national archives ireland - ulster universityassistant in the ag 's office). it is pro~osed...
TRANSCRIPT
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES
IRELAND
Reference Code: 2014/105/789
Creation Date(s): 10 October 1984
Extent and medium: 16 pages
Creator(s): Department of the Taoiseach
Access Conditions: Open
Copyright: National Archives, Ireland. May only be
reproduced with the written permission of the
Director of the National Archives.
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•
I SECHET
Memora~dum for Government __ e ___ ·----·---- ---------- -
10 October 1984
Possible An5lo-Irish Initiative on Northern Ireland ------------
1 . The Taoiseach seekR the appt'oval of the Government fot' t11e
continuance of discu8&ions on Northern Ireland on the lines
indicated in this memo1'andum.
2. Exchanees have taken place hoth in London anc1 in Dublin
over a period of months between Irish and British officiaJs
with a vie\; to exploring the pos3ibilj_t.v of an Anglo-Irish
lnitiative on t'orthern Ireland. This paper is intended to
provide an introduction to the present state of the dialogue.
3. Those involved on t~e Irish sjde are the Secretary to the
Governments the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
the Ambassador in -London and the Assistar1t Secretary in charge
of Anglo-Irish relations in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
On the British side those involved are the Secretary to the
Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong, the Deputy Under-Secretary at
the Foreign and ~ommonwealth Office (until recently Deputy
Secretary to the Cabinet) David Goodall, and the British
Ambassador in Dublin.·
4 . The Government have been informed as the exchanges have
developed and have given both general and specific instructions
to the Irish participants. The Taoiseach, the Tanaiste and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs have directrd the Irish side in
close detail.
5. In London tne Cfl.binet have received t\·io repo'rts and have
approved the continuatio~ of the e~changes. British ~iniEterG
di~ectly instruct!ng the Bri~ish side are the Prioe hiniGter,
t~e Foreign Secretary and the Sec~etary of State for Northern
lrclu.nd.
I SECHET
Memorandum for Government --~--- -------_._-----_._-
10 October 1984
1. The Taoireach seeks the approval of the Government for' the
continuance of discu~&ions on North~cn Ireland on tile lines
indicated in this memol'andurn.
2. Exchanges have taken place hoth in London an~ in Dublin
over a period of months between Irish and British officiaJs
with a viev- to exploring the pos3ibillt .v of an Anglo-Irish
initiative on Northern Ireland. This paper is intended to
provide an introduction to the present state of the dialogue.
3. Those involved on the Irish sjde are the Secretary to the
Government. the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
the Ambassador in 'London and the Assistant Seccetary in cllB.rse
of Anglo-Irish relations in the Departloent of Foreign Affairs.
On the British side those involved are tile Secretary to the
Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong, the Deputy Under-Secretary at
the Foreign and ~ommonwealth Office (until recently Deputy
Secretary to the Cabinet) David Goodall, and the British
Ambassador in Dublin.'
4 . The Government have been informed as the exchanges h~ve
developed and have given both general and specific instructions
to the Irish participants. The Taoiseach, the Tanaiste and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs have directrd the Irish side in
close detail.
5. In London the Cabinet have received tl'iO repo'rts and have
approved the continuation of the e~changes. British l~iniEtel'~
directly instructlng the British side are the Prime Mini~t8r,
the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary 01' State for tJorthern
Ireland.
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\ \ \
• - 2 -
e
6. The Taoiseach and the Prime Mini~ter have discussed the
progress of the talks and there have also been important
exchanges between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the
former Secretar3 of State for Northern Ireland and the Foreign
Secretary. The main effort has hitherto , with the approval of
policial leaders on both sides, been concentrated at the
official level.
7 . The outline of a possible "pacl{age" has now emerged on both
sides . Both sides have now included legal and security experts
in the detail of their work, (on our side the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, the Commissioner , the Chief of Staff and
Mr Declan Quigley , who has just retired as Senior Legal
Assistant in the AG ' s Office). It is pro~osed that the two
s ides \'lill exchange papers on topics within the next ten days.
This will be followed immediately by a t\:o-day meeting
involving the existing participants and possibly a few others.
Other meeting(s) are likely to take place shortly thereafter
with a view to finalising the shape and content of a possible
" package" for consideration by the Heads of Government at their
Summit meeting on 19 November . Both sides have under
consideration the possibility of issuing a general statement of
Object.iYes or Principles on 19 November \''hile holding the
content of the "package" over for presentation at a poss:'...ble ·.
conference o~ the Governments and the ·orthern Ireland parties
(and possibly, though not probably, Opposition parties in
London a .. - Dubli:n) to be held \'er·· shortly thereafter •
. e e
e x e. _., n f _ r.:;cen- r e r - in h~ 3e fa ... t :e :::_e -;;t e ~ , herE:
\ \ \
- 2 -
~
6. The Taoiseach and the Prime Mini~ter have discussed the
progress of the talks and there have also been important
exchanges between the IHnister for Foreign Affairs and the
former Secretars of State for Northern Ireland and the Foreign
Secretary. The main effort has hitherto , vith the approval of
policial leaders on both sides, been concentrated at the
official level.
7 . The outline of a possible "package" has now emerged on both
sides. Both sides have now included legal and security experts
in the detail of their work, (on our side the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, the Commissioner , the Chief of Staff and
Mr Declan Quigley , who has just retired as Senior Legal
Assistant in the AG's Office). It is pro~osed that the two
s ides will exchange papers on topics within the next ten diys.
This will be followed immediately by a t\':o-day meetlng
involving the existing participants and possibly a fell others.
