revisiting electoral responsiveness in latin america murillomay2012

7/30/2019 Revisiting Electoral Responsiveness in Latin America MurilloMay2012

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RevisitingElectoral

ResponsivenessinLatinAmerica

M.Victoria Murillo

Columbia University

Ernesto Calvo

University of Maryland


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Outlineof

Presentation

o Motivation (Latin America democratization).

o Discussion of electoral responsiveness in the literature & our

conceptualization.

Party organization.

Socioeconomic heterogeneity.

o General measures of voter sensitivity.

o Initial test of party responsiveness using public wages.


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argentina bolivia brazil colombia costa rica

chile ecuador el salvador guatemala honduras

mexico nicaragua panama paraguay peru

uruguay venezuela dominican republic

a lot some

a little none

Confidence in parties (2007)


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Arepolitical

parties

responsive

to

voters?

How do voters perceive political parties asrepresenting them?

To whom are parties responsive?

To which demands do parties respond?

Howmuchdopoliticalpartiesrepresentvoters(Lapop2008)?ARGENTINA

None 2 3 4 5 6 AlotFrequency 297 207 298 323 171 56 24

Percentage 21.58% 15.04% 21.66% 23.47% 12.43% 4.07% 1.74%

CHILE

Frequency 212 143 252 391 301 106 34

Percentage 14.73% 9.94% 17.51% 27.17% 20.92% 7.37% 2.36%


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Howresponsivearepolitical

partiestovoterspreferences?

Elections are the main mechanism that votershave to make parties pay attention to themand the most egalitarian given constitutional

guarantees of one citizen, one vote. What can parties do?

o Change policy position.

o Improve valence perceptions.

o Change distributive allocations.

Do all voters care equally about partiesstrategies?


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ElectoralResponsiveness Electoral responsiveness is the ability of parties to

interpret and act on the (broad lydefined)preferences of voters.

Such responsiveness has been predicated of:

o the capacity of elites to interpret p o lic y

preferences on issues that divide voters(Downsian proximity);

o their capacity to deliver outc om esvalued by all

voters (Donald Stokes valence);o their capacity to deliver se le c tive inc entive sto a

limited number of voters (Cox and McCubbins,Dixit and Londregan).


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PolicyResponsiveness Non-ideological dimension considered by voters:

o vary in their salience.

o assumed to correlate with ideology =>focus on policy.

If dimensions correlate with each other, valenceand targeted distribution will have acentrifugal/centripetal effect on the policies that aparty proposes (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, 2005).

Tension between responsiveness(changing theplatform policies to accommodate the medianvoters demands) and responsibility (maintaining

the value of the party label by holding on to existingpositions preferred by core voters).


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Empiricalcorrelations

CAPACITYPERCEPTION PJ UCR ARI PROPJ 0.1

UCR 0.07

ARI 0.16

PRO 0.15

IDEOLOGICALDISTANCEARGENTINA

CAPACITYPERCEPTION PS DC PPD UDI RNPS 0.4

DC 0.17

PPD 0.27

UDI 0.27

RN 0.27

IDEOLOGICALDISTANCECHILE


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MultidimensionalResponsiveness

Multidimensionality: ideological proximity(Downs) +valence (Stokes) + distributive

expectations (Dixit & Londregan).These dimension are not assumed to correlate => parties strategiesneed not be only ideological positionand other dimensions may bemore effec tive in changing the vote.

Voter heterogeneity: the salience of each ofthese dimensions could vary by group ofvoters. Some groups of voters are more sensitive to parties policypromises, distribution promises& assessments of parties performance.

The choice of dimensions & source ofheterogeneity is context specific.


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Chile

(2nationalsurveys2007,indepthinterviewstopoliticians2009)

Middle-income.

Religious & ethnichomogeneity.

Prior democratic

history (with currentparties).

Similar levels ofincome inequality

(although comingfrom different levels).


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ARGENTINA&

CHILE:

PARTY

SYSTEMS

CHILE (re-democratize in 1989)

2 ideologically driven coalitions:

Center-leftConce r t ac i on: Socialist (PS), Christian Democrats (DC),

Party for Democracy (PPD)-Presidency 1990-2010. Center-right Alianza: National Renovation (RN), Independent

Democratic Union (UDI)-Presidency 2010-now.

Presidentialism with binominal electoral system for legislators.

Electoral registration & compulsory vote.

ARGENTINA (re-democratize in 1983)

2 catch-all political parties:

Peronist or J usticialist Party (PJ ): presidency in 1989-99, 2002-now.

