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ADMIRAL ISOROKU YAMAMOTO (1884-1943)
INTRODUCTION
1. It is nearly six decades since the end of the World War II. The men behind major
success stories of the war in the Japanese perspective contribute to a lone, Admiral in their
imperial Navy. He was the architect behind the total destruction of Pearl harbour. Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto, one of the most notable sailors and military strategists and greatest
Admiral in the world led the Japanese Fleet during Second World War and engaged in many
naval battles in the central Pacific Region. Most of the time, It was his background
knowledge contributed indirectly to his successes over the US fleet at Pearl harbour.
Admiral-of-the-Fleet Isoroku Yamamoto was best known in the West for three reasons:
a. His brave plan for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.b. His defeat by inferior forces at the Battle of Midway.c. Dramatic manner of his death in an air ambush over Bougainville.
2. One of the reasons for his outstanding ability as a commander and planner was his
unusual understanding of the enemy. Yamamoto had studied English in Boston, had been a
naval attach in Washington during the 1920s, and had led the Japanese naval delegation to
the second London Naval Conference in 1934, and so had a better understanding of the West
than most Japanese leaders of his generation. He had also experienced action at first handearly in his career when he was wounded while serving on board a cruiser during the Battle
of Tsushima in 1905. Yamamoto was a far-thinking strategist and was one of the first of his
generation to recognise the crucial importance of air power in naval operations. He did much
to develop land-based, long-range anti-shipping aircraft which would be used in conjunction
with mobile striking forces built around fast, modern aircraft carriers. He was a brilliant
strategist, a skill honed through an almost obsessive interest in card games and Japanese
chess. He is often portrayed as being an unwilling participant in war against the USA. He
certainly recognised the difficulties of defeating Americas economic and industrial strengthand made himself unpopular among certain right wing groups in Japan by expressing his
reservations, however, some authors do not share this perception of Yamamoto.
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3. His departure from the world is a great lost to the Japanese, since this single man was
a threat to the entire America. The great lessons of his courage, enthusiasm, leadership, will
power and knowledge still remain to groom and guide the future leaders.
AIM
4. The aim of this presentation is to study and analyze the leadership qualities of
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in relation to his naval career.
SEQUENCE
a. Early life and naval career.b. Analysis of Naval Battles.c. Analysis of Qualities and Comparison with Contemporary Leaders.d. Lessons learnt.e. Conclusion.
EARLY LIFE AND NAVAL CARRIER
Early Life
5. On 04th
April 1884, at Nagaoka, Niigata, Japan Child was boned to family headed by
a school principle Takano Sadayoshi. The child was named Isoruko Takano. In Japanese
language the Isoruko is referred to 56, the fathers age when he was born. Isoruko was the
sixth son of the family and further he had one younger sister. They hadnt good child hood
due to economical difficulties. Isoruko couldnt even afford for text books and hence he had
to borrow them and copied them from his subordinates. His first job was to support his
brothers to remove the snow in the roofs of houses in the village. But they had a good family
harmony. Children could gather much knowledge from their father. The war stories told by
the father, lead the interest in Isorukos mind on war. Isoruko was a good dancer in his child
hood and he could win the prices in the annual spring festivals. His father encouraged him to
dance in front of visitors. Takano family usually had gone for fishing for salmon. When
Isoruko grew older, he learnt to fish in the sea as well as he learned the ways of the winds
and the waves.
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6. When he was 12, Isuruko joined Niggoka, middle school where it was functioning on
Military style. He was a very good athlete when schooling and he had become the best
sportsman in his 16th. In 1901, at the age of 16, Isoruko sat for the entrance examination for
the Japanese Naval Academy where he was the second out of 300 candidates. After 04 years
of very hardship training he graduated, obtaining the 07th position in naval academy.
7. At the age of 33 in 1916, Isoruko was adapted to into the Yamamoto family and took
Yamamoto name. It was c common practice for Japanese families lacking sons to adopt
suitable young men to carry their family name. In 1918 Isoruko married to Reiko Mihashi
with whom he had two sons and two daughters. But this family life was ended with divorce
due to his unhidden affair with a lady named Geisha.
Naval Career
8. In this era Japan was about to test her strength as a full scale naval power for the first
time. Isoruko had a opportunity to take a part in the Russo Japanese war in 1905 serving on
the cruiser Nisshin. Though he was wounded at the battle losing two fingers of left hand, it
gave the eager for young officer. In 1916 he graduated from the Naval Staff College and in
same year he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Commander.
9. In 1919 he got opportunity to study at the Harvard University, where he studied about
oil industry. At there he took a keen interest in military aviation since he identified that the
grooving weapon of the western was aero plane. He could get opportunity to visit USA
aircraft factories too. After his return to Japan in 1923 Yamamoto was promoted to Captain
and given command of the cruiser Fuji. Next year he changed his specialty from gunnery to
naval aviation after following a flaying lesson. Then he became the director of the new Naval
Air Training Base at Kasumigaura, from where elite pilots were produced for the navy. In
1925 he was appointed as the Naval Attach in Washington for three years.
10. After returning home in 1928, Yamamoto gave command for the aircraft carrier
Akagi. In 1930 Yamamoto took commander of the first air fleet and in 1931 he was
promoted to Rear Admiral. In late 1936 Yamamoto was appointed as the Vice Minister of the
Navy and from this position he argued strenuously for naval aviation and fought against the
construction of new battle ships. In 1938 Yamamoto was appointed as the as the Vice
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Minister of Navy. In 1939 he was promoted to Admiral and became commander in chief of
the combined naval fleet.
ANALYSIS OF NAVAL BATTLES
The Attack on Pearl Harbour
11. TORA, TORA,TORA, which told the entire world that AMERICAN PACIFIC
FLEET HAS BEEN CAUGHT UNAWARE
12. It was dawn of December 07, 1941 the sun was just beginning to rise in Hawaii.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamotos surprise attack plan to the Pearl Harbour execution part was
under way. A fleet of 184 aircraft started taking off from six Japanese aircraft Carriers. Highover the Pacific, Imperial Naval aviators lining the centre of formation, triangle of High-level
bombers, Dive-bombers and Torpedo planes under the command of Cdr Fuchida winged
their way to the Hawaii islands.
