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RevisitingElectoral
ResponsivenessinLatinAmerica
M.Victoria Murillo
Columbia University
Ernesto Calvo
University of Maryland
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Outlineof
Presentation
o Motivation (Latin America democratization).
o Discussion of electoral responsiveness in the literature & our
conceptualization.
Party organization.
Socioeconomic heterogeneity.
o General measures of voter sensitivity.
o Initial test of party responsiveness using public wages.
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argentina bolivia brazil colombia costa rica
chile ecuador el salvador guatemala honduras
mexico nicaragua panama paraguay peru
uruguay venezuela dominican republic
a lot some
a little none
Confidence in parties (2007)
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Arepolitical
parties
responsive
to
voters?
How do voters perceive political parties asrepresenting them?
To whom are parties responsive?
To which demands do parties respond?
Howmuchdopoliticalpartiesrepresentvoters(Lapop2008)?ARGENTINA
None 2 3 4 5 6 AlotFrequency 297 207 298 323 171 56 24
Percentage 21.58% 15.04% 21.66% 23.47% 12.43% 4.07% 1.74%
CHILE
Frequency 212 143 252 391 301 106 34
Percentage 14.73% 9.94% 17.51% 27.17% 20.92% 7.37% 2.36%
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Howresponsivearepolitical
partiestovoterspreferences?
Elections are the main mechanism that votershave to make parties pay attention to themand the most egalitarian given constitutional
guarantees of one citizen, one vote. What can parties do?
o Change policy position.
o Improve valence perceptions.
o Change distributive allocations.
Do all voters care equally about partiesstrategies?
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ElectoralResponsiveness Electoral responsiveness is the ability of parties to
interpret and act on the (broad lydefined)preferences of voters.
Such responsiveness has been predicated of:
o the capacity of elites to interpret p o lic y
preferences on issues that divide voters(Downsian proximity);
o their capacity to deliver outc om esvalued by all
voters (Donald Stokes valence);o their capacity to deliver se le c tive inc entive sto a
limited number of voters (Cox and McCubbins,Dixit and Londregan).
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PolicyResponsiveness Non-ideological dimension considered by voters:
o vary in their salience.
o assumed to correlate with ideology =>focus on policy.
If dimensions correlate with each other, valenceand targeted distribution will have acentrifugal/centripetal effect on the policies that aparty proposes (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, 2005).
Tension between responsiveness(changing theplatform policies to accommodate the medianvoters demands) and responsibility (maintaining
the value of the party label by holding on to existingpositions preferred by core voters).
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Empiricalcorrelations
CAPACITYPERCEPTION PJ UCR ARI PROPJ 0.1
UCR 0.07
ARI 0.16
PRO 0.15
IDEOLOGICALDISTANCEARGENTINA
CAPACITYPERCEPTION PS DC PPD UDI RNPS 0.4
DC 0.17
PPD 0.27
UDI 0.27
RN 0.27
IDEOLOGICALDISTANCECHILE
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MultidimensionalResponsiveness
Multidimensionality: ideological proximity(Downs) +valence (Stokes) + distributive
expectations (Dixit & Londregan).These dimension are not assumed to correlate => parties strategiesneed not be only ideological positionand other dimensions may bemore effec tive in changing the vote.
Voter heterogeneity: the salience of each ofthese dimensions could vary by group ofvoters. Some groups of voters are more sensitive to parties policypromises, distribution promises& assessments of parties performance.
The choice of dimensions & source ofheterogeneity is context specific.
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Chile
(2nationalsurveys2007,indepthinterviewstopoliticians2009)
Middle-income.
Religious & ethnichomogeneity.
Prior democratic
history (with currentparties).
Similar levels ofincome inequality
(although comingfrom different levels).
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ARGENTINA&
CHILE:
PARTY
SYSTEMS
CHILE (re-democratize in 1989)
2 ideologically driven coalitions:
Center-leftConce r t ac i on: Socialist (PS), Christian Democrats (DC),
Party for Democracy (PPD)-Presidency 1990-2010. Center-right Alianza: National Renovation (RN), Independent
Democratic Union (UDI)-Presidency 2010-now.
Presidentialism with binominal electoral system for legislators.
Electoral registration & compulsory vote.
ARGENTINA (re-democratize in 1983)
2 catch-all political parties:
Peronist or J usticialist Party (PJ ): presidency in 1989-99, 2002-now.
Radical Civic Union (UCR): presidency 1983-89, 1999-2001.