Radical Civic Union (UCR): presidency 1983-89, 1999-2001.

Minor parties emerging after the 2001 crisis: ARI (center-left), PRO(center-right) + provincial parties.

Presidentialism with Proportional Representation for legislators.

Automatic registration & compulsory vote.


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ElectoralCampaigninginArgentina

The people of lesser means have nothing but those Peronists leaders to defendthem, many of them ill reputed. That is the true. It is likely that [candidate] DeNarvaez, after walking around a low income neighborhood, sterilizes his clothes.And the a c t iv ists tha t he d e sp ise s, they sta y the re a nd b ring a b a sket o f foo d for ag uy wh o ha s no th ing e lse , and the m ed ic ine for tha t guy , a nd the c a sket for the

lit t le c h ild w ho d ied a nd w hose fam ily ha s no th ing , a nd the b ed a t the ho sp ita l.The re la ys the w o rk o f the a c tiv ists, w ho m o f c o urse a lso g a in th ing s in re turn. Abenefit, a salary, but they also fulfill an important role. That is why Peronists 'contain'social conflict while with the Radicals, under [former president] De La Rua, peoplewere on the street and he did not know what to do. They do not know how tocontain. you ca nno t have too m a ny p o lit ic a l em p loyeesbecause it takes over

your budget. You can have 100-200 employees over 3500, but not more becauseyou cannot do anything else but paying for them and garbage collection.

Former PJ Mayor of the Buenos Aires rustbelt (personal interview, 2009)

To a vo id tha t so c ia l p ro g ra m s, p a id b y a ll ta xp a yers, b e d ist rib ute d to th o se w hod o no t need t hem, which is unfair since it deprives those who need those programs

and are entitled to receive them due to their need is that the new system shouldbe fair, just and supervised, so that each of the recipients will received a cardrelated to their national identification number

PJ President Fernandez de Kirchner when establishing unive rsa l fam ily a llo w a nc e sin2009.


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Electoral

Campaigning

in

Chile I believe that there are certain voters who are more informed and others,

especially the poor, whose opinion is more volatile. If you a re a c a nd id a te in am id d le-c la ss c onst ituenc y you d on t nee d to knoc k the d oo rs b ec a use tho se

vote rs rea d the n ew sp a p er, w a tc h new s on TV, ha ve a c c ess to in te rne tandtherefore do not expect that the candidate goes to their home to informthem[with poor voters] I cannot relax, I need to be all the time on theground, I ne ed to visit so c ia l o rg a niza t io ns, I ne e d to b e d o na t ing p rize s forfund ra ising e ve nts, I ne e d to g o to sp o rts c lub s, the p e o p le ne ed to fe e l I am

ne a r them , a c c essib le to the ir d em a nd s. They need to feel that I am asaccessible as the [Socialist] major and his representatives because he fills mydistrict of social workers, of his people, of policies, which I cannot competewith because he has a much larger budget from the municipality.

UDI national representative (personal interview).

We provide medical services to people, please, come in; let me know where

it hurts?, pharmacies distribute medicines that I either buy or receive fromfriends who are doctors. Veterinarians deparasite pets, lawyers provide legaladvice, and teachers play with the kids. They paint the kids faces while radiopersonalities or karaoke machines provide entertainment. A ll o f it o n Sa turd a ym orn ing in m y hea d q ua rte rs.

PPD national representative (personal interview)


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MarginalEffectofIdeologicalDistanceonDistributiveExpectations

Effect of Ideological Distance on Expectations of Distribution

-0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10

Ideological Distance, Argentina

Handouts

Patronage

Pork

PJ

UCR

ARI

PRO

PPP

PJ

UCR

ARI

PRO

PPP

PJ

UCR

ARI

PRO

PPP

Effect of Ideological Distance on Expectations of Distribution

-0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10

Ideological Distance, Chile

Handouts

Patro

nage

Pork

PS

DC

PPD

UDI

RN

PS

DC

PPD

UDI

RN

PS

DC

PPD

UDI

RN


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Margina E ecto ConnectiontoActivistsNetwor onDistri utive

Expectations

Marginal Effect of Activist Networks on Expectations of Distribution

-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Proximity to Activists, Argentina

Handouts

Patronage

Pork

PJ

UCR

ARI

PRO

PPP

PJ

UCR

ARI

PRO

PPP

PJ

UCR

ARI

PRO

PPP

Marginal Effect of Activist Networks on Expectations of Distribution

-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Proximity to Activis ts, Chile

Handouts

Patro

nage

Pork

PS

DC

PPD

UDI

RN

PS

DC

PPD

UDI

RN

PS

DC

PPD

UDI

RN


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MeasuringVoterSensitivity&Heterogeneity What dimensions of the voter utility function have a

stronger probability of changing the vote?

o Ideological distanceo Distributive expectations

o Performance (capacity for economic management)

CONTROLS: Connection to the party network,

demographics. Voter heterogeneity => SES.

o Salience of each dimension can vary by SES group.

o Overall sensitivity can vary by SES group.

