edited by commander peter mersky, usnr-r - nhhc by commander peter mersky, usnr-r designed by...

Edited by Commander Peter Mersky, USNR-R

Designed by Charles Cooney

Published by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare)

and the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

Washington, D.C.

CONTENTS

I. The Beginning

II. Lean Years, The 1920s 4

III. Gathering Steam, The 1930s 8

IV. World War II, The Big Test 15

V. Postwar Activities and Korea, The Reserve Show 17

VI. 1953-1968: Stability with Transition, Props to Jets

VII. Reorganization and Revitalization in the 1970s

VIII. The 1980s, Present and Future

A ugust 29, 1986, marked the 70th anniversary of the U.S. Naval AirReserve. On that day in 1916, the Naval Appropriations Act for fiscal year1917 provided funds for the establishment of a naval flying corps and thepurchase of 12 planes for the naval militia. Personnel for these units weredrawn from various college flying clubs, the most prominent from Yale,organized by F. Trubee Davison. An energetic individual, Davison found12 classmates, borrowed a Curtiss seaplane from the wealthy Wanamakerfamily in Philadelphia, and set about teaching himself and his club to fly.

From these humble beginnings, the U.S. Naval Air Reserve grew intotoday’s massive organization — a navy within a navy — with bases acrossthe country and 52 squadrons, 357 aircraft and 34,350 full-time activeduty and part-time reserve personnel. Traditionally considered a hand-me-down collection of planes and equipment, the Naval Air Reserve iscurrently enjoying one of the most dramatic revitalizations in its 70-yearhistory. Factory-fresh McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A Hornets are joiningthe light attack inventory, in company with Grumman F-14A Tomcats andupgraded Lockheed P-3B Orions. And there are plans for more modernaircraft in the latter part of the decade.

Being a reservist has always signified additional dedication for thecivilian sailor. There are many reasons why people join the reserves, butthe air reserve program offers more tangible benefits and demands greatercommitment in time and involvement. Perhaps the most important reasonis the chance to remain a part of Naval Aviation. The road to the covetedWings of Gold is long and hard and, even after the trials and tribulations ofan initial tour, it is difficult to give up the wings. Most Navel Aviators wholeave active duty after a few years join the reserves and manage to affiliatewith a unit, serving a few years to see how they like it.

They often find many of the same frustrations, as well as many of theperks found in the fleet. This discovery drives some out of the Navy, but formany more it leads to the decision to remain in the reserves.

There’s also the satisfaction — and undeniable patriotism — ofcontinuing to serve one’s country, as well as maintaining readiness skills.We know that any potential aggressor considers America’s reservestrength when plotting international strategy.

America needs a strong reserve, in all services. And the Naval AirReserve has a well-documented history of contributions to many of thiscountry’s finest moments.

By Commander Peter Mersky, USNR-R

The F-boat, a two-place plane, became afamiliar sight in Pensacola during the early

I. The Beginning

days of Naval Aviation. Note the bombsight,a simple gadget, placed at the right of theplane. owered flight was barely a decade old,

and the war in Europe had been going onfor two years. These two occasionscombined to help form the U. S. NavalReserve. Aviation had proved to be anirresistible draw for young men eager tofind their way overseas, even if their owncountry was trying her best to remainneutral. Many men of college ageenlisted in the British or French armies,and saw a great deal of action in the earlyland battles. However, as the airplanebecame a more common sight in the

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skies over the batt lef ie lds, thoseyoungsters who had not lost their initialidealism and saw further adventure inthe air transferred to their host country’sair services, and continued the fightmounted in Nieuports, Spads and SE-5s.

While some of their countrymen hadmade it over “over there,” other groups ofAmerican collegemen decided to make amore formal attempt to get into the waras American units. The Navy had createda so-called Naval Militia in 1915, addingan “aeronautical service,” althoughthere were no funds, aircraft or trainingfields to service this add-on. By 1916, theNaval Reserve Aviation component hadevolved into a loose organization of 10state-run mi l i t ia uni ts made up ofaviat ion en thus ias ts l ook ing fo radventure and flight time. To get started,uni ts borrowed ai rcraf t f rom anyavailable source. Glenn Curtiss, who soldthe Navy its first aircraft — the Triad — in1911, offered airplanes at reducedprices, including instruction of one pilotper militia unit free of charge.

When the appropriations act of 1916established both a Naval Flying Corps anda Naval Reserve Flying Corps (NRFC), themilitia enthusiasts were urged to joineither the regulars or the reserves toreceive training. The sum of one milliondollars was set aside for the aeronauticalorganization. At that time the Navy hadsix airplanes, two were assigned to thebattleship USS North Carolina and fourwere assigned to the Naval AeronauticStation, Pensacola, Fla. The act limitedthe number of persons to serve in theaeronautical organization to a total of notmore than 48 officers, and 96 men, plusnot more than 12 Marine officers and 24enlisted men. Thus, by the time the U.S.declared war on the Central Powers onApril 6, 1917, the total manpowerassigned to Naval Aviation consisted of48 officers, including six Marines, and239 enlisted men.

Establishment of the Naval ReserveFlying Corps in 1916 had promptedstudents in several colleges to start“flying units.” The threat of war withMexico — due to an increasing number ofborder incidents involving such colorfulbandits as Pancho Villa — caused collegemen to wonder how they could servetheir country. Flying had the greatestappeal.

As a result of the Naval Appropriations

Act of August 29, 1916 — hereafterconsidered the birthday of the Naval AirReserve — a Naval Flying Corps and aNaval Reserve Force, including a NavalReserve Flying Corps, were established.

Three units of civilian volunteers wereformed at Huntington, N.Y.; Buffalo, N.Y.;and Newport News, Va. The First YaleUnit, led by F. Trubee Davison, is the mostfamous of these early groups. (Somesources list June 1916, as the YaleGroup’s date of formation.) Davison, asophomore, managed to find one Curtiss" "F seaplane, loaned by RodmanWanamaker, along with the plane’s pilot,David McCulloch as the sole instructor.The group of 12 Yale undergraduateslearned to fly during the summer monthsand, by September, were proficientenough to take part in maneuvers offSandy Hook, N.J., Davison said:

“This work was important in severalrespects: it demonstrated the value ofairplanes in locating hostile ships; itproved that they could be located farmore efficiently with seaplanes thansurface craft; and it showed the Navy thatcivilians were not only interested indeveloping the aviation part of navalwarfare, but were devoting our time andenergy to that end.”

That fall, two more flying boats wereadded to the unit’s flight line, gifts fromDavison’s father, H. P. Davison, a partnerin the J. P. Morgan financial firm. To benearer Yale during the fall semester, theunit moved its aircraft to the NewLondon, Conn., submarine base and flewfrom the Thames River until snow and icestopped them.

Previously, Lieutenant John Towers,one of the Navy’s first aviators, hadgotten Davison and his group to join thenew Naval Reserve Flying Corps and, onMarch 24, 1917, 13 days beforeAmerica’s entry in the war, the Yale Unitvolunteers enlisted en masse. By June,the Yale Unit had moved to Huntington,Long Island, N.Y., and had accumulatedconsiderable flight time. The unit hadbeen assigned the responsibility ofcoas ta l pa t ro l aga ins t Germansubmarines.

Before the end of June, the expansionof air training showed that pilot traininghad commenced for 25 men each atSquantum and Bay Shore, Mass.; 20 atNewport News, Va.; 27 at Huntington;and 20 each at Akron and Camp Borden,

Ohio. These were in addition to the 15 atPensacola, Fla., the Navy’s primary flighttraining base. Planes were in shortsupply and there were mount ingtechnical problems in the industry, bothin the manufacturing of engines and inthe matter of patents relat ing toairplanes.

As American involvement gatheredmomentum, members of the collegeflying groups were split up and sentwhere their expertise was needed. InAugust, two members of the Yale Unitwere ordered to France, the first NavalReserve Flying Corps members to go toEurope. Training centers opened at bases

including 2,000 aviators, and built itsenlisted strength to 30,000.

While early arrivals in Europe had to flyforeign-built aircraft, out of necessity, theAmerican aircraft industry in one yeardeveloped its production capacity andfurnished more than 200 seaplanes andlandplanes.

The bulk of these aviators werereservists. The early regulars who hadcompleted flight training were needed inthe fleet to man the battleships and totake charge of the airfields that sprang upto t ra in the new NRFC a r r i va ls .Lieutenant Marc Mitscher, Naval Aviator# 3 3 , f o r e x a m p l e , b e c a m e t h e

of the Naval Militia at Squantum and BayShore, Mass. Base expansion locatedpatrol stations along the Atlantic Coast,from Chatham, on the “elbow” of CapeCod, to Key West, Fla., and soon spreadsouth to Coco Solo, and north to Halifax,Nova Scotia. Princeton’s unit was intraining in Toronto, Ontario, with one ofits members, James Forrestal, slated tobe designated as Naval Aviator 154 and,still later, to become the first Secretary ofDefense.

In the 19 months between thedeclaration of war and the armistice onNovember 11, 1918, the Navy trainedmore than 6,000 aviation specialists,

The F/A-18 Hornet, pictured here carryingbombs and missiles, began to augment theNaval Air Reserve on October 19, 1986.

commanding officer of the air stations atRockaway, N.Y., and Miami, Fla.Lieutenant P. N. L. Bellinger, NavalAviator #8, took charge of training atHampton Roads, Va. Thus, most of theNaval Aviators which got into combat inEurope came from the ranks of the NRFC.In 18 months, the Navy’s flying forces,assigned to 20 bases abroad, attacked orsank 12 submarines, flew almost 2.5-million miles of coastal patrol, dropped

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more than 100,000 pounds of bombs onsubmar ine pens and bases , andcommenced making landplane bombingattacks on non-Navy targets inland.

Several naval reservists laid claim toimportant “firsts.” Lieutenant H. T.Stanley was the first Naval Aviator to becredited with the destruction of aGerman submarine. Ensign StephenPotter was the first Navy pilot to score akill in the air. And perhaps the bestknown individual of the First Yale Unit, Lt.David S. Ingalls, became the Navy’s firstace. shooting down four German aircraftand at least one German observationballoon while flying exchange duty withBrit ish Fighter Squadron No. 213.Reserve Ensign Charles H. Hammannwas the only U. S. Navy pilot to beawarded the Medal of Honor during WW Ifor a daring rescue under fire.

With the armistice, most of the Navy’sreservists returned to civilian life. NavalAviation had a strength of 37,407, ofwhich 82 percent was made up ofreservists.

For his part in forming the First YaleUnit, F. Trubee Davison was awarded theNavy Cross. Unfortunately, Davison didnot complete flight training, due to acrash and serious back injuries. Herecuperated for six months and sawlimited service as a junior officer duringthe war. However, in 1966, on the 50thAnniversary of the Naval Air Reserve, inspecial ceremonies at Davison’s NewYork estate, Vice Admiral Paul H.Ramsey, then DCNO(Air), pinned a set ofgold wings on Davison and designatedhim an “Honorary Naval Aviator.”

II. Lean Years, The 1920s

As one writer noted, “The last chorusof “Over There” faded into the din of thevictory cheers, and Americans did notrecogn ize the i r new he r i t age o finternational responsibility — theysough t a rap id re tu rn t o p rewarisolation. Mass demobilization was whatthe nation wanted....“It was true. As withany war , the c i v i l i an popu la t iondemanded a return to “normalcy.” andquickly dismantled the huge war-makingapparatus they had created. In victory,they defeated the very organizationwhich had given them superiority. And.as in most wars, the members of theservices who were not “career-oriented”— the reservists — got out as soon as

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they could. The result was a crushingdeflation of America’s armed forces in allbranches, including the Navy’s air armwhich had just begun to function as anoperational force.

By 1920, only a comparatively smallgroup of reserve officers remained onac t i ve du ty . Mos t o f t hese tookexaminations for the regular Navy and, by1922, the Naval Reserve Fying Corps wascompletely inactive. Funds were providedin 1920 for 15 day training periods atRockaway Beach, N.Y., for a limitednumber of of f icers of Class Five.However, due to lack of funds, thisopportunity was not offered again toreserve aviators and, subsequently, allClass Five students were transferred toClass Six of the Volunteer Naval ReserveForce. Due to the fact that provision foractual flying was no longer made in theNaval Reserve, hundreds of aviationo f f i ce rs fa i l ed to reenro l l a t thecompletion of their first four years andleft the Naval Reserve Force.