Minor parties emerging after the 2001 crisis: ARI (center-left), PRO(center-right) + provincial parties.
Presidentialism with Proportional Representation for legislators.
Automatic registration & compulsory vote.
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ElectoralCampaigninginArgentina
The people of lesser means have nothing but those Peronists leaders to defendthem, many of them ill reputed. That is the true. It is likely that [candidate] DeNarvaez, after walking around a low income neighborhood, sterilizes his clothes.And the a c t iv ists tha t he d e sp ise s, they sta y the re a nd b ring a b a sket o f foo d for ag uy wh o ha s no th ing e lse , and the m ed ic ine for tha t guy , a nd the c a sket for the
lit t le c h ild w ho d ied a nd w hose fam ily ha s no th ing , a nd the b ed a t the ho sp ita l.The re la ys the w o rk o f the a c tiv ists, w ho m o f c o urse a lso g a in th ing s in re turn. Abenefit, a salary, but they also fulfill an important role. That is why Peronists 'contain'social conflict while with the Radicals, under [former president] De La Rua, peoplewere on the street and he did not know what to do. They do not know how tocontain. you ca nno t have too m a ny p o lit ic a l em p loyeesbecause it takes over
your budget. You can have 100-200 employees over 3500, but not more becauseyou cannot do anything else but paying for them and garbage collection.
Former PJ Mayor of the Buenos Aires rustbelt (personal interview, 2009)
To a vo id tha t so c ia l p ro g ra m s, p a id b y a ll ta xp a yers, b e d ist rib ute d to th o se w hod o no t need t hem, which is unfair since it deprives those who need those programs
and are entitled to receive them due to their need is that the new system shouldbe fair, just and supervised, so that each of the recipients will received a cardrelated to their national identification number
PJ President Fernandez de Kirchner when establishing unive rsa l fam ily a llo w a nc e sin2009.
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Electoral
Campaigning
in
Chile I believe that there are certain voters who are more informed and others,
especially the poor, whose opinion is more volatile. If you a re a c a nd id a te in am id d le-c la ss c onst ituenc y you d on t nee d to knoc k the d oo rs b ec a use tho se
vote rs rea d the n ew sp a p er, w a tc h new s on TV, ha ve a c c ess to in te rne tandtherefore do not expect that the candidate goes to their home to informthem[with poor voters] I cannot relax, I need to be all the time on theground, I ne ed to visit so c ia l o rg a niza t io ns, I ne e d to b e d o na t ing p rize s forfund ra ising e ve nts, I ne e d to g o to sp o rts c lub s, the p e o p le ne ed to fe e l I am
ne a r them , a c c essib le to the ir d em a nd s. They need to feel that I am asaccessible as the [Socialist] major and his representatives because he fills mydistrict of social workers, of his people, of policies, which I cannot competewith because he has a much larger budget from the municipality.
UDI national representative (personal interview).
We provide medical services to people, please, come in; let me know where
it hurts?, pharmacies distribute medicines that I either buy or receive fromfriends who are doctors. Veterinarians deparasite pets, lawyers provide legaladvice, and teachers play with the kids. They paint the kids faces while radiopersonalities or karaoke machines provide entertainment. A ll o f it o n Sa turd a ym orn ing in m y hea d q ua rte rs.
PPD national representative (personal interview)
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MarginalEffectofIdeologicalDistanceonDistributiveExpectations
Effect of Ideological Distance on Expectations of Distribution
-0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Ideological Distance, Argentina
Handouts
Patronage
Pork
PJ
UCR
ARI
PRO
PPP
PJ
UCR
ARI
PRO
PPP
PJ
UCR
ARI
PRO
PPP
Effect of Ideological Distance on Expectations of Distribution
-0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Ideological Distance, Chile
Handouts
Patro
nage
Pork
PS
DC
PPD
UDI
RN
PS
DC
PPD
UDI
RN
PS
DC
PPD
UDI
RN
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Margina E ecto ConnectiontoActivistsNetwor onDistri utive
Expectations
Marginal Effect of Activist Networks on Expectations of Distribution
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Proximity to Activists, Argentina
Handouts
Patronage
Pork
PJ
UCR
ARI
PRO
PPP
PJ
UCR
ARI
PRO
PPP
PJ
UCR
ARI
PRO
PPP
Marginal Effect of Activist Networks on Expectations of Distribution
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Proximity to Activis ts, Chile
Handouts
Patro
nage
Pork
PS
DC
PPD
UDI
RN
PS
DC
PPD
UDI
RN
PS
DC
PPD
UDI
RN
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MeasuringVoterSensitivity&Heterogeneity What dimensions of the voter utility function have a
stronger probability of changing the vote?
o Ideological distanceo Distributive expectations
o Performance (capacity for economic management)
CONTROLS: Connection to the party network,
demographics. Voter heterogeneity => SES.
o Salience of each dimension can vary by SES group.
o Overall sensitivity can vary by SES group.
