Secure Pork Supply Plan

September 2012

North American Animal Agriculture Industry is Unique

• The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the U.S. and North American livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak

• Strategies for the response to, and management of, a FAD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses and will depend upon the magnitude, location and other characteristics of the outbreak.

Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Outbreak

• Stop movement will quickly lead to overcrowding conditions with serious animal welfare and health issues.

Phases of FMD Response

FMD Detection in the United States: Types of an FMD Outbreak

Type 1: Focal

Type 2: Moderate Regional

Type 3: Large Regional

Type 4: Widespread or National

Type 5: Catastrophic U.S.

Type 6: Catastrophic North American

Response Shifts from Emphasis on Stamping-Out to Emphasis on Alternate Strategies (duration of FMD response)

Size of FMD Outbreak (in terms of

animals, premises,

and jurisdictions

affected)

Six Types of FMD Outbreaks

5

Common Components of Secure Food Supply Business Continuity Plans

Secure Egg Supply (HPAI); Secure Turkey Supply (HPAI); Secure Milk Supply (FMD);Secure Pork Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)

– Government, industry, academia partnerships– Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components– Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology

questionnaires, movement permits – Risk assessments (completed and in process)– Plans must be based on current capabilities and will

evolve with science and new capabilities– Guidelines only: Final decisions made by

responsible officials during outbreak– Outreach and training pre and post outbreak

Secure Pork Supply Plan (Funded by USDA APHIS VS)

• Develop procedures to allow the safe movement of animals with no evidence of infection in a FAD control zone to a pork processing plant or to other sites to accommodate different stages of production.

Ramirez

SPS Partners

• SPS Planning Committee– Federal and State officials– Representatives of all phases of the

swine industry– NPB, NPPC, AASV– Academia

• swine disease experts• swine production experts

Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee

• First meeting October 11-12, 2011• Working Groups formed:

– Biosecurity– Surveillance– Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises– Data Collection, Management, and Sharing– Risk Assessments– Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak

Tomorrow– Communications

FADs included in SPS plan

• Foot and mouth disease– Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer

• Classical swine fever• African swine fever• Swine vesicular disease

PIADC

Foot and Mouth Disease : 7 days post infection

Disease Transmission(FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)

• Not zoonotic

• Direct contact and oral exposure are the most important routes of infection for swine (Pigs are relatively resistant to airborne infection by all 4 FADs)

• Indirect contact (fomites) also can play a lessor role for transmission

• Pigs exhale large concentrations of FMDV, cattle are susceptible to aerosolized virus

Vaccine

• FMD and CSF– Vaccine will not be

immediately available, or will be in short supply

• ASF and SVD– No vaccine

• May not be a viable option for initial rapid control of these FADs in a large FAD outbreak

Ramirez

BIOSECURITY WORKING GROUP

The Charge

• Define biosecurity performance standards prior to an outbreak

• Participating premises can be rapidly designated as Monitored Premises in the event of an outbreak

Our Approach

• NPB biosecurity and pork producer biosecurity protocols

• Combined protocols and revised by Level (Level One and Level Two)

• Reviewed and edited by Working Group

Next Steps• Finish editing the recommendations• Send to Planning Committee for

review• Develop illustrations demonstrating

the clean/dirty line concept

SURVEILLANCE WORKING GROUP

The Original Charge:

Develop Recommendations for• Comprehensive Integrated Swine Surveillance prior to

a FAD outbreak• Surveillance during a FAD outbreak (may depend on

phase and type of outbreak)• Surveillance to establish freedom from disease in a

premises, production system, region, or the entire US• Surveillance to be eligible for compartmentalization

prior to and during an FAD outbreak

Approach Considerations

• Utilize testing approaches the industry is using, but also test these samples for FADs– Producers are more likely to collect and submit

samples.– Not a financial burden for producers to collect

samples.– What would the incentive be for producers?

