachment Court.

3)Discuss the probable resolution of the issue if theSupreme Court is alleged to have committed grave

abuse of discretion and the impeachment court is

alleged of the same.

METHODOLOGY

Descriptive-analytical research method is used through

utilization of books, e-books, journals, e-journals and

other research materials specifically those found in the law

library of the University of San Agustin and downloadable

relevant articles from the internet. Specifically,

jurisprudence, commentaries of legal luminaries, rules of


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procedure promulgated by the Senate and the Supreme Court to

name a few were utilized.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

a)Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpableerrors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the

Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It refers also

to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been

a gross misapprehension of facts. It is also a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack or jurisdiction as is equivalent to

lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of jurisdiction must be

grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary

or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal

hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount

to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal

to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in

contemplation of law.2

b)Certiorari under Rule 65- refers to a special civilaction that can be initiated on the grounds of lack or

excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion

tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.3

c)Misapprehension of Facts- refers to a false impressionor incorrect understanding especially of the nature of

situation or a set of facts.4

d)Articles of Impeachment are the set of charges draftedagainst a public official to initiate the impeachment

2 Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuk, 534 SCRA 322, 09/28/073 http://www.1-4-3.net/remedial-law-bar-exams/?p=1864 Microsoft Encarta Dictionary, 2007


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process. The articles of impeachment do not result in

the removal of the official, but instead require the

enacting body to take further action, such as bringing

the articles to a vote before the full body.5

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Looking back at the previous impeachment

proceedings and even impeachment attempts that have

transpired in the previous years, we have witnessed the

medium rare impeachment of former president Joseph E.

Estrada that started officially on December 7, 2000.

The impeachment ended up in a walk out of public

prosecutors, resignation of Senator Pimentel as Senate

President and the massive cry of the public in another

historic event known as EDSA 2. Through the suggestion of

Senator Francisco Tatad, they voted on the opening of the

second envelope containing crucial evidence that would in

fact prove Estradas acts of political corruption. With an

11-10 vote, the Nays have it and the second envelope was

not opened.6

On 17 January 2001, the public prosecutors to Speaker

Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation submitted

a letter. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal

of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul

Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the

5 (http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Articles+of+impeachment)

6 EDSA DOS, http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php?title=Edsa_Dos (2 April2012).


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impeachment proceedings until the House of

Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation

of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the

motion. As a result, the impeachment trial never resumed

and was soon pushed back into the publics subconscious,

making it another part of history to be read and studied

again by the coming generations.7

One issue involved in Estradas Impeachment trial was

whether Estrada indeed resigned as President of the

Philippines or otherwise. The resolution of the issue states

that even though ones intent to resign needs to be coupled

with an act of relinquishment whether express or implied,

oral or written. The facts of the case clearly showed that

Estrada did not leave any formal letter stating that he

would resign from the presidency.

In the diary of Executive Secretary Angara which was

serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, his [Estrada]

resignation was implied during the first stage of

negotiation between Estrada and the opposition about a

peaceful and orderly transfer of power.

In the second stage, his resignation was again treated

as a given fact by leaving Malacanang. Justice Renato S.

Puno declared in part for the Court in the Estrada vs.

Arroyo case:

7 Instances of impeachment proceedings/case,http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Impeachment#_note-9 (31 March 2012).
http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representatives


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In a press release containing his final statement, (1) he

acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the

Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized

he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of

peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not

say, he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he

was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;

(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve

them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that

may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on

his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national

spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The press release was

petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is

now in the past tense. 8

Another, impeachment complaint was for Ombudsman Aniano

Desierto for alleged bribery, violation of the Constitution

and betrayal of the public trust that started on November 6,

2001. The complainant, Atty. Ernesto Francisco, claimed that

in the latter part of 1997, his client, Bank of Southeast

Asia, "gifted" the Ombudsman a video equipment, complete

with accessories, worth about P283,000 and P500,000 in cash.

This is allegedly to let the "Petron scam" investigation

"die down" wherein three Petron checks worth P540 million

and intended for payment to the Bureau of Customs were

deposited in a BSA account held by Skybound Realty Holdings

and its owner, Arnulfo Cabalsa, and were subsequently

8 G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001


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encashed. The House of Representatives dismissed the

complaint.9

On June 2, 2003, the former President Joseph Ejercito

Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court. The grounds for that impeachment

complaint were "culpable violation of the Constitution,

betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes ".

