NATIONAL ARCHIVES

IRELAND

Reference Code: 2014/105/789

Creation Date(s): 10 October 1984

Extent and medium: 16 pages

Creator(s): Department of the Taoiseach

Access Conditions: Open

Copyright: National Archives, Ireland. May only be

reproduced with the written permission of the

Director of the National Archives.

•

I SECHET

Memora~dum for Government __ e ___ ·----·---- ---------- -

10 October 1984

Possible An5lo-Irish Initiative on Northern Ireland ------------

1 . The Taoiseach seekR the appt'oval of the Government fot' t11e

continuance of discu8&ions on Northern Ireland on the lines

indicated in this memo1'andum.

2. Exchanees have taken place hoth in London anc1 in Dublin

over a period of months between Irish and British officiaJs

with a vie\; to exploring the pos3ibilj_t.v of an Anglo-Irish

lnitiative on t'orthern Ireland. This paper is intended to

provide an introduction to the present state of the dialogue.

3. Those involved on t~e Irish sjde are the Secretary to the

Governments the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs,

the Ambassador in -London and the Assistar1t Secretary in charge

of Anglo-Irish relations in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

On the British side those involved are the Secretary to the

Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong, the Deputy Under-Secretary at

the Foreign and ~ommonwealth Office (until recently Deputy

Secretary to the Cabinet) David Goodall, and the British

Ambassador in Dublin.·

4 . The Government have been informed as the exchanges have

developed and have given both general and specific instructions

to the Irish participants. The Taoiseach, the Tanaiste and the

Minister for Foreign Affairs have directrd the Irish side in

close detail.

5. In London tne Cfl.binet have received t\·io repo'rts and have

approved the continuatio~ of the e~changes. British ~iniEterG

di~ectly instruct!ng the Bri~ish side are the Prioe hiniGter,

t~e Foreign Secretary and the Sec~etary of State for Northern

lrclu.nd.

I SECHET

Memorandum for Government --~--- -------_._-----_._-

10 October 1984

1. The Taoireach seeks the approval of the Government for' the

continuance of discu~&ions on North~cn Ireland on tile lines

indicated in this memol'andurn.

2. Exchanges have taken place hoth in London an~ in Dublin

over a period of months between Irish and British officiaJs

with a viev- to exploring the pos3ibillt .v of an Anglo-Irish

initiative on Northern Ireland. This paper is intended to

provide an introduction to the present state of the dialogue.

3. Those involved on the Irish sjde are the Secretary to the

Government. the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs,

the Ambassador in 'London and the Assistant Seccetary in cllB.rse

of Anglo-Irish relations in the Departloent of Foreign Affairs.

On the British side those involved are tile Secretary to the

Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong, the Deputy Under-Secretary at

the Foreign and ~ommonwealth Office (until recently Deputy

Secretary to the Cabinet) David Goodall, and the British

Ambassador in Dublin.'

4 . The Government have been informed as the exchanges h~ve

developed and have given both general and specific instructions

to the Irish participants. The Taoiseach, the Tanaiste and the

Minister for Foreign Affairs have directrd the Irish side in

close detail.

5. In London the Cabinet have received tl'iO repo'rts and have

approved the continuation of the e~changes. British l~iniEtel'~

directly instructlng the British side are the Prime Mini~t8r,

the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary 01' State for tJorthern

Ireland.

\ \ \

• - 2 -

e

6. The Taoiseach and the Prime Mini~ter have discussed the

progress of the talks and there have also been important

exchanges between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the

former Secretar3 of State for Northern Ireland and the Foreign

Secretary. The main effort has hitherto , with the approval of

policial leaders on both sides, been concentrated at the

official level.

7 . The outline of a possible "pacl{age" has now emerged on both

sides . Both sides have now included legal and security experts

in the detail of their work, (on our side the Secretary of the

Department of Justice, the Commissioner , the Chief of Staff and

Mr Declan Quigley , who has just retired as Senior Legal

Assistant in the AG ' s Office). It is pro~osed that the two

s ides \'lill exchange papers on topics within the next ten days.

This will be followed immediately by a t\:o-day meeting

involving the existing participants and possibly a few others.

Other meeting(s) are likely to take place shortly thereafter

with a view to finalising the shape and content of a possible

" package" for consideration by the Heads of Government at their

Summit meeting on 19 November . Both sides have under

consideration the possibility of issuing a general statement of

Object.iYes or Principles on 19 November \''hile holding the

content of the "package" over for presentation at a poss:'...ble ·.

conference o~ the Governments and the ·orthern Ireland parties

(and possibly, though not probably, Opposition parties in

London a .. - Dubli:n) to be held \'er·· shortly thereafter •

. e e

e x e. _., n f _ r.:;cen- r e r - in h~ 3e fa ... t :e :::_e -;;t e ~ , herE:

\ \ \

- 2 -

~

6. The Taoiseach and the Prime Mini~ter have discussed the

progress of the talks and there have also been important

exchanges between the IHnister for Foreign Affairs and the

former Secretars of State for Northern Ireland and the Foreign

Secretary. The main effort has hitherto , vith the approval of

policial leaders on both sides, been concentrated at the

official level.

7 . The outline of a possible "package" has now emerged on both

sides. Both sides have now included legal and security experts

in the detail of their work, (on our side the Secretary of the

Department of Justice, the Commissioner , the Chief of Staff and

Mr Declan Quigley , who has just retired as Senior Legal

Assistant in the AG's Office). It is pro~osed that the two

s ides will exchange papers on topics within the next ten diys.

This will be followed immediately by a t\':o-day meetlng

involving the existing participants and possibly a fell others.

