In a recent article published as part of Kansas History’s “Review Essay Series,”historian James Leiker surveyed the existing scholarship dealing with racerelations in Kansas. In his conclusion, he aptly summarized the research bydeclaring that the state was a “paradox” because Kansans’ racial attitudeswere “neither consistent nor monolithic.” Due to the complexities of the sub-

ject, Leiker emphasized the need for further study of various groups, indicating thateach survey should take into consideration the impact of local factors.1

A detailed exploration of the campaign to create a segregated high school inKansas City, Kansas, illustrates the benefit of such an approach. The campaign re-veals that an overwhelming majority of the city’s white residents favored the ex-pansion of segregation. The caution and detachment displayed by those who fa-vored the separation, however, suggests that these Kansans’ racial mores were unique compared with other regions.Although race was the real issue, even the most ardent supporters of the Kansas City campaign publicly denied their ownprejudice, emphasizing instead the overcrowded conditions of the current school or the racial attitudes of others that madethe separation necessary. While most whites attempted to disavow their own racial antipathies by insisting that separa-

188 KANSAS HISTORY

by David J. Peavler

Drawing theColor Line inKansas City

The Creation ofSumner High School

David Peavler earned his master’s degree in history from Emporia State University in 2003 and currently is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Kansas. Hisresearch interests include early twentieth-century race relations in the Midwest. Peavler recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq with a firefighting group from the190th out of Topeka.

The author would like to thank staff members at the Kansas State Historical Society and the Kansas City, Kansas, Board of Education, Debra Dan-dridge at Spencer Research Library, John Sacher, and Kelly Kramer.

1. James N. Leiker, “Race Relations in the Sunflower State,” Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 25 (Autumn 2002): 236. For an overview ofrecent scholarship on Kansas history relating not only to race and ethnicity but also gender and other issues, see Rita G. Napier, “Rethinking the Past,Reimagining the Future,” ibid. 24 (Autumn 2001): 218–47.

Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 27 (Autumn 2005): 188–201.

Kansas. They did not wish to participate in the freestate/proslavery contest and hoped to avoid the escalating“border war.” Like any group of immigrants, Kansanswere more likely to share the racial antipathies of the re-gions they came from than shed their beliefs upon crossingthe Missouri River. These various attitudes would be man-ifest throughout the early years of the state, making therace question a contentious issue long after the question ofslavery was resolved.2

DRAWING THE COLOR LINE IN KANSAS CITY 189

tion would benefit students of both races, most membersof the black community clearly understood the intent ofthe plan and the consequences for their children. Thesemen and women organized an extraordinary resistancemovement that utilized the legislative, executive, and judi-cial branches of the state government.

Despite the popular image of territorial Kansas as anabolitionist stronghold, historians have demonstrated thattrue abolitionists made up a fraction of the population.With rare exceptions, even the most radical within thisgroup rejected notions of racial equality. Early settlerscame to the region for land or other opportunities in

An early group of Sumner High School students.

2. Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Repub-lican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970),301–17; Leiker, “Race Relations in the Sunflower State,” 214–36; Paul E.

Although most white Kansans were opposed to theidea of social equality for blacks—a condition many fearedmight occur after years of social interaction by attendingthe same theatres, living in the same neighborhoods, andsending their children to the same schools—many wereequally uncomfortable with the outright denial of suchbasic needs. Segregation offered a “compromise” in itschimerical promises of separate but equal, yet demograph-ic trends in the late nineteenth century, not to mention statelaw, made broad implementation of such a system nearlyimpossible. By the turn of the century, however, the largestcities in the state each had sizable black populations withKansas City’s growing black communities representing 13percent of all its citizens. Although this actually was asmaller percentage than many eastern cities in the state,Kansas City’s total black population was still larger thanthose of Lawrence, Leavenworth, and Wichita combined.3

Unlike many areas of the nation at the turn of the cen-tury, racial segregation in Kansas was far from universal.Few white Kansans spoke out against the informal and defacto forms of segregation that existed within neighbor-hoods and public spaces, but attempts to codify racialmores were rare. The Kansas legislature passed a series ofschool laws that usually allowed but did not require racialsegregation and finally settled on an 1879 statute that per-mitted segregation at the elementary level only withincities of the first class (those with a population greater thanfifteen thousand). But the law was enforced only uponsmaller communities if plaintiffs endured lengthy courtproceedings. Although some communities maintainedvarious schemes of racially segregated schools outside thelaw, other cities such as Emporia and Hutchinson refused

to entertain the practice even after reaching the populationlevel where such a system was permitted.4

Given this ambivalent legacy as background, it is notsurprising to find that in February 1905 a law was passedgranting the school district of Kansas City, Kansas, an ex-emption from the state law, which prohibited racial segre-gation at the high school level.5 Contrary to his professedbeliefs, an apologetic Governor Edward W. Hoch signedthe bill after offering a duplicitous explanation of his ac-tions as an attempt to distance himself from the campaign.Echoing the statements of many white Kansans who ner-vously endorsed the separation, the governor referred tosegregation as “a great step backwards” which he felt hadbeen made necessary by the beliefs and actions of lessermen. Despite a well-organized campaign led by the mem-bers of the black community, Sumner High School wouldsoon open its doors as the first and only legally segregatedhigh school in Kansas. Its enrollment would remain nearly100 percent African American until the late 1970s.6

Although the grammar schools of Kansas City, Kansas,were completely segregated by 1890, the same state lawthat permitted this practice in cities with more than fifteenthousand residents specifically forbade it at the highschool level. The fact that so few students of any race at-tended high school prior to the turn of the century madeseparation at this level rather impractical. Most whiteKansans could tolerate a handful of black students withintheir nascent high schools, but rising enrollment and therapid growth of the black community at the end of thenineteenth century led some whites to question thisarrangement. Besides, Kansas City High School was be-coming overcrowded, and advocates for a segregated high

190 KANSAS HISTORY

Wilson, A Time to Lose: Representing Kansas in Brown v. Board of Education(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 30; Bill Cecil-Fronsman,“‘Advocate the Freedom of White Men, As Well As That of Negroes’: TheKansas Free State and Antislavery Westerners in Territorial Kansas,”Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 20 (Summer 1997): 105.

