conflict trends I 1

EDITORIAL 2 byVasuGounden

3 TheEmergingUN/AUPeacekeepingPartnership

byCedricdeConing

11 CommunityReintegrationModelsforEx-militias:Lessons

fortheNigerDeltaandotherdividedsocieties

byDonJohnOmale

19 Zimbabwe’sIllusiveNationalHealingandReconciliation

Processes:FromIndependencetotheInclusiveGovernment

1980–2009

byTerenceMMashingaidze

28 ADeltaofaMinefield:OilResourceConflictandthe

PoliticsofAmnestyinNigeria

byAgaptusNwozor

36 FederalismandConflictsinEthiopia

byMehariTaddeleMaru

46 Post-warSecuritySectorReforminLiberia:Development

andChallenges

byIbrahimAl-BakriNyei

55 TheMediaandConflictsinCentralAfrica

byPauloNunoVicente

FEATURES

BOOK REVIEW

CT1|2010 CONTENTS

Cover:LiberiansUnitedforReconciliationandDemocracy(LURD)chiefofstaff,GeneralPrinceSiho(L)handsoverhisweapontoUNMILforcecommander,GeneralDanielOpande.

PICTure:GeTTyIMAGes

2 I conflict trends

On18February2010, themilitary inNiger, ledbyMajor

salou Djibo and Colonel Adamou Harouna, overthrew

thegovernmentofPresidentMamadouTandja.Thecoup

followedayear-longpoliticalcrisisinNigerthatarosefrom

PresidentTandja’seffortstoextendhismandatebeyond

December 2009, when his second term was originally

scheduledtoend.PresidentTandjadissolvedtheNational

AssemblyinMay2009andsubsequentlyappointedanew

ConstitutionalCourt,enablinghimtopushforwardwitha

constitutionalreferenduminAugust2009thatextended

his mandate for an additional three years. The new

constitutionalsoenhancedTandja’spowerbyscrapping

thesemi-presidentialsystemofgovernmentinfavourofa

presidentialsystem.MrTandja,aformerarmyofficer,was

firstvotedintoofficein1999,andwasreturnedtopowerin

anelectionin2004.Nigerhasexperiencedlongperiodsof

militaryrulesinceindependencefromFrancein1960.

The coup in Niger follows a series of coups and

unconstitutional changes in government in Africa. On

6August2009,seniormilitaryofficersinMauritania,led

byGeneralMohamedOuldAbdelAziz,overthrewPresident

sidiMohamedOuldCheikhAbdallahi,whocametopower

inMarch2007.GeneralAzizhadledtheAugust2005coup

thatoustedPresidentMaaouyasid’AhmedOuldTaya’s,

whohadbeeninpowerfor21years.Mauritaniahasalong

historyofcoups,withthemilitaryinvolvedinnearlyevery

governmentsinceitsindependencefromFrancein1960.

On23December2008,juniormilitaryofficersinGuinea,

ledbyCaptainMoussaDadisCamara,overthrewPresident

LansanaConte,whohadcometopowerinamilitarycoup

inApril1984,immediatelyafterthedeathofthenation’s

firstpresident,AhmedsekouToure,theleaderoftheruling

DemocraticPartyofGuinea(PDG).

On 10 March 2009, the mayor of Antananarivo,

Andry rajoelina, led the unconstitutional change of

the government of President Marc ravalomanana.

ravalomanana was f irst elected as the mayor of

Madagascar’scapital,Antananarivo,andwasthendeclared

thewinnerofthefirstroundofa2001presidentialelection.

However, he only took up the presidency in 2002, after

incumbentDidierratsirakagaveupaviolentstruggleto

keeppowerandfledthecountry.Presidentravalomanana

wasre-electedin2006.

These coups and unconstitutional changes of

government mark a disturbing trend in Africa. It takes

Africaback to thepost-independencedaysof the1960s

and1970swhenAfrica,alongsideLatinAmerica,gained

areputationforcoupsand,consequently,theunwelcome

anddangerousinvolvementofthemilitaryinpolitics.

