east asian security and defence digest 29
TRANSCRIPT
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7/31/2019 East Asian Security and Defence Digest 29
1/9[1]
China's New Aircraft?
Beijing's efforts to counter US's
military capabilities in East Asia
may have come to fruition with the
development of a new fighter jet
that can be a response to the
controversial F-35.
EAST ASIANSECURITY AND DEFENCE
DIGEST
EDITORS NOTE - TIAGO MAURCIOResearcher at Kyoto University and Orient Institute
This past week as seen possibly
dramatic events whose consequences will
be far-reaching both to Japan and East
Asia. Firstly, the modifications to Japan's
nuclear security policy by inserting an
unequivocal reference to national security
can entail the possibility of a future
development of nuclear weapons, or sosome analysts claim. Secondly, another
jurisdictional provision dealing with the use
of space has eased its clauses on the strict
prohibition of using that dimension for
military purposes. Though applicable to
dual-use surveillance technology, it can set
the precedent for more ambitious space
programs that may guarantee Japan a
place in the unfolding quest for outer space
advantages.
The opinionated lore, however, has not
yet expressed their views on any of these
subjects. Instead, JFPO's Rui Faro Saraiva
has brought to the attention of the
community the dramatic reality of Japan-
China mutual perceptions. With an
overwhelming majority of both publics
sharing a negative view of their strategic
neighbour, one can get a glimpse of the
difficulties that lie ahead. Furthermore,there are also serious concerns regarding
the potential for more bilateral incidents,
such as that which occurred in September
2010 involving a Chinese trawler and two
Japanese Coast Guard vessels, spiking
anti-Chinese feeling in Japan. These are
very important trends that ought to be bore
in mind in the future whilst fostering mutual
cooperation, transparency and dialogue to
defuse straining ties from being severed.
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Can the Senate Reverse President
Obama's Defence Cuts?
But China certainly isn't shy about
its heavenly ambitions. In 2011, Beijing
announced plans to put a man on the
moon by 2020, and its space agency has
publicly suggested establishing a "base
on the moon as we did in the South Pole
and the North Pole." Still, Washington has
given little thought to the possibility thatonce a permanent sett lement is
established, Beijing might seek to assert
extraterrestrial territorial sovereignty,
effectively declaring part of the moon's
surface Chinese territory.
The idea isn't as wild as it sounds.
During the Cold War, the possibility of
countries claiming territory on the moon
or other planets was considered realistic
enough that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
was enacted to prevent it. Washington is
wearing blinders, though, if it thinks this
piece of paper will prevent a Chinese
lunar land grab. And if China is tempted
to seize some territory, such a move
would surely be a game-changer for
international security. A new realm of
competition beyond Earth's orbit would
alter great-power politics back home as
dramatically as the 1957 launch of
Sputnik spurred the Soviet-American race
to the moon in the first place.
Red Moon Rising (John Hickman -
Foreign Policy).
The State-of-the-art in ROK-US Relations
The United States and South Korea
hav e ma i n ta ine d a s t ro ng and
longstanding alliance for almost six
decades, withstanding significant
changes in their internal dynamics and
the geopolitical climate. In recent years
the two nations have sought to broaden
their relationship to cover economic
development and emerging nontraditional
security challenges. Now the alliance isperhaps the strongest it has been, but
changes loom in both domestic and
international politics. Maintaining forward
progress among these changi ng
environments will be a test for the two
partners in the coming years.
The Sixth Seoul-Washington Forum:
Moving the United States-Korea
Relationship Forward in Changing
Environments (Sung-Joo Han - The
Brookings Institute).
Reshuffling Power Distribution in Asia
Certainly the word 'pivot' has dramatic
connotations. Some may imagine troop
transports flying from Kabul to the Korean
Peninsula, or of aircraft carriers sailing
from the Persian Gulf towards the South
China Sea. The term 'rebalance' may be
less dramatic, but it is a more accurate
description of the new US strategy. In
fact, we will probably see several types ofre-balancing in coming years.
The first is quantitative. 'Rebalance'
doesn't really signify the movement of
resources from West Asia to the Pacific.
The term signifies that, in the post-
Afghanistan world, there will be a greater
relative focus of US defence resources in
the Asia Pacific as compared with other
regions of the world. Much of that focus
will be on the US Navy. For example, the
current 50/50 split of naval resources
between the US Pacific and Atlantic fleets
will become 60/40 by 2020. (It may be a
surprise to some that 50% of the US
Navy is still based in the Atlantic more
than 20 years after the end of the Cold
War; these things change slowly.)