13. US Pacific Naval base in Oahu, Hawaii was attacked by the Japanese when Army,
Navy and marines were totally unprepared to fight the attack. The surprise was such that
most of the service personnel were on leave. The attack promoted US to join the Allies in the
2nd world war. More than 2500 members of the US armed forces were killed and the large
part of US Pacific Fleet was destroyed or damaged. The attack on Pearl Harbour was the
beginning of pacific war. The success of Japanese attack on US Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour
was mainly attributed to the element of surprise.
14. At 1000 in little over two hours the attack on Pearl Harbour came to an abrupt end
after two successive wave of attack. The Japanese aircraft began returning to their carriers,
only twenty-nine aircraft failed to return. Commander Fuchida and Genda wanted to send a
third wave of aircraft to complete the destruction of the American Naval Base especially the
huge oil storage tanks. But Admiral Nagumo did not authorize further attacks. At 1300
AKAGI the command ship reversed course towards Japan and rest of the Task Force
followed.
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Analysis the Light of Principles of War
15. In the conduct of all military operations it is essential to select and clearly define the
aim. The whole art and science of the war depends upon the selection of right aim, correct
distribution of available resources and forces to achieve that aim. Admiral Yamamoto had
selected the aim to attack Pearl Harbour and cause maximum damage to the US Pacific fleet.
Once the planning was over, Japanese attacked the Pearl Harbour with full force and crippled
the US Fleet present there.
16. Their conviction and faith on the cause brought them 3500 miles away from home to
attack and destroy the enemy. This successful attack further boosted the morale of the
Japanese.
17. The security plays an important role in any military operation. The Japanese wereconscious about this aspect. They conducted extensive aerial exercises in the similar
conditions as of Hawaii in Japan to train the pilots and even these pilots did not know the
reasons of such rigorous exercises. The security of Japanese plan played a big contribution in
the Japanese success.
18. Adverse weather and thick fog assisted concealment. It is important to note that the
element of surprise and ability to refuel at sea en route were the most vital factors for success
of the overall attack plan. Pearl Harbour attack is the many tacticians refer to explain one of
the most vital elements of the principles of war Surprise. The powerful tool to win a war
and Japanese success during this attack was mainly due to the element of surprise. The
Japanese was maintained absolute radio silence to ensure the element of surprise. The
reminder of the Fleet had maintained flow of radio traffic in order to mislead the Americans
to believe that the Fleet is in home waters.
19. Conflicts demand a high degree of flexibility to ensure pre arranged plans to be
altered to meet changing situations. The Japanese were flexible in planning. They made three
alternate plans to attack on Pearl Harbour. The Force Commander was given the flexibility
to return back if the force is detected at any moment before attack.
20. The correct and skilful application of the other principles of war should lead logically
to the concentration of men, weapons, fire power and all resources to defeat the enemy at a
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selected place and time. The deployment of six aircraft carriers with all aircraft in order to
achieve the aim is a classic example of the principle of concentration of forces.
21. Sound administration is a pre requisite for the success of an operation. Logistic
considerations are often deciding factors in assessing the feasibility of an operation. Goodtraining, sound knowledge of equipment and belief on leader is the essential ingredients of
administration. An intensive training of aircrew in Torpedo attack, Dive and High level
bombing was carried out. Good administration is directly related to morale and to win a
battle.
Strategic Appraisal
22. The purpose of the attack on Pearl Harbour was to neutralize American naval power
in the Pacific. The Japanese wanted license to do as they pleased in the Pacific and Asia, andthought they could get this by eliminating American influence. Japan knew that American
naval power could not be neutralized indefinitely, but thought that by dealing it a heavy blow
at Pearl Harbour, the American Navy could be neutralized long enough for Japan to achieve
its objectives in Asia and the Pacific.
23. In terms of its strategic objectives the attack on Pearl Harbour was, in the short to
medium term, a unique and spectacular success which eclipsed the wildest dreams of its
planners and has few parallels in the military history of any era. For the next six months, the
United States Navy was unable to play any significant role in the Pacific War, and with the
US Pacific Fleet out of the picture, Japan was free to conquer South-East Asia, the entire
South West Pacific, and even extend its reach far into the Indian Ocean.
24. In the longer term, however, the Pearl Harbour attack was an unmitigated strategic
disaster for Japan. In the first place, the main Japanese target was the three American aircraft
carriers stationed in the Pacific, but these were not in Pearl harbour at the time of the attack
and escaped unharmed.
25. Furthermore, although the Japanese forces inexplicably did not consider them an
important target, the base also had large fuel oil storage facilities and a successful bombing
of them could not only have resulted in massive fires that could have devastated the base, but
it would also have crippled much of the Pacific Fleet by robbing them of a major fuel supply
and fuelling centre thousands of miles from the mainland.
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26. Most significantly of all, the Pearl Harbour attack galvanized a divided and half-
hearted nation into action as nothing else could have done overnight, it made the whole of
America utterly determined to defeat Japan, and it forever removed any question of a
negotiated.
27. On completion of successful attack to Pearl harbour, the mind of the Yamamotos
was uncertain and hoping retaliate attack from the US and its clear from his saying ,"I fear
we have awakened the sleeping giant, and filled him with a terrible resolve." - Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto, 8 Dec 1941
Battle of Java Sea
28. The Battle of Java Sea, fought by Cruisers against Cruisers was the one of biggest
surface engagement. The Japanese amphibious forces gathered to strike at Java, and on 27
February 1942, the main American-British-Dutch-Australian Command naval force, under
Admiral Doorman, sailed northeast from Surabaya to intercept a convoy of the Eastern
Invasion Force approaching from the Makassar Strait.
