edip gölbaşı, "turning the “heretics” into loyal muslim subjects: imperial anxieties, the...

7/29/2019 Edip Glba, "Turning the Heretics into Loyal Muslim Subjects: Imperial Anxieties, the Politics of Religious Conve

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Turning the Heretics into Loyal MuslimSubjects: Imperial Anxieties, the Politics of

Religious Conversion, and the Yezidis in theHamidian Era*

Edip Glbas

History Department, Simon Fraser University

Introduction

In 1795 the Ottoman sultan was informed by the governor of Baghdad thatseventy-four Yezidi bandits were killed in a punitive expedition and the cut-offheads of those killed Yezidis were sent to Istanbul to be exhibited at the Imperial

Gate of the Topkap Palace, which was a traditional Ottoman political spectacle designedto demonstrate the absolute power of the sultan by making an example of alleged rebelsand bandits.1 There is no further evidence that those cut-off heads were in fact broughtto the capital city and exhibited at the gate. What we know is that, while the reason forthis mass killing was political, i.e. banditry, rather than religious, the justification for thebloodshed of a group of Yezidis was made by referring to their apostasy and heresy.In fact, as can be seen in many Ottoman archival documents dating back to thenineteenth century, the Yezidis, who have always stressed the uniqueness of theirreligion, were believed to be infidels (kefere), more importantly, apostates (mrted), and

* An early version of this article was presented at the 2010 World Congress for Middle Eastern Studiesconvention (1924 July 2010, Barcelona, Spain). I owe thanks to our panel organizer and chair, BirgitSchaebler, co-organizer and co-panelist Necati Alkan, and to my other co-panelists Laila Prager andSebastian Maisel. My heartfelt thanks go to igdem Akanyldz, whose help, comments and suggestions

were indispensible.1 Basbakanlk Osmanl Arsivi ([the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives] hereafter BOA.) Hatt- Hmayun(hereafter HAT.) 83/3430, 9 L. 1209 (29 April 1795): Yezid eskyasnn [. . .] ekserini tume-i sir-i simsiridp yetmis drt neferinin rus- maktasn tahriratyla Dersaadete irsal itmis oldgna [. . .] ve zikrolunan rus- makta dahi pis-gah bab- hmaynlarnda galtide-i hk-i mezellet klnacag. Inanother case, local authorities were recommended to punish the Yezidis by bloodshed, except for thechildren and the elderly, if they were to insist on infidelity and disobedience. See BOA. HAT. 2088, 29Z. 1216 (2 May 1802).

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2013 Hartford Seminary.Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148USA.DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-1913.2012.01422.x

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deviant (dalle) from Islam. They were also referred to as mlhid, meaning, amongothers, hidden godless.2

The fact that the Yezidis were regarded as mrted, or apostate, has a political

implication: if one was a mrted, then it was not illicit to shed his/her blood accordingto Islamic law.3 However, beginning from the mid-nineteenth century, the term apostate(mrted) would no more be used for the Yezidis and other groups regarded by Ottomanrulers as deviant. Along with the changing attitude of the state towards the life and deathof its subjects, and with the transformation of state-society relations in the OttomanEmpire during the Tanzimat period when the political distinction between the Muslimand the non-Muslim was officially abolished, the meaning of apostasy (irtida) changedon the political scale. This term along with others like mlhid, kefereand zndkleft itsplace to the key terms of the Hamidian period such as frka-i dalle or frka-i batla,

meaning heretics.In fact, for Hamidian rulers and religious scholars, the Yezidis were a heretic group

who had deviated from Islam centuries ago, and become clueless devil worshippers,a claim which was central to the Ottoman representation of the Yezidis.4 The reason whythe Hamidian regime named its project of reformulation of the Yezidi religious identityas the correction of the beliefs, or tashih-i akaid, lies in the fact that the Yezidi faith

2

See, for instance, BOA. HAT. 3430A, 9 L. 1209 (29 April 1795): . . . Yezid eskyalar mecbul olduklarkfr ve seraret ve maktr olduklar ilhad ve sekavet iktizasyla . . . ; and, BOA., HAT. 2088 29 Z. 1216(2 May 1802): Kefere-i mersme kitab olmayubmrted ve mteannid olduklarndan mcerred . . .3 However, the category of apostate and in what conditions it is necessary to punish the apostate todeath are controversial issues even among fakihs, or fkh experts. What is significant for our discussionis that Ottoman rulers and ulemadid not choose mrtedas a random term when referring to the Yezidisbut emphasized their deviance and apostasy in order to legitimize the punishment of the Yezidis byreference to Islamic law. This also applies to the legitimation of the enslavement of Yezidi women andchildren.4 See, for instance, BOA. Yldz Parakande Evrak Mabeyn Baskitabeti (hereafter Y.PRK.BSK.) 22/57, 9Z. 1308 (16 July 1891): Yezidilere nasihat tesir etmeyecegi [. . .] anlaslmasna [. . .] mebni is bu frka-i

dalle amide-i tarikatlerinin telkinatdan uzak ve efrad- Islamiye arasnda bulundurulub kendlerineadeta ehl-i snnet muamelesi edilmek. . . ; BOA. Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Mhimme (hereafter

A.MKT.MHM.) 723/4, 9 Z. 1311 (13 June 1894): Yezidi frka-i dallesi meyannda Melek-i Tavus yanidirilen seytan tarafndan tebligata memur- itikad olunan ve Kek Mirza nvan ifa klnan sahsn

Musuldan menfasna . . .Widely known as devil worshippers, the Yezidis essentially worship one god that they believe to

have created the whole universe, though their cosmogony is different than that of Islam andChristianity, and has quite a syncretic character containing Zarathushtrian roots. While Yezidism refersto a religious identity, the Yezidis are ethnically Kurdish, a small section of whom speaks Arabic,though. The majority of the Yezidi population is living in Iraq, housing the sacred place of thecommunity. In addition, Armenia, Georgia, Syria, Iran and Germany have Yezidi minorities. In a

footnote it is impossible to describe the religious, ethnic, geographical and social background of theYezidis. For an introduction, see John Guest: Survival among the Kurds: A History of the Yezidis(London: Kegan Paul, 1993), and Philip G. Kreyenbroek, Yezidism: Its Background, Observances andTextual Tradition (Lewiston: Edwin Melle Press, 1995).

The Muslim World Volume 103 JAN UA RY 2013

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was considered by Ottoman political elites to be incorrect and deviant from its trueway.

When a group of Yezidi leaders approached the Ottoman military authorities to

suggest joining the Hamidiye Light Cavalries, the tribal militias created in 1890 by theHamidian regime as irregular armed forces consisting of mainly powerful Kurdish tribes,the committee that was established in the Yldz Palace in order to discuss this appealdescribed the Yezidi belief as weak as the cobweb in their final report. According to thecommittee members, the conscripted Yezidis would give up the deviant way if theyfulfilled their military service together with Muslims in regular army.5 Given thisunderestimation of Yezidi faith, one can argue that the Hamidian authorities believedthat the conversion of the Yezidis to Islam would smoothly yield result. In fact, in theearly 1890s Hamidian authorities had launched a conversion campaign targeting what

were called in official circles heretic groups starting with the Yezidis, most of whomlived, actually still do, in Mosul in tribal organizations with a sixty to seventy thousandpopulation at that time.

In order to make the Yezidis return to the true way, as often cited in official termsdin-i mbin-i Islama rcular in, Hamidian rulers applied a series of methods andinstruments ranging from advice and persuasion to coercion and violence, fromreligious propaganda and schooling to rewarding Yezidi leaders. This article is about thesystematic efforts of the Hamidian regime to convert the Yezidi communities to Islam inthe early 1890s. It analyzes the broader context, strategies, and instruments of the

conversionary polices that characterized the state-Yezidi encounters in the late OttomanEmpire. By focusing on an interesting story of the attempt at reformulating the Yezidiidentity, the present study also demonstrates the discourses and representations that theOttoman state designed for the Yezidi tribes during the Hamidian era.