Other meeting(s) are likely to take place shortly thereafter
with a view to finalising the shape and content of a possible
" package" for consideration by the Heads of Government at their
Summit meeting on 19 November . Both sides have under
consideration the possibility of issuing a general statement of
Objectives or Principles on 19 November rhile holding the
content of the "package ll over for presentation at a possible
conference o~ the Governments and the orthern Ireland parties
(and possibly, though not probably, Opposition parties in
London a • ~u lin) to be held very shortly therea~ter .
8 .
__ e ex
2. r~ce - re in .= 3e :fas ere
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• - 3 -
haye been no kno\';n 11 leaks 11 from the officials involved on
eitl'e::' side although M·~ Prior has on a number of occasior..s
hinted broad_y at some of the issues involved. It is essential
that there be no unauthcr=-sed leaks from the Irish side for
doffiestic reasoDs, for reasons of staoility in lorthern Ireland
and for reasons of trust in Anglo-Irish relations. The
Taoiseach has directed that he and· the I'linister(s) concerned
mu t personal:c' appro •e the brie;ing of ar:.y official or G8..rda
or ·~my official in erer~ single case on any aspect of the
exchan0 es.
9. a·u~e of Exchanges
a
~ _rs._ ~e e---:_ ha _:_se ~ tha~ ee.c~- s.:..ce accepts tha"'.: i,i'~e excha:-:ges
~aLe : ~ -e take!!. ~::...ace -:.i;nou~ t __ e c :c:r.:=...t en~ of' e:~t.e~
r.. _ _:_s ::e~ r:..~ c:.. :::..e ~-as · eerr co .. f _:_ "'::::ed ~epeG. "'.: ed::...:-
e ia::... i c:::.. - L 6 _ r _:_ e ':"" n · s e:-:a::...) c.nd of:'icia=._
The :!.seac _ has a._so ote - and t is bas been
nfi 'i d v the British side - that the t ·o s::..des have
exp ore1 each thers ideas> not in the classic manner of
com etitive bargainin~> but rather through a pro?ess involving
mutual educatio~. Substantial progress, in the sense of a
meeting of minds, has been achieved. It will remain, however,
for the tw Governments to take all the basic decisions on the
feasibil:ty of the outline and sp~cific detail of "packagen.
This will presu:nab _y be addressed both in London and in Dublin
before 19 ove~ber .
10. Common pproach
he Irish s~de, on ins~ructions, put successively to the
British side each of the three illustratire op,_i!(ns described
in the For~ Report. When the unitary state opt:on was
re ·e,te , '-he :--edera::.../confedera._ code was pr .? sed. W-nen the
~s re:ecte _,_. - j int urrt~o ~ty mode_ was proyceed.
- 3 -
haYe been no kno\,;n IIl e aks" from the officials involved on
eitl er' side although i·l·~ Prior has on a number of occas~or..s
hinted broad~y at some of the issues involved. It is essential
that there be no unauthcr~sed ~eaks from the Irish side for
dOffiestic reasons, for reasons of stability in Northern Ireland
and for reasons of trust in Anglo-Irish relations. The
Taoisec.ch has di:'ected that he and' the I!inister(s) c0!!cerned
mus person~_~y approve the briefing of a~y official or Garda
or : r,:; official in e,rer:T sicgle case on any aspect of t. e
exchanses.
a
- ~l.;.s+- ~e e':::=--:.t.as':'sec tha~ eac:. side accepts tha"':; ..,he ezcha::g,es
e
This :e~ r~nc~ple as bee~ co~~':'rmed ~epea~e :~
. cl - irl6 .... r~me "~ip' s er ':'a~) an of~i.cia
iseac_ has a so ote - and t'is has een
y the British si'e - that; he t'o sides have
ex 10re1 each thers ideas~ not in the classic manner of
corn etitire bar aining, but rather through a pro~ess involving
mutual educatio~. Substantial progress, in the sense of a
meeting of minds, has been achieved. It will remain, however,
for the tw Governments to take all the basic decisions on the
feasibility of the o~tline and sp~cific detail of l'package".
This will presumab_y be addressed both 'n London and in Dublin
before 19 ovember .
10. Co~~on pproach
=- e Irish side, on i.structions, put successively to the
Bri~ish s~de each of the three illus~rati~e 0 ti~ns d~scribed
in tr:e F rUIil Rep rt. When the unitary state option TrIas
re:e~ted, ~he redera_/confedera_ c~j~_ was proposed. WDe~ the
~a ~er was reiected . the j int au~ho_~ty ~odel as prop sed
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• - 4 -
~
11. It is important to repeat here that the three options are
described in the Report as three possible ways of accommodating
the central criteria of the Report wh:Lch are the Realities and
Hequirements set out in Chapter 5, par'as. 1 and 2. (These
paragraphs constitute the only formal proposals of the
Report.) The Report expressed an openness to consider other
ideas that might lead to progress.
12. The analysis of the problem of Northern Ireland put
forward by the Irish side was, in a sense, an elucidation of
the Realities and Requirements. At this level a good deal of
common ground was found with the British side, most notably on
the need to reverse the alienation of a growing section of the
minority in Northern Ireland from the system of public
authority 1 the State as it is experienced by the minority at
all levels in Northern Ireland). While it is agreed that there
is an acute and extremely difficult problem in the area of
security, it is al_so agreed that any solution to work must be
based on an overall political framework and must include a
considerable political element. The Irish analysis is that,
Nhile the existing structures in .Torthern Ireland, provide
institutional pr-0tection and expression for the unionist
identity, they fail to do so for the nationalist identity.