'Asian pivot' is really an 'Asian re-
balance' (David Brewster - The Lowy
Interpreter).
China's Preeminence in the Rare Earth
Elements
Japan accounts for a third of the global
demand and receives 82 percent of its
REE from China. Thus, it is particularly
sensitive to any reduction in China's REE
export quota. Despite Wen Jiabaos
reassurance that REE would not be used
as a diplomatic tool, China temporarily
imposed a de facto export ban to Japan
after the 2010 Diaoyutai/Senkaku
maritime incident, hastening Japanese
efforts to secure REE elsewhere.
Japanese companies have formed
partnerships with companies in Vietnam,
India and Australia to mine in those
countries. Japan has also been actively
engaged in urban mining - the recycling
of end products such as mobile phones
to recover REE materials. Moreover, it
aims to slash domestic consumption of
REE by 30 per cent in the next two years.
Attempts to create a supply chain outside
China seek to lessen the blow of the
export restriction without tackling it
directly. The obvious option would be to
bring a case to the WTO to force China
into lifting the restrictions. Such a move is
not without precedent. In 2009, the US,EU and Mexico filed a case against
Chinese export restrictions on nine raw
materials. China responded by claiming
the general exception under Article XX of
GATT that trade restrictions can be
imposed for the purpose of natural
resource conservation and the protection
of public health, but the WTO Panel
rejected Chinas defence.
Rare Earths: The Dragon's Pearl (Edith
Lai - The Heptagon Post).
India Reacts to Washington's Asia Pivot
The US and India held their third annual
strategic dialogue in Washington on 13
June 2012. At the second dialogue in
June 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton pressed India to assume a more
proactive leadership role in the Asia
Pacific region, exhorting it to not just
look east, but continue to engage and act
east as well.
US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
enthusiastically restated the same
message during his recent post-Shangri-
La Dialogue swing through New Delhi.
The US pivot and Indias look
east (Sourabh Gupta - East Asia Forum).
China's Bet on Countering US Naval
Capabilities in Its Near Abroad
Are Chinas Near Seas Anti-Navy
capabilities aimed directly at the United
States?
Yes, but its more complicated than
that. In the military realm, Washington
and Beijing face a situation that is
complex both in concept and in policy
implications. In contrast to its mostly-
settled land borders , Chinas island and
maritime zone claims in the Near Seas
remain mostly unresolved.
To further its still-contested claims in
these Three Seas (the Yellow, East
China, and South China Seas), China is
developing increasingly-sophisticated
capabilities to hold at risk forces of the
U.S. and its allies and friends in that
region and its immediate approaches.While some of these anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD)or, from Beijings
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perspective, counter-intervention
capabilities are naval in nature, land-
based missiles controlled by the Second
Artillery Force and land-based aircraft
constitute many of the most potent and
potentially effective ones. Thus, merely
comparing the two nations navies as a
whole, whatever allowances are made for
the fact that the globally-distributed and -
tasked U.S. Navy could not divert the
majority of its platforms to the Near Seaseven in wartime, fails to capture the true
extent of the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA)s emerging challenge to the U.S.
Navy. For this reason, some U.S.
government analysts refer to Chinas A2/
AD forces as an Anti-Navy .
Are Chinas Near Seas Anti-Navy
capabilities aimed directly at the United
States? (Andrew Erickson - Information
Dissemination).
Is India Really a Swing State in US's
Asian Strategy?
If he felt any disappointment at not
achieving any substantial breakthrough in
talks with Indian Defense Minister A.K.
Antony, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta didnt show it publicly. On a
swing through Asia that started with
Singapores annual Shangri-La Dialogue,
Panetta had hoped to bring the Indian
defense establishment on board for a
rebalancing strategy that many believe is
aimed squarely at China.
Why India Snubbed U.S. (Nitin Gokhale- Foreign Policy).
The Trans-Pacific Partnership in
Perspective
At their summit in Beijing on May 13,
the leaders of China, Japan, and South
Korea agreed to start negotiations on a
trilateral free trade agreement by the end
of the year. For Japan, 30% of whose
total exports go to China and South
Korea, the elimination of tariffs under
such an FTA would be a major plus. Andit has been calculated that it would boost
Japans gross domestic product by 0.3%.