In 1920, a chance to stay with theactive forces for one year without givingup the reserve status was offered toenl is ted members. Wri t ten by theCommandant of the Seventh NavalDistrict, dated July 6, 1920, the letternoted, in part:

“Th i s i s j us t wha t many o f t heReservists have desired, that is, activeservice in the Reserve Force withouttransfer to Regular Navy and anoppo r tun i t y t o be con f i rmed andadvanced in rating under full pay andregular service conditions.”

Attention was given — or at leastattempted to be given — to the training ofaviation reservists. In a letter of June 12,1920, the Commandant of the 8th NavalDistrict made this notation: “The trainingof qualified Naval Aviators on inactiveduty can be given on this station anytimebetween July 1st and Sepember 30.“ Butit was not enough and, by 1923, theentire Naval Reserve program, includingthe aviation reserves, was in a decline.Since most NFRC members signed up forfour-year terms, the crucial years for thereserve forces were 1921 and 1922.Although a few reserves were givenrefresher cruises and training in 1920,there was no money allotted for trainingin 1921. Interest waned and, by 1922,the reserve aviation force was virtuallynonexistent.

Interest among the WW I aviators,

however, remained high and individualcities asked for activation of air bases forreserve flying. New York City, in 1923,had a group of policemen who were alsomembers of the NRFC. They wereattached to the Fifth Division, SixthBattalion, New York Aerial Police at FortHamilton. The group received supportfrom the city and public subscription.Four Curtiss N-9 floatplanes were givento the unit by the Navy in 1923.

In addition to activities in New York,t w o m a j o r r e s e r v e b a s e s w e r eestablished at this time, at Anacostia,Washington, D.C.. and Squantum, inBoston Harbor. Planning for Anacostiaa c t u a l l y b e g a n i n 1 9 1 7 , a n dauthorization for the establishment of“an airplane landing site” was given inNovember 1917. “The area of AnacostiaFlats in the District of Columbia” wasselected as the likely spot. The initialfinancial allocation was $500 to be usedfor construction of shacks and a hangar.An additional $30,000 was later given forthe construction of additional buildingsand runways.

The field was opened on January 1,1919, with Lieutenant W. E. Doherty incharge. Anacostia soon became a hub ofreserve flying activity, and its proximity tothe nation’s capital certainly did nothinder its growth. The air station at thefork of the Anacostia and Potomac Riversfeatured many unique installations,including a school for quartermasterswho specialized in handling pigeons formessage-carrying purposes, and radiotesting facilities.

Anacostia continued its period ofservice until September 30, 1961, whenmost flying activities came to an end, andmoved to new facilities at Naval AirFacility, Washington, D.C., situated onAndrews Air Force Base, Md.

The base at Squantum, Mass., wasoriginally established as a seaplane basein 1917, commanded by LieutenantJunior Grade E. W. Spencer. For a time,t h e B e t h l e h e m S t e e l C o m p a n ymanufactured destroyers there for useagainst the German U-boat threat. Afterthe war, it was proposed to place a NavalAviation Reserve facility at the dormantSquantum base. The main thrust of theargument by war-trained Naval Aviatorswas to take advantage of the training theyhad received, which now was not beingused. In 1923, the group found aspokesman in then-Lieutenant Richard

E. Byrd, later of Arctic exploration fame.Byrd obtained permission from theBureau of Aeronautics to use the oldfacilities at Squantum and, in 1924,Naval Reserve Air Base (NRAB),Squantum opened, with LieutenantGeorge Pond as C.O.

NRAB Squantum became a mainstayfor the Naval Air Reserves in the New

England area as well as serving as atraining base during WW II. However, by1952, Squantum had out l ived i tsusefulness and activities of the Naval AirReserve moved to the air station at SouthWeymouth, Mass., on December 4,1953. In the summer of 1923, theestablishment of a unit at Great Lakes,Ill., was authorized, utilizing the small

seaplane hangar and facilities alreadyexisting there.

In the winter of 1923, the plans for thedevelopment of reserve aviation receiveda staggering blow when, in the budgetestimates for FY 25, the aviation estimatewas reduced by 82 percent. Fortunately,a large part of this reduction was restoredor the damage which would have

resulted to the struggling Naval AviationReserve would have been inestimable.

On November 16, 1923, a definiteNaval Aviation Reserve policy wasapproved by the Ch ie f o f Nava lOperations under the insistence of NavalAviation pioneer, Rear Admiral WilliamMoffett. This policy provided for one unitin each naval district where publicinterest and condition warranted. Eachunit was to turn out at least 10 new pilotsa year. The mission was defined as theenrollment and training of new memberswho were suitable officer material inorder to insure a supply of new blood; andto maintain the efficiency of membersalready qualified. A single unit was to befurnished two training type planes, with50-percent spares and aviation material.

During the summer of 1923, 33students had qualified in primary trainingtypes at Squantum and Fort Hamilton,N.Y. During the following summer thesestudents were given 45 days additionalactive duty at Hampton Roads foradvanced training, including navigation,gunnery and bombing. A course ofground instruction in aviation subjectswas conducted during their primary andadvanced training. During flight training,they were given the rating of SeamanSecond Class, USNR, and designated asstudent Naval Aviation Pilots. At theconclusion of advanced training theywere given a professional examinationfor commission. Successful candidateswere commissioned Ensigns, Class Five,U. S. Naval Reserve Force, anddesignated Naval Aviators. In January1925, a uniform syllabus of training forall units was set forth by the Bureau ofNavigation, covering ground and flightinstruction.

In October 1925, the establishment ofNaval Reserve Aviation Base, Sand Point,Wash., was authorized. This base, likeSquantum, Great Lakes and New York,was established as a two-unit station,conducting preliminary elimination flighttraining of student reserve aviators, aswell as training facilities for reservepilots previously qualified.

On March 24 , 1926 , t he NavyDepartment adopted a five-year programfor training aviation reserves, which wasfirst proposed as legislation, but finallywas adopted as a Navy Departmentpolicy. It was designed to providepersonnel for the minimum ReserveAviation Force which would be requiredat the outbreak of hostilities. Up to this

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time, practically no provision had beenmade for training reserve enlisted men.The few who were trained were paid outof funds made available from allowancefor officers’ pay. In accordance with thenew policy, Fleet Reserve Aviationdivisions and squadrons were organizedin various sections of the country withauthorized complements of officers andenlisted men. These divisions conductedweekly drills and underwent 15-dayt r a i n i n g p e r i o d s e a c h y e a r f o rmaintenance of efficiency, and eachdivision was accorded a definite placeand mission in war plans.

On March 19, 1927, the FY 28

appropriation for “Organizing NavalReserve” authorized funds for one year’straining duty with the fleet for 50 NavalReserve aviators with the rank of ensign.On April 19, 1927, the Chief of NavalOperations set forth an operating policywhich contemplated Fleet Reserve drillpay and 15-day training periods for 275aviation officers and 500 enlisted menassigned to aviation divisions. It alsoprovided for 50 ensigns on a year’s dutywith the fleet. In addition, 45 daysprimary training was recommended for120 seamen second class, USNR, and 45days advanced training for 104 seamen.

In the spring of 1928 advanced flight

training of seamen second class, USNRwas transferred to U.S. Naval Air Station,Pensacola, Fla., and the period ofadvanced training increased to 60 days.A reserve squadron was formed atPensacola for all reserve training, andinstruction in landplanes was added tothe syllabus which had previously beencarried out at Hampton Roads, Va. Aboutthis time, the number of single unitreserve stations in operation wasincreased by four, at Oakland and LongBeach, Calif.; Detroit, Mich.; andMinneapolis, Minn.

These four stations conducted primarytraining and were designated Naval

Reserve Aviation Bases. Each had sixprimary training planes and six otheraircraft that could be used for gunnery,bombing, etc.

On February 28, 1929, the Secretary ofthe Navy set forth a policy revising andbr inging up-to-date the f ive-yearprogram. At this time, a comprehensiveplan was laid down defining the NavyDepartment plans for Naval ReserveAviation at mobilization. This plancontemplated 31 aviation divisionswithin CONUS, each having an assignedquota of six planes, for a total of 186. TheBureau of Aeronautics was proceedingwith a procurement plan designed to

meet the provisions of the five-yearprogram to arrive at the authorized quotaat the end of FY 34. The completion of thisprocurement program was contingentupon funds being provided by Congressfrom year to year.

Beginning with those classes ofseamen second class to start preliminaryflight training in June 1929, and applyingto all subsequent classes, the training att h e r e s e r v e b a s e s c o n s i s t e d o felimination flight training only designedto determine the student’s aptitude forflying. About 50 percent qualified foradvanced training and these students,after one to three hours of solo, were sentimmediately to NAS Pensacola, wherethey were placed in classes with theregular Navy flight students to take thecomplete course leading to designationas Naval Aviators. Rigid requirementswere adhered to in selecting candidatesfor training.

Upon completion of the course atPensacola, t h e s t u d e n t s w e r ecommissioned as Ensigns, Class A-V(G),USNR, and ordered to duty for one yearwith the aircraft squadronsof the fleet. Atthe end of this year, they were assignedto duty in an inactive status with anAviation Fleet Division of the NavalReserve, provided that they lived in thegeneral vicinity of such a division andwere in a position to maintain theirefficiency by regular attendance at drillsand the annual performance of a 15-dayperiod of active duty for training.

Under the Naval Reserve regulations, itwas intended that drills for Aviation FleetDivisions would largely be devoted tocarrying on flight operations as units. Thedrill periods for which retainer pay wasreceived were devoted almost entirely tocarrying out the terms of the annualsyllabus for flight training of Fleet NavalReserve aviators. While there were stillmany difficulties to be overcome, it wasfelt that great progress was being made

T h e O 2 C - 1 H e l l d i v e r s e r v e d a s amultipurpose aircraft, operating as a fighter,dive-bomber and observer. The reserve forcereceived these aircraft from the active fleetin 1931.

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in the formation and training of anadequate Naval Aviation Reserve.

III. Gathering Steam, The 1930s

Fiscal Year 1931 saw the greatestimprovement and progress made by theNaval Air Reserve in any single year sinceits reorganization in 1923. The moralewas high and active enthusiasm wasdisplayed by all units. Three factors werelargely responsible for the advances thatwere made: procurement and delivery ofservice type aircraft; systematic andprogressive methods of training forcommissioned and enlisted personnel;and competition between units andbases for efficiency ratings resultingfrom inspections by the Naval ReserveInspection Board.

Marine Corps Air Reserve squadronswere organized in those localities wherethe Naval Reserve air bases were located.During this year, 26,381 hours wereflown by reserve activities. In addition,NAS Pensacola accumulated 10,018hours in the instruction of reserves t u d e n t s f o r q u a l i f i c a t i o n a n ddesignation as Naval Aviators. Nofatalities occurred during this period.

In FY 32, a standard list of machineryand tool equipment was authorized, and32,500 hours were flown. The progressmade by Naval and Marine Corps ReserveAviation continued and the enthusiasmof the previous year was maintained byall units. The Naval Reserve InspectionBoard paid the highest complimentconsidered possible to Naval ReserveAviation when it stated in the annualreport that Naval Reserve aviators wereready for mobilization duties and that theNaval Aviation Reserve was a veryefficient organization.

During this period, many organizedvolunteer drills were held in addition tothe pay drills allocated. These additionalper iods were required to provideadequate ground and flight training.Flying fields at Squantum and GreatLakes were improved and enlarged topermit night flight training, and NewYork , S t . Lou is and M inneapo l i saccomplished major overhaul of theiraircraft for the first time. Many of thebases were also called upon to assist inmany extracurricular activities, such asphotographic expeditions, search andrescue, mosquito abatement flights, and

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lighter-than-air operations.The inspection board in 1932 also

stated that the high state of efficiencywas made possible by the method ofselection of personnel, advanced flighttraining at Pensacola and active duty inthe fleet. Total flight time for this yearwas 30,337 hours.

In the next two years, funds weredrastically reduced and operations andsyllabus flying suffered accordingly. Theinspection board expressed the opinionthat the reduced flight syllabus, whichwas less than 45 hours per pilot, wasinadequate to maintain the proficiency ofNaval Reserve aviators.

For the first time, all aviation basesaccomplished complete major overhaulof aircraft and engines. Various federalrelief administration agencies assistedmaterially in improving reserve flyingf ie lds. The inspect ion board heldexaminations of officers in navigationand radio and of all rated men in theirrespective ratings. Due to the drasticreduction in available funds, only 20,779hours were flown during this year.

A Transitional Period

In 1934, the Naval Reserve was madeup of three major classes: the Fleet NavalReserve, the Merchant Marine NavalReserve, and the Volunteer NavalReserve. The first and third of theseclasses included aviation personnel.

