dr. beth lautner - vs fmd strategy
DESCRIPTION
VS FMD Strategy - Beth Lautner, DVM MS, USDA, APHIS, VS, from the 2014 NIAA Annual Conference titled 'The Precautionary Principle: How Agriculture Will Thrive', March 31 - April 2, 2014, Omaha, NE, USA. More presentations at http://www.trufflemedia.com/agmedia/conference/2014_niaa_how_animal_agriculture_will_thriveTRANSCRIPT
Safeguarding Animal Health
National Institute for Animal AgricultureApril 1, 2014
Beth Lautner, DVM, MSAssociate Deputy Administrator, Science, Technology and Analysis Services
Veterinary ServicesAnimal and Plant Health Inspection Service
U.S. Department of Agriculture
Veterinary Services Foot-and-Mouth Disease Strategies
Safeguarding Animal Health
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Virus Biology
• Picornavirus family, Apthovirus genus
• 7 serotypes: A, O, C, Asia 1, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3
• Multiple topotypes (substrains tied to geographical region) within each serotype
Safeguarding Animal Health
Presumptive FMD Prevalence
Safeguarding Animal Health 4
FMD Serotype Distribution
Recommendations from WRLFMD strains to be included in FMDV antigen bank
HIGH PRIORITYO Manisa O PanAsia-2O BFS or CamposA24 CruzeiroAsia 1 ShamirA Iran-05 (or A TUR 06)A22 IraqSAT 2 Saudi Arabia (or equivalent i.e. SAT 2 Eritrea)
MEDIUM PRIORITYA Eritrea SAT 2 ZimbabweSAT 1 South AfricaA Malaysia 97 (or Thai equivalent such as A/NPT/TAI/86)A Argentina 2001O Taiwan 97 (pig-adapted strain or Philippine equivalent)
LOW PRIORITY A Iran ’96A Iran ’99A Iran 87 or A Saudi Arabia 23/86 (or equivalent)A15 Bangkok related strainA87 Argentina related strainC NovilleSAT 2 KenyaSAT 1 KenyaSAT 3 Zimbabwe
Safeguarding Animal Health
6 TYPES OF FMD OUTBREAKS
Safeguarding Animal Health
APHIS FMD Response Goals
7
The goals of an FMD response are to:
(1) detect, control, and contain FMD in animals as quickly as possible;
(2) eradicate FMD using strategies that stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and protect public health and the environment; and
(3) provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.
FMD Response Strategies
9
FMD response strategies—strategies are not mutually exclusive: Stamping-out Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to
kill Stamping out modified with emergency vaccination to
slaughter Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to
live Combination of options Vaccination to live without stamping-out
Safeguarding Animal Health
Challenges to Stamping-Out Only Strategies
Huge herds, highly concentrated
Mobility of animals/products
Safeguarding Animal Health
Depopulation & Disposal Challenges
Captive bolting• Labor intensive• Slow
Gunshot• Accessible• Expensive• Safety issues
Rendering• Preferred• Capacity
issues• Logistics
issues
Unlined Burial• Polluting• Long-term
environmental impact
Safeguarding Animal Health
Develop a Balanced Response Strategy
Control Outbreak
Protect Environment
Minimize Waste
Limit Economic Losses
Maintain Food Supply
Sustain Commerce
Safeguarding Animal Health
Continuity of Business Planning
• Secure Milk Supply: for milk and milk movement in an FMD outbreak, to avoid and mitigate interruptions in movement.
• Secure Pork Supply: for swine and pork products, to avoid and mitigate interruptions in movement.
Safeguarding Animal Health
FMD Response Capabilities
Secure Food Supply Plans
NAHERCNational Animal Health Emergency Response Corps
Safeguarding Animal Health
National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS)
Safeguarding Animal Health
Current Deployable Capabilities
• 24 Hour Push Packs of PPE and decon supplies
• PPE individual kits• Antiviral medications• Vaccine • Poultry depopulation
foaming units, CO2 carts
• Mobile refrigeration/ vaccine storage & transport systems
• Animal handling equipment
• Response support services
17
Iowa Outbreak: One Infected County
Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink) 14,933 66,515 3,893 404
Buffer Zone (blue) 143,866 1,860,968 20,107 2,525
Total 158,799 1,927,483 24,000 2,929
Total livestock affected: 2,110,282
Data: NASS, 2007
18
Iowa Outbreak: Three Infected Counties
Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink) 63,548 240,484 8,067 1,025
Buffer Zone (blue) 463,637 3,534,164 32,844 6,245
Total 527,185 3,774,648 40,911 7,270
Total livestock affected: 4,342,744
Data: NASS, 2007
19
Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties
Data: NASS, 2007
Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink) 181,106 1,567,560 18,690 3,108
Buffer Zone (blue) 1,927,955 11,423,618 133,979 23,723
Total 2,109,061 12,991,178 152,669 26,831
Total livestock affected: 15,252,908
20
Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties and Vaccination Zone
Data: NASS, 2007
Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink) 181,106 1,567,560 18,690 3,108
Buffer Zone (blue) 1,927,955 11,423,618 133,979 23,723
Vaccination Zone (yellow)
1,873,283 6,225,637 101,501 19,698
Total 3,982,344 19,216,815 254,170 43,799
Total livestock affected: 23,453,329
21
California Outbreak: One Infected County
Where Bovine Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink) 1,071,956 71,210 1,159
Buffer Zone (blue) 1,141,028 181,818 2,362
Total 2,212,984 253,028 3,521
Total cattle, sheep, and goats affected: 2,466,012Data: NASS, 2007Complete county-level swine data for California is not available.