Other meeting(s) are likely to take place shortly thereafter

with a view to finalising the shape and content of a possible

" package" for consideration by the Heads of Government at their

Summit meeting on 19 November . Both sides have under

consideration the possibility of issuing a general statement of

Objectives or Principles on 19 November rhile holding the

content of the "package ll over for presentation at a possible

conference o~ the Governments and the orthern Ireland parties

(and possibly, though not probably, Opposition parties in

London a • ~u lin) to be held very shortly therea~ter .

8 .

__ e ex

2. r~ce - re in .= 3e :fas ere

• - 3 -

haye been no kno\';n 11 leaks 11 from the officials involved on

eitl'e::' side although M·~ Prior has on a number of occasior..s

hinted broad_y at some of the issues involved. It is essential

that there be no unauthcr=-sed leaks from the Irish side for

doffiestic reasoDs, for reasons of staoility in lorthern Ireland

and for reasons of trust in Anglo-Irish relations. The

Taoiseach has directed that he and· the I'linister(s) concerned

mu t personal:c' appro •e the brie;ing of ar:.y official or G8..rda

or ·~my official in erer~ single case on any aspect of the

exchan0 es.

9. a·u~e of Exchanges

a

~ _rs._ ~e e---:_ ha _:_se ~ tha~ ee.c~- s.:..ce accepts tha"'.: i,i'~e excha:-:ges

~aLe : ~ -e take!!. ~::...ace -:.i;nou~ t __ e c :c:r.:=...t en~ of' e:~t.e~

r.. _ _:_s ::e~ r:..~ c:.. :::..e ~-as · eerr co .. f _:_ "'::::ed ~epeG. "'.: ed::...:-

e ia::... i c:::.. - L 6 _ r _:_ e ':"" n · s e:-:a::...) c.nd of:'icia=._

The :!.seac _ has a._so ote - and t is bas been

nfi 'i d v the British side - that the t ·o s::..des have

exp ore1 each thers ideas> not in the classic manner of

com etitive bargainin~> but rather through a pro?ess involving

mutual educatio~. Substantial progress, in the sense of a

meeting of minds, has been achieved. It will remain, however,

for the tw Governments to take all the basic decisions on the

feasibil:ty of the outline and sp~cific detail of "packagen.

This will presu:nab _y be addressed both in London and in Dublin

before 19 ove~ber .

10. Common pproach

he Irish s~de, on ins~ructions, put successively to the

British side each of the three illustratire op,_i!(ns described

in the For~ Report. When the unitary state opt:on was

re ·e,te , '-he :--edera::.../confedera._ code was pr .? sed. W-nen the

~s re:ecte _,_. - j int urrt~o ~ty mode_ was proyceed.

- 3 -

haYe been no kno\,;n IIl e aks" from the officials involved on

eitl er' side although i·l·~ Prior has on a number of occas~or..s

hinted broad~y at some of the issues involved. It is essential

that there be no unauthcr~sed ~eaks from the Irish side for

dOffiestic reasons, for reasons of stability in Northern Ireland

and for reasons of trust in Anglo-Irish relations. The

Taoisec.ch has di:'ected that he and' the I!inister(s) c0!!cerned

mus person~_~y approve the briefing of a~y official or Garda

or : r,:; official in e,rer:T sicgle case on any aspect of t. e

exchanses.

a

- ~l.;.s+- ~e e':::=--:.t.as':'sec tha~ eac:. side accepts tha"':; ..,he ezcha::g,es

e

This :e~ r~nc~ple as bee~ co~~':'rmed ~epea~e :~

. cl - irl6 .... r~me "~ip' s er ':'a~) an of~i.cia­

iseac_ has a so ote - and t'is has een

y the British si'e - that; he t'o sides have

ex 10re1 each thers ideas~ not in the classic manner of

corn etitire bar aining, but rather through a pro~ess involving

mutual educatio~. Substantial progress, in the sense of a

meeting of minds, has been achieved. It will remain, however,

for the tw Governments to take all the basic decisions on the

feasibility of the o~tline and sp~cific detail of l'package".

This will presumab_y be addressed both 'n London and in Dublin

before 19 ovember .

10. Co~~on pproach

=- e Irish side, on i.structions, put successively to the

Bri~ish s~de each of the three illus~rati~e 0 ti~ns d~scribed

in tr:e F rUIil Rep rt. When the unitary state option TrIas

re:e~ted, ~he redera_/confedera_ c~j~_ was proposed. WDe~ the

~a ~er was reiected . the j int au~ho_~ty ~odel as prop sed

• - 4 -

~

11. It is important to repeat here that the three options are

described in the Report as three possible ways of accommodating

the central criteria of the Report wh:Lch are the Realities and

Hequirements set out in Chapter 5, par'as. 1 and 2. (These

paragraphs constitute the only formal proposals of the

Report.) The Report expressed an openness to consider other

ideas that might lead to progress.

12. The analysis of the problem of Northern Ireland put

forward by the Irish side was, in a sense, an elucidation of

the Realities and Requirements. At this level a good deal of

common ground was found with the British side, most notably on

the need to reverse the alienation of a growing section of the

minority in Northern Ireland from the system of public

authority 1 the State as it is experienced by the minority at

all levels in Northern Ireland). While it is agreed that there

is an acute and extremely difficult problem in the area of

security, it is al_so agreed that any solution to work must be

based on an overall political framework and must include a

considerable political element. The Irish analysis is that,

Nhile the existing structures in .Torthern Ireland, provide

institutional pr-0tection and expression for the unionist

identity, they fail to do so for the nationalist identity.