The Fleet Naval Reserve consisted ofofficers and men in training or qualifiedfor combat duty. The aviation group wasorganized into squadrons composed ofdefinite numbers of officers and men.According to law, this class was expectedto perform 15 days’ active or trainingduty, with pay and allowances each year,and a stipulated number of regular drillsduring the year for each organization.The necessary training planes andequipment were assembled at NavalReserve aviation bases in the custody of asmall number of officers and men onyear-round duty. There were 13 suchbases in 1934 at which the Marine Corpsas well as the Navy aviation reserve unitsreceived training. The designation ofaviation officers in the Fleet Reserve wasA-F (aviation flight officers) and, as ofSeptember 30, 1934, there were 257who carried this designation. Enlistedmen in the Fleet Reserve did not have a

specific designation denoting aviationduty.

The Volunteer Naval Reserve wascomposed of officers and men availablefor detail in the event of war inacco rdance w i th the i r i nd i v idua lqualifications. Drills and training dutywere voluntary, but no compensationwas paid for such duty. There were twomain subdivisions of the Volunteer NavalReserve: those individuals qualified forcombat duty, in a degree similar to theFleet Naval Reserve, and designated forgeneral service (G); and those individualsavailable for specific technical andspec ia l i s t du t ies , des igna ted asspecialists (S). The first group includedreserve officers who served in WW I,former Navy officers and men, and NavalAviators. All of these were eligible fororganizations of the Fleet Naval Reserve,but lack of vacancies and residence at adistance from the location of the reserveunit prevented membership in the FleetReserve for this group.

The specialists included engineers ofall types, lawyers, medical personnel,etc. Officers of the Volunteer Reserveavailable for general aviation servicewere designated A-V(G), aviat ionofficers. There were 142 enrolled as ofSeptember 30, 1934. Aviation officersavai lable for special service weredesignated: A-V(K), aviation groundofficers; A-V(S), aviation officers; and A-V(T), aviation transport pilots. As ofSeptember 30, 1934, there wererespectively 22, 109, and 55 officersenrolled in these categories.

Enlisted personnel in the VolunteerReserve were likewise divided intoclasses. There were two aviat ioncategories: V-2, volunteers associatedwith aviation organizations; and V-5.Naval Reserve Student Naval AviationPilots. The numerical strength of thesetwo categories on September 30, 1934,was 345 and 17, respectively.

The mission of the Naval Reserve was“to procure, organize and train theofficers and men necessary in the eventof war.” For planning purposes, it wasconsidered that the forces of the NavalReserve shou ld be adequa te tosupplement the regular Navy to carry onfor the first 120 days of any possible war.It was estimated that, after the first 120days, training stations and specialschools could turn out the numbers

required to continue the war.

The Aviation Cadet Program

The Federal Aviation Commission,which was appointed in 1934, inaccordance with an act of Congress tostudy and make recommendations of allphases of aviation in the United States,included in its report comments onaviation in the Naval Reserve. TheCommission’s Recommendation No. 54called for a substantial strengthening ofthe aviation reserve of the Navy (and theA r m y ) , a n d f o r t h a t p u r p o s erecommended that a higher priority in theallotment of funds be awarded thoseact iv i t ies . The recommenda t i oncontinued:

“In war against a major power, our airforces would feel an almost instant needfor the mobilization of at least twice, andin the Army probably at least three or fourtimes, their regular personnel. Thenumbers immediately mobilized in full

readiness for duty would have to bebacked up, in order that military effortcould be carried on, by a Reserve of someadditional thousands of qualified pilotswho could be made ready for full servicewithin a few weeks. As we have studiedthe present status of the Reserves, it hasseemed to us that this problem has beenfaced on so small a scale as scarcely toconstitute more than a working model.The Navy has a total enrolled Reserve of481 officer pilots, of whom 251 could beconsidered as ready for immediateduty....

“In establishing priorities in a Reserveforce, we take it as self-evident that themost urgent concern must be with thefirst-line group that stands ready to stepdirectly into tactical organizations on theday of a declaration of war. The Navy haswha t seems to us an admi rab leorganization of such a reserve in its 31Fleet Reserve Squadrons, numbering851 officer pilots, and organized to fly asa unit for some 45 hours a year in the

The NY series training planes were two-seat,convertible land or sea aircraft that stressedsimplicity but ruggedness. The Navy pur-chased 186 NY-2s in 1929, 35 of which wentto the reserves.

fulfillment of a syllabus of militaryexerc ises d rawn up by the NavyDepartment and to put in a substantialamount of additional practice under thedirection of the unit commander. Theseorganizations seem to be close to theideal of military readiness, as do the ninesquadrons of the Marine Reserve whichare simi lar ly organized, but theirnumbers are far inferior to any possiblewartime need for immediate services.The specific need here seems to be foradditional funds for Reserve purposes.

“...it seems to us conservative to saythat the aggregate of effective air forceReserves should be at least double whatit is now.”

T h e e m p h a s i s o f t h e a b o v e

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In the thirties, the SU scout aircraft served in various utility roles with fleet and reserve units.

recommendation by the Federal AviationCommission was based on the need forincreasing the numerical strength ofreserve aviation personnel. As far asfu tu re n u m e r i c a l s t r e n g t h w a sconcerned, it appeared in 1935 that theAviation Cadet Program would furnishNaval Reserve Aviation with adequateofficer personnel. This would take place,i t w a s e s t i m a t e d , t h r o u g h t h ecommissioning of aviation cadets in theNaval or Marine Corps Reserve at thecompletion of their tours of active duty,and the i r ass ignment to reservesquadrons.

One justification of the Aviation CadetProgram was to build up the futurestrength of the aviat ion reserves.Apparently, with this possibility in mind,Navy Department spokesmen presentingthe es t imates fo r Nava l Reservea p p r o p r i a t i o n s t o t h e H o u s eAppropriations Committee for FYs 36through 39 did not express great concernover the numbers enrolled in the NavalRese rve fo rces . I n March 1935 ,Lieutenant W. G. Tomlinson, who wasintroduced as an aviation officer directly

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identified with Naval and Marine Corpsaviation, told the House AppropriationsCommittee:

“The aviation cadet bill, if enacted, andif funds are provided to carry it out inaccordance with the proposal of theNaval Department, will in time buildNaval Reserve Aviation up to adequatenumbers, and that will take care of theofficer phase of it. If given properauthority, we can recruit enlisted menlocally at the Reserve bases, enlist them,and train them so that they will be in aposition to satisfactorily carry out theirduties.”

Briefly, the Aviation Cadet Programprovided for the selection of young mento be appointed by the Secretary of theNavy to the grade of Aviation Cadet in theNaval and Marine Corps Reserve. Theappointment was contingent upon theappointee’s signing an agreement toserve on active duty for four years, unlessh e w a s r e l e a s e d s o o n e r . U p o ncompletion of the four years of active, theaviation cadet was eligible for a reservecommission.

The cadets were issued uniforms and

equipment and were to be paid $75 permonth during flight training and $125 permonth while on active sea duty, plus asubsistence allowance of one dollar perday. A uniform allowance of $150 was tobe paid on assignment to sea duty. Inaddition, during their period of activeduty, the aviation cadets were issued agovernment life insurance policy of$10,000, with the premiums paid by theNavy.

The Aviation Cadet Program waspassed by Congress and approved by thePresident in April 1935. The first class of55 cadets reported to Pensacola on July20, 1935, and by September, there were192 aviation cadets undergoing training,with an additional 201 potential cadetsundergoing el iminat ion training todetermine their adaptability to flightbefore going to Pensacola.

By September 1936, the first cadetswere at sea and, two years later, 614aviation cadets were on active NavalAviator duty.

The Aviation Cadet Act of 1935 wasdesigned to furnish the Navy withadditional Naval Aviators sufficient for

the peacetime operation of the fleet. untilsuch time as regular Navy personnelbecame available. It was also intended tostrengthen the Naval Reserve by theaddition of a group of qualified NavalAviators. The projection was that therequirements of 1941 would be met withapproximately 721 cadets on duty. Fromthat year forward, their numbers wouldd e c r e a s e u n t i l t h e y e v e n t u a l l ydisappeared.

This concept of the Aviation CadetProgram’s intent was held at high levelsthroughout the Navy Department, exceptfor a few intrepid souls who saw theprogram’s possibilities. A letter of April27, 1936, from the Chief, Bureau ofAeronautics to the Chief, Bureau ofNavigation stated:

“Another and more general conclusionis that there is little prospect of meetingNaval Aviator requirements from regularservice sources. and that we must acceptthe Aviation Cadet as a permanent fixtureand expect them to compose 45 percentof the Naval Aviators, unless someremedial action can be taken.”

Gradually, acceptance of the AviationCadet Program as a permanent source ofsupply began to spread. Indeed, despitesome legislative maneuvering to changeaspects of the Cadet Act, and grumblingsfrom the regulars, it was becomingobvious that to release the cadetsapproaching the termination of their seaduty period woulds seriously hamper thefleet. One admiral wrote:

“As the time draws near to release anumber of cadets from active service, thepressure to retain and commission themin the regular service will become acute.This question will undoubtedly raise thatof a separate air corps, in which cadetsmight expect permanent commissionsand advancement. In order to anticipatesuch suggest ions and provide anincentive for professional excellence, it isbelieved that a very limited numbershould be commissioned regular ensignseach year.”

However, with all of the extensivecorrespondence over a three-year period,the Aviation Cadet Program remainedrelatively unchanged.

The appropriations hearings indicatethat a problem of somewhat greaterconcern to the Navy Department than thenumerical strength of the aviationreserve was the maintenance of an

annual training program of sufficientextent to keep the reserve forces atsatisfactory levels of efficiency. Theextent of the reserve training programwas determined each year by the size ofthe appropriation made for that purpose.

During FY 34, it was necessary toreduce the number of flying hours perofficer from a total of 45 to a total ofapproximately 30; the number of drillsfrom 48 to 24; and to eliminate trainingfor flying officers of the VolunteerReserve a l toge ther . I t was a lso“necesssary to reduce the personnel onfull-time duty at the various NavalReserve aviation bases. This curtailmentin the training program was forced byconsiderations of economy. AlthoughCongress had appropriated sufficientfunds to finance the training programrecommended by the Department, theD i r e c t o r o f t h e B u d g e t l i m i t e dexpeditures for the Naval Reserve toapproximately two-thirds of the amountappropriated.

In presenting estimates for FY 35 toCongress, rep resen ta t i ves o f theBureaus of Navigation and Aeronauticswho were concerned with the activitiesof the Naval Reserve pointed out that thenecessary reductions in training duringFY 34 had jeopardized the efficiency ofthe Reserve forces. It was pointed outthat a reduction of allowed flying timebelow approximately 48 hours per yearincreased the risk of accidents through adecline in flying proficiency.

The failure to provide flight training forflyers of the Volunteer Reserve waslikewise a serious matter. Most of theseofficers were Pensacola graduates whowere not attached to a Fleet Reservesquadron, largely because of their placeof residence. It was pointed out that ifofficers of this group were not providedwith flight training from time to time, theywould soon cease to be Naval Aviators.This situation, if it should develop, wouldnot only interfere with mobilizationplans, but would result in a loss of theNavy’s investment in the training of theseofficers.

During FY 35, sufficient funds wereappropriated to increase the number ofdrills for the aviation units of the FleetReserve to 36, from the 22 which hadbeen held during the previous fiscal year.Apparently, additional funds becameavai lable dur ing the year since a

summary of Naval Reserve activitiessubmitted to Congress at a later dateindicates that 48 drills were actuallyheld. In addition, it was possible toincrease the number of flight hours perofficer to 45 from the FY 34 level ofapproximately 30. However, no flighttraining was given to members of theVolunteer Reserve because of a lack offunds.

In FY 36, there was a considerableincrease in the number of Fleet Reserveofficers on permanent active duty. Theseofficers were called to active duty to serveas instructors in the Aviation CadetProgram. According to the FY 36 report ofthe Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics,this diversion of Fleet Reserve officers toactive duty positions made it possible toprovide 14-day training periods for aconsiderable number of volunteeraviation reserve officers who previouslyhad been deprived of this training due tolack of funds. There was no significantexpansion in the training program for theaviation reserve during FYs 37 and 38.During the latter year, however, fundswere available for training with pay for afraction of the Volunteer Reserve. Thetraining quota was 425 officers and1,066 men, of which the VolunteerReserve was allotted 125 officers and300 men. The Fleet Reserve was likewisebenefitted to some degree during thesetwo years. The total number of enlistedpersonnel attached to the Fleet Reserveaviation squadrons was increased fromapproximately 500 in FY 36 to 713 in FY37, and to approximately 1,000 thefollowing year.

