~ dtS ONLY

'CRET

DECLASSIFIED

COMMUNICATION CENTER HEADQlJARTERS

FLEET MARINE FORCE. PtOFIC DESTROY BY BURNING

SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE, INFO GEN CH.APMAN FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2'.,",,\ CONTINUES TO HARBOR DEFICIENCIES .. THE WEEKLY AND DAIL,tf;~'AG, WHILE IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF THE ORIG INAL SINGLE MAtfA~Et4ENT DIRECr'ivE, HAS REQUIRED AN INORD INATEL Y HIGH NlflBER:~Qf' SCRABLES AID ADD-O N SORT IES BY MAR INE AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS .. CO NS£QUE,NTL Y THE 1ST MAW HAS BEEN FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED~ LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUCTION o AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM INDICATES THAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES NOT PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER WITH ALL THE SORTIES HE REQUIRESo FURTHERMORE, TOTS ASSIGNED A WEEK IN ADVANCE DO NOT PERMIT

,SURGE AIR EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANGING TACTICAL SITUATIONS FACING THE GROUND COMMANDER, THEREBY REQUIRING INCREASED SCRAMBLESo THE LENGTH OF THE AIR REQUEST CHAIN AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IMPOSED BY THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG ARE ST ILL EXCESSIVE" THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSlO NS ALSO APPEAR MORE SUITABLE FOR WEEKLY FRAGGING SINCE THEY HAVE CHANGED LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY o

Be (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE

, THE NEED FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE THE WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF HIS TACTICAL PLANS, IdS" TO M~ E~rE G Y ~"J\Ne C/ 4U

riNTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVNi' jl:J 1\

ht (1) THAT THE PRESENT INTEGRATED AIR C TROL SYS EM ~E R~TAINEB, ~T IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION OF SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS WItH TACTICAL AIRo

(2): ,THAT THE NUMBER OF MARINE STRIKE SORTIES SET ASIDE B~;:,C9M;~~(ifACV FOR OUT-OF~COUNTRY AIR EFFORT (CURRENTLY 16 SORTJ;CS,:i,E'R DAY) BE F,RAGGED BY THE TACC CONSISTENT WITH

OVERALL,,"ltfTERDICTION PLANS Q

(3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SORTIES (CURRENTLY:\: 289 INCLUDING 111 WEEKLY AND 32 DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES AS WELL AS THE 48 SCRAMBLES AND 18 HELD ESCORT MISSIONS) BE ASSIGNED TO CG III MAF AS A WEEKLY SORTIE BLOCK o TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG III MAF BASED ON THE

CG I II I'IAF DIG SECRET (if;

I ' __ _

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. ~ tYES ONLY

'CRET' • DECLASSIFIED

COMMUNICATION CENTER HEADQUARTERS

FLEET MARINE FORCE. P/lCIFIC Of;STROY BY BURNING

•

M.}c ........... TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS~ ~

(4) THAT, AS NECESSARY, EMERGENCY REQUIREM Nrs AR ISING OUTSIDE I CORPS BE MET BY COMUSMACV PREEMPTION OF SlRTIES SCHEDULED IN 1 CORPS lAW REF Do

(5) THAT III MAF (THROUGH I DASC) INFORM COMUSMACV BY DIRECT LINE TO TACC OF ALL MARINE SORTIES SCHEDULED IN I CORPS AND BY COpy OF THE 1ST MAW FRAG 0 REAL T IME R~F()RTS WILL BE MADE TO AIR FORCE CRC~ (PANAMA AND TACC), A;~·:.f6RTIES

'.' ARE FLOWNo ..• \ •... (6) THAT IN RECOGNITION OF AIR FORCE BASt< /;

LOCA.lI(}N AND l.()ADINGS~ PREPLANNED AIR FORCE SORTIE'Sj"-TOTS, AND ORDNANC:EJ,.,OADS 8£AD.JtJSTED THROUGH REQUESTS AND COORDINATION BETWEEtfJlI MAY , ":emuJSMACV TASE AND TAce" AIR FORCE SORTIES SUPPORTING FORCES IN I CORPS CONTINUE AS CURRENTLY DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV AND SCM£DiJLED BY TACCo

(7) THAT THE IN IT IAL PO INT OP) BE EL IMINATED FROM THE WEEKLY FRAGo THE CORRECT IP IS CONTINGENT UPON ASSIGNMENT OF A SPECIFIC III MAY SUBORDINATE TO BE SUPPORTEDG UNTIL THE WEEKLY FRAG IS RECEIVED BY III MAF AND SUBALLOCATED TO ITS SUBORDINATES, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE A CORRECT IP Q I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ARE PASSING NIGHTLY TO 7TH AF AND FMAW THE CORRECT IP FOR EACH MISSION ON THE WEEKLY AND DAILYFRAG o

(8) THAT, IN THE CASE OF I CORPS, CONSIDERATION BE GJVEN TO ADOPTION OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE COACT,

. MARINE SPHINX REPORT ~ AND INFORMATION ON DIVERTS FROM I DASC .: .: TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ON MARINE AIR FOR tHE CONSOLIDATED

MISSION 'REPORT 0

~9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH (REF A) BE RE.\lISEDTO INCORPORATE THE ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THEvfHNGLE

.. l': MANAGER TACT ICAl AIR CONCEPT 0 ~(J)~" GP=4 UNQUOTE . 1 I 2,. YOUR VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSED MESSAGE ARE SOLICITE EARLIEST, AS I'lY REPLY MUST BE TO COMUSMACV 010700H JUL68" WARM REG ARDS" GP",,4, .. BT

CG III MAF DtlS

DECLASSIFIED

RTTTZYUW RUEBHOAg793 ZlY TtTTT R 29 IE) 10Z JUN 68 FPI CNC 10 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC BT .