3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census: Population, 1900 (Wash-ington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, General ServicesAdministration, 1996). The state constitution and probably most Kansanssupported the principle of education for all children, albeit on a segregat-ed basis in those areas that had large minority populations. The mostcomprehensive survey of this subject appears is James Carothers Carper,“The Published Opinions of Kansans Concerning Education, 1854–1900”(Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, 1977). See also Carper, “The PopularIdeology of Segregated Schooling: Attitudes Toward the Education ofBlacks in Kansas, 1854–1900,” Kansas History: A Journal of the CentralPlains 1 (Winter 1978): 254–65.

4. For studies of individual Kansas communities, see Thomas C. Cox,Blacks in Topeka, Kansas, 1865–1915: A Social History (Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Judith Laird, “Argentine, Kansas:The Evolution of a Mexican–American Community, 1905–1940” (Ph.D.diss., University of Kansas, 1975); Nupur Chaudhuri, “’We All Seem LikeBrothers and Sisters’: The African–American Community in Manhattan,

Kansas, 1865–1940,” Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 14 (Win-ter 1991–1992): 270–88; Sondra Van Meter, “Black Resistance to Segrega-tion in the Wichita Public Schools, 1870–1912,” The Midwest Quarterly 20(Autumn, 1978): 64–77.

5. Wilson, A Time to Lose, 32–42; Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: TheHistory of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equal-ity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 371; Daniel G. Neuenswander, “ALegal History of Segregation in the Kansas Public Schools From State-hood to 1970” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1973); Bernard D. Reamsand Paul E. Wilson, “Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment in theStates: A Survey of State Segregation Laws 1865–1953,” document pre-pared for the United States Supreme Court in re: Brown v. Board of Educa-tion of Topeka, 1975, 183–93; Mary L. Dudziak, “The Limits of Good Faith:Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas, 1950–1956,” Law and History Review 5(1987): 357–62; J. Morgan Kousser, “Before Plessy, Before Brown: The De-velopment of the Law of Racial Integration in Louisiana and Kansas,” inToward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions, ed. Paul Finkelmanand Stephen Gottlieb (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 213–70;Topeka Plaindealer, February 3, March 3, 1905.

6. “Message From the Governor,” Kansas House Journal, February 22,1905, 723; Kansas City Times, May 29, 1978.

DRAWING THE COLOR LINE IN KANSAS CITY 191

7. While black scholars constituted 17 percent of the school-age population in 1889, black enrollment made up less than 5percent of the enrollment of Kansas City High School. By the time of RoyMartin’s death, that percentage remained the same in the grammarschools but had increased to 9 percent in the high school representing sev-enty-four black students. Kansas State Board of Education, Annual Report,July 31, 1889 (Wyandott, Kans.: Department of Public Instruction, 1889);Annual Report of First Class Cities to the State Superintendent of Education,June 30, 1904; Kansas General Statutes (1901): 1258; William W. Boone, AHistory of Black Education in Kansas City, Kansas (Kansas City: Kansas CityKansas Community College, 1986); Columbian History of Education inKansas (Topeka: Hamilton Printing Co., 1893), 229.

8. Several conflicting records exist regarding the death of Roy Mar-tin. The proceedings of his trial have disappeared, and the only record ofLouis Gregory that exists at the Wyandotte County Courthouse is a log-book listing case numbers. Gregory’s case, number 3188, was omittedfrom the microfilm record. See Kansas State Penitentiary. Record of Pris-oners Received In. ser. II, 205, Library and Archives Division, Kansas StateHistorical Society; Kansas City Journal, April 13, 14, 1904; Kim Warren,“Education for Citizenship: African Americans and Native Americans inKansas, 1865–1935” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2003), 196–98; “TheYesterdays of Sumner,” special supplement to Kansas City Voice, June8–14, 1978; Susan D. Greenbaum, The Afro-American Community in KansasCity, Kansas (N.p.: City of Kansas City, Kans., 1982), 62–65; DennisLawrence, “The Impact of Local, State and Federal Government Decisionson the Segregation and Subsequent Integration of Sumner High School inKansas City, Kansas” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1997); Scottie P.Davis, The Story of Sumner High School (Kansas City, Kans.: N.p., 1935).

school to accommodate the nearly one hundred black sec-ondary students were occasionally heard. If racial tensionexisted within the school itself, however, it was not mani-fest until 1904 when a seemingly unrelated episode gavepretext for its expression.7

Several different versions of the events of Tuesday af-ternoon, April 12, 1904, exist, but no amountof revision could change the only fact that

mattered to the majority of Kansas City’s whitepopulation. Roy Martin, a popular white student ofKansas City High School, had been killed by LouisGregory, an eighteen-year-old black employee ofthe Swift meat packing plant. Gregory had shotMartin with a revolver that he carried for protec-tion on his way to and from work. Martin, who feltlittle need for such protection among his whiteteammates at Kerr Park, started the altercation thatled to the deadly shooting.8

The hyperbole of the local press intensified theindignation of Martin’s classmates and other com-munity members. Some reporters portrayed theevent as racially motivated, using headlines such as“School Boy Shot Down in Cold Blood by Gregory,the Negro.” Although there had never been aracially motivated lynching in Kansas City, manyfeared for the safety of young Gregory, and a hand-

The first reports of Martin’s death warned of the pos-sibility of a “race war” erupting at the high school the fol-lowing morning. Newspaper accounts describe the reac-tion of the white students as a demonstration. It isdoubtful, however, that such an understatement wouldhave been employed had the black students organized toprevent white children from attending school. Emotionsran high as the white boys formed a line across the school-yard in front of their female counterparts who guarded theentrance. Convinced of the righteousness of the cause, thestudents refused to yield when officers arrived.10

ful of black men armed themselves and stood guard at theWyandotte County Jail to protect the suspect. Several his-torians claim that Gregory’s survival would have been un-certain at best had it not been for the courageous stand ofthese men who reportedly formed a column and declaredthat “the first man to cross this line is eating his breakfastin Hell in the morning.”9

The above article appeared in the April 13, 1904, issue of the Kansas CityStar. Like other white newspapers, it portrayed the shooting of Roy Martinas a race-related incident.

9. Greenbaum, The Afro-American Community in Kansas City, Kansas,65–66; Warren, “Education for Citizenship”, 197; Nellie McGuinn, “TheKansas City, Kansas, Public School System, 1819–1961,” 114–15 (manu-script, Kansas City Board of Education Archives, Board of Education Of-fice, Kansas City, Kans.).