On October 13, 2003, the House Committee on Justice

ruled that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient

in form," but voted to dismiss the same for being

insufficient in substance on October 22, 2003.

Article XI, Section 3(5) states that, "No impeachment

proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one year."

This provision was violated in the impeachment case

against Chief Justice Davide. On 23 October 2003, a day

after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the

first impeachment complaint, the second impeachment

complaint against Chief Justice Davide was filed with the

Secretary General of the House by Representatives founded on

the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by

above-mentioned House Resolution.

This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a

"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least

9 Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001


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one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of

Representatives.

The issue raised in this impeachment case was whether

or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint

against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. falls within

the one year bar provided in the Constitution.10

It was only four months and three weeks since the

filing of the first impeachment complaint, hence barring the

second impeachment complaint under paragraph 5, Section 3,

Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.11

On March 22, 2011, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez

was impeached by the House of Representatives after a

marathon plenary discussions that lasted almost seven

hours. The House of Representatives approved (212 in favor,

46 against, 4 abstentions) the articles of impeachment,

contained in House Justice Committee Report No. 778,

against Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her alleged

betrayal of public trust due to the low conviction rates

during her term and her supposed inaction on five high-

profile cases.12

On March 23, Tupas and company, including the two

leading complainants, personally submitted to the Senate the

Articles of Impeachment. Later that day, the Senate adopted

its rules for impeachment, adopting the rules used in the

2000 impeachment of Joseph Estrada with amendments such as

10 Instances of impeachment proceedings/case,

http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Impeachment#_note-9 (31 March 2012).

11 Francisco vs. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44, Nov. 10, 200312 (Instances of impeachment proceedings/case,http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Impeachment#_note-9 (31 March 2012))
http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Ombudsmanhttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Ombudsmanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Estradahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Estradahttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Ombudsmanhttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Ombudsmanhttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representativeshttp://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=House_of_Representatives


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maintaining the silence of the visitors and neutrality among

the senators.

Finally, Gutierrez resigned on April 29, just ten days

before the impeachment trial. She personally handed her

resignation letter to President Aquino; the president

accepted the ombudsman's resignation. The senate then

canceled the impeachment trial and the senators thanked the

ombudsman for "sparing" the country from a "tedious,

divisive, and painful" impeachment process. Senate

President even thanked her as the senate can now concentrate

on legislative matters. 13

The current impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato

Corona has several controversies. First, the appointment of

the Chief justice was a midnight appointment of the Arroyo

administration just two (2) months before the former

President ends her term. This is definitely contrary to

what the constitution mandates stating that two months

immediately before the next presidential election and up to

the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall

not make appointments, except temporary appointments to

executive positions when continued vacancies therein will

prejudice public service or endanger public safety.14

Since the last trial before the Lenten season started,

Chief Justice Corona has been pressured to take the witness

13 (Impeachment of Merceditas Gutierrez,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment_of_Merceditas_Gutierrez, 2 April 2012).14 Article VII, Section 15, 1987 Constitution


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stand because the House Prosecutors and even the Senator-

judges believe that:

1) It would be a wise move for him to testify so he maygive light to the issues regarding the entries in his

SALNs, including the acquisition costs of his various

properties, and source of the P32.6 million withdrawn

from his account on Dec. 12, 2011; and the sale of

their properties to a daughter, inter alia.

2) According to Marikina Rep. Romero Federico Quimbo, theprosecutions official spokesperson, the trial, being

political in nature, demands that the accused take the

witness stand and answer questions from the senator-

judges. Otherwise, this will be taken against him.15

In the course of the trial, Chief Justice Corona sought

relief before his home turf when he alleged that the

impeachment court committed grave abuse of discretion in

depriving him of constitutional rights.

How can the Supreme Court acquire jurisdiction over a

decision of the impeachment court?

As previously discussed, a political question becomes a

justiciable one if it involves grave abuse of discretion.

But since the Supreme Court could not motu proprio initiate

such proceeding, there should be a valid petition invoking

the same.

15 Burgonio, TJ, Corona risks conviction by not testifying, prosecutors say, PhilippineDaily Inquirer, 31 March 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/170207/corona-risks-conviction-by-not-testifying-prosecutors-say (1 April 2012).