DECLASSIFIED

18i1656=TiTT==~'HHFMAo COpy '11 OF

TOR: 2918~5Z JUNG8

TOP SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE DEL IVER DUR INS WORKING HO URS PO S1 VIETNAM PO STURE OF FMFPAC (U) AoFI'IFPI'IT 052059Z JUN 68 ~ B9 CINCPAC 121112Z JUN 68

CCJFtlES

10 IN VIEW REF A AND B, ALTERNATIVE FMFPAC POSTURES HAVE BEEN REVIEVED AND APPROVED FOR USE BY HGMC AND FMFPAC IN FORMULATING ACTIONS AND POSlrIONS RELATIVE TO FMFPAC POSTHOST ILliIES P6STUREo 21il THESE POSTURES ARE PREDICATED ON:

Ao THE DESIRAB ILITY OF COLLOCATING AIR AND GOUND COMPONENTS TO THE MAXII'IUMDPRACTICABlE:EXTENT o

BoT HE PROBA8 IL lTV THAT: ULTIMATE RELINQUISHMENT OF BASES JAPAN W ILL BE NECESSARY 0

Co THE NEED FOR FACILITIES ON GUAM TO PROVIDE FOR RELOCATION ~ROM VIETNAI'I AND BASING OF A MES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER 2/3 OR A

CMC R 291~lfZ/JUN68 '. ,

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--

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PAGE TWO RUEBHOA9793 TOP S:EJ:~ REt SPECAl FULl. !i!E~ IS RETAINED IN WESTPAC o THESE FACILITIES WILL BE REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY UPON WITJmRAWAL FRO'M VIETNAM TOCO'MPENSATE FOR LOSS OF FACILITIES AT AlSaG I~ JAPAN AND CAMP SUKIRAN, OKINAWA" 3" THE PRtFERRED POSTURES ARE: .

AQ IF 2/3 MEr IN WESTPAe~ . LO'CATION UNIT GROUND COMPONENT

......oKINAWA MEF("") RL! (PUJS) ~UAM • MEB RtT (~)

AIR COMPONENT MAW (=)

CMAG

NO'TES: (D MEB (RLT/CMAG) IN "RAWftll FROM WESTPAC MEF 0

(2) (iJAW HQ AND MAG (VM) At:·~ FUTEMA 0

(3) CrtAG AT l(USHI'"'WAN: OR; KADENAo , " (4) GUAM RLTC';",) EQUIVALENT IN SIZE TO ARTILLERY REGIMENT ( ... )

DISPLACEOfROM."CAMP S.tiKIRAN 9 O'KINAWAo (5) FIR st ALTERtlA~tE TO'~ AB.OVE A IR COMPONENT LOCATIONS

WOULD BE TWOCP1AGS IN GUAM. " . (6) SECOND ALTERNATE AIR P()STURE~ ONE CMAG IN GUAM 9

ONE CMAG n4JAPAN·o

B" IF A FULL "MEr IN WESTPAC:: LOCATION UNIT GRO'UND COMPONENT AIR COMPONENT

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA9793 TOP SEC RET SPECAT O'KINAWA MEF (=) 2 RLTS MAW (=) GUAM MEB RLT CMAG NOTES: (1) MAW HQ AND MAG (VH) At FUTEMA o (2) 2 CMAG S AT f(USHI=WAN 9. KA'DENA, OR COMB INAT ION 0

(3) FIRST ALTERNATE AIR P()StURE: ONE CMAG IN OKINAWA, TWO CMAG S IN GUAM

(4) SECO'ND ALTERNAtE AIR PO$TURE~ O'NE CMAG IN EACH OKINAWA w GUAM, JAPANe

(5) THIRD ALTERNATE AIR POSTUREi TWO' CMAGS IN GUAM,-ONE CMAG IN JAPAN~

4 .. IN A RELATED MATTER9 A PAPER NOW BEING ADDRESSED BY THE JCS MAKES PATENTLY CLEAR EARLY: LOSS OF FUJI TRAINING AREASo EAST FUJI NOWo NORTH FUJI. AS SO'O'N AS SOME ALTERNATE FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE OR AS SOON AS RELIABLE ASSURANCES ARE OBTAINED FRO'M JAPANESE ON CO'NTINUED US USEo IN ANY CASE, RESTRICTIONS BY 1970 SEEN AS PRECULSIVE TO MEANINGFUL USEo CINCPAC WILL BE TASKED TO OBTAIN ALTERNATE SITE., SUGGEST YOU INITIATE PRIORITY ACTIO'N TO' GET BID IN rOR SUITABLE" REPLACEMENT TRA IN INGAREA TO INCLUDE ADEQUATE ARTILLERY RANGE" WARM REGARDSt;'O" GP-4 BT

(Me 2-2

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•

:( MARINE CORPS EYES ot{{y CIttOY!.WNICATION CENTER HEADQUARTERS

~: r FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

CRET Show. to: DESTROY BY BURNING Fr: CG

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STAFF SECTlur~S NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAi{E COPI[S

ZNY SSSSS .