29. The Japanese task force protecting the convoy consist with two heavy and two light
cruisers and 14 destroyers including the 4th Destroyer Squadron engaged with the ABDA
force in the Java Sea, and the battle raged intermittently from mid-afternoon to midnight as
the Allies tried to reach and attack the troop transports of the Java invasion fleet, but they
were repulsed by superior firepower. The Battle of the Java Sea was a resounding victory for
the Japanese defeating unified command known as American-British-Dutch-Australian
(ABDA) Command. Japan invasion force successfully landed troops forty miles to the west
of Surabaya at Kragan. In the fighting, Dutch Admiral Doorman lost two light cruisers and
three destroyers, as well as one heavy cruiser badly damaged and around 2,300 killed.
Japanese losses numbered one destroyer badly damaged and another with moderate damage.
30. With the victorious Java with its oil wells was safely gone to the Japanese hands.Admiral Yamamoto now had enough fuel to fight as long as his ships could float.
31. In terms of its strategic objectives the battle of Java Sea was a unique and spectacular
success for the Japanese.
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Battle of the Coral Sea
32. The Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942 was the first naval battle fought entirely
between aircraft carriers in which no ship on either side sighted the enemy. The Coral Sea
bounded on one side by 1500 miles of the Great Barrier Reef of Australia and on the other
side by New Caledonia, the New Hebrides and the Louisiades.
33. Admiral Yamamoto rejected the traditional Japanese naval strategy of keeping the
fleet in home waters awaiting the enemy's arrival and the Japaneses plan was to advance
deeper into the Solomon Island to seize Tulagi coupled with capture of Port Moresby in
Papua, which would bring Queens land with in range of Japanese bombers and mastery of
Coral Sea. Followed by invasion of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa to isolate the Australia.
Then the combined Fleet under Admiral Yamamoto was to cross the Pacific to annihilate the
remains of American Fleet and capture of Midway Island including Western Aleutians. The
aim was to establish a ribbon defence anchored at Autto, Midway, Wake, Marshal and
Gilberts to bring the Americans to negotiation favourable for the Japanese.
34. The Battle taken place from 1st to 8th May 1942 and the out came of the battle was the
loss of American Carrier LEXINGTON and damage to the YORKTOWN. It had occurred at
a critical movement when it was known that another massive Japanese invasion was
imminent. For the Japanese the loss of SHOHO and damage of SHOKAKU along with the
Japanese losses in aircraft and expert aircrew were both more numerous and much more
difficult to replace. Therefore, both Japanese carriers were unable to take part in the battle of
Midway. Japanese aggression had received its first serious check as the Port Moresby
operation was abandoned and never attempted through the sea route again. In terms of
units lost it was a tactical victory for the Japanese but a strategic victory for the United
States.
Analysis in the light of principles of war
35. Japanese planners simultaneously tried two main objectives of occupying Port
Moresby and destroying the American pacific fleet .Centre of Gravity Talugi. Simultaneous
operations in all areas indicate a fundamental weakness. Had they engaged pacific fleet first,
Japanese would have succeeded. Moreover there were differences between Army and navy
on carrying out such type of operations.
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36. For carrying out this operation, Japanese had organised five separate naval groups.
Such strategy would have worked only in case of emasculate planning and well co-ordinate
actions. Which was lacking e.g. No help could be provided to Talugi Group by carrier force
when they were attacked upon on 04 May 1942. Similarly on 7th May, Port Moresby
invasion group was called back due to non availability of carrier strike force which was
operating separately. The tactical competence required for this operation was lacking.
37. Vice/Adm Inouye, Commander Fourth fleet could not exercise the control over his
forces divided in complex manner. He had virtually no operational control on 25 Air Flotilla
Commander at Rabaul. Similarly when ever needed carrier force was for away from actual
scene.
38. Japanese always tendered to divide their forces into numerous subgroups. Which cost
them strategic results. Due division of forces in various groups and each group having its
own tasks, these was no room left for flexibility in execution of their duties. A strict time
frame was thus necessary for every group. Moreover on highest ranks, no timely directions
were issued to relax this time limit.
39. Owing to two powerful instruments (MAGIC & RADAR) Allies exactly knew the
Japanese plans. Through RADAR, they were able to detect the opponents on long ranges.
Though unknown to them, breaking of codes did enormous damage to Japanese aim.
40. Japanese possessed high morale due to their victories in the preceding days. But
sinking of SHOHO changed the situation and they could not wage this battle for long time.
Battle of Midway
41. The Battle of Midway between 4th and 6th June 1942, a great naval battle took place
between the United States Pacific Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy about 180 miles (288
km) north-west of America's Midway Atoll. The two small islands that comprise Midway
Atoll are located 1,120 miles (1,800 km) north-west of Hawaii and 2,250 miles (3,620 km)
east of Japan. It continues to grip the imaginations of those interested in World War II. This
is true not just because it was the pivotal engagement of the Pacific theatre but also because it
was a battle the Americans should have lost, but instead won by one of the most lopsided
margins in naval history. The Japanese entered the battle with an overwhelming advantage in
ship-sinking firepower, but in the end they were soundly trounced. All four of their aircraft
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carriers were sunk, as against just one of the Americans. Most dramatically, three of the
Japanese carriers were destroyed in a span of just two minutes, and only minutes before those
carriers were to have launched their own attack against the American carrier fleet. On 4 June
1942, Japans offensive naval air power was virtually destroyed in a single battle, and what
little chance it ever had of winning the war in the Pacific went up in the smoke of its burning
carriers.
Analysis
42. Yamamoto's plan for Midway Island has been the subject of much criticism. When
analysis it is found that the Japanese made two high commandlevel mistakes that were lead
to blame for the Japanese disaster. The first was a massive failure of communication and the
second was rearming the torpedo planes.
Communication Failure
43. When Nagumo departed from Japan on 27 May, he and most of the Japanese naval
high command believed that the Americans were completely unaware of the Midway
operation and their carriers would probably be at Hawaii. He never knows that Yamato
intercepted on 29 May a transmission from an American submarine in the vicinity of the
Japanese transport group. Yamamoto had not passed any of this vital information on to
Nagumo, because he had decided on a policy of strict radio silence, he assumed that Akagi
had picked up the same transmissions he had been receiving on Yamato.