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Considering that forwarding the matter of dispute is

not within the Judiciary, it follows a different procedure.

In the regular course of things, forwarding a matter to the

Supreme Court would only need a certiorari as a mode of

appeal it is from the Regional Trial Courts, the

Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals. Such is within the

appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. If the matter

is from a different branch of the government, the same could

be forwarded before the Supreme Court via certiorari as an

original action under rule 65. The same can only be filed on

the grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse

of discretion amounting to/tantamount to lack or excess of

jurisdiction. This is very much applicable in cases wherein

an aggrieved party seeks for a reversal of an opinion before

the final arbiter of all disputes alleging the presence of

grave abuse of discretion. So much so in impeachment

proceedings.

In the case of the impeachment trial of the Chief

Justice, assuming that the impeachment court would render a

decision unfavorable to the defense, it would be very

probable that the same would resort to the above-stated

course of action. One of the grounds for grave abuse of

discretion they could possibly raise is the misapprehension

of facts since the evidences presented by the prosecution

are currently just marked. The evidences still have to be

weighed by the impeachment court.

The impeachment court could also have the power as

watchdog to allege that the Supreme Court committed grave


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abuse of discretion. As previously defined, grave abuse of

discretion also involves a render by passion. The Canons of

Judicial Conduct clearly states that the judges should not

only be impartial but must be perceived to be impartial by a

reasonable viewer. Even the cloak of the presumption of

regularity appears to be transparent considering that no

less that the Chief Justice is on trial and the Supreme

Court is his home turf. Such scenario is a fertile ground to

sow doubts regarding a possible reversal of an unfavorable

decision from the impeachment court.

Power of the Supreme Court to Review vis--vis Power of

Legislative to Impeach

Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall;

Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.

All the King's horses

And all the King's men

Couldn't put Humpty together again!

The on-going impeachment trial of Chief Justice Corona

is a reminder that history repeats itself. As the nursery

rhyme Humpty Dumpty goes, the on-going trial is like the

tale of Charles I (Humpty Dumpty) of England whom the

Puritan majority overthrow in the Parliament during his

days. The Kings army could not restore his power and

unluckily the Roundheads executed him.


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Will this Humpty Dumpty be the Chief Justice of the

Philippines as he is subjected on impeachment trial lately?

The sovereign Filipino people are witnesses of the on-

going impeachment trial of the highest magistrate of the

Philippine Supreme Court-Chief Justice Renato Corona.

Impeachment trial is a means not to overthrow a King on this

regard but rather it is a powerful check and balance weapon

of the legislative department to oust the erring impeachable

officials when proved to be guilty of the allegations in the

Articles of Impeachment.

Impeachment does not necessarily mean removal from

office. It means that once an impeachable public official

goes into an impeachment trial it shall be construed to

mean that he is given due process to prove that he deserves

the office rather than being be removed from the office

automatically. It is only a formal statement of charges,

which is akin to an indictment in criminal law. It is,

therefore, only the first step towards removal from

office.16

The word impeach is derived from the Middle English

term "empechen" which means "to impede" or "to accuse." It

also comes from the Latin word "impedicare" which means "to

entangle" or "to put in fetters." From these, it can,

therefore, be inferred that the "person impeached is not

16 UST LAW Review December 2004


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necessarily adjudged guilty as impeachment only means that

he has been formally charged of an impeachable offense."17

Once a public official is impeached, he or she faces

the probability of conviction by means of a legislative

vote. Conviction, on this aspect, is equal to removal from

the public office. It requires 2/3 vote of all the Senator

judges in order to sustain the conviction of the impeachable

officials given that the removal from public office presents

an overturning of normal constitutional procedures by

which an individual may achieve high office like in cases of

election or appointment. Impeachment is usually reserved

for those who are deemed to have committed abuses in the

discharge of the public office trusted to them.

The reason why the impeachment court is also called as

the people's court is because the proceeding is initiated by

the House of Representatives. In fact, the initiation of the

same is reserved by the Constitution solely to the House of

Representatives.18 It being more in number compared to the

upper house, it is considered to be representative of the

people.

A verified complaint may be filed by any member of the

House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution

of endorsement by any member thereof.19 Such will be

17 Carmelo V. Sison and Florin T. Hilbay, ImpeachmentQ & A (Quezon City, Philippines:

University of the Philippines Law Complex, 2000), 1.