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OTTSZYllW RUEBHOA9832 1811933~ ssss=luHHFMA Ru7'RAo

o 291934 Z JUN 68 COpy OF COPIES I'M CMC TOR:· 292~41Z/JUN68 TO RUHHFMAI CG FMFPAC INFO RUMUGRAI CG II I MAl' BT SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE, INFO LIGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY III MAl' AVIATION ASSETS(ill Ao CG I I I MAl' 290334 Z JUN68 1 .. THIS CONFIRMS OUR TELECON OF 29 JUNEe 20 THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS APPLY TO PARA 5B OF REF Ao ~ (QUOTE) THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADEo0@ REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVE­NESS: (CLOSE QUOTE> 0

BM (QUOTE) (1) THAT THE PRESENT INTEGRATED AIR CONFOL SYSTEM BE FURTHER IMPROVED@oo(CLOSE QUOTE). Go (QUOTE> (3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINEe @ G BE RETURNED TO MISSION DIREST ION OF CG III MAFo TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDANCE LOADS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG III MAl' BASED ON THE

PAGE TWO RUEBH0A9832 SEC RET S P E CAT TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS o (CLOSE QUOTE> Do (QUOTE) (9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE~ e 0 REFINE­MENTS TO THE TEMPORARY SINGLE MANAGE~.~(CLOSE QUOTEID WARM REGARDSo GP=4 BT

(Me o 291934Z/JUN68

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SEC RE T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOE LTGEN CUSI-UvIAN, INfO

GEN CHAPM}\N FRO:l\'l LTBEN RUSE. DELI\lER DURING WAKING O.

HOURS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG III MAF ex::.m"';;~ 29 0334Z/JUN 68 (S) B. -C!';-i C fi 91'7:34iZ /-:rVN6' ttP B Cr:) 1. THE COMMANDANT AND 1 HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO

EXCHANGE THOUGHTS CONCERNING YOUR PROPOSED

" MESSAGE TO ~,:;~ ABRAMS, REFERENCE A, OUTLINING YOUR

VIEWS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT. WJ-IILE CONCURRING WITH

YOUR EVALUATION AND SUMMARY, AND UNDERSTANDING

THAT IN YOUR POSITION DOGMATISM MAY BE COUNTER-

PRODUCTIVE, WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THAT ANYRECOM-

MENDATION WITH REGARD TO CHANGES IN THE SINGLE

MANAGER SYSTEM MUST BE PREFACED BY A POSITIVE 8TATE-

MENT REAFFIRMING OUR COLLECTIVE POSITION PAGE 1 OF 7 PAG

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m:TUK1\i OF AIR A~)SETS Te III Ivli\::='. 'tHIS1)C:3TTI0N SHOULD

BE S'fATED IN TJNEMCYllONAL TERiV[S, TIE':J CLOSELY TO [\ ~ . U

P~.H-IL,000PLi-'f OT:' ,.' ·'[1U'T-uA·' lyr.'SIT)r T() 01="1" :)~,T U·TI1'T·j" 'I"T:fJ' \F~R· Ci o 1" . _ J..L-l. \ _ .l..l .--",.l.....I 1 \.~, ~ l~ LI .... I \l ... \ __ .. _ . _ r _: . J . \- r'l _.

2. ACCORDINGLY, OUR APPROACH 1'0 THE NEW CO.MI'lIIANDER {"- !

IN SAIGON SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THIS !\'Ii\Y BE 'If-II! BEST i

CHANCE YET TO m::'VERSE THE SINGLE MANJ\.CER DCCIStON.

IT MAY A 1[3 0 BE OUR LAST rULL SHOT AT IT BECAUSE ABE

AND NO ONE ELSE WILL MAKE THIS DECISION::;; AND ONGE

MADE WE CAN EXPECT IT TO LAST FOR THF. DURATION. SINCE

HE IS PRACTICAL, APOLITICAL, NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY

PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS AND NOT INTIMIDATED BY 7TH AF

PRESSURE, OUR ARGUMENTS SHOULD MAKE A POWERFUL

IMPRESSION 'BECAUSE THEY ARE COMPELLING AND HOLD

SPECIAL APPEAL TO THOSE WHO UNDERSTAND THE INFANTRY/

SUPPORTING ARMS COMBINATION. IT APPEARS TIMELY TO

REITERATE TO ABE OUR POSITION THAT THE GROUND COM-

MANDER MUST HAVE FULL MISSION DIRECTION OF HIS

TACTICAL ELEMENTS)STRESS~rG THAT WE HAVE GIVEN UP \ll,

,

MUCH IN OTHER HIGHLY DESIRABLE RESOURCES IN ORDER TO

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J\CHIEV-.f~ THE BALANCED AIK-GROUND COi~FIGURAj'I()N

Tl'-~ll\ 'T' -yVF PRE'- Q'L";·JT TO r'i\T I,'N-T"l,/f".LT TT-II:'c.;p ProT!'\j1"'l" q D'LTJS f'rTrrt' '. •• _ , .,~ L>", .r.~, .. """" .., ,~,. • '._., ,U I 1, ! I L ,

~~ .... CONSISTV\NT "'!'lOEB OiM THE SING LE IvlANAGENIENT SYSTEM

;

l?~t;;':;I/II;'l,"·:", ;,;., _ "-p,,'.',,," PI "'C-~'ATO'')~'' ~IX,.,rt V '1'~ICI" }' LL LP 71D Br ("'K I~·T 'JIH'!.' ' ~,,""'.'.,;'C -\1. 1'1 VI 1\.,". t. ,,r,0) V ."l ::1." .w.'1 1-\ -'.. l~." _ ,U I

~

DIRECTION OF THB OLD ARRANGEMEln)MAY INDUCE ApE TO ~ !