The Hamidian regime sought to implement its conversion policies toward theYezidis of Mosul by means of two special committees: the Advice and PersuasionCommission, or Heyet-i Tefhimiye, and the Reform Force, or Frka-i Islahiye, the latterof which was also aimed to make larger reforms such as a population census, thecollection of tax debts, the conscription of deserters, and the sedentarization of several

nomadic groups, all targeting the tribal populations of the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad,and Basra. While the Advice and Persuasion Commission, established in 1891,attempted to convert the Yezidis to Islam by advice at the beginning, its methods turnedinto being more violent as the Yezidis strongly rejected the idea of becoming Muslim.However, the Reform Force founded in 1892, which might also be translated as theTaming Force, intended to correct their beliefs through much more coercive and

violent methods and instruments, which provoked a series of incidents in whichhundreds of Yezidis were killed, tortured, and terrorized by the commanders and

5 BOA. Yldz Esas Evrak (hereafter Y.EE.) 139/15, 23 S. 1309 (23 March 1892).

Turning the Heretics into Loyal Muslim Subjects



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soldiers of this special taming force. Moreover, the sacred places and items of thecommunity were plundered, confiscated, and converted to a medrese, or an Islamicschool.

Although the Yezidis were forced by a group of Muslim Kurdish tribes in theneighborhood to convert to Islam at different times, the Ottoman state had never madean effort in this direction by the end of the nineteenth century. This point takes us to thepolitical background of the late Ottoman attempts to enforce a Sunni orthodoxy amongheterodox communities.6 Before moving to this striking and, from the perspective ofthe Yezidis, traumatic story, I contextualize the politics of religious conversion byassociating it to the Hamidian strategies of rule and hegemony, and to the regimes seekfor imperial loyalty based on Sunni Muslim identity in a period when the Ottoman statesought to (re)conquest its periphery and attempted to reorganize its political control in

the eastern provinces. In other words, this project, designed to impose Sunni Islam as acommon value, is explained here as part of the attempts to expand the imperialdomination more effectively in a region where Ottoman rule was relatively weak andfacing challenges from Kurdish and Arab tribes and Armenian nationalists.

Drawing attention to the cultural and political distance between the regime and thecommunity, I also argue that the Hamidian politics of conversion was formulated tomake this distance governable and to create, in a metaphoric sense, a common referencepoint or vocabulary through which two parts could understand each other. It is alsosignificant to note that Ottoman authorities assumed and expected that the internaliza-

tion of Sunni Islamic values would facilitate the desired process of the integration of theYezidis to the imperial order, and make them conform to the image of loyal Muslimsubjects of the empire. The conversion campaign against the Yezidis and otherheterodox groups also reflects the efforts of the Hamidian regime to transform fluid,

6 The attitude of the Ottoman state toward religious conversion, voluntary or forced, was neitherwell-defined nor institutionally permanent. Although there was no official policy of conversion that

organized the state-non-Muslim relations in terms of confessional divisions, the Muslim ruling elitemostly accepted conversions to Islam willingly, promoted mass conversion to Islam as seen in theperiod of the empires expansion in the Balkans, made systematic efforts to Islamize newly conqueredlands, and applied forced conversion policies within the context of devsirme system, or boy levy, andtowards what are called heterodox communities in the late nineteenth century, an example of whichthe present study is concerned with. On conversion to Islam in the Ottoman Empire in different periods,see, for instance, Marc D. Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in OttomanEurope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Tijana Krstic, Contested Conversions to Islam:Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 2011); Anton Minkov, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahasi Petitions and OttomanSocial Life, 16701730(Leiden: Brill, 2004); Selim Deringil, There is no Compulsion in Religion: on

Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire: 18391856, Comparative Studies in Society andHistory42, no. 3 ( Jul., 2000): 547575. Deringil has also analyzed the Hamidian conversion policies inthe case of the Yezidis, Istavris, Nusayris, and Kizilbashs: The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and theLegitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 18761909(London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 6892.




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communal, and ambiguous form of identities into a fixed and officially promotedcategory, though all these projects of reformulating heterodox identities proved to bedifficult, and ultimately remained unaccomplished. Lastly, I suggest that the conversion

policies were directly influenced by the factors such as what is referred to as theArmenian question, and the presence of missionary organizations, especially the

American Protestant missions, in the eastern provinces.Though this study deals with a particular community, it is essentially centered on

the policy, discourses and practices of the Hamidian regime itself. The Yezidi case isparticularly illuminating about how this regime represented heterodox and tribalpopulation groups, and what policies it envisaged and formulated to consolidate statepower and authority over such groups. Furthermore, the Yezidi-Hamidian regimeencounters, I believe, allow us to draw conclusions about a series of questions

regarding imperial identities, policies toward heterodoxy and heterodox commu-nities, imperial techniques of pacifying and subjugating savage populations, disputesover confessional and legal statuses, as well as institutional violence in the lateOttoman Empire.

Below there is consistent reference to a particular community or a group of people,namely, Yezidis or Yezidi tribes, without making any distinction among them. One mightjustifiably question whether or not the conversion and taming policy equally affectedthe Yezidi population as a whole. In other words, are the differences within and betweenthe tribes, inequalities along the castes,7 kinship affinities, and gender irrelevant to the

discussion? I believe that, particularly with respect to the conversion policy, everymember of the Yezidi community who shared this identity one way or another was analmost equal subject of that state policy. More precisely, as will be mentioned below, thesub-identities, tribal status, or individual histories of, for instance, five hundred Yezidis

who were killed during the attacks of the Reform Force are irrelevant to our discussionsince the Hamidian rulers problematized the entire Yezidi identity. In addition, internalstruggles over political leadership and economic resources among the Yezidis, too, willnot be a part of the story told in this article.

Contextualizing Conversion Policies: Nineteenth-CenturyState-Yezidi Encounters and the Hamidian Strategy of Rulein the Eastern Provinces

The subjection of the Yezidis to the most systematic and violent conversioncampaign in the late 19th century was not a coincidence. The reasons, I suggest, partlylie behind a series of problems characterizing the interactions between the Ottoman

7Appealing such foundational categories of traditional sociology as tribe and caste is questionable aswell. Given that my aim is not, however, to discuss the social organization of Yezidi tribes, appealingto these terms should be seen as a matter of translation.




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government and Yezidi tribes from the early nineteenth century on. Attempts to makethe Ottoman central administration effective in the region covering Cezire, Botan andMosul, where the powerful Kurdish emirates dominated the local politics by the early

1830s, had led to split the previous order and create new fields of conflict. In fact, a largemilitary campaign conducted by the Ottoman government in this period in order to

weaken the Kurdish emirates in the region had also aimed at the Yezidi tribes of Mosul.8

The attacks carried out firstly by Resid Pasha, and then by Muhammed Hafz Pasha in1837 were intended to maintain the order and security threatened by the Sinjari Yezidis,and to collect their tax debts.9

The state efforts to penetrate into the Yezidi tribes persistently became more evidentduring the Tanzimatperiod. Three concrete items of the agenda both in general and inthe Yezidi case were indispensable: establishing a permanent and efficient mechanism

of tax collection, providing recruitment for the Ottoman armies based on universal maleconscription, and maintaining public security. Indeed, the Yezidi tribes had come upagainst the state more than ever before due to these three demands. For instance, fromthe 1850s on, when a new and strict taxation regime was introduced in the wholeempire, there is substantial evidence that the Yezidis tax debts posed a serious problemfor the state. The researcher feels as if he periodically came across almost the same story:first, the Yezidis who failed to pay their taxes attract the attention of local and centraladministration; then, government officials or military authorities are sent to settle theproblem but as it was of no use, the total sum or mostly a big part of tax debts are

collected as a result of an effective military operation. Tax accrued debts in the comingfew years are collected by use of the same method, i.e use of force (muamele-icebriyye).10