10. Kansas City Journal, April 13, 14, 19, 1904; Kansas City Star, April13, 14, 15, 18, 1904; Kansas City Times, April 15, 1904; Topeka Plaindealer,April 22, 1904.

192 KANSAS HISTORY

The intrusion of the school’s bell only intensified thequiet tension. None of the students answered its call, de-liberately challenging anyone in authority to put an end totheir insubordination. But no one in authority seemed dis-turbed by their actions, and time crept on until a group ofsenior boys who were only weeks from graduation decid-ed to end the disturbance themselves. As they started upthe steps they were met by a line of girls who declared thatthe boys must stay outside and help them “drive the ne-groes away.” When the girls refused to budge, the seniorboys were forced to use “foot ball tactics and rushedthrough the line of girls,” gaining entry to the school whilebeing subjected to kicks and fists as they broke through theline. The movement quickly lost steam after the seniors en-tered the school, but as the white students slowly resignedthemselves to their classrooms, school officials preventedimmediate reconciliation by barring black students fromentering the building. African American students were ad-vised to go home to avoid more trouble, and statementswere made to the effect that if they did so the trouble soonwould blow over.12

The Kansas City Board of Education called an emer-gency meeting for Thursday evening, April 14, to addressthe disturbance at the high school and “to settle the racedifference.” Records of this meeting are limited but sup-port the conclusion that board members had no intentionof punishing the students who participated in the distur-bance. Immediately after the meeting was called to order, amotion was made that “the action of Supt. Pearson in clos-ing the school until the next Monday be ratified.” The mo-tion was approved unanimously without any recorded dis-cussion. Subsequently, the Star found much support in thecity for leaving the school closed “for the balance of theterm,” and, more significantly, “in favor of separate highschools.”13

Even after the white students forced the closing of thehigh school, local papers chose to focus on the “lawless”actions of those blacks who sought to protect Louis Grego-ry. The defendant’s guilt was a forgone conclusion amongreporters who referred to him as the “young negro mur-derer” while the black men who stood guard to preventmob violence were blamed for the resulting hysteria and

11. Kansas City Star, April 13, 1904; Kansas City Board of EducationMinutes, March 6, 1905, Kansas City Board of Education Office; American

Citizen (Topeka), February 17, 1905. The following year, upon the recom-mendation of Superintendent Pearson, Brooks was replaced as a direct re-sult of his attempt to enforce discipline.

12. Kansas City Star, April 13, 1904; Kansas City Journal, April 14, 1905.13. Kansas City, Kansas, Board of Education Minutes, April 14, 1904;

Kansas City Star, April 14, 15, 1904.

The police did not attempt to break the line, however,forming their own column in front of the male students, asif reinforcing the students with a second rank. In the dis-tance a crowd gathered, waiting to see what would hap-pen. Mayor T. B. Gilbert, Principal W. C. McCroskey, andSuperintendent M. E. Pearson also were on hand, not todiscipline the students or call them to their classes, but

rather to counsel moderation in their display. Although thecrowd that had gathered contained parents, police, teach-ers, and city and school officials, only one person made anattempt to enforce discipline. “A. A. Brooks, one of the old-est teachers in the school,” the April 13 Kansas City Star re-ported, “talked to the boys from the front steps aboutbeing more careful in their expressions of resentment andconduct towards the negro pupils who were innocent ofany crime. . . . This angered some of the hot headed youthsand they wanted to pull Prof. Brooks from the steps.”11

During the demonstration at Kansas City High SchoolPrincipal W. C. McCroskey and Superintendent M. E.Pearson (above) did nothing to enforce discipline amongthe white students who had formed a barrier to preventblack students from entering the school.

DRAWING THE COLOR LINE IN KANSAS CITY 193

Black newspapers conveyed a different interpreta-tion of the trouble at the high school, questioningthe role of the parents and administrators who al-

lowed the white students to take over the schoolyard andthreaten their peers. For the editors of the Topeka Plaindeal-er, the fact that few efforts were made to control the dis-turbance was evidence of tacit approval by school officials.“Teachers should have insisted on order” and expelledthose who were unwilling to obey; and, besides, “Thepupils who started this uproar in the school are not asmuch responsible for their actions as their parents who un-doubtedly must have taught them race prejudice.”17

Believing that the race question would become a majorelection issue in the fall, leading candidates were immedi-ately pressed to identify their stand on the issue of a sepa-rate high school for black students. Republican candidates,who were dependent upon the black voters of the city,were reluctant to talk openly about the issue of segrega-tion. Edward K. Robinett and James F. Getty, who laterwould sponsor a bill to amend the school law, issuedvague statements claiming they would support “what themajority of people want” while assuring black leaders inprivate that they would not support any measure expand-ing segregation.18

Black and white children continued to attend the highschool together for nearly a year without incident and withonly one administrative change: cancellation of the city-wide eighth-grade graduation. School administrators justi-fied the decision to have each of the segregated middleschools host its own graduation by declaring it a means ofavoiding another disturbance. Since there had been no fur-ther problems and was no real reason to anticipate any, itseems likely that school officials who favored segregationfeared a successful graduation ceremony involving whiteand black eighth graders would undermine their argu-ments for the necessity of separation.19

If the school board and its appointed leaders were stillclamoring for separate schools during the fall of 1904 andwinter of 1905, the people of Kansas City were less con-cerned. Leading newspapers do not record any mention ofthe issue until a public meeting was called on February 13,1905, only a couple days before the deadline for new billsto be introduced before the state legislature. When few

14. Kansas City Star, April 13, 16, 1904.15. Kansas City Times, April 18, 1904.16. Kansas City Star, April 18, 1904; Kansas City Journal, April 19, 1904;

Handbook of the Kansas Legislature, 1905 (Topeka: Crane and Co., 1905), 87,192.