Parties can implement policies, highlight valence-issues,deliver targeted benefits, and reach to voters =>responsiveness can be targeted by SES.
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Measuring Voters Preferences
We estimate models where voters from differentincome categories (ABC1, C2, etc.) have differentsensitivity to each of the described dimensions.
VOTE CHOICE MODEL: Conditional Logit Modelwith Random Slopes by Income Category.
The model measures the importance of ideologicalproximity , connection to party network, targeteddistribution , and performance on vote choice foreach voter iin income category kand partyj
Estimation via bayesian MCMC, with randomintercepts by Socio-Economic Class.
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MaximumEffectofIdeology,Networks,Patronage,andCapacityinChileIDEOLOGY
CAPACITY(valence)
DISTRIBUTIVEEXPECTATIONS
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A[C1] A[C2] A[C3]
A[C2] 0.2334
A[C3] 0.3798 0.9161
A[D1] 0.093 0.5302 0.1639
C[C1] C[C2] C[C3]
C[C2] 0.0085
C[C3] 0.0093 1.0000
C[D1] 0.0435 0.1402 0.214
D[C1] D[C2] D[C3]
D[C2] 0.0310
D[C3] 0.1578 0.1747
D[D1] 0.0062 0.7222 0.0414
TestofSignificance,Capacity
Chile
TestofSignificance,Ideology
Chile
TestofSignificance,Patronage
Chile
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MaximumEffectofIdeology,Patronage,andCapacityinArgentinaIdeology, Argent ina
Salience of Ideolgy by Social Class (Normalized)
MaximumLinearEffectofIdeologicalDistance
-5 0 5 10 15
E
D2
D1
C3
C2
C1
Distributiv e Expectations (Normalized), Argentina
Salience of Distributive Expectations by Social ClassMaximumLinearEffectofExpected
DeliveryofPublicSectorJob
-5 0 5 10 15
E
D2
D1C3
C2
C1
Capacity, Argentina
Salience of Capacity by Social Class (Normalized)
MaximumLinearEffectofPartyCapacity
-5 0 5 10 15
E
D2
D1
C3
C2
C1
IDEOLOGY
CAPACITY(valence)DISTRIBUTIVEEXPECTATIONS
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A[C1] A[C2] A[C3] A[D1] A[D2]
A[C2] 0.8857
A[C3] 0.6144 0.7689
A[D1] 0.8278 0.9867 0.8205
A[D2] 0.9712 0.9259 0.3966 0.8204
A[E] 0.6051 0.7811 0.9783 0.8261 0.5515
C[C1] C[C2] C[C3] C[D1] C[D2]
C[C2] 0.5846
C[C3] 0.3138 0.9197
C[D1] 0.1517 0.6396 0.7913
C[D2] 0.0037 0.0357 0.0453 0.312
C[E] 0.0244 0.0602 0.0727 0.1404 0.4209
D[C1] D[C2] D[C3] D[D1] D[D2]
D[C2] 0.175D[C3] 0.0031 0.262
D[D1] 0.0005 0.0608 0.728
D[D2] 0.0001 0.0387 0.6706 0.9976
D[E] 0.1008 0.7159 0.9621 0.7456 0.7254
TestofSignificance,Patronage
TestofSignificance,IdeologyArgentina
Argentina
Argentina
TestofSignificance,Capacity
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Expectationsfor
Parties
Responsiveness
Chile:
J OBS: no effect for C1and positively related toSES for the others
although not significantdifferences => uncleartargeting by SES.
VALENCE: strong effect,
positively related to SESand significantdifferences => moreattention to higherincome voters.
Argentina:
J OBS: negative relationwith SES and significantdifferences between C
and D2 => targeting tolower income.
VALENCE: strong effect,negative relation withSES with significantdifferences => attentionto lower income voters.
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Chile:PublicSectorWagePremiumbyEducation
SOURCE:
Casen for
population
of
employees.
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Argentina: Public Sector Wage Premium by
Education
SOURCE:
SIEMPRO
for
population
of
wage
earners
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QUINTILEREGRESSION: effectofpublicsectorwage
premium
for
different
levels
of
income
in
Chile
(2006)
=>
higherpremiumforhigherlevelsofincome.