So the agreement to start talks is
welcome. But we cannot be certain that
the negotiations will actually be launched
as agreed before the year ends. For one
thing, South Korea has a deficit in its
trade with Japan. Furthermore, South
Korean companies would be better
served by a bilateral FTA between their
country and China than by a trilateral
agreement that would level the playingfield between them and their Japanese
rivals in the Chinese market.
Looking Ahead in Promoting Free Trade
and Sustaining Japans Defense
Industry (Shiraishi Takashi -
Nippon.com).
Behold, China's Response to the
Controversial F-35?
Another hypothesis is that this is the
long-rumored single-seat variant of
Hongdus L-15 advanced jet trainer. The
L-15 is a twin-engine design similar to theYak-130. A single-seat light attack variant
would be a logical development. It could
be an attractive export offering and a
much needed replacement for the
PLAAFs obsolete Q-5 light attack aircraft.
But given the heavy security presence
around the air frames transporter, it is
most plausible that this is either a mock-
up or static test frame of Shenyang
Aircraft Corporations latest combat
aircraft program. The images reveal an air
frame that bears a strong resemblance to
a model displayed by Shenyang in arecent UAV exhibition. While the unveiling
of a flying prototype may not take place
this year, photos of the mock-up/static
test frame is proof that there is at least
one other advanced combat aircraft
project in China other than the J-20.
Chinas homegrown F-35? (Wilson
Chau - Asia Security Watch).
South Pacific Islands' Strategic Drift
The recent Chinese involvement in
Yap, and the FSM as a whole, may be
nothing more than a coincidence between
three interests: a private Chinese
company seeking to make profit; the
Chinese government trying to quell its
Mal thus ian fears by secur ing a
dependable food source for its enormous
population; and the FSM government
trying to develop infrastructure and a
sustainable economic sector that a nearly30-year-old agreement with the US has
failed to develop. Yet given the FSMs
geo-political situation between China and
the US, Chinas ever increasing defence
budget, and the proximity of these islands
and their territorial waters to US military
installations in Guam and the Kwajalein
Atol l, there is reason to fear that
something that started as mutually
beneficial will devolve into something that
is mutually detrimental.
Micronesias future between China and
the US (Scott Leis - East Asia Forum).
An Overview of China's Regional Impact
How is the rise of China changing
East Asia? In order to understand what is
happening, we need to consider the
impact of Chinas growing influence from
a number of different perspectives. In this
article, I want to look at some of the ways
in which an increasingly assertive China is
shaping the regional order in East Asia,
how other countries in the region are
reacting to Chinas rise, and the ways
Chinese economic cooperation is
changing the overall situation in East
Asia.
The Rise of China and Its Significance
for East Asia (Shiraishi Takahashi -
Nippon.com).
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Japan's Role in Myanmar's
Democratisation
The Japanese governments idea of
appointing me ambassador stems, I
think, from the success of a unique
Nippon Foundation project for assisting
ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Initiatives
und er thi s pro j ect inc lud e the
construction of elementary schools and
the distribution of medicine boxes
[called okigusuri in Japanese] containing
traditional medicines. The school
construction, in particular, gives even
ethn ic minorities living in remote
mountainous areas a sense that the
central governments democratization is
bringing tangible results. In the state of
Shan, for instance, inhabited by several
ethnic groups, around 200 elementary
schools have been constructed already
under the project. And work is moving
forward on the construction of 100
schools in the state of Rakhine, where
religious conflict has been escalating.
The Road to True
Democracy in Myanmar
(Sasakawa Yohei -Nippon.com).
The Deployment of Osprey Aircraft to
Okinawa Raises Local Concerns
Okinawa is once again showing signs
of increasing public protest against
decision made by Tokyo's central
government regarding the United States'
military presence in the island. This time,
the speakers and microphones were
voicing the concerns of more than 5,000
people who fear that the scheduled
redeployment of MV-22 Osprey aircrafts
from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
Iwakuni to MCAS Futenma later this year
is a serious hazard to the population.
Fears have been ignited following two
incidents involving Ospreys in recent
months. Firstly in Morocco, where a
crash in April has led to the fatally of the
two crewmen onboard. Secondly, last
week's crash in Florida has once again
led Okinawans to question the safety of
operating the twin- tilt-rotor aircraft in a
densely populated area. Fears over a
repetition of the 2004 US helicopter
crash in Okinawa International University
are undoubtedly fueling some of the
protesters to ask for the withdrawal of
Prime Minister Noda's decision for
redeployment. Not to mention the noise
pollu tion the aircr aft' s rotors are
(in)famously known to create.