17. Topeka Plaindealer, April 15, 22, 1904.18. Kansas City Star, April 15, 1904; Vindicator (Coffeyville), February

17, 1905.19. Kansas City, Kansas, Board of Education Minutes, May 2, 1904.

were fined by local judges. The Star reported that these ac-tions forced the chief of police to issue specific orders“against allowing armed bands of negroes to congregateon the streets.” The paper also complained that these meninsulted whites who were passing by the courthouse andcounty jail between the hours of two and four o’clock inthe morning by demanding to know their business. TheStar reported that “the negroes seemed to want trouble,”but remained curiously silent on the intent of the whiteswho also had stood outside the jail at this odd hour.14

The funeral service on Sunday, April 17, seemed tobring a spirit of reconciliation to the city, as a crowd of twothousand listened to Methodist Reverend W. H. Comerpray for divine forgiveness for Louis Gregory. That sameday religious leaders throughout the city held special ser-vices counseling kindness and brotherly love in responseto the turmoil at the high school. Reverend Frank Fox ofthe First Congregational Church delivered a sermon enti-tled “The Only Possible Solution to the Race Problem.” Inthis sermon the reverend condemned the violence and dis-ruption of the previous week but gave divine sanction tothe actions of would-be segregationists by accepting theirviews about the inherent differences between whites andblacks. His viewpoint led him to conclude that separationwas the only solution. “The negro race is here to stay,” thereverend continued. “No human power can ever removethem from our midst. They are the nation’s care and thewhite man’s burden.”15

Although the hostility of the previous week had faded,it was still uncertain how the students would respond onMonday morning when classes resumed. In contrast to theprevious week, special officers were posted in advance toprevent another demonstration. The students wisely per-ceived that further disturbances would not be tolerated,with white students who had previously resolved to pre-vent blacks from entering apparently experiencing a sud-den change in heart. Although more than fifty studentsstayed home or refused to attend classes that day, many ofthe children were escorted by their parents and compelledto enter the building. One of the first parents to do so wasformer Tennessee adjutant general Colonel Charles Wood,a man who had dropped out of West Point when a blackstudent was admitted in 1883.16

tempting to satisfy their own moral reservations, facts donot support their statements. Every black leader whospoke out on the high school issue opposed separation, in-cluding the most well-known and influential black educa-tor in the state, William T. Vernon, president of WesternUniversity and future registrar of the United States Trea-sury. White political and business leaders frequently mis-represented Vernon as supporting the campaign for a sep-arate school despite his public statements to the contrary.In fact, Vernon refused to support the campaign evenwhen these leaders threatened to block funding allocationsfor his school.22

Perhaps the best rejoinder to those whites who hid be-hind the argument of segregation in the interests of blackschildren came from a southeastern Kansas woman. Writ-ing in response to a similar campaign to segregate theschools of Parsons, Aritha A. Dorsey, an African Americanteacher, poignantly exposed the duplicity of this view.“After all these years of mixed schools,” Dorsey wrote,“what is it which has caused the white people of late yearsto become so VERY much interested in the welfare of thecolored children that they try to make us believe that theydon’t think the colored children get their rights in mixedschools, and for this reason wish to have them establishedoff to themselves?”23

The American Citizen considered the campaign to bethe nadir of race relations in Kansas City, claiming that thedisturbance at the school was the worst of its kind that hadever been witnessed in the city and emphasizing the rela-tive harmony of the two races prior to the disturbance.Black writers throughout the state challenged the assump-tion that the students were acting on their own behalf; ar-guing that parents and school officials were to blame forthe students’ behavior. “The attempt to crystallize the sen-timent, that the present action of the Kansas City children,is being wholly inspired and engineered by themselves, isall bosh,” reported the Coffeyville-based Vindicator. “Theiraction is directly in accord with the dictations of their lillywhite Republican and Populist parents, who have not thecourage and Back-bone to openly identify themselves withthis damnable movement.”24

In response to articles printed by the Kansas City Star,which asserted that African Americans were opposed to

194 KANSAS HISTORY

20. Kansas City Star, February 14, 15, 16, 1905; Kansas City Journal,February 15, 1905; Topeka Daily Capital, February 15, 1905; Topeka Plain-dealer, February 24, 1905; W. C. McCrosky to Edward W. Hoch, February20, 1905, Correspondence Files, box 20, Edward W. Hoch Administration,Records of the Governor’s Office, Library and Archives Division, KansasState Historical Society, hereafter cited as Governor’s Records.

21. Kansas City Star, February 14, 15, 16, 1905; Kansas City Journal,February 15, 1905; Topeka Daily Capital, February 15, 1905; Topeka Plain-dealer, February 24, 1905; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census: Popu-lation, 1900.

22. Kansas City Journal, February 23, 1905; Topeka Plaindealer, June 24,1904.

23. Topeka Plaindealer, June 24, 1904. 24. Vindicator, February 17, 1905; American Citizen, February 17, 1905.

people attended this meeting, plans were made to artifi-cially resuscitate the campaign. The next morning thewhite students held their own meeting during schoolhours in the auditorium of the high school. Most localnewspapers reported this meeting as being student-ledand spontaneous in nature, but the black press claimed thatthe students were actually called to the auditorium by theprincipal with the support of faculty in order to restore theagitation for separate schools. Although this conclusion isstrongly supported by the fact that no suspensions or otherpunishments were issued, Principal McCroskey “emphati-cally denied” an complicity. His February 1905 correspon-dence with Governor Hoch provides additional insight aswell. McCroskey explained Kansas City’s unique racial sit-uation, and then essentially threatened the governor withmore of the same during the 1905–1906 term if the “sepa-rate school bill” were not allowed to become law.20

Regardless of whether the administration called themeeting, clearly the teachers and administrators pushedthe students to action. Rather than calling on the studentsto return to their classes, Superintendent Peterson merelycounseled moderation, addressing the group in the capaci-ty of a featured speaker rather than a disciplinarian andwarning students that violence would hurt their cause.With the support of the administration, which also gavethe students permission to leave the grounds in the middleof the day, many students circulated a petition urging therepeal of the law prohibiting segregated schools at the sec-ondary level. Local newspapers reported that between thehours of 11:30 A.M. and 1:30 P.M., approximately two hun-dred students obtained the signatures of ten thousandKansas City taxpayers, an amazing feat considering thattotal white population of the city was below forty-fivethousand at the last census.21

Whites who advocated segregation proclaimed them-selves experts on the needs and wants of the black com-munity, claiming that a separate high school would benefitblack children and was supported by black leaders. Al-though those who voiced these opinions may have been at-

separate schools because of the superiority of white teach-ers, the Vindicator made it clear that this argument held“not the slightest resemblance of truth.” The black weeklyalso replied to the Star’s contention that blacks desiredwhite classmates and teachers because “a higher degree ofculture and refinement is attained by the negro boys andgirls being associated in the same high school as whites.”The author used the example of a prominent white bankerwho was verbally abusive to black children in his neigh-borhood as an index of the “culture and refinement” theStar was referring to, concluding that such qualities werevastly overrated. The Kansas City’s American Citizen alsocountered the Star’s argument by reminding readers of theintrinsic benefits a large school offered in terms of electivesand classroom facilities.25