/
13. Some of the general principles which govern the thinking
on the British side were set out by Prior in his speech - which
had Cabinet approval - on the Forum Report on 2 July. These
include an acknowle gement of the problem of alienation
including alie11ation from the security forces ~nd the need to
overcome alienation, the right of the Irish Government to speak
on behalf of the ~'01·thern nationalists (an unprecedented
acknowledgement), the principle that un:onists do not have a
veto or: the manner in \;hich I ort:-ie~·n Ireland .. ill be governed
tit. ~n the u.:. end acceptance that ~t ·ou:d no~ be more
,_ . -... :.. U S-.
e -- .: <:.- _, ... -- - '- - ': - e t -
- 4 -
11. It is important to repEat here that the three options are
described in the Report as three possible ways of accommodating
tIle central criteria of the Report which are the Realities and
Hequi r'ement s set out in Chapter 5, par'as. 1 and 2. (Thes e
paragraphs constitute the only formal proposals of the
Report.) The Report expressed an openness to consider other
ideas that might lead to progress. /
12. The analysis of the problem of Northern Ireland put
forward by the Irish side was, in a sense, an elucidation of
the Realities and Requirements. At this level a good deal of
common ground was found with the British side, most notably on
the need to reverse the alienation of a growing section of the
minority in Northern Ireland from the system of public
authority (the State as it is experienced by the minority ~t
all levels in Northern Ireland). While it is agreed that there
is an acute and extremely difficult problem in the area of
securi ty, it is al,so agreed that any solution to v!ork must be
based on an overall poli tieal framevlork and must include a
considerable political element. The Irish analysis is that,
while the existing structures in Northern Ireland, provide
institutional protection and expression for the unionist
identity, they fail to do so for the nationalist identity.
13. Some of the general principles which govern the thinking
on the British side were set out by Prior in his speech - which
had Cabinet approval - on the Forum Report on 2 July. These
include an acknowledgement of the problem of alienation
including alierlation from the security forces end the need to
overcome alienation, the right of the Irish Government to speak
on behalf of the <'orthern nationalis~cs (an unprecedented
acknm,ledoeinent), the principl.e that unionists do not have a
veto on the map-ner in \;hich I ort~et~n Ireland ';:11 be governed
\'l.:.t.:n L.e .r. and acceptarce that it rmLd no' be more
dap.~ero\"'f:: to 0 .0': .. ':'ng thc.p. to do some .i!".g.
- L 5 ":h s:' -es, acce: \;:'ng t .. &',. 'c.._:e .at:. -" is - e grea .. e .... t
:'n- e us::.., e_:c-'e:' at a de -r€e
::"s e e t: _
. .
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• - 5 -
"' 15. In general, and put rather simplistical!y, the British
strategy would seem to be to find a structure which, while
reassuring unionists about their position within the U.K., would at the sa~e time seelc, through a series of institutional
devices, to reassure the nationalists in giving them for the
first time institutional expression and protection of their
Irish identi~y. In one version, their approach would be to
take from the uAionists nothing that they are entitled to feel
is theirs by right or by necessity, while for the first time
giving to the nationalist side 1:hat they have hitherto lacked
in institutional terms covering most of the levels of the
exercise of public authority.
16. The BritisL side also accept that it is probatl· necessa!'Y
to be reaay to contemplate structures which ha~e no precedent
any1~ere if an initiative is to work. ,
17. In tha·t sense the approach is similar on both sides.
18. It must be noted :
(a) that the R~alitities and Requireme~ts sect:on o~ the
Foru_ Report aoes not demand either Irish unit• or the . t' d ~ f th I' ,__ ,, ( • ,__ £" • L. w:. 11 ra"a_ 0 e guara .. ..,ee l v COn1 lYleS :. vS er:.,__ icis::-.
to the man.er of ract:cal &pplication of ~:e
11 g a1"'an .. ee' - C •• a~..,e., 5 . _. ) ; indee""' the SC.we sec-'.:;:o:--~
0
- "'
O •-p. Y"f .... c. - - _,.# M -
,__ 0 1,,. -
The ' ackaae: con a:.. s a number of e en:.ects y hich 1fl:ll be .
descr:.ue briefly in t.e follow·ng paragrap~s. The s1..:ccess or
• - 5 -
!}
15. In general, and put rather simplistical!y) the British
strategy would seem to be to find a structure which, while
reassuring unionists about their position within the U.K.,
would at the sa~e time seek, through a series of institutional
devices, to reassure the nationalists in giving them for the
first time institutional expression and protection of their
Irish identity. In one version) their approach would be to
take from the u~ionists nothing that they are entitled to feel
is theil's by right or by necessity, while for the first time
giving to the nationalist side what they have hitherto lacked
in institutional terms covering most of the levels of the
exercise of public authority.
16. The Brit-isL side also accept that it is probably necessary
to be ready to contemplate structures which ha e no precedent
any\,'here if an initiative is to \;ork.
17. In tha't sense the approach is similar on both sides.
18. It must be oted:
(a) that the R~alitities and Requirements sect:on o~ the
Foru .. Report does not der.1and eit .. er Ir' sh uni~" or t .. e
,'ithdra -a _ of the I:guara .. tee' (it confi!1es ::"ts cr::.. .... ic::"s::-.
to the mallDer of . ract:cal app1icatio:~ of ",:.e
(
"g a~an~ee' -
s ecif1cB_ ~ :
"9. The ~
C",? :- ... er 5 ) . .. - "-',
-::e
-.=:. FT!"
'- -- ......
inrieed tIle saITi::: sec'.:;:o~
Y1' -'-:0 - - Loo ... _
The I packave l con a: .s a I'u ber of e eEeEts wh1ch ,.1:11 be
descI'::" e br1efl~ in t. e folIo,." ng paragrap:ls. TCte s .:ccess 0""
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• - 6 -
" failure of a possible initiative wilJ depend to a critical
degree on the political coherence and interdependence of all
the clements of the "packar;e". This principle uill have to be
kept to the fore in any work on de•eloping these various
elements.