/

13. Some of the general principles which govern the thinking

on the British side were set out by Prior in his speech - which

had Cabinet approval - on the Forum Report on 2 July. These

include an acknowle gement of the problem of alienation

including alie11ation from the security forces ~nd the need to

overcome alienation, the right of the Irish Government to speak

on behalf of the ~'01·thern nationalists (an unprecedented

acknowledgement), the principle that un:onists do not have a

veto or: the manner in \;hich I ort:-ie~·n Ireland .. ill be governed

tit. ~n the u.:. end acceptance that ~t ·ou:d no~ be more

,_ . -... :.. U S-.

e -- .: <:.- _, ... -- - '- - ': - e t -

- 4 -

11. It is important to repEat here that the three options are

described in the Report as three possible ways of accommodating

tIle central criteria of the Report which are the Realities and

Hequi r'ement s set out in Chapter 5, par'as. 1 and 2. (Thes e

paragraphs constitute the only formal proposals of the

Report.) The Report expressed an openness to consider other

ideas that might lead to progress. /

12. The analysis of the problem of Northern Ireland put

forward by the Irish side was, in a sense, an elucidation of

the Realities and Requirements. At this level a good deal of

common ground was found with the British side, most notably on

the need to reverse the alienation of a growing section of the

minority in Northern Ireland from the system of public

authority (the State as it is experienced by the minority ~t

all levels in Northern Ireland). While it is agreed that there

is an acute and extremely difficult problem in the area of

securi ty, it is al,so agreed that any solution to v!ork must be

based on an overall poli tieal framevlork and must include a

considerable political element. The Irish analysis is that,

while the existing structures in Northern Ireland, provide

institutional protection and expression for the unionist

identity, they fail to do so for the nationalist identity.

13. Some of the general principles which govern the thinking

on the British side were set out by Prior in his speech - which

had Cabinet approval - on the Forum Report on 2 July. These

include an acknowledgement of the problem of alienation

including alierlation from the security forces end the need to

overcome alienation, the right of the Irish Government to speak

on behalf of the <'orthern nationalis~cs (an unprecedented

acknm,ledoeinent), the principl.e that unionists do not have a

veto on the map-ner in \;hich I ort~et~n Ireland ';:11 be governed

\'l.:.t.:n L.e .r. and acceptarce that it rmLd no' be more

dap.~ero\"'f:: to 0 .0': .. ':'ng thc.p. to do some .i!".g.

- L 5 ":h s:' -es, acce: \;:'ng t .. &',. 'c.._:e .at:. -" is - e grea .. e .... t

:'n- e us::.., e_:c-'e:' at a de -r€e

::"s e e t: _

. .

• - 5 -

"' 15. In general, and put rather simplistical!y, the British

strategy would seem to be to find a structure which, while

reassuring unionists about their position within the U.K., would at the sa~e time seelc, through a series of institutional

devices, to reassure the nationalists in giving them for the

first time institutional expression and protection of their

Irish identi~y. In one version, their approach would be to

take from the uAionists nothing that they are entitled to feel

is theirs by right or by necessity, while for the first time

giving to the nationalist side 1:hat they have hitherto lacked

in institutional terms covering most of the levels of the

exercise of public authority.

16. The BritisL side also accept that it is probatl· necessa!'Y

to be reaay to contemplate structures which ha~e no precedent

any1~ere if an initiative is to work. ,

17. In tha·t sense the approach is similar on both sides.

18. It must be noted :

(a) that the R~alitities and Requireme~ts sect:on o~ the

Foru_ Report aoes not demand either Irish unit• or the . t' d ~ f th I' ,__ ,, ( • ,__ £" • L. w:. 11 ra"a_ 0 e guara .. ..,ee l v COn1 lYleS :. vS er:.,__ icis::-.

to the man.er of ract:cal &pplication of ~:e

11 g a1"'an .. ee' - C •• a~..,e., 5 . _. ) ; indee""' the SC.we sec-'.:;:o:--~

0

- "'

O •-p. Y"f .... c. - - _,.# M -

,__ 0 1,,. -

The ' ackaae: con a:.. s a number of e en:.ects y hich 1fl:ll be .

descr:.ue briefly in t.e follow·ng paragrap~s. The s1..:ccess or

• - 5 -

!}

15. In general, and put rather simplistical!y) the British

strategy would seem to be to find a structure which, while

reassuring unionists about their position within the U.K.,

would at the sa~e time seek, through a series of institutional

devices, to reassure the nationalists in giving them for the

first time institutional expression and protection of their

Irish identity. In one version) their approach would be to

take from the u~ionists nothing that they are entitled to feel

is theil's by right or by necessity, while for the first time

giving to the nationalist side what they have hitherto lacked

in institutional terms covering most of the levels of the

exercise of public authority.

16. The Brit-isL side also accept that it is probably necessary

to be ready to contemplate structures which ha e no precedent

any\,'here if an initiative is to \;ork.

17. In tha't sense the approach is similar on both sides.

18. It must be oted:

(a) that the R~alitities and Requirements sect:on o~ the

Foru .. Report does not der.1and eit .. er Ir' sh uni~" or t .. e

,'ithdra -a _ of the I:guara .. tee' (it confi!1es ::"ts cr::.. .... ic::"s::-.

to the mallDer of . ract:cal app1icatio:~ of ",:.e

(

"g a~an~ee' -

s ecif1cB_ ~ :

"9. The ~

C",? :- ... er 5 ) . .. - "-',

-::e

-.=:. FT!"

'- -- ......

inrieed tIle saITi::: sec'.:;:o~

Y1' -'-:0 - - Loo ... _

The I packave l con a: .s a I'u ber of e eEeEts wh1ch ,.1:11 be

descI'::" e br1efl~ in t. e folIo,." ng paragrap:ls. TCte s .:ccess 0""

• - 6 -

" failure of a possible initiative wilJ depend to a critical

degree on the political coherence and interdependence of all

the clements of the "packar;e". This principle uill have to be

kept to the fore in any work on de•eloping these various

elements.

