-mail, SMS, video-conferencing, and other tech-nologies continue to link nations and peoplesacross the world, placing humanity at thegateway of a networked world, where we are

divided by geography and united by technology. Thesedevelopments in science and technology bear testi-mony to the greatness of humankind. However, thisgreatness stands in stark contrast to our ability tounderstand, respect, tolerate and live with oneanother. The war on Iraq was witness to our ability toconstruct the most sophisticated weapons to destroyeach other, yet we have failed to develop the ability toresolve conflicts peacefully. Religion, race, ethnicityand other forms of identity continue to divide nationsand peoples. Our response to contemporary conflictsis no longer innovative and creative. We are increas-ingly coming to rely on force as a way in which toresolve conflicts.

The year 2003 will certainly find its way into thehistory books of humanity as one of those years inwhich a newly evolving world order started to beshaped. The doctrine of regime change, as a form ofconflict management, became a reality in the first halfof this year. By the time we exit this year the character-istics of the doctrine of regime change will be severelychallenged. Those of us whose job it is to engage inconflict management as a profession, will have newquestions to focus on and new answers to seek. Will werise to the challenge of providing answers and solu-tions to the new paradigm we confront, or will we becrisis managing another tumultuous year or, worsestill, will we be paralysed into inaction?

We cannot afford to slumber into inaction norcan we afford to crisis manage. 2004 will prove to be a

very difficult year for international relations. We canexpect that, as power relations begin to evolve andreshape, that new alliances and partnerships will form,which will both unite the world and polarise it. Ourchallenge, as conflict management practitioners, will beto find ways of strengthening the uniting strands of ourrelationships and managing to peacefully transformthe dividing strands. We have to foster relationshipsthat recognise and respect the differences we have andto find and develop issues that will unite us. We oughtnot to be idealistic but we must not abandon ouridealism of creating a more peaceful world. We mustembrace the world of realpolitik and use our idealismto continuously shape this world order.

Africa in 2003 is an example of idealism andrealpolitik at work. Our quest for a more stable andpeaceful Africa drove our resolve to forge peace agree-ments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi,Liberia, and Sudan. However, all these agreements arebased on the realities of what constitutes self andnational interest in the context of the complex maze ofinterests that characterise these conflicts. A key featureof conflict management in Africa has been the growingsolutions that have been African driven.

The statement, “African solutions for AfricanChallenges” continues to define conflict managementin Africa. There is no doubt that Africa will continue totake responsibility for her challenges in 2004. However,together with this responsibility will come the need tofind innovative and creative ways to move beyond peaceagreements to peace consolidation. This will requirethat peace becomes the business of not just the Africanleadership but of all African people. It will also meanthat the African leadership will have to embrace, aspartners, other sectors of society, so that we form truepartnerships for peace.

As Africans we will also have to embrace peoplefrom other continents who have the will and resourcesto assist us in resolving our challenges. In a spirit ofsharing we, as Africans, must also lend our support,expertise and resources to help resolve conflicts in other parts of the world. It is only through taking co-responsibility for the problems of the world, byrecognising that we all have a role to play and byrespecting that individual role, that we can collectivelylive out our idealism for a truly peaceful world.

On behalf of the Trustees and staff of ACCORD, I wish you a peaceful 2004.

2

EDITORIAL B Y VA S U G O U N D E N

E

Vasu Gounden is Executive Director of ACCORD.

Introduction

The year 2003 was somewhat symbolic for Burundiin two different but related ways. From apessimistic point of view, 2003 marked a decade ofwar and civil strife in a country that has experi-enced a vicious circle of violence and instability.From an optimistic point of view, the same periodalso contains various attempts and many initiativesto find peace in Burundi. Therefore, the year 2003has symbolised for Burundi one of the key anec-dotes and paradoxes of most African states:attempts to bring about peace and stability existside by side with and are often marred by condi-tions that still breed conflict and crisis. In such asituation, the focus has tended to be more on thefailures to bring about peace than on a genuineappreciation of concerted efforts to end the war.

Indeed, a sneak preview of the year 2003 indi-cates that it marked the continuation of a politicaltrend that has so characterised the Burundi situa-tion, where prospects for stability and peace aremingled with pessimistic attitudes as a result of the war; where efforts to arrive at a cessation of

hostilities among different actors meet up with thechallenges of mediating peace in a protracted socialconflict. This short review highlights some of thekey attempts undertaken in 2003 to move to a situ-ation in which peace and stability are not onlyobtained but sustained.

Slippery Road to a Cease-fire

The year 2002 ended positively with the signing ofa cease-fire agreement in December between theTransitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) andthe faction of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence ofDemocracy (CNDD–FDD) armed oppositionmovement led by Pierre Nkurunziza. Two monthsearlier, a cease-fire agreement had been reachedwith the other factions of the CNDD–FDD rebelmovements led by Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiyeand the National Forces for Liberation (FNL) led byAlain Mugabarabona. At the time, these positiveoutcomes mean that the other faction of the FNLfaction led by Agathon Rwasa was the only non-signatory to a cease-fire agreement with the TGoB.

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highlights of a ‘thorny’ road to peace?

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The cease-fire agreement with the CNDD–FDDof Nkurunziza was meant to come into effect on 30 December 2002. But the agreement containedpolitical and military components, and the latterbecame the subject of disagreement between themovement and the TGoB. The military chaptersought to address a programme on disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration of combatants.

However, it soon emerged thatno consensus could be reachedon the implementation of thataspect and this resulted in afailure to adhere to the end ofDecember deadline.

Despite these challenges,the conclusion of the cease-fireagreements with the othermovements paved the way forthe establishment of an AfricanMission in Burundi (AMIB).Accordingly, at the beginning of2003, Ethiopia, Mozambiqueand South Africa (which hadalready dispatched 700 soldiers

to Burundi to provide protection to returned polit-ical leaders) agreed to deploy troops to verify theimplementation of the cease-fire agreement. Whileappreciating the efforts and commitments shown by

4

“The FNL faction of Rwasa

remained completely

outside the process,

claiming that to deal with

the real problem, one

should talk with the ruling

Tutsi minority and not with

the transitional government”

the African states to support thecease-fire process in Burundi, it isstill necessary to note the chal-lenges that are connected todeploying a mission without aclear consensus on the implemen-tation of the cease-fire agreement.

Given the challenges withconcluding the agreementsbetween the TGoB and the CNDD–FDD of PierreNkurunziza, the search for peacein 2003, therefore, mainlyconsisted of efforts to bring thisfaction into the process.

An Inclusive Cease-fire Process?

In mid-January, the South AfricaDeputy-President, Jacob Zuma,in his capacity as the facilitator of

the cease-fire talks in Burundi, met withNkurunziza’s CNDD–FDD to further discuss theissues around the delayed implementation of thecease-fire agreement. The opportunity was alsotaken to meet with the other two leaders who hadalready concluded agreements with the TGoB.These meetings culminated in talks in Pretoria,between Burundian President Buyoya and the threerebel leaders – Ndayikengurukiye, Mugabarabonaand Nkurunziza. These talks focused on issuesrelating to the participation of these movements inthe transitional government, the return of formercombatants and leadership to Burundi, as well assecurity sector reform. On the other hand, the FNLfaction of Rwasa remained completely outside theprocess, claiming that to deal with the realproblem, one should talk with the ruling Tutsiminority and not with the transitional government.

The Pretoria talks yielded some positive results,with the signing of a Memorandum of Under-standing on 27 January between President Buyoyaand the CNDD–FDD of Jean Bosco and the FNL ofMugabarabona respectively. One of the key pointscovered by the January MoU was a permanentsuspension of hostilities and the cessation of allother forms of violence. In addition, it was agreedthat a joint cease-fire commission would be estab-lished and that the two leaders would return from

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exile on 10 February.1

Further attempts to include the other factionsin the process produced an MoU between PresidentBuyoya and Nkurunziza, covering the implementa-tion of the cease-fire agreement signed in December2002. Subsequently, a meeting was held between theDefence and Security Technical Commissions of theTGoB and the CNDD–FDD in Dar es Salaam.However, owing to the parties’ inability to reachconsensus on the implementation of the cease-fire,talks were officially suspended.

This setback was soon forgotten in March,when a two-day regional summit in Dar es Salaamended with the issuing of a joint communiquébetween the Burundian government andNkurunziza’s CNDD–FDD. The summit wasattended by the Presidents of Uganda andTanzania, the Vice-President of South Africa andthe President of Burundi ,and was aimed at contin-uing the cease-fire implementation talks. The keyoutcome of this summit was an understandingthat government positions would be shared, inaccordance with the Arusha Agreement, and thatall affected political players would be accordedprovisional immunity.

Following the positive outcome of this summit,AMIB received financial support to the tune of US$ 1.34 million from the European Commissionin March and soon thereafter the TGoB signed anagreement with the African Union (AU) regardingthe deployment of AMIB.2 As planned, SouthAfrican, Ethiopian and Mozambican troops were tobe deployed in Burundi with a mandate of super-vising, observing, monitoring and verifying theimplementation of the cease-fire agreement.

Changing of the Guard

In May 2003, the world witnessed the passing of thebaton of leadership from Former President PierreBuyoya to Vice-President Domitien Ndayizeye. Thiswas consistent with an understanding reachedduring the inauguration of the transitional govern-ment in November 2001. Despite numerous specu-lations prior to this change of leadership aboutwhether it would happen or not, the fact that theprocess that was started in Arusha managed toprogress that far sent a signal that Burundi wasslowly en route to peace. Immediately after hisinauguration, President Ndayizeye visited the

Presidents of Uganda and Tanzania to discuss thepolitical and security situation in Burundi andfurther initiatives that could be undertaken tosupport the cease-fire efforts.

The new President also held talks with armychiefs to consolidate views on how to run thecountry during the last 18 months of the transi-tional period. The aim was to make sure that,despite the change in leadership and the currentsituation in the country, all parties would worktowards the same goal.

Moreover, for the first time, talks were heldbetween government officials and the Rwasa factionof the FNL movement in June 2003, in Switzerland.The government delegation was led by formerMinister for Peace, Ambroise Niyonsaba, while theFNL delegation was representedby its vice president, Jean BoscoSindayigaya. These talks couldbe regarded as a confidence-building mechanism as theysought to establish contacts forfurther and more in-depth talksat a later stage.

Later that month, theCNDD–FDD of Nkurunzizaheld further talks with theTanzanian facilitators in Dar es Salaam. These talkswere followed by meetings with the TGoB officialsin Dar es Salaam, which were inconclusive due todisagreements on issues regarding the disarma-ment and reintegration of the ex-combatants. Inthe aftermath of these botched talks, intenseclashes were reported in the province of Kayanza, innorthern Burundi, which were said to have involvedthe CNDD–FDD of Nkurunziza.3

That all attempts to reach a cease-fire agree-ment had thus far failed to yield a positive resultbecame obvious when the capital, Bujumbura, wasshelled in early July by both Rwasa’s FNL andNkurunziza’s CNDD–FDD. The city remainedunder attack for four days. Almost at once, Deputy-President Zuma indicated his willingness to talkwith Rwasa’s FNL during a visit to the Great Lakesregion. During this visit, Deputy-President Zumaannounced that a regional summit was to takeplace in Dar es Salaam on 21 July to resume cease-fire talks with Nkurunziza’s CNDD–FDD. Thesummit was attended by the Presidents of Uganda,Tanzania and Burundi, and focused on the vexed

5

“One of the key points

covered by the January

MoU was a permanent

suspension of hostilities and

the cessation of all other

forms of violence”

PEACEMAKING

issue of power-sharing in Burundi and the ForcesTechnical Agreement. At the end of the summit,the CNDD–FDD reiterated its commitment to the peace process in Burundi. The movementfurther stated that cantonment of their combat-ants would commence immediately and that itsmembers would participate in the Joint Cease-fireCommission.

Follow-up talks between the TGoB and theCNDD–FDD took place as scheduled in Dar es

Salaam on 4 and 5 August.While the meeting could againnot come up with a concreteagreement, Deputy-PresidentZuma as facilitator was never-theless positive and indicatedthat he would discuss theproposals of both parties withUgandan President Museveni.Subsequent to this summit,the CNDD–FDD delegation

visited Burundi to discuss security and logisticalissues with representatives of AMIB.

To maintain the momentum, further talks wereheld in August in South Africa between PresidentNdayizeye and Nkurunziza, facilitated by Deputy-President Zuma. The talks were a continuation ofthe Tanzania summit, as the parties discussedissues regarding positions in the transitionalgovernment and the reform of the BurundianArmed Forces. However, the talks were again

adjourned with the view that issues wouldbe finalised during the regional summitscheduled for September in Tanzania.

This summit included the Presidents ofMozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, SouthAfrica and Burundi. The summit was,however, deadlocked, with the governmentdelegation refusing to give in to thedemands of the CNDD–FDD: the latterwanted 40 per cent of the national armycomprising its forces and to hold the posi-tion of Speaker of the National Assembly.The parties nevertheless agreed to continuetalks on 6 October in Pretoria.

Consequently, on 8 October, the partiessigned an agreement on the implementationof the cease-fire agreement, known as thePretoria Protocol on Political, Defense andSecurity Power Sharing in Burundi. With

regard to the military, the parties agreed that theCNDD–FDD would get 40 per cent of the integratedgeneral staff and the officer corps of the nationalBurundian army. In addition, 35 per cent of thegeneral staff of the new national police force wouldbe made up of CNDD–FDD members. The politicalaspect of the protocol stated that the CNDD–FDDwould hold four ministerial positions, includingthat of Minister of State. The final agreement wassigned during the regional summit, which was heldin Tanzania, almost one year after the first agree-ment was concluded with the CNDD–FDD of PierreNkurunziza in December 2002.

This positive outcome resulted in a nation-widecampaign, organised by the ministry charged withmobilisation for peace and national reconciliation,to inform people at all levels about the latest signedpower-sharing agreement. The power-sharing dealbecame even more official when the BurundianParliament approved the protocol, which allowedPresident Ndayizeye to start its implementation.

If the events of 2003 are anything to go by, itwould be accurate to state that the road ahead inBurundi will be a difficult ride. It will still be marredby challenges associated with mediating peace in apolitically volatile situation. The successes scoredthus far, however, should be able to galvanise moresupport from across the continent and internationalcommunity for peace in Burundi.

It should be noted, however, that the gainsmade thus far in Burundi have certainly come at a

6

“If the events of 2003 are

anything to go by, it would

be accurate to state that

the road ahead in Burundi

will be a difficult ride”

AFP

PEACEMAKING

price. Therefore, any attempt to appraise thecurrent situation in the country should note thatthe facilitation process in Burundi has always been,and perhaps more so in 2003, undertaken underhostile conditions, where the possibilities of a slideback to hostilities and full-scale war far outweighedthose of securing peace. These achievements shouldalso lead to a focus on other pressing issues, whichgo beyond signing of agreements.

The first of these is ensuring that the agreementsare indeed observed. This task should involve all keystakeholders, primarily those charged with theresponsibility of bringing about peace in Burundi,including the AMIB, the United Nations Office inBurundi (UNOB) and the international and donorcommunity. There is a need to show support to thecurrent progress made in Burundi through clearlydefined commitments to the necessary financialsupport for the country’s reconstruction and rehabil-itation of its infrastructure.

This support from the international communitywill also enable the TGoB to meet its commitments,such as the resettlement of internally displacedpeople, as well as the challenges posed by refugeesreturning to the country. In other words, the mostimportant commitment that such actors can showtowards Burundi is to ensure that the implementa-tion of Chapter IV of the Arusha Agreement isrealised. Arguably, more than ever before, thecurrent political conditions in Burundi requireconcerted efforts, effective co-ordination, and aproper delineation of tasks to prevent duplication ofactivities in order to ensure that these combinedefforts yield the desired results.

Furthermore, there are two relevant issues at thelevel of the cease-fire. First, it is necessary to ensurethat all three factions of the armed opposition that inthe recent past have concluded agreements with theTGoB remain within the process. In this regard, it is

imperative that all the factions continue to beconsulted on key issues and attempts are made toaddress any of their concerns to ensure that they donot find illegitimate excuses to frustrate the gainsthat have been made. There is also a need to ensurethat the attempts which have been previously under-taken, and those that are currently underway to bringon board the remaining faction of the FNL, continueand receive the necessary support.

Another task which would positively contributeto maintaining momentum in Burundi is to devise

strategies aimed at creating platforms for all stake-holders in Burundi to air their views and thereby feelpart of the process. The rationale is that ‘feelings ofexclusion’ from the process should be dealt with. Tobe sure, there has hardly been any peace process inhistory that has managed to include, let alone carryout, all the interests, positions and fears of all theplayers. Therefore, if there are sectors that feelmarginalised, it has to be borne in mind that this isnot unique to Burundi. That being said, however,there are possibilities at this stage of the peaceprocess that the fears and interests of most players,especially the local actors, can still be catered for.