20. The pacl{age v.ould comprise the following elements:
1. Sovereignty over Northern Ireland remains with
Westminster: there would be arrangements for
consultation if we so desired on the "Westminister
powers".
2. An institutional 11 Involvement" for the Irish Government
in certain key areas of the government of orthern
Ire an ~nro ~h an Anglo-Irish .inisteria: Colli..~:ssion for
r __ er_ _e and.
. ..-.,._ e:::...ec--e
-""\.=----~~ e:a _d
. ..-_
r"" - -
. ...--
=-==. __ _
::..
- 6 -
~
failure of a possible initiative will depend to a critical
degree on the political coherence and interdependence of all
the elements of the "packae;e". This principle Hill have to be
kept to the fore in any work on developing these various
elements.
20. The package would comprise th~ following elements:
1. Sovereignty over Northern Ireland remains wi th
Viestrr,inster: there \lOuld be arrangements for
consultation if \'le so desired on the "Westminister
po'ers".
2. An institutional "Involvement!! for the Irish Government
in certain key areas of the government of ~orthern
Irel~ _ _ro oh an A _ o- Irish _inisteria~ COI~ission for
T !' : er _ - _ e an •
. _,,_ e ec- e~
5 . ~!1 ... ""l. __ - re:'a_~ .. ~~.
. .--
::..
---- ------- ------"
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' '
• - 7
its form and content and its possible legal implictations. It
is not expected that it would have constitntional implications
23. The Immedl.ate Next Stage
It is agreed between the two sides to meet early next week to
develop discussion on the topics outlined in paragr·aphs 19 and 21 and also to discuss the possible form and content of a
statement of objectives or principles which might be issued by
the two sides to launch the discussion.
On securitv it was agreed that each side should consult expe1·ts
and perhaps bring experts with them to the next meeting.
24. Th~re follow brief summary notes on some of the major
elements in the "package n as it is eme·rging.
25. The "Westminste1' Powers"
Basically: foreign affairs, external defence and finance.
These would r'emain !'at Westminster". It would be provided that
the Irish Government could , if it wished, seek consultation on
these matters. In some cases e.g. CAP in EC policy it would be /
desirable from the unionist viewpoint that the Irish Government
should seek consultations ( this is implied positively in the
DUP document published last week). Other issues of practical
interest would be overall economic, including fiscal (to reduce
smuggling) policy and allocation of resources between sectors
(e.g. industralisation).
26. Ministerial Commission for Northern Irelan~ \
A Commission would be established within the framework of the
existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council
(est. November 1981) to provide for an "involvement" by the
Irish Government in the governme~t of Northern Ireland.
Potentially the range of issues involved would include all
issues now h8.ndled under "Direct Rule" other than the
ll\Jest.fl1inist;:.;r -)oi';8rs". Ther>e \;ould be: institutionaltsed (1Jased
\
• - 7
its form and content and its possible legal implictations. It
is not expected that it would have constitntional implications
23. The Immedt·ate Next Stage
It is agreed between the two sides to llieet early next week to
develop discussion on the topics outlined in paragraphs 19
and 21 and also to discuss the possible form and content of a
statement of objectives or principles which might be issued by
the two sides to launch the discussion.
On security it was agreed that each side should consult expel·ts
and perhaps bring experts with them to the next meeting.
24. Th~re follow brief summary notes on some of the major
elements in the "package 1i as it is eme'rging.
25 . The "Westminster Powers"
Basically: foreign affairs, external defence and finance.
These would rema·in Hat Westminster". It would be provided that
the Irish Government could , if it wished , seek consultation on
these matters •. In some cases e.g. CAP in EC policy it would be , desirable from the unionist viewpoint that the Irish Government
should seek con~ultations (this is implied positively in the
DUP document published last week). Other issues of practical
interest would be overall economiC , including fiscal (to reduce
smuggling) policy and allocation of resources between sectors
(e.g. industralisation).
26. Ministerial Commission for Northern Irelan~ \
A Commission would be established within the framework of the
existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council
(est. November 1981) to provide for an "involvement" by the
Irish Government in the governmeritof Northern Ireland.
Potentially the range of issues involved \10uld include all
issues now hG.ndled under "Direct Rule" other than the
"\"JestPlinist~r -)ow~rs". There \;ould be.. institutional i.sed Ct:lClsed
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• - 8 -
" on t.h formal Anglo-Irish Agreement) an? obligatory
co1 s .. ltction of tLe Ir.:.sh G ·ern:nent on all decis:'...ons in this
area.
27. ~e recess P cos:~ tion ·o~-d oe carried out directlJ
·it 1 Ir is •. re. 1 es t ta ti ve, . robabl.Y c.. sen:'... or inis t er, who
lave an office fl;ing t: e trico ou~ t!tl a re~id~nt
secretariat in Belfasc. Polit:cally t e viabiiity of the
system ~ould depend on the com~itment of both Governments to
make i \1ork and that vould have to be specificall · included in
the Agreement. The Irish side \1ould retain the capacity to
withdraw fro: the system if it felt necessary.
28 . The Agreement would pro•ide for the establishment of an
Assembly (the existing Assembly might suffice) and a
power-sharing Exec~tive. In the event of an Executive being
appointed the range of issues subject to the Ministerial -
Con:: .. :'...ssion would be limited to these issues for the time being
not devo ·ed to the As embly. Minimally those issues would
include:
n mination_of the Exec tive;
is e- _ i 'e~-:- e.g. f ags, ans age,
... ,_,,a __
: .... s - e: i
. s
----- _;:;
- 8 -
1 formal Anglo-Iris' Agreeme~t) and obligatory
. ItB.tion of t .. e Irish Go rernment on all decisions in th's
area.