Right in the early 1870s, Midhat Pashas appointment to the Baghdad governorshipcarried a different meaning for the Mosuli Yezidis as the new energetic governorlaunched decisive and efficient implementations in tax collection, public security, andobligatory military recruitment. Midhat Pasha was criticizing the Ottoman administratorsmethod to collect the Yezidi tax debts, just as in the case of many other tribes, by a

8 For Ottoman military expeditions against major Kurdish emirates see, among many others, DavidMcDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 4147.9 See, for instance, BOA. HAT. 22332A, 13 Ra. 1253 (17 June 1837); BOA. HAT. 22378, 28 N. 1252 (6

January 1837); BOA. HAT. 22350F, 21 C. 1853 (22 September 1837) and BOA. HAT. 22350, 18 C. 1853(19 September 1837). See also, Frederick Forbes, A Visit to the Sinjar Hills in 1838, with Some Accountof the Sect of Yezidis, and of Various Places in the Mesopotamian Desert, between the Rivers Tigris andKhabur. Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, vol. 9 (1839): 409430.10 For a few examples, see BOA. A. MKT. MHM. 757/21, 18 Za. 1269 (23 August 1853); BOA. MVL. 263/1,

5 M. 1270 (8 October 1853); BOA. A.MKT.MVL. 82/95, 17 Ra. 1273 (15 November 1856); BOA.A.MKT.UM. 396/1, 19 B. 1276 (11 February 1860); BOA. A.MKT.MHM. 224/86, 28 Z. 1277 (7 July 1861).See also, Edip Glbas, The Yezidis and the Ottoman State: Modern Power, Military Conscription, andConversion Policies (MA Thesis, Bogazii University, 2008), 4252.




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sudden raid, appropriation of their animals and goods both for being ineffective andturning the Yezidis against the state.11Among the actions that the Pasha tried to carry outduring his relatively short term of office were regularly censuses, sedentarizing

mountainous tribes, keeping an eye on the Yezidis by the help of a permanentadministrative and military unit, and designating a tribe leader as the paramount chief

who was responsible for collecting taxes and maintaining the order and peace. Thoughthese new regulations and practices did not ensure a total control of the Yezidis, theyformed the episodes of a process in which the Yezidis encountered a transformation thatmight be called the Ottoman modernization.

Obligatory military service that was put on the agenda from the mid-1840s on wasanother issue that characterized the state-Yezidis encounters not only in the Tanzimatperiod but also until the end of the empire, even in the Republican Turkey. The strong

reluctance and resistance displayed by the Yezidis to compulsory military service madeit a long-standing problem and caused serious conflicts between the government and thecommunity throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. When the

Yezidis first encountered the phenomenon of universal military conscription, theyclaimed that they were not obliged to be recruited as an external sect just like Christiansand Jews, and then tried to justify that their religious beliefs, taboos and rituals were notfit for military service.12 The community that was never recognized by the Ottomangovernment as a separate religious group would be able to obtain exemption at certaintimes but each time when a new law of recruitment was introduced, their exemption

would become controversial, and new bargains would be negotiated between thecommunity and the government.13Although it is possible to argue that many tribes werereluctant to be recruited, the Yezidis long-term resistance carried specific meanings forthe Ottoman administration, especially for the Hamidian regime, which regarded

11 For the report of Midhat Pasha, see BOA, I.DAH. 41492, 25 R. 1286 (4 August 1869), folio 3.12Yezidis were not the only community that resisted compulsory military service by referring to

religious tenets and taboos. One of the nearest examples comes from imperial Russia, where theMolokans and Dukhobors in the South Caucasus persistently refused and evaded conscription as, theyargued, the demands of military service contradicted their religious commandment of you shall not kill[anyone]. This was a reflection of their pacifist religious faith and of their opposition to the tsaristcolonization. They also resisted conscription because of, among other reasons, the prohibitionsconcerning daily religious practices, and also because army cuisine compelled them to eat foodsforbidden by their religion. These briefly mentioned taboos, complaints, and justifications perfectlycoincide with those of the Yezidis, who repeatedly explained why they avoided military service usingsimilar justifications. For the Molokans and Dukhobors refusal of conscription, see Nicholas B.Breyfogle, Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russias Empire in the South Caucasus(Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 2006), 217, 238, and 299300.13

See Glbas, The Yezidis and the Ottoman State, pp. 5369. On the issue of Yezidi conscription incolonial Iraq, see Nelida Fuccaro, Ethnicity, State Formation, and Conscription in Postcolonial Iraq:The Case of the Yazidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 29, no.4 (1997): 59580.




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military service as a way of disciplining and mixing up heretic groups with the Muslimpopulation.14

As mentioned above, the Ottoman government never recognized the Yezidis as a

separate religion or sect different than Islam. In this regard, the Ottoman officialdiscourse on the Yezidi faith should be thought within the context of the ideologicalrelation of the Ottoman state as a Sunni rule to what are often cited as heterodoxcommunities such as Alevis, Nusayris, Zeydis, Kalenderis, and Druzes.15 What makesthe Yezidi example different is that from the beginning the community defined

Yezidism as a religion different than Islam or any Islamic sect. While the Yezidisdemanded at different times to be officially recognized, the Ottoman state refused toacknowledge them as a millet, a recognized and protected confessional communityhaving particular political and legal rights under an Islamic rule. In accordance with

this denial, in almost all population censuses and registers the Yezidis were registeredas Muslims.16

So far it has been emphasized that the encounters between the Ottoman state andthe Yezidis were always shaped by a series of problems and conflicts, most of whichoriginated from empire-wide changes in governing practices and from the Yezidiresponses to these changes. I have also implied that internal state-building processtransformed the dynamics of the relation of the Yezidi community with the state. Theoverall picture also tells us about the ideological and political distance between the

Yezidis and the state. The ideological dimension of the distance was defined by

14 For instance, this question is so central to the history of the community that Mustafa Nuri Pasha, theMosul Governor between 19021905, who, among the other Ottoman authors, wrote the mostimportant book on the Yezidis that has been ascertained so far, aimed to write it in order to explain,exactly in his own words, why the Yezidis remained so distant from military service, see Mustafa NuriPasa, Abede-i Iblis: Yezidi Taifesinin Itikadat, Adat, Evsaf (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Itihad, 1328 [1909]).This issue occupied such a place in the history of the Yezidis that they for the first time declared theirreligious beliefs and rules to the outer world in a written form via the petition they wrote to the Ottomangovernment in 1872 in order to be granted exemption. It is so impressive and unusual that the

community that was blamed for worshipping the devil put them in writing although they had rulesand traditions such as concealing their beliefs from the outer world. For this petition, see Isya Joseph,Devil Worship: The Sacred Books and Traditions of the Yezidiz (Boston: R. G. Badger, 1919), 7782;Guest, A History of the Yezidis, p. 122123; Nuri Pasa, Abede-i Iblis, p. 54; Glbas, The Ottoman Stateand the Yezidis, pp. 6669.15 For heresy, heterodoxy, and syncretism in general and in the Ottoman Empire, see A. Yasar Ocak,Osmanl Toplumunda Zndklar ve Mlhidler, 15.17. Yzyllar (Istanbul: Tarih Vakf Yurt Yaynlar,2003); Gilles Veinstein (ed.), Syncrtismes et Hrsies dans LOrient Seljoukide et Ottoman (XIVe-XVIIIeSicles)(Paris: Peeters Publishers, 2005), and Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, et al., (eds.), Syncretistic ReligiousCommunities in the Near East(Leiden: Brill, 1997).16 Furthermore, in 1906 the Council of Ministers rejected the proposal of the Yezidis to write Yezidi in

the religion section of Ottoman identification cards (tezkire-i Osmanis). For the Council, this group wasessentially Muslim and it would not be right to consider them officially as non-Muslims because of theirevil beliefs (s-i akidelerinden dolay). It is really interesting that a state council had decided the realidentity of a community. See BOA. MV. 113/161, 7 C. 1324 (29 July 1906).