In this regard, platforms for dialogue need to becreated to ensure that the voices of various forma-tions, such as youth structures, women’s organisa-tions and the media, are heard in Burundi. It isimportant to understand, for instance, the extent towhich the media shapes perceptions and themanner in which the people of Burundi respond toand appreciate the progress of the process thus far.

In Place of a Conclusion

The fact that the year 2003 marked ten long years ofprotracted conflict in Burundi should serve as areminder to all that peace is elusive, and that this factis well understood by the people of Burundi, who havebeen at the receiving end of this long and nightmarishperiod. In reminding ourselves of this fact and notingthe progress achieved in 2003 in pursuit of peace inBurundi, it is worth stating that “peace remains theeternal ideal, the goal for which even wars are fought.It is better to achieve peace by making and keeping itthan by seeking it through war”.4

Senzo Ngubane is Senior Researcher and Co-ordinator ofthe ACCORD Burundi Programme.

Endnotes

1 G Mfuranzima, ‘Burundi: Between war and peace’, 2003,http://users.peacelink.it/anb-bia/nr450/e04.html.

2 IRIN, ‘Burundi: EC to launch ceasefire observer mission’, 5 March 2003, www.irinnews.org.

3 IRIN, ‘Burundi: Rebel group steps up attacks’, 17 June 2003,www.irinnews.org.

4 William Zartman, ‘Challenges in the New World Order and thePlace for the Old’, in William I. Zartman (ed.), Traditional Curesto Modern Conflicts, London: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

7

8

Introduction

The Machakos Protocol, signed under the auspicesof the Inter-Governmental Authority onDevelopment (IGAD) in August 2002 remains themost promising peace initiative yet in the Sudan.Earlier peace attempts, including the 1947 JubaConference, 1956 Roundtable Conference, 1972Addis Ababa Agreement, and the Abuja I and AbujaII talks (immediately preceding the IGAD peaceprocess in 1993), among several other bilateral andmultilateral attempts, have not succeeded in gettingthe parties to confront the core issues or guaran-teeing the fulfilment of agreements.

At the core of the problem is the inherent diffi-culty in resolving identity-based conflicts, preciselybecause such conflicts touch not only on tangibleand negotiable issues (power-sharing, wealth-sharing, representation modalities and so on) butmore importantly, the intangible ones (rooted inmore abstract and interpretative dynamics of

history, psychology, culture, values and identity),which are much more difficult to negotiate orcompromise.2 The resolution of such conflictsdepends on how the two aspects, the tangible andintangible, are balanced and reconciled. In Sudan,the conflict hinges around two competing culturaloutlooks: a dominant Arab-Islamic identity in thenorth; which offers an Arab Islamic model as a solu-tion to the national question, and a dominantAfrican cultural identity in the south, which offersa secular democratic model, based on a flexible andpluralistic formula of unity in diversity, as acounter-solution. Since independence, the succes-sive ruling elites in the north have fashioned theentire national framework along the Arab-Islamicmodel, which the south has resisted, on thegrounds that it has excluded other national diversi-ties, which make up the multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious mosaic of the Sudan.

B Y PA U L N A N T U LYA 1PEACEMAKINGA

FP

The Machakos Protocol and prospects for peace in

9

The evolution of separate and competingnational identities in Sudan has its roots in fourreinforcing historical aspects:3

▲ The cultural Arabisation and Islamisation of thenorth and resistance to those forces in the southsince the advent of Islam in Sudan in the 7thcentury;

▲ Southern resistance to slave raids into the south,from the 7th century to the 1855 Turkish–Egyptian invasion;

▲ A colonial policy of investing more in the cultural,economic, infrastructural and social developmentof the north, along Arab-Islamic lines, and the‘development’ of the south along so-called indige-nous African lines, and discouraging contactbetween the north and south;

▲ A post-colonial state whose policy framework isfashioned along an Arab-Islamic modality at thepolitical, social and economic levels.

This laid the foundations for the structural margin-alisation of national groups that do not identifywith the dominant Arab-Islamic model. The dispar-ities based on identity were entrenched in the publicpolicy process, which made the conflict even more

complex, and undermined the quest for building anational commonality with which all Sudanesecould identify.

In essence, therefore, what we are dealing within the Sudan are two entities, one that is economi-cally, politically and socially more empowered, andwhich professes an Arab Islamic identity, andanother which is economically, politically andculturally disempowered and marginalised, andwhich professes an African cultural identity basedon African nationalism and pan-Africanism.4 Thebenchmarks for any peace process would thereforehave to deal with the challenges of:

▲ Revisiting the existing national framework; ▲ Re-structuring the public policy process to

make it more nationally inclusive; ▲ Revisiting the existing political and economic

systems; ▲ Creating mechanisms for parity redress and

equal participation; ▲ Committing the parties to a shared settlement.

These benchmarks have eluded all peacemakingefforts since 1947, with the exception of the IGADpeace initiative, which, if successful, could create a

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realistic basis for a comprehensive and justsettlement.

The Machakos Peace Protocol andKey Issues in the Negotiations

So far, the comparative success of the IGAD peaceprocess lies in the fact that it has redefined theconflict as one that is rooted in a clash of nationalidentities. It also offers an alternative nationalframework and promises more profound changes inthe structure and character of the Sudanese state.

From its inception in 1993, theideological starting point ofIGAD’s various principles andprotocols, (which are based onthe Declaration of BasicPrinciples, or DOP), has beenthat the Sudan is a multi-racial,multi-religious, multi-cultural,multi-ethnic society, whosediversities must be reflected inthe national framework. TheDOP, and other protocolsflowing from it (including the

current Machakos Protocol), challenge the existingnational identification framework by providing thata secular and democratic state must be establishedin Sudan and that religion and state will be separate.No other prior peace initiative has been this boldand far-reaching, but problems remain.

Separating Religion from State

In the current negotiations, the issue of separatingreligion from state has been one of the most difficulthurdles. The government of Sudan has traditionallybeen ideologically committed to building a societyalong Islamic tenets. The Sudan People’s LiberationMovement (SPLM), and other liberation movementsbefore it, on the other hand, have rejected this notion in all negotiations. Despite the fact that thegovernment eventually accepted the DOP as a basisfor negotiations, two years after the SPLM/SPLAendorsed them, it has been unwilling to compromiseon this basic principle.

In the negotiating sessions held in July andAugust 2002 in Machakos, Kenya, however, theSPLM/SPLA made concessions by accepting a draftframework agreement which did not make anyexplicit reference to separating state from religion.

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PEACEMAKING

The provisions of the Agreed Text on Religionand State provide for:5

▲ Freedom of worship and belief; ▲ No discrimination on the basis of religion; ▲ Eligibility for public office based on citizenship

and not religion ▲ Observance of religious public holidays and

days accorded to all religious communities; ▲ Observance of religious laws confined to the

personal or family realm.

For its part, the government of Sudan acceptedthese principles, mainly because they are silent onexplicitly separating religion from state.

Second, the agreed text on self-determinationprovides that national legislation with respect tostates outside southern Sudan shall have shari’ah(Islamic law) as the source of legislation. Effectively,therefore, northern Sudan will retain its Islamic char-acter, while the south will remain secular. While thismight appear to be a realistic compromise given thestated positions of both parties, there are practicalissues which could complicate its implementation.First, there is the question of what law will be appliedto southerners living in the north, and second, it isnot clear whether the creation of parallel legal systemsto cater for minorities in the north and south is practically possible. These are issues which, given thesensitivities involved, could create future conflictsduring the transition.

In the sessions held in January, July andSeptember 2003, the issue of separating religion andstate resurfaced in the discussions on the status ofthe national capital. The government maintainedthat Khartoum needed to be retained as the nationalcapital and that it would remain Islamic. TheSPLM/SPLA, on the other hand, proposed that thenational capital needed to be secular, and accessibleto all religions, in the spirit of the peace process. Thegovernment refused to compromise on this issue.The SPLM/SPLA then proposed that a secularenclave be created in Khartoum, but the governmentrejected that too. The issue remains unresolved, anddemonstrates just how far apart the parties stillremain on the issue of religion and state, despite thefact that the issue appears to have been resolved bythe agreed text.

For its part, the SPLM/SPLA’s acceptance of the agreed text marks a significant shift from its

”The comparative success

of the IGAD peace

process lies in the fact

that it has redefined the

conflict as one that is

rooted in a clash of

national identities”

11

PEACEMAKING

ideological thinking, which argues that simplyallowing autonomy for the south and exempting itfrom the laws of the north will be counter-produc-tive, as long as the broader national identificationframework is left intact. This, in their view, is thekey factor which led to the collapse of the 1972Addis Ababa Agreement and which could lead tofurther conflict in future.

Power- and Wealth-SharingArrangements

Comparatively speaking, the IGAD peace processhas made far-reaching proposals on how power andwealth will be shared in Sudan. The starting pointof the DOP was that Sudan belonged to all wholived in it, and that the sharing of power and wealththerefore needed to be exercised in a manner thatwas inclusive and reflective of all national groupsand diversities that constitute the Sudan. Thiscardinal principle is reflected in the agreed texts ofthe Machakos Protocol signed in August 2002.

The protocol provides for the right of the peopleof southern Sudan to participate fully in the polit-ical and economic governance of their region, as wellas the national level, as well as offering a solutionthat enhances social, political and economic justice,which respects the fundamental human and polit-ical rights of all the Sudanese people. This rights-based approach to power- and wealth-sharing isinformed by the sensitivity of the IGAD DOP to theneed for justice, parity and redress in Sudan. It isbased on an understanding that it is only throughjustice and rights that the historical emasculationand marginalisation of the south and other areascan be overcome. Although both parties accept thata new framework for sharing power and wealth willconstitute an important part of a future agreement,there are significant differences and difficulties. Onthe issue of sharing wealth, the position of thegovernment of Sudan is that land belongs to thestate, whereas the SPLM/SPLA insists that it belongsto the community and that each community mustparticipate in the processes which will determinehow the wealth of their land will be allocated. Thegovernment sees this as an attempt by the SPLM toundermine it, since most of the strategic resourcesare located in the south. This suspicion on the partof the government is further reinforced by the factthat the Machakos Protocol provides for self-deter-mination for the people of southern Sudan. The

government of Sudan has traditionally viewed self-determination as nothing more than an excusefor the south to break away from the rest of thecountry, thereby denying them control over naturalresources, including oil. This is one of the reasonswhy the government initially favoured anEgyptian–Libyan initiative, which did not makespecific reference to self-determination of the south.

This basic ideological difference has beenreflected in the discussions on specific percentagesand modalities for sharing national wealth as well.In the session held in January 2003, for instance, theSPLM/SPLA proposed that 60 per cent of the oilrevenues should be reserved for the south. Thegovernment rejected this and counter-proposedthat the south should take only 10 per cent Themediators attempted to narrow their differences byproposing a system of resource allocation based on:

▲ Developmental needs, ▲ Rehabilitation priorities; ▲ Joint decision-making through an inter-party

and inter-regional financial mechanism andregulatory body.

Another source of disagreement was the bankingsystem. Towards the end of 2002, the SPLM/SPLAintroduced an alternative currency in the areasunder its control, insisting that the nationalbanking system was based onIslamic laws, which are incon-sistent with the cultural attrib-utes of the south. The partiesremain divided on these issues.

In the area of power-sharing, significant differencesalso remain. In the January2003 session, the SPLM/SPLAinitially proposed to have arotating presidency during thetransitional period, along thelines of the Burundi peace process. The governmentrejected this proposal, insisting that it could inter-rupt the functional coherence of the state duringthe transition. The SPLM/SPLA then proposed thecreation of the post of an executive vice presidentwith real decision-making powers. The governmentinitially accepted the proposal, but then rejected iton the grounds that the SPLM/SPLA could takeover the national government in the event that the

“It is only through justice

and rights that the

historical emasculation

and marginalisation of

the south and other areas

can be overcome”

12

PEACEMAKING

state president died or became incapacitated. Themediators then offered a compromise solution,with several vice presidents, but reserving the posi-tion of first vice president with genuine powers forthe SPLM/SPLA. The parties are still negotiatingthis specific proposal.

The next significant disagreement was on thepercentage of representation in the organs of state.In the July 2003 session, the SPLM/SPLA proposed

that the south should have 40 per cent representation inthe Lower Chamber and 50 percent in the Upper House. Thegovernment rejected thisproposal on the grounds thatthe southerners were aminority in the Sudan andcould not therefore be entitledto 50 per cent representation inthe Upper House. The SPLM/SPLA, however, insisted that itwas not true that the south-erners were a minority in the

country, and pointed out that it was the ruling classin the north that constituted the minority inSudan. The south’s minority status, they argued,came about due to their historical marginalisationin matters of public life. The next disagreement wason the percentage of representation in the executive

and judicial arms of thenational government.The SPLM/SPLA teamagain proposed 40 percent representation forthe south, while thegovernment offered acounter-proposal of 10 per cent. The issueremains unresolved,although the mediatorshave now offered acompromise solution of 33 per cent for theSPLM/SPLA.

In the final analysis,no specific agreementshave been reached onthese matters but whatis important to note isthat on all these issues,

the parties are being guided by fundamentallyopposed ideological and philosophical outlooksabout how society in Sudan should be managed.This qualification is important because it is alwaysthe case that disagreements over power- and wealth-sharing are dismissively attributed to the personalambitions and self-serving interests of conflictingparties. Fundamentally, however, one of the distin-guishing characteristics of the Sudan case is thatthe parties are deeply divided on core ideological,cultural and philosophical issues, which go beyondpersonal ambitions. Unlike negotiations in otherconflicts, therefore, power- and wealth-sharing arenecessary but not sufficient conditions that willlead to the resolution of the conflict in Sudan.

The Three Marginalised Areas of Abyei,Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile

The question of Abyei, Nuba Mountains andSouthern Blue Nile has been one of the most diffi-cult issues since the start of the IGAD peace processin 1993. The three areas, although part of the northsince independence, are ethnically and linguisticallypart of the south and have participated in successivesouthern-based liberation movements, includingthe SPLM/SPLA. In the talks in Karen, Kenya, heldin July 2003, the position of the SPLM/SPLA wasthat the people in the Nuba Mountains, andSouthern Blue Nile were part and parcel of

“One of the distinguishing

characteristics of the Sudan

case is that the parties are

deeply divided on core

ideological, cultural and

philosophical issues, which go

beyond personal ambitions”

AFP

PEACEMAKING

13

Southern Sudan, and therefore had a right toparticipate in the referendum that will be held atthe end of the six-year transitional period. Theirposition on Abyei was that it should be returned tothe southern province of Bahr el Ghazal.

The referendum will give the southerners a rightto vote either for the unity of the country, or forseparation. Owing to the strategic significance ofthe three areas in relation to natural resources(including oil in Abyei), the government is notprepared to risk losing them in a referendum. Ittherefore maintains that the three regions are partof the northern administration according to the1956 colonial boundaries and must remain so.

In the October 2003 session of the negotiations,representatives from the government of Sudan andthe three areas presented position papers. TheSPLM/SPLA proposed that, during the interimperiod, the Nuba Mountains and Southern BlueNile would be governed under SPLM/SPLA control,and accorded autonomy within a decentralisedgovernment of southern Sudan. Both regionswould draft their own constitutions and be allowedtheir own security organs, police, civil service, judiciary and legislature. The SPLM/SPLA teamalso proposed that a land commission be set up tooversee land disputes, restitution and compensa-tion. The regions would also have to be awardedresources for reconstruction and rehabilitation toensure that they were on the same footing as otherregions owing to their historical marginalisation.

On the question of Abyei, the SPLM/SPLAproposed that the government restore the area toBahr el Ghazal by presidential decree, failing which,it should also be granted the right to participate inthe referendum. For its part, the governmentinsisted on keeping the areas as part of northernSudan, while accommodating the concerns of theSPLM/SPLA by providing the regions with specialresources to overcome their underdevelopment and neglect. The SPLM/SPLA has rejected this, andmaintained its earlier positions. The parties there-fore remain divided on the issue.

Whatever the outcome of the ongoing negotia-tions, these areas are bound to play a critical role infuture North-South relations. Their geographicalposition along the North-South borderline makeseach of the three areas a microcosm of the widerconflict of nationalist visions in Sudan. If the feelings of nationalism, self-identification and

cultural preservation among the northerners andsoutherners are strong in the rest of the country,they are even stronger in Abyei, Nuba Mountainsand Southern Blue Nile.6 The civil war, which haslargely, but not exclusively, been waged along anorth–south dichotomy, has turned these areas(which at one time achievedreconciliation and peacefulcultural co-existence) into flash-points of violent confrontation.The constant raids conductedby local Arab militia groups inAbyei, for instance, have beenwell documented by interna-tional humanitarian agencies.

The three regions can there-fore either serve as culturalmelting pots, where the distinctidentities can interact andmutually reinforce each other,or as loci of violent conflict, inwhich those identities continueto compete for self preservation. Whatever the case,the challenge for mutual co-existence cannot beavoided.