The student petition, which had been organized andpasted together on a roll of muslin by students and teach-ers, was frequently cited as evidence of the necessity ofseparating the white and black students of Kansas City andwas presented to the state legislature. Its validity, however,was frequently challenged by members of the black com-munity. A careful analysis of the original petition revealsthat many who signed it also signed for multiple familymembers. More important, only a few different individualsproduced many sheets of signatures, with the majority ofthe names bearing familiar handwriting when comparedwith other signatures on the same pages. Members of theblack community later circulated a counter-petition, bear-ing the signatures of approximately 3,370 persons opposedto the expansion of segregation.26

Due to the opposition by members of the black com-munity who regularly accounted for 15 to 20 percent ofKansas City voters, it appeared for a time as though a billto expand segregation might never be introduced beforethe legislative deadline approached. The Kansas City Starreported an eleventh-hour story that indicated none of themembers of the Wyandotte delegation were willing tosponsor the bill. “All are willing to support the bill whenthey hear from the people,” the paper explained, “but eachwants the other to introduce it.” Perhaps owing to the fact

that he was the only member of the state legislature to at-tend a public meeting on the subject the evening prior,Kansas City Representative Robinett ultimately agreed tointroduce the bill the following day.27

Armed with the student’s petition, Robinett attemptedto slip the bill through the house with a batch of inconse-quential local bills on February 16, 1905. When the magni-

tude of the new law was discovered, however, a motion toreconsider the bill was immediately approved with onlynine members of the chamber opposed. Although thehouse approved the measure the following day, it passedthe lower chamber with only three votes above a constitu-tional majority. A personal confrontation between Robinettand Representative William A. Trigg of Garnett nearly re-

25. Kansas City Star, February 15, 1905; Vindicator, February 17, 1905;American Citizen, February 17, 1905.

26. Kansas City Journal, February 18, 1905; Topeka State Journal, Febru-ary 18, October 11, 1905; Topeka Plaindealer, February 24, 1905; “Petitionsfrom Citizens of Kansas City, Kansas in regard to race segregation in theschools,” boxes 19–22, Governor’s Records. Many signatures on thecounter petition also appear to be written by the same hand, yet a largerpercentage appears to be unique than in the petition circulated by the stu-dents on the afternoon of February 14, 1905.

27. Kansas City Star, February 16, 1905; Randall B. Woods, “Integra-tion, Exclusion, or Segregation? The ‘Color Line’ in Kansas, 1878–1900,”Western Historical Quarterly 14 (April 1983): 186.

DRAWING THE COLOR LINE IN KANSAS CITY 195

Every black leader who spoke out on the high school issueopposed separation, including the most well-known andinfluential black educator in the state, William T. Vernon(above), president of Western University and future reg-istrar of the United States Treasury.

sulted in the bill being reconsidered for the second time. Itwas revealed that Trigg, who had expressed his oppositionto the bill, found himself on the receiving end of a profanereply uttered by Robinett. House members then gatheredaround Robinett’s desk, threatening to change their votesuntil he made a public apology.28

Senator James F. Getty of Kansas City sponsored thebill in the senate the fol-lowing day. By this timethe galleries were full ofmembers of the AfricanAmerican communitywho had traveled toTopeka to voice in per-son their opposition. At

first it seemed their presence had swayed the tide, as thebill was defeated by the vote of twenty-four opposed andfifteen in favor. In response, Getty motioned for a suspen-sion of the rules, asking the chair to disregard the vote andforward the bill for revisions to the Committee on Cities ofthe First Class. Lieutenant Governor David J. Hanna, aspresident of the senate, granted this motion, and the com-mittee, chaired by Senator Getty himself, returned the billback to the floor of the senate in less than an hour. Theamended bill was different only in that it applied specifi-cally to Kansas City rather than all cities with populationsabove fifty thousand. Although his was the only city that

met the population criteria, Getty was aware that some hadvoted against the measure because they opposed the possi-bility of expanding segregation in their own counties. Withthe bill now phrased as a piece of local legislation, Gettyhoped his colleagues would allow the measure to pass.29

The amended version of the bill passed the senate withonly two votes above a constitutional majority, the result ofmore than one-third of the membership abstaining fromthe question. Even after both chambers passed the revisedbill, the African American press assured its readers that thegovernor would veto the segregation bill. If any of theirelected representatives would take a stand on the issue,members of the black community were sure it would beGovernor Hoch. As a Republican, Hoch relied heavilyupon the black vote and made frequent statements favor-ing equality when speaking to African American voters.Even more encouraging was the report of the Kansas EqualRights Association, whose interracial membership metwith the governor on the subject and returned with apromise from Hoch that “he would do all in his power toprevent the passing of any law applying to any particularrace—especially the colored people.”30

White legislators from Kansas City were so concernedthat the governor would veto their bill that they threatenedblack leaders and initiated a letter-writing campaign topressure the governor. The Wyandotte County delegationwent so far as to promise to “knock out the appropriations”for Western University, an institution within their own ju-risdiction, if Hoch took action against their bill. Despite hispromises to his black constituents, political pressurecaused the governor to consider the bill for several days. Itis clear that the governor did not agree with the measure,but he also wished to avoid taking a stand that might costhim politically. Citing overwhelming public opinion, thegovernor signed the bill into law on February 22, 1905. Heincluded an apologetic explanation of his actions in whichhe detailed his abolitionist heritage and cited “local condi-tions” as necessitating the separation. In his statement thegovernor condemned segregation as “a concession to theSouthern ideas” as well as a “step backwards” in race rela-tions, but emphasized that he felt public sentiment necessi-tated the action.31

196 KANSAS HISTORY

28. Kansas House Journal, February 16–17, 1905, 514, 552, 562; TopekaState Journal, February 17, October 11, 1905; Kansas City Star, February 17,1905; Kansas City Journal, February 18, 1905.

29. Kansas Senate Journal, February 17, 1905, 360–3; Kansas City Jour-nal, February 18, 1905; Topeka Plaindealer, February 24, 1905.