During 1935 to 1938, there wasconsiderable discussion of a legislativeamendment to the Naval Reserve Act of1925 under which the Naval Reservec o n t i n u e d t o f u n c t i o n . A N a v yDepartment draft of a new Naval Reservelaw was prepared in the latter part of1936 by a conference of regular andreserve officers, but failed approval bythe Director of the Budget in March 1937.The bill was later redrafted and wasapproved by Congress and the Presidenton June 25, 1938. It was known as theNaval Reserve Act of 1938.

This act contained little or no languageexclusively applicable to the aviationcomponents of the reserve forces.However, some of the provisions ofgeneral application were of significance

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to the Naval Aviation Reserve. The moresignificant of these were: the FleetReserve was to be composed only ofpersonnel transferred from the regularNavy to the Naval Reserve; the activelydrilling components of the existing FleetReserve were transferred to a newcategory, the Organized Reserve. Flyingofficers formerly designated A-F were tobe classified as A-O; and the act statedthat the maximum numerical strength ofthe reserve as determined by theSecretary of the Navy should be reachedwithin a 10-year period, as nearly aspossible by equal annual increments.This objective was made subject toannual appropriations approved byCongress.

D u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g s o n t h eappropriation bill for FY 40, referencewas made to the intended expansion ofthe Naval Reserve as stated in the NavalReserve Act of 1938. Captain Gygax,then in charge of reserve matters in theBureau o f Nav iga t i on , made thestatement that the estimate presented tothe committee was entirely inadequate toaccomp l i sh the f i r s t s tep i n theannounced in tent ion of reachingmaximum strength of the reserve in a 10-year period. When asked why, he replied,“The budget prepared by...the Bureau ofNavigation did contemplate a reasonablefirst step in that direction but budgetaryconsideration, both in the NavyDepartment and in the Bureau of theBudget, reduced this estimate to what wehave here.”

As in earlier years, funds for thetraining of the Volunteer Reserve wereleast adequate. Capt. Gygax stated thatthe estimates submitted would provide atwo-week training period each year foronly one out of 25 officers enrolled in theVolunteer Reserve. In other words, onlyone training period every 25 years couldbe provided for each individual. TheNavy’s goal at the time was sufficientfunds for a training period every fouryears. Some members of the committeeappeared sympathetic to the need foradditional training of the VolunteerReserve, but did not see fit to recommendan increase in the budget estimates forthis purpose. The Chief of the Bureau ofNavigation indicated in his FY 39 reportthat, through savings on other portions ofthe appropriation, it had been possible toextend some training to approximatelyone-twelfth of the Volunteer Reserveofficers during that fiscal year.

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The same annual report also raised theproblem of a shortage of qualified pilotsin the reserve aviation squadrons. It wasstated that this shortage had “long beena matter of concern to the Bureau.” Sinceall individuals enrolled in the NavalReserve for flight training after July 1,1935, had been a part of the AviationCadet Program, no new officer personnelhad been added to the rese rvesquadrons. In addition, since 89 of the227 officers of the Organized Reserve(Fleet Reserve prior to the Naval ReserveAct of 1938) were on active training dutyin connection with the Aviation CadetProgram, only 138 were available formobilization. It has already been pointedout that the problem of inadequateenrollment in the aviation reserves wasnot stressed in appropriation hearings.The lack of emphasis on shortages ofreserve personnel was in part the result

of a belief that the Aviation CadetProgram would provide an ample supplyof reserve officers in the future. It wasprobably due to the fact that in view of thelimited training program permitted byavailable funds, an increase in thenumbers enrolled in the reserve wouldserve no useful purpose. Therefore, theneed for expanding the training of thosealready enrolled was stressed in thediscussion of appropriations for themaintenance of the Naval Reserve.

There are indications, however, that ashortage of reserves in aviation was amatter of concern within the Navy,notwithstanding the representationsmade to the House AppropriationsCommittee. In a secret memorandum tothe Chief of the Bureau of Aeronauticsdated December 10, 1935, the PlansDivision of the Bureau indicated its beliefthat the progress of the campaign in an

“orange war” was entirely dependentupon the number of pilots in the NavalAviation Reserve rather than upon theproduction of aircraft. The minimumnumber of reserve officers needed tomeet mobilization requirements was7,453. The magnitude of the expansionrequired by this estimate is emphasizedby the fact that as of September 30, 1935,there were only 631 reserve officersenro l led in the var ious av ia t ioncategories.

The Plans Division memorandumrecognized the difficulties of securingsufficient funds for the desired expansionand training, but recommended that theNavy present to Congress a definiteseven-year program for reaching theminimum personnel goals by 1942, andconcluded with the statement, “If NavalAviation is to carry out the task assignedto it in an orange campaign, steps should

be taken immediately to remedy thec r i t i c a l N a v a l A v i a t i o n R e s e r v esituation.”

The Flight Division of BuAer expressedapproval of the conclusions reached bythe Plans Division relative to reservepersonnel and recommended thatproposals for expansion of the NavalReserve be submitted to the Bureau ofNavigation and the Chief of NavalOperations. The suggestion was alsomade that reserve pilots probably couldbe obtained and trained in the samemanner as aviation cadets,

In the annual estimate for FY 38prepared by the Ch ie f o f Nava lOperations in 1936, the requirements forthe Naval Aviation Reserve included thefollowing references to expansion of thereserve forces: “Provision should bemade to expand the Aviation Cadettraining to ensure the graduation of 500

from Pensacola yearly; to increase theenrollment of AVT (sic) pilots; to arrangea system of certifying qualifications fornaval training of civilian pilots and issuesuch certificates in exchange for promiseto join the Navy for training at Pensacola;and to extend the enrollment of civilianpersonnel in the aviat ion enl istedclassification.”

In preparing budget estimates withinthe Navy Department, provision wasmade for an expansion of the aviationcadet training program intended to resultin the training of 500 aviation cadetsannual ly for four years. However,financial obstacles were encountered inthe fall of 1936. The Director of theBudget requested a total reduction of $75million in the Navy Department estimate.In response to a request from the Chief ofNaval Operations for comment on thepossibility of reductions in bureauprograms, BuAer voluntarily suggestedthe elimination of funds for expansion offacilities at Pensacola and for additionalaircraft to accommodate the expandedAviation Cadet Program. The Bureaupointed out that the expansion in theprogram was designed to produce a“reserve of reserves.” Such surplus wasto build up reserve aviation squadrons inthe event of mobi l izat ion. BuAerindicated that it would prefer to postponethis expansion in the Aviation CadetProgram in preference to other budgetreductions affecting its programs.BuAer’s suggestion was apparentlyaccepted, and it resulted in further delayin attaining the desired number ofPensacola-trained pilots in the reserves.

In spite of the need for augmentingaviation reserve personnel to meetmobilization requirements, the AviationCadet Program continued to be limited tonumbers sufficient to supply the currentneeds o f t he regu la r Navy. Theconsequences of this situation werereviewed again by the Bureau ofNavigation in a letter to BuAer in March1 9 3 9 , w h i c h s t a t e d t h a t t h econtemplated active duty utilization of

The FF-1 was a two-seat, carrier-based fighterthat was flown by the Naval Air Reservebeginning in 1936.

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aviation cadets who had completed theirrequired periods of service would imposean additional limitation on the growth of areserve for mobilization purposes. As aresult of this situation, “...the estimatedannual increase of such a reserve foremergency is so small that it nowappears to be impossible to ever meetmobilization needs with the program asat present constructed.”

After pointing out that the NavalReserve Act of 1938 required plans bemade to bring the reserve to desiredstrength of qual i f ied and t ra inedpersonnel within a 10-year period, theBureau concluded, “...the present andproposed aviation cadet programs do notappear to meet the requirements of thisprovis ion of law. I t thus appearsnecessary to revise the concept uponwhich the Aviation Cadet Program isbased or to establish some other meansto create such a reserve.”

The Bureau of Aeronautics agreed thatimmed ia te ac t i on to remedy thedeficiency in reserve personnel should betaken. Its letter also pointed out that theNaval Aviation Reserve Act of 1939 inconjunction with the Naval Reserve Actof 1938 contemplated a reserve of 6,000reserve Naval Aviators by July 1, 1948,whereas Bureau estimates indicated thatunder the existing program there wouldbe 1,548 Naval Aviators in the reserve onthat date.

Two recommendations were made byBuAer. The first requested authorizationto increase the number of aviation cadetsentering Pensacola during FYs 40 and 41to 350 cadets beyond estimated fleetneeds. The second recommendationcalled for a study of all phases of aviationpersonnel. An attempt was made byBuNav to secure funds for an increase inthe number of aviation cadets enteringPensacola during FY 40, but the increasewas disallowed by the Bureau of theBudget. However, BuNav recommendedto the Chief of Naval Operations asubstantial increase in aviation cadettraining for FY 41.

Other sources of aviator personnel toaugment reserve squadrons werelikewise considered during the spring of1 9 3 9 . O n e p r o p o s a l c a l l e d f o rcommissioning pr ivate pi lots andcommercial pilots not employed onairlines or similar essential employmentin the Naval Reserve; providing trainingfor these individuals at Naval Reserve

aviation bases while on inactive duty; andthen their incorporation into reservesquadrons as Naval Aviators.

T h i s p l a n w a s s p o n s o r e d b yCongressman Maas of the House NavalAffairs Committee who was concernedover the shortages in reserve personnel.Congressman Maas presented his plan ata meeting of the Naval Reserve PolicyBoard, and also at hearings on the NavalAviation Reserve Act of 1939. On thelatter occasion, Mr. Maas expressed thebelief that the majority of aviation cadetscompleting their required term of dutywould accept jobs in commercial aviationand would not be available as aviators inthe reserve squadrons. The Bureau ofAeronautics was likewise aware of thepossibility that aviation cadets mightseek opportunities to transfer to the ArmyAir Forces because of the greaterpossibilities of a permanent careeroffered by that service.

In spite of the serious actual andpoten t ia l de f i c ienc ies in reservepersonnel, the Maas plan did not receivestrong support within the Bureau ofAeronautics. Opposition to the plandeclared it an unwise reduction instandards heretofore maintained for theNaval Aviator designation. The majoritytook the position that, regardless ofpr ivate f l ight experience, only anIntensive course in Naval Aviation suchas that provided at Pensacola couldproduce a Naval Aviator acceptable to thefleet. However, no official action wastaken on the plan, and apparently noofficial position was taken by the Bureauof Aeronautics prior to the end of FY 39.

The mission of the Naval Reserve was,as previously stated, to provide a trainedforce of officers and men immediatelyavailable for duty with the Navy in theevent of war. This force should be ofsufficient numbers to meet the Navy’sneeds until such time as schools andtraining stations, established at theoutbreak of war, could begin to supplytrained personnel for the continuation ofthe war. The foregoing account ofdevelopments during the years 1934 tomid-1939 indicates that at the end of theperiod under discussion. the NavalAviation Reserve was clearly not in aposition to fulfill its assigned mission.

While it appeared that the efficiency ofthe squadrons of the Organized Reservewas high and that they were, in general.prepared for speedy mobilization, the

number of aviators enrolled was totallyinadequate as compared with estimatedmobilization requirements. Against amobilization requirement in April 1939 of2,905 reserve Naval Aviators of classesA-O and A-V(G), and subject to upwardrev i s ion w i th in the th ree mon thsfollowing, there were 226 A-O officersand 118 A-V(G) officers enrolled as ofJune 20, 1939. Since the A-V(G) officerswere not regularly attached to reservesquadrons, they had in many casesreceived a minimum of training from yearto year. The several classes of theVolunteer Reserve received little or notraining during this period. It should beremembered, however, that the aviationcadets constituted a group in the NavalReserve, and that the program wasf i n a n c e d f r o m N a v a l R e s e r v eappropriations. Thus, the creation anddevelopment of the Aviation CadetProgram may be regarded as a significantexpansion in the Naval Aviation Reserve.

On the other hand, the expandingaeronautical organization absorbed all ofthe cadets which could be trained duringthe period to meet the requirements ofthe peacetime regular Navy for aviators.Consequent ly, the Aviat ion CadetProgram failed to augment the reservesquadrons, which was its original intent;and the p rospec ts o f s i gn i f i can texpansion in the reserve squadrons fromthis source in the future were somewhatdim in the spring of 1939.