Conclusion

As has been shown, the parties remain divided onthree main issues: power- and wealth-sharing, statusof the national capital, and the future status of themarginalised areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains andSouthern Blue Nile. Both parties have made conces-sions, key to which has been the sensitive issue ofseparating religion from the state. However, thecompromises reflected in the agreed texts of theMachakos Protocol are ambiguous and create roomfor misinterpretation and problems of practicalimplementation. This could ignite future conflicts,particularly since the issue of religion and state isfundamentally linked to the national identificationframework over which both parties have contrastingvisions. Indeed, as the article has shown, the issueresurfaced in the discussions on the status of thenational capital, which once again showed just howfar apart the parties remain on this particular point.

Having pointed this out, it is also important tonote that the devil of all peace agreements is to befound in the detail. This might be one of thereasons why the mediators have changed their

“If the feelings of nation-

alism, self-identification

and cultural preservation

among the northerners and

southerners are strong in

the rest of the country, they

are even stronger in Abyei,

Nuba Mountains and

Southern Blue Nile”

14

strategy from securing specific agreements on keydividing issues, to getting the parties to focus onthemes and principles. Given the complexitiesinvolved in the Sudan case, this strategy might bethe most pragmatic, if not realistic. To be sure, theparties in the Sudan conflict are fundamentallydivided on their visions on how the Sudanese stateand society should be conceived and managed.These differences are embedded in the dynamics ofculture, race and identity, which are rooted in thatcountry’s historical and contemporary experiences.The IGAD peace process has succeeded in recog-nising these inherent complexities despite the sensi-tivities involved. It has also been more courageousand far-reaching than previous initiatives byinsisting that the national framework needs to berevisited. The mediators and their advisors shouldalso be credited for at least having gotten the partiesto confront each other in a more structured andsustained process that has been modelled along aframework of mutual dialogue and interest basednegotiations, as opposed to positional negotiations,which characterised the initial stages of the IGADpeace process.

We can therefore safely argue that, in all proba-bility, a final agreement is likely to be signed in theshort term, but the daunting challenge ofconfronting the deeper issues, and reformulating anew and flexible formula for nation-building andnational cultural accommodation, will remain.

Paul Nantulya is Manager of the Constitutional Programmeand responsible for the Political Institutions Support Unitat ACCORD.

Endnotes

1 The author has extracted the themes in this paper from hisMaster’s dissertation, which looks at the dynamics of identifica-tion in the Sudan conflict.

2 Paul Nantulya, ‘Conflict Prevention: The Case of Sudan’, inHussein Solomon (ed.), Towards Sustainable Peace: Reflectionson Preventive Diplomacy in Africa, Pretoria: Africa Institute ofSouth Africa, 2003.

3 Francis M. Deng, Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Sudan,Durban: ACCORD, 1997, p 6.

4 Abdelwahab el Effendi, ‘Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmasfor Islam in Africa’, African Affairs, vol 89, July 1990, p 371.

5 Machakos Protocol: Agreed Text on Fundamental Issues: SudanGovernment and Sudan Peoples Liberation Army and Movement

6 Paul Nantulya, ‘Policy Commentary on the Ngok of AbyeiPeoples Conference’, Sudan Peace Fund, 2003.

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PEACEMAKING

15

t a workshop on ‘Conflicts and Peace-Building in Africa: The Role of the AfricanUnion and Civil Society’, that was held inTripoli, Libya, from 19 to 20 August 2003,

the immense potential wealth of Africa wasacknowledged. The question, however, arose: “Whyhas this incredibly rich continent remained a homefor so many poor people?”

The question was posed against the sad realitythat in Africa, 340 million people, or half the popu-lation, live on less than US$ 1 per day; and that themortality rate of children under five years of age is140 per 1 000, while average life expectancy at birthis only 54 years. The rate of illiteracy for peopleunder 15 years of age is over 40 per cent; and thereare only 18 fixed-line telephones per 1 000, peoplecompared with 146 for the world as a whole, and567 for the high-income countries.1

It is also to be noted that, as at the end of 2002,Africa alone accounted for 70 per cent of adults(aged 15–49) estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS,with Botswana (38.8%), Zimbabwe (33.7%),Swaziland (33.4%), Lesotho (31.0%) and Namibia(22.5%) at the top of the list of these countries.2 It isto be noted that the disease of HIV/AIDS not onlyconsumes a country’s labour force but also greatlyenhances poverty and creates fertile ground forconflict formation.

At the outset, there are three perceptions aboutAfrica’s poverty and under-development, togetherwith their concomitant aspect of conflict, that needto be grasped. First, that Africa’s potential wealthcontrasts so sharply with the continent’s appallinglevels of poverty appears to mean that for Africa,poverty is wealth turned upside down. What ismore, just as poverty can breed conflict, so too can

PEACEMAKINGB Y C H R I S B A K W E S E G H A

the emerging role of

A

AFP

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conflict cause poverty and thus more conflicts.Second, the resource base of the poor in Africa istheir labour, which we have failed to mobilise andutilise to create more wealth and avoid conflict.Third, Africa’s resource base is believed to be poten-tially more than it would take to eradicate povertyand reduce the tempo of conflict, but much of thisresource base is being wasted away in endless wars,

and their attendant aspects offorced migration or humandisplacement, including thebrain drain, all of which havemade Africa a donor to boththe developed and the rela-tively rich developing countriesin terms of a brain gain.3

Thus, to all intents andpurposes, the value of Africa’spotential wealth must beassessed against the conflagra-tion of violent conflicts andwars that have been ravaging

the continent from Algiers to Cape Town, and fromMogadishu to Bissau, while preying on the conti-nent’s wealth and plunging Africa into an abyss ofpoverty and pestilence. But what role have sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADCand IGAD been playing, or should they play, inAfrica’s quest for peace during 2003? And what arethe issues that need to be addressed in this area inthe course of 2004?

First of all, in this globalised world, peace isindivisible, and the process of ensuring comprehen-sive, sustainable and lasting peace calls for collec-tive responsibility among all peoples, nations andinstitutions. The present article focuses on theactivities of Africa’s sub-regional organisations inthe promotion of peace and security. But thisshould not be interpreted to mean that these sub-regional arrangements are the only entities that canfoster peace. Furthermore, by Chapter I, Article 1,of the United Nations Charter, the burden of main-taining peace world-wide rests with the UN.4 Butthere are so many conflicts in the world today that,notwithstanding its resources and cumulative expe-rience, to leave this responsibility solely to the UNwould be unrealistic.

At any rate, being visionary, the drafters of theUN Charter offered a proviso in Chapter VIII thatallows for the engagement of regional arrangements

as well as other agencies in the world’s quest forpeace, as long as “such arrangements and theiractivities are consistent with the Purposes andPrinciples of the United Nations”.5 Thus for themaintenance of peace and security in Africa, theideal situation would be that of performing thisduty through partnership between a well co-ordinatedcivil society and sub-regional organisations – allplaying centre stage, under the political leadershipand guidance of the African Union, with the activelogistical and financial support of the UN, inleague with the wider international community.Graphically, this arrangement would be akin to apyramid, with its apex representing the UN, a bodyrather remotely connected with the grass-rootspeople, followed by the African Union, a regionalbody not so distant from the ordinary Africancitizen, positioning itself in the middle of thepyramid, and with the bottom of the pyramidrepresenting both governments of member statesof sub-regional organisations and ordinary people.

African leaders have realised before that,following Africa’s political liberation through theOrganisation of African Unity (OAU), the conti-nent’s second mission would be that of economicliberation. They had, in fact, begun to set up sub-regional organisations such as the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS), theSouthern African development Community(SADC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority onDevelopment (IGAD), to act as engines for thepromotion of economic integration. However, asthe Cold War began to collapse towards the end ofthe 1980s, African leaders became more visionaryand began to realise that the pursuit of “bread andbutter issues” that they were going to launch couldnot take place in an ocean of political turmoil,conflict and wars. They thus resolved to set up aMechanism for Conflict Prevention, Managementand Resolution within the OAU, and gave it as itsprimary role the task of monitoring and preventingincipient conflict situations.

The OAU was tasked to redouble its efforts inthe area of peace and security in Africa, as a preludeto economic integration, for several reasons. First,as a regional body, it was relatively closer to thepeoples of Africa than the UN. Second, as a polit-ical organisation, the OAU had the political muscleto guide the operations of other internationalorganisations anywhere on the continent. Third, as

“The value of Africa’s

potential wealth must be

assessed against the

conflagration of violent

conflicts and wars that have

been ravaging the continent

from Algiers to Cape Town”

PEACEMAKING

17

a regional body, it had a greater interest in theaffairs of its ‘neighbourhood’ than any otherorganisation. It was, however, observed that, likethe UN, the OAU could not be everywhere on thecontinent to promote peace and security on itsown. Currently, because there are so many conflictson the continent, the AU has no direct presence insuch hot spots as Liberia, the eastern DRC,Somalia, the Sudan or Uganda.

Given this state of affairs, it became necessarythat sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS,SADC and IGAD, originally set up to promoteeconomic integration, should also embrace issues ofpeace and security and, together with civil society, actas the first port of call on peace and security matters.The reasons for this were as follows:

▲ First, unlike the UN and AU, sub-regionalorganisations and civil society were the closestentities to the theatres of conflict in Africa.This would enable them to have a deeper under-standing and more intimate knowledge of theissues behind the conflict, including the historyand culture of the populations concerned, theirsocio-economic conditions, and the actorsinvolved. However, their proximity to theatresof conflict could make some of them part ofthe problem, rather than part of the solution.

▲ Second, it was observed that Africa’s externalfriends were increasingly becoming less chari-table, particularly after the Somali debacle ofthe early 1990s.

▲ Third, grass-roots people and their govern-ments had to own the process of peace-buildingin Africa. Without such ownership, they couldnot defend the process.

▲ Fourth, member states of the sub-regionalorganisations together with civil society aremore interested in localising their ownconflicts since usually they are the first victimsof the consequences of those conflicts.

For all these reasons, ECOWAS, under thevanguard of Nigeria, has remained the backbone ofrestoring and building peace in the West Africansub-region, especially in countries like Liberia, Côted’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, which have witnessedan upsurge of conflicts in the course of 2002–2003,together with Sierra Leone, which has beencarrying out the uphill task of reconstruction and

rehabilitation. Perhaps the greatest achievement inthe area of peace in the West African sub-region hasbeen the championing of the stepping down byCharles Taylor of Liberia, and Nigeria’s grantinghim asylum as a humanitarian gesture. Ghana, in itscapacity as the current Chair of ECOWAS, andunder the current indefatigable Secretary General,has done a commendable job of trying to mediateconflicts and restoring peace and constitutionalorder in the wake of coups in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberiaand Guinea-Bissau.

But despite all those commendable efforts,ECOWAS is still overwhelmed by the political stale-mate in Côte d’Ivoire, where the rebel groups havedecided to suspend their participation in thepower-sharing government inAbidjan, and by the divisionswithin the country alongethnic, regional and religiouslines. Xenophobia has alsoremained a bone ofcontention in Ivorian polit-ical life. ECOWAS alsocurrently faces a politicalquagmire in Liberia evenafter the departure of CharlesTaylor, in addition to the problem of succession inGuinea, as the life of the current president appearsto be failing, the problem of the spread of smallarms and light weapons throughout the sub-region, the growing number of child soldiers espe-cially in Liberia, where a total of 15 000 have been

“The OAU was tasked to

redouble its efforts in the

area of peace and security

in Africa, as a prelude to

economic integration”

AFP

PEACEMAKING

19

marginalisation in southern Sudan, for these twoconflict situations reinforce and feed each other.Another part of the Ugandan public feels that thetime has come for Uganda to demonstrate that it nolonger provides support to the Southern SudaneseLiberation Army (SPLA). Yet another part of theUgandan public is of the view that Uganda shouldbe seen to support the current Naivasha talksconcerning the war in Southern Sudan, for, once theSudanese war ends, the Khartoum government willhave no more excuses for supporting the LRA.

Finally, the Somali crisis continues without anend in sight, and the resolution must includetalking to Ethiopia, which, according to certaincircles, has been a major player in the conflict.Moreover, member states of IGAD need to co-operateand co-ordinate their activities in the fight againstterrorism, especially following the 11 Septemberevents in the USA, and which has been under-mining both the tourism industry and investorconfidence.

In conclusion, our eyes are fixed in the directionof realising the noble objectives of NEPAD.However, let the various sub-regions of Africa riseto the challenges of our time, especially in the fieldof peace and security. After all, NEPAD represents abargaining chip: African governments are requiredto scrutinise each other in terms of performance,while expecting Africa’s external friends to supportAfrica in terms of foreign investment.

But in scrutinising each other’s performance inthe field of peace and security, the African leadershipshould endeavour to do away with some of thedouble standards that characterise African societyand clearly map out the continent’s priorities. First ofall, hardly any meeting of our Heads of State andGovernment ever ends without accolades for Africanunity, African solidarity and the need to remain eachother’s brother’s keeper or to remain tolerant of eachother. But we cannot continue cherishing these idealsthat call for respect for diversity, while at the sametime embracing xenophobia.

Second, there is a tendency on the side of someAfricans to expect too much from our externalfriends in terms of dealing with our challenges.There are those who in fact think that all ourcurrent problems are a result of colonialism.Indeed, colonialism did a lot of harm to Africa. Butwe cannot go on blaming colonialism endlessly.Furthermore, the West should not abandon Africa,

for the price of neglecting the poor is not only highbut is usually paid in anguish. Yet, however willingand well intentioned our external friends might bein salvaging Africa, few of them have better knowl-edge of our local conditions and problems than usAfricans. Let us Africans occupy the driver’s seat,sort out those things that we cando for ourselves and do them,before soliciting external help.

Third, there are those whomight think that all humanproblems must perforce be solvedmilitarily. There are times whenwar becomes the best of the notso good options. But overall,peace achieved on a negotiatingtable is more durable than peaceachieved on the battlefield.

Fourth, there are conflictsthat can be contained withinnational borders. But there are also those thatspread beyond national borders and which can onlybe resolved meaningfully through holisticapproaches involving the neighbouring statesaffected. Co-operation and co-ordination of activi-ties relating to peace building in Africa have, there-fore, never been more pressing than now.

Finally, a state that chooses to sponsor rebelactivities against a neighbouring state ought toremember the adage that those who live in glasshouses should not throw stones. Thus, two neigh-bouring states that choose to mutually sponsor rebelactivities against each other, based on the logic thatmy enemy’s enemy is my friend, should never sharetheir grief with anybody at the end of the day.

Chris Bakwesegha is the former Head of the OAU’s ConflictManagement Division.

Endnotes1 Final Report of the Eastern Africa Ministerial Conference on the

New Partnership for African Development. Kampala, Uganda,13 March 2002, p 4.

2 The New Vision (Uganda), 23 September 2003, p 12.

3 Chris Bakwesegha, ‘Political Impediments in the Developmentand Utilization of High Quality Resources: The African RefugeeFactor’, African Studies Journal, vol 9, 1986, pp 2-13.

4 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, New York:Department of Public Information, Chapter I, Article 1.

5 Ibid., Chapter VIII.

6 The Monitor (Uganda), Friday, 26 September 2003, p 16.

“Perhaps the greatest

achievement in the area

of peace in the West

African sub-region has

been the championing of

the stepping down by

Charles Taylor of Liberia”

Introduction

“What prevents us from fighting while we possess the oilthat supports us in a battle, even if it lasts for acentury?” Sudanese cabinet minister

Civil wars have provided many opportunities forpolitical leaders in Africa to take advantage of theprevailing instability and plunder valuable naturalresources all over the continent. Resultantly,resource-endowed nations of Africa have foundthemselves regressing politically, economically, andsocially as they have been plunged into never-ending civil strife which has led to the loss ofmillions of innocent lives. Individual political

leaders, on the other hand, have in the process prof-ited enormously from revenues from the exploita-tion of natural resources, often at the cost of theirconstituents.

By briefly outlining four ‘diamond-fuelled’ warsin Africa, this paper tries to bring to light Africa’s‘resource curse’ and ponder on whether Africa reallyneeds its nature.

Whereas other parts of the world have benefitedfrom the abundance of natural resources trans-lating them into economic prosperity, the Africanstory (with the exception of South Africa, Botswanaand to a lesser extent Ghana) has been entirelydifferent. Africa has found itself in an entirelydifferently situation; as the “interplay among a

20

PEACEMAKING B Y G E O R G E LWA N D A

and the African ‘resource curse’

AFP

Country Date Estimated ResourceDeaths

Algeria 1992–date 71 000 gas, oil

Angola 1975–2002 >800 000 diamonds, oil

Chad 1980–1994 300 000 oil, uranium

Congo-Brazzaville 1993–date 9 000 oil

DRC 1993–date 200 000 copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, uranium

Liberia 1989–1996 250 000 diamonds, iron, rubber

Sierra Leone 1991–1999 85 000 bauxite, diamonds, rutile

Sudan 1983–date >1 500 000 oil

amassed enormous wealth at the cost of thousandsof innocent lives. As noted earlier, diamonds andoil, in particular, have prolonged vicious wars inAfrica. This paper concentrates on ‘diamond-fuelled’ wars in Africa.

