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3. Ö¿�ÖÚêâ
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¥I<¬Õ1µ5¥I7K½�w(2018)6
IMF: A Decade after the Global Financial Crisis: Are We Safer?, Global
Financial Stability Report, October 2018
BIS: Promoting global monetary and financial stability, Annual Economic
Report, June 2018
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1 Funke, M., M. Schularick, and C. Trebesch 2016: Going to Extremes: Politics
after Financial Crises, 1870–2014, European Economic Review, Vol.88, P227-260,
Jorda-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database
2 Laeven, L. and F. Valencia 2018: Systemic Banking Crises Revisited, IMF Working
Paper, No.18/206, Data
3 Reinhart, C.M. and K. Rogoff, 2009: This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of
Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, Data£¥©�µ5ùgØ��ºlzc
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