The appropriations made available byCongress were the limiting factor on theactivities of the Naval Reserve. However,although Congress failed to increasesubstantially the funds available for theNava l Reserve over the es t imatesubmitted by the Navy Department foreach fiscal year, in no case during FYs 35through 40 did Congress significantlyreduce the Naval Reserve appropriation,at least that portion earmarked foraviation. It appears that limitations on thefunds available for the use of the NavalReserve were imposed at earlier stagesin the p repa ra t i on o f t he annua lestimates, either in the Navy Departmentor in the Bureau of the Budget.

The draft of a bill which embodiedchanges in the Aviation Cadet Act wasrequested by BuNav and was prepared bythe Judge Advocate General andforwarded to Congress and the Chief ofBuNav on April 11, 1939. The bill becameknown as the Naval Aviation Reserve Act

o f 1939 , and embod ied seve ra lsignificant changes in the Aviation CadetAct of 1935:

Aviation cadets, if qualified aftercompletion o f t r a in ing , cou ld becommissioned as ensigns in the NavalReserve or second lieutenants in theMarine Corps Reserve.

Promotions to the next higher rankafter three years of active duty excludingthe year of training were authorized,subject to qualification by examination.

Following cadet training, the individualcould remain on active duty up to sevenyears.

The lump sum bonus of $1,500 wasreduced to $500 payable upon releasefrom active duty of four years or more.The increase in pay received as an ensignwould offset the reductions in the bonus.

Aviation cadets serving in the Fleetwere to be commissioned immediatelyand given the option of retaining the oldpay with the $1,500 bonus, or acceptingensign’s pay and the new $500 reducedbonus.

The basic provisions duplicated thoseapplying to the Army’s flying cadets. Thehearings on the bill were low-key, andthe bill was passed by Congress andapproved by President Roosevelt on June

13, 1939. Concurrent with the bill’spassage, t h e N a v y D e p a r t m e n testabl ished a new administrat iveclassification for the officers to beappointed under its provisions. Therequest for such classificaton was madeby BuNav in anticipation of the passage ofthe act. The Bureau established a newvolunteer class of commissioned officersof the Naval Reserve to be known asClass A-V(N). The composition of the newclass consisted of “...naval aviators andex-aviation cadets serving on active dutyto meet fleet needs, as distinguishedfrom reserve officers on active duty fortheir own training or in connection withthe instruction, training and drilling ofthe Naval Reserve.”

Thus, within four years of its incpetion,the Aviat ion Cadet Program wasstrengthened by improving the status ofthe individuals concerned. Originallyconceived as a temporary measure, theprogram had proven itself successful andhad become an important source ofaviation personnel. Just how importantwould become crystal clear in the franticyears of the early 1940s during the WWII. Without the cadre of aviation cadetalumni, most of which were immediatelycommissioned after Pearl Harbor, U.S.

Naval Aviation would have been evenharder pressed to meet its commitmentswh i l e t he coun t r y gea red up fo rproduction of men and machines.

IV. World War II, The Big Test

Even though the acts of 1935 and 1939went a long way in creating a viablereserve aviation force in the Navy, therewas still much to be done. By the time theJapanese attacked Navy facilities at PearlHarbor on December 7, 1941, and thePhilippines on December 8 and 9,catapulting the U.S. into WW II, thereserve resources still left much to bedesired.

World War II was to prove again theability of Americans to adapt themselvesin war. Instead of a “trained and readyreserve,” the Navy had only a relativehandful of trained men ready to step inand help the regular forces in the openingdays of the war. Of the thousands oftrained aviators, only 600 were availableimmediately, and there were only 700enlisted reserves ready. During the war,aviation training in the Navy involvedmore than 54,000 aviators and hundredsof thousands of enlisted men. Thenumber of trained reserves grew in a

Carrier flight deck personnel prepare to tie down an F4U Corsair of reserve squadron VF-884, while off-duty shipmates take a break in the sun.

four-year period to a number whichstaggered the imagination. For example,from 1935 to 1940, only 1,800 aviationcadets had been trained. In 1941, theinput jumped to 7,000 and, by the end of1943, the rate soared to 20,000 per year— an increase of nearly 300 percent!

By the end of 1944, there were morethan 55,000 trained Naval Aviators plus asimilar number of aviation specialistsand general service officers on activeduty in aviation duties. At the end of thewar, in August 1945, 83 percent of theNavy’s fleet manpower consisted ofreserves.

The t remendous t ra in ing ef for tinvolved opening several major bases,including New Orleans, Atlanta andDallas. In November, 1940, one-third ofthe Navy’s reserve aviation squadronshad been mobilized, and full mobilizationo f t h e N a v a l A i r R e s e r v e w a saccomplished by January 1941. NRABSquantum began training aviators fromall allied countries, as well as Navypersonnel. Flight training was conductedas was antiaircraft training in the

marshes around the station. Outlyingfields in Beverly and Ayer, north ofBoston, served as bombing and gunnerytraining facilities.

One of the legendary figures in thehistory o f NRAB Squan tum wasCommander John Shea from Boston.Commissioned a reserve-ensign at theclose of WW I, Shea returned to civilianlife and joined the Aviation ReserveDiv is ion at NRAB Squantum. Heeventually became executive officer ofSquantum in 1931 and remained thereuntil 1940. Like thousands of otherfellow reservists, Cdr. Shea was recalledto active duty in 1940, reporting aboardUSS Wasp as air operations officer. Waspwas destined to see a great deal of actionafter Pearl Harbor, serving as fightingcompanion with the few Americancarriers operational in the Pacific afterPearl Harbor. The responsibility fell tothis small band of forward-based ships toface the seemingly invincible Japanesejuggernaut and halt the enemy drive.

While supporting the U.S. invasion ofGuadacanal in the late summer of 1942,

Wasp was sunk on September 15, andCdr. Shea was reported “missing ina c t i o n . ” S h e a w a s w e l l - k n o w nthroughout his command as a hardworker, but his fame in the “outside”world came through a letter which hewrote to his five-year-old son, Jackie, justbefore he sailed in Wasp. Dated June 29,1942, Shea’s letter has become a classicand is reproduced here.

“Dear Jackie:This is the first letter I have written

directly to my little son. I am thrilled toknow you can read it all by yourself. If youmiss some of the words it will be becauseI do not write very plainly. Mother willhelp you in that case, I am sure.

“I was certainly glad to hear your voiceover the long distance telephone. Itsounded as though I were right in theliving room with you. You sounded asthough you missed your daddy verymuch. I miss you, too, more than anyonewill ever know. It is too bad this war couldnot have been delayed a few more yearsso that I could grow up again with you and

The distinctive gull-wing design of Vought’s F4U Corsairs is unmistakable as silhouettes in theAn earlier version of the aircraft, the FG-1D, was a mainstay in the reserves in the late 1940s.

predawn sky over USS Sicily (CVE -1 18) in 1950.

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do all the things l planned to do when youwere old enough to go to school.

“I thought how nice it would be to comehome early in the afternoon and play ballwith you and go mountain climbing andsee the trees and brooks, and learn allabout woodcraft, hunting, f ishing,swimming and other things like that. Isuppose we must be brave and put thesethings off now for a while.

“When you are a little bigger you willknow why your daddy is not home somuch any more. You know we have a bigcountry and we have ideas as to howpeople should live and enjoy the riches ofit and how each is born with equal rightsto life, freedom and the pursuit ofhappiness. Unfortunately there are somecountries in the world where they do nothave these ideas, where a boy cannotgrow up to be what he wants to be withno limit on his opportunities to be a greatman such as a great priest, statesman.doctor, soldier, businessman, etc.

“Because there are people in countrieswho want to change our nation, its ideals,its form of government and way of life, wemust leave our homes and families tofight. Fighting for the defense of ourcountry. ideals, homes and honor is anhonor and a duty which your daddy has todo before he can come home and settledown with you and mother. When it isdone he is coming home to be with youalways and forever. So wait just a littlewhile longer. I am afraid it will be morethan the two weeks you told me on thephone.

“In the meantime take good care ofmother, be a good boy and grow up to be agood young man. Study hard when yougo to school. Be a leader in everythinggood in life. Be a good Catholic and youcan’t help being a good American. Playfair always. Strive to win but if you lose.lose like a gentlemen and a goodsportsman.

“Don’t ever be a quitter, either in sportsor in your business or profession whenyou grow up. Get all the education youcan. Stay close to Mother and follow heradvice. Obey her in everything, no matterhow you may at times disagree. Sheknows what is best and will never let youdown or lead you away from the right andhonorable things of life.

“If I don’t get back, you will have to beMother’s protector because you will bethe only one she has. You must grow upto take my place as well as your own inher life and heart.

“Love your grandmother and grandadas long as they live. They, too, will neverlet you down. Love your aunts and seethem as often as you can. Last of all, don’tever forget your daddy. Pray for him tocome back and, if it is God’s will that hedoes not, be the kind of a boy and manyour daddy wants you to be.

“Kiss Mother for me every night.Goodbye for now.

“With all my love and devotion forMother and you.

Your Daddy”LINE SPACE

While perhaps a bit maudlin forreaders 45 years later, Shea’s letter wast y p i c a l o f s i m i l a r p i e c e s o fcorrespondence many fathers wrote totheir families showing the emotions ofbeing separated and going into battle.

The letter also gives a goad feeling forthe commitment many reservists feltduring their period of active service. Theair f ie ld at NAS South Weymouth,descendant of NRAB Squantum, isnamed in honor of Jack Shea.

NAS Anacostia, in Washington, D.C.,also contributed to the war effort. Newbuildings were constructed and in 1942,a n d t h e P h o t o g r a p h i c S c i e n c eLaboratory, now known as the NavalImaging Command, moved into its new$4 million facilities. A new aviation unit,t h e A i r c r a f t E x p e r i m e n t a l a n dDevelopment Squadron, was formed andbased at Anacostia. Its function was toexperiment with aerial tactics. During1943, the Tactical Air Intelligence Centermoved from Philadelphia to Anacostia toevaluate captured Japanese equipment.

The WAVES — Women Accepted forVoluntary Enlisted Service — first cameto Anacostia in January 1943, andvar ious o ther admin is t ra t i ve anddeve lopmenta l fac i l i t i es took upresidence there as well.

World War II provided the first chancein 20 years for complete integration ofthe reserve fo rces . Cer ta in l y theoverwhelming victory over the axispowers — Japan, Germany and Italy —could not have been obtained without thehuge influx of ready reservists, thosemen already in the reserves in 1941, andthe draf ted and volunteer reservepersonnel who came in af ter thedeclarat ion of war fo l lowing Pear lHarbor. (There was a measure of frictionbe tween the ha rdened regu la rs ,particularly at the senior levels, whooccasionally made little attempt to hide

their contempt for “those reservists.”A n d t h e f e e l i n g w a s s o m e t i m e sreciprocated by the reservists. But, on thegrander scale, the complete integrationof the reserves with the regular forcesprovided this country with the means tocompletely defeat the enemy. Therecould have been no other way.

V. Postwar Activities and Korea, TheReserve Show

After the stunningly complete victoryof the Allies in 1945, the winners tried toreturn to prewar simplicity. War-wearyBritain battled with the desires of itspopulation to supply food and clothing.The U.S., while trying to maintain themomen tum o f t he wa r t ime boomeconomy, was beginning to realize itsnew role as leader of the free worldagainst the Soviet monolith. And thebattered countries of Europe’s mainlandtried to rebuild. Most of Asia was in ruins,lifeless. It was a hard world immediatelyfollowing the devastating global war andvictory by one side, complete as it was,did not bring a commensurate promise ofrelief for anyone.

Finally understanding its new founddominance, the U.S. also understood thatit would not allow its military forces tocompletely wind down. Although severec u t s i n m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g a n dconstruction programs did occur, onearea which was addressed was themaintenance of the reserve forces,including the Naval Air Reserve.

The post war plans officers decided thatloss of t ra ined reserves would bewasteful and the Naval Air ReserveTraining Command was established asthe instrument to continue to utilize themanpower in the reserves. Headquartersfor the command was established at NASGlenview, Ill., in November 1945, withformal commissioning ceremonies inJuly 1946. Rear Admiral F. D. Wagnerbecame the first Chief, Naval Air ReserveTraining (CNAResTra) on November 1,1945 . F rom h i s headquar te rs i nGlenview, CNAResTra could control thethousands of naval air reserviststhroughout the country. Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen took over from RAdm. Wagner inDecember 1945 and. together withBrigadier General C. B. Schilt — Medal ofHonor winner in Nicaragua in 1928 —built the joint resources of the Navy andMarine Corps Air Reserves.