Diamonds are Forever?

Without doubt, diamonds have been the majornatural resource ‘responsible’ for fuelling civil strifein Africa. Warring parties in Africa have engaged invicious cycles of war fighting to control the lucrativeillicit trade in ‘blood diamonds’ – a term used todescribe diamonds originating from war-torn areasthat are used to fund military action by their traders.Control of these diamonds hasenabled warring parties toexchange diamonds forweapons to furnish their warcampaigns. Middlemen, armsdealers, and corrupt politicianshave ultimately ended up as thewinners, reaping massive profitsfrom the unfortunate state of affairs. The dreadfulabuses of human rights in diamond-rich Africancountries by both sides of the warring parties havethus been, and continue to be, closely linked to thefight to control the trade in these precious minerals.Such has been the extent to which these mineralshave been responsible for prolonging conflicts inAfrica that, on 1 December 2000, the UnitedNations General Assembly unanimously adopted aresolution to try to arrest the trade in ‘blooddiamonds’. This fight is far from succeeding, and asa result ‘blood diamonds’ continue to fund wars in

PEACEMAKING

seemingly endless supply of mineral resources, thegreed of multinational corporations desperate tocash in on that wealth, and the provision of armsand military training to political tyrants has helpedto produce the spiral of conflicts that have engulfedthe continent”.1

Mineral resources in Africa, unlike elsewhereworld-wide, have led to massive looting, indiscrimi-nate rape, the conscription of thousands of childsoldiers across the continent, and the subjection ofmillions of innocent civilians to misery and hopelessness. The continent’s vast mineral wealth,especially diamonds and oil, has hence been itscurse – prolonging, amongst others, the continent’smost vicious wars, in Angola, the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Table 1lists ten conflicts in Africa that have been fuelled bynatural resources.

Profiting From War

The last two decades of the twentieth centurywitnessed the emergence of at least twenty majorconflicts in Africa. Although a variety of reasons,ranging from philosophical differences to ethniccleansing, have been advanced as the reasons forthese conflicts, one common feature stands out inmost of these wars, especially after the end of theCold War: economic factors. Economic factors havehad a great influence on “determining the actions ofactual and potential belligerents”.2

The end of the Cold War translated into the endof unconditional military support, from both theEast and the West, to warring belligerents on theAfrican continent. Warring parties inevitablywitnessed a decline in revenue to fund their warcampaigns. In the case of Southern Africa, the emer-gence of a peaceful post-apartheid South Africa, atpeace with its neighbours, also saw the furtherdecline in parties willing to fund war and destabili-sation on the continent. Faced with no revenue tofund their activities, warring parties in some casesresorted to a negotiated peace, as in Mozambique.In natural-resource-abundant Africa, however, thisonly saw the escalation of war, as the warring partiesnow fought for the control of natural resources tofund their activities. More implicit has been themassive profits that the patrons of these warringparties have amassed in the process.

Most of the leaders of these warring parties have

21

“The continent’s vast mineral

wealth, especially diamonds

and oil, has been its curse”

Table 1: African Conflicts Fuelled by Natural Resources

PEACEMAKING

Africa. Table 2 summarises the ‘diamond-fuelled’wars in Africa.

This paper briefly touches on the wars inAngola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,Liberia and Sierra Leone, which have been, to oneextent or another, prolonged by illicit diamondtrade. These four wars have seen the senseless loss ofa total of more than 1.1 million lives since 1975 aswell as countless others displaced, raped, maimed,and tortured. Angola has been left with millions ofunexploded landmines planted all over the country,thousands have had their limbs hacked off in SierraLeone and Liberia, while a very fragile peace istaking shape in the Democratic Republic of theCongo.

Angola

The existence of an anxious peace accord signed afterthe death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in Angolanotwithstanding, the country, prior to the death ofSavimbi in 2001, had experienced over a quarter of acentury of civil strife. Although Angola has the poten-tial of being a wealthy African state due to its vast oiland diamond reserves, the country is today a run-down state recovering from 27 years of civil strife,which has torn the country apart and left the countrycovered with millions of landmines.

Angola is new to peace. The last peace accord inAngola lasted only about one and a half years beforethe resumption of the armed struggle, so it is yet tobe seen how long the current state of peace will last.Strategic analysts nonetheless believe that the deathof Jonas Savimbi, former leader of the rebelNational Union for the Total Liberation of Angola(UNITA), will bring lasting peace to Angola.

UNITA, in particular, is known to have useddiamonds as its chief source of finance during the war.

Liberia and Sierra Leone

In the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, ‘conflictdiamonds’ have provided a source of funding for

22

Angola 1975–2002 >500 000

DRC 1993–date 200 000

Liberia 1989–1996 250 000

Sierra Leone 1991–1999 85 000

AFP

Table 2: Diamond-Fuelled Wars in Africa

Country Date Estimated Deaths

PEACEMAKING

the purchase of weapons and other military resources.Charles Taylor, who until very recently was the presi-dent of Liberia, has been blamed as the main culpritin the instability of the two countries. Not only did heextract natural resources from Liberia, but Taylorsupported the rebel Revolutionary United Front(RUF) in neighbouring Sierra Leone, providing themwith weapons, training, logistical support, a stagingground for attacks as well as a retreating safe haven –all in exchange for diamonds.

Over 250 000 people died in the civil strife inLiberia and Sierra Leone between 1989 and 1996.Over a million innocent citizens were displaced overthe same period in Liberia alone, and half the nationalpopulation has been driven out of their homes inSierra Leone. The RUF became known for its use ofdrugged child soldiers, who were notoriously brutal.In fact, the RUF had the reputation of carrying outdeliberate and systematic amputations of the limbs oftens of thousands of innocent civilians.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

“This is all money,” says a Western mining executive,his hand sweeping over a geological map toward theeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He isexplaining why, in 1997, he and planeloads of otherbusinessmen were flocking to the impoverished countryand vying for the attention of then-rebel leaderLaurent Kabila. The executive could just as accuratelyhave said, “This is all war.” 3

The abundance of mineral wealth residing beneathits soil has been and continues to be the great curseof the people of the DRC. The country is endowedwith many valuable natural resources, includingdiamonds. So rich is the DRC in natural resourcesthat it is said that the first explorer declared thecountry a ‘geographical scandal’. Yet the DRC hasnot known peace since the Banyamulenge-led revoltagainst the dictatorial and unstable Mobutu regimebegan in October 1996.

“The DRC, according to some sources, is theworld’s fourth largest diamond producer, othersplace it as second in the world.”4 It is thesediamonds that have fuelled the war, with both thegovernment and rebels fighting for control of thediamond-rich regions of the country. The situationwas further complicated by the presence of foreigntroops aiding both the rebels and the government. Arecent United Nations report singled out the

foreign troops, in particular, as being responsiblefor the wholesale plunder of DRC resources.5

The Way Forward

Evident from the four cases touched on above is thefact that in most cases the warring parties reliedheavily on revenues from natural resource exploita-tion to not only fund their wars but also to build upmassive personal fortunes, to the extent thateconomic motives have crowded out any initial polit-ical motives. Most of these civil wars have hence beenequally driven by their leaders’ hunger to cling to theresources that they control as well as the motivationof the prospects of amassing personal wealth.

A crucial fact about these wars is that politicaland military leaders of the governments and therebels, traders and businessmen have derived consid-erable wealth and status from war as opposed topeace. Thus, war has accorded them economic andpolitical opportunities unachievable in times ofpeace. To make maximum gains from this, govern-ments and rebels alike have skilfully but selfishlymanipulated political motives, interspersed withpromises of large booty, to fuel conflicts, conse-quently making it very difficult for any peripheralparty to mediate a peaceful settlement.

Does Botswana Hold the Key?

Indeed, while it is recognised that Botswana’s develop-ment record reflects ‘good luck’ to a substantial degree,we are also proud of the reputation that has been estab-lished for ‘good management’ on the part of the govern-ment … Although the national endowment has for thepast 15 years or so been the main element in the ‘goodluck’ factor, it is nevertheless recognised by those whoare well acquainted with our country that we havestriven with good effect to minimise adverse conse-quences of the ‘mineral led economy’ syndrome.

Then Vice-President of Botswana, Festus Mogae.6

Many debates have come up as to what needs to bedone to curb the fuelling of war by diamonds inAfrica. It has generally been agreed that “governments,inter-governmental and non-governmental organi-zations, diamond traders, financial institutions, armsmanufacturers, social and educational institutions,and other civil society players need to combine theirefforts, demand the strict enforcement of sanctions

23

PEACEMAKING

and encourage real peace”.7 The United Nations, forits part, has passed several resolutions that have triedto curb the trade in conflict diamonds in each of thenations looked at in this paper. These have not reallystopped the trade for a number of reasons, which areout of the context of this paper. It is the opinion of theauthor that, Africa needs to look at Botswana andlearn from this country how to best utilise diamondsfor continued development.

Botswana is arguably the only country in Africawith abundant reserves of diamonds that has experi-enced eternal peace matched by economic prosperity.

It has had the highest per capitagrowth rate of any country in theworld in 35 years and has movedfrom a low-income country to amiddle-income African success story.Resource-endowed African nationshence have a lot to learn fromBotswana. Although an examinationof how Botswana has managed tomake it, amidst a jungle in whichgood economics is bad politics, is avery lengthy exercise requiring awhole academic paper in itself, it can

be summarised that Botswana managed to achieverapid development by “choosing orthodox textbookpolicies; prudent macroeconomic and exchange ratepolicies, trading on the basis of comparative advan-tage, investing in education, health, and infrastruc-ture, nurturing a meritocratic bureaucracy, andenforcing hard budget constraints”.8

Botswana managed to avert the root cause ofAfrican problems – i.e. poor policies benefiting onlythe ruling elites – despite the uncertain situation in

which it found itself after the discovery of diamonds.It managed to do what very few, if any, African coun-tries managed to do. This it did by adopting goodinstitutions and policies and by investing heavily ininfrastructure and the educational and healthsystems, quite clearly elements that the governmentsof the four countries looked at above have overlooked.Instead, they adopted political strategies that wereoptimal only for the ruling elite and economic failurewas the consequence. Economic failure led to thegeneral disillusionment of the masses, who feltcheated by their leaders, and war resulted as differentgroups fought for control of resources. Most Africanpolitical leaders have over the years overlooked theimportance of sound, selfless economic policies in thequest for economic prosperity and development.Zimbabwe, for instance, presents a good example ofwhat selfish policies can lead to.

Clearly, from the Botswana example, Africanleaders need to come to terms with the importanceof democratic, selfless, unifying and development-oriented policies that remove the political stakesand vested interests of the ruling elite whilstincreasing their legitimacy. The New Partnershipfor Africa’s Development (NEPAD) seems to holdthe only route through which African leaders canchange their old retrogressive tendencies.

George Lwanda is a freelance researcher based in Malawi.

Endnotes1 D. Montague, ‘The Business of War in the Democratic Republic

of Congo: Who Benefits?’ Dollar & Sense, July 2001, availableonline at www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2548/2001July/77384512/print.jhtml.

2 T. Addison et al., Conflict in Africa: The Cost of PeacefulBehaviour, United Nations University/World Institute for Econo-mics Research, Discussion Paper No. 2001/51, August 2001.

3 Ibid.

4 Nadia Martinez, Congo Diamonds and Domestic andInternational Conflict, Inventory of Conflict and Environment,2000, available online atwww.american.edu/TED/ice/congo.htm.

5 UN Report on the Exploitation of Natural Resources in the DRC.

6 Festus Mogae, Address to the International Conference onSouthern Africa and East Asia, Gaborone, January 1991.

7 United Nations, Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, NewYork: United Nations, 2001.

8 D Acemoglu et al., How Botswana did it: ComparativeDevelopment in Sub Saharan Africa, Harvard University, 2001,available online athttp://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/RobJohnAcem-Botswana.pdf.

24

AFP

“Botswana is arguably the

only country in Africa

with abundant reserves

of diamonds that has

experienced eternal

peace matched by

economic prosperity”

25

would like to discuss the role of the UnitedNations in support of the peace process in theDemocratic Republic of the Congo byaddressing four broad questions. First, why isthe Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

important? Second, will the Transition succeed?Third, what is the role of the UN Mission in theDRC (MONUC)? And, fourth, what is MONUC’sconcept of operations?

The Importance of the DRC

To begin, I am deeply conscious of the responsibil-ities and challenges that the United Nations hastaken on in assisting the Congolese people begintheir transition from a state of war to a state of law.At this time of multiple calls for internationalintervention and assistance, it compels us to recallwhat is at stake in the DRC.

The DRC is Africa’s third largest country – fivetimes larger than Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra

Leone combined, with more than twice their popu-lation – around 53 million. It has massive mineralresources, 50 per cent of Africa’s hardwoods andsome 10 per cent of the world’s hydroelectric powerpotential. Moreover, the DRC is a natural politicalcentre of gravity for the Central African region. Inmany senses, peace and stability in the DRC and inthe Great Lakes region must go hand in hand.

But as recently as last year, multiple armiesfighting on Congolese soil led commentators torefer to the situation in the DRC as “Africa’s FirstWorld War”. The International Rescue Committeeestimates that up to 3.5 million people haveperished in the past four and a half years. The UNOffice for the Coordination of HumanitarianAssistance (OCHA) estimates that there arecurrently 3.4 million internally displaced personsin the DRC, and around 17 million people are foodinsecure. Forty-one per cent of all children areundernourished. At least 1.3 million people areinfected with the HIV virus whose prevalence

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MO

NUC

The role of MONUC in the

I

peace process

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26

among soldiers and irregular combatants is around60 per cent. And sexual violence, particularly rape,is at horrendous levels.

Comparisons of human tragedy are always invid-ious. But by any objective standard, the situation inthe DRC over recent years can truly be described asone of the world’s greatest living tragedies.

A Historic African Process

The difference today, however, is that there is at lasta credible path to peace, the restoration of sover-eignty and national reconciliation. The first stepshave been taken in what can only be described as anhistoric transition. As Nelson Mandela once said,“at such times, one has a sense that one is in phys-ical contact with history”.

And we should recognize clearly that the transi-tion process in the DRC is quintessentially anAfrican process. The milestones of peace – theLusaka Agreement, the Luanda Agreement, thePretoria Accords, and the Sun City Resolutions -are African milestones. At every step of the way, itwas African statesmen, such as President Mbekiand Sir Ketumile Masire, and African institutions,

such as SADC and the African Union who brokeredand facilitated the key agreements.

Indeed, when I characterize what has happenedin the DRC over the past four years, I do so in termsof three phases:

▲ The ‘Lusaka Phase’ that saw the withdrawal offoreign forces and the end of large-scaleconflict;

▲ The ‘Pretoria Phase’ that drafted the architec-tural design for sustainable peace; and,

▲ The ‘Kinshasa Phase’ where agreementsreached must be implemented on the ground.

The Prospects for Peace

This brings me to my second question: will theTransition succeed? I must say that I am optimistic.The first months since the signing of the Final Act ofthe Inter-Congolese Dialogue on 2 April, have seenfar more progress than most would have predictedor that one might reasonably have expected. Thefundamental reality is that every Congolese hassomething to gain from this transition – and theyknow it.

It is truly remarkable by any peacekeeping stan-dard, that in the first four months with only a fewslippages in timetable, all of the major benchmarksof the transition have been met. The integratedinstitutions of Government have all been established – the Transitional Constitution, thePresidency, the Parliament and the Council ofMinisters are in place and functioning.

The ‘Five Institutions in Support of Democracy’(the Independent Electoral Commission, theNational Human Rights Observatory, the HighMedia Authority, the Truth and ReconciliationCommission and the Ethics and Anti-CorruptionCommission) are being established.

The integrated military command of the newArmed Forces of the DRC has been agreed and is nowworking with the World Bank to to establish amassive national Disarmament, Demobilization andReintergration (DDR) programme, for which donorfunding is available. And MONUC is meeting regu-larly with the Minster of Interior and chairing weeklymeetings of the Police Chiefs to design and imple-ment the first integrated police unit.

Throughout the DRC the national flag isflying, the national currency is in free circulation,

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commercial airlinks have been reestablished, theCongo river is open for commercial traffic, and theentire country now has a single communicationsspace.

We should have no illusions about the magni-tude of the challenges ahead. Inevitably, there will bedifficulties and crises. But there are at least foursound reasons why I believe the Transition cansucceed.

One: national identity. Unlike so many otherareas of conflict within states where the protago-nists basically want to secede, in the DRC there isan almost universal sense of Congolese identitythat is a powerful force for nation building.Congolese by and large, want to be Congolese.

Two is war fatigue. After more than four-years ofbloody internecine fighting, the vast majority ofCongolese want an end to the nightmare of warand deprivation.