20. The pacl{age v.ould comprise the following elements:

1. Sovereignty over Northern Ireland remains with

Westminster: there would be arrangements for

consultation if we so desired on the "Westminister

powers".

2. An institutional 11 Involvement" for the Irish Government

in certain key areas of the government of orthern

Ire an ~nro ~h an Anglo-Irish .inisteria: Colli..~:ssion for

r __ er_ _e and.

. ..-.,._ e:::...ec--e

-""\.=----~~ e:a _d

. ..-_

r"" - -

. ...--

=-==. __ _

::..

- 6 -

~

failure of a possible initiative will depend to a critical

degree on the political coherence and interdependence of all

the elements of the "packae;e". This principle Hill have to be

kept to the fore in any work on developing these various

elements.

20. The package would comprise th~ following elements:

1. Sovereignty over Northern Ireland remains wi th

Viestrr,inster: there \lOuld be arrangements for

consultation if \'le so desired on the "Westminister

po'ers".

2. An institutional "Involvement!! for the Irish Government

in certain key areas of the government of ~orthern

Irel~ _ _ro oh an A _ o- Irish _inisteria~ COI~ission for

T !' : er _ - _ e an •

. _,,_ e ec- e~

5 . ~!1 ... ""l. __ - re:'a_~ .. ~~.

. .--

::..

---- ------- ------"

' '

• - 7

its form and content and its possible legal implictations. It

is not expected that it would have constitntional implications

23. The Immedl.ate Next Stage

It is agreed between the two sides to meet early next week to

develop discussion on the topics outlined in paragr·aphs 19 and 21 and also to discuss the possible form and content of a

statement of objectives or principles which might be issued by

the two sides to launch the discussion.

On securitv it was agreed that each side should consult expe1·ts

and perhaps bring experts with them to the next meeting.

24. Th~re follow brief summary notes on some of the major

elements in the "package n as it is eme·rging.

25. The "Westminste1' Powers"

Basically: foreign affairs, external defence and finance.

These would r'emain !'at Westminster". It would be provided that

the Irish Government could , if it wished, seek consultation on

these matters. In some cases e.g. CAP in EC policy it would be /

desirable from the unionist viewpoint that the Irish Government

should seek consultations ( this is implied positively in the

DUP document published last week). Other issues of practical

interest would be overall economic, including fiscal (to reduce

smuggling) policy and allocation of resources between sectors

(e.g. industralisation).

26. Ministerial Commission for Northern Irelan~ \

A Commission would be established within the framework of the

existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council

(est. November 1981) to provide for an "involvement" by the

Irish Government in the governme~t of Northern Ireland.

Potentially the range of issues involved would include all

issues now h8.ndled under "Direct Rule" other than the

ll\Jest.fl1inist;:.;r -)oi';8rs". Ther>e \;ould be: institutionaltsed (1Jased

\

• - 7

its form and content and its possible legal implictations. It

is not expected that it would have constitntional implications

23. The Immedt·ate Next Stage

It is agreed between the two sides to llieet early next week to

develop discussion on the topics outlined in paragraphs 19

and 21 and also to discuss the possible form and content of a

statement of objectives or principles which might be issued by

the two sides to launch the discussion.

On security it was agreed that each side should consult expel·ts

and perhaps bring experts with them to the next meeting.

24. Th~re follow brief summary notes on some of the major

elements in the "package 1i as it is eme'rging.

25 . The "Westminster Powers"

Basically: foreign affairs, external defence and finance.

These would rema·in Hat Westminster". It would be provided that

the Irish Government could , if it wished , seek consultation on

these matters •. In some cases e.g. CAP in EC policy it would be , desirable from the unionist viewpoint that the Irish Government

should seek con~ultations (this is implied positively in the

DUP document published last week). Other issues of practical

interest would be overall economiC , including fiscal (to reduce

smuggling) policy and allocation of resources between sectors

(e.g. industralisation).

26. Ministerial Commission for Northern Irelan~ \

A Commission would be established within the framework of the

existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council

(est. November 1981) to provide for an "involvement" by the

Irish Government in the governmeritof Northern Ireland.

Potentially the range of issues involved \10uld include all

issues now hG.ndled under "Direct Rule" other than the

"\"JestPlinist~r -)ow~rs". There \;ould be.. institutional i.sed Ct:lClsed

• - 8 -

" on t.h formal Anglo-Irish Agreement) an? obligatory

co1 s .. ltction of tLe Ir.:.sh G ·ern:nent on all decis:'...ons in this

area.

27. ~e recess P cos:~ tion ·o~-d oe carried out directlJ

·it 1 Ir is •. re. 1 es t ta ti ve, . robabl.Y c.. sen:'... or inis t er, who

lave an office fl;ing t: e trico ou~ t!tl a re~id~nt

secretariat in Belfasc. Polit:cally t e viabiiity of the

system ~ould depend on the com~itment of both Governments to

make i \1ork and that vould have to be specificall · included in

the Agreement. The Irish side \1ould retain the capacity to

withdraw fro: the system if it felt necessary.

28 . The Agreement would pro•ide for the establishment of an

Assembly (the existing Assembly might suffice) and a

power-sharing Exec~tive. In the event of an Executive being

appointed the range of issues subject to the Ministerial -

Con:: .. :'...ssion would be limited to these issues for the time being

not devo ·ed to the As embly. Minimally those issues would

include:

n mination_of the Exec tive;

is e- _ i 'e~-:- e.g. f ags, ans age,

... ,_,,a __

: .... s - e: i

. s

----- _;:;

- 8 -

1 formal Anglo-Iris' Agreeme~t) and obligatory

. ItB.tion of t .. e Irish Go rernment on all decisions in th's

area.