Launching the admittedly ambitious air

reserve program was far from easy.Personne l to f i l l t he ac t i ve du tycomplement of 21 naval air stations andtraining units had to be recruited from thev e t e r a n s w h o w e r e r e l e a s e d o rdischarged from the Navy. In someinstances, it took six months to get half ofthe active duty allowance filled. Acomplement of 5,000 officers and 30,000enlisted men was assigned to the “readyreserve,” as those who were in a “drill-pay status” were called.

The mission of the ready reserve was toform a group of trained pilots and men toman the “mothballed fleet” in the eventof a national emergency. A “standbyreserve” made up of volunteers in anonpay status would act as a buffer andreplace those in the ready reserve whowere recalled to active duty.

The first year of operation provedconclusively that war-trained reservistsstill had an interest in the Navy and inNaval Aviation. Naval Reserve aviatorsflew 412,000 flight hours and 55 airgroups were commissioned throughoutt h e N a v a l A i r R e s e r v e T r a i n i n gCommand. In 1947, the ready reservewas redesignated the “OrganizedReserve,” and the standby reserve wascalled the “Volunteer Reserve.” Therough spots uncovered in a year ofoperation were smoothed out. Closeharmony between the squadrons andtraining activity resulted. There were71,419 officers and 15,458 enlisted menin the Naval Reserve.

When Rear Admiral R. F. Whiteheadbecame CNAResTra in February 1948,200 squadrons had been commissioned,and their pilots flew nearly a half-millionhours. On the ground, 17,000 troops keptthe more than 1,500 aircraft flying. Thebig test came in the fall of 1948 when thereservists, by now nicknamed “weekendwarriors,” took their WW II-vintageaircraft, including F6F Hellcats and F4UCorsairs, o n t h e i r f i r s t c a r r i e rqualifications since the war. Fifty pilotsmade a total of 421 carrier landingswithout incident.

The following year, NAS Squantumsent Carrier Air Group 56 aboard USSFranklin D. Roosevelt as the first airgroup from the New England area to goaboard a carrier. Thirty-seven pilotseventually made 222 landings on FDR.For many, this was their first time at seaas well as the first carrier qualification

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An AD Skyraider launches from a carrier’sflight deck. The dive and torpedo-bomberserved in the Korean War and theVietnam conflict.

period. Naval Air Reserve activities werenot limited just to carriers. In 1949, sevenPBY Catalina flying boats from PatrolSquadron 69 visited NAS Miami and, fortwo weeks, conducted independentoperations.

By the end of the decade, the Naval AirR e s e r v e w a s a v i a b l e , w o r k i n gorganization. In July 1950, it was calledupon to serve in yet another conflict, inKorea.

When North Korean forces invadedSouth Korea, crossing the 38th parallel inlate June 1950, they were subjected toattacks by aircraft from the carrier ValleyForge, which was patrolling offshore. Asthe conflict grew in intensity, it was clearthat it would not be resolved quickly and,once again, America geared up for a war.One aspect involved the mobilization ofselected units and squadrons of theNaval Air Reserve, eventually numbering84. Over 30,000 reservists eventuallywere recalled, either voluntarily orinvoluntarily. Several aviation squadronsvolunteered en masse, taking pride indemonstrating their patriotism andpreparedness. VF-781 at Los Alamitos,Calif., was the first reserve squadron tovolunteer.

Many of the squadrons werre stillflying obsolete W W II aircraft and,although their services were welcomed,their transition to current aircraft such asthe AD Skyraider and F9F Panther tooktime. Perhaps the only units whichneeded little or no training were thesquadrons flying the F4U Corsair. Thesefighter-bombers were in great demand.In fact, they served throughout the three-year conflict, not only with the Navy butwith the Marines, from carriers andshore bases, by day and night.

As the reserve recal l gatheredmomentum, squadrons manned entirelyby reservists flew increasing numbers ofsorties against enemy targets. At onetime, USS Bon Homme Richard wasmanned entirely by reservists. USSBoxer, with reserve squadrons fromOlathe, Kans.; Glenview, III.; Memphis,Tenn.; and Dallas, Texas, had 90-percentreserve manning, while Princeton had 50

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percent. The presence of reserve-manned carriers allowed fleet carriers tocome off the line for rest andreplenishment. In March 1951, the firstall-reserve air group took off from Boxerto attack targets along the entire front ofthe 38th parallel. At times, 75 percent ofa month’s sorties were flown by reserveaircrews.

By the time the last Neptunes were delivered in1962, the designation P2V-7S had changed toSP-2H (pictured here). As P-3 Orions filled outfleet squadrons, P-2s continued in reserve andsupport roles.

The reservists flew everything fromprop-driven Skyraiders and patrol planesto the new Panther and Banshee fighter-bombers.

Famed author James Michenerimmortalized the Naval Air Reservists inhis novel The Bridges at Toko-ri, whichtold the story of Denver lawyer HarryBrubaker who suddenly finds himselfflying from a carrier against a little-known enemy, in a little-understoodwar. The book was made into a poignantmoving starring William Holden and Grace

Kelly, as Brubaker’s wife. The bookaddressed several aspects of thereservists’ commitment and thequestion, “Where do we get such men?”

Upon his return from Korea in April1952, Vice Admiral H. M. Martin,Commander, Naval Air Force, PacificFleet, wrote to Rear Admiral L. A.Moebus, CNAResTra:

“I sincerely believe that this countrynever before has had a reserve sosplendidly trained and ready to meet anysudden emergency. I am likewise firmly

n anonymous reservist wrote thefollowing account of his service. In someways it presents the feeling of manyservicemen 15 years later duringVietnam.

I Flew with CAG-101

My name is Smith. Lieutenant CharlesSmith, USNR, to be correct. I’m a NavalAviator just back from Korea. Don’t wantto talk about it? I thank heaven I’m able to

talk. But you are right. I don’t want to talkabout myself, particularly. I want to talkabout a lot of guys — ground crewmen,enlisted men, and pilots like myself that Imet out there.

I made a promise to those guys. Itstarted out as a joke at first. We had a lotof time on our hands while our carrier,Boxer was en route to Korea. When theyfound out that I used to be anewspaperman, they would sit aroundmaking up corny headlines like “Local

Barber Trims Commie Jet” or “MerchantMugs MiG.”

You see, we were all reservists, hadcivilian jobs, a family maybe. There wereshoe salesmen, brokers, garagemechanics and, yes, even a barber.Jokingly, I said if I ever got back alive I’dtell the world their story. As it turned out,their story is no joke. Fred Painter didclobber a YAK that jumped him. Fredowns an appliance store. Joe Gino, thebarber, put the clippers to several air

20

convinced that never before has ourcountry realized such dividends from apeacetime training program. It is mysincere hope that we will profit from ourexperience in Korea and continue tomaintain our Naval Air Reserve programat peak efficiency.”

The reserves intended to carry outVAdm. Martin’s wishes and, as theKorean War came to a close in July 1953,Naval Air Reserve squadrons continuedto perform drills and two-week trainingperiods.

VI. 1953-1968: Stability withTransition, Props to Jets

When the reservists returned fromservice in Korea, the biggest changeoccurr ing was the t ransi t ion f romfamiliar, relatively obsolete propeller-d r i v e n a i r c r a f t t o m o r e m o d e r nequipment. Korea had placed a drain onsome of the more utilitarian types of propaircraft such as the Skyra ider a n dCorsair. While the Marine Air Reservesheld on a little longer to the F4U-1, the

Naval Air Reserve made the change tojets sooner. In April 1955, the first F9FPanthers joined the Naval Air ReserveTraining Command. By the mid-1950s.however, the air reserve had settled intoa period of tranquility.

To clar i fy the recal l el igibi l i ty ofi n d i v i d u a l r e s e r v i s t s , C o n g r e s sestabl ished “ready” and “standby”categories in the Armed Forces ReserveAct of 1952. Ready Reserves could berecalled in an emergency declared war.In addition, categories of “active” and

strips before he was through. But let metell the story from the beginning.

Like I said, we were members of theReserve, the Naval Air Reserve. We usedto make weekend trips to the nearestnaval air station to maintain our flightproficiency and keep our hands in. Someof us got paid, some didn’t. The moneydidn’t matter much.

Sure, we know we stood a good chanceof being called in the event of anemergency or a war. But we got back withthe old gang, told sea stories, and had achance to fly or fool around with theplanes. Then the training started gettingtougher, our flight syllabus kept gettingtighter. There was less time for seastories or coffee after a flight. Toward theend they were really piling it on us. Iguess we all knew it was just a matter oftime.

I got my orders in the middle of July. Ihad j us t t aken the fam i l y t o themountains. I had 24 hours to report. Itwas the same with the rest. I found outlater that more than 3,100 guys likemyself had received similar orders.Twenty-four hours later they werer allthere. Their businesses, their homes,their families had been left behind. Theydidn’t know where they were going, orexactly what they were going to do. Theydid know they were ready.

How does a guy feel? What goesthrough his mind, especially if he has awife and a couple of kids? I remember thetight feeling in my throat and a knot in mystomach. My hands were sweaty, too. Iremember saying to myself, “This is it.”

Yes. my wife Alice cried a little. Shetried hard not to but women are like that.The kids didn’t know what it meant. Icould see the question marks in theireyes along with the tears. I knew I’d missthem.

It was harder to go this time, yes, a

million times harder. Sure, I flew with theNavy in WW II but I was young. The wideblue yonder was a challenge, a challengeto youth. I accepted it eagerly. This timethere was no challenge.

I had no desire to feel a thousandhorses pulling me through the air, or thewind clutching my flight jacket. I wantedto laugh and say it was all a big joke. Onlyit wasn’t. Somebody somewhere neededme. I remember I felt like a policemanwhen I pinned my wings on my greens.

Sure I could have requested adeferment and probably gotten it, socould the rest of them. But they didn’t.Don’t ask me why. A man must live withhimself, I guess.

But there we were on board USS Boxerheading for Korea and God knows what.The intensive training we had receivedwas behind us. It was the first time inNaval Aviation history that an all-reservesquadron had struck back at the enemy.The eyes of an anxious nation were on us.

Some time later we joined Princetonand Valley Forge, as part of Task Force77. There were humorous little parodiesby the “Happy Valley” boys and bits ofverse from the “Sweet Pea.” Withappropr iate ceremony, Boxer w a sdubbed the “Busy Bee.“ We had joined agreat team.

The din of this brief welcome still rangin our ears as we prepared to launch ourfirst aerial attack. No longer “weekendwarriors,” we were members of CarrierAir Group 101 and part of the Navy, thefighting Navy!

I’m not going to bore you with a longwar story. The record of the “Busy Bee”and the Naval Air Reservists that servedon her speaks for itself.

Members of VF-721, VA-702. VF-791and VF-884 were in the air more than20,000 hours and flew over 8,000 sortiesagainst the enemy. Seven thousand

enemy casualt ies resul ted. These“butchers, bakers and candlestickmakers” virtually pulverized bridges,railroads and troop concentrations fromthe 38th parallel to the muddy Yalu.

Their Corsa i rs , Skyra iders a n dPanthers gladdened the hearts of groundtroops as they flew in close air support, ortheir napalm tanks sent seething flameover advance enemy positons. For sevenmonths, these Naval Air Reservistscarried the fight to the enemy.

They’re home now, or back in theStates, just like I am. They left behindthem a wonderful record. A record forNaval Air Reservists of Bon HommeRichard and Antietam to shoot at as theytake our place on the team.

P e r h a p s t h i s m e s s a g e f r o mCommander Air Forces, Pacific Fleet willillustrate what I mean:

“The members of the former reservesquadrons of Carrier Air Group 101 haveearned the admiration and gratitude ofboth the Navy and the nation for theirmagnificent performance of duty whileconducting combat operations againstthe enemy in Korea. Despite lossessuffered from the constantly increasingaccuracy and intensity of the enemy’santiaircraft fire, you have maintained theaggressiveness that characterized ourfighting men, and seven thousand evemycasualities attest to the vigor anddeterminat ion of your at tack. Mycongratulations to each officer and manfor his part in the splendid record theGroup has established. Vice Admiral T. L.Sprague.”

That’s the story of Joe Gino, barber;Fred Painter, merchant; and a host ofothers just like them. I’m proud to tell thestory of these “modern minutemen.”

There’s Alice with the kids. Guesswhat? We’re going to the mountains! gg

“inactive” determined the status ofreservists in certain programs. Activestatus reserves were those participatingin accredited training programs, andinact ive r e f e r r e d t o t h o s e n o tparticipating in any training.

Because reservists make their livingslike other civilians, it was necessary tomake the training convenient and somereserve activities provided airlifts, ifwarranted, a practice which continues tothe present day.

Besides the actual bases which servedas training facilities, various supportingand administrative units were created,such as air wing staffs, auxiliary air unitsand auxiliary ground units.