44. By 2 June (1 June in Hawaii) even the Naval General Staff in Tokyo, in an about-
face, had come to the conclusion that the Americans had discovered the Midway operation
and might be sending carriers to ambush Nagumos Mobile Force. It sent that intelligence in
an urgent radio message addressed to both Yamamoto and Nagumo. Yamamoto received this
warning, but Nagumo did not. Yamamoto was inclined to relay it to Nagumo but Yamamoto
assumed that it received by Nagumo and he maintained radio silence. Thus, three days before
the attack on Midway it seems that almost everyone in the Japanese naval high command
suspected that American carriers might be at Midway, everyone except Nagumo.
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Admiral Nagumoss rearming the torpedo planes dilemma
45. The American naval presence in the Midway area had been discovered by a Japanese
search planethe infamous "Tone 4"on the morning of 4 June, at 0728, almost three hours
before the fatal bombing at 1025 by American dive-bombers from the carriers Enterprise and
Yorktown. Before the American fleet was discovered, Nagumo had ordered the rearming of
his torpedo planes and dive-bombers for a second strike on Midway. The planes were struck
below to the hangar decks, the torpedo planes (on Akagi and Kaga) were to be reloaded with
eight-hundred-kilogram land-type bombs in place of torpedoes, and the dive-bombers (on
Hiryu and Soryu) with 242-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation bombs instead of 250-
kilogram, armour-piercing anti-ship bombs.
46. The rearming of the torpedo planes with land-attack bombs contravened a standing
order by Yamamoto that half of the torpedo planes in Nagumos Mobile Force were always
to be fitted with torpedoes, on standby in the event an American carrier fleet showed up at
Midway. When analyse if the absence of those planes, loaded with fuel and ordnance, from
the flight decks of the carriers at 1025 would have greatly reduced the damage inflicted on
them by the American dive-bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown.
Analysis in the light of principles of war
47. Keeping these in view the Battle of Midway will now be analyzed in the light of
Principles of war.
Selection and maintenance of aim
48. Admiral Yamamoto had selected 2 aims to be achieved at the same time i.e., to
destroy the US Pacific fleet and to attack and seize the Midway Islands. The plan was a
contradiction in terms since its conception. The major flaws in the plan were:
a. To seize an Island, a strict time-line has to be made. However while seeking
to destroy mobile fleets in the vastness of oceans; the time-lines are usually flexible.
b. To take an island, a fleet can sit around and surround it. To destroy the last
remnants of a fleet, one has to physically go after it and move around. The plan
required one fleet to do 2 jobs, for which it could do neither at full capacity. Thus the
aims selected were unsustainable and could not be maintained.
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Surprise and Security
49. The breaking of Japans General Purpose code JN-25 prior to the commencement of
war provided the Americans with the ability to plan the battle with complete knowledge of
what was about to happen. Due to this weakness of security in Japanese plan, the surprise
factor shifted from Japan to America. Since surprise was a key factor in Yamamotos plan,
his plan was already falling apart and allowed Americans to catch the Japanese at their
weakest moment.
50. The surprise was also nearly impossible on American carriers since they were
equipped with radar for search and tracking. However the only two radars on Japanese ships
were on battle ships far away from its carriers. Furthermore Japanese Reconnaissance was
poor and at times non-existent.
Morale
51. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour served as a great morale booster for theJapanese troops. Although the aim of destroying the carriers was not achieved, yet the
pacific appeared like a large lake to the Japanese now.
Concentration of forces
52. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was
overly complex. The first and the foremost mistake of Japanese was the decision to leave
behind 2 carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku. Their added strength would have been a great help
at Midway. This additional power might have completely overwhelmed the American
Forces. Another contingency that led to Japans loss was the wrong disposition of her forces.
The battle ships were far behind the carrier force. If Yamamoto had kept his forces together,
he would have easily achieved numerical superiority over the US forces, or at least had a
better chance of defeating them by increased Anti Air protection of carriers through the
battleships that also had a massive long-range firepower capability.
53. The second problem with the disposition was the fact that in the main force all his
carriers were together, creating the problem that when one was found then all the carrierswere found presenting an easy target and hard to protect against an attack of concentrated
force. And also the distance between the dispositions of Japanese forces made it difficult to
react according to the requirement of the situation, which demanded a high degree of co-
ordination.
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Flexibility
54. According to Murphys Law, Anything that can go wrong; will. This is exactly
what happened to Japan. The battle was a series of continually wrong decisions. A complex
and contradictory plan was conceived by an over-confident nation. No thought was put forth
as to what might go wrong, for they believed nothing could or would go wrong. If the
Japanese had been prepared for all what-ifs instead of their probably and most-likely,
they could have foreseen all possible problems. Due to this lack of flexibility, the Japanese
made rash decisions, which were not planned for in advance and resulted in a total loss for
Japan.
Battle of Guadalcanal
55. Guadalcanal is part of the Solomon Islands which lie to the north-eastern approaches
of Australia. Though it is a humid and jungle-covered tropical island its position made it
strategically important for both sides in the Pacific War. If the Japanese captured the island,
they could cut off the sea route between Australia and America. If the Americans controlled
the island, they would be better able to protect Australia from Japanese invasion and they
could also protect the Allied build-up in Australia that would act as a springboard for a major
assault on the Japanese.
56. Being the Guadalcanal was that advanced base, Admiral Yamamoto commanded the
numerous attempts to reinforce the Japanese soldiers on Guadalcanal and New Guinea. The
results of these efforts only resulted in marginal success.
57. Yamamotos Combined Fleets ships met American naval forces in two great carrier
battles during the battles for Guadalcanal the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and the Battle
of the Santa Cruz Islands and inflicted some heavy damage on the American carriers. The
Americans lost the Hornet at Santa Cruz and the Wasp to the torpedoes of a Japanese
submarine. The Enterprise sustained heavy damage and had to retreat to Pearl Harbour for
repairs. Meanwhile, Japanese cruisers and destroyers sank several American cruisers at the
Battle of Savo Island, the Battle of Cape Esperance, the first night of the Naval Battle of
Guadalcanal, and the Battle of Rennell Island.