27. The I"ocess f co su::.t ti n ' o\....~· oe carr~ed 0 t direct_y
·:t£ re.le~~~tative, p'obab ~ a sen:or :nister, '~o
d ha e an office f ;:.g t . e trico OJr litl a resident
secretariat in Belfast. P litlcally the viabi~ity of the
syste, would depend on the co,mitment of both Governments to
make it Hork and that 'ould have to be specificall.)' included in
the Agreement. The Irish side \;ould retain the capacity to
withdraw from the system if it felt necessary.
28 . '1'l1e f.greement would provide for the establishment of an
Assembly (the existir.g Assembly might suffice) and a
po\;er-s •. a i~ Exect' thTe • In the event of an Execut i ve being
appoi .ted the range of issues subject to the 4inisterial
COi!:m:"ssion ,,"ould be limite to these issues for the time being
not devo red to the .s embl; . Minimall: those issues would
include:
n m:na ion of the E.ec tive;
is e~ e. -. f _ ~ -s > ans a e,
. .J
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• " 29. Assembl_,y_ a .d Executive
- 9 -
The intention would be that the provision that the Assembly and
Executive powers would be exercised by the Secretary of State
for 1orthern Ireland, with the direct involvement of the Irisl1
Minister unless an Executive were formed, would constitute a
stronB incentive to unionists to serve on the Executive thereby I
eliminating the Vinisterial Commission as such from certain
areas of government. Those areas ~ould be governed through a
power-sharing e:ecutive and thus the nationalist interest
(the SDLP) Kould play a full executi •e role in decision-making.
30. The Irish Go·ernment has yet to consider the forrr- of
power- haring Executive and the checks and balances ~n the
Assembl voting-system that it would wish to see. It an
earlier tL.e, and in different circumstances, the Go rerr:r.-lent
favoured a non-boycottable system whereby the Secretary of
State \:ould himself be Chief Executive nominating (no\·f in
consultation with the Irish Minister) rep~esentatives from both
sides of the community to the Executive and, in those cases
where individuals refused to serve, his place being taken by a
British junior minister (perhaps now also possibly an Irish
junior minister). At an earlier stage a 70% vote in the
Assembly was felt nec~ssary for certain decisions. ,. · ..
31 . An advantage of having the Secretary of State directly
in 1 olved in the Executive would be that there would thus be an
existing institutional channel to handle the many issues of
torth-South interest which would come within the purview both
of the Executi 1 e and the Assembly.
32. .ission
e e e t
e
e
be e~ ab :.s e 0
e =..ie a-_:_o
- 9 -
29. AssemblL a .d Executive
The intention Hould be that the provision that the Assembly and
Executive powers would be exercised by the Secretary of State
for 'orthern Ireland, with the direct involvement of the Irisll
r·,unistec unless an Executive \,:ere formed, \iOuld cODsti tute a
strong incentive to unionists to serve on the Executive thereby
eliminating the Jrinisterial COTP.lT.ission as such from certaj.D
areas of government . Those areas ~ould be governed through a
power-sharing e .ecutive and thus the na~io~alist interest
(the SDLP) Kould play a f~ll executi re role in decision-making.
30. The Irish Gorernment has yet to consider the form of
pouep- haring Executi re and the checks and" balances ::"n the
Assembl " voting-system that it yould wish to see. ~t an
earlier ti ,e, ar d in differe" t circums tance~, the Go ern!Yle~~ t
favoured a non-boycottable system whereby the Secretary of
State \;ould himself be Chief Executi ye nominating (no"l in
consultation with the Irish linister) rep~esentatives from both
sides of the community to the Executive and, in those cases
where individuals refused to serve, his place beins taY-en by a
British junior minister (perhaps now also possibly an Irish
junio r minister). At an earlier stage a 70% vote in the
Assembly was felt nec~ssary for c ertain decisions. /
31. An advantage of havino the Secretary of State directly
involved in the Executive would be that there would thus be an
existing institutional channel to handle the many issues of
orth-South interest whicl would come ~lthin the purvieJ both
of the Executire and the Assembly.
32. .i5sion
e - -'l e e ~e os~-S t
e
e
r-de 0
b ... e . _. is ':' !': o· ... ei . C . s ':' -r:: --
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• - 10-
33. Joint Court
The Attorney General advises that this can be set up on our
side without copstitutional chan~e. The British are
i11vestigating the possibility that legiRlativc chRnge would be
required to have judges from outside their jurisdiction,
themselves not appointed by the Queen, sitting on the bench in
their jurisdiction. The British side have also indicated that
Lowry is, to their knowledge, opposed. They may need to seek
to win him and the Northern Ireland judiciary over.
34. The question has yet to be fully considered whether there
should from the outset be a single court with its own appellate
division, a court which would deal with, not alone terrorism,
but also human rights issues, thus renoving fro~ the Court the
aura of repression. There are political attractions here but
the in~titution of such a court \·ould r-equire extensive
constitutio .. al cl an e. It is possib} e that the need to c a~.ge
the Co~stitution to create such a co1rt, itself attractiv€ to
na~io~alist op~nion, cou_d if tested on the sa~e day as the
c1an es i .rt:cles 2 and 3 ad~ to the pos~tirc rea"ons for
v t:ng for all the a. en ments . On the other hand, :.t me.·- not
be • act.:.ca _e to co ter.!p_ate s··ch a fu aamenta.l cha .. ge in the
• ' • .._ ro t mh · t' t i-' B · .... · h ' ,_ t lffi •.• eC. a ..,e .!:. U ure . 1 ~ s_gns ar·e · na vI.e r ~ i.,J..S.. ·ou_a WC..!11,, 0
approach tL:'...s ~ore sl.o·· l}, if at all. An a~ter·nati -e app!"oach
mlg . t be to set up the joint. court imrr;ed~ ate_.- and rr.andate t. e
La,- Comm.:.ss~on to set up the single cour'- vithin a spec.:.fic
period e.g. a year .