Although transition to jets wouldeventually come in the very early 1960s,the Naval Air Reserve in the 1950s stillmade due with prop types, including theAD Skyraider, P4Y Privateer for patroldu t i es and the R5D fou r -eng inetransport. PV-2 Venturas and P2VNeptunes occasionally supplemented theroster. An odd type which found its wayinto Naval Air Reserve service was theGrumman AF Guard ian, a uniqueapproach to carrier-based ASW, arrivingat NAS Oakland, Calif., in December1952. The AF served for several years inthe reserves.

By conducting training on weekends,civilian employment did not have to bedisrupted. Some reservists still had touse their vacation time, however, toparticipate in the two-week active dutyperiods. But most employees allowedtheir double-citizens extra time, just asmost do today.

Fo l low ing Korea , the reservescontinued to drill, and were not recalledto active duty again until the fall of 1961.

When the communists threw up a wallin the divided city of Berlin, therebychallenging the 16-year-old agreementof the freedom of the city squarely placedin East Germany, Soviet territory, theU.S. called 3,600 Naval Air Reservists in18 squadrons to active duty. Althoughthe units remained in the country, theshow of resolve apparently impressedthe Soviets and the world in general.

Carl Vinson, then Chairman of theHouse Armed Services Committee, said,“These reserves were ordered to activeduty to prevent a war, not fight a war.They were called to meet the crisis and itis to their everlasting credit that they met

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Two RF-8G Crusaders of VFP-306 flyformation with a KA-3B tanker from VAK-308 in 1983. Though the VAK squadronscontinue to provide aerial refueling services,VFP-306 was disestablished in 1984 and itssister unit, VFP-206, will be disestablishedin early 1987.

the crisis head-on.”The Berlin crisis was the first time the

1959 integration of the Naval AirReserves into the Selected Reserve hadbeen exercised. The integration hadmade all Naval Air Reservists eligible foractive duty within hours after thecommencement of the emergency.During this time, the emphasis for thereserves swung away from fighter andattack training to ASW and, as a result,several reserve units transitioned to therelatively modern Grumman S2F Trackerand later models of the P2V Neptune.

The Naval Air Reserve remained activethroughout the mid-1960s, attending tovarious crises, and training on their agingequipment. Most of the tactical reserveshad made the transition to jets, the mostmodern equipment being the F-1 (or FJ inpre-1962 designation) Fury, a derivativeof the F-86 series. In fact, the Fury hadarrived in the reserves as early as 1948,when the Oakland reserves acquiredseveral FJ-1s. Other types included theF-2 Banshee (nee F2H) and F-9 Cougar,all representing first-generation jettechnology of the mid to late 1940s. Thef lee t was work ing w i th the newMcDonnell F-4 Phantom and late modelsof the A-4 Skyhawk, having retiredseveral types such as the McDonnell F-3Demon, an underpowered behemothwhose potential was never fully realized.

Even as the devastating decade ofd i r e c t A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t i nSoutheast Asia approached, there waslittle thought given to updating theequipment of the Naval Air Reserve, orany of the various reserve components.Even when the August 1964 Gulf ofTonkin incident brought full participationby American fleet forces, it would be fourmore years before the reserves weredirectly tested and steps taken to changethe makeup of the program. Surprisingly,as huge an effort as Vietnam was tobecome, the Naval Air Reserve had verylittle direct participation, aside from someinitial transport runs to South Vietnam in1966. Of course, many of the aircrewsjoining the Navy were reservists on activeduty, but not the true “weekend warrior”

recalled reservists. Vietnamlargely an active duty affair.

was to be

VII. Reorganization and Revitalizationin the 1970s

Cruising the Korean coast in January1968, the light cargo ship USS Puebloseemed to have nothing to do withU.S. Naval Air Reserve. But, when

thethe

ship was captured and boarded by NorthKorean sailors on January 23, the seizureset off a chainaffected the

of eventsreserves

which eventuallyi n a d y n a m i c

fashion. In addition to the immediatereaction of sending a fleet carrier taskforce up into the Sea of Japan toward theKorean Peninsula, away from its normalduty off Vietnam, U.S. President LyndonJohnson also mobilized six Naval AirReserve carrier squadrons. The Puebloincident settled into a typical cycle ofcondemnation and rebuttal from bothsides, and lost in the more sensational

headlines was the fact that the reserveswere having trouble.

For several years, the reservists hadflown obsolete aircraft and now the timefactor in upgrading to fleet-comparablemodels was slowing down the speed atwhich the squadrons readied themselvesfor integration into the fleet. It wasembarrassing as well as counterproduc-tive. Fighter units struggling at NASJacksonville, Fla., were hopelessly lost intransitioning to the newer versions of theF-8 Crusader. By September, with thediminished state of the crisis, and thelack of readiness displayed by the reservesquadrons, the six units were releasedfrom active duty. But the lesson on thestate of preparedness of the reserves wasnot lost and plans were immediatelyinitiated to change the program.

The major thrust of the plan was tocreate a mirror image of the fleet. OnApril 1, 1970, two Reserve Carrier AirWings (CVWRs) were commissioned —

CVWRs 20 and 30. (In addition, twoshort-lived wings were commissioned forASW carrier use — CVSGRs 70 and 80.)The reorganization placed all carrier-typesquadrons in two reserve carrier airwings and two carrier ASW groups.Twelve patrol (VP) and three transport(VR) squadrons were also part of thereorganization. It was an ambitious plan,but one whose time had come. It provideda chance for the reserves to operate thesame aircraft the fleet did, therebyhopefully allowing the reservists tomaintain currency in their type in theevent of mobilization.

The CVWRs were composed of eightsquadrons, similiar to the fleet air wings:two fighter (VF); three attack (VA); onelight photoreconnaissance (VFP); onecarrier airborne early warning (VAW);and one tactical electronic warfare(VAQ), later aerial refueling (VAK). Anadditional squadron, the VAQ EW unit,made its appearance in the early 1980s.

The aircraft with which to equip the newsquadrons of the CVWRs were drawnfrom current stocks and included F-8HCrusaders, A-4L Skyhawks, RF-8Gphoto- Crusaders, E-1B Tracers and KA-3B Skywarriors. Physical location of thesquadrons was more centralized. Thosesquadrons belonging to CVWR-20, whichwould deploy to the Atlantic Fleet, weresituated at East Coast naval air stationssuch as NAS A t l an ta , Ga . ; NAFWashington, D.C.; and NAS Cecil Field,Fla. CVWR-30’s squadrons, slated forPacific Fleet deployment in the event ofmobilization, were located on the WestCoast, at NASs Miramar, Lemoore, PointMugu and Alameda. Calif. There was oneexception, one wh ich was neve rchanged. VFP-306, CVWR-30’s lightpho to reconna i ssance squad ron ,equipped with RF-8Gs, was based at NAFWashington, a long wi th i ts s is tersquadron, VFP-206. Although attentionwas occasionally given to relocating VFP-306 on the West Coast, the change wasnever seriously considered, and thesquadron remained near the nation’scap i ta l du r ing i t s en t i re 14-yearexistence.

The reorganization of the Naval AirReserve in 1970 was hailed as a majormilestone. The reserves now trulymirrored the fleet, and could be recalledas entire organizational wings, ready todeploy in a crisis. No longer wouldindividual squadrons, or even personnel,be subject to recall. The table ofadministrative organization was exactlylike the fleet, complete with an air groupcommander, always a regular Navysenior commander or junior captain.

Another advantage of the reserve airwing concept was that the entire wingwould perform the regular annual two-week active duty for training (AcDuTra)as a unit, thereby providing anopportunity for the wing to come togetherat least once a year and operate as it wasintended.

The first order of business was toconduct carrier qualifications with itsnew aircraft. Accordingly, squadrons ofCVWR-30 went out to the carrierRooseve l t (CVA-42) in late 1970.Operations went smoothly, especiallysince many of the members of thesquadrons were recent ly-returnedVietnam veterans with considerableoperational and combat experience in

23

their particular aircraft.After carrier qualifications, the wings

deployed to several sites, such as theweapons training range at NAS Fallon,Nev., 60 miles east of Reno. Fallon’slimited facilities necessitated many of thesquadrons staging from NAS Miramar’sp h o t o f a c i l i t i e s w h i c h p r o v i d e ddeveloping services for the aircraft’scameras and film. This situation wasremedied in 1977 when Fallon installedt h e n e c e s s s a r y f i l m p r o c e s s i n gequipment, allowing the VFPs to remainat Fallon during the period of deployment.

By the mid-seventies, the squadrons ofthe CVWRs had begun to receive evenmore modern aircraft in the form of the F-4 Phantom and A-7 Corsair. An earlierattempt to include the Phantom in thereserves at a California site in 1970proved abortive and it was not until 1974that the first war-weary F-4Bs made theirappearance in VFs 301 and 302 at NASMiramar. The Marine Air Reserve alsoaccepted its first F-4Bs at this time. Theattack squadrons, based at Point Mugu,Lemoore and Alameda, exchanged theirA-4s for A-7As, and eventually A-7Bs.With colorful markings applied to theiraircraft — recalling the 1930s when

This H-3 from HS-84 gets a steady and multicolored aircraft populated the fleet professional hand from a crewman during in-flight refueling. The reserves have been flying

and reserves — the Naval Air Reserve

the Sea King since the early seventies when had finally begun to achieve a measure of

four reserve squadrons received SH-3Hs. parity with the fleet.

The apparent success of the reservewing concept was such that a wing wasdeployed with a fleet carrier for a shorttime, and the CVWR assumed the role ofthe ship’s actual dedicated wing. Thus,CVWR-30’s AcDuTra period began inNovember 1976 and, for a continuousperiod of seven days, operated from USSRanger (CV-61).

The success of the Ranger deploymentencouraged the reserve air wings toparticipate in various exercises, as wellas to travel farther afield from theirbases.

Of course, besides the more glamoroustactical jet airwings, the remainder of theNaval Air Reserve — the patrol andhelicopter wings — had also receivedupda ted e q u i p m e n t w i t h t h ereorganization. In the ear ly 1970s,although many VP squadrons still flewthe venerable P-2E N e p t u n e , t h etransition to the P-3A Orion was wellunder way, and units in Massachusetts,Glenview, Jacksonville and Moffett Fieldtook advantage of the greatly increasedcapabilities of their new aircraft. PatrolSquadron 91 accepted the first P-3As inNovember 1970.

The HS squadrons, with their ASWmission, gained the H-3 Sea King. Twounique squadrons, HAL-4 and HAL-5,were formed to operate the HH-1K, agunship version of the ubiquitous Huey ofVietnam fame. Loosely descended fromHAL-3, which operated various armedversions of the Huey from 1967 to 1972in Vietnam, the reserve HALs alsoincorporated training in terrorist controland special operations in their overallmission. Formed in 1975, HC-9 remainsunique as the only dedicated combatsearch and rescue helicopter squadron inthe Navy, fleet or reserve. Flying aspecially modified version of the H-3 —the HH-3A — California-based HC-9t r a i n s f o r a m i s s i o n p r a c t i c a l l y“invented” by the Vietnam war rescue ofdowned f l ight crewmen in host i leenvironments.

A major administrative change to comefrom the revamping of the reserves wasthe consolidation of the headquarters forthe two large components, air ands u r f a c e r e s e r v e . P r i o r t o t h econsolidation, which officially occurredon February 1, 1973, the surfacereserves had been administered fromfacilities in Omaha, Neb. — the reasoningbeing that this site was approximately inthe middle of the country — while theNaval Air Reserve had its headquarters atNAS Glenview, III., near Chicago. While

this arrangement was satisfactory, aconsolidation was deemed necessary togo with the new organization and,accordingly, New Orleans was chosen asthe location for the new command.

Chapter VIII: The 1980s, Present andFuture

The Naval Air Reserve entered the1980s on a definite upswing, as did muchof the military. The ridiculous stigmaattached to military service imposed bythe long, frustrating war in SoutheastAsia was slowly beginning to disappear,espec ia l l y coup led w i th a r i s ingunemployment rate in the public sector.Years of neglect, fostered by Vietnam andperpetuated by a bumbling, inept politicalleadership in the last half of the 1970s.had crippled not only the active dutyforces but the reserves as well.

An open arms policy where the U.S.became a haven for not only bonafiderefugees from Haiti, Vietnam, Cambodiaand Cuba but for the dregs of thesecountries’ societies — criminals, drugaddicts and activists — further erodedthis country’s already shaky standing inthe world arena.