27. The I"ocess f co su::.t ti n ' o\....~· oe carr~ed 0 t direct_y

·:t£ re.le~~~tative, p'obab ~ a sen:or :nister, '~o

d ha e an office f ;:.g t . e trico OJr litl a resident

secretariat in Belfast. P litlcally the viabi~ity of the

syste, would depend on the co,mitment of both Governments to

make it Hork and that 'ould have to be specificall.)' included in

the Agreement. The Irish side \;ould retain the capacity to

withdraw from the system if it felt necessary.

28 . '1'l1e f.greement would provide for the establishment of an

Assembly (the existir.g Assembly might suffice) and a

po\;er-s •. a i~ Exect' thTe • In the event of an Execut i ve being

appoi .ted the range of issues subject to the 4inisterial

COi!:m:"ssion ,,"ould be limite to these issues for the time being

not devo red to the .s embl; . Minimall: those issues would

include:

n m:na ion of the E.ec tive;

is e~ e. -. f _ ~ -s > ans a e,

. .J

• " 29. Assembl_,y_ a .d Executive

- 9 -

The intention would be that the provision that the Assembly and

Executive powers would be exercised by the Secretary of State

for 1orthern Ireland, with the direct involvement of the Irisl1

Minister unless an Executive were formed, would constitute a

stronB incentive to unionists to serve on the Executive thereby I

eliminating the Vinisterial Commission as such from certain

areas of government. Those areas ~ould be governed through a

power-sharing e:ecutive and thus the nationalist interest

(the SDLP) Kould play a full executi •e role in decision-making.

30. The Irish Go·ernment has yet to consider the forrr- of

power- haring Executive and the checks and balances ~n the

Assembl voting-system that it would wish to see. It an

earlier tL.e, and in different circumstances, the Go rerr:r.-lent

favoured a non-boycottable system whereby the Secretary of

State \:ould himself be Chief Executive nominating (no\·f in

consultation with the Irish Minister) rep~esentatives from both

sides of the community to the Executive and, in those cases

where individuals refused to serve, his place being taken by a

British junior minister (perhaps now also possibly an Irish

junior minister). At an earlier stage a 70% vote in the

Assembly was felt nec~ssary for certain decisions. ,. · ..

31 . An advantage of having the Secretary of State directly

in 1 olved in the Executive would be that there would thus be an

existing institutional channel to handle the many issues of

torth-South interest which would come within the purview both

of the Executi 1 e and the Assembly.

32. .ission

e e e t

e

e

be e~ ab :.s e 0

e =..ie a-_:_o

- 9 -

29. AssemblL a .d Executive

The intention Hould be that the provision that the Assembly and

Executive powers would be exercised by the Secretary of State

for 'orthern Ireland, with the direct involvement of the Irisll

r·,unistec unless an Executive \,:ere formed, \iOuld cODsti tute a

strong incentive to unionists to serve on the Executive thereby

eliminating the Jrinisterial COTP.lT.ission as such from certaj.D

areas of government . Those areas ~ould be governed through a

power-sharing e .ecutive and thus the na~io~alist interest

(the SDLP) Kould play a f~ll executi re role in decision-making.

30. The Irish Gorernment has yet to consider the form of

pouep- haring Executi re and the checks and" balances ::"n the

Assembl " voting-system that it yould wish to see. ~t an

earlier ti ,e, ar d in differe" t circums tance~, the Go ern!Yle~~ t

favoured a non-boycottable system whereby the Secretary of

State \;ould himself be Chief Executi ye nominating (no"l in

consultation with the Irish linister) rep~esentatives from both

sides of the community to the Executive and, in those cases

where individuals refused to serve, his place beins taY-en by a

British junior minister (perhaps now also possibly an Irish

junio r minister). At an earlier stage a 70% vote in the

Assembly was felt nec~ssary for c ertain decisions. /

31. An advantage of havino the Secretary of State directly

involved in the Executive would be that there would thus be an

existing institutional channel to handle the many issues of

orth-South interest whicl would come ~lthin the purvieJ both

of the Executire and the Assembly.

32. .i5sion

e - -'l e e ~e os~-S t

e

e

r-de 0

b ... e . _. is ':' !': o· ... ei . C . s ':' -r:: --

• - 10-

33. Joint Court

The Attorney General advises that this can be set up on our

side without copstitutional chan~e. The British are

i11vestigating the possibility that legiRlativc chRnge would be

required to have judges from outside their jurisdiction,

themselves not appointed by the Queen, sitting on the bench in

their jurisdiction. The British side have also indicated that

Lowry is, to their knowledge, opposed. They may need to seek

to win him and the Northern Ireland judiciary over.

34. The question has yet to be fully considered whether there

should from the outset be a single court with its own appellate

division, a court which would deal with, not alone terrorism,

but also human rights issues, thus renoving fro~ the Court the

aura of repression. There are political attractions here but

the in~titution of such a court \·ould r-equire extensive

constitutio .. al cl an e. It is possib} e that the need to c a~.ge

the Co~stitution to create such a co1rt, itself attractiv€ to

na~io~alist op~nion, cou_d if tested on the sa~e day as the

c1an es i .rt:cles 2 and 3 ad~ to the pos~tirc rea"ons for

v t:ng for all the a. en ments . On the other hand, :.t me.·- not

be • act.:.ca _e to co ter.!p_ate s··ch a fu aamenta.l cha .. ge in the

• ' • .._ ro t mh · t' t i-' B · .... · h ' ,_ t lffi •.• eC. a ..,e .!:. U ure . 1 ~ s_gns ar·e · na vI.e r ~ i.,J..S.. ·ou_a WC..!11,, 0

approach tL:'...s ~ore sl.o·· l}, if at all. An a~ter·nati -e app!"oach

mlg . t be to set up the joint. court imrr;ed~ ate_.- and rr.andate t. e

La,- Comm.:.ss~on to set up the single cour'- vithin a spec.:.fic

period e.g. a year .