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QUINTILEREGRESSION: effectofpublicsectorwage
premiumfor
different
levels
of
income
in
Argentina
(2001)
=>
higherpremiumforlowerlevelsofincome.
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Public
Jobs
Distribution
public private public private public private
Permanent 80% 63% 72% 65% 81% 72%
Temporary 19% 15% 27% 34% 19% 27%
Total 13% 87% 13% 87% 25% 75%
CHILE1996 ARGENTINA2001CHILE2006Public
Jobs
as
aPercentage
of
Total
Employment
by
Type
of
Contract
Source:Casen 1996&2006forChile;Siempro 2001forArgentinaforpopulationofwageearnersinbothcountries.
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TemporaryPublicSectorEmployment
We expect stronger effects of SES targeting on
temporary rather than permanentemployment because politicians have higherdiscretion over these contracts & reversibilityincreases the incentives of employees to align
their interest with those of the employer.
We expect that the Conce r t a c i onand
Peronistprovinces target lower income votersthan their political rivals given historicalpatterns of class vote.
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Variables:
DV: wage (log) of all salaried employees inArgentina & Chile.
Independent Variables:o Public employee (dummy): a positive effect => wage premium for
work in the public sector in Argentina > Chile.
o Education (Escola97): number of years of schooling, positiveeffect. Stronger effect on private sector.
o Permanent: contracts of indefinite duration. Public sec tor effectsshould be weaker on permanent employees. In the private sector,the permanent should have a higher wage premium.
o Concertacin municipalities/Peronistprovinces: based onlocation of respondents to capture partisan effects.
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QUINTILEREGRESSIONwithcontrolsforChile(2006):interactingtemporaryemployment&Concertacion municipalities.
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Chile:WageDifferentialsforPublic
Employees
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CHILE:WageDifferentialsforPublicEmployees
PrimaryEducation 31,299 4%HighSchool 246,951 33%Somecollege(16ys) 469,839 63%TOTAL 748,089
CHILEANPUBLICEMPLOYMENT
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SummaryofChileanResults
Public employment: higher wages at higherlevels of income but the net effect is negative
with respect to private employment. Temporary public sector employees show a
stronger positive wage effect on higher levelsof income, controlling for partisanship andeducation.o This relationship is weakened by higher education.
o This relationship is weaker in Concertacion municipalities.
Controlso Women: negative effect on wage more intense for higher income.
o Education: higher premium at high levels of income.
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QUINTILEREGRESSIONwithcontrolsforArgentina(2001):interactingtemporaryemployment&Peronist governorships.
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Public Employee with Completed Primary
Quantile
PublicSectorWagePremiumbyQuantile
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Temporary Public Employee
Permanent Public EmployeeTemporary Public Employee, PJ ProvincePermanent Public Employee, PJ Province
Public Employee with Comp leted High Schoo l
Quantile
PublicSectorWagePremiumbyQuantile
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Temporary Public Employee
Permanent Public EmployeeTemporary Public Employee, PJ ProvincePermanent Public Employee, PJ Province
Argentina:WageDifferentialsforPublicEmployees
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ArgentinePublicEmploymentPrimaryEducation 103,330 8%HighSchool 476,457 39%Somecollege(17ys) 655,357 53%total 1,235,144
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SummaryofArgentineResults
Public employment: premium over private forlower income levels.
Temporary public employees show a strongereffect at lower levels of income, controlling forpartisanship and education.
o Education has almost no effect on the relationship.
o The relationship is weaker in PJ provinces(partisanship stronger in Argentina than in Chile).
Controls
Women: negative effect on wage moreintense for lower income.
Education: the effect of education is veryweak.
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Our
findings
for
Argentina
and
Chile:Different sensitivity by SES to different dimensions (capacity
& selective incentives) shaping the vote decision =>
parties should target lower income voters in Argentinathan in Chile.
Test on selective incentives (public sector wages):
Higher public sector wages to lower income votersin Argentina but not in Chile.
The effect is stronger for temporary employees(higher party discretion & reversibility),
controlling for education, gender &partisanship.
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Conclusion Electoral responsiveness can be measured in
multiple dimensions, not only policy positioning(e.g. selective incentives).
Biased electoral responsiveness can bemeasured by distinguishing groups of voters ofdifferent sensitivity when making theirelectoral calculus rather than based on past
electoral behavior => responsiveness can betargeted to more sensitive groups of voters.