30. Topeka Plaindealer, February 24, June 2, 1905; Kansas City Star, Feb-ruary 17, 18, 1905; Jennie Small Owen and Kirke Mechem, Annals ofKansas, 1886–1925, Vol. 1, 1886–1910 (Topeka: Kansas State Historical So-ciety, 1954), 420.

31. Kansas City Star, February 18, 1905; “Message From the Gover-nor,” 723.

Senator James F. Getty(above) and RepresentativeEdward K. Robinett (right)introduced a legislative billthat allowed segregation inKansas City High School.

The “public sentiment” the governor cited likely wasthe product of letters and telegrams sent by those on bothsides of the issue. Out of twenty-two surviving letters andthirty-five telegrams that appear among Governor Hoch’spapers, nearly one-third of them actually were written inopposition to the segregation bill. It is important to notethat two letters calling for segregation came from PrincipalMcCroskey, while an official telegram sent from the clerkof the Board of Education contains a statement approvedby the entire board urging the governor to sign the bill andpromising equal facilities and funding if approved.32

Following the passage of the bill and the governor’sapproval, African American leaders expressed shockand disappointment. Although the black press

spoke out strongly against the actions of the WyandotteCounty legislators, they reserved their harshest criticismfor Governor Hoch. Black editors took the governor to taskfor his hypocritical stand on the race issue—boasting ofhis abolitionist pedigree while signing a bill that expandedsegregation. For nearly a month the Plaindealer ran severalarticles denouncing the governor in the harshest of terms,using headings such as “Hoch Enslaves Kansas Blacks”and “Undoing the Work of Old John Brown.” The articleleft no question that the editors of the paper felt the main-tenance of separate schools was analogous to second-classcitizenship. “The enactment of separate laws for black andwhite people in this country,” the paper declared, “is nomore nor less than partial slavery.” Nick Chiles of thePlaindealer likened the betrayal of Hoch to that of anothergovernor two millennia prior:

We are forcibly carried in our mind’s eye back to thedays of Pontius Pilate, when he said: “I find no faultin this innocent man. Take him and do unto him ac-cording to your custom. I wish to wash my hands ofany blame,” and still knowing the Negro to be blame-less, Gov. Hoch knuckles to the clamor of a few of thedominant race and turns the victim over into thehands of the enemy to be crucified on a cross of prej-udice and hatred.33

Although McCroskey and other school officialsclaimed impartiality regarding the campaign to expandsegregation, their reaction to its passage was revealing.

“Good news! Good news!” exclaimed Board of EducationPresident Alfred Weston upon learning of the bill’s pas-sage. “I am certainly glad to hear it. Now the thing to do isto immediately take up the matter of voting bonds for theerection of a suitable school for the negroes.”34

The irony of the board’s reaction was intensified by thepassage of a resolution against gender discrimination in

the hiring of school principals just minutes before unani-mously adopting a resolution for the construction of thenew segregated high school. Perhaps in recognition of theincongruity of their actions, the resolution avoided anymention of race, instead relying on the assertion that “thepresent manual training high school facilities of KansasCity, Kansas are wholly inadequate,” and that a new man-ual training school was demanded by “the pupils of thiscity.” The student publications of Kansas City High Schoolwere equally delicate in reporting the matter, with the onlymention of the entire affair appearing in the very back ofthe yearbook. The story reminded readers of the upcoming

32. F. G. Horseman to Edward W. Hoch, February 18, 1905, Gover-nor’s Records.

33. Topeka Plaindealer, February 24, March 3, 1905; Vindicator, Febru-ary 24, 1905. 34. Kansas City Journal, February 23, 1905.

DRAWING THE COLOR LINE IN KANSAS CITY 197

Following passage of the bill and Governor Hoch’s approval, theTopeka Plaindealer ran several articles denouncing the governorin the harshest of terms. This article appeared in the February 24,1905, issue.

bond election and emphasized the “great benefit” the newschool would provide for their black classmates.35

The bond election put those who had opposed theschool in a difficult position, as many felt that votingagainst the bonds would simply deprive their children of adecent facility. Considering that the state legislature hadalready approved the concept of segregation at the highschool level, most citizens understood that an unsuccessfulbond election was not likely to result in the re-integrationof the high school, rather a continuation of the currentscheme of separate sessions or the attempt to pass a small-er bond issue. On June 9, 1905, the city council reviewedand approved the election results. It reported the final voteas 2,789 in favor with 554 opposed, with the measure pass-ing in every ward of the city.36

Although a handful of school leaders repeatedlyclaimed that racial disturbances were inherent in a“mixed” school, the African American press remindedreaders that black and white children were quietly attend-ing classes together as they had since the school wasfounded in 1879. Race relations in the city may have left agreat deal to be desired, but the Plaindealer issued a chal-lenge for anyone to identify the “local conditions” that de-manded separation, promising that it would surrender itspresses to whomever was able to do so. A survey of localnewspapers, school board minutes, and student publica-tions sustains the Plaindealer’s argument that black andwhite students had peacefully attended school togetherboth before and after the death of Roy Martin.37

If anything was unique about the local conditions ofKansas City, it was not the students’ disturbance duringthe spring of 1904 but rather the attitudes and actions of ahandful of school officials in using the event as a pretextfor segregation. Although the question of segregationwould be a contentious issue in cities throughout the state,

only Topeka and Kansas City had enough black highschool students to reasonably justify the maintenance ofseparate high schools during this period.38

The establishment of separate schools was oftenviewed as a panacea among white Kansans, yetscarce funding meant that such a system was gen-

erally limited to urban school districts containing segre-gated neighborhoods. The low numbers of black middleschool students and the existence of several black residen-tial areas throughout Topeka only partly explains that dis-trict’s refusal to segregate its intermediate grades at thistime. The actions of local leaders were equally important.A large group of white Topeka junior high students at-tempted to create a racial disturbance in September 1908by refusing to attend school with black students as theyhad done since the time of the school’s founding. The dis-turbance was quickly suppressed as teachers and schooladministrators refused to be manipulated by student mis-conduct. Classes were not cancelled, and students werepunished immediately. Furthermore, the superintendentheld parents responsible for their children’s behavior, re-quiring the adults to also provide a written letter of expla-nation prior to accepting the student for readmission.39

In Kansas City school officials were so zealous in theircampaign to segregate the high school that they did notwait for a new facility to be constructed. During the1905–1906 school year white students attended class in themorning between the hours of 8:00 A.M. and 1:00 P.M., andblack students occupied the building between 1:15 P.M. and5:00 P.M. Reflecting the prejudices many held about the de-sirability of providing higher education for black students,the afternoon session was officially referred to as “ManualTraining High School” despite its identical curriculum.40

Meanwhile, members of the black community tooktheir fight to the courts, confident that the justice of theircause could not be denied by the branch of government re-

198 KANSAS HISTORY

35. Kansas City, Kansas, Board of Education Minutes, March 6, 1905;Jayhawker Senior Annual (Kansas City, Kans.: Lane Printing Co., May1905).