35 ·. B.:..11 of Rights

This pro. osal is ub icl fa 'O ·red, not alone bs t:- e SDLP and

al_ h a • :-ig: '-:s a2.ti ists ~n the .. orth, bi~t eve .. b-- t. e OU'?

c. .. · t' e v ·p as 'ell a~ the P.ll~acce a:.•ty. ·.ost \·teulc1 seem to

be _ repa "'e' to Co .. ven~::..or1 bro· ght i to the

c. stic :a: of ·or~.e~n :re:a d.

- 10-

33. Joint Court.

The Attorney General advises that this can be set up on our

side without copstitutlonal change. The British are

illvestlga ting the possibility that leg:i.Rlati ve ch8nge \'wuld be

required to have judges from outside their jurisdiction,

themselves not appointed by the Queen, sitting on the bench in

their jurisdiction. The British side have also indicated that

Lov;ry is, to their kno'lledge, opposed < They may need to seek

to v/in him and the Northern Ireland judiciary over.

34. The question has yet to be fully considered whether there

should from the outset be a single court with its own appellate

division, a court \':hich would deal with, not alone terrorism,

but also hu~an rights issues, thus re~oving from the Court the

aura of repression. There a~e political attractions here but

tl e institution of such a court \'ould require extensi e .

constitl.tio.,a~ change. It is possibl e that the need to c .a:-.ge

the Co~st·tution to create such a cOlrt, ~tself attractive to

nat.io::alis-; opinion, cou~d if tested on -I-he sarr,e da" as the

c la;1~es i .rt_cles 2 and 3 add to the pos:ti TC r:eaGo .. s i'or

yo,,:no for all the ame .. ' me.:'s . On the other hand, it m~" not

be . act:ca ~e to co te _p~ate sllch a fun 'a .. ental c' .aL.ge in the • ,.... f> t "'h ' t' -I- t' B ' .... h d L. t lm, .. eo. a..,e 1 u 're. 1 ~ s:.gns a'e '1 a" ne rJ. "lS.. "ou_ \,i&.n" 0

approach tt.::'s .. ore slO\ .. 1/, if at all. Im alter'nati"e approach

m1S.t be to set up the joint court i mediate~. and ~andate the

La' Co,~:"'ssion to set up t~e s::'ng!e co'rL. \'ithin a spec:fic

eriod e.g. a year.

35 '. Bill 0

This pro~ osal is pub icl- fa.vo '!.'ed, not alor.e b: tI' e SDLP and

all h la., ~ig 4-, a~,tivists:"n tne . orth~ bl.:t eve!'! b' t e Oi':':

a •. I e _ as .ell a~ rhe All:arce arty. ~DS~ lculd see~ to

be p~epa, ' to ha e .t, e Ev.:"c. ean Co., ent'- on >-rou"'ht i. to the

d ,. s<-ic ::'a: of :'or hern :re::'a

• - 11-

36. It would seem that, in the event of the establishment of a

single court de a ling with not alone terrorism but also human

rights, it would be desirable to have the same human rights

regj_me, in fact . the same charter, in both parts of Ireland. It

is understood that there might be objections by the

Roman Catholic Church to the introduction of the Convention

into domestic law in the South.

37. A Joint Security Commission

The Commj_ssion would, it seems agr e ed, meet within the

Ministerial Commission for Northern Ireland. The two Ministers

would be assisted by security advisers (administrative and

professional). The British are considerin-g the following

proposals and the first indications are that they would no~ be

opposed: '

that the Commission '[ould appoint the security chief ( s);

that the Commission uould decide and lay do·"n for the

security services guidelines for secur~ty operational

policy .

38. Th e Brit~sh vie- . see~ s to be t hat for operational purposes ,

the securi~, serT·ces s ou . d e, i n practice and inde ed i~

theo~J, a1~on0~ous.

--=-~ a

s::_ E. e ar.s ·e~ .o · ~ be n -~es • e EO et .:no: .iow -'- h e B _ _:_ t :__ s . • uld ·::. e~ -:: ::. s .

nis re~a ::. ns t .e . ost ' iff :__ c :t q est:o .• I ~he a::.scussior~

at ~near :er ~ tase t.a· n t. · s area the ~~m~ry

• - 11-

36. It would seem that, in the event of the establishment of a

single court dealing with not alone terrorism but also human

rights, it wouJd be desirable to have the same human rights

reglrne, in fact. the same charter, in both parts of Ireland. It

is understood that there might be objections by the

Roman Catholic Church to the introduction of the Convention

into domestic law in the South.

37. A Joint Security Commission

The Commission would, it seems agreed, meet \~ithin the

~1inisterial Co'nmission for Northern Ireland. The t\'10 Hinisters

would be assisted by security advisers (administrative and

professional) . The British are considering the following

proposals and the first indications are that they would noi be

opposed: '

that the Commission \[ould appoint the security chief (s) ;

that the Commission would decide and lay d01n for the

security services guidelines for security operational

policy .

38. The Brit~sh vie '. see. s to be that for operational purpoces .-

the secu -. serv~ces s ou_d be, i practice and indeed in

theo~:, a~~onD~ous.

e £ !' t __ e C m=,:ss~o:-_

c'''' s::.. -e ':'5

~s -2 ___ a ... a!"

?re...,um~' - - e ar.~ er -~

I Yes • e d r.o~ et u

:t ap ear~d at ~n

. .