35 ·. B.:..11 of Rights
This pro. osal is ub icl fa 'O ·red, not alone bs t:- e SDLP and
al_ h a • :-ig: '-:s a2.ti ists ~n the .. orth, bi~t eve .. b-- t. e OU'?
c. .. · t' e v ·p as 'ell a~ the P.ll~acce a:.•ty. ·.ost \·teulc1 seem to
be _ repa "'e' to Co .. ven~::..or1 bro· ght i to the
c. stic :a: of ·or~.e~n :re:a d.
- 10-
33. Joint Court.
The Attorney General advises that this can be set up on our
side without copstitutlonal change. The British are
illvestlga ting the possibility that leg:i.Rlati ve ch8nge \'wuld be
required to have judges from outside their jurisdiction,
themselves not appointed by the Queen, sitting on the bench in
their jurisdiction. The British side have also indicated that
Lov;ry is, to their kno'lledge, opposed < They may need to seek
to v/in him and the Northern Ireland judiciary over.
34. The question has yet to be fully considered whether there
should from the outset be a single court with its own appellate
division, a court \':hich would deal with, not alone terrorism,
but also hu~an rights issues, thus re~oving from the Court the
aura of repression. There a~e political attractions here but
tl e institution of such a court \'ould require extensi e .
constitl.tio.,a~ change. It is possibl e that the need to c .a:-.ge
the Co~st·tution to create such a cOlrt, ~tself attractive to
nat.io::alis-; opinion, cou~d if tested on -I-he sarr,e da" as the
c la;1~es i .rt_cles 2 and 3 add to the pos:ti TC r:eaGo .. s i'or
yo,,:no for all the ame .. ' me.:'s . On the other hand, it m~" not
be . act:ca ~e to co te _p~ate sllch a fun 'a .. ental c' .aL.ge in the • ,.... f> t "'h ' t' -I- t' B ' .... h d L. t lm, .. eo. a..,e 1 u 're. 1 ~ s:.gns a'e '1 a" ne rJ. "lS.. "ou_ \,i&.n" 0
approach tt.::'s .. ore slO\ .. 1/, if at all. Im alter'nati"e approach
m1S.t be to set up the joint court i mediate~. and ~andate the
La' Co,~:"'ssion to set up t~e s::'ng!e co'rL. \'ithin a spec:fic
eriod e.g. a year.
35 '. Bill 0
This pro~ osal is pub icl- fa.vo '!.'ed, not alor.e b: tI' e SDLP and
all h la., ~ig 4-, a~,tivists:"n tne . orth~ bl.:t eve!'! b' t e Oi':':
a •. I e _ as .ell a~ rhe All:arce arty. ~DS~ lculd see~ to
be p~epa, ' to ha e .t, e Ev.:"c. ean Co., ent'- on >-rou"'ht i. to the
d ,. s<-ic ::'a: of :'or hern :re::'a
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• - 11-
36. It would seem that, in the event of the establishment of a
single court de a ling with not alone terrorism but also human
rights, it would be desirable to have the same human rights
regj_me, in fact . the same charter, in both parts of Ireland. It
is understood that there might be objections by the
Roman Catholic Church to the introduction of the Convention
into domestic law in the South.
37. A Joint Security Commission
The Commj_ssion would, it seems agr e ed, meet within the
Ministerial Commission for Northern Ireland. The two Ministers
would be assisted by security advisers (administrative and
professional). The British are considerin-g the following
proposals and the first indications are that they would no~ be
opposed: '
that the Commission '[ould appoint the security chief ( s);
that the Commission uould decide and lay do·"n for the
security services guidelines for secur~ty operational
policy .
38. Th e Brit~sh vie- . see~ s to be t hat for operational purposes ,
the securi~, serT·ces s ou . d e, i n practice and inde ed i~
theo~J, a1~on0~ous.
--=-~ a
s::_ E. e ar.s ·e~ .o · ~ be n -~es • e EO et .:no: .iow -'- h e B _ _:_ t :__ s . • uld ·::. e~ -:: ::. s .
nis re~a ::. ns t .e . ost ' iff :__ c :t q est:o .• I ~he a::.scussior~
at ~near :er ~ tase t.a· n t. · s area the ~~m~ry
• - 11-
36. It would seem that, in the event of the establishment of a
single court dealing with not alone terrorism but also human
rights, it wouJd be desirable to have the same human rights
reglrne, in fact. the same charter, in both parts of Ireland. It
is understood that there might be objections by the
Roman Catholic Church to the introduction of the Convention
into domestic law in the South.
37. A Joint Security Commission
The Commission would, it seems agreed, meet \~ithin the
~1inisterial Co'nmission for Northern Ireland. The t\'10 Hinisters
would be assisted by security advisers (administrative and
professional) . The British are considering the following
proposals and the first indications are that they would noi be
opposed: '
that the Commission \[ould appoint the security chief (s) ;
that the Commission would decide and lay d01n for the
security services guidelines for security operational
policy .
38. The Brit~sh vie '. see. s to be that for operational purpoces .-
the secu -. serv~ces s ou_d be, i practice and indeed in
theo~:, a~~onD~ous.
e £ !' t __ e C m=,:ss~o:-_
c'''' s::.. -e ':'5
~s -2 ___ a ... a!"
?re...,um~' - - e ar.~ er -~
I Yes • e d r.o~ et u
:t ap ear~d at ~n
. .