SCFAP THIS CONTROVERSIAL SETUP ALTOGETHER, RETURN TO

95-4, ANI? G~T ON WITH THIS WAR. REtJnN't)ERS MAY BE IN

ORDER TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FUNDAMENTrfL CONCEPIUAL

DIFFERENCE BETV'IEEN CONSUMER ORIENTED MARIN:F~ AVIATION

AND PRODUCER ORIENTED USAF TACTICAL AIR WILL CONTINUE

TO BE DEEP AND ENDURING DESPITE 'rHE BEST EFFORTS AND

GOODWILL OF THOSE IN THE FIELD WHO TRY TO -MAKE THEM

OVERLAY; THAT THE COND]TIONS THAT SPAWNED THE SIN:; LE

MANAGER DECISION ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT TODAY;

AND, FINALLY, THAT EVENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT WHATEVER

CONCERN AROSE OVER POSSIBLE CONFLICT DUE TO INTER-

MINGLING OF ARMY AND MARINE FORCES IN ICTZ PROVED -Ii

UNFOUNDED. THE U\ST TH~lJGHT IS THAT ABE MUST BE \;1 .\

ASSURED THAT MAHINE AIR IS READY TO GO

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-j \,~ ,~ :.; ~ r~: : \ ,-;. ~ ,~, J. .~: j ;': ".' E ~< t ~ ~'':J " ;. ... ~ ""'-·"...-. .. ·---->..-.·--·~·-___ ~_~_.·,_~ ... __ ·-_*,· ___ "''''';,f

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i~';~r:~~~~\l;: __ ~ :/: ,':: ~:t~:~_'''~:~~~~~1 8EAC~Il\ AT ANY TIME ],ND IN \VHATEVER NT ~',1. BERS THAT HE

DIRECTS AND WE CAN DO IT UNDER 95-4. •

j;;!P:':.t"7'Aj'N", y 3. THE MATTER or IMPROVED AIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY

;) :. "':! .... , ~

MUST ALSO BE ADDRESSED BECAUSE IT MN{ CC5NSTITUTE THE

STRONGEST DETEREENT FOR ABE TO MAKE jo,;\JY CHANGE NOW.

IIERE IS OUR ESTIMATE OF VvHAT HAS ACTUALLY OCCURRED

UNDER ~ SINGLE MANAGETv1ENT IN THIS RESPECT. IT,FORCED

THE CUMBERSOME, LONG-LEAD TIME, COMPLETELY

CENTRALIZED 7TH AF SYSTEM TO INTERFACE WITH THE

FLEXIBLE AND HIGHLY RESPONSIVE MARINE SETUP .. THE

MANY RESULTANT PATCHES AND IMPROVISATIONS HAVE ALL

TENDED TOWARD OUR SYSTElv1 AND THE ARMY HAS BENEFITTED

SIGNIFICANTLY. THE KEY_POINT HERE, HOWEVER, IS THAT

IT WAS THE INTERfACE ITSELF AND THE WAY IN WHICH IT

HIGHLIGHTED THE RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY AND UNRESPONSIVE":

NESS OF 7TH AF IN COMPARISON TO OUR SYSTEM THAT FORCED

MORE SORTIES AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THE ARMY. IN THE

END IT'S CLEAR THAT NO GREAT EFFICIENCIES RESULTED FROM

!?£::Sl,lt, rE .. D CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT PER SE, BUT RATHER 'f_~r·'''.~!:':'r::~:!~!Jj-

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--~ E'J~' INTERFi\C}~ AND IlvlPROVISATIO\!S.

4. ACCOf{DJJ-JGLY I I BELIEVE THAT YOU SHcnJLD RECOiVIlvLE;j\fD

l\/[ARlNE FJXED WING R£CONNAISSAJ'JCE AND STRIKL ASSETS BE

RETURNED TO CG, III MAP IN ACCORDI\NCEVifITH 95-4. i"'.

5. HA\lING MADE YOUR POSITION CLEAR, AND SHOULD YOU

DEEM 11' REQUIRED AND NECESSARY I BELIEVE THAT THE FOL-,

LOWII\fcf CH1-\NGES SHOULD BE MADE IN YOUR RECO!AMENDA-

TIONS; REFERENCE B PERTAINS.

A. PARAGRAPH 5. B LEAD-IN. - REWORD TO READ:

QUOTE: THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE

TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEED FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE

THE WEIGHT or AIR ErrORT IN SUPPORT or HIS TACTICAL

PLANS I TO MEET EMERGENCY AND CONTINGENCY REQUIRE-

fI""\

MENTS THROU:; HOUT RVN I AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE

RES PONSIVENESS. UNQ DO TE.

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., +.t-.. .,,,.- - ~ ., • ..,~-" .... "-'-'"'"""' -, --.- ~,"--"'-.' .'.' .,"'- ," " -.-- - ~ ~

j~1:f:,{)t,~;: '~:~t~C:.r:~ Li'l:t ;.~~~,: L _____ ._~ ..... L ............... '--o-.. -,--.~-c------~- _".~'~L ___ ''''_~''

FURTHER IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR fULL COORDINA'I'ION

OF SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS \iVITH,TACTIC/\L AIR. UNQUOTE. d. ~ "~

C. PARl\GPJ-\PH S. B. (3) - REWORD TO READ: '"

QUOTE: (3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SOHTIES

(CURRENTLY 209 INCLUDING 111 '\f\!EEKLY AND 32 DAILY PRE-

PLANNED SORTIES AS WELL liS THE 48 SCRAMBLES AND 18 HELO '

. ESCORT MISSIONS) BE RETURNED TO MISSION DIRECTION OF

CG I III MAP. TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDNANCE LOADS TO

BE DETERMINED BY CG , III MAl' BASED ON THE TACTICAL

NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS IN ORDER TQ IMPROVE

. . RESPONSIVENESS AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING

ARMS. UNQUOTE.