22
California Outbreak: Five Infected Counties
Where Bovine Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink)
3,029,931 183,321 5,675
Buffer Zone (blue) 1,188,938 236,568 7,061
Total 4,218,869 420,389 12,736
Total cattle, sheep, and goats affected: 4,639,258
Data: NASS, 2007Complete county-level swine data for California is not available.
23
Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Approximately Three Infected Counties
Where Bovine Swine* Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink) 900,654 1,336,881 1,236 564
Buffer Zone (blue) 3,494,672 865 18,816 4,091
Total 4,395,326 1,337,746 20,052 4,655
Total livestock affected: 5,753,124
Data: NASS, 2007*Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated.
24
Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Six Infected Counties
Data: NASS, 2007*Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated.
Where Bovine Swine* Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink) 1,516,259 1,337,157 4,569 1,633
Buffer Zone (blue) 7,549,474 146,615 39,783 12,268
Total 9,065,733 1,483,772 44,352 13,901
Total livestock affected: 10,593,857
25
Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Twelve Infected Counties
Data: NASS, 2007*Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated.
Where Bovine Swine* Sheep/Goats Operations
Infected Zone (pink) 2,180,236 1,476,783 14,873 3,120
Buffer Zone (blue) 12,713,422 1,322,642 97,648 31,298
Total 14,893,658 2,799,425 112,521 34,418
Total livestock affected: 17,805,604
Safeguarding Animal Health
The Complexities of FMD Vaccine Planning
• 7 serotypes: A, O, C, Asia 1, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3• Multiple topotypes within each serotype• Topotypes within serotype ± cross-reactive• Most vaccine inactivated (killed)• Molecular vaccines in development (Genvec)• Two categories:
• Emergency Vaccine - ≥ 6 PD50
• Commercial Vaccine - ≥ 3 PD50
• Emergency vaccine stored as concentrate• Commercial vaccine stored as finished product• Difficult to anticipate what to bank• Novel vaccine technology needed
Mission Statement
The NAFMDVB fosters the preparedness for responding to an FMD outbreak in North America, maintaining expertise in FMD vaccines, vaccine deployment, vaccination and other FMD control measures. The NAFMDVB maintains the repository of vaccine antigen concentrates (VAC) for the production of emergency FMD vaccines.
Background
Established: In 1982 from a Memorandum of Understanding between United States, Canada, and Mexico to ensure the availability and readiness of vaccines when needed, to control an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in North America. • Based on emergency vaccinate to kill strategy• Annual contributions from Canada, Mexico and the United States
proportional to the susceptible animal population of each country.
Two Governing Bodies
The Commission: Chief Veterinary Officer from each country
The Technical Committee (TC): Comprised of one technical and one regulatory representative from each
country. The TC advises the Commission on matters of a scientific and technical
nature. The TC works in coordination with the Emergency Management Working
Group (EMWG) to advise the Commission on policy and implementation of the NAFMDVB program by each member country.
The EMWG is a subcommittee of the North American Animal Health committee (NAAHC) charged with coordinating, harmonizing, and expediting animal health emergency management in North America.
NAFMDVB Location USDA’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory
(FADDL) at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. Under stringent safety and security controls 24/7.
FacilitiesLaboratory facility for antigen, sera and master seed
testing.Storage facility
Liquid nitrogen freezers for antigens and antigen samplesRefrigerators for pilot vaccines
Access to animal rooms with capacity to house 17 bovines of 400 pounds.
USDA-APHIS-VS/NAFMDVB/US COMMODITY GROUPDELEGATION VISIT LPA 20/02/2014
WELCOME / BIENVENUE / BIENVENIDOS
Safeguarding Animal Health
Safeguarding Animal Health
Questions?