DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 1

IERM VERSION

IR – AIR OPERATIONS

DASR ORO – ORGANISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR OPERATIONS

DASR ORO - CONTENTS

ORO.05 Conduct of Flying Operations ORO.10 Flying management system (FMS) ORO.15 Appointment of Key Staff ORO.25 Aircrew Competency System ORO.30 Flight Authorisation ORO.40 Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE) ORO.50 Aircraft Crewing ORO.55 Aircraft Captaincy ORO.60 Provision and Use of Oxygen in Aircraft ORO.65 Carriage and Use of Electronic Equipment ORO.70 Carriage of Personnel on Defence Aircraft ORO.75 Use of Aircraft Role Equipment ORO.85 Flight Recorder and Locating Equipment

ORO.05 – CONDUCT OF FLYING OPERATIONS (OAREG 2.2) TOP

ORO.05.A. Defence registered aircraft must be operated:

(1) within the approved Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) and Configuration Role and Environment (CRE) parameters

(2) in accordance with the Type Certificate and MAOC limitations

(3) in accordance with the procedures in Defence AIP, except as required by the NAA of the state of operation

(4) as detailed in the Aircraft Flight Manual and applicable OIP

(5) in accordance with Defence OIP.

GM to ORO.05.A – Flight Operations (AUS) (8000.010 s3 c1)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure Defence aircraft are operated with adequate controls to ensure safety of flight.

Overview

2. Flight Operations is concerned with ensuring aircraft are operated in approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by competent and authorised individuals, according to approved procedures and instructions, under a system of supervision and monitoring. This is achieved in practical terms through a structure of three interconnected elements:

a. Competent flying organisation b. Approved operating standards and limitations c. Qualified and authorised aircrew.

Flying organisations

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

2 AL 1

3. The aviation community has learnt from experience that aircraft accidents are normally the result of a linked sequence of errors, omissions or failures; the prevention of any one of which would have broken the ‘chain’ and stopped the accident from occurring. The community has also learnt that such ‘chains-of-failure’ are unlikely to develop within structured organisations where activities are performed and supervised by appointed individuals in accordance with refined processes and instructions. The likelihood of accidents is further reduced where such organisations are subjected to ongoing (internal and external) assessments of their performance and compliance with prescribed requirements.

4. Flying organisations provide local guidance, training, supervision and monitoring of individual aircrew to ensure they are competent and authorised to conduct specific flying operations. To support the performance of this role, Defence flying organisations are required to establish and abide by local management practices, rules, orders and instructions regarding flying operations. They are also required to develop training and qualification requirements appropriate to the operations they conduct. Collectively, such administrative arrangements, or elements, form the organisation’s ‘Flying Management System’. DASR ORO.10 identifies the key elements of a FMS.

5. A FMS may be local in focus, but to allow organisations to safely operate with one another, and to provide for the movement of personnel between them, there must be some consistency or commonality across organisations. For this reason, FMSs are subject to Defence-wide requirements relating to operational rules and pre-requisite training and qualification standards.

Operating standards and limitations

6. Operational rules establish boundaries for the conduct of flight operations. Defence operating standards and limitations are the set of approved guidelines, instructions and restrictions within which aircraft are to be operated by personnel belonging to a flying organisation. Such criteria are derived from a collective wisdom that encompasses the engineering and operational fields; with the latter including the military operating area. Operating standards and limitations may be high-level and general in nature or specific to an Aircraft Type, operating locality, competency level, mission category or flying organisation. The common feature is that operating standards and limitations should all promote the attainment of a known level of safety for aviation operations. They should also be consistent and not susceptible to mixed interpretations or subject to arbitrary alteration. Notwithstanding this, the nature of the considerations behind operating standards and limitations means that they are not always permanent; they may change as more becomes known about human behaviour and aircraft design or as other factors come into play.

7. The Defence flight operations concept operates on the principle of centralised control and decentralised execution (or Mission Command). This allows commanders the flexibility to exercise discretion and judgement in managing the safe operation of aviation systems they are familiar with in roles and environments they are accustomed to and approved for. There remains, though, a need for operational rules to be based on minimum and consistent criteria, so Defence flying operations regulations are intended to prescribe common minimum requirements which are then supported by more focused and tailored rules developed for individual flying organisations.

8. At the level of a flying organisation, standards and limitations whether locally and externally developed may take a number of forms including, among others, flight manuals, Orders, authoritative Flight Information Documents and rules governing crew training and currency, low flying, air displays, cargo carriage, the use of role equipment and others. Collectively, such documentation comes under the title of OIP, the subject of DASR AO.GEN.10. Other MAAs and NAAs may use the term Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) in lieu of OIP.

Aircrew qualification and authorisation

9. The safety of aviation systems depends upon them being designed, constructed, maintained and operated by personnel who are competent and authorised to do so. The abilities of the end-user are key design considerations for any item of equipment, but this is a particularly important principle in aviation. Designers, however, still need to presume a certain level of proficiency or competency in operators and this manifests itself in design parameters covering such matters as handling characteristics, cockpit and control layouts and the coverage of

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 3

automated systems. Defining and attaining these operator abilities is a prerequisite to achieving known minimum levels of operational safety and effectiveness.

10. To help meet operational safety and effectiveness minima, Defence only permits aviation systems to be operated by qualified and authorised individuals who have been assessed as competent and fit to operate a particular type of aviation system in specified roles. However, since Defence aircraft may be operated in multiple roles (many of which may be unusually demanding) it may be not be feasible for aircrew flying a particular type to be competent in all of its intended roles. There may necessarily be a range of competencies required within a flying organisation. Furthermore, some roles that may be technically possible for an aircraft to perform may not be approved for a particular flying organisation because it is not practicable for its personnel to become and stay competent in performing the roles.

11. Competency in the context of Defence flying operations refers to the capacity of an individual to effectively and safely complete a task to a required standard of performance through the application of appropriate skills, knowledge and attitude. For aircrew, competency is achieved and recognised through a controlled and progressive process of training, accumulated experience and formal assessments.

12. Since competency is measured against a standard of performance, flying organisations must determine what these standards are. Certain competencies are regarded as essential for the safe operation of all aircraft, so these are set under Defence-wide arrangements or articulated through common principles. For example, Defence has common principles relating to minimum levels of training and proficiency required to safely operate aircraft in general. There are also minimum training and qualification requirements stipulated for medical fitness and general aviation operations, such as basic flying training, crew resource management (CRM), aviation risk management (AVRM) and aviation safety. Flying organisations are responsible for establishing local requirements that relate more particularly to the organisation’s operating environment, roles and aviation systems. Competency requirements must be sufficient in scope and detail to provide a suitable degree of confidence that a known level of safety can be achieved in flying operations when aviation systems are operated by personnel with prescribed qualifications and levels of experience and proficiency.

13. Defence flying operations requirements regarding competency levels and the management of local competency assurance regimes are prescribed in DASR AIRCREW.

Operation of Non-Defence Registered Aircraft (NDRA)

14. Where Defence personnel operate non-Defence registered aircraft, the principles that underpin the Defence concept of flight operations remain relevant. Operational safety depends upon the aircraft being flown in accordance with approved standards and limitations by qualified and authorised individuals working within an effective flying organisation.

15. As with operations involving Defence aircraft, commanders will need to make determinations about criteria that must be satisfied in order to obtain a desired level of safety in the operation of non-Defence registered aircraft. Conformance to applicable civil aviation requirements covering crew competency and operating standards and limitations is mandatory in making such determinations, but additional criteria may need to be developed under some circumstances. Moreover, though non-Defence registered aircraft may be operated under arrangements that incorporate a level of oversight by a civil flying organisation, Defence flying organisations will nonetheless need to supplement civil requirements with their own to ensure that Defence personnel continue to receive suitable guidance, supervision and monitoring. The nature of such supplementation will depend upon the situation and the associated degree of risk.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

4 AL 1

ORO.10 – FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (OAREG 2.1) TOP

ORO.10.A. The MAO must ensure a flying management system (FMS) is maintained that includes:

(1) appointment of key staff

(2) management of the SOIU

(3) aircrew competency

(4) flight authorisation

(5) aviation risk management

(6) aviation safety management

(7) management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP)

(8) management of Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD).

GM to ORO.10.A – Flying Management Systems (AUS) (8000.010 s3 c2)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure flying organisations have an adequate flight operations framework of authority to enable assurance of flight safety.