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• - 12-
" British cone rn \'as to establish a more efficient system of
co pera~:on while the Irish concern was to have a system of
secu~itL fer he first ti.eon the ground in ~ort:ern Ire~a.d
~i"h, in area~ of na-:onalisL concentrat:on !n particular,
be a.--ce_ -.a le ·o - __ e nat:onf!_!st p8ople. _,ecent::..u· the
n ·~ gi e,_ e i 'erice 4- .at .... ey ·n:ers~a .d a .d take on
th:s Ir!s" co.en. h· s they .a"e ta_ked 2ecently of
: e pPoblem of . o_icing at two le· 1els. F!rs tly, in
relation to terroris crime, t ey ha·e talked of having spec:al
units possib L "joint squads 11 of RUC and Garda personnel
operating in certain areas including po2sibly cross-border.
(N te: they have been told repeatedly ~nd insistently that a
cross-border band of territory for joint operat~ons is both for
securit~ and political reasons 11 not on11 ; the Taoiseach so told
the Prime :ir.istee at their recent meeting). The intention,
they say, ,·ould be to reduce the n obloquy 11 v.-i th Nhich RUC
activities in this area are v~ewed by nationalists. ~bile
these suggestions seem to have little attraction, we have not
forJ ally rejected t.1err! at this stage. Secondly, they noH see
the 1ee· to c eate a dimension of community policing but thE:y
feel this m ·st be \•ithin the RUC frame ·10rk. The:f say that it
c .... d n t be established overnig .. t and that, in practice, the
.. int Sec .r · t. mmissior: shou1 be pub_icly o.andated to
wi h:n te R-- as -s e~ of 1 ~a- ccrrr::..Jn~ty olici g
-~:~ =~~ - { ~e: :he; c-u: e.vi-ag
e_:: ~-
--- . - ·-,
- 12-
BritL .. h conc rn \-'as to establish a more efficient system of
co perat:on yhile the Irish concern las to hare a system of
... O~ --Le first t2.. .. e on the grou r in I o~therr! Ir·e-"-c.d
" h, in area f na-~onalis~ conce .. trat:on ~n part'cular,
le -0 t:.e nat:ona:ist pE:or le. _.ecent:.: the
~ h, "e g" e. e "ice_ ce at t ,ey 'n" era 'ca ,d awl "ake on
h:s Ir~s' co, e __ . h s they _a'e ta_ ed rece tly of
a c •. i 0 : e pro~ em of o_icing at t\ 0 _e 'e_s. F~rstly,.in
relation to terroris cri _e, t' ey ha-e talked of ha-ing spec~al
units poss~b_~ 'joint squads: of RUC and Garda personnel
operating in certain areas including possibly cross-border.
(N te: they have been told repeatedly and insistently that a
cross-border band of territory for joint operat:ons is both for
security and political reasons 'not on'; "the Taoiseach so told
the Prime Linistep at their recent meeting) . The intention ,
the~" say, ,"ould be to reduce the Ilobloquy" viith [hich RUC
activities in this area are v~eKed by nationalists. ~hile
these suooestions seem to have little attraction , we hare not
foruall~ rejected t~em at this stage. Secondly, they now see
the lee' to c eate a dimens:on of community policing but they
feel this m'st be w:thin the EUC fram~10rk. he~ say that it
c Id n t e estab ished overnig.t and that, in prac ice, the
~ int Sec,.! it. n::.rn:ss~or. shoul be ublicly c.andated to
'ci g
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• - 13-
~
43. The problem of the UDR has no~ yet been dealt with but the
British are aware of our view that the UDR should preferably be
stood down. The question has been raised within our m·n side
as to whether one might consider having separate Catholic units
of the UDR perhaps off~cered by our own Army officers seconded
for the purpose, but this is seen es creating a danger of armed
sectarian confrontation between Catholic and Protestant units
of the UDR, and 1 has not been broached with the British.
44. There is the related and very difficult question of
military back-up for the police. The British have been told
that we would be prepared, if necessary, to consider deploying
our own forces in the North for this purpose. It must be said
that they do not now appear to be attracted by ths suggestion.
The problem remains, however, and must be faced, that if we can
agree a system of policins which would in our view reduce the
alienation of ycur.s Catholics in particular from the police,
the question would remain as to what sort of military fo~ce to
bac · t _e ci il po ;ers ;ou_ be acce_;::,tc. le,. i r F-eqt!i:, cG.-
c es 2 a. 3
e ··· 11 .. ot cons .._ L.e B:':...tis ab ·~ t::e conte -~ of any
.e !'e • e : a le i.:_ .. :_ ted a~~_ se~ "es to
in"'· "a .... ::..n t .a ... our .._,_::_ .kL.g at p_,eseDt '-hat c. .. :- char:ge 1e
~::.. .. t co _ ... e .p:ate ~o _ ~c:ude ,_ .. e fo::... - o ::.. _g ele~er:t::>:
,.. " .L
W ~ ..... -- ~ '
- e "~-::.se.t.
- 13-
~
43. The problem of the UDR has not yet been dealt with but the
British are aware of our view that the UDR should preferably be
stood dm'!D. The question has been raised within our mm side
as to whether one might consider having separate Catholic units
of the UDR perh~ps off~cered by our own Army officers seconded
for the purpose, but this is seen 2S creating a dange~ of armed
sectarian confrontation bet;leen Catholic and Protestant units
of the UDR, and / has not been broached with the British .
44 . There is the related and very difficult question of
military back-up for the police. The British have been told
that we would be prepared , if necessary, to consider deploying
our own forces in the North for this purpose. It must be said
that they do not now appear to be attracted by ths suggestion.
The problem remains, however, and must be faced , that if we can
agree a system of policing which would in our view reduce the
alienation of yo ng Catholics in particular from the police,
the question wou d remain as to what sort of military force to
bac' the civil P OrTerS \'iOul be acce-;)ta le,.i ~ Fe It!i:7cG..-
e "ill . 0 " c .s ->-. t .. e B:,':"t.is. ab u" t::.e conte .. ~ of a n y
in~icat::"li t :a<- Q' T W
.ere.