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the Ottoman denial of Yezidism as a religion, while the political one was associated withthe constant struggle over taxation, security, and military service. Exactly at this point, Istrongly believe that the systematic conversion policy conducted by the Hamidian

regime was closely related to the intention of the Ottoman administration to penetrateinto such groups and make up the distance in question.

Though this historical background reveals the source of the Hamidian regimesdesire to tame the Yezidis, it does not explain the reasons for the conversion policysatisfactorily. Given that other heterodox communities were urged or forced by theHamidian rule to convert, it is necessary to look at the characteristics of the regime as

well as at the unique political and social dynamics of the Ottoman eastern provinces inthe late nineteenth century. Before anything else, the state effort to reformulate theheretic beliefs, I believe, was a part of a Hamidian strategy of hegemony and a product

of the intention to constitute the empire on an integrated basis. What I call the Hamidianstrategy of hegemony was a response to a set of problems assumed to be threateningthe empire. One pillar of this strategy was to concentrate imperial power around thesultan at the Yldz Palace, through the agency of trusted counselors, and to keep theSublime Porte, the military, and the Young Turk opposition under a strict control. Thesecond pillar was to obviate the separatist activities, especially, of Bulgarian, Macedo-nian and Armenian nationalists, and to eliminate the interventions of the European greatpowers in internal politics by the agency of these nationalisms. The third pillar of theHamidian strategy of hegemony was to base the empire on Muslim unity and solidarity,

by appealing to supra-national identities and sources of loyalty for the sake of imperialintegrity.17

Selim Deringil has aptly argued that the Hamidian regime sought to create a reliablepopulation by means of a systematic education/indoctrination and propaganda of Sunni

17 On the Hamidian politics of unity and what is often cited as Islamism in eastern and Arabprovinces, see, for instance, Stephen Duguid, The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern

Anatolia, Middle Eastern Studies, no. 9 (1973): 139155; Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam:Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001); Engin D. Akarl, Abdlhamid IIs Attempt to Integrate Arabs into theOttoman System, in Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social, and Economic Trans-

formation, ed. David Kushner (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 7489; Cezmi Eraslan, II. Abdlhamid veIslm Birligi: Osmanl Devletinin Islm Siyaseti, 18561908 (Istanbul: tken, 1995). For a generalassessment, see Benjamin Fortna, The Reign of Abdlhamid II, in The Cambridge History of Turkeyvol. 4: Turkey in the Modern World, ed. Resat Kasaba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2008), 4752. It should be noted that the Hamidian regime was not alone in appealing tosupra-national identities and sources of loyalties, nor was it the only regime that mobilized religioussymbols in order to keep an empire together. As Dominic Lieven says, having a series of dilemmas

in an age of growing nationalist and democratic ideologies, empires adopted various responses tothese challenges such as Muslim unity, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy to legitimize their rules. DominicLieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals, second edition (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 2001), 4951, 275281.




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Islam, which was regarded as an ideological defense line.18 While the Hamidian policyof integration targeted many Kurdish and Arabic tribes, the project of the correction ofthe beliefs was specifically designed for heretic communities such as Shiites, Alevis,

Nusayris, and Druzes, a project that was similar to missionary ambitions. It appears thatthe Hamidian regime believed a potential Sunni Yezidi community would adopt thepolitical and social order desired by the regime, and their conversion to Islam could turnthem into loyal and useful subjects. In other words, it was an attempt to close thecultural gap by way of religious conversion, and, therefore, to create an obedient orconformist Yezidi population, as conversion was supposed, but not proved, to be arebirth or a process of cultural transformation and assimilation to the norm ina society where religion defined cultural, political, and social norms.19 To put it in acolonial analogy, through conversion, one of central colonial techniques, the colonizer

targets the conquest and colonization of the mind and the soul so that the subjectivityof the colonized can be reconstituted.

In addition, once the nineteenth-century Ottoman state discovered the category ofpopulation, as an object of the government in a Foucauldian sense, the centralauthorities became more interested in the confessional statutes, health, reproductioncapacities, education, and mobilization of their subjects.20 Furthermore, it became moreimportant to describe and classify subjects, and to redefine the categories of normaland abnormal, orthodox and heterodox. In many respects, the Yezidis essentially

were an indefinable community whose loyalty was suspicious for the regime. Like all

what are often referred to as heterodox communities, they were liminal characters inthe sense that they were neither here nor there, neither Christian nor Muslim. Given thatperipheral identities were generally often regarded as secondary, marginal, and threat tothe political order, I interpret, conversion was intended to function as a normalizing

18 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, p. 68 and 9394, and idemFrom Ottoman to Turk: Self-Imageand Social Engineering in Turkey, in The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Politics: Collected Studies

(Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000), 169.19 Conversion as a matter of governance was on the agenda of various empires. The tsarist RussianEmpire is a perfect epitome, which, as it expanded its power to religiously and ethnically diverseterritories, pursued a passionate policy of conversion in order to spread Orthodox Christianity amongnon-Christian and heretic populations from the seventeenth century on. As a government policy,conversion in the Russian imperial context was intended to be a way of assimilating non-Christian ornon-Orthodox subjects to the empire. See Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky (eds.), OfReligion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 2001), especially Michael Khodarkovsky, Eugene Clay, Sergei Khan, and Robert Geracischapters; and, Paul W. Werth, At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and ConfessionalPolitics in Russias Volga-Kama Region, 18271905(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).20

See Michael Foucault, Govermentality in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. G.Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87104, and,idem, Right of Death and Power over Life in The History of Sexuality: volume 1: an Introduction(New

York: Vintage Books, 1990), 138140.




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practice through which the abnormal or the heterodox is regulated and disciplined,though, as I have already mentioned above, the conversion to the norm or religiousconformity does not necessarily contribute to the creation of loyal, good subjects.

A report, for instance, which was written by Sleyman Hsn Pasha who was exiledby the sultan to Baghdad, explicitly revealed the close relationship between religiousconversion, conformity, and political control. Offering a sort of strategic plan in hisreport, Sleyman Pasha pointed out that Ottoman rule was extremely weak in Iraq, andin addition to many other measures, suggested that a systematic propaganda, Islamicproselytization, be carried out to correct the beliefs of some deviant groups. ThePasha advised that Sunni Islam be proliferated among Shiites, in the first place, andKurdish and Arabic tribes, by the help of dis that had a function similar to Christianmissionaries, and strongly believed that the Ottoman presence would be strengthened

in this critical region if the tribes showed loyalty to the empire.21

Kemal Karpat argues that the imperial goal of bringing the Ottoman subjectsunder the umbrella of Islamic union had seriously influenced some religiously orsocially marginal groups like Yezidis in a region in which Armenian nationalism wasseen as the largest threat to the Ottoman authority.22 In fact, that the regime perceivednot only the Armenian nationalist organizations but the whole Armenian populationas a threat arose the idea that suspicious groups like Yezidis and Kizilbashs wereinclined to cooperate with the Armenians, or had the potential to do so.23 In thisregard, I believe that one of the reasons behind the formulation of the correction of

the beliefs project was directly related to the Hamidian policies designed for theArmenian question.