2. The key elements of an FMS are:

a. Appointment of Key Staff. Key staff are those personnel appointed or delegated by commanders to be responsible for managing or controlling some aspect of the FMS. Appointment responsibilities are usually based on performance of a specified function; for example, flight authorisation officers. All Key Staff appointments are made in writing at the appropriate command level. Further guidance is provided in DASR ORO.15.A.

b. Management of the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU). The SOIU defines the approved roles and environment for the aircraft type. Guidance on the content and structure of an SOIU is contained in DASR ARO.50. A SOIU for each aircraft type is managed within the FMS. Management of the SOIU ensures that any changes or variations are appropriately handled, and ensures the SOIU remains up-to-date and valid.

c. Aircrew competency. For each aircraft type, aircrew competency and currency standards must be defined and recorded. Management of aircrew competency within the FMS ensures that prerequisite qualifications are obtained, aircrew currency is achieved, and that aircrew are competent to perform their assigned roles.

d. Flight authorisation. Flight authorisation underpins safe flying operations by assuring that all contributing factors to flying operations have been considered, and an appropriate basis exists for safe flying operations. The FMS ensures that the flight authorisation process is defined, controlled and recorded. Further guidance on flight authorisation is provided in DASR ORO.30.

e. Aviation risk management (AVRM). AVRM is a documented process to assess risks to safety resulting from aviation operations. Whilst the AVRM process is documented via AAP 6374.001—Defence Aviation Safety Manual and associated subordinate single-Service instructions, the FMS ensures the process is applied locally and that operations are authorised at the appropriate level. Additional guidance on AVRM management is included in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual.

f. Aviation safety management. Aviation safety management includes education, incident prevention and correction, and investigative functions aimed at promoting a ‘safety culture’ within the Defence aviation community. The FMS ensures aviation

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 5

safety principles are applied and incidents or potential hazards are investigated, reported and prevented. Further guidance on flying safety management is provided the Defence Aviation Safety Manual.

g. Management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP). OIP collectively document all limitations, instructions, procedures, processes and rules necessary to operate an aircraft type. OIP includes all documents which are essential for operation of an aircraft type in the approved roles, or are authoritative in terms of providing a framework of orders and information to facilitate safe operations. Management of OIP ensures they are accurate, available and authorised. Additional guidance on OIP management is included in DASR AO.GEN.10.

h. Management of Flying Simulation Training Devices (FSTD). Some aspects of flying training are performed via ground based simulation devices. Where these systems are utilised in lieu of actual flying, the training value provided must be validated, and the basis of validation maintained. The FMS ensures that such devices are managed to assure the continued validity of the simulated curricula. Guidance on the management of FSTDs is included DASR FSTD.

3. Each element of the FMS, when cohesively managed in relation to aircraft types, collectively contributes to the conduct of safe operations. Whilst the FMS provides the framework for managing day-to-day operations, the system is directly supported by defined operational rules as required by DASR Aircrew. These regulations prescribe a consolidated list of rules and standards which are required to support the safety of operations for applicable aircraft types. The FMS should be constructed on the basis of these rules and requirements and continually assure compliance.

4. The interaction of the FMS elements described in the preceding paragraphs is expanded further in Figure ORO.10-1. Flight Operations management can be considered an interdependent system with the aim of enabling safe and effective aviation operations. An important feature is the role of the defensive mechanisms inherent to the FMS which are designed to allow a culmination of activities to result in safe flying operations.

U

Figure ORO.10-1 – Flying Management Systems (FMS)

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

6 AL 1

Organisational Implementation

5. Implementation of an FMS for an aircraft type occurs at various command levels within an overall flying organisation. The custodian of the system is the MAO who is responsible for the safe management of the aircraft type. Implementation of the FMS by the MAO may vary depending on the variety or complexity of the subordinate units operating the aircraft types. The MAO and commanders at different levels may appoint Key Staff to manage aspects of the system according to their experience and position within the flying organisation.

6. Unit Level implementation. Unit Level management is the lowest level of implementation of the system. The flying unit is primarily concerned with the day-to-day conduct of operations and as such should define authorisation and supervision processes, and operational procedures particular to specialist roles performed by the unit. Operating units should provide advice to higher level command on the effectiveness of the FMS arrangements directed by the Wing or Group level. Compliance with the FMS requirements should mainly be assessed at the operating unit level.

7. Wing (E) Level implementation. Flying operations management at Wing level may satisfy the majority of the regulatory requirements for an FMS. Although the SOIU may be managed at a higher level, the Wing Level organisation should be the custodian of the aircraft roles and environment. The Wing may provide advice to COMAUSFLT/COMD FORCOMD/ACAUST on any necessary changes to the SOIU, or identify new roles. With a number of operating units utilising the same aircraft type, the Wing may also be best placed to define and standardise currency and competency criteria, manage OIP and training devices, and define policy and processes for AVRM and aviation safety.

8. Group (E) Level implementation. Flying management at Group Level (which is the next level above Wing) should include those functions generic to the operation of all aircraft types within the MAO. These might include the:

a. definition and approval of pre-requisite training and qualification criteria for the broader discipline of flying operations, for example, fast-jet operations, Army helicopters, transport aircraft, etc;

b. management of the SOIUs for each aircraft type, and c. management of Group Level OIP applicable to operations involving the aircraft types

and roles.

9. Management of Aircraft Types across Command boundaries. In some situations, a flying organisation will operate an aircraft type which is mainly flown by a separate sub-element of the flying organisation. For example, the PC-9/A is predominantly operated by AFTG. However AWC also operate PC-9/A aircraft for the purposes of flight test training. A flying organisation may also operate an aircraft type where flying operations of the type is the responsibility of an MAO outside of that organisation’s chain of command (eg example PC9/A aircraft operated in the JTAC role, and Army aircraft operated by AWC). In these situations, flying operations authority does not challenge the command chain. Rather, it provides commanders with a source of authoritative advice upon which to base decisions which impact flying operations. In such cases the flying management arrangements which have been implemented to manage an aircraft type should be effective across command boundaries where they remain valid for the roles performed by the external organisation. Such organisations, by their nature, may perform unique roles beyond those typically conducted during ‘normal operations’. In this case, the organisation may become the custodian or subject matter expert for the roles they perform. The overall FMS for the aircraft type should therefore be augmented by processes or standards defined by the unique organisation.

10. Ultimately, the distribution of flying management responsibility at group level and below should suit the operational circumstances of the organisation and seek to standardise flying practice in consideration of the intended roles and the impact on flying operations of each aircraft within the scope of the delegation.

Documentation of the Flying Management System

11. The MAO should document the FMS and should:

a. describe the strategy to manage the flying operations of the aircraft types within scope of the MAO.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 7

b. identify any unique operational circumstances affecting the management of the aircraft type;

c. for a large organisation, describe how the FMS has been implemented at each level within the flying organisation;

d. identify who may appoint Key Staff; e. identify the custodians or sponsors of specialist roles or functions within the

organisation;

f. describe any relationships with external organisations that assist in the operational management of an aircraft type under the management of the MAO; and

g. provide a compliance cross reference of orders and instructions necessary to meet DASR requirements.

ORO.15 – APPOINTMENT OF KEY STAFF (OAREG 2.1.1 A) TOP

ORO.15.A. The MAO must ensure that OIP issued under this regulation includes:

(1) key appointments in the management of flying operations are identified

(2) the initial and continuing eligibility criteria for each appointment are identified

(3) the responsibility and authority of each appointment is clear and unambiguous

(4) appointed individuals receive written authorisation which includes any limitations to their responsibility or authority.

GM to ORO.15.A – Appointment of Key Staff (AUS) (8000.010 s3 c3)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure Key Personnel and expertise is assigned within a Flying Management System, who are integral to safe flight operations.

2. Flying organisations contribute to the safety of Defence Aviation by providing local guidance, training, supervision and monitoring to help ensure that only competent and authorised personnel operate aviation systems. Their contribution occurs through the interaction of people, processes and information. Defence views the people formally involved in this interaction as ‘Key Staff’. All appointed personnel who support the safe operation of Aviation Systems, such as flight authorisation officers, flight examination officers, aircraft captains, standards officers, and others, are considered to be Key Staff.

3. Key Staff are not casually appointed. They must be suitably competent to manage, train and supervise others, and, in turn, must be subject to ongoing supervision and assessment of their competency and performance. They must also understand that they are Key Staff and be formally made aware of their responsibilities and delegations. This requires that those appointments important to the safe management of flying operations be identified, and the associated eligibility criteria and authority delegations determined and made known within the organisation.