=-r.: .. t co ..... e_.p:::.Jl.te fl'o .. -
.p i.
e : a-'e 1=-._ ~ ted Q' :'se - yes to
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'
• - 14-
" 47. Should the Government decide to.go ahead with amending
these Articles (and so far as 11rs Thatcher and her Government
are concerned nothing can be done otherwise), it would be
essential
along, in
assjst in
opinion in
to b~ing the constitutional nationalists of the North
effect the g~"eat bulk of the SDLP, with o.~s sq \ as to\ -a,.._ ~u~~\<L ~ 1,-:i o....,
the crerl::.ion of the necessary climate for/}public
the South. It would seem that the Government should
in those circumstances assert the primacy of their concern to
improve the actual political situation of the nationalists of
the North rather than merely to assert goals which are for the
foreseeable future unattainable because the consent of the
people of the North ''ould he required (Forum Report) and is now
not available, while the Northern nationalists continue to
suffer de~rivation of any expression of their identity. There
is reason to believe that recognition has been growing amorigst
constitutional nationalists both of the realistic limits to
political progress that exist at the present time and of the
likely need to off_er to unionist opinion the ceassurance of a
modification of Articles 2 and 3 as the necessary price of
securing progress within these limits.
/
Department of Foreign Affairs
10 October 1981~
See Appendix. \
\ - 14-
47. Should the Government decide to"go ahead with amending
these Articles (and so far as Mrs Thatcher and her Government
are concerned nothing can be done otherwise), it would be
essential to b~ing the constitutional nationalists of the North
along, in effect the gl"eat bulk of the SDLP, with us sQ \ as tOl ' Do- ~u~eA\>\~ ~ I,-!j
assj st in the erECtion of the necessary climate fOl"/, pUblic
opinion in the South. It would seem that the Government should
in those circumstances assert the primacy of their concern to
improve the actual political situation of the nationalists of
the North rather than merely to assert goals which are for the
foreseeable future unattainable because the consent of the
people of the North v/ould be required (Porum Report) and is no\~
not available, while the Northern nationalistR continue to
suffer de~rivation of any expression of their identity. There
is reason to believe that recognition has been growing amorigst
constitutional nationalists both of the realistic limits to
political progress that exist at the present time and of the
l il{ely need to of (er to unionist opinion the reassurance of a
modification of Articles 2 and 3 as the necessary price of
securing progress within these limits.
/
Department of Foreign Affairs
10 October 1984
See Appendix. \
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•
• Appendix
Update on 'orthern Ireland J'ationalists' Attitudes
1. The Government were informed on 31 August 1984 o~ the
minimal requirenents of responsible leaders of the Northern
Ireland nationalist com~unity. Essential!' these are focussed
on the need for a nev security system v;i thin a nev.- political
framework. Sevet"'al of those contacted also saw the need for an
amnesty, at least a partial amnesty, for some of those in
prison. The olitical fr>ane-.rnrk should include a strong role
for Dublin and pro"lli e for tLe Irish ide1tity of nationalists
to be institut:on~lly e~pressed.
2. Su seqtent contacts ~ith SDLP politicians have sho·1n that
there is considerable realism de;eloping in that party as to
what mi ht be feasible and as to ~hat might be necessary.
Rather s igni icant1-y some of the 11 g1·eenest 11 among them are
prepared to concede in private that Irish unity is not on, that
what may be feasible would fall a good deal short of that and
that it may be necessary to change Articles 2 ana 3 of our
Constitution to secure it.
3 . The efforts of ~his Irish Government on behalf of members
of the Northern minority ha e created a feeling of confidence
in Dublin on the part of the minority such as has not existed
for many years. Bishop Cahal Daly of Belfast has told us in
recent days that the efforts of the Minister in this regard are
having a direct impact and turning people aHay from Sinri Fein.
This "ca. paign" should, in the Minister's view, be maintained
stron0 ly, for intrinsic reasons and also beca se the confidence
Appendix
Update 01 'orthern Ireland Nationalists' Attitudes
1. The Government were informed on 31 August 1984 o~ the
minimal require~ents of responsible leaders of the Northe~n
Ireland nationalist community. Essentiall~ these are focusced
on the need for a new security sys ter I ,'ii ~hin a ne\'J poli t ical
framework. Several of those contacted also saw the need for an
amnesty, at least a partial a ... nesty, for some of those in
prison. The political fpameiwrk should include a strong role
for Dublin and provide for the Irish identity of nationalists
to be institution~ll' e~pressed.
2. Su se ent contacts "ith SDLP politicians have sho,,'n tI at
there is considerable realism de¥eloping in that party as to
what mi ht be feasible and as to ~hat might be necessary.
Rather significant1.y some of the "gl'eenest" among them are
prepared to concede in private that Irish unity is not on , that
what may be feasible would fall a good deal short of that and
that it may be necessary to change Articles 2 ana 3 of our
Constitution to secure it.
3 • The efforts of this Irish Government on behalf of members
of the Northern minority have cpeated a feeling of confidence
in Dublin on the part of the minority such as has not existed
for many years. Bishop Cahal Daly of Belfast has told us in
recent days that the effopts of the Minister in this regard are
ha ring a direct impact and turning people aHay from Sinn Fein.
This "cal paign 11 should, in the fftinis ter' s vie\', be maintained
strongly, for intrinsic reasons and also beca se the confidence
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• - 2 -
of the Northern minority in the Gove0nment will be essential if
we are to proceed with an initiative on the lines now being
contemplated.
Department of Foreign Affairs
10 October 1984
\
• - 2 -
of the Northern minority in the Government will be essential if
we are to proceed with an initiative on the lines now being
contemplated.
Department of Foreign Affairs
10 October 1984
\