Okinawa and the
Redeployment of Ospreys toFutenma
JAPAN
HIGHLIGHTS
OKINAWA WITNESSES LOCAL
PROTESTS OVER
DEPLOYMENT OF OSPREYS!
Mutual Perceptions Among
Japanese and Chinese Are At
Extreme Low
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(Tiago Mauricio - JFPO).
What Happened to Japan's Leadership
Model?
But Japan has been suffering dramatic
reverses in two critical areas - population
and cutting edge industries. With nearly a
quarter of its people already over 65, Japan
is aging more rapidly than any other major
country and will see 40 percent of its people
at the age of 65 or older by 2050. Also, by
2050, the total population will drop from
today's 128 million to only 95 million. That
will make achieving any kind of growth and
paying the retirement and health costs of
the elderly extremely difficult. Meanwhile,
on the industrial scene, much of the
Japanese semiconductor industry that
nearly killed off Silicon Valley in the 1980srecently declared bankruptcy in the face of
aggressive competition from the likes of
Korea's Samsung and Hynix and Taiwan's
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company. Similarly, Korea's Samsung and
LG are running away with the flat panel
electronic display market once the preserve
of Japan's Sony and Sharp. Finally, Korea's
Hyundai/Kia Motors is taking great chunks
of market share away from the Japanese
auto companies in the North American,
European, South American, and Chinese
markets while the Korea ship builders have
pushed the Japanese into only a small
share of the high end ship bui ldin g
business.
Back to Japan's Future
(Clyde Prestowitz - Foreign Policy).
Perceptions and Misperceptions in Japan-
China Relations
This survey came to my attention during
the prime time news on NHK. About 84% of
Japanese respondents said they have a
negative impression of China, while 64.5%
of Chinese indicated that the feeling is
mutual regarding Japan. Its the highest
percentage of negative views seen among
Japanese respondents since 2005. In a very
simplistic and generalized way we could say
that most of the Japanese have a negative
perception about China, and the same
occurs with the majority of Chinese peoplewhen they think about Japan.
Japan and China Mutual
Perceptions
(Rui Faro Saraiva -JFPO).
With Interests Rising in East Asia, Will
Russia Follow Suit?
As China steps up its external
econ omic coope rat i on act i v i t i es ,
international institutions like the ADB, along
with bilateral aid organizations and
i n t e r n a t i o n a l n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l
organizations, are actively working to build
their ties with the responsible Chinese
organs in connection with the Mekong
region. Japan has also been forming a
relationship with China in connection with
the region. Since 2008 the two countries
foreign ministries have been engaging in
policy dialogue on Mekong region. Dialogue
is also being conducted within the region
for example, between JICA Overseas
Offices and the economic and commercial
sections of the Chinese embassies in
Cambodia and Myanmar. Meanwhile,
Japanese companies have been building
global partnerships with their Chinese
counterparts in locations around the world,
including joint undertakings in Vietnam for
thermal power plant and cement plant
construction.
Chinas External Economic
Cooperation: Ties to the
Mekong Region
(Kitano Naohiro -Nippon.com).
Interview with Linus Hagstrm
Continuing ours series of interviews with
specialists on Japanese foreign and
security policy and East Asian affairs at
Japan Foreign Policy Observatory (JFPO),
yet again we bring you another renown
scholar whose significant contributions to
Japanese studies have earned him a
privileged status in the global intellectual
landscape. Professor Linus Hagstrm is a
dist ingu ish ed aca demi c with a long
repertoire of publications, conferences and
positions, and therefore an authority in
security studies not only with regards to
Japan but also more broadly.
I first met Professor Hagstrm at an event
in the University of Kobe, where Professor
Minohara Tosh held a conference with
several other academics. Hagstrm's
presentation followed the results of his
research on "Chinese Aggression and
Japanese Defeat: Deconstructing Narratives
on the 2010 Senkaku Islands Incident."
Incidentally, I have penned down a few
thoughts in the aftermath of the said
conference which may give you a glimpse of
the ideas presented. What followed was a
heated and rich debate that aroused my
interest to look a bit deeper into the
process in which Japan's identity politicsshapes its foreign policy decisions, namely
in times of crises.