D. PARAGRAPH S.D. (9) -- REWORD TO READ:

QUOTE: (9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF

7 MARCH (REFERENCE A) BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE

ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THE TEMPORARY SINGLE MANAGER

TACTICAL AIR' CONC EPT. UNQUOTE.

(

6. I'LL CALL YOU ABOUT NOON I YOUR TIME, TO DISCUSS

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INFO RUESHOA/CMc . BT COpy o •• ooo.OF 0 •• 0. o~OPIES ___ _

s· E C RET SPECAT INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LGEN CUSHMAN MARL NE CORPS EYES ONLY SECT ION 1 OF 2 A. CG FMFPAC 2~2245Z JUNG8 1. THE FOLLOWING MSG WAS DISPATCHED TO COMUSMACV, INFO CINCPAC, CONCERNING OUR EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED PREPLANNED REQUEST SYSTEM UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT: Qu.oTE P 30063GZ JUN 68 ZFF-l FM CG III MAF DA NA NG to R UMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN INFO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC 8T SEC RET SECTION ONE OF TWO II 1 MA F EVALUAT 1 ON OF 51 NGLE: MANAGEMENT I 5TR 1 KE SUPPORT PH OCEDURES (U)

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5347 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MeEO A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOO OF 7MAR68 (S) B. COMUSMACV 14578 MSG 211145Z MAY68 (S) C. COMUSMACV 16352 MSG 071135Z JUN68 (C) D. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, 28 JUNE 1966 (C) 1. III MAF HAS ONE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE: TO FORGE A COMBINED ARMY-MARINE-ARVNeSUPPORTING ARMS TEAM IN 1 CORPS WHICH WILL DEFEAT THE ENEMY IN THE MOST RAPID AND LEAST COSTLY -'MANNER. IT IS ?I'iJ iikllk iiiA¥L 11113 12AI Ii •• na t 811111'10 ...

~ti~iB! 1'9281 ;:;w::i ::: =;~t~\,a:2kl't:::::: ;:;;:~

~i~II!!Iiii!=!:;~;~~~i:~~;;;i~;i1ii=;:: 'MARINE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED OUTSIDE OF I CORPS WOULD BE FRAGGED 'BY 7TH AF, AS WOULD AIR FOR,CE AiRCRAFT RESPONDING TO 1 CORPS 'REQUIREMENTS BEYOND 111 MAF CAPABILIT lES. THE SLIGHT AOJUST- L::\ ME"NIS 1 N THE PRESENT SYSTEM TO EFFECT THIS IMPROVEMENT ARE r.::/,ijI DISCUSSED B~L.oW. '2 • .ee) OO~EcrI'E OF REF A WAS TO ACHIEVE IHeREA

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NESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, PRINCIPALLY BY PROVIDING: A. GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF TOTAL STRIKE RESOURCES ABAILABLE. 'Bo IMPROVI NG RESPONSIVENESS TO T HE A IR SUPPORT REQUIRE"" 'MENTS OF GROUND TACTICAL COMMANDERS" c.. SIMPLIFICATION OF PROCEDURES AND REDUCTION OF A~lNISTRATIVE BURDEN. 3. (U) REF C DIRECTED A 30-DAY EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE PROMULGATED BY REF B, IN ORDER TO ASSESS PROGRESS OF THE SYSTEM AND TO IDENTIFY NECESSARY PROCEDURAL CHANGES .. COVERAGE OF THE FOLLOWING WAS REQUESTED AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE ORDER LISTED: A. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEMm B .. EVALUAT ION .. C. CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS AND APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS .. 4. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM. A. THE LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK LOAD PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REF A HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH I N REF B .. HOWEVER, BOT H FACTORS CAN BE

:, ... ." '/" '

PAGEI\!4 RUMSAK 5347 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MeEO IMPROVED WITH RELATIVELY MINOR MODIFICATIONS. IN ADDITION, FULLY ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR ARTILLERY COORDINATION WITH AIR OR AIRCRAFT DIVERSION AROUND DANGER AREAS. 5. EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEMo Aa ADMINISTRATION ~ UNDER REF B THE ADMINISTRATIVE WORK LOAD WAS LESSENED BY REDUCTION IN THE LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY OF FRAGS AND REQUEST DATA; HOWEVER, THE BURDEN IS STILL EXCESSIVE. THIS IS DUE TO THE CURRENT DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG PROCEDURES AND DETAILED SCHEDULING THROUGH THE TACC., II IS NOTED THAT DURl NG THE TEST PERIOD. T HE SORT IES ASSIGNED 1ST MAW BY THE DAILY FRAG WERE ESSENTIALLY AS UNVARYING AS THOSE IN THE WEEKLY FRAG. FURTHER, BASED UPON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS, THERE WERE NO DI VERTS FROM 1 CORPS DA IL Y SORT IES TO OTHER CORPS AREAS* CONSEQUENTLY, INASMUCH AS COMUSMACV HAS PREEMPTION AUTHORITY OVER ALL SORTIES AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL AGENCY (7TH AF TACC) IS FULLY INFORMED OF SORTIE STATUS A~D CAPABILITIES, THE DAILY FRAG PROCEDURES APPEAR TO BE AN UN- ~ NECESSARY COPJPLEXITY IN lCTZ.. ~ B. (c) [FFICIENCY "" THE PROVISlONS OF REF B .sRoua