18 See Section 3 (1), Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

19 The Supreme Court decision in Francisco et al. vs. House of Representatives (GR No.160261, 10 November 2003), states that Impeachment proceedings are initiated upon filing of thecomplaint and/or resolution and its referral to the Committee on Justice.


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included in the Order of Business of the House within ten

session days from receipt of the impeachment complaint. It

must be referred to the proper committee within three

session days thereafter.

The members shall submit its report to the house with

the corresponding resolution. Such resolution shall be

calendared by the House within ten session days from receipt

thereof. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of

the House shall be necessary to affirm a favorable

resolution within the Articles of Impeachment of the

Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of

each Member shall be recorded.20

However, even without the House Committee Report or the

Articles of the Committee, the Constitution provides that:

"In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment

if filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the

House, the same shall constitute the Articles of

Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith

proceed."21

Therefore, there are two ways to transmit the Articles

of Impeachment to the Senate for trial without need of a

report: 1. By means of a complaint for impeachment verified

by at least one-third of the Members of the House; 2. By

means of a resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-

third of the Members of the House. The verified complaint or

20 Refer to the RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

promulgated by the 15th Congress of theHOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES and adopted last August 3, 2010.21 See Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2), Article XI, 1987 Constitution


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the resolution filed accordingly shall constitute the

Articles of Impeachment.22 The constitution also requires

that the votes of those who are for and against the

impeachment have to be recorded.

The impeachment proceeding is sui generis in nature. It

would seem that the existence of an impeachment court is

either an overlapping of the powers of the Senate or an

establishment of a fourth branch of the government. Such

point is somewhat strengthened since the impeachment court

is sui generis which is Latin for a class in itself. It is

very unique, very different from judicial courts that do not

follow strictly the Rules on Procedure. In this case, the

Senate, seating as an impeachment court, can use the same as

suppletory in case it be needed.23

Therefore, proving the guilt is less demanding since

it will not follow the quantum of evidence required in

criminal cases which is proof beyond reasonable doubt. It

follows also that the Senator Judges can ask questions for

clarification in case there is vagueness in the presentation

all in the interest of justice. The impeachment court is a

fact-finding body that examines, tests or tries whether the

one holding a high level government position has the

necessary high level qualities needed for that position.

This disproves the speculation that the impeachment court is

an overlapping to the powers of the Senate or an

22 Section 3 (4), Article XI, 1987 Constitution23 http://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-senate-of-the-philippines/


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establishment of a fourth branch of the government since it

is an affirmation of the sovereignty of the Filipino people

in the search for truth. It has been lenient in the

application of rules to give way for clarification.

The impeachable offenses are political offenses in

nature as distinguished from criminal ones. As such, the

subject of impeachment are "those which proceed from the

misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse

or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature,

which may with peculiar propriety be denominated, political,

as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the

society itself. 24

In the Philippines, the 1987 Constitution Article XI

Sec.2 states that The President, the Vice-President, the

Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the

Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed

from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable

violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and

corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

All other public officers and employees may be removed from

office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Furthermore, Section 3 par. 1 provides that the House of

Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate

all cases of impeachment. It shall be noted that the power

to impeach or not to impeach lies solely on the discretion

24 Antonio R. Tupaz and A. Edsel c.F. Tupaz, Fundamentals on Impeachment (MetroManila, Philippines:Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Ine., 2001), quoting Alexander Hamilton

(emphasis in the original), 6.


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of the legislature as what the present Constitution in its

chapter on Accountability of Public Officers.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try and to

decide all cases of impeachment.25 If it is the President

who is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

shall preside but shall not vote although he has the power

to rule on questions relating to evidence presented

including, but not limited to, materiality, relevancy,

competency or admissibility. When impeachable officials

other than the President are tried, the Senate President

presides over the trial. In either, case, the Senators

shall act as Judges, hence the term "Senator-Judges." The

concurrence of two-thirds of all Members of the Senate is

required in order to sustain a conviction.