Wanting to find out more about the
relevance of the constructivist turn in IR
scholarship on Japan's foreign and security
policy, I then had the pleasure of arranging
an interview with Prof. Hagstrm. He is
currently a Japan Foundation scholar at
Kyoto University's Graduate School of Law,
in a bu ild ing opp osi te to min e. Wediscus sed severa l issues concerni ng
Japan's internal and external dimensions
an d ho w th e ch an gi ng st ra te g i c
environment is forcing policy-makers to
adapt and reinvent established formulas to
deal with both emerging and longstanding
risks and threats. As our meeting ended, I
kindly invited him to answer a few questions
for Japan Foreign Policy Observatory. The
following is the result of yet another
discussion.
But before I share with you Hagstrm's
http://prestowitz.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/20/back_to_japans_futurehttp://prestowitz.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/20/back_to_japans_futurehttp://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://prestowitz.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/20/back_to_japans_futurehttp://prestowitz.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/20/back_to_japans_futurehttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00803/http://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://www.japanfpo.org/2012/06/japan-and-china-mutual-perceptions.htmlhttp://prestowitz.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/20/back_to_japans_futurehttp://prestowitz.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/20/back_to_japans_future -
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in si gh ts , al lo w me to do a sh or t
presentation for those of you who are not
familiar with his work. The bio is taken
directly from the professor's personal
website, which can be accessed at: http://
www.linushagstrom.org
Linus Hagstrm is currently Japan
Foundation Fellow and Visiting Professor at
Kyoto University (January to July 2012),
Senior Research Fellow and East Asia
Program Chair at the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs, Research Fellow at the
Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History
and Antiquities, and Associate Professor of
Political Science at Stockholm University.
He is also Research Associate at The
European Institute of Japanese Studies and
the East Asia Peace Programme, Editorial
Board Member of Pacific Affairs,and BoardMember of the Scholarship Foundation for
the Study of Japanese Society.
Hagstrms research covers Japanese
foreign- and security policy, JapanChina
relations, the North Korean nuclear issue
and Japanese domestic politics. His primary
field of expertise is foreign policy analysis,
and he has worked extensively with power
analysis. Hagstrm is currently interested in
interpretation and identity.
: : INTERVIEW : :
In analysing Japan's foreign and security
policy, North Korea is a curious case study
that may allow us to understand Japan's
role as a regional security actor. In your co-
edited book "North Korea Policy: Japan and
the Great Powers", you have explored this
facet of Japan's policy toward the Peninsula
and one gets the sense that Tokyo's posture
towards Pyongyang is indicative of the
commitment toward the pursuit of a
proactive role internationally. But how is this
issue perceived by the political leadership in
Japan? Can we resume it to an interest in
the abduction issue, its nuclear programme
and impact on regional security, or are there
other dimensions often overlooked?
Its true that Ive from time to time been
analyzing the multilateral coordination of
North Korea policy as a case of Japanese
foreign and security policy. The background
is that Ive a problem with the way in which
Japan is most often seen as lacking in
agency in its foreign and security policyas
if it were merely an appendix to the USA.
This view is shared by the US mainstream
an d rad ic a l an a ly s ts l i k e Gav an
McCormack , although there are big
differences in the nuances and particularlyin the normative aspects of their arguments.
Ive argued that North Korea policy is a
good case to test this view of Japan.
The reason is basically that its a case
where the interests of all regional actors
intersect, overlap and also collide. I'm not
sure if "proactive" most appropriately
captures my findings, but where most
analysts have seen a passive and largely
insignificant Japan in the multilateral
coordination of North Korea policy, and at
time s an obstr uct ive and ther efor e
insignificant Japan, my articles on the
subject make three interrelated arguments:
1. The gist of my article The Dogma of
Japanese insignificance is that analyses of
the multilateral coordination describe quite
a few Japanese behaviors which could be
interpreted in terms of Japanese exercises
of power over other actors, but that they
entirely fail to make that interpretation. The
reason is arguably that the view of Japan as
weak and subservient in its foreign and
security policy has functioned as a lens,
enabling certain interpretations and
disabling others.
2. Another articleNormalizing Japan
argued basically that Japan has often been
accused of obstructing the process of the
Six-Party Talks by relentlessly bringing up
the abduction issue, but that most analysts
fail to acknowledge the component of
Japanese power. Namely, by conditioning
the use of economic incentives on the
normalization of diplomatic relations and by
conditioning normalization on a full solution
of the abduction issue, Japan keeps
withholding what is deemed as a crucial
component in a future lasting solution of the
nuclear conundrum.