• - 12-

" British cone rn \'as to establish a more efficient system of

co pera~:on while the Irish concern was to have a system of

secu~itL fer he first ti.eon the ground in ~ort:ern Ire~a.d

~i"h, in area~ of na-:onalisL concentrat:on !n particular,

be a.--ce_ -.a le ·o - __ e nat:onf!_!st p8ople. _,ecent::..u· the

n ·~ gi e,_ e i 'erice 4- .at .... ey ·n:ers~a .d a .d take on

th:s Ir!s" co.en. h· s they .a"e ta_ked 2ecently of

: e pPoblem of . o_icing at two le· 1els. F!rs tly, in

relation to terroris crime, t ey ha·e talked of having spec:al

units possib L "joint squads 11 of RUC and Garda personnel

operating in certain areas including po2sibly cross-border.

(N te: they have been told repeatedly ~nd insistently that a

cross-border band of territory for joint operat~ons is both for

securit~ and political reasons 11 not on11 ; the Taoiseach so told

the Prime :ir.istee at their recent meeting). The intention,

they say, ,·ould be to reduce the n obloquy 11 v.-i th Nhich RUC

activities in this area are v~ewed by nationalists. ~bile

these suggestions seem to have little attraction, we have not

forJ ally rejected t.1err! at this stage. Secondly, they noH see

the 1ee· to c eate a dimension of community policing but thE:y

feel this m ·st be \•ithin the RUC frame ·10rk. The:f say that it

c .... d n t be established overnig .. t and that, in practice, the

.. int Sec .r · t. mmissior: shou1 be pub_icly o.andated to

wi h:n te R-- as -s e~ of 1 ~a- ccrrr::..Jn~ty olici g

-~:~ =~~ - { ~e: :he; c-u: e.vi-ag

e_:: ~-

--- . - ·-,

- 12-

BritL .. h conc rn \-'as to establish a more efficient system of

co perat:on yhile the Irish concern las to hare a system of

... O~ --Le first t2.. .. e on the grou r in I o~therr! Ir·e-"-c.d

" h, in area f na-~onalis~ conce .. trat:on ~n part'cular,

le -0 t:.e nat:ona:ist pE:or le. _.ecent:.: the

~ h, "e g" e. e "ice_ ce at t ,ey 'n" era 'ca ,d awl "ake on

h:s Ir~s' co, e __ . h s they _a'e ta_ ed rece tly of

a c •. i 0 : e pro~ em of o_icing at t\ 0 _e 'e_s. F~rstly,.in

relation to terroris cri _e, t' ey ha-e talked of ha-ing spec~al

units poss~b_~ 'joint squads: of RUC and Garda personnel

operating in certain areas including possibly cross-border.

(N te: they have been told repeatedly and insistently that a

cross-border band of territory for joint operat:ons is both for

security and political reasons 'not on'; "the Taoiseach so told

the Prime Linistep at their recent meeting) . The intention ,

the~" say, ,"ould be to reduce the Ilobloquy" viith [hich RUC

activities in this area are v~eKed by nationalists. ~hile

these suooestions seem to have little attraction , we hare not

foruall~ rejected t~em at this stage. Secondly, they now see

the lee' to c eate a dimens:on of community policing but they

feel this m'st be w:thin the EUC fram~10rk. he~ say that it

c Id n t e estab ished overnig.t and that, in prac ice, the

~ int Sec,.! it. n::.rn:ss~or. shoul be ublicly c.andated to

'ci g

• - 13-

~

43. The problem of the UDR has no~ yet been dealt with but the

British are aware of our view that the UDR should preferably be

stood down. The question has been raised within our m·n side

as to whether one might consider having separate Catholic units

of the UDR perhaps off~cered by our own Army officers seconded

for the purpose, but this is seen es creating a danger of armed

sectarian confrontation between Catholic and Protestant units

of the UDR, and 1 has not been broached with the British.

44. There is the related and very difficult question of

military back-up for the police. The British have been told

that we would be prepared, if necessary, to consider deploying

our own forces in the North for this purpose. It must be said

that they do not now appear to be attracted by ths suggestion.

The problem remains, however, and must be faced, that if we can

agree a system of policins which would in our view reduce the

alienation of ycur.s Catholics in particular from the police,

the question would remain as to what sort of military fo~ce to

bac · t _e ci il po ;ers ;ou_ be acce_;::,tc. le,. i r F-eqt!i:, cG.-

c es 2 a. 3

e ··· 11 .. ot cons .._ L.e B:':...tis ab ·~ t::e conte -~ of any

.e !'e • e : a le i.:_ .. :_ ted a~~_ se~ "es to

in"'· "a .... ::..n t .a ... our .._,_::_ .kL.g at p_,eseDt '-hat c. .. :- char:ge 1e

~::.. .. t co _ ... e .p:ate ~o _ ~c:ude ,_ .. e fo::... - o ::.. _g ele~er:t::>:

,.. " .L

W ~ ..... -- ~ '

- e "~-::.se.t.

- 13-

~

43. The problem of the UDR has not yet been dealt with but the

British are aware of our view that the UDR should preferably be

stood dm'!D. The question has been raised within our mm side

as to whether one might consider having separate Catholic units

of the UDR perh~ps off~cered by our own Army officers seconded

for the purpose, but this is seen 2S creating a dange~ of armed

sectarian confrontation bet;leen Catholic and Protestant units

of the UDR, and / has not been broached with the British .

44 . There is the related and very difficult question of

military back-up for the police. The British have been told

that we would be prepared , if necessary, to consider deploying

our own forces in the North for this purpose. It must be said

that they do not now appear to be attracted by ths suggestion.

The problem remains, however, and must be faced , that if we can

agree a system of policing which would in our view reduce the

alienation of yo ng Catholics in particular from the police,

the question wou d remain as to what sort of military force to

bac' the civil P OrTerS \'iOul be acce-;)ta le,.i ~ Fe It!i:7cG..-

e "ill . 0 " c .s ->-. t .. e B:,':"t.is. ab u" t::.e conte .. ~ of a n y

in~icat::"li t :a<- Q' T W

.ere.