36. Kansas City Star, June 5, 7, 1905; Kansas City, Kansas, City Coun-cil Minutes, Regular Election Session, Friday June 9, 1905, Library andArchives Division, Kansas State Historical Society.

37. Topeka Plaindealer, February 24, 1905; Kansas City Star, April 13,1904; Greenbaum, The Afro-American Community in Kansas City, Kansas,64–65; Boone, A History of Black Education in Kansas City, Kansas; Minutesof the Kansas City, Kansas, City Council, 1894–1905; Boards of Educationof Kansas City, Rosedale, and Argentine, Kansas, Minutes, 1898–1905,Kansas City Board of Education Office; 1904 Jayhawker Senior Annual(Kansas City, Kans.: Lane Printing Co., 1904); 1905, 1906 Jayhawker SeniorAnnual (Kansas City, Kans.: Lane Printing Co., 1906), The High SchoolRecord, vol. 1–4 (Kansas City, Kansas: Kansas City, Kansas, High School,1899–1903); American Citizen, February 17, 1905; Topeka Plaindealer, Febru-ary 24, March 10, 1905.

38. Racial demographics at Topeka High School were similar to thoseof the high school in Kansas City, Kansas, with 122 black students, or 11percent of total enrollment in 1905. See Annual Reports of First Class Citiesto the State Superintendent of Education for the School Year Ending June 30,1904. A brief survey of the archives of the Topeka Board of Education re-veals that students would be both formally and informally segregatedwithin that school, their experiences typified by limited and segregatedathletic and extracurricular activities. Sixty-Two Years of History in the Tope-ka High School (Topeka: College Press, 1932); Carper, “The PublishedOpinions of Kansans Concerning Education,” 88.

39. Topeka Daily Capital, September 12, 25, 1908; Topeka Plaindealer,June 24, 1904, October 2, 1908.

40. John A. Hodge, “Some Facts About Sumner High School” (man-uscript, Sumner Collection, Kansas Collection, University of Kansas Li-braries, Lawrence).

sponsible for enforcing such principles. More than a quar-ter of the black students violated the new regulations andattempted to enroll in the morning session of the school onSeptember 11, 1905. Principal McCroskey turned the stu-dents away, telling them to return in the afternoon. One ofthe students was heard to ask, “Then you refuse to enrollus?” The principal explained that he had no authority to doso, and the students quietly left thebuilding, satisfied that they now hadthe evidence needed to test the le-gality of the law.41

Black Kansas Citians laboreddiligently as their campaign movedfrom the legislative and executivelevels to the courts. The AmericanCitizen reported that all economicclasses contributed to a fund to helpdefray the expenses of the lawsuit,with even the smallest children do-nating their allowances to the cause.The case was brought under thename of Mamie Richardson, an eigh-teen-year-old student at the highschool, and reached the KansasSupreme Court on October 11, 1905.Balie P. Waggener, a prominentwhite attorney from Atchison,served as lead counsel for the plaintiff, arguing that theoriginal statute that was amended to allow Kansas City tosegregate its high schools was a general law providing forthe maintenance of all high schools within all cities of thefirst class and therefore could not be amended to apply toonly one city. Despite the technicality of this argument,Waggener and the other attorneys who presented the casemade it clear that they were also questioning the legality ofsegregated schools in general. Their suit specifically statedthat segregation was a violation of equal protection andwas an attempt to abridge the privileges and immunities ofthe black citizens of Kansas City.42

The actions of the black community challenged theopinions of many whites who had convinced themselvesthat blacks accepted or even favored the arrangement. TheTopeka Daily Capital sought to calm its readers by reportingthat “only a few of the leading negro citizens of Kansas

City, Kansas, appeared to know anything of a movement totest the key high school law.” The paper also reported thatthese individuals “expressed themselves as being satisfiedwith the plans of the board of education to build for thenegro pupils a manual training high school.” The paperfailed to identify which “leading negro citizens” were sur-veyed.43

The school board tacitly acknowledged the merit of theRichardson lawsuit by holding a special meeting on Octo-ber 25, 1905, to discuss the case and devise a strategy. Theboard voted to delay the issue of bonds and the construc-tion of the school until after the case was decided by thecourt. Even those who favored segregation publicly voicedconcerns that Waggener was correct in his appraisal of thelegal issues in question. In fact, Senator Getty and othersponsors of the bill had originally framed the amendmentto apply generally to all cities with populations greaterthan fifty thousand for this very reason. The change wasmade only out of dire necessity after the measure had beendefeated in the state senate in its original form. AlthoughGetty understood that the validity of his amendment wasquestionable, he publicly declared his willingness to makethe change and “take his chance[s] in the courts.”44

41. Topeka Daily Capital, September 12, 1905.42. Mamie Richardson v. The Board of Education of Kansas City, Kansas,

72 Kan 629 (1906); Neuenswander, “A Legal History of Segregation in theKansas Public Schools,” 61–63; Topeka State Journal, October 11, 1905;American Citizen, September 29, October 20, 1905.

43. Topeka Daily Capital, September 12, 1905; Owen and Mechem, An-nals of Kansas, 425.

44. Kansas City, Kansas, Board of Education Minutes, October 25,1905; Sumner Courier, March 16, 1940; Kansas City Star, February 8, 1905;Kansas City Journal, February 18, 1905.

DRAWING THE COLOR LINE IN KANSAS CITY 199

The case against high school segregation was brought under the name Mamie Richardson, aneighteen-year-old student, and reached the Kansas Supreme Court on October 11, 1905. Despitethe strength of the arguments, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to counteract the legislature.The Topeka Plaindealer reported the outcome in its January 12, 1906, issue.