21 See Y.EE. 14/1188/16/9 10 N. 1309 (8 April 1892). Selim Deringil was the first to draw attention to thisreport: The Struggle against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Propaganda, in TheOttomans, the Turks, and World Politics: Collected Studies(Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000), 64, and, idem,The Well-Protected Domains, p. 66. Gkhan etinsaya has analyzed the report as well: OttomanAdministration of Iraq, 18901908(London: Routledge, 2006), 3334.22

Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, p. 205. Karpat tries to justify his claim by referring to two examplespertaining to the Yezidis in Bitlis and Mosul. For him, the Hamidian state attempted to bring the Yezidisunder the umbrella of orthodox Islam by opening schools and mosques in the Yezidi villages. WhileI agree with his argument that the Armenian question directly influenced the relationship betweensuch marginal groups and the Hamidian regime, Karpat is also totally wrong in arguing that theseattempts were partly successful, and the Yezidis were brought together under Sunni Islam. As will beshown below, it is not possible to find long-lasting conversion among the Yezidis either voluntarily orby force except for a few incidents of temporary conversion.23 For instance, a document reveals that the information that the Sivas governor was supporting theBektasis had alarmed the authorities as the Palace thought that a possible dissolution of the perceivedMuslim unity would serve the purpose of the Armenians, see BOA. Yldz Parakende Umum Vilayetler

Tahrirat (hereafter Y.PRK.UM.) 30/85, 10 R. 1312 (11 October 1894). In addition, in Malatya schoolingthree Alevi children in an Armenian Catholic school was regarded as dangerous, and hence the localgovernment was asked to impose a ban in similar cases, see BOA. Y.PRK.UM. 28/70, 29 R. 1311 (9November 1893).




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From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the relationship between the Yezidicommunity and the Protestant Missions was serious enough to alarm the Hamidianregime, though it did not turn out well for the missionaries.24As the missionaries began

to establish close relationships with various heterodox groups, the Kizilbashs andYezidis in particular, that were in conflict with the Sunni character of the Ottoman rule,the Hamidian regime regarded it as a threat against its authority and tried to obviatethe interaction between those groups.25 In particular, the ABCFM (American Board ofCommissioners for Foreign Missions) centered in Mardin established relationships withthe Yezidis as from the 1870s, however, as Hans Lukas-Kieser notes, these relations werenever as dynamic as those with the Alevis. Yet, even though the attempts of the missionsto convert the Yezidis to Protestantism came to naught, these contacts were enough todisturb the Sultan and the Yldz Palace, which managed to weaken these points of

contact.26

Heyet-i Tefhimiye: An Attempt to Convert the Yezidisthrough Advice and Persuasion

The first mission assigned to correct the beliefs of the Yezidis, i.e, the Advice andPersuasion Commission, which consisted of a group of religious scholars and govern-ment officers led by a military commander, Abdlkadir Bey, was sent to Mosul in April1891 in order to tell the Yezidis about Islam, and convince them to accept conversion.27

As soon as the commission arrived in Mosul, they set off for Seyhan, the religious andpolitical capital of the entire Yezidi population. The commission gathered the prominentfigures of the Yezidis including Mirza Bey, the emir of the community, in the village ofBaadre, and explained the necessary reasons to them for the gathering without delay: theSultan was calling them to return to their so-called previous religion, Islam, be savedfrom deviation, and resort to his mercy. Abdlkadir Bey also reminded that if they did notaccept the offer, they would have to pay all the taxes due immediately and fulfill the

24

For the relationship between the Hamidian regime and American missions, Hans Lukas-Kieser:Iskalanms Bars: Dogu Vilayetlerinde Misyonerlik, Etnik Kimlik ve Devlet, 18391938 (Istanbul:Iletisim Yaynlar, 2005). See also, Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, chapter 5. Both authorsindicate with convincing evidence that the missionary activities directly influenced the relation of theHamidian regime to such marginal groups as the Yezidis and Kizilbashs.25 For the various aspects of the Yezidi-Protestant missions interactions from earlier periods, see Guest,A History of the Yezidis, pp. 7685 and 124145, and Lukas-Kieser, Iskalanms Bars, p. 118 and208209.26 Lukas-Kieser, Iskalanms Bars, p. 102, fn. 84, and p. 208, and idem, Muslim Heterodoxy andProtestant Utopia: The Interactions between Alevis and Missionaries in Ottoman Anatolia, Die Welt desIslams 41, no. 1 (2001), 97.27

For the commissions task, members and affairs, see BOA. Y.MTV. 50/21 10 L. 1308 (19 May 1891),and, BOA. Y.MTV. 50/51 16 Za. 1308 (23 June 1891). As could be clearly seen in the documents, themain goal was to instill the Yezidis with the doctrine of Islam ( akaid-i Islamiyeyi telkin etmek), andfamiliarize them with the sacred military service (hdmet-i mukaddese-i askeriyeye alsdrmak).




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obligation of military service. According to Guest, whose knowledge is based oncontemporary sources, the Yezidi leaders declined the offer defiantly declaring that theirown belief system went back to earlier periods than Islam, and Islam itself actually grew

out of Yezidism.28

In following twenty-one days as well the committee failed to persuade the Yezidis toaccept conversion to Islam. It was obvious for the committee member that persuasion wasnot a proper and efficient way towards the stubborn Yezidis. Thereupon Colonel

Abdlkadir submitted a report to the Sublime Porte stating that the problem could not besolved as long as the leading Yezidi figures were in Mosul. He suggested that eleven of the

Yezidi leaders, including Mirza, be sent to exile to another province so that the communitywithout their leaders could easily be brought under control.29 Upon that report, the palacedecided to exile those Yezidi chiefs to Bingazi, in todays Libya. We know for sure that six

of them were brought to the military barracks to be sent to exile. 30 From the correspond-ence between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Mosul province, we understand thatthe remaining five people were expected to be caught without turmoil, but there is noclue about their doom. What we definitely know is that Mirza Bey, who continued to livein Seyhan in the forthcoming years, had not been sent into exile.31

The community would be continuously faced with harsh outcomes for notresponding to advice. A group of Yezidis who declined to be recruited once again weredetained and conscripted, being forced to wear military uniforms in blue, a color of

which the Yezidi community has considered to be a taboo, and subsequently delivered

to the military barracks. Among these were Mirza and some Yezidi sheikhs.32 In theforthcoming days, some more Yezidi tribe chiefs were forced to cast recruitment lots andeighteen of them were recruited under compulsion.33

Mirza Bey, who thought that a campaign was openly launched against theircommunity, asked the American Protestant missions for help, and even informed themof their readiness to convert to Protestantism. However, they were only advised to calmdown and nothing more came.34 Aware of the Yezidis appeal to Protestant missions,

28 Guest, A History of the Yezidis, p. 133. Though he only gives half a page to deal with this issue in hisbook, Guest bases the answers given by Mirza Bey and the sheikhs on the missionary and consulatereports.29 For the report and correspondences pertaining to the exile, see Y.MTV. 50/21, folio 1.30 BOA. DH.MKT. 1850/65, 8 Z. 1308 (15 July 1891).31 Ibid. In the summary of 19067 civil registry records, it is mentioned a total of 97 Yezidis, 57 men and40 women, in Bingazi and Trablusgarb, see Kemal Karpat, Osmanl Nfusu(Istanbul: Tarih Vakf Yurt

Yaynlar, 2003), 203. It is possible to assume that at least a part of this population grew out of the exileas there is no evidence for the existence of an indigenous Yezidi population in this region.32 BOA. Y.MTV. 51/61, 18 Za. 1308 (25 June 1891).33

BOA. DH.MKT. 1850/43, 7 Z. 1308 (14 July 1891).34 Guest, A History of the Yezidis, p. 134135. It would not be incorrect to interpret the Yezidis effort toconvert to Protestantism as a tactic of the weak for survival. Such transitions were mostly short-term,and it was seen that the converts returned to their previous religion.