Three: the real interests of the Congolese leaders. Allpolitical leaders, and their respective militaryforces, have something to gain from a successfultransition, and much to fear from an unsuccessfulone. Their choice is simple: they can be left isolatedand marginalized, in bare control of decreasingpieces of territory, or become part of legitimateGovernment structures. And in this context, weshould take full account of civil society and publicopinion, which is overwhelmingly for peace

Point Four is the strength of international commit-ment. This has been demonstrated in many waysincluding: the deployment of the first EuropeanUnion military peace operation under the EUCommon Foreign and Security Policy; the decisionof the Chief Prosecutor of the InternationalCriminal Court to examine human rights abuses inIturi as the Court’s first case; and the willingness ofinternational financial institutions and govern-ments to wipe DRC’s foreign debt virtually clean.

Indeed, I would like to express particular grati-tude to the European Union and to France for thetimely deployment of Operation Artemis in Bunia. Asyou might recall, faced with the near certainty ofgross human rights violations following the with-drawal of Ugandan forces, MONUC deployed toBunia its only reserve battalion of lightly armedUruguayan troops under a Chapter VI mandate. Theyperformed heroically – some 20,000 civilians mightnot be alive today were it not for their actions.

But this was a situation that could not be

sustained indefinitely. Operation Artemis, in whicha robust and capable force ‘held the fort’ while theUN received a new mandate and marshaled astrong Ituri Brigade to take over in a seamless tran-sition, is a testament to international cooperationin the cause of peace. I would venture to suggestthat, in many ways, this might be a model for othersimilar peacekeeping situations.

Perhaps we are finally learning that the mostexpensive peace is a better bargain than thecheapest war.

The Role of MONUC?

The complex and at times difficult history ofMONUC is well known. It should be recalled thatMONUC was originally deployed, four years ago, invery difficult circumstances. It grew incrementally,constrained by doubts aboutthe prospects of success andfear of a never-ending commit-ment of international resources.

Not for the first time in thehistory of this part of the world,MONUC was severely chal-lenged by the operational and logistics difficultiesof deploying in a country the size of WesternEurope, but without roads, where one-third of thebudget is just to get in place to be able to startwork.

Despite this, MONUC had some notablesuccesses in monitoring disengagement of combat-ants and verifying the withdrawal of foreign armies.But many of its tasks were simply not realizablewithout a political horizon and legitimate localpartners.

It was not until the signing of the Final Act on 2April 2003, that the Congolese parties at last agreedand committed themselves to a comprehensiveprogramme for the restoration of peace and nationalsovereignty during a transition period of two yearsculminating in democratic national elections.

This crucial milestone led the Secretary-General to state, in his Second Special Report onMONUC to the Security Council, that:

“The peace process has now moved beyond the Lusakaframework and begun a new chapter that, more thanever, will require the comprehensive engagement andassistance of the United Nations and the international

“The most expensive

peace is a better bargain

than the cheapest war”

PEACEKEEPING

28

community at large … MONUC is well, if notuniquely, placed to play a central catalytic role inassisting the parties through the transition period. Forthis reason I believe that the main focus of MONUCshould now shift to facilitating and assisting the transitional process, and that the Mission should bereconfigured and augmented accordingly”.

The restructuring of MONUC has begun with theclear articulation of our goal, namely: to facilitate andassist the Congolese parties through a successfulnational transition to good governance culminatingin free and fair elections within the constitutionallyauthorized period of two to three years.

The achievement of this goal requires action infour multi-disciplinary core:

1. Peace and Security, to stop the killing andviolence, the sine qua non for all that follows.The focus is on stabilizing Ituri and the Kivus;enabling refugee and IDP returns; ensuringeffective DDR and further progress on DDRRR;supporting the embargo on arms; andpromoting the normalization of bilateral andregional relations.

2. Facilitating the Transition, leading to free andfair elections. MONUC’s Neutral Force hasalready filled the security void in Kinshasa, and

we are now beginning to focus on supporting thenational electoral framework for which we areestablishing an Electoral Assistance Division.

3. Establishment of the Rule of Law and HumanRights – to end impunity and build stable insti-tutions. Police training and criminal justicecapacity building is underway in Ituri and willsoon begin in Kinshasa and the Kivus. MONUCis supporting the establishment of a NationalHuman Rights Observatory and a Rule of LawTaskforce to coordinate security sector reform.

4. Improve Human Conditions for SustainablePeace. The focus here is on programmes thataddress the tragic legacy of war: humanitariancatastrophe; child soldiers; sexual violence; HIV-AIDS and support for the establishment of aTruth and Reconciliation Commission.

All of these components are interlinked and mustbe pursued simultaneously. Without peace, thepolitical process will collapse. Without the politicalprocess, we will have no partners for nationalconsolidation. Without rule of law, there is no exitstrategy. And without addressing the humandetritus of war, the process will not be sustainable.

I would emphasize one additional point. In planning our operations, we have been intenselyconscious of the enormity of the challenges of the

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DRC. Perhaps more than in any other peacekeepingsetting, this is a situation where the Congoleseparties themselves must take the lead and the inter-national community will follow with the necessarysupport and assistance.

But no single international organization can dothis alone. The primary role of MONUC is to be acatalyst for the work of the international commu-nity as a whole. And with respect to the UN family,the United Nations system, the Bretton Woodsinstitutions, and bilateral and multilateral donorswill need to “plan and coordinate their activities toan almost unprecedented degree”.

Thus a key theme running through our newconcept of operations is the need for coordinationwith external partners, and the need for the UNfamily to work as one, to avoid duplication and todevelop real synergy.

Concept of Operations

The immediate challenges are manifest: to establishan elections plan and modalities; to make opera-tional our responsibilities in DDR; to consolidateand expand our presence in Ituri; to establish ourapproach to the rule of law and respect for humanrights; and to put our local conflict resolution effortsin the Kivus on a firm footing, to name but a few.

Our core goal is supporting and facilitating thepolitical transition. The International Committee inSupport of the Transition (ICST) that I chair,comprising the Ambassadors of fifteen closelyengaged states, has already been crucial in assistingthe Congolese parties to resolve disputes such as overthe national armed forces. To chair this effectively, I need timely and comprehensive information on theprogress of the transitional institutions at practicallyevery level. For this purpose, the establishment of afully staffed and sufficiently senior TransitionalSupport Unit is essential.

Advancing the rule of law and respect for humanrights will be achieved through a Rule of Law TaskForce including MONUC, UN system agencies andother international organizations, supported by aRule of Law Unit, the Office of the Civilian PoliceCommissioner and the Human Rights section,which will also be the focal point for human rightsinvestigations to end the culture of impunity as wellas supporting transitional justice initiatives.MONUC CIVPOL will soon expand to some 200

officers with mentoring and monitoring roles insupport of local police reform and restructuring.

Improving human conditions for sustainablepeace will be accomplished through: deployment ofHumanitarian Affairs Officers in areas of localconflict and deprivation; deployment of ChildProtection Officers in Kinshasa and the fieldparticularly where there are child soldiers; andadvocacy work by the Gender Issues Unit and theHIV/AIDS Unit.

The Office of Public Information including the countrywide Radio Okapi network is critical to the success of all MONUC activities. Recently, awholesale review of information functions wasconducted, and we are now making necessarychanges to ensure that we are up to the task, andthat the MONUC message is heard.

Conclusion

The detritus of war remains, including foreignarmed groups, lawless local bands and organizedcriminal networks enriching themselves throughthe illegal exploitation of natural resources in onedirection and the illicit trade in arms in the other.And on the humanitarian side, we continue to seelarge numbers of civilian refugees living on bothsides of unstable border areas.

The capacity to engage keycountries and employ good officesto foster normalization of bilateralrelations and improvement ofregional relations is key to every-thing we wish to achieve. A stableDRC is in many senses the lynchpinfor stability in the wider Central African region.

The end state, I believe is clear and worthwhile: ademocratically-elected government in the DRC and aspace where rule of law can be the essential frame-work that will finally permit the Congolese people toexploit and develop the vast and rich resources oftheir country. In this process, MONUC can help, butthe Congolese must lead. I believe that they are readyto do precisely that, and MONUC is ready to helpthem put their tragic past aside and build the foundations of a better future.

William Lacy Swing, Special Representative of theSecretary-General and Co-ordinator of United NationsActivities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

“Our core goal is

supporting and facilitating

the political transition”

he past year saw a number of significantdevelopments and important trends in thefield of peacekeeping in Africa. In terms ofdevelopments, the most significant is possibly

the decision by the African Union (AU) to embarkon the process of establishing an African StandbyForce (ASF). The AU also authorised and deployedits first fully-fledged peacekeeping mission, theAfrican Mission to Burundi (AMIB), in 2003. Interms of trends, the most important is probably theincreasing specialisation between the UN andregional organisations, where the latter focus onstabilising conflict zones with short but robustoperations whilst the former follows on with morelong-term peace building missions. This article willdiscuss some of the significant developments thatemerged in Africa in 2003 and consider some of thetrends what are likely to dominate the crisismanagement and peace building field in 2004.

The African Standby Force

The AU made significant progress in the develop-ment of a cohesive African peace and securitysystem in 2003. African Chiefs of Defence Staff metin Addis Ababa in May 2003 and agreed on themodalities of an African Standby Force and aMilitary Staff Committee, a standing advisorycommittee to the Peace and Security Council.1 TheASF provides for five sub-regional stand-byarrangements, each up to brigade size (3 000–4 000troops), which will provide the AU with a combinedstand-by capacity of 15 000 to 20 000 peacekeepers.

The ASF design was developed on the basis ofsix possible mission scenarios, ranging fromobserver missions (1-3) to peacekeeping (4) tocomplex peace operations (5) and finally to inter-vention (6) missions.2 The ASF also provides for apolice and civilian standby capacity but these have

30

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FP

T

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration(DDR) process. AMIB is an integrated missioncomprising a civilian component and militarycontingents from Ethiopia, Mozambique andSouth Africa, with an approved strength of up to 3 335 personnel. AMIB is a significant develop-ment because it demonstrates Africa’s political willand technical capability to deploy a peace opera-tion in situations where the UN is unable orunwilling to do so. The peace process in Burundihas created a dilemma for the United Nations andthe traditional donor community. On the onehand, a significant number of parties have signedthe Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliationand have formed a transitional government. On theother hand, hostilities continue and during mostof 2003 two important players – the CNDD-FDD(Nkurunziza) and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Rwasa) –remained outside the peace process. (The CNDD-FDD joined the peace process in November 2003,and now it is only the FNL that is still engaged inhostilities.)The AU felt it was important that theagreements reached thus far be implemented if the positive momentum of the peace process wereto be maintained. This was especially true for thoseaspects relating to security sector reform, princi-pally the transformation ofthe army into an institutionthat was representative of allthe peoples of Burundi. TheUN, on the other hand, feltthat as a comprehensivecease-fire involving allbelligerent parties was not inplace, it could not consider apeacekeeping mission inBurundi. This difference instrategic approach betweenthe UN and the AU resultedin a number of operational challenges. Forinstance, the AU mission could not secure supportfor the basic needs of the approximately 200 ex-combatants gathered in the MuyangeDemobilization Centre.4 AMIB was forced toarrange for food, clothing, bedding, and healthservices themselves. Another telling example is thedifference in approach between AMIB and thehumanitarian community when it comes to thepre-assembly areas. These are areas where combat-ants will gather to be disarmed and transported to

PEACEKEEPING

not yet been unpacked to the same extent as themilitary component of the ASF. It is foreseen thatthe ASF will be operationalised in two phases. Thefirst is aimed at developing the capacity to managescenarios 1 to 3 by the end of 2005. The secondphase is aimed at developing the capability tomanage the remaining scenarios by 2010. Thedevelopment of an African standby system is asignificant achievement because it provides Africawith a common policy framework for peacekeepingcapacity building. This means that the variouspeacekeeping capacity building initiatives underway,and any new programmes, can be directed tosupport this common objective, regardless ofwhether such initiatives are taking place at theregional, sub-regional or national level. Africanleaders left the G8 Summit in France earlier thisyear with an in-principle undertaking from the G8to support the ASF. It is now up to Africa to presentthe G8 with proposals that will indicate how theASF will be operationalised and how G8 countriescan support this process. This planning process islikely to dominate African multilateral defence andsecurity meetings in 2004, both at the regional and sub-regional level. For instance, at a meeting of Defence Chiefs of Staff of the EconomicCommunity of Central African States in Brazzavilleat the end of October 2003 a decision was taken tocreate a brigade-sized sub-regional standby force.3

They also decided to establish a joint peacekeepingtraining centre and to undertake regional militaryexercises. Whilst this planning process is expectedto continue to gain momentum, it is important tonote that the ASF will only officially come intooperation once the AU Protocol on the Peace andSecurity Council has been ratified by sufficientcountries to enter into force.

The African Mission in Burundi

Another major development in 2003 was thedeployment of the first ever fully fledged AfricanUnion peacekeeping mission. The African Missionto Burundi (AMIB) was approved by the AU CentralOrgan on 3 February 2003. The mandate of AMIBprovides for the monitoring and verification of thevarious Burundi cease-fire agreements, facilitatingthe activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commissionand the Technical Committees and supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the

31

The development of an

African standby system is

a significant achievement

because it provides Africa

with a common policy

framework for peacekeeping

capacity building

PEACEKEEPING

the demobilisation centres. AMIB argues that someform of limited assistance is needed in these areas

so as to prevent the combat-ants from depending on thelocal communities for food,thus limiting their negativeimpact on the host commu-nities. The humanitariancommunity, however, has anin-principle objection toproviding humanitarianassistance to combatants.These and other differencesare likely to be the focus ofefforts in 2004 to improvethe synchronisation and co-ordination between peace

and security considerations on the one hand andrelief and reconstruction concerns on the other.

UN Support to UNMIL in Liberia

Another interesting development was the deploy-ment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia(ECOMIL) on 4 August 2003. After weeks of indecision at the UN Security Council and when itbecame clear that the United States would notintervene in Monrovia as long as fighting

continued, the Economic Community of WestAfrica (ECOWAS) authorised the deployment of anECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missionto Liberia. ECOWAS, however, already had 1200troops committed in Cote d'Ivoire and a signifi-cant number of the troops in the UN Mission inSierra Leone (UNAMSIL) were from the WestAfrican region. This problem was overcomethrough the bold leadership of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. He notonly took the unprecedented step of authorisingthe release of some of the West African forcesdeployed in Sierra Leone, but also authorised logistical support for these forces from UNAMSIL.The deployment of ECOMIL in Liberia was thelatest and perhaps one of the clearest examples of agrowing trend in Africa where regional organisa-tions undertake short but robust operations aimedat stabilising a conflict zone, followed by UNmissions with a more long-term peace-buildingmandate. ECOMIL was replaced by the UN Missionin Liberia (UNMIL) on 1 October 2003. TheECOWAS mission provided the UN with the time itneeded to plan and deploy a peace-buildingmission. At the same time the ECOMIL missionmanaged to sufficiently stabilise the situation forUN and other civilian humanitarian personnel toreturn to Monrovia, and later to other parts of the

32

“The deployment of ECOMIL in

Liberia was the latest and

perhaps one of the clearest

examples of a growing trend

in Africa where regional

organisations undertake short

but robust operations aimed at

stabilising a conflict zone”

AFP

PEACEKEEPING

country. The new UN Mission in Liberia is alsosymbolic of the implementation of the Brahimirecommendation that the UN should deploymissions with the requisite mandate and resourcesto enable it to achieve its objectives. UNMIL, withan approved strength of 15 000 soldiers and almost900 police officers, will be the largest current UN peacekeeping mission.5 It is an integratedmulti-functional mission with a robust mandate,including, for the first time, a specific clause on theprotection of civilians. This stands in sharpcontrast to the previous UN mission to Liberia thathad a very limited observer mandate. The UN nowhas three missions in three neighbouring countriesin West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Coted’Ivoire. It would appear as if the UN has nowrecognised the regional dimension of this conflictsystem and the three missions, although distinct,have been designed to share resources, exchangeinformation and co-operate where necessary.

Operation Artemis in Ituri

Another significant development in 2003 was thedeployment of a European Union interventionforce in Bunia, in the Ituri District of theDemocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It wasthe first European Union peace operation underthe EU Common Foreign and Security Policy andanother example of a regional organisation stabil-ising a conflict zone in preparation for a morecomprehensive UN peace-building operation.Unprecedented violent conflict, bordering on genocide, erupted in the Ituri district of theOriental Province in north-eastern DRC after thewithdrawal of Ugandan forces in March and April2003. Rival rebel groups mobilised along ethnicHema and Lendu identities was fighting a proxywar of control, linked to competing Ugandan andRwandan interests, that has resulted in approxi-mately 50 000 deaths and half-a-million internallydisplaced persons since 1999.6 The UN SecurityCouncil authorised a French-led EU InterimEmergency Multinational Force (dubbed OperationArtemis) on 30 May 2003 when it became clear thatthe situation in Ituri could not be managed withinthe mandate and means of the UN mission in theDRC (MONUC). This operation is another exampleof a regional organisation mustering a short butrobust stabilisation operation that gives the UN

time to plan a longer-term comprehensive peace-building response to the problem. These regionalorganisations have demonstrated that they are in a better position than the UN to muster a quickand robust military response, typically led by onecountry in a lead-nation capacity. However, suchmilitary interventions can achieve little beyondstabilising a critical situation for a limited period oftime. The UN, on the other hand, has the capabilityto pull together the various components needed toform a complex integrated peace-building responsethat can address the long-termpost-conflict reconciliation andreconstruction needs of theseconflict zones. Not all regionalorganisations have these capa-bilities and one should guardagainst assigning such roles toall regional organisations andin all circumstances, but theUN, ECOWAS and the EU, inthe context of the type of situa-tions that occurred in Liberiaand Ituri, appear to have arrivedat a division of roles that play to each other’sstrengths and compensate for each other’s weak-nesses. This may be a model that will be favoured infuture crises, where similar circumstances prevail. If so, this trend will have specific implications forthe design, training and preparation of the variouselements of the African Stand-by Force.