58. The Japanese lost two battleships, the Hiei and Kirishima, one light carrier Ryujo and
several cruisers and destroyers. While the Americans lost more ships, the Japanese suffered
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strategic defeats at each of the naval battles they fought against the Americans because they
failed to land enough men and materiel to help their soldiers defeat the American Marines
and soldiers on Guadalcanal. In addition, the losses among Japanese were even more
appalling.
59. The situation became so severe such that many Japanese soldiers almost starved to
death. The Japanese had to abandon their attempts to retake Guadalcanal and concentrate
their efforts against MacArthur on New Guinea. The last surviving Japanese soldier left
Guadalcanal on February 8, 1942. The Americans had full control of Guadalcanal and its
valuable airfields on the next day.
LEADERSHIP APPRAISAL
60. Leadership is defined as, inspiring and directing forces and resources toward a
purposeful end; establishing a teamwork climate that engenders success providing the vision
that both focuses and anticipates the future course of events.
61. Admiral Yamamoto was a leader of strict principle and mostly authoritarian. He
always remained strict to his plan at any cost. Despite his personal oppositions, he planned
the attack on Pearl Harbour and executed the same with grand success.
62. As a commander he sometimes gave liberty to his under command to make decision
in a particular situation. When the question arose, whether there would be a second wave of
air attack on Pearl Harbour to destroy the shore installations, he left it to be decided by his
Force Commander Nagumo. Unfortunately Nagumo did not attack for the second time,
which ultimately gave Americans enough scope to recover.
Professional Competence
64. The knowledge will strengthen the confidence of the leader. Knowledge makes
confident leaders as well as confident subordinates. Admiral Yamamotos professional
competence was of high reputation. In fact, his professional capability was indispensable for
Japan.
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65. He was elected to the Japanese naval academy and was honoured distinguished
graduation when he was just 22 years. Having visited and studied at the US Naval War
College, Harvard University and the exposure he had as naval attach in the USA made him
well matured diplomat which also gave the confidence to fight against the USA afterwards.
His background knowledge gave him a great ideology about aircraft carriers. The
subordinates of Yamamoto believed and respected him for his professional ability.
Yamamoto was able to launch one of the worlds modern and strongest naval fleet by the end
of 1930.
63. In April of 1919, Yamamoto began two years of study at Harvard University, where
he concentrated on the oil industrythe lifeblood of any modern navy. Returning with the
rank of commander in July of 1921, he was appointed instructor at the prestigious naval staff
college in Tokyo.
64. His professional competence was based on historical, operational and organisational
perspective. As a young man of twenty, he bravely fought at Tsushima against the Russians
and gained experience in naval battles. He studied the lessons of the First World War with
great care. While in America he pursued his interest in naval policy making. He studied naval
warfare painstakingly, visiting various installations and devoting every moment to his
studies.
65. Admiral Yamamoto became one of the Japans leading theorists on the military
applications of aviation. Even the Americans continued to respect his reputation as the first
great practitioner of air-sea warfare.
67. Admiral Yamamotos professional ability and military contributions to his country
were considerable. His emphasis on aircraft and aircraft carries showed real foresight to the
future naval warfare. He had remarkable technical knowledge and was appointed as the Chief
of the Technical Division of Naval Air Crops. He insisted on torpedo bombers and long
range bombers and most of all he demanded a fast carrier borne fighter plane. His emphasis
on torpedo aircraft proved to be fully justified at Pearl Harbour by demonstrating that they
were the real striking power of modern fleet while the fighter plane was the primary defence.
His deployment of the carrier task forces showed remarkable imagination.
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Ethics
66. Yamamoto was firm in professional beliefs. He was always straightforward and bold
in his opinion, even if his superiors did not like it. He was a man who hated pomposity.
When Prime Minister Konoye asked Yamamoto, what chances Japan had in a war againstBritain and America. He with his usual directness replied If we are told to fight, regardless
of consequences, we can run wild for 6 months or a year but after that I have utterly no
confidence. I hope you will try to avoid war with America. Contrary to his opinion on war
against the US, when ordered to do so, he planned, organised and executed the attack on
Pearl harbour with unprecedented vigour.
67. Yamamoto was a successful role model in his organisation. Even as a senior
commander, he received training for several hours everyday to learn flying. The flyers used
to love him for his unparalleled interest in naval aviation.
Motivation
69. He used to motivate his under command by rewarding intrinsically. When numerous
accidents and casualties evoked frustration amongst the flyers, Yamamoto said, .... I regard
death in training as a heros death. Not only that, Yamamoto listed the names of dead-pilots
which was compulsorily saluted by all. This unprecedented respect and honour shown to
colleagues inspired the pilots.
70. In April 1943, he planned a risky visit to motivate his troops in the northern part of
Solomon Island despite Commander in Chief, Rear Adm Joshimas warning, not to undertake
the visit. But he did not care such suggestion and during the flight his aircraft was shot down
by Americans fighters. His concern for subordinates struck the hearts of every sailor and
each was ready to die for him. His leadership touched even the lowest ranks of the navy.
Will Power
71. He had tremendous strength of will power which made him distinct from other
leaders. He was injured in the first battle that he participated and lost two of his fingers. But
that could not stop perusing him from achieving mastery in naval warfare. His defeat in the
battle of midway did not stop him to prepare for further blow to the enemy. He was
optimistic and proactive with his plans and strength.
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72. During the Russo-Japanese War Yamamoto was onboard cruiser Nisshin, On 27 May
1905, in the battle of Tsushima Strait his ship was struck by Russian shells. He wrote home,
I realised no fear when the shells began to fly around me, damaging the ship and killing
many men. At 1850 hours a shell hit Nisshin and knocked me unconscious. I was wounded in
the right leg and two fingers of my left hand were blown away. The Russian ships were
utterly defeated, and their dead bodies littered over the sea. When victory was announced at
0200 next day, even the wounded cheered. This is one of the many evidences to prove the
will power of Yamamoto to dominate the events in war.