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Hamidian authorities declared that whatever religion the Yezidis chose to convert to,whether Christianity or Judaism, they would still be obliged to complete military service,and that the state decision was hard and fast.35 The palace also stressed that the Yezidi

chiefs should be prevented from influencing their community, and the conscriptedYezidis be treated among Muslims as if they were Sunni (kendlerine adeta ehl-i snnetmuamelesi edilmek). As can be seen, the Hamidian regime proposed a close relationshipbetween conscription and conversion because they strongly believed that it was possibleto convince the Yezidis to accept conversion to Islam as a result of religious indoctri-nation of imams in military barracks as well as thanks to interactions with Muslims. 36

While all these were taking place, various letters and petitions by the notables,religious authorities, local administrators and merchants of Mosul arrived at the palace,referring to Colonel Abdlkadirs failure to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of his

position efficiently.37 Most of them argued that Abdulkadirs improper actions might leadto a Yezidi uprising, and, therefore, the commission should be abolished.38 However,

Abdlkadir reported that the local officials were misinforming the government abouthimself and his services, and stated that the Yezidis had given 35,000 liras to the membersof the Provincial Administrative Council to obtain fake military discharge certificate. Healso argued that he had completed very good tasks, but since his work had threatenedthe interests of the local authorities, he had been prevented from doing his job.Nevertheless, these complaints resulted against him, and working fifty-seven days inMosul, he was dismissed from his position in July 1891.39

After dismissal of Abdulkadir, a new commission was set up under the leadership ofHac Mesud Bey, the Nakiblesrafof Diyarbekir. The Hamidian administration thoughtthat Hac Mesud, who had oration skills and knew the language (Kurdish and Arabic)and customs of the tribes, would manage to elevate the ignorance and deviation of the

Yezidis. However, the new commission failed to make the Yezidis accept Islam andobligatory conscription just as the same before. This community that did not pay heedto advice and could not be tamed in one way or another had to be disciplined by wayof a more effective power and by use of violence. A reform, or taming force constitutedunder the leadership of mer Vehbi Pasa, a lieutenant-general, would be the power

expected to meet the duty.

Frka-i Islahiye: Forced Conversion Campaign againstthe Yezidis

In essence this reform force was sent to Mosul by the Hamidian regime not only toconvert and tame the Yezidi tribes but also to implement a range of important reforms

35 Ibid.36

BOA. Y.PRK.BSK. 22/57, 9 Z. 1308 (16 July 1891).37 BOA. Y.MTV. 51/51, 16 Za. 1308 (23 June 1891).38 BOA. Y.MTV. 52/84, 26 Z. 1308 (2 August 1891).39 BOA. Y.MTV. 53/73, 17 M. 1309 (23 August 1891).




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in the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, which constituted a critical geography forthe empires policies.40 mer Vehbi Pasha, who would be called Ferik Pasha by the

Yezidis in the future, was appointed as the commander of the Reform Force on 9 May

1892.41 According to the written order given to the pasha, the main tasks of Frka-iIslahiyewere to conscript a large number of draft deserters, to collect the tax debts thathad remained unpaid for a long time, to take a population census in several places, torestrain mobility of the tribes on the Ottoman-Iranian border, and, finally, to sedentarizecertain nomadic tribes.42 As highlighted in correspondence, Kurdish and Arab tribes

were the main target of the reforms as the Reform Force was constituted on the basisof slah- asair, i.e. taming tribes.43

Though not mentioned in the official instruction, the duty extraordinarily assignedby the Yldz Palace to the lieutenant-general was to convert the Yezidis to Islam. In a

document, he was defined as such: mer Vehbi Pasha [. . .] the Commander of theReform Force, remunerated with rank and salary to give good service as to convert the

Yezidis to supreme religion of Islam, who acknowledges and undertakes to realize thisobjective.44As a matter of fact, as will be shown below, Frka-i Islahiyewould spend agreater deal of time on converting, conscripting and taming the Yezidis.

From his arrival in Mosul on 11 June 1892, the Pashas tendency to resort to violencemanifested itself in the very first days. He had benefited from a group of prisoners tocollect the hidden weapons owned by the tribes, and had forced a group of people to

walk around the city with fetters on their ankles so that they would set a lesson to tax

debtors.45 When he was asked the reason for these illegitimate actions, the Pasha gavethe fact that only the prisoners knew where the weapons were kept as reason for hisexploitation of prisoners, and showed it as a motivation that would speed up taxcollection for his fetter show. Even he stated that it really worked and could collect taxmore than three thousand liras in a short time.46

Without delay the commander sent a message to the Yezidis in the Seyhan area,demanding that they either accept conversion to Islam, or punish. In turn, as seen in theprevious examples, the Yezidis gave the Pasha a negative response, which trigged an

40 The Frka-i Islahiyewas examined by Gkhan etinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, p. 7980;Davut Hut, Musul VilayetininIdar, Iktisad ve Sosyal Yaps (18641909)(Ph.D. Dissertation, MarmaraUniversity, 2006), 121131. Within the context of its relation to the Yezidis, see Guest, A History of theYezidis, pp. 134137; Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, pp. 7175, and Ufuk Glsoy, Srads BirDini Topluluk: Osmanl Yezidileri Trk Kltr Incelemeleri Dergisi7 (2002), 147153.41 For the appointment and rank given to mer Vehbi, see BOA. I.DAH. 100344, 11 L. 1309 (9 May1892), and BOA. I.DAH. 1276/100388, 17 Za. 1309 (13 June 1892)42 BOA. Y.PRK.BSK. 26/85, 27 Z. 1309 (23 July 1892), article 2.43 See, for example, BOA. DH.MKT. 1973/102, 24 Z. 1309 (20 July 1892).44

BOA. DH.MKT. 2002/56, 23 Safer 1310 (16 September 1892).45 BOA. DH.MKT. 1981/104, 9 M. 1310 (3 August 1892).46 For the Pashas response, see the afore-mentioned document, and BOA. Y.MTV. 66/39, 6 S. 1310 (30

August 1892).




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extraordinary attack on the Sinjari Yezidis. Having managed to take the Bedouin Araband Kurdish tribes on his side against the Yezidis, the Pasha ordered to organize an attackon two Yezidis villages, Mihirkan and Bakran, on August 2. As a result, it was reported

to the Sublime Porte that while ten Yezidis were killed and 35 wounded, two soldiersfrom the Pashas troop died and four wounded.47 In addition, according to the consulatereports used by Guest, one hundred and twenty Yezidis were captured and brought toMosul, some of whom were conscripted and some put in prison.48

A little while after this battle, the Frka-i Islahiyecommander gathered the membersof the Mosul Provincial Council and summoned the Yezidi leaders to the governorsoffice. The Yezidis who accepted the invitation were once again commanded to correcttheir beliefs and convert to Islam. Concerning what followed this invitation, there isa huge difference between what happened in reality and what mer Vehbi Pasha told

Istanbul about it all. I would be able to learn this difference only when I saw the reportsprepared by the Investigation Committee sent out to Mosul in order to scrutinize thePashas doubtful actions. Let me first narrate the story and the ceremony reported, sayfictionalized, by mer Vehbi Pasha: the superstitious Yezidis, who had been aberrantlyfollowing a wrong path for ages and could not be disciplined despite various attemptscome to Mosul without any force in order to be honored to convert to Islam with theirown good will and consent. They are welcomed with respect by the Pasha, sheiks andreligious scholars. On the following day, a ceremony is held with the attendance of allprovincial administrators and civil servants, high-ranking soldiers and commissioned

officers, the notables and worthies, and a crowded group. In the ceremony in which theband is singing the Hamidian anthem, the Yezidis willingly and orally accept thesuggestion offered by the mufti of Mosul and become Muslims expressing profession,or sehadet. Followed by the Pashas speech and muftis prayers, the ceremony iscompleted along with enthusiastic cries and acclamations: long live my sultan! The

Yezidi chiefs are also put up by the Pasha; animals are sacrificed; their meat isdistributed among the poor; and Friday prayer is performed together in Nebi SitMosque.49

As mentioned above, the Investigation Committee proved that what had happened

was utterly different from the story so vividly narrated by the pasha. First of all, it wasrevealed that the Yezidi leaders, who had been invited by the Pasha to the center of

47 BOA. DH.MKT. 1981/104, 9 M. 1310 (3 August 1892); BOA. DH.MKT. 1983/68, 13 M. 1310 (7 August1892), and BOA. Y.A.HUS. 263/52, 13 M. 1310 (7 August 1892).48 See Guest, A History of the Yezidis, p. 134. Devoting a couple of pages to the 1892 events, Guest baseshis information on consulate reports. It was going to be approved in another report that heads of some

Yezidis had been cut off so as to be a lesson to all though it is not certain whether it happened during

the operations conducted in August. See BOA. Y.MTV. 74/33, 8 B. 1310 (26 January 1893).49 BOA. I.DAH. 53/S.1310, 27 S. 1310 (20 September 1892). This document can also be found inBasbakanlk Osmanl Arsivi, Musul-Kerkk ile Ilgili Arsiv Belgeleri (Ankara: T.C. Basbakanlk Devlet

Arsivleri Genel Mdrlg, 1993), 544546.