The 1990s saw a decline in the number of coups in

Africa, which also coincided with the dismantling of

severalone-partystatesandtheresurgenceofmultiparty

democracy.Thispositivetrendinthe1990sculminatedin

thebirthoftheAfricanunionin2000,throughtheadoption

oftheConstitutiveActoftheAfricanunion.TheAfrican

unionreplacedtheOrganisationofAfricaunity,whichwas

foundedin1963.

Given the history of coups and unconstitutional

changes of governments in the 1960s and 1970s, the

foundingfathersoftheAfricanuniondecidedtoaddress

this issue by enshrining, as one of the principles of

the African union, the “condemnation and rejection of

unconstitutional changes of governments”. In addition,

theysetasoneoftheobjectivesoftheAfricanunionthe

needto“promotedemocraticprinciplesandinstitutions,

popularparticipationandgoodgovernance”.

Thisprincipleandobjective,amongotherssetbythe

African union, is commendable. However, as we have

witnessed,afteralmosttwodecadesofadeclineincoups

andalmosteightyearsaftertheAfricanunionmadethese

declarations,wehavenotarrested thisnegative legacy.

Whilewecanandmustcondemntheseunconstitutional

changesofgovernment,itisincumbentonusalsotolook

atthecausesoftheseunconstitutionalchanges.

eachofthefourcountriescitedaboveareamongthe

poorestcountries intheworld,yetallareendowedwith

sufficientbeneficialnaturalresources.Iftheseresources

aremanagedproperlythroughgoodgovernance,andtheir

benefits accrueequitably to thenationasawhole, this

willassist inaddressing theunderlyingcausesof these

unconstitutionalchangesofgovernment.

Therefore,wehavetostrivetobuildasetofnormative

rulesandvaluesandgeneratethecollectivepoliticalwillof

thepeopleofAfricatoholdourpublicofficialsaccountable

forthenegativeconsequencesof theseunconstitutional

changes.Wemustaddressboththemanifestationofthe

problemandthecauseifwearetomoveAfricaforward.

ByvASUGOUNDEN

EdiTOrial

vasuGoundenistheFounderandExecutiveDirectorofACCORD.

conflict trends I 3

In the last few years, cooperation between the united

Nations(uN)andtheAfricanunion(Au)hasdeveloped

intoameaningful,practicalandpragmaticpartnership.

Manygoodintentions,especiallyonesaboutcoordination

and cooperation, fail to get off the ground because of

bureaucraticwrangling, infightingandpreoccupations

with control. In this case, cooperation seems to work

becauseitismotivatedbynecessity.

TheuNandAuneedeachother.eightoftheuN’s15

peacekeepingoperationsareinAfrica.Thisincludessix

oftheuN’ssevenlargestpeaceoperations,andexplains

why75%of theapproximately115000military,police

THeeMerGINGuN/AuPeACeKeePING

PArTNersHIPByCEDRICDECONING

Above: Missions administered by the United NationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations.