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!PAGE 5 RUMSAK 5347 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MeEO IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN SORTIE ALLOCATION, BUT OPTIMUM USE OF SORTIES WAS NOT REALIZEDc THIS IS EVIDENCED IN I CORPS BY THE HIGH NUtilBER OF SCRAtilBLE AND ADD=ON SORTIES TO MEET THE DAILY NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS, RESULTING IN THE 1ST MAW BEING FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUC­TION. OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES IHAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES NOI PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER IN I CT PS WITH THE NUMBER OF SORTIES HE DESIRES J AND THE SORTIES AVAILABLE ON THE PREPLANNED F'RAG ARE NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE: TO THE GROUND COMMANDER IN SUF­FICIENT NUMBERS AT THE CRITICAL TIMES NEEDED TO INFLUENCE THE TACTICAL SITUATION$ THEREFORE, ADDITIONAL SORTIES IN THE FORM OF SCRAMBLES ARE REQUIRED I) OF COURSE, SCHEDUl.ES FOR SORT IE PRODUCTION, WHEN APPROACHED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY ON THE PART OF AIR UNlIS, RARELY COINCIDE WlTH THE TOTS REQUIRED BY THE GROUND SCHEMES OF MANEUVEIL. BASE LOCATIONS AND A IRCRAI'T RADI US OF ACTION STRONGLY INFLUENCE ORDNANCE LOADS, AIC TURN AROUHDS, AND TIME ON TARGETS., ADJUSTMENTS AND COMPROMISES BETWEEN THESE REQUIREMENTS CAN BEST BE MADE LOCALLY, THUS ENSURING GREATER SORTIE EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTION.

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 5347 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO C. (C) CONCENTRATION OF AIR EFFORT - THE DAILZNPREPLAN~ NED FRAG WAS INSTITUTED, INTER ALIA, TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY TO CONCENTRATE THE AIR EFFORT AS DICTATED BY THE ENEMY THREAT ~ J)lJRI~lHE

TEST PERIOD, WHICH ENDED 210600H JUN, THIS EMERGENCY MASSI NG AND DIVERSION OF AIR EFFORT FROM 1 CORPS WAS NOT EM­PLOYED, EXCEPT FOR A REDUCTION IN TAC AIR AVAILABLE TO I CORPS TO 25 PCT OF TOTAL IN-COUNTRY TAC AIR SORTIES COMMENCING 260600H . i,'

JUNE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THAT MONTH", THE CHANGE IN THE WEIGHT OF THE AIR EFFORT WAS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO INCREASE THE OUT-Of-COUNTRY SORTIES TO 35 PCT OF TOTAL STRIKES AVAILABlE / (SEE MACV "S6 230757Z JUNE)~ ALSO, THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSIQN CHANGED LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY" RATHER THAN CON-TINUING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND COMPLEXITY OF THE DAILY ?REPLANNED FRAG, MARINE SORTIES IN I CORPS COULD BE MORE EFFICIENTLY EMPLOYED BY ALLOCATION OF A BLOCK OF MARINE SORTIES TO BE SCHEDULED IN I CORPS6 D .. (C) PRODUCTION OF SORTIES - DURING THE TEST PERIOD MARINE FIXED WING AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, BASED ON POS­SESSED AIRCRAFT IN-COUNTRY AGAINST A 102 SORTIE RATE., WERE PROGRAMMED AT 225 SORTIES PER DAY <I> OF THIS NUMBER, l6 WERE BT

CG III MAF

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SEC R~E 1 SPECAT EXCLUSI \IE FOR LGEN BUSE INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LlikN CUSHMAN. MARl NE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2 ROUtt~ELY EMPLOYED IN NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS OUT OF COUNTRY; 48 SORTIES WERE EMPLOYED AS SCRAMBLES TO MEET EMERGENCY NEED OF ALL FORCES IN I CORPS; 18 WERE DESIGNATED FOR HELICOPTER ESCORT, AND 143 SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED BY THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER F'OR AIR OPERATIONS THROUGH THE TACC AT SAIGON. MP THE 143 SORTIES, 7121 PCT, OR 111, WERE SCHEDULED BY THE WEEKLY FRAG AT SET TIMES AND WITH STANDARD ORDNANCE LOADS; THE REMAINING 32 WERE SCHEDULED DAILY, BASED ON INDIVIDUAL TARGETS REQUESTED THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND~ THE 1ST MAW, TO MEET THE NEEDS OF FORCES IN I CORPS, ALSO AVERAGED AN ADDITIONAL 18 SORTIES PER DAY, EMPLOYED BY SCRAMBLE AND ADD .

IN,;1'"1IS.~.}ONS (FOR A DAILY AVERAGE OF 243 ATTACK SORT IES) .. 6 .. g!tJMMA~:r IRECOMMENDAT IONS ..

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5348 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO A. (C) SUMMARY: THE MODIFIED SYSTEM IS AN IMPROVEMENT, A STEP FORWARD FROM THE CUMBERSONE SYSTEM IXLLEMENTED ON 2121 MARCK/. .--AIR FORCE SORTIES HAVE IMPROVED GREATLY UNDER THE SYSTEM e '~i:" IN FACT, A 54 PCT INCREASE IN AIR FORCE SORTIES HAS BEEN REALIZED DURING THE TEST PERIOD, WHICH IS COMMENDABLE .. STILL, THE-" SYSTEM CONTINUES TO HARBOR DENJYIENCIESo THE WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG, WHILE IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF THE ORIGINAL SINGLE MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE, HAS REQUIRED AN INORDINATELY HIGH NUMBER OF SCRAMBLES AND ADD-ON SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS~ CONSEQUENTLY, THE 1ST MAW HAS BEEN FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUCT lONe AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM INDICATES THAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES NOT PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER WITH ALL THE SORTIES HE R PUIRES. FURTHERMORE, TOTS ASSIGNED A WEEK,Hi ADVANCE DO NOT PERMIT SURGE AIR EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO THt\C:-AA\NGI NG TACT lCAL SITUAT IONS FACING I HE GROUND COM-MANDER ;"~t;JiiitREBY REQUIRING INCREASED SCRAMBLES" THE LENGTH ~ OIL THE AIR' REQUEST CHAIN AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN ~ ,~.:~;oSED- BY THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG AilE 51 ILL