However, it was held, that even if the power of

impeachment has been solely vested by the Constitution on

the Legislative Department of the government, it shall never

be interpreted that all acts related to the impeachment

trial goes out of the ambit of judicial review primarily

because of the averment that it is a political question. The

Supreme Court, as part of the democratic society, has been

mandated by the Fundamental Law of the land that it has been

vested a judicial power. This judicial power includes the

duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights that are legally demandable and

25 Art. XI. Sec.3 (6) ,1987 Constitution


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enforceable, and to determine whether there has been grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of

the government.26

Thus, where the House of Representatives, through its

conduct or through the rules it promulgates, transgresses,

in any way, the detailed procedure prescribed in the

Constitution, the issue is far removed from the sphere of a

"political question," which arises with the exercise of a

conferred discretion, and transformed into a constitutional

issue falling squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of

the Supreme Court as being the interpreter of the

fundamental law.27

The impeachment trial, on this case at hand, marks a

new stage to the infant status of the Philippine Legislature

to act as an Impeachment Court for the first time to hear

and decide the case of the Chief justice. This is a fresh

alarm for the legislature to exercise impeachment as a

formal inquiry aimed ultimately at making Chief Justice

Renato Corona accountable to the people based on the

principle that public office is a public trust.

On February 8, 2012, Corona filed a 39-page urgent

petition for certiorari that sought from the high court a

26 Art.VII. Sec 1 (2),1987 Constitution27 Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug in the case of Francisco, Jr. vs. House of

Representatives,November 10, 2003.


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temporary restraining order as well as a writ of preliminary

injunction during the pendency of the case, claiming that

his right to due process was violated and that the Senate,

as an impeachment court, committed grave abuse of

discretion.

Petitioner has suffered grave and irreparable injury

due to the continuing violation of his constitutional rights

by respondents. Unless a TRO is issued forthwith, the trial

shall continue and banks and their representatives will

produce and disclose the confidential statements, documents

and accounts of petitioner, amounting to irreparable injury

from which petitioner has not appeal or other plain, speedy

and adequately remedy. 28

Fr. Joaquin Bernas opined that the Supreme has the

jurisdiction over petitions involving cases with grave abuse

of discretion in any proceedings like the impeachment trial

of Corona.

Nevertheless, the Impeachment Court presided by the

Senate President, Juan Ponce Enrile averred that the Supreme

Court, in spite of the fact that it has the judicial power

to review actions of different branches of the government,

cannot assume jurisdiction over the power, solely vested on

28 Opinion made by Chief Justice Renato Corona posted inhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenas
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenas


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the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court to try and to

decide impeachment cases.

Thus, it can be construed that the Impeachment Court

submits and follows to the mandate of the Highest Law of the

land and laws enacted of duly constituted authorities, but

it cannot let the Supreme Court assume jurisdiction in

handling the impeachment proceedings. This is in consonance

with the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution on

1987 Constitution in Article XI Sec 3 Par.6 to try and

decide all cases of impeachment now and unless the

Constitutional provision is changed.

Furthermore, it can be inferred that the Supreme Court

can also be charged of committing grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction should it assume the

Senates power to try the impeachment case of the Chief

Justice.

Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to

"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion

must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a

positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty

enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,

as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic

manner because of passion and hostility.


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The Constitutional grant that the Legislative

Department has the vested power of impeachment cannot deny

the provision embodied in the same Constitution that the

Supreme Court has the power to review actions of the

branches of the government if there is grave abuse of

discretion amounting to either lack or excess of

jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, the judicial power of the Supreme Court

to review erring actions of each department of the

government is not absolute. It shall also be exercised

within the scope of its authority; otherwise, it might

commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction, as the case may be.

The standard of grave abuse of discretion is of

remedial law origin and has acquired well-known parameters

in that field distillable to two alternative propositions:

(1) it connotes arbitrary conduct or (2) conduct that is

more than mere error.29

If, in reviewing acts of any tribunal . . . exercising

judicial . . .functions in petitions for certiorari, the

Court does not overturn rulings of judges, who are under its

supervision and control, for mere errors of judgment or for

non-arbitrary conduct, there is more reason to let lie

undisturbed the non-jurisdictional errors committed by any

29 Applicable to special actions for the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under

Rule 65 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.


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branch or instrumentality of the Government, done in the

exercise of their discretionary powers. 30

The officials in these branches are neither under the

control nor under supervision of the Court. As Justice Irene

R. Cortes had opined:

The [grave abuse of discretion] test . . . should apply

with greater cogency to the executive and legislative branches of

government. As to [them], the exercise of the power and duty of

judicial review would call for a higher degree of self-restraint

and circumspection. Should no grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction taint thechallenged acts of the

executive or the legislature the courts must necessarily uphold

them.