4. Personnel who are appointed with flying operations management responsibilities in support of flying operations play an essential role in the overall management of the FMS. Key Staff includes:

a. Flight Authorisation Officers. Flight authorisation officers are responsible for the flight authorisation of all aircraft operations or simulator flights undertaken by the unit.

b. Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). An ASO is a specialist (eg aircrew, JBAC or air defence officers, as applicable to the organisation) appointed at the Command, Group and Wing level and is responsible for management and maintenance of flying safety practices and flying operations frameworks within the operating organisations. Such duties might include, flying safety practices are applied to all flying and aircraft operations; including flying safety training, crew duty limits are being enforced,

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

8 AL 1

operational hazards and incident reporting and investigation, and correction of identified deficiencies and SME on flying operations matters.

c. Flying Instructor. A flying instructor is a pilot who has been trained and certified as competent to give flying instruction. Sub-categories or specialised Flying Instructor roles may be created or endorsed by COMAUSFLT/COMD FORCOMD/ACAUST as part of the applicable FMS (eg QHI)

d. Instrument Rating Examiner (IRE). An IRE is a pilot who may conduct instrument flight tests for the award of an instrument rating. A Senior Instrument Rating Examiner (SIRE) is a Flying Instructor authorised to renew IRE ratings and to conduct instrument flight tests.

e. Standardisation Officer (STANDO). A STANDO is responsible to operating unit CO for monitoring and reporting on aircrew compliance with OIPs, and providing guidance for standardisation of unit flying operations.

f. Unit Maintenance Test Pilot (UMTP). A UMTP is a pilot specifically trained and endorsed to carry out post-maintenance flight testing of an aircraft.

g. Qualified Test Pilot (QTP). A QTP is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of an aircraft.

h. Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA): A COMAUSFLT/COMD FORCOMD/ACAUST appointment who represents a single Service, is recognised by the Surgeon General ADF as being qualified to provide authoritative aviation medical advice and is responsible for the implementation of aviation medicine policies.

ORO 25 – AIRCREW COMPETENCY SYSTEM (OAREG 2.1.3) TOP

ORO.25.A. The MAO must establish an aircrew competency system that ensures:

(1) aircrew are trained and qualified in accordance with DASR Aircrew.10

(2) aircrew maintain currency on the required aircraft type

(3) aircrew are competent to perform their assigned roles.

ORO.25.B. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that aircrew currency requirements are identified, including:

(1) minimum currency criteria

(2) methods of maintaining and regaining currency

(3) identification of circumstances and authority for extension.

ORO.25.C. The aircrew competency system must ensure that competency requirements are identified, including:

(1) competency for all aircraft roles and operations

(2) training and assessment requirements for initial award and maintenance of competency

(3) criteria that define a lapse in competency, including the requirements for requalification.

ORO.25.D. The aircrew competency system must ensure that all aircrew qualifications and award of competencies are recorded.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 9

ORO.30 – FLIGHT AUTHORISATION (OAREG 2.1.4)TOP

ORO.30.A. The MAO must establish a flight authorisation system that assures the assessment of suitability for flight of Defence aircraft. (OAREG 2.1.4a)

GM to ORO.30.A – Flight Authorisation System (AUS)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Defence aircraft missions are authorised, supervised and flown by appropriately trained, fit and competent individuals, on aircraft within the approved Configuration Role and Environment (CRE) where risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as reasonably practicable (SFARP).

2. Flight crew are qualified to operate Defence aircraft after they have been assessed as competent and fit to do so. However, owing to the complexity of Defence aviation1 and limitations of the operational aviation safety assurance framework2, without an independent flight authorisation decision, real-time threats to operational aviation safety measily bypass preventative controls within the Flying Management System (FMS). The lack of anindependent flight authorisation decision will likely force sole reliance on flight crew post-everecovery action

ay

nt 0-1). 3 to maintain safe flight operations (Figure ORO.3

3. Flying organisations are therefore responsible for making real time, suitability for flight determinations through a structured and formal process. This assures the preventative controls within the FMS are intact, the outcome of which is that flight crew are authorised to perform specific roles in a particular aircraft type within a planned environment and timeframe.

Figure ORO.30-1 – Flight Authorisations role in the FMS

4. An effective flight authorisation system should include controls that ensure:

1 Aircraft configuration, crew composition, environmental conditions and individual mission requirements vary frequently. 2 Independent board of review is primarily retrospective analysis, compliance assurance and auditing activities currently focus on organisational implementation of regulation. 3 Bow-Tie Methodology

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

10 AL 1

a. A suitability for flight assessment made by a qualified, competent and authorised officer.

b. The acceptance of authority for the safe and effective conduct of the aircraft flight by a competent and fit Aircraft Captain.4

5. System controls address the hazards that are present when Defence aircraft are operated by authorised flight crew.

6. The flight authorisation system should afford maximum flexibility to support Defence aircraft operations.

7. ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS). Participants of the ACFS may not have previously held a flight authorising appointment, or have access to an appropriate Flight Authorisation Officer. Therefore, unless COMAUSFLT/COMD FORCOMD/ACAUST directs otherwise, in addition to any civil requirements, ACFS participants are expected to self-authorise using the guidance and AMC provided under this regulation.

8. Flexibility Provision. DASR ORO.30 does not apply to non-Defence registered aircraft flights that are solely conducted by non-Defence flight crew under a recognised MAA or NAA. In such cases, the relevant NAA or MAA requirements apply.

AMC to ORO.30.A – Flight Authorisation System (AUS)

Flight Authorisation System Controls

1. Flight authorisation system controls should include:

a. Approval authorities. Delegation of authority to command personnel for the management of the flight authorisation system. Approval authorities should be able to:

i. appoint a suitable Flight Authorisation Officer(s) (FLTAUTHO) within the operating unit

ii. approve the duties, responsibilities and limitations of a FLTAUTHO via a written delegation.

b. FLTAUTHO suitability criteria. Effective flight authorisation draws heavily on aviation experience, technical mastery and proven decision making attributes. Accordingly, a potential FLTAUTHO candidate requires both time and aviation experience to develop. Candidate suitability should be assessed against MAO defined criteria that ensure only appropriately trained, competent and experienced individuals are selected and appointed as a FLTAUTHO. Selection criteria may include:

i. Minimum qualification and competency: For flight crew, competency is achieved and recognised through a controlled and progressive process of training and accumulated experience. A potential FLTAUTHO may have demonstrated competency across the spectrum of operations for an aircraft type prior to being delegated the authority to authorise. Where a FLTAUTHO is experienced in a niche role of a particular type, the FLTAUTHO may be granted permissions to authorise specific types of flight only.

ii. Specialisation. The MAO may specify what flight crew specialisations are suitable for FLTAUTHO duties; however, whenever practicable the FLTAUTHO should be a pilot.

iii. Flying Supervision training: Authorisation should only be delegated to an officer who satisfactorily completes Defence endorsed flying supervision training that should include:

4 Although the Aircraft Captain is granted authority, it is expected that the minimum required flight crew to complete the task are also qualified, fit and competent.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 11

(a) Human factors.

(b) Defence Aviation Safety Program and Regulations.

(c) Aviation safety hazards.

(d) Contemporary risk management.

(e) Accidents/incidents study of related aircraft types.

(f) FLTAUTHO roles and responsibilities.

(g) Supervision of Aircrew.

c. Periodic review. All FLTAUTHO appointments should undergo review at regular intervals not exceeding 24 months to ensure qualification and competency requirements for the appointment are valid.

d. Restrictions on further delegation. A FLTAUTHO may not further delegate their authority except as provided within the limits of their appointment.

e. Flight Authorisation responsibilities executed through the normal chain of command. FLTAUTHO appointment should not be lower than the designated flying supervisor level; however, limited term delegations to a lower level may be necessary to meet specific requirements. Procedures should identify the responsibilities associated with flight authorisation and identify suitable personnel within the chain of command to discharge that responsibility.

f. Detachment Commander. When aircraft are deployed, flight authorisation may be delegated to the Detachment Commander or the most suitably qualified flight crew member, or both. The appointing officer should ensure clear guidance on any limits of the FLTAUTHO appointment.

g. Self–authorisation. Under certain circumstances it may be necessary for authorising officers to authorise flights where they are acting as the Aircraft Captain, commonly referred to as ‘self–authorisation’. As self–authorisation excludes the independent mechanism for identifying potential factors that may lead to an aircraft accident, self–authorisation should only occur when another FLTAUTHO is not available. Regardless of the reason for doing so, the default position should always be to obtain independent flight authorisation whenever practicable. If a suitably qualified FLTAUTHO is not available and self–authorisation is necessary, the Aircraft Captain should attempt to discuss the sortie profile with a qualified flight crew member to provide some measure of independent oversight. Whenever self–authorisation occurs, use of a check list based process to ensure all considerations are assessed should occur. OIP supporting this control should list the circumstances under which self-authorisation may be performed.