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PAGE 3 RUMSAK 5348 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 'FOR MCEO THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSIONS ALSO APPEAR MORE SUITABLE FOR WEEKLY FRAGGING SINCE THEY HAVE CHANGED LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY~ .. '9' AI, .. ar77T.III18: THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEAW FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE THE WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF HIS TACTICAL PLANS AND TO MEET EMERGENCY AND CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN AND TO FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSI VE NESS: <l) THAT THE PRESENT JOINT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM BE FURTHER IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION OF SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS WITH TACTICAL AIRe (2) THAT THE NUMBER OF MARINE STRIKE SORTIES SET ASIDE BY COMUSMACV FOR OUI~OF-COUNTRY AIR EFFORT (CURRENTLY 16 SORTIES PER DAY) BE FRAGGED BY THE TACC CONSISTENT WITH OVERALL INTERDICTION PLANS0 (3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SORTIES (CURRENTLY 209 INCLUDING 111 WEEKLY AND 32 DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES AS WELL AS THE 48 SCRAMBLES AND 18 HELO ESCORT MISSIONS) BE FRAGGED BY CG III MAFe TIMES ON TARGET AND ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG III MAF BASED ON THE TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINEH

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 5348 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO AND ARMY DIVISIONS, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS o

(4) THAT, AS NECESSARY, EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS ARISING OUTSIDE I CORPS BE MET BY COMUSMACVPREEMPTION OF SORT IES SCHEDULED IN I CORPS lAW REF D" (5) THAT III MAF (THROUGH I DASC) INFORM COMUSMACV BY DIRECT LINE TO TACC OF ALL MARINE SORTIES SCHEDULED IN I CORPS AND BY COpy OF THE lSI MAW FRAG@ REAL TIME REPORTS WILL BE MADE TO AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA AND TACe) t AS SORTIES ARE FLOWN. (6) THAT IN RECOGNITION OF AIR FORCE BASE LOCATION AND LOADINGS, PREPLAN NED AIR FORCE SORTIES, TOTS, AND ORDNANCE LOADS BE ADJUSTED THROUGH REQUESTS AND COORDINATION BETWEEN III MAF, COMUSMACV TASE AND rACC~ AIR FORCE SORTIES SUPPORTING FORCES IN I CORPS CONTINUE AS CURRENTLY DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV AND SCHEDULED BY TACC& (7) THAT THE INITIAL POINT (IP) BE ELIMINATED ~ FROM THE WEEKLY FRAG@ THE CORRECT IP IS CONT INGENT UPON \1::.) ASSIGNMENT OF A SPECIFIC III MAF SUBORDINATE TO BE SUPPORTED0 UNT lL THE WEEKLY FRAG IS RECEIVED BV III MAF AND f:IIt~AI!~CWJ!llllr.'"

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PAGE 5 RUMSAK 5348 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO TO ITS SUBORDINATES, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE A CORRECT IP. I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ARE PASSING NIGHTLY TO 7TH AF AND FMAW THE CORRECT IP FOR EACH MISSION ON THE WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG. (8) THAT, IN THE CASE OF I CORPS, CONSIDERATION BE GIVE~ TO ADOPTION OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN TH~ COACT, MARINE SPHINX REPORT, AND INFORMATION ON DIVERTS FROM I DASC TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ON MARINE AIR FOR THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT .. (9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH (REF A) BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THE TEMPORARY SINGLE MANAGER TACTICAL AIR CONCEPT. GP-4 UNQUOTE 29 APPRECIATE HELPFUL RECOMMENDATIONS, AND I INCORPORATED AS MANY AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING. MUCH OF THE PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSED IN REF A HAS BEEN ADVANCED SEVERAL TIMES TO COMUS AND TO REPEAT IT ONCE AGAIN COULD BE COUNTER­PRODUCTIVE. FURTHER, I'M CONVINCED THAT IF GEN ABRAMS ACCEPTS OUR RECOMMENDATIONS, I WILL ONCE ATAIN HAVE CONTROL

PA·GE (5 RUMSAK 5348 SEC RET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO OF ALL MY AIR ASSETS, LESS THOSE FOR OUT-OF~COUNTRY AND EMERGENCY MISSIONS. I"M NOT TOO ENCOURAGED OVER THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THIS CONTROVERSY, BUT BELIEVE OUR PRESENT PROPOSAL TO BE MORE SALEABLE THAN OUR PAST DIRECT APPROACHES" BEST REGARDS. GP-4 BT CG II I MAF p 3~~73~ZlJUN68 6-6

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"STAff SECTIONS NOT ~ AUTHORIZED TO MAKE COPIES /t? . ~

~ ~ .« A/.,I- Cmd. Ctr ~

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MAF -T-PACJl)[O

-, "-'-" ,_._ .... , ._ .. _ .. _... . .... -.---- ----- -~

111111111111111111 SPEC AT EXCLUSIVE FO~ FOLLOWS 111111111111111111 ~

-' -~-.---"-.. - ---_._ .. ,. .... . .