South Africa Enters the Field

Another important development in 2003 was thedeployment of a significant number of SouthAfrican troops to a various peacekeeping missionsin Africa. As a result of committing approximately1 200 troops to MONUC, South Africa’s stature asa UN peacekeeping nation jumped from 39 out of89 countries in May 2003 to a ranking at number10 in October 2003. South Africa is now the fourthlargest UN Troop Contributing Country in Africa,after Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya. If you add thedeployment of a further approximately 1 600troops to Burundi, then South Africa had a totalforeign deployment of around 3 000 personnel in2003, making it the second largest peace-keepingcontributor in Africa, after Nigeria. South Africaalso has personnel in UNMEE and UNMIL and is

33

“South Africa’s stature as a

UN peacekeeping nation

jumped from 39 out of 89

countries in May 2003 to

a ranking at number 10 in

October 2003”

PEACEKEEPING

thus participating, in some form or other, inalmost every UN peacekeeping mission in Africa. Inaddition, South Africa also contributed to the EUoperation in Ituri. South Africa’s entry into the

peacekeeping world is impor-tant because it adds a consider-able amount of resources to theUN, AU and SADC. The deploy-ments in the DRC and Burundiare also an indication thatSouth Africa has now developedthe political will to support itspeacemaking initiatives withmilitary deployments, where

required, and this will further add to the credibilityand impact that South Africa can project in thepeacemaking field.

The Financial Realities of Peacekeeping in Africa

One of the most important lessons of 2003 relatesto the financial realities of peacekeeping in Africa.In 2003, the extent of African peacekeeping was notlimited by political will, the availability of troopsand equipment or institutional modalities, but bythe lack of funding. Peacekeeping operations are bytheir very nature costly affairs. The AU experience isthat even the relatively small and less logistically

demanding unarmed military observer missionsundertaken by the OAU were so costly that it wasnot able to finance them from its own budget. TheOAU had to rely on donor funding to finance therelatively small missions it deployed to Rwanda(NMOG), Burundi (OMIB), the Comoros (OMIC),Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE) and the DRC (JMC)over the past decade. The operational cost of maintaining 67 military observers in Burundi(OMIB) from 1993 to 1996 was approximately US$ 7.2 million. The budget for the OAU LiaisonMission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE) was US$ 1.8 million per year. Its original plannedstrength was 43 civilian and military personnel, butbecause of financial constraints it had an actualstrength of 27 in 2000, comprising 11 military staffand 16 civilian support staff. The African Missionin Burundi (AMIB), by contrast, is considerablylarger than any mission the AU, or the OAU beforeit, has undertaken to date, with up to 3 335personnel and an operational budget of approxi-mately US$ 110 million per year. This is a signifi-cant expense in the African context. In comparison,the budget of the AU Commission for 2003 isapproximately US$ 32 million. It is thus under-standable that finding the financial resources tosustain AMIB was an important preoccupation forthe AU in 2003 and it will continue to dominate aportion of the AU agenda in 2004. The degree towhich it manages to do so will have an importantbearing on the kind of peacekeeping missions theAU is likely to undertake in future. One of the variables is whether AMIB will become a UNmission. The AU has always considered AMIB to bea temporary bridging mission aimed at providingthe security necessary to maintain the momentumin the peace process until the UN can take over. At the Regional Summit that convened in Dar EsSalaam in November 2003, the call for the UN totake over the AMIB mission was repeated. Theregional leaders argued that sufficient progress hasnow been achieved, after the CNDD-FDD of PierreNkurunziza joined the transitional government of Burundi, to meet the UN requirement that acomprehensive cease-fire has to be in place before itwould consider a peacekeeping mission in Burundi.The UN currently runs 11 peacekeeping missionswith an annual budget of US$ 2.17 billion.7 It isresponsible for six peacekeeping missions in Africa,namely Western Sahara (MINURSO), Ethiopia and

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“The UN currently runs

11 peacekeeping missions

with an annual budget

of US$ 2.17 billion”

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Eritrea (UNMEE), the DRC (MONUC), SierraLeone (UNAMSIL), Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI) andthe newest and largest mission, the UN Mission inLiberia (UNMIL). The UN is likely to add a seventhAfrican mission in the Sudan in 2004, if theMachakos peace process between the governmentof Sudan and the Sudan Peoples LiberationMovement/Army (SPLM/A) proceeds apace.8 If theUN deploys a peacekeeping mission in Sudan, theUN Security Council is unlikely to approve an eightAfrican mission in Burundi as well. A similar situa-tion prevailed during the OAU Observer Mission inBurundi (1993–1996). The OAU expected the UNto take over the mission but the UN SecurityCouncil felt that the situation in Burundi wasbeing dealt with by the OAU and thus preferred tofocus its resources on more pressing needs on itsagenda. With this history in mind the UN isunlikely to take over from the AU as long as the AUmaintains a credible peacekeeping mission inBurundi. If the UN is unlikely to deploy a peace-keeping mission in Burundi, the AU will have tofind the money to sustain AMIB for at least two tofour years. South Africa as lead nation hasbudgeted approximately R850 million, or approxi-mately US$ 120 million, annually to sustain itstroops and to supply most of the logistical needs,like fuel, air transport and medical support, for themission.9 Although the AU is expected to reimburseSouth Africa at some point, there is no immediatepressure to do so. The AU is, however, underconsiderable pressure to find funds to sustain theEthiopian and Mozambican contingents. Thedeployment of the Ethiopian contingent wasfinanced by the United States with a US$ 6 millioncontribution that included the airlift of the contin-gent to Burundi and logistical support for 60 days.The AU needs to find funds to maintain theEthiopian contingent before the 18 December 2003deadline when the US-funded period comes to anend. Similarly, the United Kingdom contributedUS$ 6.4 million to prepare, deploy and sustain theMozambican contingent and the AU needs to findadditional funds to sustain their deploymentbeyond the initial 60-day period. This is not goingto be an easy task if the wider context within whichthese funds are being sought is taken into consid-eration. The international donor community isheavily committed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and theBalkans. In Africa, peace operations like AMIB are

competing for funds against the backdrop of thefight against HIV/AIDS and the food crisis insouthern Africa. The money that could be allocatedfor peace support operations in Africa in 2003 wasspread across five non-UNmissions: Burundi, the CentralAfrican Republic, Cote d’Ivoire,Liberia and Sudan. For instance,at a donor conference in Paris inJuly, ECOWAS sought a furtherUS$ 40 million to double its 1 200 strong ECOMOG force inCote d’Ivoire, but managed tosecure only US$ 8 million. TheECOMOG operation in Coted’Ivoire costs approximatelyUS$ 1.3 million a month.10 TheUnited States, France and Britain had contributedUS$ 13 million for the first six months of theECOMOG operation in Cote d’Ivoire. France is alsosupporting a 300-strong peacekeeping force of theEconomic and Monetary Community of CentralAfrican States (CEMAC) in the Central AfricanRepublic.11 And the United States, Norway, theUnited Kingdom, Italy and other donors aresupporting two observer missions in the Sudan, theJoint Monitoring Commission and the Verificationand Monitoring Team. Seen in this context it isunlikely that the international donor community

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“In Africa, peace operations

like AMIB are competing for

funds against the backdrop

of the fight against HIV/AIDS

and the food crisis in

southern Africa”

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will be able to contribute more than between US$ 10 to 20 million to AMIB, if that much.Considering these prospects, the AU has actuallymanaged to do remarkably well in terms offundraising for AMIB in 2003. Over and above thecontributions received from the USA and UK, theAU has managed to secure funding from Italy,Germany, and Denmark, and has itself contributedUS$600 000 from the Peace Fund. The most signif-icant contribution is likely to come from theEuropean Union. Although the AU has thusreceived significant contributions and commit-ments in 2003, it still needs approximately US$ 80million to finance AMIB’s first year of operations.The AU experience with AMIB is thus likely to be acostly lesson. From this perspective, the only viablepeacekeeping operations in Africa are UN peaceoperations. Compare, for instance, the cost ofAMIB with the cost of MONUC, where the UN willbe spending US$ 608 million over the next year.South Africa is contributing a similar size force toMONUC, at about half the cost (US$ 55 million)because the UN provides most of the logisticsSouth Africa is responsible for in Burundi. In thecase of MONUC, the UN will reimburse approxi-mately 60 per cent of the expenses incurred bySouth Africa. The advantages of contributing toUN, as opposed to AU or sub-regional operations,are not difficult to grasp. This is an importantreality check for those who advocate a greater role

for regional peacekeeping in Africa. If the UN, orthe international community in general, would liketo see the delegation of more conflict managementresponsibilities to the AU and sub-regional organi-sations, it would have to provide it with the neces-sary resources to carry out such mandates.Themost important lesson learned in 2003 is that wecannot escape the financial realities of peace-keeping in Africa. In the long term, the AU is likelyto shy away from undertaking such operations onits own. Instead, it is likely to facilitate short-termstabilisation missions like the ECOMIL mission inLiberia. The ASF concept that is designed aroundbrigade-sized sub-regional forces may have to berefined to focus on the operational needs ofscenarios 1 to 3 (observer missions) and 6 (inter-vention missions), whilst preparations for scenarios4 and 5 (peacekeeping and complex peace opera-tions) should be undertaken in the framework ofthe UN stand-by system.

Cedric de Coning is an Advisor to the Training for PeaceProgramme at ACCORD.

Endnotes

1 Jakkie Cilliers, From Durban to Maputo: A Review of 2003Summit of the African Union, ISS Paper 76, August 2003, p.7.

2 Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African StandbyForce and the Military Staff Committee (Part 1), 12-14 May2003, Addis Ababa, Exp/ASF-MSC/2(1).

3 UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)Weekly Round-up for Central & Eastern Africa, 25-31 October 2003.

4 Mozambique, South Africa Set Conditions for the FullDeployment of Peacekeepers, IRIN, www.irinnews.org, 15September 2003.

5 Liberia Peacekeeping Mission Could be Approved this Week,UN Wire, www.unwire.org/UNWire/, 18 September 2003.

6 Military Intervention in Ituri, International Crisis Group (ICG)Africa Report No. 64, 13 June 2003, p. 1.

7 UN Committee Approves $2.17 Billion For Missions, UN Wire,www.unfoundation.org/unwire, 7 June 2003.

8 Sudan: UN Preparing for Peace Accord, IRIN,www.irinnews.org, 24 September 2003.

9 E-Africa, SAIIA, July 2003.

10 The ECOMOG mission in Cote d’Ivoire includes soldiers fromBenin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo. See West AfricanPeacekeepers Seek Funding to Increase Strength, IRIN,www.irinnews.org, 7 June 2003.

11 CEMAC has 380 men, with 139 from Gabon, 121 from Chadand 120 from the Republic of Congo. See CEMAC SeeksAdditional Troops, IRIN, www.irinnews.org, 10 October 2003and Eric G. Berman, Troubling Questions, West Africa, Issue4371, 14-20 April 2003.

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udan has, except for the period between1972 and 1983, been in a state of civil warever since its independence in 1956. War hasthus been the central focus of political,

economic, and social life throughout the country’srecent history. The prolonged conflict has causedthe loss of up to two million lives and displacedmore than four million people. The war’s mainconsequence has been a devastated country in steepeconomic decline, which has severely hinderedSudan’s capacity to develop as a nation.

Despite the above facts, recent media state-ments have expressed indications of hope:

The possibility of ending the 21-year old civil war in theSudan inched a step closer Wednesday [22 October2003] after the Khartoum government and the SudanPeoples [sic] Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)

agreed to work out a comprehensive peace deal by 31 December.1

The purpose of this article is not to provide adetailed overview of the conflict-ridden modernhistory of Sudan, nor to present an in-depthanalysis of all the different peace initiatives in thecountry in the past. Rather, in a time where‘successful’ is a rare description of peace effortsapplied to African conflicts, it is meant to highlightone of very few fairly prosperous peace missionarrangements going on in Africa today – namely the Joint Monitoring Mission (JMM) and, morespecifically, the Joint Military Commission’s (JMC)implementation of the so-called Nuba Mountainscease-fire agreement (CFA).

Even though each conflict is unique, and thusdemands different approaches, methods and

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the Sudan

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resources, the JMM/JMC model may – without theelusive luxury of future hindsight – serve as a usefultest case as a conflict management tool. Based on itspresent positive status and potential, on the fact

that the agreement andimplementation of it havereceived limited presscoverage, and on the factthat the limited informa-tion provided is ofteninaccurate or lacking, it isimperative to provide aclear and concise pictureof the CFA. Moreover, it isimportant to look at the

structure and role of the JMM/JMC’s effort toimplement it and what the initiative has achieved –facts that may provide significant lessons for futurecease-fire and peace initiatives in Sudan, otherAfrican countries, or elsewhere in the world.

Background

Although the civil war in Sudan is commonly, oftenrather simplistically, depicted as one of the Muslimnorth versus the Christian and animist south,reality tells one that there are numerous additionalcomplicating factors associated with the conflict. Atthe moment, and as it always has, it involves severalarmed factions and militias, and various ethnic andreligious groups. Today, the main parties are, on the

one side, the government of the Republic of Sudan,and on the other, the Sudan Peoples LiberationMovement/Army (SPLM/A). When people talk aboutthe government in terms of the conflict in the Nubaarea, it is often in reference to the Sudanese army andthe Popular Defence Forces, of which the latter iscomposed of various tribal militias. Similarly, whenthey talk about the SPLMA/A in the NubaMountains, it is often rather referred to as SPLM/N,where the ‘N’ represents the faction of the movementoperating in the Nuba Mountains.

The conflict in the Nuba Mountains has no singlebattlefront, thus creating a very complex and fluiddisplacement situation. Fighting over control of territory and the appropriation of civilian food-stocks, partly with the aim of displacing civilians2, andfighting for the denial of resources to the opposingside, have been dominant war patterns.3 In the past,these patterns left many conflict resolution expertsand diplomats with slim hopes of a successful implementation of the Nuba Mountains cease-fireagreement. Experiences over the last 22 months have –so far – proven them somewhat wrong.

The Nuba Mountains Cease-fire Agreement

Geographically, the Nuba Mountains cease-fireagreement entails the whole of Southern Kordofanand the province of Lagawa in Western Kordofan.The area is more than three times the size ofRwanda (about 80 000 km2) and has a populationof about 500 000 people.

Based upon a US initiative, the Nuba Mountainscease-fire agreement was signed between the govern-ment of Sudan and the SPLM/N on 19 January 2002in Switzerland. It came into force three days later.The CFA provided for the establishment of an inter-national monitoring unit (IMU) and the JMC, whichtogether form the so-called Joint MonitoringMission. As there are representatives from thewarring parties in the JMC, the JMM comprises onlythe international component of the JMC/IMU. TheCFA is now in its fourth six-month period and afifth is agreed upon.

According to the CFA’s broader objectives of“promoting a just, peaceful and comprehensivesettlement of the conflict”, the warring parties wereto “immediately observe and extend the currentmilitary stand-down and to apply it to the Nuba

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“The principles of the

cease-fire include the

guarantee of free movement of

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humanitarian assistance,

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Mountains to facilitate the negotiation of the cease-fire and the relief and rehabilitation program”.4

It further reaffirmed the parties’ will to negotiate aninternationally monitored cease-fire agreement super-vised by a JMC, including third-party participation.5

More specifically, the principles of the cease-fireinclude the guarantee of free movement of civiliansand goods, including humanitarian assistance,through the Nuba Mountains. It also entails thecessation of:

▲ Hostilities, military movements includingreconnaissance and reinforcements, as well ashostile actions;

▲ All attacks by air or land, as well as acts of sabo-tage and the laying of mines;

▲ Attempts to occupy new ground positions andmovements of troops and resources from onelocation to another for reasons other than thesupply of food, clothing and medical supportfor military forces in the field;

▲ All acts of violence against or other abuse of thecivilian population, e.g. summary executions,torture, harassment, arbitrary detention andpersecution of civilians on the basis of ethnicorigin or political affiliation, incitement of ethnichatred, arming civilians, use of child soldiers,sexual violence, training of terrorists, genocide,and bombing of the civilian population;

▲ Supply of ammunition and weaponry and otherwar-related stores to the field;

▲ All hostile propaganda between parties, includingdefamatory, untruthful, or derogatory state-ments, both within and outside the country.6

The agreement further implies that “the Parties shallexercise control over all armed groups other than theirown forces within their respective zones of control”.They will also “promote the culture of peace andrespect for civil and political rights and freedoms inthose zones” while “the cessation of hostilities shall beregulated and monitored through the Joint MilitaryCommission (JMC)”.7 As indicated above, the CFA hasheld up surprisingly well so far.