h. Non-unit personnel. Wherever possible, all flights should be authorised by a unit based FLTAUTHO; however, an operational requirement may exist which necessitates the authorisation of flight operations by a higher headquarters or an associated training unit. OIP supporting this control should list the circumstances under which authorisation by non-unit personal may be performed.

i. Maintenance check flight. Before authorising any maintenance check flight, the FLTAUTHO should:

i. Be acquainted with maintenance practices and the applicable flight check schedule.

ii. Ensure that the Aircraft Captain meets minimum qualifications and is familiar with relevant requirements and OIP supporting the safe and effective conduct of the check flight.

j. Non-executive flying instructor. To meet curriculum objectives for solo and mutual flights during pilot training, student pilots are tasked as Aircraft Captain. Accordingly, the CO of a flying training unit may delegate the flight authorisation of solo and mutual flights by student pilots to approved flying instructors. This should be limited to those flights required by the approved flying training curriculum and promulgated within OIP. Restrictions should be applied to such delegations based on:

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

12 AL 1

i. The experience of the flying instructor.

ii. The specific nature of relevant flights within the curriculum.

iii. Receiving flying supervision training or unit equivalent training.

iv. Ability of unit flying executives to maintain close scrutiny of the overall flight authorisation process, particularly in regard to external factors such as weather.

v. Use of a check list based process to ensure all considerations are assessed.

k. Flight crew disclosure requirements. For flight authorisation to be effective, the FLTAUTHO requires sound and up-to-date knowledge. Therefore, crew disclosure of any factors that could potentially compromise suitability for flight is essential. Accordingly, crews should advise the FLTAUTHO, Aircraft Captain or other senior crew members of anything that may affect a particular member’s medical, psychological or technical mastery to perform flying related duties.

l. Flight outside CRE limitations. Planned flight outside an aircraft’s approved CRE requires additional planning, training, and clearance prior to execution and should be limited to flight test or operational clearance approvals.

m. Low flying. Flight authorisation and supervision of low flying operations should ensure that:

i. Specific authorisation is required for all low flying/terrain flight operations.

ii. The minimum heights to be flown, along with any route restrictions, are entered in the flight authorisation record.

iii. Flights are planned to avoid populated areas and operating mines, quarries or other industrial centres.

iv. Weather aspects have been considered where applicable.

v. Flight crew are aware of:

(a) The height and lateral separation limitations as well as obstacles and other known hazards.

(b) Their aircraft's performance and capability in relation to the likely ground and air hazards.

(c) Known sensitive areas or other airspace concerns.

n. Other flights of a hazardous nature. Other hazardous flights that may require specific authorisation limitations include:

i. operational missions

ii. flight crew training

iii. flight test

iv. carriage of certain types of dangerous cargo

v. display flying.

o. Verbal authorisation. Authorisation or changes to flight authorisation may be given verbally; however, the details of any verbal flight authorisation should be recorded in the flight authorisation record as soon as practicable. Wherever possible, the Aircraft Captain should leave a written record of a verbal authorisation on the ground with a responsible person prior to the flight.

p. Flight authorisation record. A record of flight authorisation is documented via use of a hard copy form, soft copy form or an electronic means. The flight authorisation record may not be carried on the aircraft conducting the task, unless a duplicate copy is handled by an authorised procedure. The record should include:

i. identifiable acknowledgements by the FLTAUTHO and the Aircraft Captain

ii. relevant flight details

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 13

iii. any specific limitations applied to the flight.

q. Flight authorisation record retention. Flight authorisation records should be retained as a permanent record of flying activity. When no longer required by the unit, flight authorisation records are archived. An acceptable means of compliance to preserve records is adherence to the relevant Commonwealth Records Management Policy issued under the Archives Act 1983.

Flying Supervision

2. Flight crew supervision includes the full spectrum of the aviation activity (Safety and Mission). The Flying Supervisor should be familiar with the competencies, capabilities and personal disposition of all crew that may require authorisation. Such knowledge forms the very basis for sound flight authorisation decision making.

3. Flying supervision ensures that the controls inherent within the FMS are being adhered to on a daily basis at unit level. Flying supervisor controls may be applied (days-weeks in advance) during mission planning and execution. These include5:

a. Minimum levels of crew qualification. Minimum flight crew composition and qualification requirements are specified in OIP that supports the specific mission types of a particular aircraft type.

b. Assigning flight crew to tasks. Air tasking and mission scheduling are distinct from flight authorisation. Aircraft Captains and crews are assigned to a particular task after supervisor assessment of the nature of the task, the potential risk, and the suitability of the individuals. Crew structure decisions in terms of cockpit gradient, crew cohesion and other associated crew resource management issues may be required. Crew selection should occur at unit level to ensure that specific individual crew limitations and abilities associated with the task/mission are considered.6

c. Risk management. Standard Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) planning for flights/profiles may be created to ensure safety.

Flight Authorisation Officer

4. Flight authorisation ensures that the FMS controls are in place on a flight by flight basis. FLTAUTHO controls include:

a. Suitability for flight assessment. FLTAUTHO considerations involve a range of factors that ensure an overall suitability for flight determination. Considerations may include:

i. Individual suitability. Self assessment to ensure the FLTAUTHO is appropriate to authorise the flight.

ii. Flight safety risks. Considering all factors arising from the CRE that have the potential to compromise suitability for flight and being satisfied that the flight will be conducted whereby residual risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP.

iii. Crew are medically fit to fly. The Aircraft Captain’s and crew’s medical status is known including temporary medical unfitness for flying (TMUFF) related duties considerations. This includes psychological fitness and the disposition of crew members in terms of individual human factors, including abnormal stresses and external influences which might compromise suitability for flight.

iv. Crew are trained, competent and current. The Aircraft Captain and crew authorised for each flight meet the currency, competency and training criteria relevant to the flying operation to be conducted, specifically considering aircrew competency and currency in the specific operation which is to be conducted.

5 These controls are normally implemented by the command chain and unit flying supervisors 6 Cognisant of the requirement to develop flight crew experience, additional supervising crew members may be utilised to assure suitability for flight whilst developing junior crew.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

14 AL 1

v. Crew are prepared. Crew have received, or will receive, adequate instructions, information and/or tasking details to complete the flight safely and effectively.

vi. Crew duty limitations. The flight can be performed in accordance with approved crew duty limits.

b. Flight authorisation briefing. The FLTAUTHO briefing should provide unambiguous instructions and guidance to allow the Aircraft Captain to make well-balanced decisions, while avoiding unnecessary interference with the Aircraft Captain’s legitimate decision-making responsibilities.

c. Flight authorisation record. Flight is not authorised until the flight authorisation record is documented and signed, except as allowed under verbal authorisation.

d. Flight monitoring. The minimum requirement is: i. The FLTAUTHO or other suitable person maintains oversight of the flight until

its completion.

ii. The Aircraft Captain advises the FLTAUTHO of any deviation from the bounds of the flight authorisation as soon as practicable.

e. Post-flight. The Aircraft Captain is responsible for ensuring that the post-flight details are entered in the flight authorisation record as soon as practicable after flight.

ORO.30.B. A Flight Authorisation Officer must be Type Rated to undertake flight authorisation duties.

GM to ORO.30.B – Type Rating (AUS)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the FLTAUTHO has technical mastery7 on the applicable aircraft type.

2. In addition to other MAO specified FLTAUTHO selection criteria, being Type Rated ensures a FLTAUTHO holds appropriate aircraft knowledge and experience that includes:

a. Demonstrated competency in the aircraft type’s CRE. b. Awareness of the human factors requirements of the aircraft type. c. Awareness of the particular aircraft type ‘nuances’.

3. The regulation requires initial Type Rating only. Ongoing currency requirements may be specified by the MAO.

4. Flexibility provision 1. COMAUSFLT/COMD FORCOMD/ACAUST may issue a waiver against the Type Rating if the FLTAUTHO holds or has held a Type Rating for a similar aircraft or has the technical mastery required to compensate for the lack of specific Type Rating. This exemption provides flexibility to risk manage cases where strict adherence to the regulation cannot be achieved.