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Mosul, were insulted, pounded up and six or seven of them severely injured. Those whorefused to convert were locked up in the harem section of the government building foreight days. Moreover, none of the Yezidi villages accepted to correct their beliefs and

the community was insistent to be deviant. Lastly, the committee underscored thatmer Vehbi had completely made up a story and lied to the Sultan. 50

Let us get back to the ordinary sequence of events: After this severe oppression andcaptivation, a group of Yezidis, which involved leaders like Mirza, Hamza and Bedii,embarrassedly expressed that they corrected their beliefs accepting to becomeMuslims. For the Pasha, such a significant problem that had remained unresolved for a

very long time had finally been brought to an end. He also stated his hope that theYezidis from Sinjar region would move on a similar path.51 Upon his suggestion, theprovincial government decided that a small mosque and school would be built in each

of the six villages for the Yezidis who were honored to accept Islam.52 In accordancewith the local authorities, the Sublime Porte decided to assign teachers and attendantswho were going to reside there and give teaching and preaching to the Yezidis in properlanguage and manner and take on the responsibility to teach and educate Yezidichildren.53 Teachers to be appointed were expected to have a good command of Kurdishand Arabic, and to know the customs and dispositions of the local population.Meanwhile, Osman Pasha, who was assigned as the new governor of Mosul inSeptember, sent a telegram to the Porte, notifying the need for a high number of alphabetbook, the Quran fascicles and leaflets related to the Islamic principles that would be used

for instruction at schools which were being built for the Yezidi and Sebek children.54

Although the Ottoman administration could never manage to sustain attendance of theYezidi tribes in these schools and mosques, we see that mosque and school wereintended by the Hamidian regime as two important instruments to discipline savage,ignorant, and deviant communities.

Again, in accordance with mer Vehbis suggestion, the Council of Ministersdecided to grant the emir of the Yezidis, Mirza Bey, the rank of mir-i miran and hisbrother Ali, and his cousins Hamza and Hseyin, the rank of emirl-mera, each of

whom were also put on a salary of two thousand piasters.55 However, Ali Bey [Pasha],

who was going to be the new Yezidi emir after Mirza Beys death in 1899, was not solucky as the others. Though he was honored with the rank of pasha, he was exiled

50Y.MTV. 74/36.51 BOA. Y.MTV. 65/115, 25 M. 1310 (19 August 1892).52 I.DAH. 53/S. 1310. Meanwhile, the Hamidian regime had already declared its inclination to establisha school and mosque in the Yezidi villages after the Heyet-i Tefhimiye was abolished. See BOA.DH.MKT. 1889/75, 12 R. 1309 (15 November 1891) and BOA. DH.MKT. 1902/42 14 Ca. 1309 (16

December 1891).53 I.DAH. 53/S. 1310. See also, BOA. DH.MKT. 2012/117, 28 Ra. 1310 (20 October 1892).54 BOA. Y.MTV. 68/90, 19 Ra. 1310 (11 October 1892).55 BOA. DH.MKT 2002/56, 23 Safer 1310 (16 September 1892).




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from Mosul as he disturbed public security.56According to the correspondence datedvariously, Ali Beys insistence not to convert, and his inclination to cause trouble andto influence the Yezidi tribes against the government lied behind his exile. Although the

city of Kastamonu was set as the place of exile, he would be compelled to live in Sivason some allowance that would never be regularly paid.57 In his appeals for pardon atdifferent times, he claimed that he had been exiled without any justification but due tohostility nurtured by mer Vehbi Pasha towards him. Despite the fact that he alleged thedistance from his family and the climate in Sivas as excuse, and stated that he alreadyeducated his desires and converted to Islam in front of the Sivas Governor, he could notstop his compulsory stay in Sivas until 1898.58

Ali Pasha was not the only one who could not receive the allowances promised.Mirza Bey and others would never be able to regularly receive the monthly salary of two

thousand piasters assigned to them. In addition, when it was discovered that they hadnot truly converted, the salaries granted as an award and incentive for conversion wasto be cut, as this goal could not be achieved.59

The Yezidis, who had to get in trouble that they could not even imagine within ayear, also lost their holy place. Upon the approval of the Sublime Porte, the ProvincialCouncil of Mosul transformed the Yezidis sacred place of pilgrimage, Seyh Adi Tomb atLalish near the ancient city of Nineveh, into a medrese and appointed a professor, ormderris, and twenty-one students there. Moreover, mer Vehbi broke into the tomband seized various sacred goods, among which there were five bronze Melek-i Tavus

statues.60 In all descriptions made by contemporary observers, the tomb in Lalis isportrayed as completely plundered, tumbledown, deserted, grass-covered with only onesingle wall remaining, and icons shattered.61 Nuri Pasha, who was going to be thegovernor of Mosul for about two years in the very early 1900s, was explaining in hisabove-mentioned book that these sacred goods had been taken by mer Vehbi from

56 BOA. I.DAH. 1298/1310-Ra.-56, 18 Ra. 1310 (10 October 1892).57

See, for instance, BOA. Y.A.HUS. 267/24, 7 Ca. 1310 (27 November 1892), and BOA. I. HUS.6/1310.Ca/18, 6 Ca. 1310 (22 November 1892).58 For Ali Beys demands for pardon, see Y.MTV. 89/109, 18 B. 1311 (25 January 1894); BOA. DH.MKT.273/25, 17 S. 1312 (20 August 1894), ve BOA. DH.MKT. 2072/67, 21 C. 1313 (9 December 1895), andBOA. DH.MKT. 2073/62, 29 N. 1313 (14 March 1896).59 BOA. DH.MKT. 2114/111, 23 Ca. 1316 (9 October 1898).60 For the list of the captured items and their fate, see Nuri Pasa, Abede-i Iblis, p. 72; Guest, A Historyof the Yezidis, p. 136137.61Among them were Lord Percy Warkworth, the British PM, who visited all the eastern provinces of theempire in 1897, Mark Sykes, who was present in the region as the honorary attach of Britain in theearly 1890s, and the Archbishop W. A. Wigram from the American Mission Committee, see Lord H. A.

G. Percy Warkworth, Notes from a Diary in Asiatic Turkey (London: Edward Arnold, 1898), 184;Gertrude Bell, Amurath to Amurath(London: William Heinemann, 1911), 279; Guest, A History of theYezidis, p. 141144, and Ebubekir Hazm Tepeyran, Hatralar, second edition, edited by Faruk Ilkan(Istanbul: Pera Yaynclk, 1998), 478479.