UNMIS

unitedNations

Missioninthe

sudan

MINURSO

unitedNations

Missionforthe

referendumin

Westernsahara

MINUSTAH

unitedNations

stabilization

MissioninHaiti

MINURCAT

unitedNations

Missioninthe

CentralAfrican

republicandChad

UNMIK

unitedNations

Interim

Administration

MissioninKosovo

UNFICYP

unitedNations

Peacekeeping

ForceinCyprus

UNIFIL

united

Nations

InterimForce

inLebanon

UNDOF

unitedNations

Disengagement

ObserverForce

insyria

UNMOGIP

unitedNationsMilitary

Observer Group in

IndiaandPakistan

UNMIL

unitedNations

Missionin

Liberia

UNOCI

unitedNations

Operationin

Côted’Ivoire

UNAMID

Africanunion/

unitedNations

HybridOperation

inDarfur

MONUC

unitedNations

Organization

Missioninthe

Democraticrepublic

oftheCongo

UNTSO

united

NationsTruce

supervision

Organization

intheMiddle

east

UNMIT

unitedNations

Integrated

Missionin

Timor-Leste

4 I conflict trends

andcivilianuNpeacekeeperscurrentlydeployedarein

Africa.TheemphasisonAfricaisalsoreflectedintheuN

peacekeepingbudget.Of theapproximateus$8billion

budgetedfor2009,77%wasforoperationsinAfrica.1

Peacekeeping is also a dominant concern for the

Au. In the first decade since its founding, the Au has

undertakenthreemajorpeaceoperationsofitsown–in

Burundi(AMIB),sudan(AMIs)andsomalia(AMIsOM)–

involvingapproximately14000peacekeepersatatotal

costofapproximatelyus$900million.2Africa isalsoa

significanttroopcontributortouNpeaceoperations,with

34Africancountriescontributingapproximately28%of

theuN’suniformedpeacekeepers.

ComparativeAdvantages

TheAuhasaprovencapabilitytoundertakehigh-risk

stabilisation-typemissions–operationsaimedatsaving

livesandstabilising thesecuritysituation inacountry

beforealastingceasefireorpeaceagreementhasbeen

reached.Thesearepreciselythe‘no-peace-to-keep’type

missionsatwhichtheuNisparticularlybad,andthatthe

Brahimireportwarned theuNnot toundertake.3 It is

thusahugerelieftotheuNthattheAuiswillingtostep

intothisgap.However,theAuisunabletosustainthese

operations, because it does not yet have predictable

fundingmechanisms,and ithasnotyetdeveloped the

in-house mission-support capacity to backstop these

missions with the logistics, personnel and financial

systemsneededtomanagethem.

TheuN,on theotherhand,hasaprovencapability

tosustainpeacekeepingmissions,becauseithasaccess

to a predictable funding arrangement, the assessed-

contributionsystemtowhicheveryof the192member

states of the uN contribute, in proportion to their

gross domestic product (GDP). This financing system

has proven to be the uN’s single largest comparative

advantage.TheuNhasalsodevelopedauniquecapacity

to plan, sustain and drawdown large peacekeeping

missions, of ten in some of the most remote parts of

the world. In fact, this mission-support capacity is

BoubacarGaoussouDiarra(C),SpecialRepresentativeoftheChairpersonoftheAfricanUnionCommissionforSomalia,RamataneLamamra(R),CommissionerforPeaceandSecurity,AfricanUnionCommissionandAhmedouOuldAbdalla(L),SpecialEnvoyforSomaliaoftheUNSecretaryGeneral,visitthebaseoftheAfricanUnionCommissionforSomalia.

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conflict trends I 5

UgandansoldiersfromtheAfricanUnionrideinaconvoyofarmouredpersonnelcarriers,protectingUNofficialsduringatourofcampsforinternallydisplacedpeopleontheoutskirtsofMogadishu,theSomalicapital.

now housed in its own dedicated department – theuN’s Department of Field support – and, apart frompeacekeepingmissions,itisalsoresponsibleforafurther15specialpoliticalorpeacebuildingofficesinplaceslikePalestine,Nepal,Burundi,sierraLeoneandIraq.

It is thusnotsurprising thata trendhasdevelopedwhere Au peace operations first stabilise a conflict,whereaftertheuNdeploysapeacekeepingmissionthattakes on the longer-term responsibility for overseeingpost-conflictpeacebuilding.Thispatternwasestablishedin Burundi, where the Au deployed AMIB in 2003,followed by a uN operation (ONuB) in 2004; and wasrepeatedinLiberia,wheretheeconomicCommunityofWestAfricanstates(eCOWAs)deployedeCOMILin2003,followedbyauNoperation (uNMIL) later in thesameyear. This trend was again repeated in 2005 in Darfur,whentheAufirstdeployedAMIs,whichhandedovertotheuN/Auhybridmission,uNAMID,on1January2008.

Whathappens,however,whenthesituationremainstoo unstable for a uN operation to take over the Auoperation? This was the predicament faced initially inDarfur,anditisamajorchallengeinsomalia.InDarfur,

theuNsteppedintothebreachwhenitsupportedAMIswithfirstalight-support,andthenlater,aheavy-supportpackage. Insomalia, theuN issupportingadedicated

trust fund and a specialised support mission, the uN

supportOfficeforAMIsOM(uNsOA).4Hereweseethe

uN deploying a mission dedicated to supporting the

Au, using its comparative advantages to fill the gaps

in theAu’sowncapacity –namelyaccess to theuN’s

peacekeepingbudget,andspecialisedmission-support

expertise,experienceandsystems. InbothDarfurand

somalia,theuNhasdevelopedpragmaticandinnovative

wayswithwhichtosupporttheAu.