5. Flexibility provision 2. The FTAA is exempt from DASR ORO.30.B for flight test activities.

ORO.40 – AERONAUTICAL LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (OAREG 2.1.9, 2.2.13) TOP

ORO.40.A The MAO must ensure an Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE) management system is established that includes:

(1) Appointment of an ALSE manager under DASR ORO.15.

7 Technical mastery is the combination of an individual’s training, knowledge, experience and skills that ensures their ability to carry out a specific employment function with a high level of competence. (Source: ADG)

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 15

(2) ALSE is authorised to reflect the roles and environmental parameters contained in the SOIU.

(3) OIP contain details of authorised ALSE and appropriate guidance on its use for the aircraft type.

(4) In conjunction with the Continuing Airworthiness Manager (CAM), proposed changes to the SOIU are assessed for any impacts they may have on ALSE.

GM to ORO.40.A – Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (AUS)

1. (8000.010 S4 C8) Introduction. ALSE differs from flying clothing in that ALSE requires servicing via a technical maintenance plan. ALSE includes the following:

a. Safety Equipment. Includes: Air Sea Rescue Kits, helmets, locator beacons and radios, personal flotation devices, cold water immersion suits, underwater breathing devices, survival aids and survival kits.

b. Mission Equipment. Includes: Anti-G suits, Night Vision Goggles, protection of eyes from laser threats, oxygen masks and restraint systems.

2. Flying clothing is generally non technical equipment and includes flying suits – both single and two piece, thermal clothing, boots, jackets, gloves and watches. Flying clothing is managed by Soldier Modernisation SPO (SMSPO) in Land Systems Division, CASG.

3. ALSE Advice. The Aeronautical Life Support Logistics Management Unit (ALSLMU) is the Defence Centre of Expertise for ALSE and will provide authoritative airworthiness advice regarding ALSE. ALSE ALSLMU can provide advice on ALSE eg earplugs or helmets, current capability and review ALSE requests. ALSLMU can also provide information on the various airworthiness issues associated with the use of ALSE .

4. Procurement of ALSE. The normal process to procure ALSE is as follows:

a. FEG HQ to submits a request to the Director or OC of the appropriate CAMO with funding.

b. The appropriate CAMO request ALSLMU support from HQAC (A8), who is ALSLMUs sponsor. A copy of the request to the ALSLMUs SPO Director who is OC MPSPO.

5. Operational ALSE Authorisation. The normal process for ALSE authorisation is for the CAMO for Defence registered aircraft and civil agencies for non–Defence registered aircraft to manage the technical risk and the MAO to manage the operational risk. When authorising ALSE the following should be taken into account.

a. Fit For Purpose. The appropriate CAMO shall satisfy itself that the proposed system is able to satisfactorily meet requirements and/or that the probability and consequences of any identified deficiencies are eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP. Operational requirements include colourings and markings; durability, fire protection characteristics, weather, dust and sand proofing, buoyancy.

b. ALSE Integration. How does the equipment fit with other worn ALSE. Does it interfere with operations.

c. Aircraft Integration. Impacts imposed by the wearing of the equipment on aircraft ingress, egress and impact on normal operations. This may include using a rescue winching equipment, weapons use etc.

d. Environmental conditions. Effect of wearing and maintaining ALSE in adverse temperature and humidity conditions (all potential climatic and aircraft environmental conditions).

e. Emergency Conditions. Are the Aircrew able to exit the aircraft in an emergency wearing the ALSE. This includes underwater egress. Post emergency egress implications should also be considered, such as buoyancy, integration with parachute systems, winching equipment etc.

f. Advice. Recommendation from ALSLMU that the equipment is fit for purpose and integrates with other ALSE and advice from the aircraft CAMO (or civil authority) that

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

16 AL 1

the equipment integrates with the aircraft and does not compromise technical airworthiness.

g. Logistics. The integrated logistics support arrangements in place including engineering venues, maintenance venues, spares parts and replacement items.

h. Funding. Funding shall be identified before any ALSE is transferred to the CASG for support.

i. Publications. Maintenance and Aircrew procedures are in place. This includes pre-flight inspections, maintenance requirements, and operating procedures.

j. Training. Aircrew and maintenance training and currency requirements are defined. 6. Crashworthiness. Consideration of the crashworthiness of the equipment for aircrew seated and restrained at crew stations and unrestrained (beyond that provided by the standard loadmaster harness) in the cargo compartment is necessary. The Authority or appropriate CAMO can provide further information on Crash Protection. ALSLMU can provide advice on restraint straps and harnesses.

ORO.40.B. Defence registered aircraft must only be operated with ALSE in accordance with the applicable OIP. (OAREG 2.2.13.a)

ORO.40.C. OIP issued under this regulation must: (OAREG 2.2.13.b)

(1) specify minimum standards of flying clothing to be worn for flight operations with aircraft types under their management

(2) identify occasions where alternate Defence uniforms may be used during flying operations, where applicable

(3) specify minimum standards of dress and grooming such that the risk of FOD, entanglement or snagging hazards are minimised.

ORO.40.D. The use of ALSE must be approved and documented by the MAO. (OAREG 2.2.13.c)

ORO.40.E. Before approving the use of ALSE or flying clothing on Defence registered and non-Defence registered aircraft the MAO must conduct and document the following: (OAREG 2.2.13.d)

(1) ALSLMU recommendation that the equipment is suitable for use in the operational application and environment.

(2) Advice from the appropriate CAMO, or clearance under the civil aviation regulations, for affected aircraft types, that the proposed equipment/clothing does not compromise the certification basis for aircrew accommodation, including but not limited to emergency egress requirements.

(3) Pre-flight inspection and on-going maintenance requirements are defined in authorised publications.

(4) Operating procedures are defined in authorised aircrew publications.

(5) Aircrew and maintenance training, endorsement and currency requirements are defined, documented and implemented.

(6) Administrative requirements appropriate for recording and monitoring of the equipment have been implemented.

(7) AVRM assessment has been conducted to demonstrate that the technical and operational integrity of the equipment proposed for use is acceptable in the operational context.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 17

ORO.50 – AIRCRAFT CREWING (OAREG 2.2.2) TOP

ORO.50.A. Defence registered aircraft must be crewed in accordance with minimum and normal crew compositions promulgated by the MAO. (OAREG 2.2.2.a)

GM to ORO.50.A Aircraft Crewing (AUS)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that aircraft are suitably crewed to deal with normal operation and foreseeable emergencies so as not to compromise suitability for flight. Aircrew crew composition (normal and minimum) should be identified for the different tasks or missions a capability may perform and stipulated in relevant Orders, Instructions or Publications. (8000.010 s4 c5)

2. Aviation safety occurrences. All crew members have a responsibility to clearly advise the aircraft captain of any circumstance that may compromise the safety of a flight. Where the captain does not properly report a flight safety compromise or breach, it is incumbent on the other crew members to ensure that the authorising officer and aviation safety officer are informed. (8000.010 s4 c5)

3. Defence members crewing non-defence aircraft. Defence aircrew may fly on duty as crew in aircraft operating outside of the scope of the DASP provided the flight will further their Service knowledge and experience and that any pre-conditions imposed by the operating authority are satisfied. (8000.010 s4 c5)

ORO.50.B. Aircraft crews operating Defence registered aircraft must be trained, qualified, competent and authorised in accordance with DASR Aircrew. (OAREG 2.2.2.b)

ORO.50.C. Foreign military aircrew operation of Defence registered aircraft must only be approved by the MAO on the basis that the aircraft will be operated in accordance with the requirements of a Defence FMS. (OAREG 2.2.2.c)

ORO.50.D. Civilian aircrew operation of Defence registered aircraft must only be approved by the MAO on the basis of: (OAREG 2.2.2.d)

(1) Identification and attainment of prerequisite civil and military training, qualifications and competency.

(2) Familiarity and adherence to applicable Defence, single-Service and type related OIPs.

(3) Identification and provision of flying clothing and ALSE necessary to crew the aircraft type.

(4) Approval is provided under the appropriate flight authorisation system.

GM to ORO.50.D - Civilian aircrew operation of Defence registered aircraft (AUS)

1. Non-Defence registered aircraft covered by Implementation Procedure for Australian Civil Registered Aircraft Operated as State Aircraft and Aircrew Licensing may be operated in accordance CASA/Defence agreement, see ACPA website for details. (GM in OAREG 2.2.2)

2. Civilian aircrew medical fitness is to be IAW DASR MED.

TOP

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

18 AL 1

ORO.55 – AIRCRAFT CAPTAINCY (OAREG 2.2.3) TOP

ORO.55.A. An aircraft captain must be assigned for each flight and must be one of the following: (OAREG 2.2.3.a)

(1) a qualified pilot endorsed on the aircraft type and certified as a captain by the commander of the operating unit

(2) a qualified pilot undergoing an approved conversion training course on the aircraft type

(3) a trainee pilot undergoing an approved pilot training course.