• Provide samples to diagnostic labs so can conduct testing pre-outbreak

Next Steps

• Draft a straw man protocol to be reviewed by the Surveillance Working Group

COMPARTMENTALIZATION/MONITORED PREMISES WORKING GROUP

The Charge

Develop criteria – To receive and maintain monitored premises

status during an FAD outbreak– For swine production systems to be eligible for

compartmentalization according to OIE guidelines

Our Approach:Monitored Premises

• Biosecurity and Surveillance are very important to achieve Monitored Premises status

• Wait for Biosecurity and Surveillance working groups to make recommendations for becoming a Monitored Premises

Our Approach: Compartmentalization

• Discussed how to approach compartmentalization

• Start with swine specific disease such as CSF

• Ask two production companies/ systems to start the process of working toward compartmentalization

• Identify road blocks during process

Progress Update

• One production company is willing to work through the application process to apply to become a compartment

DATA MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP

The Charge

• To enable optimal management of data during an FAD outbreak, recommend – data to be collected prior to and in the event

of an outbreak– responsibilities for data entry and

management– priorities and mechanisms for data sharing

prior to and during an outbreak• Address issues related to data

confidentiality and access

Our Approach

• Reviewed and discussed approaches of other Secure Food Supply plans

• Discussed what types of gaps may exist in data collection and storage of information

• Administer questionnaires to help identify gaps

Next Steps

• Analyze survey responses.– NAHLN Laboratories– State Veterinarians

• Discuss possible approaches on how to address gaps in the data collection and storage process

• Evaluate available data sharing mechanisms and best practices

• Produce report for committee with findings on data availability, gaps and sharing

Producer Information

RISK ASSESSMENTS WORKING GROUP

The Charge

Recommend and prioritize risk assessments necessary to provide additional scientific basis for the Secure Pork Supply plan

Risk Assessment Priorities

• Risk Assessments will be Disease and commodity (movement) specific

• Disease Priority– FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD

• Type of Movement PrioritySuch as Wean to Finish /Nursery to FinishGenetic replacements in to breeding farmCull pigs (different types)Finishing to harvest

Next Steps

• Working group calls as needed

• Assure alignment with other SPS working groups

• UMN finalizing funding and priorities of RA funding with USDA for the next year

• More detailed discussions when have Analyst assigned and begin RA

OUTBREAK TOMORROWWORKING GROUP

The Charge

• Recommend policies and procedures for maximizing a secure pork supply while minimizing FAD spread if an outbreak occurred tomorrow with currently available resources

• The plans should vary with the phase and type of outbreak

Our Approach

• Updating NPB’s Highly Contagious Foreign Animal Diseases of Swine Strategy Document – provides a basic overview of response

activities that would occur if an FAD is suspected and/or confirmed in swine by animal health officials

– includes industry goals in support of the FAD response and actions necessary to meet industry-defined goals

Our Approach

• Develop a controlled stop movement document– Factors to Consider in a Stop Movement

Order for Swine in the U.S. due to a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak

Next Steps

• Complete revisions of NPB’s Highly Contagious Foreign Animal Disease of Swine Strategy document

• Complete the Controlled Stop Movement Document

• Send both documents to working group for review

COMMUNICATIONS WORKING GROUP

CROSS-SPECIES FMD COMMUNICATIONS TEAM

Goals– Protect animal health & minimize

disease spread– Ensure consumer confidence in meat &

milk safety– Prevent supply disruption to customers

Cross-Species FMD Team Desired Outcomes

• Serve as the umbrella for all outreach

• Speak with one voice

• Do not duplicate efforts/work smart

• Eliminate consumer confusion

• Do not duplicate efforts/work smart

FMD Messaging Website

Next Steps

Develop messaging for – CSF– ASF– SVD

Summary

• Reviewed the goals, charge and approach of the SPS and the seven Working Groups

• Discussed the progress and next steps of the Working Groups

Any Questions?

zaabelp@iastate.edu