AnInnovativeUnitedNations

These innovations in theway that theuNsupports

Aupeacekeepingreflectmajorshiftsinglobalsecurity

partnerships,aswellassignificantdevelopmentsinuN

peacekeeping reform. uN peacekeeping has radically

transformeditselfsinceitsdramaticfailuresinsomalia,

rwanda and srebrenica.5At the end of the 1990s, the

uNhadonly20000peacekeepersandapeacekeeping

budgetofus$1billionperyear.Adecadelater,theuN

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6 I conflict trends

deployed approximately 11 times more peacekeepers

thantheAu,includingapproximately84000military,13

000policeand18000civilianpeacekeepers.Incontrast,

in2009theAuhadapproximately10000peacekeepers

andabudgetofapproximatelyus$500million.

One of the most significant, but often overlooked,

developmentsinuNpeacekeepingisthetransformation

frommilitary-tocivilian-ledmultidimensionalmissions.

TheuNintegrates thepolitical,security,development,

rule of law and governance dimensions under one

overarchingpeaceconsolidationframework.Incontrast,

Au,europeanunion(eu)andNATOpeaceeffortsarestill

primarilymilitaryoperations,whichalsoexplainswhy

theyarefocusedonstabilityoperations.Twentypercent

of uN peacekeepers are now civilian, compared to

approximatelyonepercentintheAuoperationsinDarfur

andsomalia.However,theAunowhasadedicatedeffort

supportedbyACCOrD’sTrainingforPeaceprogramme,

todeveloptheciviliandimensionofAupeaceoperations

further,especiallythroughtheAfricanstandbyForce.

As the scope of uN peacekeeping has expanded,

so has its challenges. some uN missions, like that in

Kashmir, have been operational for some 60 years,

and are small and relatively stable. Others, like the

Au/uN hybrid mission in Darfur (uNAMID), southern

sudan(uNMIs)andtheCongo(MONuC),arelargeand

dangerous. In2008,136uNpeacekeepersdied.As the

uN noted in a recent assessment, uN peacekeeping

is stretched like never before and is increasingly

called upon to deploy to remote, uncertain operating

environmentsandintovolatilepoliticalcontexts.6There

has been criticism that the security Council has been

tooquick to launchnewmissions,withoutadequately

assessing the consequences.7The scaleof the current

andnewly-emergingconflictsaresuchthattheneedfor

peacekeepingisunlikelytodecrease.TheuN,Au,euand

NATOwillbeunderincreasingpressuretofurtherexpand

theirpeacekeepingcapacitiesanddeployments.Allthis

comesatanincreaseincosts.

TheFinancingofPeaceOperations

Thesinglemost important factorwhenconsidering

thefutureofpeaceoperationsinAfricaiscost,andhow

theyare tobe financed. Ifweconsider thedemandfor

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UNpeacekeeperspatrolaroadinKibati,about25kmnorthoftheprovincialcapitalofGomaintheDRC.

conflict trends I 7

more and larger peace operations against the global

financial crises, theobvious conclusion is that theuN

andAuwillbeunderincreasingpressuretodomorewith

less.

Apositivedevelopmentinthisregardisthatunited

states (us) President Barack Obama has pledged to

transform the Bush administration’s poor relationship

withtheuN,andtoincreasehisadministration’ssupport

foruNpeacekeeping.Theus,europeandJapantogether

are responsible for approximately 88% of the uN’s

annual peacekeeping budget. In August 2009, susan

rice,Washington’sambassador to theuN,announced

that, despite the global financial crisis, the us is now

inaposition to clear all itspeacekeepingarrears, and

handoverus$2.2billioninnewandoldcontributionsto

theuN.