For the expanded constitutional power of judicial review

cannot be read to place in the judicial branch of government the

prerogative to substitute its judgment for that of the branch of

government in which the discretion has been reposed.

Indeed, every time judges loosely construe the grave

abuse of discretion standard in applyingthe second clause

of Article VIII Sec. 1, par. 2, they defeat the purpose

for which this stringent doctrinal standard was embedded in

the power granted, giving fresh outlet for protests of

Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper

court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling ormodifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs aslaw and justice may require.


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judicial overreaching to surface, undermining, however

infinitesimally, the legitimacy of the impugned judicial

act.31

The Impeachment Court could be guilty of grave abuse of

discretion if there is capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The

abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to

an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to

perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in

contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an

arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion and

hostility.

For instance, when the Impeachment Court, would go

beyond the mandated procedural and substantive provision of

the Constitution with regard to the impeachment proceedings

(i.e. as to the number of votes necessary to convict an

impeachable public official, denial of due process to the

public officer facing impeachment trial, and other violation

on the Rules in Impeachment Proceeding), the Senate could be

guilty of grave abuse of discretion. On this regard, the

Supreme Court can review such actions made by the

Impeachment Court.

31 In the field of constitutional interpretation, jurists have advocated a double standard to

review questions involving personal rights and economic policy as interpretive tool to easestructural tensions occasioned by the exercise of judicial review. See e.g. Vicente V. Mendoza, The

Nature and Function of JudicialReview, 31 IBP JOURNAL 6 (2005).


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On the other hand, when the Supreme Court goes outside

of its constitutionally mandated jurisdiction (as such

reviewing a purely political question with regard the

decision of the Senator Judges), the Supreme might commit

grave abuse of the discretion and can be alleged of such by

the impeachment court.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES

If one is fated to be ousted, there is no point of

holding a cavalcade and arming oneself with petitions to

review the judges verdict for the constellation in the sky

commands an immutable order to surrender that throne as the

superior judge of the highest tribunal. Hence one has to bid

goodbye to that office. Nonetheless, fate or things other

than what the constitution or applicable laws provide to

overthrow a Chief Justice has no bearing, we are a

government of laws and not of men and the body politic does

not always conform to what fate, destiny or luck has to

offer. The state has legal means to protect the rights and

interests of each individual which means that everyone even

the Chief Justice should be accorded the right to be tried

impartially.

If after days and months of heated arguments in the

impeachment court, the judges had come into a decision

affirming the allegations of the prosecution that indeed the

Chief Justice had betrayed the public trust and had violated


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any other basis for impeachment, what more can the Chief

Justice do?

Given that his credibility, integrity and not to

mention source income are on the line, most probably he

would exhaust all possible means to modify the judges

decision. What would he do then? One pretty obvious remedy

is to seek refuge from the Supreme Court via certiorari

under Rule 65 alleging that the verdict is unreasonable,

excessive, unwarranted, inequitable or undeserved because he

would allege that there were misapprehension of facts on the

part of the senator judges and the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings were not adhered to which had

immensely affected the judgment.

The Chief Justice then would feel aggrieved and as a

result, he would file a petition for certiorari with the

Court of Last Resort. As a result, our Supreme Court would

eventually take cognizance of his petition because the

Constitution so mandates as evident on Article VIII, Section

1 expressly stating that Judicial power includes the duty

of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of

the Government.32

32 Lawas , Hector. SC has power to review actions of the impeachment court, February 12,2012.


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Renowned constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin Bernas stated

that the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over petitions

involving cases with grave abuse of discretion in any

proceedings like the impeachment trial of our Chief Justice

and his statement was further affirmed by Fr. Ranhilo

Aquino, dean of the San Beda Graduate School of Law. Dean

Aquino stressed that the impeachment court is not an

independent republic and it remains part of our government,

thus still subject to the powerful claws and scrutiny of our

Highest Magistrate. However, the petitioner is no other

than the Chief Justice, the members of the Supreme Courts

comrade in the administration of justice, and so the

question of partiality would be a deafening concern. Though

the Supreme Court Justices are not infallible because they

are just like ushuman and subject to temptations still the

researchers find the issue untenable because they are the

care takers of justice and they are also subject to the

prying eyes of the public considering that they too are

impeachable officers, the tendency is, they would be more

careful on their every move and cautious in deliberating and

deciding the case.