3. A third articleCritiquing the Idea of
Japanese Exceptionalismargues that
Japan's approach to the North Korean
nuclear issue has been seen as unique and
exceptional, but that it actually compares
rather well with that of other actors
involved. All seem to favor short-term
national gains before denuclearization. No
one seems fully committed to solving the
nuclear issue.
4. The implication of the three articles is
that in the multilateral coordination of North
Korea policy Japan has been exercising
power over the other actors in attempts to
secure national interests. Hence, it is
already behaving quite "normally" in itsNorth Korea policy.
North Korea's regime and international
behaviour also questions Japan's direct
peace and security, not just its role in the
region. Despite that, it appears that the
DPRK checks Japan's efforts to delineate a
strategy for East Asia, or indeed the political
will to engage with these issues. Is Japan
devoid of a strategy toward its near-
abroad?
First of all, I don't think North Korea is a
serious threat to Japan. Still, as I have
argued in the co-authored piece Among
Threats and a Perfect Excuse, the fact that
its constructed as a threat of sorts in
Japanese discourses is quite interesting
and probably reflective of a Japanese
interest in not securitizing China. North
Korea provides Japan with a very good
excuse to undertake changes in its security
policy, which had probably been better
understood in the context of the rising
China.
As for the question of the presence or
absence of a Japanese strategy, I think the
commonly held notion that Japan lacks a
strategy is very interesting in itself. When I
tell people in Japan what I'm doing research
about the most common reaction is to ask
"but is there such a thing as a Japaneseforeign and security policy?" In short, most
people seem to think that a strategic
component is lacking in Japanese foreign
and security policy. In this context I think
it's worthwhile first to point out that
"strategy" seems to be something we
usually ascribe enemies or threats to
ourselves, while the threatened self is
usually seen as devoid of strategic thinking;
and second to remind that in Chinese
discourses Japan is typically construed as
very strategic. Whether Japan has a
strategy or not is thus a matter of
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interpretation, and to claim that it does, or
that it doesn't, itself tends to fulfill strategic
goals.
This strategic debate on Japan's role in the
world is now very much alive with the rise of
China. Though cooperative powers in many
areas, they also have some very important
tension points that might have an impact in
the relationship as a whole. That became
evident in the aftermath of the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands incident of 2010. How has
this incident been construed in Japan
regarding the larger strategic debate as
aforementioned?
Overall I think the aspect if tension in the
bi lat eral relat i onshi p is commonl y
overstated. It is clear that there remains
many divisive issues, but at the same time I
think there has been a quite consistent
pattern of Japan accommodating the rise of
China since 1978. This is an argument that I
make in a coauthored article (with Bjrn
Jerden) that is forthcoming in Journal of
East Asian Studies. In the wake of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu incident in September 2010
most analy sts in Japa n and abroad
understood the process and outcome of the
incident as yet another instance of weak
Japan and strong China, and as evidence ofthe power shift occurring in East Asia and
around the worldthe rise of China and
Japan's decline.
However, this image isnt unproblematic,
because available data actually lend
themselves to rather contradictory
interpretations. Although it was arguably
Tokyo that escalated the incident by taking
unprecedented measures, namely by
detaining the Chinese captain, Japan was
discursively construed as the reasonable
party while China was understood as
aggressive, clearly to the advantage of
Japan and the disadvantage of China. This
is by the way the topic of another
forthcoming article in Chinese Journal of
International Politics.
Muc h ha s bee n wri tte n on Jap an' s
"normalisation", it becoming a civilian or
normative power and thus represent a force
for good in word affairs. Where do you see
this debate of Japan's "exceptionalism"
going?
There is no consensus about the standards
of "normality" and as I pointed out before
Japan could in many ways be understood
as quite "normal" already. I think this debate
is mostly about identity, both Japan's
identity and the identity of those, which
seek to define Japan. I'm currently working
on an article discussing notions of Japan's
"excep tionalis m" and "normali zation"exactly in such terms, and I don't want to
forego my analysis anymore than this.