Organizational Vision
73. Admiral Yamamoto was a very good organiser. With rigorous studies and enormous
experience he could determine the threats to Japan correctly. Once decided to launch
offensive against the US, he could correctly assess the main US naval air power at Pearl
harbour, as his first assignment. Launching attack against Pearl harbour was unthinkable for
Japanese Force. He reorganised the existing set-up and redrawn the battle tactics, where the
battle would be conducted centring aircraft carrier. In fact, he was the inventor of carrier
battle concept. The Japanese doctrine was to use the carriers to provide an air umbrella for
battleship force. But Yamamoto changed the tactics. He used the carriers to project firepower
deep into enemy territory.
74. He also opposed the traditional Japanese strategy of keeping the fleet in home waters
and wait for the enemys arrival, which was actually a defensive concept. His concept was to
send submarines, torpedo bombers and even aircraft carriers ahead of the main force to fight
enemy. If the enemy was not defeated, then final offensive was launched from battleship
waiting in the home waters.
75. Though his organisational vision was wider but his intelligence network was
inadequate. For that, he missed his first target at Pearl Harbour and his force was defeated in
Midway. He failed to take right action in Guadalcanal, where he planned to capture theislands part by part. Thereby he divided his force in a number of small groups, which
ultimately weakened him everywhere and strong in nowhere. This gave the US Force easy
chance to defeat him.
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76. He used to communicate his concepts to his subordinates through personal contacts in
the form of conference, written orders and meetings. He mostly used personal contact as his
craft to communicate and implement his plans and missions. He often used special aircraft
for his command, control and communication purpose.
Command Climate
77. As a commander, Yamamoto was successful. His planning was always centralised but
the execution was decentralised. He was successful in Pearl Harbour, Sumatra, Java, Borneo,
etc but miserably failed in Midway and Guadalcanal. He used to supervise the activities of
his under command personally and directly, which was not always required to be done by a
personality like him. His visit to Solomon Islands was not that important under the prevailing
situation. But due to his over enthusiastic attitude, he did it and ultimately he had to pay with
his life.
78. He was very meticulous in maintaining time. He was never late anywhere. He used to
keep strict accountability of his men and material. He was sensitive about anything said
against his nation.
79. He undertook number of risks as a valiant hero. Pearl Harbour itself was a risk. But
sometimes, he was over confidant about his plan and success, ignoring his limitation in
intelligence net work. And he was ready to accept the failures of his subordinates.
Innovation
85. Admiral Yamamoto was a very innovative character and showed that quality in many
instances which were instrumental to series of victories.
86. In 1930 Yamamoto took command of the 1st Air Fleet and the following year was
promoted to rear admiral incharge of the navy's technical service. Yamamoto, who had learnt
to fly, became convinced that future wars would be decided by air power and embarked on a
massive new building programme.
87. In office, he did the expected, promoted the development of aircraft carriers. At the
same time, he opposed the construction of new battleships, claiming that they could be sunk
by torpedo planes. Yamamoto quoted an old Japanese proverb, "The fiercest serpent may be
overcome by a swarm of ants," then elaborated: "These ships are like elaborate religious
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scrolls which old people hung up in their homes. They are of no proved worth. They are
purely a matter of faithnot reality."
88. In 1934 the Japanese built around 445 aircraft. This increased to 952 (1935), 1,181
(1936), 1,511 (1937), 3,201 (1938), 4,467 (1939) and 4,768 (1940). This included fighters,torpedo-bombers and dive-bombers. The most important of these were the fighters
Mitsubishi A5M, Nakajima Ki-27, and the Mitsubishi A6M and the bombers Mitsubishi ki-
21 and Mitsubishi G3M.
Courage
89. While in office, he took several courageous stands. He opposed army desires for an
alliance with Germany, fearing that such an agreement would lead to war with the United
States and Britain, the world's two strongest naval powers, and possibly the Soviet Union.Moreover, he noted, the Imperial Navy and indeed the entire Japanese economy depended on
imports of raw materials from the United States. In 1937, he opposed Japan's invasion of
China when Japanese planes bombed the U.S. gunboat Panay, cruising China's Yangtse
River. Three Americans were killed, and 43 were injured. Yamamoto personally apologized
to U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, saying, "The Navy can only hang its head."
90. Such views made Yamamoto unpopular and became a target for extremist attacks.
The atmosphere became so hostile that tanks and machine guns were installed in the Navy
Ministry. Supposedly, extreme rightists offered 100,000 yen as reward for his assassination.
Bearing
91. A man short even by Japanese standards (five feet three inches), with broad shoulders
accentuated by massive epaulets and a thick chest crowded with orders and medals. But a
strong, commanding face dominates and subdues all the trappings. The angular jaw slants
sharply to an emphatic chin. The lips are full, clean-cut, under a straight, prominent nose; the
large, well-spaced eyes, their expression at once direct and veiled, harbour potentialamusement or the quick threat of thunder.
Imagination
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92. Yamamoto is generally regarded as one of the most prominent leaders in the Japanese
Navy for making significant changes to its organization, although he was also responsible for
several critical defeats. Yamamoto is considered as an imaginative leader.
93. Admiral Yamamoto possessed high intelligence and a strong will to achieve what heset out to accomplish and possessed strategic vision, and credited as the catalyst for
transformation of his organization. He foresaw the evolving nature of the strategic threat to
his country and developed innovative concepts for the organization to adapt to and remain
relevant. Admiral Yamamoto was a fierce proponent for converting the navy from a
battleship focused fleet to an aircraft carrier focused fleet. He based his concept on initial
observations he made as a student at Harvard, during World War I, and continued to refine it
throughout his career. When he was Vice Minister of the Japanese Navy, Admiral Yamamotoargued with members of the Naval Staff that, in modern warfare battleships would be as
useful as a samurai sword.
COMPARISON WITH CONTEMPORARY LEADER
ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ
93. Admiral Nimitz participated 1st world war as a submariner but no eventful
performance was recorded. In WW II in between 1941 to 1945 as C-in-C of Pacific Fleet, he
could achieve a series of victories.