Basing on the aforementioned contentions, the Supreme

Court may review the verdict of the impeachment court. On

the other hand, the legislative department particularly the

senator judges, as envoy and voice of the Filipino people

would not concur on the precept that the Supreme Court may

review their decisions because of the provision on article


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XI, section III, paragraph VI that states The Senate shall

have the sole power to decide all cases of impeachment...

and paragraph IX of said section The Congress shall

promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out

the purpose of this section.

A statement quoted by Senator Pia Cayetano from Michael

Gerhardt Judicial review of such an impeachment procedure

would undermine the impeachments effectiveness especially

judicial abuse of power.

Judicial review of the impeachment process would give

judges of the Supreme Court the last word on the propriety

of the procedure for their own removal, and thus the chance

to make their own, or their colleagues removal virtually

impossible by ensuring that Congress could achieve such

outcome solely to the most complex and time-consuming

ways.33 Simply stated, the impeachment court would not

accede to favor the decision of the Supreme Court in case it

would overrule their verdict or decision on the impeachment

case of the Chief Justice by reason of grave abuse of

discretion.

It could therefore be inferred that the two branches of

government would collide on the central issue of whose voice

should be echoed to the public and whose decision should be

followed. If the scenario would continue to be as chaotic as

this controversial trial of our Chief Justice then the fight

for truth and justice would never be won, the case would be

33 Philippine Daily Inquirer, Haunting Questions, February 18, 2012.


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left unresolved and it would give birth to a new dispute and

argument.

There is therefore a need to draw a clear and fine line

that would define the functions of the two gnashing

independent bodies of the government, the Judiciary through

Supreme Court and the Legislative due to the Impeachment

Court. As previously ruled by the Supreme Court, the grant

of the power to impeach upon the Legislature by the

Constitution is not without limitations. For instance, its

power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by

the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this

section. Therefore, the rules promulgated by the

Legislature cannot contravene the very purpose of the

Constitution which aid rules intended to effectively carry

out and when they do, they begin to fall within the ambit of

the expanded concept of judicial review as embodied in the

1987 Constitution and hence, the Supreme Court may look into

their legality.34 The Supreme Court can only review the

technicalities of the impeachment proceedings which would

mean that the courts jurisdiction would be limited to the

procedural aspect that would make sure that both parties had

been accorded their constitutional rights and the Supreme

Court can only intervene if their jurisdiction is invoked.

They could not therefore question the decision of the

impeachment court for if the Supreme Court would do that,

they would be circumventing the Constitution because they

acted beyond their powers. This would entail that we should

34 Janice G. Ayson, Intricacies of the Impeachment Process.


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always go back to the intention of the Constitution that

recognizes public office as public trust. The sound

discretion and verdict of the senator judges speaking in

behalf of the Sovereign Filipino people should therefore be

upheld without the intervention of the Supreme Court.

Conclusion

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers guarantees that

each of the branches of the government is sovereign in its

own jurisdiction. Although that is provided by no less than

the Constitution, intricate webs of encroachment or

interference cannot be helped.

In the impeachment case of Chief Justice Corona, one

can speculate that it is very likely that a constitutional

crisis is an incident waiting to happen. The Supreme Court

has the power to determine grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the impeachment court when invoked by an aggrieved

party, and the impeachment court also has the power to

allege that the Supreme Court committed grave abuse of

discretion. It appears that there will be an endless

bouncing of assertions between the two courts. Such will

only constitute of an exchange of how powerful they are or

how a certain matter is under its jurisdiction backed up by

legal basis or by jurisprudence.

The researchers would like to give a distinction on the

extent of judicial review on the part of the Supreme Court.


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The Supreme Court can review the procedural facets of

the impeachment trial vis-a-vis the mandates of the

constitution however the court should not review the

decision of the impeachment court in this case. It being sui

generis, it is supreme in its own jurisdiction. The Supreme

Court can only get into the picture if the matter forwarded

before it involves grave abuse of discretion and if, and

only if, an aggrieved party invokes it. Without these twin

requirements, the impeachment court is untouchable. It also

follows that anything that it has decided, given it is not

forwarded for judicial review, is final.