In the conversation we had you mentioned
the emphasis the Swedish academy is
investing in becoming a hub for Japanese
studies in Europe, and how it should
dev elop a diff ere nt voi ce, the reby
countering the existent dominant discourse
by the American School, as it were. Could
you explain to us what are your views on thecurrent state of affairs in Japanese studies
in North America and Europe and what
trend s you see deve lopin g, perh aps
illustrating with the Swedish case?
I think Japan's IR as a subject is far more
developed in the USA than in Europe, and
one can clearly see how the US research is
most often related to American strategic
interests in East Asia. The US debate takes
plac e with in quit e clea rly defin edperimeters, characterized by the shared
int eres t of retain ing the US as the
preeminent actor in the East Asian theater.
Some European scholars take part in the
debat e on Japan's IR witho ut ever
questioning the assumptions upon which it
is conducted, and without ever challenging
its US centrism.
Th e fir st step is cl ea rl y to try to
problematize the taken-for-grantedness of
the most pervasive assumptions in this
debateto discuss them in terms of
interpretations and to provide different
interpretations. This is something that I've
been preoccupied with over the past
decade. The next step might be to try to
construe a more "European voice" in the
analysis of East Asian IR, and to think more
carefully about what interests Europe
might have. I'm not sure this is something
I'm personally going to be very much
engaged in, but to some extent it is already
happe ning within the fram ework ofEurope an Japan Advanced Rese arch
Network under the leadership of my
colleague in Stockholm, Professor Marie
Sderberg.
I should also add that there is curiously
much research on East Asian international
politics going on in Stockholm already,
although people and resources are divided
between a number of institutes and
institutions. Marie, others, and I share anambition to keep developing Stockholm into
a hub of both Japanese studies and East
Asian studies more broadly, not least by
attracting good PhD candidates and
postdocs.
It is only fitting to express my sincerest
gratitude to Linus Hagstrm for kindly
conceding to share his thoughts with JFPO
and our readership. We will continue
following his work attentively and pay closeattention to developments in Europe's
Japanese studies panorama.
Interview with Linus
Hagstrm (Tiago Mauricio -JFPO).
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8/9[8]
Japanese, Russian firms to jointly develop
eastern Siberia oil field
Japan, South Korea, U.S. must consolidate
security cooperation
Objections raised over U.S. plan for Ospreyflights outside Okinawa
'National security' amendment to nuclear law
raises fears of military use
Okinawa gov. urges govt to block Osprey
deployment
U.S., Japan, S. Korea hold joint naval exercise
off Korea Peninsula
Noda, Putin to swap judo gear
Noda, Putin agree to resume talks on
Northern Territories
Japan, Russia to resume territorial talks
Osprey is safe aircraft, Pentagon says after
talks with Japan
China ambassador warns Japan against
stirring up 'emotional' conflict
Chinese man nabbed for breaking memorial
plaque at Yasukuni Shrine
U.S. gives Osprey probe updates,
reassurances
Protesters rally in Japan, U.S. against nuclear
power resumption
Battle of Okinawa survivor speaks up about
experiences, tragedy of war
Many barriers to resolving Japan-Russiaterritorial dispute
N. Korea shows sites it says accommodate
remains of Japanese
Okinawans mark the day guns fell silent
China envoy draws parallel between Uighur
activists and Aum fugitive scenario
Japan city assembly adopts motion against
U.S. military aircraft deployment
Noda lauds JCG's Senkaku patrols
U.S. to brief Japan on Osprey crashes
Okinawa up in arms over Osprey deployment
Okinawa marks battle anniversary
Okinawa commemorates victims of Battle of
Okinawa
U.S. says no change to plan to deploy Osprey
in Okinawa in Aug.
Footages from 1945 Battle of Okinawa
restored in DVD format
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7/31/2019 East Asian Security and Defence Digest 29
9/9
Japan and China Mutual Perceptions by Rui Faro
Saraiva
Interview with Linus Hagstrm by Tiago Mauricio
Remembering Manzanar by Aleksandra Babovic
Okinawa and the Redeployment of Ospreys to
Futenma by Tiago Maurcio
A World Maritime Outlook by Tiago Mauricio
EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIGESTEditor: TIAGO MAURICIO
Editors Mailbox: mauricio.tiago.47x(at)st.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Kyoto, Japan
East Asia Security and Defence Digest covers expert analysis
and news highlights on East Asian Security and Defence Affairs.
The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of JFPO.
JAPAN FOREIGN POLICYOBSERVATORY(JFPO)
HTTP://WWW.JAPANFPO.ORG/
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