The JMC

The JMC is part of the body supervising the imple-mentation of the CFA, again is indirectly part of agreater Sudanese peace agreement currently beingworked on (which is beyond the scope of this article).

The initial key tasks of the JMC can be summarisedas follows:

1. Determining the location of combatants as ofthe effective date of the Agreement.

2. Verifying disengagement of combatants.3. Monitoring and reporting on the redeployment

of combatants from combat positions todefensive positions.

4. Monitoring and reporting on the storage ofarms, munitions and equipment.

5. Supervising the mapping and clearance of mines.6. Inspecting all supplies to both Parties.7. Approving all flights destined to the Nuba

Mountains and assuring notification to theParties.

8. Coordinating all military movements in theNuba Mountains.

9. Resolving disputes concerning the implementa-tion of the Agreement, including the investiga-tion of any alleged violation.

10. Facilitating liaison between the Parties for thepurposes of the Agreement.8

The leadership of the JMC is composed of threerepresentatives from each party to the conflict andan international Chairman with two Vice-Chairmen– the latter three internationals appointed in consul-tation with the parties. Both theHead of Mission (HoM) of theJMM and Chairman of the JMCis currently, and has been sincethe start, Brigadier-General J.E.Wilhelmsen from Norway. TheJMC comprises a Central JMC,of which the leadership and asupport staff are part,9 as wellnumerous Local JMCs workingin different sectors of the Nuba Mountains.

There are several aspects to the JMC that make itsomewhat unique. First of all, it is not mandated bythe UN, as most international peace initiatives aretoday – especially if it involves military troops on theground. Second, in the absence of a comprehensivepeace agreement, the CFA was brokered outside acomprehensive Sudanese peace-making framework. Itwas actually primarily agreed upon on humanitariangrounds and as a confidence-building measure.

Another special quality about the JMC is itsmixed structure. About forty unarmed observers are

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breaches of the agreement

and the parties to the conflict

and the local population

seem fairly content”

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currently part of the JMC, where Local JMC teamswork in groups of three, consisting of one representative from each of the Sudanese partiesand one international staff member from the IMU.According to Brigadier-General Wilhelmsen, theteams exist of monitors who overlook the CFA bypatrolling by helicopters, in cars and on foot.10 And,as the CFA states, “They [the Local JMCs] shall beresponsible for observing and reporting to theSector JMCs on compliance with cease-fire and forresolving disputes concerning the [CFA] in theirdesignated areas of responsibility”.11

The JMM/JMC is also supported politically bythe so-called Friends of the Nuba Mountains. This iscomposed of several diplomats based in Khartoum,representing the countries sponsoring the JMM,including numerous European countries, Canadaand the USA. This support is meant to lend credi-bility and leverage to the Nuba cease-fire agreementas well as to the more comprehensive peace processunderway in regard to the entire Sudan.

A Surprising Success?

As alluded to above, the JMM/JMC’s implementa-tion of the CFA is an overall success so far. Therehave been no serious breaches of the agreement andthe parties to the conflict and the local populationseem fairly content with the agreement and thegeneral situation.

The fact that the conflict has many parties andseveral complicating factors, combined with the fewresources the JMC has available – including only a

limited number of unarmedpersonnel – to control a rela-tively big area, is what makesthe success of the JMC unique.

Battle fatigue and stale-mate, which might have madethe conflict somewhat ripe forsettlement, is not to be under-estimated. Yet, consideringthat the war in the Nuba areaof Southern Kordofan, located

in south-central Sudan, was sealed off from theoutside world and that humanitarian access toSPLM/N-controlled areas of the mountain regionwas denied for long periods over the last 15 years,few believed an agreement could be signed, let aloneheld.12 Despite some tense moments, the January

2002 CFA has survived its first two years.13

Although this model might not work elsewhere –not even elsewhere in Sudan – the success of thecease-fire agreement monitored by the JMC in theNuba Mountains makes it an important test casethat deserves further and more detailed attention.Yet, regardless of its overall success, many observers,from the military as well as the civilian side, high-light various problems.

The Good News … and the ‘Not so Good’ News

Most people with knowledge or interest in theregion maintain that any appraisal must acknowl-edge the successes of the Nuba CFA. Among thesesuccesses, one expert includes:

… establishment of an international presence in such apolitically sensitive area; cessation of hostilities and areduction in violence; removal of the long-standinghumanitarian blockade; and arrest of the alarmingdecline of the food security situation in SPLM/A-controlled parts of the mountain region.14

He adds that the CFA also

… brought about the formulation of a novel frameworkto guide humanitarian and development actorsresponding to the new conditions. This integratedprogramme design, the Nuba Mountains ProgrammeAdvancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT), hasmoved beyond the parameters of the Operation LifelineSudan (OLS) tripartite agreement for humanitarianaccess – between the government, the SPLM/A and theUnited Nations – by introducing a ‘peace building’approach and addressing issues across the lines ofconflict from both sides.15

Although there have been few breaches of the CFAand the aid community is present in the area, thereare still serious ongoing problems. Brigadier-General Wilhelmsen, naturally being more on themilitary side of the equation, points out that theneed for humanitarian assistance is still enormous.He does not hide his frustration, almost helpless-ness, with the aid community when he says that“Sudan is knowingly one of the poorest countries inthe world and that is why it is essential that particularly the aid organisations get on the ball.”

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“The success of the cease-

fire agreement monitored

by the JMC in the Nuba

Mountains makes it an

important test case”

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More specifically, Wilhelmsen expresses immenseconcern over the slowness of the humanitarianorganisations, and says that: “for us in the military –who expect results, fast results on every decisionmade – it is at times very frustrating to see that themost basic necessities for survival do not reach peoplewho suffer. The way the international community can show that it believes in peace is to help on thehumanitarian side.”16

With regard to the humanitarian side, a numberof actors engaged in the Nuba Mountains have drawnattention to various other shortcomings that couldundermine the agreement. These include:

▲ Inadequate explanation of the cease-fire to thewider Nuba community throughout Sudan,since the government portrayed it as a peaceagreement and the SPLM/A as a humanitariansettlement;

▲ Incomplete deployment of military forces in theNuba Mountains, according to the terms of theagreement;

▲ Excessive government-armed police presence(making the local population nervous) andcontroversial attempts by the JMC to integratethe police from both sides under an ambiguouslegal framework;

▲ Incidents of civilian harassment and impededmovement;

▲ Unclear administrative procedures for civiliansin demilitarised zones of separation;

▲ Dissatisfaction with the manner in whichviolations are addressed through the JMCmechanism.17

In spite of these legitimate civilian and militaryconcerns, there is one broadly shared criticism – onethat appears to underlie many of the above-mentioned shortcomings of the cease-fire agree-ment. It has to do with the lack of routine andpersuasive political oversight by the countries thatsponsor the ceasefire agreement, particularly theFriends of the Nuba Mountains arrangementreferred to above. Many observers criticise it forbeing too passive, and not functioning as the neces-sary political “watchdog” that it is supposed to be.Without applying such leverage, it is hard for theJMC and humanitarian organisations to succeed insuch a sensitive environment. Lately, though, withthe somewhat positive indications of a comprehen-sive peace agreement being signed in the near future,the political leverage utilised will likely spill over toand influence the Nuba Mountains region as well.

On the other hand, somewhat complicatingmatters, is the fact that the region covered by the CFAlies within the disputed zone between northern andsouthern Sudan, which gives rise to contentiousclaims over boundaries and national ethnic identitiesspecific to the Nuba people. However, recent discus-sions and thinking about a comprehensive peaceagreement indicate that numerous constitutionalarrangements will be established and several borders

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demarcated. This would hopefully mean that anycease-fire arrangement, to include the one in the Nubaregion, would be rooted and included in a process tobring about an enduring peace in Sudan.

Conclusion

Before and at the inception of the cease-fire agree-ment, it appeared to many that the type of issuesunder contention would seriously undermine anychance of a successful signing and implementationof a CFA in the Nuba Mountains area. Yet, with itsunique mission, composition, organisation andstructure, the JMC, together with other involvedelements, has been able to implement the CFA inquite a remarkable manner.

By actively including both sides as well as interna-tional monitors in the implementation, combinedwith a relatively straightforward agreement, the partiesto the conflict have most likely felt a strong sense ofcontrol and ownership in a process they both –including local militias – agreed to be part of. Hence,few breaches have occurred, humanitarian aid is, albeitslowly, being brought in, mines are being cleared, andit looks as if the agreement can be part of an overallSudanese peace agreement in the near future.

Although not yet clear, there are strong indica-tions that the UN will soon be involved in a morecomprehensive manner in the peace process inSudan, if not even take over the process and imple-mentation entirely. Regardless of the UN’s futureinvolvement, and independently of what will happento the Nuba CFA and its implementation in the

future, the JMC efforts have proven that it might bepossible to achieve a lot with a limited mandate andfew resources. Maybe it was the timely luck of“ripeness”? Or perhaps it was the provision ofownership of the process to the parties? What we doknow is the simple fact that it worked quite well,and that it thus might be possible to apply such anapproach elsewhere. As alluded to above, eachconflict is unique, and hence necessitates its ownapproach. Yet, if exercised with caution, in applyingthe right lessons from the Nuba experience, thereshould be few logical arguments to stop the worldcommunity from trying it elsewhere.

Andreas Vogt is the Programme Director of the Training for Peace programme at the Norwegian Institute of Inter-national Affairs (NUPI)

Endnotes

1 ‘Sudan: Parties set 31 December as deadline for peace deal’,Pan African News Agency, 23 October 2003.

2 Estimates of people displaced since the mid-1990s vary between3.7 and 4.3 million people, and it appears that there have beenat least two million war-related deaths. Quantifying internallydisplaced populations in Sudan is complicated by traditionalnomadic migration patterns, as well as movements related topeople searching for emergency assistance, and is compoundedby sustained drought and other natural calamities. See ‘SUDAN:Problems and progress with civilian protection’, IRIN, available online atwww.irinnews.org/webspecials/civilprotect/Sudan12.asp.

3 ‘SUDAN: IDPs on the edge of peace?’, Global IDP Database,available online atwww.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/SudanProfile+Summary.

4 Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement, available online atwww.sudan.net/news/press/postedr/83.shtml.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 The support staff includes teams that deal with logistics, transporta-tion, information, operations, and legal and compliance issues.

10 Inge Bjerklund, ‘Den ‘Glemte’ Freden’, 12 May 2002, availableonline atwww.mil.no/felles/fokiv/start/article.jhtml?articleID=33279.

11 Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement.

12 ‘SUDAN: Nuba ceasefire experience suggests points to ponder’,IRIN, available online atwww.irinnews.org/webspecials/sudan/nubaceasefire.asp.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Bjerklund 2002.

17 ‘SUDAN: Nuba ceasefire experience suggests points to ponder’.

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43

n the post-Cold War era, with its characteristicproliferation of civil wars and intra-stateconflicts, the erstwhile application of post-conflict reconstruction has become antiquated.

The contemporary nature of wars now demandsmore holistic and innovative approaches to recon-struction efforts, beyond rebuilding physical infrastructure, to strengthening institutional andsocial infrastructures in areas where they alreadyexist or fostering an enabling environment for theircreation in more extreme cases.

Defined in broad terms, post-conflict recon-struction entails those exercises undertaken afterhostilities have ceased in order to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace and to put a countryback on the path of institutional functionality,macro-economic stability and development. Post-conflict reconstruction goes beyond ensuring thathumanitarian aid is delivered, security is stabilised,elections are held and “democracy” is off to a start.

In fact, it is my argument here that these events onlymark the beginning of the process. A successfulpost-conflict rebuilding project is one which setseffective foundations for democracy, economicprosperity, peace and justice to take root in societiesin transition. It is crucial for long-term sustain-ability that the reconstruction effort is locallyconceived of and led. The impact of internationalresponses to reconstruction represents a dynamicfactor in the process, due to the sheer number ofagencies with varying agendas and capacitiesinvolved in individual situations, which has oftenhad negative consequences for successful imple-mentation. Furthermore, the pattern of interna-tional funding of reconstruction also represents aphenomenon with ambiguous consequences thatpotentially can complicate any rational planningprocess within nascent governments that have alimited capacity at the best of times.1

Each post-conflict society is unique in its needs

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and thus the reconstruction project must be tailoredaccordingly. Nonetheless, there are some overridingcharacteristics which mandate certain necessary steps.These include the following factors:

▲ Security is often not a constant. Guaranteeingsecurity is a more elusive target since an atmos-phere of security is a long-term project thatimproves as progress is made on a number ofother socio-economic factors such as theeffecting of justice, reconciliation, and reintegra-tion of ex-combatants. The transition to peace isoften characterised by insecurity, uncertainty,and repeated cycles of violence. However, this is avery crucial first step because it is only in a secureenvironment that the next sequence of eventscan take place.

▲ Economic distortions and skewed incomedistribution are often widespread as a result of a number of factors such as international sanctions imposed on the particular country,perhaps as a means to coerce a cease-fire, andrent-seeking behaviours in the distribution ofresources during the conflict such as in SierraLeone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo.

▲ Human capital for reconstruction tasks is scarceor contentious.

▲ Societies and their populations are highly traumatised and militarised due to the fact thatvictims and perpetrators are often undistin-guishable. This creates an environment ofpotential violence, distrust and insecurity.

▲ Conflict is cyclical; many African countries havereturned to conflict after unsuccessful attemptsat reconstruction, which makes it necessary totake into account in any peace-building attemptthe dynamics of the conflict, that is, the charac-teristics of victims, warring factions, perpetra-tors, and the inequities and schisms that lead to a build-up of tensions and the escalation into conflict.

Rwanda as a country in transition once had all ofthe above-mentioned characteristics. It emergedfrom the 1994 genocide with a highly militarised,traumatised and displaced populace and very fewintellectuals or professionals to partake in thereconstruction of its country. It has been nine yearssince the events that cumulated in the systematickillings of some one million Tutsis and moderateHutus in one of the worst genocidal campaigns of

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PEACEBUILDING

the century. Rwanda has managed to pull itself upagain by its own bootstraps; provided a bold visionfor reconstruction and development, re-establishedpeace and security; and put in place mechanisms foreffective governance that ensure inclusive andparticipatory policies at all levels. Although Rwanda,like most post-conflict societies emerging fromdevastating conflict with all its challenges, has theusual buzz of international workers, donors, andaid agencies, the framework of the reconstructioneffort has largely been government-induced andcommunity-led. The various instruments that havebeen formulated to achieve the above goals include:

▲ The Unity and Reconciliation Commissionenacted in March 1999 to undertake the task offostering dialogue on the historical dimensionsand causes of the conflict with the aim ofpromoting unity among the people of Rwandaand utilising the materials gathered for educa-tional purposes.

▲ The Legal and Constitutional Commission estab-lished to consult with the population at all levelsof society to propose the constitutional arrange-ments for a democratic society, thereby empow-ering people in the democratic process as a result.

▲ The creation of Gacaca jurisdictions to utilisetraditional methods of justice (Gacaca) to clearthe bulk of the cases of genocide suspects, sowthe seeds for the restoration of peace and unity,and reintegrate perpetrators into society. Thisinvolves community-based councils adjudi-cating cases that provide punitive measures forthose convicted and allows them to spend aportion of their sentence performing commu-nity service tasks. Gacaca works on four levels –cell, sector, district and provincial – dealing withcrimes ranging from property abuse to rape, butstopping short of the cases of the political lead-ership behind the killing, which are handled bythe National courts.

▲ A Poverty Reduction Strategy that has three mainprogrammes: governance; rural economic trans-formation and labour-intensive public works;and decentralisation through the common devel-opment fund (CDF). This forms an instructivebasis for Rwanda’s current macro-economic plan,which has a very strong bottom-up approach toensure grass-roots poverty alleviation initiativessuch as Ubudehe.2 One of the amazing fruits that

have already been borne out of this strategy is theButare pilot, run by the Ministry of LocalGovernment and Social Affairs to facilitatedecentralisation and community-level develop-ment processes. In the Butare pilot, communitiesprioritise the areas they desire to put their ownresources and energy into resolving, after whichthey develop a community-level action plan to addressthese issues. This plan formsthe basis of discussion fordeveloping a solution by thecommunity, complementedby the appropriate technicaland scientific knowledge tohelp find the most appro-priate solutions. These exer-cises so far have identified pressing issues such assoil fertility and health. The Ministry of LocalGovernment and Social Affairs, in collaborationwith other related ministries, plans to developresponse packages of information that will helpcommunities finalise their action plans andimplement them. This is a good instance ofempowering communities to act collectively forthe benefit of economic development as part ofpost-conflict reconstruction.