94. Admiral Nimitz, did include his subordinate commanders in the planning process. He
called his Task Force commanders, their staffs, intelligence and operations officers together
with his staff to plan. Included were Rear Admirals Fletcher, Spruance and Commander
Layton (Intelligence). Admiral Nimitz shared information and took suggestions from
subordinates to heart. The plan became theirs;he increased their loyalty and motivation level
through this process. Unity of purpose and effort were established and the mission, both tasks
and purpose were clear, opening the path for success.
95. Admiral Yamamoto's planning process neither applied Sun Tzu's advice nor did it
incorporate a team approach in planning. Two of his fleet commanders, Vice Admiral Kondo
and Vice Admiral Nagumo, were not included at all during the planning. Since both were
involved in other operations, Admiral Yamamoto did not want to distract them. As a result,
staff members, who did not have firsthand knowledge of the capabilities of these forces, drew
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up the plans. The resulting weaknesses were apparent even before the operation began.
Yamamoto called together his subordinate commanders at the Battleship Yamatoon 1st
May
1942 for a briefing. This was the first time that Admiral Nagumo and Kondo were exposed to
the plan and each saw serious problems with it, but Yamamoto was not open to discussion.
He told Kondo that the plan was credible since it was written by senior staff officers and he
had no intentions of changing it. That same day, a major war game began during which
several other flaws in the plan came to light. Yamamoto overlooked these flaws since
officially his plan won, Thus, Yamamoto did not build a team, establish unity and inspire
subordinates, nor did he realistically view the situation in developing his plan. Although his
commanders understood what tasks were assigned, and understood that the U.S. carriers were
the center of gravity, the plan left some serious unanswered questions.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamotos failure to defeat the U.S. Pacific Fleet during the battle
of Midway was the event that precipitated the eventual defeat of the Japanese Combined
Fleet in the Pacific theater during World War II. Fresh off a resounding victory over the U.S.
Navy at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto was very near achieving complete dominance in
the Pacific as well as validating to his detractors the preeminence of his carriers as the
decisive weapon in naval warfare. All he needed to do, was find and finish the U.S. Pacific
Fleets carriers. Sailing boldly into the Central Pacific Ocean with the most powerful fleet
known to man, Admiral Yamamoto found the U.S. carriers, but instead of destroying them,
the strength of his Combined Fleet - four fast carriers - were sent to the bottom of the Central
Pacific Ocean and the Japanese Navy was never again capable of a strategic offensive.
Leadership faults and traits are observable and are likely to be imitated bysubordinates. This is what happened to Admiral Yamamotos Combined Fleet Staff whenthey assembled to conduct the pre-Midway war-game. According to Parshall and Tully,
instead of using the war games as an analytic tool to validate assumptions and test thevalidity of the operational design, Admiral Yamamoto and his staff treated this important
event as merely a pro forma step they must complete before setting sail
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LESSONS LEARNT
96. In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great
Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after
that, I have no expectation of success Admiral Yamamoto in an interview with ShigeharuMatsmoto.
97. Having lived and studied previously in the United States, Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto
of the Imperial Japanese Navy was not eager to enter into war with that country. Ordered into
combat by his country, Admiral Yamamoto was the most reluctant of warriors who seemed
to know that it was his destiny to fight and die for his Emperor in a lost cause.
98. One of the great advantages that the United States enjoyed in its war with Japan was
the cracking of the Japanese code. This gave the U.S advanced warning of impending
Japanese operations. One such operation was a visit by Admiral Yamamoto to the Japanese
base on Bougainvillea. Allied intelligence intercepted and decoded a message describing the
visit, and the 13th
Air force decided to welcome him. Even the highest ranking American
military commanders felt that to give a direct order to assassinate an enemy commander was
above them, and the day after the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo, 18 American P-38s from the Air
force launched from Guadalcanal, flew to Bougainvillea, found the Admirals flight , and
shot down his plane killing him. That was an end of Japanese Nelson Admiral Isoruku
Yamamoto.
99. It is necessary to select and define the aims clearly in the conduct of war as a whole,
and in each military operation bearing the superior authoritys intention in mind. Though the,
Battle of Midway was a failure due to the lack of security in communication; mainly it was a
not availability of combat support services and the functions of combat. However Admiral
Yamamotos aim was very definite.
100. Achieving Surprise in battle has won many wars for great military leaders includingAdmiral Isoruku Yamamoto. So did Admiral Yamamoto in 1941 directing his entire first
fleet at Pearl harbour, where his enemy was unprepared and disorganized. So he could
achieve the trump of surprise against the enemy.
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101. Admiral Yamamotos character edifies the effectiveness of the Concentration of
Force if it timely adopted. The ideal example again was from the attack on Pearl harbour. It
was a gigantic harmonized attack with around 350 planes launched from six aircraft carriers
of the United States to suffer their greatest naval defeat.
102. He could achieve the security of his forces and resources, but not the Economy of
Effort especially in the attack on Pearl harbour, since the US Carrier Fleet was out of the
harbour. The effort he made with his forces would have been very economical; provided that
he could destroy US carrier fleet and oil storage facility in Hawaii concurrently forcing the
US Navy in dire straits for a considerable period than he achieved.
103. Sun Tzu said, If you only know yourself, not the enemy; the chances of winning and
loosing the war are equal. It was proved in the battle of Midway. The importance of having
accurate and up-to-date intelligence of the enemy for the success of operation; and the
disastrous effects it may cause on own forces for not having the same was also proved.
104. However, Admiral Yamamoto failed to maintain the communication security during
Midway Operation. Neglecting one of the most important Principles of War that is
Security, made him to face the greatest naval defeat of Japan, and his untimely death at the
hand of his foe, Americans.
105. Good communication between the commander and the subordinate is of paramount
important; whether they take the form of a verbal message, a letter, or a signal. The crucial
requirement is that the recipient must clearly understand the commanders intent. There must
be no room for misinterpretation. Failure to maintain good communication with Admiral
Nagumo during Pearl Harbour attack resulted Nagumo to withdraw without a second
successive strike. A similar communication lapse was also experienced during the Midway
Operation. Battle plan was very complicated, and almost the entire Fleet hastily convened
constituted own forces. But Commanding Officers had not been briefed thoroughly. No one
knew what to do in an eventuality, or when plan went wrong.