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Mosul to the Sixth Army quarters in Baghdad.62As a consequence, the Yezidis took holdof the key to the tomb, which they treasured as the place for their prayers and pilgrimage,in 1904 thanks to Nuri Pasha who considerably concerned himself with the Yezidis and

pursued a moderate policy. Yet, they had to wait until 1914 to get the sacred items backfrom the Ottoman authorities.63

As mentioned above, from his arrival in Mosul, the pashas various actions causedconflicts and turmoil. Among them were the cancellation of the tax-farming and tithecontracts in the provincial center of Mosul and its towns; the employment of someprisoners in collecting weapons that belonged to the tribes; the enforcement of someconvicts to go around the city center with fetters on their ankles; his attempt to include

women as well in population census contrary to the sultans order; and lastly, in directrelation to his previous action, the arrest and detention of a few notables and members

of the Mosul Provincial Council without trial. mer Vehbi Pasha had also obtained thewritten permission of his second military operation against the Sinjari Yezidis by threatand force from the provincial governor. Based on this permission, the governorreported, the troops led by the pashas son Asm Bey had given rise to the death of aboutfive hundred Yezidis, and women and children were burnt to death alive, villagesattacked, and goods and animals captured.64 As a result, these incidents caused the

Yezidis to take up arms and revolt in the Mount Sinjar. Though the Pasha had been toldto solve the problem without bloodshed, he forwarded his soldiers to the Mount Sinjaragain, and brought death to many more people. There was a big loss for the Ottoman

soldiers as well in these fights. When the City Mayor of Mosul, Hac Emin Efendi, steppedin twice to convince them to give up uprising, the Pasha ordered the third and fourthattacks on the Yezidis.65

So to say, these pieces of news were the last straw that broke the camels back. SultanAbdlhamid dismissed mer Vehbi Pasha and his son, who were sent to Iraq with greathope, on 8 December 1892 due to their improper actions, i.e., among others, thebloodshed of his subjects and organizing a military expedition without governmentauthorization. At the same time, the sultan sent an investigation committee (Heyet-iTahkikiye) to Mosul.66While the committee members, Sakir Pasha, Kamil Pasa and Sadk

Bey just started investigating all the events and official correspondence pursuant toFrka-i Islahiyeand mer Vehbis affairs, a dreadful incident occurred: a group of Yezidinotables came to Mosul with seven beheaded corpses and argued that these people had

62 Nuri Pasa, Abede-i Iblis, p. 72.63 The sacred items would be delivered by the Mosul Governor Sleyman Nazif Pasha to the Yezidis ina ceremony in 1914. See Glsoy, Osmanl Yezidileri, p. 159. According to the document cited byGlsoy, the sacred items had been kept in the stockrooms of the Thirteenth Army Corps.64

BOA. Y.EE. 87/73, 21 Ca. 1310 (11 December 1892). For the telegram dated to 4 December, seefolio 3.65Y.EE. 87/73, folio 3, and BOA. Y.MTV. 71/99, 15 Ca. 1310 (5 December 1892).66 BOA. I.HUS. 6/1310.Ca/65, 18 Ca. 1310 (8 December 1892).




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been slain by the Pashas son, and Resid Efendi, previous head of the Seyhan district. Thegroup did not forget to ask for justice from the provincial authorities.67 Three days later,the committee informed the Palace that as a result of their investigation the Pashas son

and Resid Efendi were discovered to be the suspects of the incident.68

In the following week, investigation regarding the events in Mosul was completed.Consequently, mer Vehbi and his son were found to be responsible for torturing andleading to the death of hundreds of people as well as plundering of their goods. Inaddition to this, the committee members stated that the Mosul Governor Osman Pashasnegligence contributed to the incidents.69 Upon this correspondence, Sakir and DervisPashas notified the Sultan that news sent by mer Vehbi was completely false, and thatabove all he had acted in contravention of the sultan, shedding the blood of his subjects,and violating the laws. For that reason, instead of returning to his office in the Fourth

Army headquarter, the pasha was called to Istanbul with his son to be trialed.70 The pashawas trialed by a commission affiliated to the State Council, and exiled to the Fifth Armyin Damascus as a result of the hearing. After a while, he went on obligatory retirement,

yet two years later his rank was given back to him.71

Concluding RemarksAs a result, the Hamidian project of correcting the faith of the Yezidis, either by

advice or force, failed, not to mention that the Frka-i Islahiyecould not even complete

the first part of the reform project designed for Ottoman Iraq. The Hamidian conversion-ary policy in the case of Yezidis demonstrates how the Yezidi- Ottoman state interactionsin the late nineteenth century were transformed by central concerns with rearrangementof confessional statuses and imperial identities in a period when the Hamidian regime

was seeking to bring its subject populations under firmer control by extending its powerinto blur areas of the eastern provinces, and to assure the loyalty of what are regardedas heretic communities. However, the Yezidi example also demonstrates that political,societal and cultural projects developed by states are contested and limited by multipleactors within a complex network of political and social processes. In this sense, as some

historians do, focusing merely on the projects produced by central governments andseeing them unquestionably as the constitutive of reality is problematic.

The conversion campaign of the Hamidian regime in the case of Yezidis alsoillustrates the violent character of imperial integration policies in the late Ottoman

67 BOA. Y.MTV. 74/33, 8 B. 1310 (26 January 1893), and BOA. Yldz Yaveran ve Maiyyet-i Seniyye(Y.PRK.MYD.) 12/31, 7 B. 1310 (25 January 1893).68 BOA. Y.MTV. 74/36, 9 B. 1310 (27 January 1893).69

BOA. Y.PRK.ASK. 88/36, 22 B. 1310 (9 February 1893).70Y.MTV. 76/136.71 BOA. Y.PRK.BSK. 54/112, 21 C. 1315 (17 November 1897); BOA. Y.PRK.ASK. 154/20, 10 R. 1317 (18

August 1899); Hut, Musul Vilayeti, p. 130; and, Tepeyran, Hatralar, p. 477.




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Empire as well as in other imperial contexts. Indeed, I suggest that major politicaldevelopments experienced in the late nineteenth century such as state-centralization,the introduction of novel governmental practices, the emergence of new conceptions of

sovereignty and territoriality, and struggles over confessional statuses and groupidentities contributed to produce modern forms of violence in the Ottoman easternprovinces. Moreover, the Frka-i Islahiye example perfectly epitomizes what I callorder/chaos dilemma, i.e. the paradoxical way in which the efforts of the officialauthorities to establish security and order ultimately create insecurity, violence, andchaos for ordinary citizens as well as for the central government. To clarify it in anutshell, the sultan had sent a powerful commander to a complicated region with verybroad authority since he had come to the conclusion that advice and propaganda wouldnot work to incorporate the Yezidi tribes into the imperial order; however, this powerful

figure thoroughly aggravated the problems at hand due to the very power that the sultanhad invested in him.

Lastly, what can we say about the ways the Yezidis conceptualize and represent theirexperience concerning the forced conversion campaign and violence? Or what is theplace of the Frka-i Islahiyeand its persecution in the history and collective memory ofthe community? It would be problematic to discuss how the Yezidis were influenced bythe state policy, and how they have remembered those traumatic days by looking atofficial documents reflecting the perspective and discourses of the central governmentand its local agencies. However, it is legitimate, and indeed necessary, for the historian

as well as the anthropologist to interpret the Yezidi representations of the Frka-i Islahiyeby looking at the Yezidi oral sources and the ethnographic present embodying thepopular narratives of an institutional violence faced by a religious community. In fact,after over a century, the Yezidi Kurds have always remembered and narrated all theseevents through a stran, a Kurdish literary genre that might be translated simply as song,named Ferik Pasha, in which they convey those hard times and the Pashas cruelty withhatred and anger to new generations of Yezidis. However, the stranalso tells how theirancestors resisted the oppression and persecution of the Ottoman pasha.72 Given that itis one of three most important Yezidi songs, and that, though recently declining, oral

transmission of religious principles and historical narratives has been the norm for thecommunity for centuries, it can be argued that Ferik Pasha Stran is very central to the

Yezidi collective memory and identity-construction, indicating how they conceptualizetheir history, experience, identity, subjectivity, and agency.

72 Christine Allison perfectly analyzes the Yezidi oral culture and tradition including their stransin TheYezidi Oral Tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan(Richmond: Curzon, 2001).



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