ORO.55.B. An aircraft captain is responsible for the safe and effective operation of the aircraft in carrying out the assigned task. (OAREG 2.2.3.b)

GM to ORO.55.B – Aircraft Captaincy (AUS)

1. The aircraft captain is in the unique position of being the only person on the aircraft who must be aware of all the factors and operational constraints affecting their particular flight. The aircraft captain is assigned command of the aircraft and is legally responsible for the safe and effective operation of the aircraft in performing its mission. Being accountable for the safety of the aircraft and its crew and passengers while underway, the captain has authority over all persons on board, regardless of their rank.

AMC to ORO.55.B – Aircraft Captaincy (AUS)

Authority of Aircraft Captain (AAP 8000.010 S4 C6)

1. Within the bounds of section 28 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFDA), all other legal orders and the scope of the flight authorisation, the authorised aircraft captain has total responsibility for the safe and effective operation of an aircraft. The aircraft captain therefore has authority over all persons on board, irrespective of rank, for the period of operation of the aircraft.

2. Flying instructors. In any aircraft in which dual controls are fitted and instruction is being given, the instructor should be designated as aircraft captain, and has authority, irrespective of rank, over the student or pilot to whom instruction is being given in all matters concerning the operation of the aircraft. Where the instructor is non-pilot aircrew, the pilot will be designated captain.

Duties and Responsibilities of Aircraft Captain (AAP 8000.010 S4 C6)

3. In flight. An aircraft captain is responsible for the effective operation of the aircraft in meeting the assigned task. In particular, the captain is to:

a. ensure that they have received sufficient pre-flight detail by way of tasking information, authorisation guidance, mission briefing, and/or curriculum description

b. conduct an adequate pre-flight briefing for any crew c. ensure the requirements of all orders, instructions, regulations and publications

relating to the aircraft and its operation are observed

d. conduct a post-flight crew debrief e. notify the authorising officer of any unusual occurrences or deviations from the flight

authorisation.

4. Aircraft marshalling. While taxiing an aircraft under the guidance of a marshaller, the aircraft captain retains overall responsibility for its safe operation. The aircraft captain should follow the marshaller’s directions except where the aircraft captain considers that, in so doing,

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 19

the safety or effective operation of the aircraft would be compromised. The aircraft captain should stop the aircraft at once if, whilst receiving marshalling directions, sight of, or confidence in, the marshaller is lost.

5. Aircraft serviceability and flight safety. The aircraft captain is responsible for ensuring that the aircraft serviceability state, as indicated by the Certificate of Release to service and associated documentation, is adequate for the safe conduct of the flight.

6. In–flight occurrences. Occurrences outside the scope of the flight authorisation should be handled in accordance with the flight manual and applicable OIP if possible. Where that guidance is insufficient or inappropriate, aircraft captains should exercise their best judgement and use all the resources at their disposal to ensure the safe recovery of their aircraft, crew and passengers. As soon as circumstances allow, the authorising officer should be contacted for advice, or informed, when a captain finds it necessary to deviate from the flight authorisation given. During normal peacetime operations, captains should give overriding consideration to flight safety during any deviation from flight authorisation.

7. Passenger and cargo requirements. The aircraft captain is responsible for all aspects associated with the carriage of passengers and cargo, appropriate Service specific OIP and other approved publications relevant to the carriage of passengers and cargo.

8. In-flight transfer of Captaincy. The in-flight transfer of aircraft captaincy is an undesirable practice which should be avoided if possible. However, where the in-flight transfer of aircraft captaincy becomes necessary for the successful completion of a task, the authorising officer should:

a. clearly indicate to both pilots the point in the flight that aircraft captaincy transfer is to occur

b. record the transfer details in appropriate documentation. 9. To make sure there is no uncertainty concerning who is acting as aircraft captain at various stages of the flight or task, all pilots involved should:

a. advise all crew members on intended aircraft captaincy transfer arrangements during the pre-flight briefing

b. conduct a formal ‘hand-over/take-over’ of the aircraft captaincy c. advise all crew members when the aircraft captaincy transfer is actually completed.

ORO.55.C. An aircraft captain must: (OAREG 2.2.3.c)

(1) ensure they have received sufficient pre-flight detail by way of tasking information, authorisation guidance, mission briefing, or curriculum description

(2) conduct an adequate pre-flight briefing for any crew

(3) ensure the aircraft and ancillary equipment is serviceable, a certificate of release to service has been issued at the completion of any maintenance and the aircraft accepted for the flight

(4) ensure the requirements of all OIPs relating to the aircraft and its operation are observed and obeyed

(5) ensure the flight is conducted in accordance with authorised sequences, and relevant OIP

(6) deal with occurrences outside the scope of the flight authorisation in accordance with the flight manual, SI and the principles of good airmanship

(7) use all the resources at their disposal to ensure the safe recovery of their aircraft, crew and passengers

(8) contact the authorising officer for advice and guidance when necessary to deviate from the flight authorisation given, as soon as circumstances allow

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

20 AL 1

(9) conduct a post-flight crew debrief

(10) notify the authorising officer of any unusual occurrences or deviations from the flight authorisation

(11) comply with post-flight documentary requirements.

ORO.55.D. OIP issued under this regulation must identify: (OAREG 2.2.3.d)

(1) the responsibilities of aircraft captains

(2) the authority of the aircraft captain in all circumstances relating to flying operations

(3) the responsibilities of the aircraft captain in relation to cargo and passengers

(4) considerations for flight authorisation regarding firearms and ammunition carried aboard Defence registered aircraft, the authorised degree of weapon readiness and method of carriage

(5) the circumstances and requirements under which an in-flight transfer of captaincy may occur, including a mechanism to record the transfer in the appropriate documentation.

ORO.60 – PROVISION AND USE OF OXYGEN IN AIRCRAFT (OAREG 2.2.16) TOP

ORO.60.A. The MAO must establish an oxygen management system that ensures appropriate provision and use of oxygen systems on Defence aircraft.

GM to ORO.60.A Oxygen Management System (AUS)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure suitability for flight is not comprised due to lack of supplemental oxygen for use when required by crew or passengers on Defence aircraft.

2. For Defence aircraft that are not Defence registered, unless agreement exists with CASA that assigns oversight responsibility of the aircraft operation to Defence, or the aircraft is not deemed a State aircraft, the MAO may rely upon the oxygen management provisions required by CASA.

3. The regulatory outcome required is not intended to replace formal aviation medicine training requirements. For example, detailed decompression illness (DCI) knowledge and treatments. In developing the oxygen management system, DCI references should be balanced by limiting oxygen management system to general prevention measures, leaving the more detailed awareness and procedures to be prescribed by aviation medicine regulation outcomes.

AMC to ORO.60.A – Oxygen Management System (AUS)

Controls

1. The oxygen management system controls should include:

a. Direction on determination of appropriate supplemental oxygen supply duration periods and system design as relates to flight crew, other crew and passengers.

b. Ejection seat aircraft occupants are provided a correctly fitted oxygen mask and that maximum use of the oxygen mask is achieved to the extent practical during flight.

c. A suitable supplemental oxygen dispensing system within easy reach of the personnel carried onboard the aircraft. Pressurised aircraft may have different oxygen systems than unpressurised aircraft.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 21

d. Methods for calculating supplementary oxygen requirements. Calculations may consider aircraft performance characteristics WRT to emergency requirements as a balance to total quantities of oxygen carried.

e. Oxygen training requirements, unless covered under other OIP. f. Pre-flight briefing requirements by a suitably qualified person that may include

appropriate briefings and demonstrations in the use of the oxygen system.

g. For pressurised aircraft, direction that ensures enhanced emergency response for the pre–fitment of oxygen masks. Examples include:

i. Above 35 000 ft AMSL: At least one pilot is seated at the flight controls using an oxygen mask, unless the aircraft is fitted with a quick donning mask system.

ii. Above 41 000 ft AMSL: If one pilot has to leave a pilot control position, the remaining pilot uses an oxygen mask until the other pilot has returned to the pilot control position.

iii. Above 45,000 ft AMSL: At least one pilot will use an oxygen mask at all times.

iv. Pre-flight briefs for passengers on use of the passenger supplemental oxygen systems.

h. Other mitigating considerations as may relate to aircraft type design aspects that may also achieve desired outcomes.

i. Advice relating to high altitude management procedures for levels above 21 000 ft CA that reduces the risk of DCI. AMC 2 provides examples.

j. Direction that should loss of cabin pressure occur above 25 000 ft AMSL, and the aircraft oxygen system capability can support all crew and passengers (if carried) if the aircraft will remain at this level, that the time spent above that 25 000 ft CA should be kept to a minimum.