00 ltUABQL lttfHHFMA ltUMtfGJtA DE "UMHVP 0613D 1821440 ~IfY 555SS o 3 0 144~Z JUN6S Fill CS TlUltD MAftDIV IQ.....! UP! US It A /CS II I M A F' __ lNFO JWHHFMA/CG P'MFPAC (D020) ftUABQL/CG NINTH MAB BT SECltET

COpy} OF '2 COPIES TOR:- 3~2349Z1JUN68

5PECAT EXCLUSIVE FOlt LISEN CUSHMAN F'ftOM MGEN DAVIS INFO LTG EN B USE AIDBS EN CHIP Ao CS N INTM MAS 10'0130Z JUN 68 TO CS 1 I I MAF (TS) , B. MY 301430Z JUN 68 Co CS III MAP' 1'1104Z JON 68 D. CS PCV Z60639Z JUt 68 I .. I CONCUlt WHOLEHEAJtTEDL Y IN THE CO NCEPT OF ltEF A FOft A MULTI-SLF OPR IN I COltPS, SPECIFICALLY "ECOl'll'lENDING TRE NAPOLEON/SALINE AO AS THE OBJECTIVE AltEA. 2. IN "EFS" I ftESPO NDED TO ltEF C AND D, ltECOI'1MEND INS THE AftG/StF (ONE Oft 80TH) BE EMPLOYED IN THE NAPOLEON/SALINE AD P'Opt A PEpt 100 OF 1HptEE WEEKS COMMENCING ABO I1T 25 AUG. THIS OPN WOULD THEN BE TIMED WITH THEftETUftN OF 1ST PlAftlNES TO 1ST MAftDIV ~ THIRD HARDlY 0 :5;14tt~P"'UN68 ACTN: 515ft 1-2

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- ~E:~E~~~:VP :13D SEC U r . . . " .. , ~ . Pnfl!IrTI~G IN tTIAL EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST BGDE, 5TH IIQF D IV INTO ~

'.:-..

TJiIi PftOBABLE EXPANSION OF THE DIV AO VICIN ITY OF QUANG nu AND Sf) MTM.. ~ 3. WHILE AGltEElNGWITHTHE CONCEPT OF ItEF A, I WOULD ADD THE FOLLOWING COMMEITS TO THE OUTLINED ItATIONALE:. ~ A$ THE PJltACTlCE OF DESI6lUTING BNS fOftOM 1ST AND 3D MAPtDIU FOftCES AS SLFS SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED AS . % COUNTEft ... PftODUCTIVE. tASKING 26TH MAJUNES TO PftOVIDE BOTH SlFS ON A CONTINUING BASIS PftESENTS A MOftE ~ EFF lC1ENT AND EFFE.CIIVE. MEANS OF MEET INS THE ftEQUlftEMENT. ~ THIS PftOCEDUPtE SHOULD COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY WITH A BN FftOM 26TH MA1UNES ftELIEVING BLT 2/4. IF POSSIBLE, 2/4 ~ SHOULD SE.,DEACTIVATED WHILE ASHOftE., ALLOWING HIGHLY DESIftABLE CONTINUITY TO O'IS FO! ITS PAltENT ftEGT IN ~ THE S.ENSITIVE SCOTLAffD II AD. SUBSEQUENTLY,OtREft BNS,ftEG!5 AND. DIVS WOULD SIMILAftLY PftOFIT BY NOT ~ BEING ftEQUlftED nhtHSPtUP! OPNS CAUSED BY PE1UODIC

B .. 26TH MAftlNESH'QCO~DBE ~ECONS!ITUTED AS ftLT .26 LOSS OF A 8ft TO, ACTIVlTIO.· N Oft. EMPLOYMENT AFLOAT A.S BlT. ~

AND COl'll'! A NDO NE Oft'BOTH 0 F THE SLFS. HO WEVEft. IT ~

PAGE THftlEftUMHVP 06130 SEC ft E T \\oULD THEN DUPLICATE EXISTlNG SLF COMMAND OftGANIZATIONS AND COMPLICATE COMMAND ftELATIONSHIPS, PAftTI'CULAftLY WHEN 9..FS AftE COMMITTE!) INDEPENDENTLY .. IT WOULD ALSO· DEPftlVE THE DIVS OF A ftESIHG. AS ~ MODIFIED' APPftOACH, ftECOt'lMEND THE 26THMAftINE HQ BE ASSfGNED TO A COASTAL AO (SP'tCIFICAtLY NAPOLEON/SlrL.INE) IN AJV ECONOP}l.\ OF FOfteE' J?OSTUftE, WITH THE ON! 0.6,QIC BN MOT ON "SLF DUTY IJN'DEftMftElaI ~()~~ON. AS THE ENEl'W'J'f1t1ATION IN THAT AO MAY S[J8 SEQuqTL Y D IeTATl, St., ftj~DftJ!SP(,)NSE WO ULD PLACE OftGAN ItS NS UNDER 26T llMArftl'ES opeON WHILE SLFS ASHOftE. FOJt SPECIFIED PE'HOIHC OPNS AstJOftE COULD BE BftOUSHT UNDEft9TH MAB CONTftOL& AT THE SAME TIME, SHOULD THE 3D MAftDIV SITUATION PEftMIT t 26TH MAftINES AND ITS ASHOftE BN WOULD B!>liN OPTIMUM POSITION TO COMB INE WITH THE SLFS AND":·ftE:ADY FOft COMMITMENT AS AN FL T WH Eft E "EED ED j) . . .,

C. I SEE NO. ADVANTAGE To . ft~ESIGNATING BNS (E.G 2/7 AND 2/4) AS THE 26TH MA!INES~; I MUCH PrtEFEft THAT 2/4 CONTINUE ITS PRESENT Ml5SIQ~ ASHOftE. GP=4" . , .....

BT CG nt~"~D MAADIV

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