Parties can implement policies, highlight valence-issues,deliver targeted benefits, and reach to voters =>responsiveness can be targeted by SES.


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Measuring Voters Preferences

We estimate models where voters from differentincome categories (ABC1, C2, etc.) have differentsensitivity to each of the described dimensions.

VOTE CHOICE MODEL: Conditional Logit Modelwith Random Slopes by Income Category.

The model measures the importance of ideologicalproximity , connection to party network, targeteddistribution , and performance on vote choice foreach voter iin income category kand partyj

Estimation via bayesian MCMC, with randomintercepts by Socio-Economic Class.


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MaximumEffectofIdeology,Networks,Patronage,andCapacityinChileIDEOLOGY

CAPACITY(valence)

DISTRIBUTIVEEXPECTATIONS


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A[C1] A[C2] A[C3]

A[C2] 0.2334

A[C3] 0.3798 0.9161

A[D1] 0.093 0.5302 0.1639

C[C1] C[C2] C[C3]

C[C2] 0.0085

C[C3] 0.0093 1.0000

C[D1] 0.0435 0.1402 0.214

D[C1] D[C2] D[C3]

D[C2] 0.0310

D[C3] 0.1578 0.1747

D[D1] 0.0062 0.7222 0.0414

TestofSignificance,Capacity

Chile

TestofSignificance,Ideology

Chile

TestofSignificance,Patronage

Chile


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MaximumEffectofIdeology,Patronage,andCapacityinArgentinaIdeology, Argent ina

Salience of Ideolgy by Social Class (Normalized)

MaximumLinearEffectofIdeologicalDistance

-5 0 5 10 15

E

D2

D1

C3

C2

C1

Distributiv e Expectations (Normalized), Argentina

Salience of Distributive Expectations by Social ClassMaximumLinearEffectofExpected

DeliveryofPublicSectorJob

-5 0 5 10 15

E

D2

D1C3

C2

C1

Capacity, Argentina

Salience of Capacity by Social Class (Normalized)

MaximumLinearEffectofPartyCapacity

-5 0 5 10 15

E

D2

D1

C3

C2

C1

IDEOLOGY

CAPACITY(valence)DISTRIBUTIVEEXPECTATIONS


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A[C1] A[C2] A[C3] A[D1] A[D2]

A[C2] 0.8857

A[C3] 0.6144 0.7689

A[D1] 0.8278 0.9867 0.8205

A[D2] 0.9712 0.9259 0.3966 0.8204

A[E] 0.6051 0.7811 0.9783 0.8261 0.5515

C[C1] C[C2] C[C3] C[D1] C[D2]

C[C2] 0.5846

C[C3] 0.3138 0.9197

C[D1] 0.1517 0.6396 0.7913

C[D2] 0.0037 0.0357 0.0453 0.312

C[E] 0.0244 0.0602 0.0727 0.1404 0.4209

D[C1] D[C2] D[C3] D[D1] D[D2]

D[C2] 0.175D[C3] 0.0031 0.262

D[D1] 0.0005 0.0608 0.728

D[D2] 0.0001 0.0387 0.6706 0.9976

D[E] 0.1008 0.7159 0.9621 0.7456 0.7254

TestofSignificance,Patronage

TestofSignificance,IdeologyArgentina

Argentina

Argentina

TestofSignificance,Capacity


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Expectationsfor

Parties

Responsiveness

Chile:

J OBS: no effect for C1and positively related toSES for the others

although not significantdifferences => uncleartargeting by SES.

VALENCE: strong effect,

positively related to SESand significantdifferences => moreattention to higherincome voters.

Argentina:

J OBS: negative relationwith SES and significantdifferences between C

and D2 => targeting tolower income.

VALENCE: strong effect,negative relation withSES with significantdifferences => attentionto lower income voters.


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Chile:PublicSectorWagePremiumbyEducation

SOURCE:

Casen for

population

of

employees.


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Argentina: Public Sector Wage Premium by

Education

SOURCE:

SIEMPRO

for

population

of

wage

earners


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QUINTILEREGRESSION: effectofpublicsectorwage

premium

for

different

levels

of

income

in

Chile

(2006)

=>

higherpremiumforhigherlevelsofincome.