106. Selecting personnel with professional ability and expertise are as Subordinate
Commanders a battle winning factor in the concept of Mission Command. Admiral
Nagumo was an Anti-Submarine Warfare specialised officer, who could not comprehend the
evolving battle of aircraft, and Carrier Based Operations.
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107. In establishing the grand strategy, a country needs to consider its own goals, the likely
reactions of other countries, own economic weaknesses, and developments in international
affairs. She also needs to take into account of the strategic goals of both her potential
enemies and potential allies. Japans expansionist politics can be traced back at least till
1895, when she seized (Formosa) Taiwan. In 1931 she invaded Manchuria, and in 1937
attacked China. These and other conquests alarmed the Western powers, notably the US, who
imposed an embargo on the export of certain manufactured goods and oil to Japan. By mid
1941, Japan realised that they must either withdraw from the lands they had conquered to
prevent US interference, or go to war. Japanese authorities failed to understand those
issues, and ensured that the latter would be chosen. The ultimate result was her surrender on
2nd
September 1945, following the atomic air raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Lesson Learnt From Attacking Pearl Harbour
108. Lets see what lessons are to be learnt from this battle.
a. Operational and intelligence works require centralization of authority and
clear-cut allocation of responsibilities.
b. Supervisory officials cant safely take anything for granted in the alerting of
subordinates.
c. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always
be resolved in favour of supplying the information.
d. The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the duty of
inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised.
e. The implementation of official orders must be followed with closet
supervision.
f. The maintenance of alertness towards responsibility must be insured through
repetition.
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g. Complacency and procrastination are not out of place where sudden and
decisive actions are of the essence.
h. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must
be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competentofficials.
j. There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of
supervisory and intelligence officials.
k. Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness and
appropriateness.
l. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigency of unusualsituations.
m. Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of
officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the
work of the organization.
n. There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident.
109. If we could only learn lessons from such campaigns, we would be able to avoid
disasters like pearl harbour and at the same time conduct operations like pearl harbour.
Lessons Learnt from Battle of Coral Sea
110. Foregoing analysis of this war brings out the following lessons:
a. It is must that to conduct a coordinated operation a well-netted command and
control structure as well as inter-Services harmony is required.
b. Training is the most vital ingredient of a good fighting force. Operational
training of all personnel including the force commanders is of significance
importance.
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c. Quality is not the quantity of forces counts in Naval War.
d. A comprehensive surveillance and security system is essential to avoid a
surprise attack from the enemy.
e. The carrier operations proved that ship borne air operations had come of ages.
The aircraft had not become the main strike weapon of the navies.
f. The Battle of the Coral Sea dispelled any doubt what so ever that battleships
can never be the capital units and the carrier become synonymous with sea power.
g. The importance of SLOCs still holds good today.
h. The centre of gravity must to safe guarded because from it is drawn the will to
fight.
j. While the Japanese intended to be on the offensive in order to strike the first
blow, the Americans planned to be on the defensive and retaliate if attacked.
k. Control of air is essential for the success of the operation. But it is not the full
of victory.
Lesson Learnt from Battle of Midway
111. Following lessons can be drawn from the Battle of Midway:
a. The singleness of the aim is a vital factor.
b. The security of information is very important to win or loose a war.
c. It is essential to concentrate forces against the enemy at correct time and
space.
d. The air element is a dominant factor in the naval warfare and air power is a
real force multiplier in modern warfare.
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e. Positive control and coordination is a key to success. The commander should
be able to exercise a positive control over his battle field elements during the
operations.
f. Effective surveillance is of immense importance to get early warning anddeny enemy the surprise.
g. The enemy should never to be under estimated. Nothing can be more
dangerous than Victory Disease.
h. Correctly deployed submarines can help to attain the aim. However, correct
estimates/intelligence has to be available for fruitful deployment of this potent
weapon. As in case of this was neither side could utilize submarines.
j. Superiority in numbers does not automatically mean victory. There are
numerous intangible factors which can play pivotal role in victory or defeat.
112. Entire picture is continuously winning wars might be over estimated own forces and
their capabilities and would not be known about the enemy and their capabilities have been
ended up every one of Japanese people and resources.
CONCLUSION
113. Admiral Yamamoto through out his younger period, learning from his father and
mother were contributed shaping his stronger character. Yamamoto in the spirit of the
Samurai always displayed high level of honour, loyalty and dedication. His education in US
during the teenage years made him stronger in vision and knowledge from which he could
enhance his states. It enables him to influence the development and advancement of carrier
based operations. After induction of Carrier fleet in Pearl Harbour attack, It is understood
that no one could maintain the ability to dominate the sea without a Carrier Force.
114. Admiral Yamamoto also realized that a decisive battle would be needed to win the
war for Japan, and after Doolittles Raid on Tokyo, advanced the attack plans for Midway.
He established a massive force which consisted of over 130 Japanese ships to combat the
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United States naval operations in the Pacific. However, after the loss of the battle, Yamamoto
told his council that he didnt want anyone blaming the loss on the submarine force or the
navy, because the loss was Yamamotos fault, and his alone.
115. While during the Solomon Islands campaign, Admiral Isoroku Yamamotos Betty bomber was ambushed by a squadron of P-38 Lightning fighter aircraft over Bougainville.
These aircraft were sent after intercepting a Japanese coded transmission which revealed that
Yamamoto would be on an inspection tour of forward air bases. All aboard the two Betty
bombers were killed.
116. Admiral Yamamotos death was a tragic blow to Japanese morale. Many commanders
felt that they had lost Japans greatest naval figure in the Pacific War. Yamamoto's remains
were cremated at Buin and his ashes were returned to Japan on his last flagship, the
battleship 'Musashi'. Yamamoto was posthumously promoted to the highest rank of Fleet
Admiral.