It took a shattering event in November1979 — the seizure of over 50 U.S.citizens by radical elements in the strife-torn country of Iran, once a staunch U.S.ally — to bring the American peopletogether as a nation once more. And withthe drastically changed political climate,which the long, so-called hostage crisisbrought, liberal politics that had so badlydamaged the U.S. capacity to actdecisively were given up for the moreconservative politics of the RonaldReagan administration. Thus, as theleadershlp of the country changed handsin January 1981, coinciding with theemotional return of the remaining 51Iranian-held American hostages, theU.S. quickly began rebuilding its crippledmilitary capability. And included withinthis massive rebirth was funding for theNaval Air Reserve.

The main thrust centered on newequipment. The basic reorganization of1970 was found to be a viable program.What was needed in the 1980s wascomplete parity with the fleet. Evenduring the periodic bursts of updating,such as the early 1970s, the reserves stiIIoperated aircraft which were in the earlystages of retirement from the fleet. The F-4B and A-7A/B are good examples.Obsolescent , n o t o b s o l e t e , b u tapproaching it.

Actually some modernization hadcontinued. The ancient E-1B Tracers hadbeen replaced by E-2 Hawkeyes. VAW-88 of CVWR-30 received its first aircraftin time to take them on AcDuTra inOctober 1977. The F-4Bs of VFs 201,202, 301 and 302 had been exchangedfor F-4Ns, and a new squadron had joinedthe CVWRs — the VAQ which operatedEA-6As, two-seat, specially-modified A-6 lntruders. VAQ-209 assigned toCVWR-20, flew from NAS Norfolk, Va.,and VAQ-309, operating with CVWR-30,was based at Whidbey Island, Wash.,(The VAQ designation had been used bythe KA-3B tanker squadrons 208 and308, but was always something of amisnomer since, aside from occasionalpath-finding navigational duties on longtransoceanic flights, the big, twin-jet KA-3Bs “Whales” had only one mission:aerial refueling. Therefore, with theestablishment of the more properly-equ ipped EA-6A un i t s , t he VAQelectronic warfare designation wasreassigned. The aerial refuelers becameVAKs.)

One problem which began to appear inthe early eighties, and which threatenedto virtually cripple a major portion of thereserve tactical community, involved theengines for the A-7Bs which equipped sixreserve light attack squadrons. Basically,the problem was one of age, whichtranslated into unreliability and noairplanes. Indeed. the problem was soacute by 1983 that the planned CVWR-30 AcDuTra in May at NAS Fallon,including an operational readinessinspection, was nearly cancelled due tothe nonavailability of the wing’s A-7s. Inany event. the cruise was great lymodified, allowing two to three A-7s fromeach squadron to use those engineswhich were still operational to fly toFallon, and the inspection was cancelled.

T h e N a v a l A i r R e s e r v e w a sembarrassed and frustrated. Again, whatseemed a good program, manned byexperienced and willing people, wasbeing damaged by the age of i tsequipment. The decision was made tobring the A-7E into the reserves and, in alandmark decision, to allow transition tothe spanking new F/A-18 Hornet. VA-303, based at NAS Alameda, Calif., wasdesignated as the first Naval Air ReserveF/A-18 squadron. The Naval Air Reservewas to receive first-line equipment forthe first time in its nearly 70-yearexistence. Redesignated VFA-303, thesquadron formally accepted its firstHornet on October 19, 1985, after a two-

year transition program in conjunctionwith VFA-125, the West Coast fleetreadiness squadron. In addition, thefighter squadrons would transition to theF-14 Tomcat, nearly bringing to a closethe incredible career of the F-4 Phantom.It was a clean sweep by a new broom.

Viewed from a political standpoint,there were several aspects of thistremendous influx, not the least of whichwas the new prominence of the militaryas a whole, and the somewhat unusualdesignation of an active Naval AirReservist as Secretary of the Navy. JohnLehman was quickly confirmed in 1981and became one of the most activesecretaries in the history of the office. Ayoung, dynamic man in his late thirties,Lehman was then also a LieutenantCommander and a designated A-6bombardier/navigator who drilled atNAS Oceana with VA-42, the A-6 fleetreplacement squadron. At last, the NavalAir Reserve, indeed the Navy, had achampion who understood the service’sneeds and organization. Lehman, ofcourse, brought new visibility to theNaval Air Reserve, providing the thrustfor new programs and equipment.

In June 1983, VAW-78 accepted itsfirst E-2C, a significant increase inmission capability and a major steptoward fleet parity for the reserves. Thevalue of training reservists in sosophisticated an aircraft as the E-2C wasquickly realized when a number of VAW-78 crewmen volunteered for Christmasduty in the eastern Mediterranean toaugment the E-2 squadrons already onstation in that troubled area. The fleetsquad rons were fac ing an acu temanpower shortage and the arrival oftrained reserve replacements, ready togo, helped relieve the strain during theintense period of operations. In addition,VAW-78 received the Meritorious UnitCommendation for its part in providings u r v e i l l a n c e r e s o u r c e s f o r t h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ s o n g o i n g a n t i d r u gcampaign.

Continuing with modernization plans.VF-301 at NAS Miramar, accepted itsfirst F-14 on October 1, 1984. A dayear l ie r , i n c e r e m o n i e s a t N A FWashington, D.C., VFP-306 wasdisestablished, the f i rs t Nava l A i rReserve squadron to do so since themassive 1970 reorganization. Therequirement for reconnaissance wouldbe assumed by VF-301’s Tomcats whichw o u l d c a r r y t h e t a c t i c a l a i rreconnaissance pod system (TARPS).Thus, VFP-306’s 27-Year-old RF-8G

Crusaders were retired, leaving VFP-206as the sole operator of the Crusader in theNavy until March 30, 1987. On this date,VFP-206 was disestablished and the lastU.S. Navy RF-8G made its final flight.

VF-301 quickly brought itself up tooperational readiness with its newmount, conducting the first carrierqualifications in February 1985 aboardUSS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). As Rear AdmiralC. J. Kempf, Chief of Naval Reserve,wrote “What is happening...is a majorstep toward horizontal integration...[TheF-14]...is an airplane that is identical tof leet equipment. . .Reserve f ightersquadrons will soon be able to deploy tofleet carriers as units....”

CVWR-20 emulated the 1976 Rangerdeployment of CVWR-30 when the entirewing deployed aboard USS Eisenhower(CVN-69) in September 1985. Duringtheir two-week AcDuTra, the squadronsof CVWR-20 accumulated over 1,000arrested landings.

A new addition to the Naval AirReserve program was the creation ofSquadron Augment Units (SAUs).Designed to create a pool of trainedreservists, the SAUs provide personnel toaugment fleet squadrons to wartimemanning should the need arise. Inaddition, the SAU reservists drill withtheir designated unit or the parent fleet

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squadron, as well as fly the fleets q u a d r o n ’ s a i r c r a f t t o m a i n t a i nprof ic iency. SAUs are part icular lyvaluable where not enough aircraft areavailable to create an individual reservesquadron, such as the F-14 or A-6. Thus,although the introduction of the F-14 intothe Nava l A i r Reserve has beenaccomplished, those reservists trained inthe Tomcat drill with the Oceana-basedSAUs which fly aircraft belonging to VF-101, the East Coast F-14 fleet readinesssquadron (FRS). In addition, A-6 SAUmembers fly VA-42 A-6Es, augmentingthe East Coast A-6 FRS.

Other components of the Naval AirReserve a r e b e n e f i t t i n g f r o mmodernization. In a similar program tothe SAU, the maritime patrol squadronsare br inging the Reserve MasterAugment Unit (MAU) into operation. Thelatest versions of the P-3C have beenavailable only to fleet squadrons, leavingthe reserve units based throughout thecountry to fly older, less capable A and Bmodels, albei t wi th some updatesincorporated. With the invention of theMAU concept, reservists in designatedareas, such as Brunswick, Maine, fly thelatest P-3Cs, and would report directly totheir sponsoring squadron if mobilized.

Reserve VP duties take members allover the world, filling in occasionally for

Left, two F-4s Phantoms of VF-202 fly neartheir base at NAS Dallas. VF-202 and VF-201,the other Texas-based reserve fighter squadron,transitioned to the F-14 in 1987. Top, a TA-4Jfrom Oceana-based VC-12. VCs 12 and 13provide valuable adversary services to fleet andreserve squadrons. Above, VAQ-309 flies theEA-6A, the electronic countermeasures versionof the veteran Intruder.

regular Navy VP squadrons, as far awayas Spain and Japan. During the summerof 1984, four squadrons from ReservePatrol Wing, Pacific took turns flyingtours in Japan.

VPs 65, 67, 69 and 91 each flew theirP-3Bs out of Misawa for one-monthp e r i o d s . T h e r e s e r v e O r i o n ssupplemented the resources of VP-48,the fleet VP squadron.

The reserve helicopter community hasexperienced changes, also. The two HSreserve squadrons, flying SH-3Ds, wereredesignated HSL-84 and 85 and, inMarch 1984, HSL-84 traded its SH-3Dsfor SH-2Fs which are part of the LAMPSMK I ASW system. HSL-74, based at NASSouth Weymouth, Mass., also acquiredSH-2Fs in January 1985.

Perhaps the most successful, thoughnot as well-known nor as glamorous,story in the “new” Naval Air Reserveinvolves the transport squadrons, VRs.

With the retirement of the last prop-driven C-118 four-engine transports in1985, the Navy’s VR squadrons areresponsible for all the movement ofpersonnel and logistical supplies, exceptfor del iver ies to aircraft carr iers.Beginning with the 1970 reorganization,the reserve transport program graduallysaw the introduction of the C-9, the Navyversion of the McDonnell Douglas C-9twin-jet airliner. Eleven reserve fleetlogistics support squadrons make up thecomplement of the Fleet LogisticsSupport Wing, based at NAS NewOrleans, La. In addition to the VRs, twofleet composite squadrons (VCs), flyingA-4 Skyhawks, supply adversarialresources to various Navy squadrons.

The VRs proved invaluable during thehectic October 1983 actions in Grenadaand Lebanon which necessitated usingC-9s from Norfolk-based VR-56. InGrenada, VR-56 C-9s landed at PointSaline Airfield carrying the invasion forcecommander, Rear Admiral JosephMetcalf, and his staff to the staging area.With another aircraft from VR-58, NASJacksonville, VR-56 flew the staff intothe Cuban-built airfield at night andwere, thus, the first fixed-wing aircraft to

land at Point Saline during the Grenadaoperation. VR-58 crews also flew theCuban prisoners captured during theinvasion of Grenada to Mexico to beeventually repatriated.

Only a few days after the Grenadaconflict, VR-56 was again called on totransport wounded Marine survivorshome from the bombing of their barracksin Beirut, Lebanon. With this impressiverecord of accomplishment during 1983, itwas not surprising that VR-56 won theNoel Davis Trophy with Battle E for 1983.

Thus, as the U.S. Naval Air Reservebegins its eighth decade of organizedservice, and enters the last half of the1980s, there are signs that it is finallywithin reach of attaining its goal ofcomparab i l i t y to the f l ee t , bo thadministratively and operationally.

The Naval Reserve is even part ofspace exploration. On October 1, 1983,the Nava l Space Command wasestablished at Dahlgren, Va., long the siteo f N a v y - s p o n s o r e d t e s t i n g a n devaluation. The new command wascreated to support the Navy’s role in theongoing national space programs. Areserve component was then created,headed by Captain S. David Griggs,

USNR-R. U.S. Naval Reserve Naval SpaceCommand 0166, formed in January 1985at Dahlgren, supports the parentcommand. Captain Griggs is an astronautwho flew in the space shuttle Discovery,mission 51D, April 12-19, 1985.

With the continuing introduction off leet-comparable equipment, andrequirements to use the new aircraft inexercises and surveillance programs, theNaval Air Reserve is much different fromits earlier counterparts. The traditionalpublic image of the Air Reserve as a flyingclub for airline pilots is changing. Thosepeople involved direct ly wi th thesquadrons have always known the truth.With six air wings, supporting facilitiesand thousands of personnel, the NavalAir Reserve is a major part of the overallNavy strength. Rear Admiral Tommie F.Rinard, Commander, Naval Air ReserveForce, summed it up when he wrote:

“Never has the readiness of the NavalAir Reserve Force been at a higher level.From the pilot who is training in the F/A-18 to the yeoman at a Naval Air ReserveCenter, the Selected Reservist...is bettertrained and more professional than atany time in the history of the Naval AirReserve.” n

The C-9B Skytrain II transport supports the logistics requirements of reserve and fleet squadrons.

edited by commander peter mersky, usnr-r - nhhc by commander peter mersky, usnr-r designed by...

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