In an assessment system based on GDP, the us is

responsible for26%of theuN’speacekeepingbudget,

which implies an annual contribution under current

commitmentsofapproximatelyus$2billion.Although

thatisasignificantamount,itpalesincomparisonnext

tothecostoftheus’sownoperations.In2008,Iraqcost

ustaxpayersus$12.5billionamonthandAfghanistan

us$ 3.5 billion a month. 8 Ambassador rice pointed

out that, foreverydollar it costs theus tocarryouta

peacekeeping activity independently, it costs just 12

centstocarryoutthesametaskaspartofauNmission.

Another estimate indicates that the per capita cost

ofaNATOmission is five times thatofauNmission.9

Whilst thecostofuNandAupeaceoperations is thus

not insignif icant, they are ef f icient and convenient

investments for the major powers – and considerably

USPresidentObamalooksonasSouthKoreanPresidentLeespeakstotheUSAmbassadortotheUnitedNations,SusanRice,duringabilateralmeetinginSeoul.

AMBAssADOrrICePOINTeDOuTTHAT,

FOreVeryDOLLArITCOsTsTHeusTO

CArryOuTAPeACeKeePINGACTIVITy

INDePeNDeNTLy, IT COsTs JusT 12

CeNTsTOCArryOuTTHesAMeTAsK

As PArT OF A uN MIssION. ANOTHer

esTIMATe INDICATes THAT THe Per

CAPITA COsT OF A NATO MIssION Is

FIVeTIMesTHATOFAuNMIssION

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8 I conflict trends

cheaper than if they were drawn into these conflict-

management tasks themselves. This also explains,

in part, why China is now the largest contributor of

peacekeepersamongthepermanentmembersoftheuN

securityCouncil.

The us and europe are also major f inancial

c o n t r i b u t o r s t o Au p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s . T h e

Au ’s f i r s t su c h op er a t ion , A MIB in Burund i ,

h a d a n a p p r o v e d s t r e n g t h o f j u s t o v e r

3000troopsandanoperationalbudgetofapproximately

us $13 0 mi l l ion p er year. In c ompar ison, the

annual budget of the Au Commission for 2003 was

approximatelyus$32million.southAfricawasthelead

nationinthismissionanditcovereditsowncosts,while

alsocontributingmoderatelytothecostoftheothertwo

participantstates,ethiopiaandMozambique.Thetotal

cost to thesouthAfrican taxpayerwasapproximately

us$110million.Theeucontributedapproximately€45

million to the Au, whilst the united Kingdom and the

us contributed another approximately us$20 million

directly to ethiopia and Mozambique, to enable them

toparticipateinAMIB.southAfricawaswillingtotake

on the lead-nation role – including its financial cost –

in Burundi because it led the mediation ef for t that

resultedinthepeaceprocess,anditwasthusamatter

ofnationalinteresttoensurethatthepeaceprocesswas

supportedwithanAfricanpeaceoperation.However,itis

unlikelythatthiswilloftenbethecase.

TheAu’ssecondpeaceoperation,AMIsinDarfur,was

evenlarger,withapproximately6500military,policeand

civilianpersonnelandanannualbudgetofapproximately

us$500million.AMIswasalmostentirelyfundedfrom

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AUnitedNationspeacekeeperfromSouthAfricaonanarmoredvehicleintheNorthKivuprovinicialcapitalcityofGoma.

sOuTH AFrICA WAs WILLING TO TAKe ON THe LeAD-NATION rOLe – INCLuDING

ITsFINANCIALCOsT– INBuruNDIBeCAuse ITLeDTHeMeDIATIONeFFOrTTHAT

resuLTeD IN THe PeACe PrOCess, AND IT WAs THus A MATTer OF NATIONAL

INTeresT TO eNsure THAT THe PeACe PrOCess WAs suPPOrTeD WITH AN

AFrICANPeACeOPerATION

conflict trends I 9

voluntary contributions, mostly from the eu and the

us. The eu contributed approximately €435 million

toAMIs10,andbilateral contributionsby individualeu

memberstatesamountedtoanadditionalapproximately

€115million.Theuscontributedapproximatelyus$450

milliontowardstheoperation.11Becauseofthesizeofthe

fundingrequiredandtheAu’slackofcapacitytomanage

itsownmissionsupport, financialcontributors like the

us had to enter into direct arrangements with private

contractorstoprovideAMIswithmissionenablers like

vehicles,camps, fuelandwater.eachcontributionhad

tobeindividuallynegotiated,andthefundingwasthus

unpredictableandcame indribsanddrabs.Thismade

it extremely difficult to plan properly and sustain the

mission.TheuN’ssupportpackages,mentionedearlier,

were thus a welcome relief and a highly meaningful

contribution.