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QUINTILEREGRESSION: effectofpublicsectorwage

premiumfor

different

levels

of

income

in

Argentina

(2001)

=>

higherpremiumforlowerlevelsofincome.


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Public

Jobs

Distribution

public private public private public private

Permanent 80% 63% 72% 65% 81% 72%

Temporary 19% 15% 27% 34% 19% 27%

Total 13% 87% 13% 87% 25% 75%

CHILE1996 ARGENTINA2001CHILE2006Public

Jobs

as

aPercentage

of

Total

Employment

by

Type

of

Contract

Source:Casen 1996&2006forChile;Siempro 2001forArgentinaforpopulationofwageearnersinbothcountries.


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TemporaryPublicSectorEmployment

We expect stronger effects of SES targeting on

temporary rather than permanentemployment because politicians have higherdiscretion over these contracts & reversibilityincreases the incentives of employees to align

their interest with those of the employer.

We expect that the Conce r t a c i onand

Peronistprovinces target lower income votersthan their political rivals given historicalpatterns of class vote.


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Variables:

DV: wage (log) of all salaried employees inArgentina & Chile.

Independent Variables:o Public employee (dummy): a positive effect => wage premium for

work in the public sector in Argentina > Chile.

o Education (Escola97): number of years of schooling, positiveeffect. Stronger effect on private sector.

o Permanent: contracts of indefinite duration. Public sec tor effectsshould be weaker on permanent employees. In the private sector,the permanent should have a higher wage premium.

o Concertacin municipalities/Peronistprovinces: based onlocation of respondents to capture partisan effects.


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QUINTILEREGRESSIONwithcontrolsforChile(2006):interactingtemporaryemployment&Concertacion municipalities.


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Chile:WageDifferentialsforPublic

Employees


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CHILE:WageDifferentialsforPublicEmployees

PrimaryEducation 31,299 4%HighSchool 246,951 33%Somecollege(16ys) 469,839 63%TOTAL 748,089

CHILEANPUBLICEMPLOYMENT


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SummaryofChileanResults

Public employment: higher wages at higherlevels of income but the net effect is negative

with respect to private employment. Temporary public sector employees show a

stronger positive wage effect on higher levelsof income, controlling for partisanship andeducation.o This relationship is weakened by higher education.

o This relationship is weaker in Concertacion municipalities.

Controlso Women: negative effect on wage more intense for higher income.

o Education: higher premium at high levels of income.


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QUINTILEREGRESSIONwithcontrolsforArgentina(2001):interactingtemporaryemployment&Peronist governorships.


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Public Employee with Completed Primary

Quantile

PublicSectorWagePremiumbyQuantile

-0.4

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

Temporary Public Employee

Permanent Public EmployeeTemporary Public Employee, PJ ProvincePermanent Public Employee, PJ Province

Public Employee with Comp leted High Schoo l

Quantile

PublicSectorWagePremiumbyQuantile

-0.4

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

Temporary Public Employee

Permanent Public EmployeeTemporary Public Employee, PJ ProvincePermanent Public Employee, PJ Province

Argentina:WageDifferentialsforPublicEmployees


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ArgentinePublicEmploymentPrimaryEducation 103,330 8%HighSchool 476,457 39%Somecollege(17ys) 655,357 53%total 1,235,144


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SummaryofArgentineResults

Public employment: premium over private forlower income levels.

Temporary public employees show a strongereffect at lower levels of income, controlling forpartisanship and education.

o Education has almost no effect on the relationship.

o The relationship is weaker in PJ provinces(partisanship stronger in Argentina than in Chile).

Controls

Women: negative effect on wage moreintense for lower income.

Education: the effect of education is veryweak.


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Our

findings

for

Argentina

and

Chile:Different sensitivity by SES to different dimensions (capacity

& selective incentives) shaping the vote decision =>

parties should target lower income voters in Argentinathan in Chile.

Test on selective incentives (public sector wages):

Higher public sector wages to lower income votersin Argentina but not in Chile.

The effect is stronger for temporary employees(higher party discretion & reversibility),

controlling for education, gender &partisanship.


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Conclusion Electoral responsiveness can be measured in

multiple dimensions, not only policy positioning(e.g. selective incentives).

Biased electoral responsiveness can bemeasured by distinguishing groups of voters ofdifferent sensitivity when making theirelectoral calculus rather than based on past

electoral behavior => responsiveness can betargeted to more sensitive groups of voters.

revisiting electoral responsiveness in latin america murillomay2012

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