=-r.: .. t co ..... e_.p:::.Jl.te fl'o .. -

.p i.

e : a-'e 1=-._ ~ ted Q' :'se - yes to

'

• - 14-

" 47. Should the Government decide to.go ahead with amending

these Articles (and so far as 11rs Thatcher and her Government

are concerned nothing can be done otherwise), it would be

essential

along, in

assjst in

opinion in

to b~ing the constitutional nationalists of the North

effect the g~"eat bulk of the SDLP, with o.~s sq \ as to\ -a,.._ ~u~~\<L ~ 1,-:i o....,

the crerl::.ion of the necessary climate for/}public

the South. It would seem that the Government should

in those circumstances assert the primacy of their concern to

improve the actual political situation of the nationalists of

the North rather than merely to assert goals which are for the

foreseeable future unattainable because the consent of the

people of the North ''ould he required (Forum Report) and is now

not available, while the Northern nationalists continue to

suffer de~rivation of any expression of their identity. There

is reason to believe that recognition has been growing amorigst

constitutional nationalists both of the realistic limits to

political progress that exist at the present time and of the

likely need to off_er to unionist opinion the ceassurance of a

modification of Articles 2 and 3 as the necessary price of

securing progress within these limits.

/

Department of Foreign Affairs

10 October 1981~

See Appendix. \

\ - 14-

47. Should the Government decide to"go ahead with amending

these Articles (and so far as Mrs Thatcher and her Government

are concerned nothing can be done otherwise), it would be

essential to b~ing the constitutional nationalists of the North

along, in effect the gl"eat bulk of the SDLP, with us sQ \ as tOl ' Do- ~u~eA\>\~ ~ I,-!j

assj st in the erECtion of the necessary climate fOl"/, pUblic

opinion in the South. It would seem that the Government should

in those circumstances assert the primacy of their concern to

improve the actual political situation of the nationalists of

the North rather than merely to assert goals which are for the

foreseeable future unattainable because the consent of the

people of the North v/ould be required (Porum Report) and is no\~

not available, while the Northern nationalistR continue to

suffer de~rivation of any expression of their identity. There

is reason to believe that recognition has been growing amorigst

constitutional nationalists both of the realistic limits to

political progress that exist at the present time and of the

l il{ely need to of (er to unionist opinion the reassurance of a

modification of Articles 2 and 3 as the necessary price of

securing progress within these limits.

/

Department of Foreign Affairs

10 October 1984

See Appendix. \

•

• Appendix

Update on 'orthern Ireland J'ationalists' Attitudes

1. The Government were informed on 31 August 1984 o~ the

minimal requirenents of responsible leaders of the Northern

Ireland nationalist com~unity. Essential!' these are focussed

on the need for a nev security system v;i thin a nev.- political

framework. Sevet"'al of those contacted also saw the need for an

amnesty, at least a partial amnesty, for some of those in

prison. The olitical fr>ane-.rnrk should include a strong role

for Dublin and pro"lli e for tLe Irish ide1tity of nationalists

to be institut:on~lly e~pressed.

2. Su seqtent contacts ~ith SDLP politicians have sho·1n that

there is considerable realism de;eloping in that party as to

what mi ht be feasible and as to ~hat might be necessary.

Rather s igni icant1-y some of the 11 g1·eenest 11 among them are

prepared to concede in private that Irish unity is not on, that

what may be feasible would fall a good deal short of that and

that it may be necessary to change Articles 2 ana 3 of our

Constitution to secure it.

3 . The efforts of ~his Irish Government on behalf of members

of the Northern minority ha e created a feeling of confidence

in Dublin on the part of the minority such as has not existed

for many years. Bishop Cahal Daly of Belfast has told us in

recent days that the efforts of the Minister in this regard are

having a direct impact and turning people aHay from Sinri Fein.

This "ca. paign" should, in the Minister's view, be maintained

stron0 ly, for intrinsic reasons and also beca se the confidence

Appendix

Update 01 'orthern Ireland Nationalists' Attitudes

1. The Government were informed on 31 August 1984 o~ the

minimal require~ents of responsible leaders of the Northe~n

Ireland nationalist community. Essentiall~ these are focusced

on the need for a new security sys ter I ,'ii ~hin a ne\'J poli t ical

framework. Several of those contacted also saw the need for an

amnesty, at least a partial a ... nesty, for some of those in

prison. The political fpameiwrk should include a strong role

for Dublin and provide for the Irish identity of nationalists

to be institution~ll' e~pressed.

2. Su se ent contacts "ith SDLP politicians have sho,,'n tI at

there is considerable realism de¥eloping in that party as to

what mi ht be feasible and as to ~hat might be necessary.

Rather significant1.y some of the "gl'eenest" among them are

prepared to concede in private that Irish unity is not on , that

what may be feasible would fall a good deal short of that and

that it may be necessary to change Articles 2 ana 3 of our

Constitution to secure it.

3 • The efforts of this Irish Government on behalf of members

of the Northern minority have cpeated a feeling of confidence

in Dublin on the part of the minority such as has not existed

for many years. Bishop Cahal Daly of Belfast has told us in

recent days that the effopts of the Minister in this regard are

ha ring a direct impact and turning people aHay from Sinn Fein.

This "cal paign 11 should, in the fftinis ter' s vie\', be maintained

strongly, for intrinsic reasons and also beca se the confidence

• - 2 -

of the Northern minority in the Gove0nment will be essential if

we are to proceed with an initiative on the lines now being

contemplated.

Department of Foreign Affairs

10 October 1984

\

• - 2 -

of the Northern minority in the Government will be essential if

we are to proceed with an initiative on the lines now being

contemplated.

Department of Foreign Affairs

10 October 1984

\