High Altitude Exposure Management

2. In the absence of other DCI risk factors, such as underwater diving within 48 hours of flight time, including use of self contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA), and noting that DCI actually can occur at a lower altitude, the risk of DCI is considered very low at or below 21 000 ft CA without the need for 100% oxygen or flight restrictions.

3. Flight above 21 000 ft CA or rapid changes in cabin altitude can lead to an increased risk of DCI, which is influenced by a variety of individual and environmental factors. Above 21 000 ft CA controls that may reduce the risk of DCI include:

a. Pre–oxygenation. Medical evidence suggests that the DCI risk is significant enough to require 20 minutes of pre-oxygenation with 100 %8 oxygen completed before ascending above 21 000 ft CA. Pre-oxygenation may commence on the ground prior to take off and continued during the climb. Where pre-oxygenation has not been possible, emergency ascents above 21 000 ft CA without pre-oxygenation may only occur if deemed an operational imperative. Time should be limited, 100% oxygen should be applied, and the maximum time above 21 000 ft CA should not exceed the time limits specified in Table–19.

b. 100% oxygen. Use of 100% oxygen during flight when practicable Aircraft equipped with irregular oxygen systems that prevent the use of 100% oxygen for pre-oxygenation, or other aspects of exposure to high altitude requirements, should have alternative RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine endorsed DCI risk reduction procedures published in type specific OIP that provide an equivalent level of DCI protection.

8 Aircraft utilising on board oxygen generation systems (OBOGS) are unlikely to achieve 100% oxygen output. When OBOGS is used, the maximum oxygen concentration output achieved is sufficient when the AMC refers to 100% oxygen. 9 Table 1 limits primarily refers to TMUFF limitations, but also afford DCI protection by not exceeding the limits at all.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

22 AL 1

c. Time at altitude. After pre-oxygenation, time limits above 21 000 ft CA are applied as specified in Table–1. The time above 21 000 ft CA is based on the highest cabin altitude reached during the sortie. Pilots should descend to or below 10 000 ft CA before the Table–1 time limit is reached. Any breach of Table–1 limits requires an AVMO assessment before conducting further flight and appropriate safety reporting.

d. Time between re–exposures within a sortie. Time spent at or below 10 000 ft CA resets the allowable duration above 21 000 ft CA at a one-for-one rate. For example, when aircrew spend 60 minutes at 23 000 CA and descend to 10 000 ft CA or below for 60 minutes, they regain 60 minutes of exposure time and may climb above 21 000 ft CA and operate at 23 000 ft CA for a further 120 minutes (allowable at Table 1) before having to descend again. To ensure reduced DCI risk, use of 100% oxygen when resetting for exposure within a sortie, including below 10 000 ft CA, is required.

e. Subsequent sorties. Risk of DCI is significantly higher for re-exposure because post-flight time not spent on 100 % oxygen reintroduces nitrogen into the oxygen system due to the high nitrogen content of ambient air. Following flight above 21 000 ft CA, within the Table–1 time limits, crew or passengers may only conduct further sorties unrestricted providing CA exposure does not exceed 21 000 ft CA again within the next 24 hour period.

Table 1 – Above 21 000 ft CA time limits

TIME IN MINUTES CABIN ALTITUDE (FT)

45 24 001 – 25 000

70 23 001 – 24 000

120 22 001 – 23 000

200 21 001 – 22 000

Very High Altitude Exposure Management Procedures

4. Flight at altitudes above 25 000 ft CA may not be conducted without MAO approval as this incurs a significantly increased risk of DCI.

5. MAO may not approve Sustained flight above 25 000 ft CA unless special operational reasons exist. Approval considerations should consider Single Service Aviation Medicine Advisor (SSAMA) advice.

6. Operations at altitudes above 50 000 ft AMSL may require provision of appropriate counter pressure garments to assist positive pressure breathing.

ORO.60.B. The MAO must ensure that flight crew who are occupants of flight crew seats on flight crew compartment duty use supplemental oxygen above 10 000 ft cabin altitude.

GM to ORO.60.B – Flight Crew Oxygen Requirements (AUS)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that reduced levels of oxygen do not introduce physiologically based flight crew deficiencies that could compromise suitability for flight. The regulation does not consider mission capability beyond airworthiness aspects and specifically addresses only the flight crew who are holding primary control of aircraft flight systems. If deemed necessary, the MAO may expand those flight crew members who are deemed to be actively conducting essential flight crew duties. In this manner, the regulator does not impose potentially unneeded aircraft design features.

2. The regulation does not discriminate between pressurised or non-pressurised aircraft as a cabin altitude above 10 000 ft CA presents the same hazard to the flight crew of both aircraft types and therefore requires the same controls. For example, military operations in a pressurised aircraft may require the Aircraft Captain to authorise depressurisation of the aircraft environment at altitudes above 10 000 ft CA in order to achieve a mission requirement, such as parachute operations. This is equivalent to a non-pressurised aircraft being operated above 10 000 ft CA or a cabin pressurisation failure above 10 000 ft AMSL.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 23

3. Flexibility Provision. The MAO may approve flight above 10 000 ft CA if required due to operational reasons, where the aircraft is not equipped with an adequate supplemental oxygen system.

AMC to ORO.60.B – Flight Crew Oxygen Requirements (AUS)

1. Oxygen management system controls should include:

a. The supplemental oxygen supply is sufficient to ensure availability for the entire time cabin altitude is above 10 000 ft CA if a planned operation, or 15 minutes as a minimum period to allow descent to 10 000 ft CA in an emergency

b. Pre-flight calculation should include the anticipated flight profiles above 10 000 ft CA, planned depressurisation aspects, and potential emergency descent profiles required to descend the aircraft to 10 000 ft CA.

c. To ensure flight crew are able to achieve access to supplemental oxygen when required the oxygen system should include:

i. Individual oxygen dispensing units that are connected to the oxygen supply terminal can be readily and visually checked for the flow and quantity of available oxygen and are available for immediate use.

ii. A quick donning mask that can be placed on the face with one hand from the ready position within five seconds10, properly secured, sealed and supplying oxygen.

iii. The mask should be a pressure demand type mask .Use of a diluter demand pressure breathing regulator design is not mandatory.

iv. An ability to access the aircraft communications system simultaneously with the use of oxygen.

v. A portable oxygen system, sufficient supply hose, or spare oxygen outlets and masks to ensure immediate availability of oxygen for flight crew members who are required to move around in the aircraft to perform essential flight crew duties. For example, a loadmaster who must oversight a parachute extraction mission and the aircraft is depressurised above 10 000 ft AMSL.

ORO.60.C. The MAO must ensure passengers and crew not regulated under ORO.60.B use supplemental oxygen whenever:

(1) flight above 10 000 ft cabin altitude but not above 13 000 ft cabin altitude exceeds 30 minutes, or

(2) flight is above 13 000 ft cabin altitude.

GM to ORO.60.C – Supplemental Oxygen Requirements (AUS)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that reduced levels of oxygen do not introduce physiologically harm to passengers and crew.

2. The regulation does not discriminate between pressurised or non-pressurised aircraft as flight above 10 000 ft CA presents the same hazard to the passengers and crew of both aircraft types and therefore requires the same controls.

3. This regulation does not consider safety procedures and equipment for mission essential passengers who are intending to egress an aircraft above 10 000 ft CA, such as parachute operations. Should mission essential personnel be equipped with mission commander authorised self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for use upon egress of the aircraft, the SCBA may also be used as the onboard aircraft support system for those personnel.

10 Excludes the time period required to remove protective helmets that may interfere with donning the mask. In such cases, AVMED advice should be sought to ascertain if anticipated time limits will not exceed safe limits.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

24 AL 1

AMC to ORO.60.C - Supplemental Oxygen Requirements (AUS)

1. Oxygen supply durations, means of supply and other considerations may be provided under ORO.60 outcomes. Defence aircraft are not always constructed to civil design standards; however, use of any recognised NAA standard for the provision of oxygen, or a hybrid of more than one such standard, which may achieve the required outcome may be used provided technical endorsement and approval has been obtained by the appropriate CAMO..