Nick Chiles, “that it aroused the body of old John Brown,who turned over in his grave, and Kansas experienced anearthquake on Sunday.”46

School records give no indication of any student dis-turbances during the year, and it is likely that the black andwhite pupils simply ignored one another during the inter-val between the morning and afternoon sessions. As thegraduating class of 1906 prepared to receive their diplomasin a segregated ceremony, salutatorian Helen Glasscockaddressed her fellow white students from the podium.“The tendency of education,” she said, “has always been tomake people as similar as possible.” It is doubtful whethershe or any of her peers grasped the tragic irony of thisstatement. Rather than bridging the gap between them-selves and their black classmates, students and facultyused the educational system to prevent such progress be-cause of the imagined differences they had constructed.47

Despite the regretful circumstances that surroundedits inception, Sumner High quickly became an outstandingschool and a source of pride for the African American com-munity of Kansas City. Within its first decade Sumner wasawarded accreditation by the North Central Association ofSecondary Schools and Colleges, an honor shared by onlythe best high schools in the state. In comparison to otherregions that claimed to follow the principle of “separatebut equal,” Kansas City school officials provided roughlyequivalent funding and facilities in the decades that fol-lowed. A large percentage of Sumner faculty held ad-vanced degrees and utilized this experience to providetheir students with an education that was “better than fiftyper cent of the schools of [the] state” according to a whiteeducator who feared that such a statement might endangerhis professional reputation. Although this endorsement ofSumner spoke well for the students and faculty, the appre-hension with which it was delivered illustrates the kind ofassumptions that would prevent its graduates from expe-riencing the same opportunities as white graduates of less-er schools. No matter how many advanced courses wereoffered at Sumner, the ignorance and influence of lessermen and women still proved the greatest obstacle.48

200 KANSAS HISTORY

Despite the strength of Waggener’s arguments, theKansas Supreme Court refused to counteract the legisla-ture, upholding the law with only one dissent. The courtalso chose to ignore the larger question of whether sepa-rate schools violated the guarantee of equal protection pro-vided by the Fourteenth Amendment. The solitary dissentcame from Justice Rousseau A. Burch who disagreed with

the decision not because he opposed segregation, butrather because he felt the technical argument presented byWaggener had not been adequately explored.45

The African American press was once again left withlittle to do but express its indignation. The Plaindealer re-ferred to the Richardson case as “the most infamous deci-sion ever passed by the Supreme court of Kansas or by anycourt in the United States since the Dred Scott decision.”“So absurd and contemptible was the decision,” wrote

The Plaindealer referred to the Richardson case as“the most infamous decision ever passed by theSupreme court of Kansas.” “So absurd and con-temptible was the decision,” wrote Nick Chiles(above), “that it aroused the body of old John Brown,who turned over in his grave, and Kansas experiencedan earthquake on Sunday.”

45. Topeka State Journal, January 6, 1906; Mamie Richardson v. The Boardof Education of Kansas City, 637.

46. Topeka Plaindealer, January 12, 26, 1906.47. 1906 Jayhawker Senior Annual.48. Sumner High School file, Kansas City Board of Education

Archives; Kansas City Voice, June 8-14, 1978; Greenbaum, The Afro-Ameri-can Community in Kansas City, Kansas, 69; Jeffrey A Raffel, Historical Dictio-nary of School Segregation and Desegregation: The American Experience (West-port, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998), 33.

that some whites welcomed any opportunity to insulatethemselves further, allowing and even encouraging theirchildren to join the charade while hiding behind their ownfabrications about the best interests of those they sought toremove.

The story of Sumner High will likely never achieve thefame of traditional civil rights narratives such as the Mont-

gomery Bus Boycott or the Little Rock Nine, yet its lessonsmay be more valuable in an era where race relations aremore nuanced than they were in Alabama and Arkansasduring the height of the Civil Rights Movement. While fewepisodes can match the emotional appeal of the EmmettTill case or the drama that unfolded in Selma, Alabama, in1965, using only historical events of a single time or regioncreates a false sense of separation, leading many to at leastsubconsciously consider race to be a regional problem ofthe past. Local histories such as Sumner High not onlycounter these myths, they are useful for understandingrace relations during times and within places that are moresimilar to the challenges society faces today. Perhaps mostimportant, local history reminds us that the battle for civilrights is a constant struggle involving millions of peopleduring every era and within every community.

The legacy of Sumner High will always be ambiguous.While it was the most visible symbol of segregation inKansas, it was also a pillar of strength within the AfricanAmerican community. Rather than abandon the fight theystarted when they opposed the school’s creation, thesemen and women directed their efforts inward, creating aunique bond between school and community. As a result,Sumner provided greater academic and ex-tracurricular opportunities for its studentsthan were typically available in the “mixedschools” of the state. Yet Sumner’s very suc-cess also worked to solidify segregationthroughout the city and served as validationin the minds of many Kansans that blacks andwhites should live separately from one an-other. Even Sumner’s integration as a magnetschool in 1978 was ambiguous. Members ofthe black community believed strongly in thegoal of integration yet expressed sadness be-cause they had lost more than a school. Onecan only imagine how a community would beaffected if many of its children were busedmiles away to various neighboring communi-ties.

The story of Sumner High helps explainthe ambiguous nature of race relations in theSunflower State. More important, it is an ex-cellent model for understanding the dynam-ics of racial discrimination in an environmentwhere such lines were still being drawn. Kansas Citywhites were anxious about the growing black population,yet segregation did not occur automatically once that pop-ulation hit a predetermined level. Like the Wyandotte leg-islators who hoped a colleague would introduce the bill,white Kansans favored segregation privately but were cau-tious in their outward expressions of support. In contrastto other regions of the nation, Kansans could not hide theirsupport of segregation on the basis of tradition becausethose racial lines had not yet been drawn. As a result, thedeath of Roy Martin and the resulting aftermath is signifi-cant, but not as a matter of confirming real or imaginedfears of racial violence. Had Kansas City whites sharedsuch paranoia, the campaign to segregate the school wouldnot have lasted two years. Instead, these events gave ahandful of individuals the pretext to push for segregationunder the guise of necessity while protecting their sup-porters. The transparency of this pretext was so apparent

DRAWING THE COLOR LINE IN KANSAS CITY 201

The legislation allowing segregation in Kansas City High School resulted in the cre-ation of Sumner High School (above), which opened its doors to primarily black stu-dents following the 1905–1906 school year.