For the people of Rwanda, building a sustainablepeace is defined in similar terms to other post-conflict societies: re-building a political framework,

AFP

“It has been nine years

since the events that

cumulated in the systematic

killings of some one million

Tutsis and moderate Hutus”

46

including a revision of the constitution; ensuring aworking social contract; resettling refugees anddisplaced persons; disarmament, demobilisationand reintegration of ex-combatants, and ensuringeconomic redress. However, the most importantelement for Rwandans is the “never again” elementenshrined in the attempts to rebuild society.Rwandans place a strong emphasis on breakingaway from the destructive and divisive ideology ofthe past that pitted one group against the other. Inaddition, there is an element of denial that in somecases is curiously flagged by a rationalisation of whyidentity was delineated as such and preferentialtreatment accorded to one group at the expense ofthe others. In the same vein, denial manifests itselfin some Rwandans’ apparent ignorance of pastevents, ideologies that ran counter to the nationalspirit. Thus, much like the South African healingprocess, the Rwandan efforts at rebuilding areheavily geared towards acknowledgement, discus-sion, and cohabitation of truth in order to under-stand past events and prevent their recurrence. It isimportant to note the significance of this dynamic;

these are not goals that could beachieved simply by signing apeace accord or by forming arepresentative government,symbolic and crucial as thesemay be. The real milestonesbegin with the implementationstage, whereby every individualis made to count, under-standing the meaning andworkings of the ideals that havebeen set forth. The culminationof this occurs when individuals,

communities and the nation at large is able to liveby and embody the principles in the documents thatthe warring factions signed.

The aim of the Gacaca system is twofold: toinvolve the community in establishing the truth,promoting reconciliation in the process; and tospeed up trials and decongest the prisons. It iscertainly doing the latter, as earlier this year thou-sands of prisoners were released by a presidentialdecree to go back to their communities to be cate-gorised and face justice in their communities. Theprisoners released were mostly the old and sick,those who by virtue of being in prison for someeight years may have served the appropriate term for

their crime, and the young. This also constituted anact of effective leadership, demonstrating necessarycompromise, on the part of the government, and apromotion of the need for the eventual reintegra-tion of perpetrators into their communities. Eventhis action did not unleash the social turmoil thatthe doomsday prophets spoke of. Moreover, thecategories of persons most affected by the process –the prisoners, the survivors, and all Rwandancommunities – seem to largely favour and supportGacaca. At the very least, the Gacaca law contains apolitically and astutely designed set of incentives toencourage popular participation, social cohesionand acceptance. The confessions procedure, with itsrequirement for complete confession, including thenames of all people involved in the crime, is alreadysetting in motion an avalanche of confessions,including the implication of other people, which islikely to lead to significant debates as people seek toexplain themselves, implicate others, contextualiseevents, and so on. Hence the Gacaca procedurepromises to produce more truth than the formaljustice system has so far managed to do. In addition,the confessions procedure and the communityservice commutation option bring significant reduc-tions in the length of prison sentences, even forthose found guilty. As a result, many people shouldbe able to finally rejoin their families and participatein the reconstruction of their communities.

Gacaca holds untold potential for solving theproblem of slow judicial practice and for creatingsignificant benefits in terms of truth, reconcilia-tion, and even community and individual empower-ment. Communities turn out in great numbers towitness proceedings and are quite co-operative inparticipating as members of the general assembly.Gacaca may not be able to satisfy international standards of justice, but it will bring catharsis to thevictims of the genocide, as accusers face the accusedand torturers the tortured. The main challenge toGacaca, other than financial and socio-economicfactors, could be the absence of formal traumacounselling for the judges and members of thegeneral assembly. However, this is hardly financiallyfeasible at the moment and perhaps redundant byvirtue of the main tenets of a system like Gacaca: achance for communities to heal themselves byspeaking openly and honestly about past demons. Itcould very well mean a thorough exorcism of hatepolitics because everyone has to confront the evil it

“Rwandans place a strong

emphasis on breaking

away from the destructive

and divisive ideology of

the past that pitted one

group against the other

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PEACEBUILDING

has caused. In the 20th century’s landmark Nuremberg

trials, Nazi leaders were prosecuted for the system-atic murder of millions of Jews. However, forged outof the rubble of World War II, the trials were adistant affair to many of those struggling to rebuildtheir lives and communities. In contrast, Rwandansare choosing to honour their healing process. Long-term stability might well result. As theInyagamugayos3 of a cell Gacaca in Kigali Provincenoted, Gacaca has created a forum for people tocome together on a constant basis; to feel part of thesame system and to build a future together. Theyonly hope that every effort to assist Rwanda in exorcising its demons could be harmonised in theirprocesses to attain peace and justice, i.e. Gacaca, theSupreme Court and the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda, based in Arusha, Tanzania.

At this juncture, it is too early to say how well thecountry will fare. Nonetheless, there are more obvioussuccesses and opportunities, as the window forchange is shrinking, such as the adoption of the newconstitution in July 2003 and the conducting of elections in September 2003. More recently, there wasalso a symbolic gesture of reconciliation from rebelcommander Paul Rwarakabije,4 returning from theeastern DRC, who says that his decision to return toKigali was based on a desire to further his goals andthe interests of his constituency by working withinthe newly elected government. This is a developmentthat no doubt will ease the return of more refuges andmilitants to join in the rebuilding of their country.

In the same vein, there are some challenges thathave to be addressed if Rwanda is to succeed andsustain its post-conflict reconstruction. These includeregional peace and security in the Great Lakes; especially in the DRC, northern Uganda and Burundi;poverty alleviation and economic rehabilitation; thechallenges of restorative vs. retributive justice; the roleof the international community, especially throughthe work of the ICTR; better co-ordination betweenthe ICTR and peace-building and judicial processwithin Rwanda; and the continued denial of responsibility by certain incumbent groups such asex-government officials and ex-FAR (Rwandan ArmedForces) militias still at large.

Among outside viewers, there are concerns for thestability of the reconstruction process as the revolu-tionary methods of Gacaca continue, as well asconcerns for the protection of the rights of individuals

within their communities. Nonetheless Rwanda,much like its counterpart, South Africa, has a formulafor success as long as it continues to have a united,committed, disciplined and driven leadership toremind the Rwandan people of their achievementsand continuously energise them in dealing with thechallenges that still abound.Rwanda continues to see thefruits of opting for a locallyconceived and driven post-conflict reconstruction frame-work as the priorities of itspoor government are the prior-ities identified by the peopleand the sense of security fromretaliation, both internal andexternal, as well as recourse toviolence are continuously strengthened within a rela-tively volatile Great Lakes region. Consensus building,coupled with social delivery and a constant redefini-tion and revisiting of the social contract between thegovernment and its people, and among citizens aswell, will ensure that no one is marginalised in theprocess, and grievances and greed are sufficientlychannelled through the appropriate institutions, asthe outbreak of conflict is a clear indication of thebreakdown of social cohesion in a society.

Oghogho Edomwonyi is an intern with the PeacekeepingProgramme at ACCORD, who has spent time in Rwandaworking at the Gacaca Courts Head Office in Kigali.

Endnotes

1 S. Holtzman, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Social Policy andResettlement Division, Environment Development Work inProgress.

2 Ubudehe is a local initiative that invests in community-ledprogrammes geared towards encouraging local entrepreneurs,farmers and the like to be proactive in their economic empower-ment by identifying point of emphasis and priority for investment.

3 Inyagamugay’s is a Kinyarwandan word for “honest persons”,and it used in this context to mean the judges who serve ingroups of twelve and are elected from among the men andwomen over 18 years of age who are not incriminated in thegenocide, have good standing in the communities and do nothold any political office.

4 Rebel commander Paul Rwarakabije returned with 103 fightersof his movement, the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda,which had been based in eastern Congo for nine years. It wasestablished following the flight of Hutu extremists to the Congoafter the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Seewww.allafrica.com/stories/200311180406.html.

“Gacaca may not be able to

satisfy international standards of

justice, but it will bring catharsis

to the victims of the genocide,

as accusers face the accused

and torturers the tortured”

he reasons for military interventions (militoc-racy) in Africa are as varied as they arecomplex. They range from personal griev-ances to the political and economic kleptoc-

racy of civilian regimes. In a struggle to cope with thispredicament between the devil of tyranny (as in one-party systems) and the deep sea of anarchy (as inmultiparty systems) military rule has often beeninvoked. The balance sheet has largely been negative,with very few being benign, that is serving the inter-ests of the people whether in a short or long politicallife span.

Soldiers as Power-Mongers

The 1960 civilian leadership in Africa was basicallypan-African to the extent that some failed to cover

enough ground in their own national territories.This gave leeway to soldiers as power-mongers.Among the prominent military take-overs in the1960s were those in Congo (Kinshasa) in November1965 by Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu, and in the same year in Algeria by Colonel HouariBoummedienne; in Nigeria in January 1966 byMajor Nzeogwu followed later by a counter-coup byMajor-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi; a month laterin Ghana by Colonel Akwasi Amankwaah Afrifa; inTogo in January 1967 by Lieutenant ColonelEtienne Gnassingbe Eyadema; in Mali in 1968 byLieutenant Moussa Traore; and in Libya inSeptember 1969 by Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi.

The symbol of benign militocracy in this epochis Muammar Ghaddafi. He, with a small group ofunknown young officers, overthrew the monarchy

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COMMENTARY B Y M WA L I M U N G WA N E

the military and African politics

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T

for militocracy, and the only way the military couldbe excluded was through national constitutionalreforms. The 1990s were therefore years of nationaldebate. That debate was to provide Africa with ademocratic system which would enable it to aspireto a stable political and economic future.Unfortunately most Africanleaders refused to budge andwhere they did, it was for polit-ical convenience not conviction,and so the military rode on.

The 1990–2000 civilianleadership in Africa is basicallyglobalist to the extent that ithas yielded its power to interna-tional donors. The masses havewatched how their independ-ence gains have been pillaged bythe ‘axis of economic evil’ (the InternationalMonetary Fund, World Bank, and World TradeOrganization); they have watched with pain theirrepublican institutions turned into burdens ofmonarchy; they have watched in distress how theirhumble leaders have transformed themselves intodemi-gods. The social democracy that the masseswere advocating has become so neo-liberal that theonly (dis)credit one can give multipartyism ishaving expanded both the economic and politicalspace for a simpering elite (across the politicaldivide). This simpering elite thrives on electionmanipulation, social exclusion and brazen corrup-tion. If the masses were helpless the soldiersthought they still could make a contribution tonational life.

Prominent among the military coups in the1990s were Mali’s 1991 coup by Ahmadou ToumaniToure; Nigeria’s 1993 coup by General Sani Abacha;the 1997 coup in Zaire (now the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo) by Laurent Désiré Kabila;and Sierra Leone’s series of coups embodied byFoday Sankoh. The most benign of these wasAhmadou Toumani Toure who took power,installed a national conference, and the followingyear left the scene for civilian rule. That he cameback in 2001 as elected leader is proof of hischarisma and political vision.

Soldiers as Statesmen

Africa has tried both the single party (where there

COMMENTARY

of King Idris I to establish a participatory democracybased on people’s congresses and committees. Stillthe leader of Libya today, Ghaddafi has succeeded inwresting power from the former colonialists byexploiting Libyan wealth and putting it at thedisposal of the citizens. The results are for anyone(not wearing neo-colonial blinkers) to see.

Soldiers as Power-Brokers

The 1970–1980 civilian leadership in Africa wasbasically nationalist to the extent that it wanted tohave a tyrannical grip on every facet of national life.Torn between the exigencies of “under the tree” ruleand the pressures of Cold War politics, the leader-ship opened avenues for soldiers to step in aspower-brokers. Prominent among the militarycoups in the 1970s were the experiences in Ugandain 1971 by Idi Amin Dada; in Ethiopia in 1974 byColonel Mengistu Haile Mariam; in Nigeria in July1975 by General Muhammad Murtala; and inGhana in 1979 by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings.The most benign of these take-overs was that ofMuhammad Murtala. General Murtala’s eight-month government gained a reputation forintegrity and commitment to radical change andwas welcomed by most Nigerians.

In the 1980s, there were take-overs in Liberia inApril 1980 by Master-Sergeant Samuel K. Doe; inGhana in 1981 once again by Rawlings; in Nigeriain 1983 by Major-General Muhammad Buhari, andin 1986 by General Ibrahim Babaginda; in BurkinaFaso in 1983 by Captain Thomas Sankara; inGuinea in 1984 by Colonel Lansana Conte; and inthe same year in Uganda by Yoweri Museveni.

The most spectacular of military rules in the1980s was that of Captain Thomas Sankara. Heinstituted a nation in which all citizens participatedin its development and brought the masses intopolitical and economic decision-making. He lastedin power only four years.

Soldiers as Power-Sharers

In spite of some of the positive records of militaryrule, it has been observed that the military shouldstick to their legitimate places in the barracks. Theyshould return to their roles as protectors of statesecurity, not as custodians of political power. Thepeople of Africa saw the one-party tyranny as a front

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“In spite of some of the

positive records of military

rule, it has been observed

that the military should

stick to their legitimate

places in the barracks”

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was discipline with-outdemocracy) and multi-party system (where thereis liberalisation withoutdiscipline) but the militaryseldom remained in thebarracks. National debateswere deferred until the late1990s. In 1999, Ghaddafi –who thought the gainsAfrican countries hadmade during independ-ence had all been lost backto the colonialists – calledfor continental debate.One of the main things tocome out of Sirte was thetransformation of the

Organisation of African Unity into the AfricanUnion. Among the 33 articles that were adopted in the African Union Treaty was Article 30:“Governments which shall come to power throughunconstitutional means shall not be allowed toparticipate in the activities of the Union.” Was theword ‘unconstitutional’ to mean just coming topower by the bullet?

In spite of this resolution, the wave of militarycoups continues even in twenty-first century Africa.The early years of the new century saw coups fromRobert Guei followed by Guillaume Soro in Côted’Ivoire, from François Bozize in Central AfricanRepublic, from Sekou Damateh Conneh in Liberia(although the transition is now manned by a civilian businessman, Gyude Bryant), and GeneralVerissimo Conneia Seabra in Guinea Bissau, with atransition also manned by a civilian businessman.

From the utterances of these coup leaders, thereseems to be a return to benign militocracy. The coupleaders are all establishing a short-term transitionduring which there will be a national debate,national catharsis and national reconciliation.Strangely, the coup leaders are enjoying maximumco-operation not only from their citizens, but recog-nition and support as well from regional bodies inthe continent. The central African organ, CEMAC,gave Bozize the red-carpet treatment after he oustedelected leader Ange Patasse, who sought politicalasylum first in Cameroon and then in Togo. The West African organ, ECOWAS, yielded to rebelpressure and presided over the departure of

democratically elected leader Charles Taylor fromLiberia. Taylor has now found asylum in Nigeria.ECOWAS also negotiated the smooth resignationfrom power by Kumba Yala in Guinea-Bissau tomake way for a rebel-led agenda.

In the 1960s–1980s, coups were quickly anddecisively condemned, but what is happening todaythat ‘young Turks’ are given more prominence thanopposition leaders? Is the African Union holdingthe tenets of the African Peer Review Mechanismmore to its chest than Article 30 of its treaty?Should we not now agree with Antonio deFigueredo, Basil Davidson, Claude Ake, ThandikaMkandawire, Adebayo Olukoshi, Samir Amin,Kwesi Prah, Micere Mugo and other African revi-sionist scholars that Africa’s real political and devel-opment problem lies in copying the wrongborrowed Western models?

In presiding over transition periods, the twenty-first century military must move from being benignsoldiers to visionary statesmen. Transition periods arenot only meant to establish civilian election calendars.They are avenues to re-examine and reconsider ourmodels of democracy and development, which so farhave served Western countries and their Africanlackeys in power. Transition governments have theadvantage of practising consensual democracy (noparty ideology) and proposing home developmentmodels. So what works for a transitional governmentcan work for a permanent government.

Finally, militocracy, whether benign or malign,has no legal binding; it is not the people’s bestchoice, but as long as democratic avenues aregagged by truncated elections and constitutionalpanel-beating, and as long as civilian leadership inAfrica is by grotesque routine instead of bygrandiose reform, the military will remain thepeople’s hidden choice.

Militocracy, whether benign or malign, is adangerous trend but as long as the weak civil society ispauperised and emasculated by civilian (mis)rule, themasses will be tempted to yield their voices to benignmilitocracy in the hope that the bloodless bullet willsilence the fraudulent ballot and bring to nationaldebate, the unanswered questions of what independ-ence, democracy, citizenship, justice, and economicempowerment mean to the people of Africa.

Mwalimu Ngwane is a writer and pan-Africanist, andauthor of a new book, Way forward for Africa (2003).

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