The researchers would offer a resolution. While it is

true that the Supreme Court can decide on matters involving

the grave abuse of discretion from any branch or

instrumentality of the government, the impeachment court is

the court of the sovereign Filipino people. If the same has

rendered a decision, the researchers suggest it is best to

be respected because it is no less than the sovereign

Filipino people that have given the verdict.

REFERENCES

a)BooksHutchinson, Greg. Hot Money, Warm Bodies: The Downfall

of President Joseph Estrada. Pasig City, Philippines: Anvil

Publishing, 2001.


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Wilkinson, Earl and Atkins, Alan. Trial of the Century:

The Impeachment of Philippine President Joseph E. Estrada.

University of Michigan: Book of Dreams, 2001.

Sison, Carmelo and Hilbay, Florin. Impeachment Q and A.

Quezon City: Philippine law Complex, 2000.

Aralar, Reynaldo. Separation of Powers and Impeachment.

Mandaluyong City: National Bookstore, 2004.

Aguilar, Narciso. Through the Eyes of the Law: Deja Vu

at EDSA : an Account of the Legal Consequence of People

Power 2. Quezon City: Central law Books, 2003.

Mendoza, Vicente. The Nature and Function of Judicial

Review, 31 IBP JOURNAL 6 (2005).

1987 Philippine Constitution

b)Jurisprudence Francisco vs. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44,

Nov. 10, 2003

Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2,2001

Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuk, 534 SCRA 322,09/28/07

G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001G.R. No. 146738March 2, 2001. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.


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c)Electronic Sources http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Certiorari.asp

x

http://www.1-4-3.net/remedial-law-bar-exams/?p=186 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sui_Generis_%28Latin_expre

ssion%29

Microsoft Encarta Dictionary, 2007 http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Articles+o

f+impeachment

FAQ on Impeachment in the Philippines, 14 March2011,http://www.tan.org.ph/index.php?option=com_content

&view=article&id=149:faq-on-impeachment-in-the-

philippines&catid=55:impeachment-in-the-philippines-

2011&Itemid=98 (1 April 2012).

Burgonio, TJ, Corona risks conviction by nottestifying, prosecutors say, Philippine Daily

Inquirer, 31 March 2012,

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/170207/corona-risks-

conviction-by-not-testifying-prosecutors-say (1 April

2012)

Yasmuan, Cathy C., Coronas testimony to help defense,Santiago says, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 31 March

2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/169889/coronas-

testimony-to-help-defense-santiago-says (2 April 2012


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EDSA DOS,http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php?title=Edsa_Dos (2

April 2012).

Instances of impeachment proceedings/case,http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Impeachment#_n

ote-9 (31 March 2012).

Calonzo, Andreo C., House impeaches Merci for betrayalof public trust, 22 March 2011,

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/215844/news/nation

/house-impeaches-merci-for-betrayal-of-public-trust, (2

April 2012).

(Impeachment of Merceditas Gutierrez,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment_of_Merceditas_

Gutierrez, 2 April 2012).

RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGSpromulgated by the 15th Congress of theHOUSE OF THE

REPRESENTATIVES and adopted last August 3,

2010.http://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-

rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-

senate-of-the-philippines/Citation?

Antonio R. Tupaz and A. Edsel c.F. Tupaz, Fundamentalson Impeachment (Metro Manila, Philippines:Central

Lawbook Publishing Co., Ine., 2001), quoting Alexander

Hamilton (emphasis in the original), 6.

Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug in the case ofFrancisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, November
http://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-senate-of-the-philippines/Citationhttp://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-senate-of-the-philippines/Citationhttp://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-senate-of-the-philippines/Citationhttp://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-senate-of-the-philippines/Citationhttp://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-senate-of-the-philippines/Citationhttp://blogwatch.tv/2012/01/a-primer-on-the-new-rules-of-procedure-governing-impeachment-trials-in-the-senate-of-the-philippines/Citation


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10, 2003. Opinion made by Chief Justice Renato Corona

posted in http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-

asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenas
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenashttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142077/corona-asks-sc-to-stop-impeachment-trial-bank-subpoenas

measuring grave abuse of discretion in the chief justice's impeachment trial

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