2. If not considered as part of the initial Military Type Certification, and depending on the complexity of the design, the introduction of a new passenger supplemental oxygen system could be undertaken as:

a. a change to the Military Type-certificate (MTC), b. a (Military) Supplemental Type-Certificate, c. a modification, or d. approved role equipment (see GM to ORO.75 – Use of Aircraft Role Equipment

(AUS) for guidance on role equipment.)

ORO.65 – CARRIAGE AND USE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (OAREG 2.2.8) TOP

ORO.65.A. The MAO must ensure that electronic equipment is only carried and used in accordance with approved Defence OIP that includes: (OAREG 2.2.8.a - b)

(1) the requirements for carriage and operation of non-standard electronic devices for operational use by aircrew

(2) the requirements for carriage and operation of portable electronic devices by passengers.

GM to ORO.65.A – Authorised Electronic Equipment (AUS)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that electronic equipment that is not part of the aircraft configuration and is carried aboard an aircraft does not introduce hazards including: electromagnetic interference, overloaded electrical systems, electrical fumes, or battery fires.

2. In the context of this regulation, ‘electronic equipment’ includes all electrical equipment that may be operated in flight by a passenger or crew member, which is not part of an authorised role fit or has not been authorised or cleared for flight in the relevant aircraft. Electronic equipment may include:

a. personal electronic devices such as laptop computers or tablets b. communication devices such as mobile telephones and wireless transmitters c. medical or monitoring equipment not authorised as role equipment for an

aeromedical role.

ORO.70 – CARRIAGE OF PERSONNEL ON DEFENCE AIRCRAFT (OAREG 2.2.9) TOP

ORO.70.A. The MAO must ensure a system is established that assures the carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft will not compromise suitability for flight. (OAREG 2.2.9.a)

GM to ORO.70.A - Carriage of Personnel in Defence Aircraft (AUS)

1. Purpose. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that carriage of personnel on Defence aircraft using approved aircraft restraints and seating systems is conducted so that suitability for

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 25

flight is not compromised, with emphasis on eliminating or otherwise minimising risk SFARP regarding loss of life or injury to personnel carried on the aircraft.11 (AAP 8000.010 S4 C9)

2. Exemption. This regulation does not apply to flight crew, who are managed under other approved OIP, such as the aircraft flight manual.

3. Equipment Inclusion. Carriage of personnel includes any required equipment a person must use or control to achieve an assigned mission outcome. For example, parachutes or dive equipment. Such equipment is restrained by the owning person, with direction and assistance of a relevant crew member as may be appropriate. Equipment handed over to flight crew to restrain is treated as cargo and not managed under this regulation.

AMC to ORO.70.A - Carriage of Personnel in Defence Aircraft (AUS)

1. While aircraft configuration and mission requirements will vary, the system controls should:

a. Address the hazards that are present when personnel are carried on Defence aircraft.

b. Vary depending on whether the person is classified as mission crew or passenger, noting mission crew may not have the equivalent training as flight crew regarding aircraft operations.

c. Where appropriate, consider and utilise requirements that exist to support carriage of personnel in civil registered aircraft. For example, a civil registered A340 used to transport troops will already be under CASA oversight, alleviating the need for Defence to produce additional controls, or minimising any additional treatments that may be desired.

System Controls

2. System controls supporting development of a carriage of personnel control system may include:

a. Approval authorities. A system that delegates decisions to carry personnel on Defence aircraft using approved restraints and seating to airworthiness appointments and/or relevant command appointments.12 Approval authorities should be able to:

i. determine the classification of personnel

ii. approve the carriage of personnel13

iii. if required, assess documentation that supports judgement of an individual’s fitness for flight and the suitability of the aircraft for carriage of such personnel.

b. Safety assessments. Consideration of safety risks apply equally regarding personnel carriage on operations or during training. Similarly, when engaged on operations, in addition to the aircraft captain, the operational commander should be jointly responsible for eliminating or otherwise minimising the safety risk to personnel SFARP.

c. Dedicated seats or crew stations. Personnel should only be carried in dedicated seats or crew stations in accordance with an aircraft’s approved SOIU CRE14. Considerations include:

i. passenger capacity and seating configurations

11 OAR Decision Brief of 16 Dec 14 (AB20660751). 12 Delegation via command authority is less restrictive than delegation via airworthiness appointments, thereby affording increased flexibility. 13 In deciding whether a passenger will be granted carriage, the guiding principle for the approving authority is that such carriage is of benefit to, or in the interests of, Defence. Where delegated approving authorities have any doubt as to the eligibility of an applicant for travel on Defence aircraft, the request should be forwarded to a higher authority for decision. 14 Carriage of personnel may be authorised in non-standard aircraft seating under DASR ORO.70.B.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

26 AL 1

ii. any passenger capacity limitations due to restricted access to emergency exits by cargo or role equipment

iii. requirement for the use of seatbelts, harnesses and aircraft fittings and equipment.

d. Classification of personnel. Personnel are classified as crew or passengers, from which risk levels should be determined. Classifying personnel travelling in Defence aircraft with precision assures that the requirement for an individual’s presence onboard an aircraft is balanced against the hazards of the aviation activity15. For example, the treatment of risk for a mission essential passenger may be different to that of passenger, as one must fly while the other need not.

e. Classifying sub-categories of passengers. When not classified as mission essential, passenger sub-categories can improve awareness of increased risks regarding carriage of a particular passenger type in a crew station or in a specific aircraft type. For example, opportunity travel, VIP, Defence personnel, foreign Defence personnel, Commonwealth employees, external service providers, other non-Defence personnel.

f. Restricting non-Defence personnel from acting as crew. Non-Defence personnel should not be permitted to fly as crew on Defence aircraft without approval from an appropriate authority.

g. Training mission crew and mission essential passengers. Identifying and training personnel who travel frequently on Defence aircraft may be considered a way of managing increased risk exposure.

h. Restrictions regarding flights of a hazardous nature. Unless classified as crew or a mission essential passenger, personnel should be not be authorised for carriage on flights of a hazardous nature. Hazardous flights may include test flights, low level operations, operational missions, certain types of dangerous cargo carriage and display flying.

i. Restrictions regarding flight crew stations. Before approving carriage of passengers in flight crew stations, where the presence of the passenger could compromise flight safety, consideration should be given to:

i. the potential for passengers to access aircraft systems or equipment which may jeopardise the aircraft safety

ii. the possibility of interference with essential crew functions.

j. Pre-flight briefings. Defence has a duty of care for the carriage of passengers who may be unaware of basic aircraft safety requirements. Personnel should be briefed on aspects relating to passenger safety by an authorised person, normally a crew member. At a minimum, all personnel should be instructed on how to use restraint and seating systems and how to operate relevant safety systems, such as emergency oxygen masks. Consideration should be given to comfort breaks, repositioning within the aircraft during flight and other reasons a person may be required to move within an aircraft during flight time. Additionally, an authorised person should brief passengers seated in crew stations on:

i. flight profiles and sequence of events, especially those sequences that may cause concern

ii. emergency procedures

iii. any controls or switches that the passenger may be asked to operate

iv. securing or stowage of loose items.

k. Personnel are fit to fly. This particularly applies to fast jet aircraft as such aircraft will expose individuals to higher physiological stresses than transport aircraft or rotary wing aircraft. Medical checks should be considered on advice of medical SME.

15 Definitions for crew, passenger and mission essential are requirements of the COI into the CH–47F crash in AFG 30 May 11 – recommendations 8 and 9.

DRAF

T

IR–AIR OPERATIONS DASR ORO

AL 1 27

l. Use of aeronautical life support equipment (ALSE) and/or personal protective equipment (PPE). Use of such ALSE and PPE includes training in its use prior to flight.

m. Minimum levels of qualification. Minimum flight crew composition and qualification requirements should be specified that support the safe carriage of passengers

n. Restricting the carriage of loose articles. Requirements for carriage, stowing and restricted items should be defined to ensure FOD hazards are minimised.

o. Personnel supervision requirement. Ratio of supervising flight crew to passengers is defined, particularly with respect to cabin crew vs. passengers on those flights dedicated to passenger transport activities. While CASA standards provide an acceptable means of compliance for this ratio, mission requirements may dictate differing ratios from civil practice.

p. Requirements for the carriage of infants, sick or injured personnel, and handicapped personnel. Any increased requirement for supervising crew members, or competent passengers, to assist in the evacuation of personnel with limited mobility should be considered.

Compliance Examples

3. Examples of a management system supporting the carr