AMIsOMinsomalia,theAu’sthirdlarge-scalepeace

operation, with approximately 8 000 military, police

and civilian peacekeepers, was first deployed in 2007.

AMIsOM’s cost has increased proportionally with the

numberofsoldiers,fromaninitialapproximatelyus$250

million per year to now close to us$500 million. The

us and europe have again contributed the bulk of the

costsforAMIsOMand,asmentionedearlier,theuNhas

nowdeployedadedicatedsupportmissiontoAMIsOM

– uNsOA – which provides it with the same kind of

mission-supportskillsetthatasimilar-sizeduNmission

wouldneedtosustainitself.

Ascanbeseenfromthesethreemissionexperiences,

Aupeaceoperationsareresourcedfromacombination

of African military and police contributions, Au and

voluntarycontributionstotheAuPeaceFundandsupport

from the uN. This is problematic, but unavoidable,

because the Au’s dependency on external resources

denies it the independent freedom to make decisions

onsomeof thestrategic,operationalandeventactical

aspectsofthepeaceoperationsitmaywishtoundertake.

The availability of funding determines the number of

peacekeepers,thenatureoftheirequipmentandsupport,

thedurationofthemissionandthelevelandintensityof

theiroperations.

A joint uN and Au panel was established to

consider the modalities for supporting and financing

Au peacekeeping operations. The panel was chaired

by the former Italian prime minister, romano Prodi,

and it submitted its report to the Au and uN on 31

December 2008. The panel recommended a number

of concrete steps that could be taken to strengthen

the relationship between the uN and the Au, but the

central recommendation of the panel was the use of

uN assessed-contribution funding for Au-led and

uN-authorisedpeacekeepingoperationsona case-by-

casebasisforuptosixmonths,tobeprovidedmainlyin

kind,andonlywhenthereisanintentiontotransitionthe

missiontoauNpeacekeepingoperation.12

Thereportofthepanelisapositivedevelopmentin

thatthequestionofusingtheuN’sassessed-contribution

system to support uN-authorised Au peacekeeping

missions is now openly discussed as one option on

the table. However, in reality, the panel’s suggestion

goesno further thanwhat theuNhasalreadydone in

Darfurandsomaliawith thesupportpackagesandthe

supportoffice.Infact,theuNhasalreadygonefurther

inpractise,because thepanel refers tosupport forsix

monthsonly,andthenonlyif it issurethattheuNwill

takeoverthemission,whilst thesupport inDarfurand

somaliahaslastedlongerthansixmonthsandtheuNis

unlikelytotakeovertheAumissioninsomaliaaslong

asthefightingtherecontinues.Inthatsense,thereport’s

recommendationsweredisappointinglyconservative.

Political,PlanningandOtherFormsofCooperation

However, financial considerations are not the only

aspects of Au/uN cooperation. There is room for

enhancedcooperationonthepoliticalfrontbetweenthe

Au’s Peace and security Council and the uN security

Council,andscopeforfurthercooperationbetweenthe

uN secretariat and the Au Commission – not just on

missionsupport,butalsoonintegratedplanning,mission

management,leadership,trainingandthemonitoringand

evaluationofpeacekeepingoperations.

Insights fromtheAuanduNexperiences inDarfur

andsomalia,and theexperiencesof theunitedstates

and NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan, have resulted in

the widely recognised understanding that the uN

failures in the1990swerenotbecause theuNsystem

was inherently flawed. They failed because they were

facedwith impossiblycomplexodds.Tosucceed, they

wouldhaveneededamuchmoremultidimensionaland

comprehensiveapproachthanwasavailableatthetime.

However,thepopularnotionwasthattheuNwasweak

and that theworldneededmore robustpeacekeeping.

Ten years later, the us and NATO, and the world with

A JOINT uN AND Au PANeL WAs esTABLIsHeD TO CONsIDer THe MODALITIes

FOr suPPOrTING AND FINANCING Au PeACeKeePING OPerATIONs. THe PANeL

WAsCHAIreDByTHeFOrMer ITALIANPrIMeMINIsTer,rOMANO PrODI,AND IT

suBMITTeDITsrePOrTTOTHeAuANDuNON31DeCeMBer2008

10 I conflict trends

them, have rediscovered in Iraq and Afghanistan that

complex conflicts are not resolved by force alone, no

matter how technically superior and advanced, but

primarilythroughpolitically-drivenpeaceprocesses.As

thefigurescitedearlierhavedemonstrated,thelattercan

oftenbeachievedatafractionofthecostoftheformer.

Themostimportantprerequisitesforpeacebrokers

are credibili ty and legitimacy. This is the critical

ingredient that the us and NATO lack in Iraq and

Afghanistan, and the reason why the uN has proved

indispensable in Kosovo, Lebanon and Darfur. The

enduring lesson is that, in peacemaking, credibility

trumps overwhelming force. In this sphere, the uN

securityCouncilandtheAuPeaceandsecurityCouncil

havemuchtogainfromclosercooperation,andmuchto

losefromlackofcoherencebetweenthetwobodies,in

thosemanycaseswhere thereare jointorcoordinated

mediationandpeacekeepingeffortsunderway.

A2008studybytheHumansecurityreportProject

at Canada’s simon Fraser university found that there

has been a decline in every form of violence, except

terrorism,since1992.Armedconflictsfellbymorethan

40%inthepast13years,andthenumberof“verydeadly

wars”hadfallenby80%.Althoughlarge-scaleconflicts

anddeathshavedeclined,thescale,frequencyandnature

oftoday’sconflicts–nowmoreoftendirectedatcivilians,

especially women and children – are still alarming.

However,thestudycredits“interventionsbytheunited

Nations,plus theendofcolonialismandtheColdWar,

as the main reasons for the decline in conflict”.13 The

uNandAuhave thusalreadyhadasignificant impact

oninternationalpeaceandsecurity,andanevencloser

andmoreprofessionalpartnershipbetweentheAuand

theuNhasthepotentialoffurtherenhancingcoherence

amongtheseorganisations,withthepotentialbenefitof

more efficient and effective peacekeeping operations,

andeventuallymoresustainablepeaceprocesses.

CedricdeConingisaResearchFellowatACCORDandtheNorwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairs(NUPI),andactsasanadvisortothepeacekeepingandpeacebuildingunitsatACCORD.

Endnotes

1 AlltheunitedNationsPeacekeepingOperationsstatisticsinthisarticlearebasedontheDPKOBackgroundNoteof31August2009,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>Accessedon:10October2009.

2 AllAustatistics,unlessotherwisereferenced,arebasedoninformationontheAuwebsite,Availableat:<http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AuC/Departments/PsC/PsC.htm>Accessedon:10October2009.

3 see‘reportofthePanelonunitedNationsPeaceOperations’,21August2000,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2000/809>Accessedon:22February2010.

4 uNsOAandthetrustfundareauthorisedunderuNsecurityCouncilresolution1863of2009.

5 Formoreinformation,see‘reportofthesecretary-GeneralontheFallofsrebrenica’(A/54/549),15November1999,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/549>Accessedon:22February2010;and‘TheIndependentInquiryintotheActionsoftheunitedNationsDuringthe1994Genocideinrwanda’(s/1999/1257),16December1999,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/1999/1257>Accessedon:22February2010.

6 (2009)‘ANewPartnershipAgenda:ChartingaNewHorizonforuNPeacekeeping’,Newyork:DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsandDepartmentofFieldsupport,unitedNations,p.6.

7 Gowan,richard(2008)ThestrategicContext:PeacekeepinginCrisis:2006–08.International Peacekeeping,Vol.15,No.4,pp.453–469.

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