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ON CONDITIONALS

On Conditionals

provides the first major cross-disciplinary account of con-

ditional

(if-then)

constructions. Conditional sentences directly reflect the

language user's ability to reason about alternatives, uncertainties and

unrealized contingencies. An understanding of the conceptual and be-

havioural organization involved in the construction and interpretation of

these kinds of sentences therefore provides fundamental insights into the

inferential strategies and the cognitive and linguistic processes of human

beings. Nevertheless, conditionals have not been studied in depth until

recently, and current research has tended to be compartmentalized within

particular disciplines.

The present volume brings together studies from several perspectives:

(i) philosophical, focusing on abstract formal systems, interpretations

based on truth or information conditions and precise notions of inference

and entailment; (ii) psychological, focusing on evidence about how people

not trained in formal logic use and interpret conditionals in language and

everyday reasoning, whether in natural or experimental situations; and

(iii) linguistic, focusing on the universals of language that partly constrain

the way we reason, and on the relations to other linguistic domains revealed

by acquisition and historical change.

Readers of On Conditionals - whether their backgrounds are in cognitive

science, philosophy of language , linguistics, or indeed artificial intelligence

- will find in the book an original and salutary emphasis on the intrinsic

connections between the issues that are addressed. The volume points

to exciting new directions for interdisciplinary work on the way in which

we use form, meaning, interpretation and action in reasoning and in learn-

ing from experience.



ON CONDITIONALS

EDITED BY

Elizabeth Closs Traugott

Alice ter Meulen

Judy Snitzer Reilly

Charles A. Ferguson

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was granted

y

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C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

Cambridge

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Melbourne Sydney



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United S tates of Am erica by Cam bridge U niversity Press, New York

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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521113274

© Cambridge University Press 1986

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,

no reproduction of any part may take place without the written

permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1986

This digitally printed version 2009

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

On Conditionals.

"Present volume arose out of a Symposium on

Conditionals and Cognitive Processes, which was held

at Stanford University in December 198 3" -

Pref.

Includes indexes.

1. Gramm ar, Comparative and general - Co ndit iona ls-

Congresses. I. Traugott, Elizabeth C loss.

II . Symposium on Conditionals and Cognitive Processes

(1983: Stanford University)

P292 .5.05 1986 415 86 9529

ISBN 978-0-521-30644-7 hardback

ISBN 978-0-521-11327-4 paperback



CONTENTS

Contributors vii

Preface ix

Acknowledgments xi

PARTI: GENERAL STUDIES

1 OVERVIEW

Charles

A. Ferguson, Judy Snitzer Reilly, Alice ter Meulen, and


3

2 CONDITIONALS

ND

CONDITIONAL INFORMATION

Jon Barwise 21

3 CONDITIONALS

ND

MENTAL MODELS

P.

N. Johnson Laird 55

4 CONDITIONALS: A TYPOLOGY

Bernard Comrie 77

PARTII: PARTICULAR STUDIES

5

ON THE

INTERPRETATION

OF

DONKEY -SENTENCES

Tanya Reinhart 103

6 GENERIC INFORMATION, CONDITIONAL CONTEXTS ND

CONSTRAINTS

Alice ter Meulen 123

7 DATA SEMANTICS

ND THE

PRAGMATICS

OF

INDICATIVE

CONDITIONALS

Frank Veltman 147

8 REMARKS

ON THE

SEMANTICS

ND

PRAGMATICS

OF

CONDITIONALS

Ernest W. Adams i6g



Contents

9 THE USE OF CONDITIONALS IN INDUCEMENTS ND

DETERRENTS

Samuel Fillenbaum 179

10 CONDITIONALS ND SPEECH ACTS

Johan Van der Auwera 197

11 CONSTRAINTS ON THE FORM ND MEANING OF THE

PROTASIS

John Haiman 215

12 CONDITIONALS, CONCESSIVE CONDITIONALS ND

CONCESSIVES: AREAS OF CONTR AST, OVERLAP ND

NEUTRALIZATION

Ekkehard Konig 229

13 THE REAL IS-IRREA LIS CONTINUUM IN THE CLASSICAL

GREEK CONDITIONAL

Joseph H Greenberg 247

14 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SI-CLAUSES IN

ROMANCE

Martin B Harris 265

15 FIRST STEPS

IN

ACQUIRING CONDITIONALS

Melissa Bowerman 285

16 THE ACQUISITION OF TEMPORALS ND CONDITIONALS

Judy Snitzer Reilly 309

17 CONDITIONALS RE D I SC OU R SE-BOU N D

Noriko Akatsuka 333

18 CONDITIONALS IN DISCOURSE TEXT-BASE D STUDY

FROM ENGLISH

Cecilia

E Ford and Sandra A Thompson 353

Index of names 7

Index of languages 77

Index of subjects 79

VI



C O N T R I B U T O R S

Ernest W. Adams Department of Philosophy, University of California,

Berkeley

Noriko Akatsuka Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures,

University of California at Los Angeles

Jon Barwise

Ce nte r for the Study of Language and Inform ation , Stanford

University

Melissa Bowerman Max-Planck-Institut fur Psycholinguistik, Nijmegen

Bernard Comrie

D epa rtm ent of Linguistics, University of Southern California

Charles A. Ferguson

De partm ent of Linguistics, Stanford University

Samuel Fillenbaum D epar tm ent of Psychology, University of No rth C arolina

Cecilia E. Ford Applied Linguistics Program, University of California at Los

Angeles

Joseph H. Greenberg

Department of Linguistics, Stanford University

John Haiman

De partm ent of An thropo logy, University of Ma nitoba

Martin B. Harris De partm ent of Mo dern Langu ages, University of Salford

P. N. Johnson-Laird

M RC App lied Psychology Un it, Cam bridge

Ekkehard Konig

Seminar fur Englische Philologie, Universitat H anno ver

Judy Snitzer Reilly Salk Institute for Biological Stud ies, C alifornia

Tanya Reinhart Department of Poetics and Comparative Literature, Tel Aviv

University

Alice

ter

Meulen

D epa rtm ent of Linguistics, University of Washington

Sandra A. Thompson

Departm en t of Linguistics, University of California at

Santa Barbara

Elizabeth Closs Traugott Departments of Linguistics and English, Stanford

University

Johan Van der Auwera

De partm ent of Linguistics, University of An twerp

Frank Veltman

Cen trale Interfaculteit, University of Amsterd am

vn



P R E F A C E

Conditional

if-then)

sentences have long been of central concern in the study

of reasoning. Because modern academic practice has compartmentalized three

distinct disciplines: linguistics, psychology and philosophy, a tremendous var-

iety of different questions and angles of approach have developed, often inde-

pendently, and without a common focus. The purposes of this book are: i)

to emphasize the intrinsic connections between the issues that have been

addressed within the three disciplines; ii) to show that all share similar concerns

with how human beings use conditional constructions in their language to reason

and to communicate their thoughts; and iii) to point to new directions and

potential areas of cross-fertilization for future studies.

The papers are arranged as follows. Part I presents a broad survey of condi-

tionals, the ways in which they are used to reason, and the ways in which

they are structured in language the overview by the editors, and papers by

Barwise, Johnson-Laird, and Comrie from the points of view of philosophy,

psychology, and linguistics, respectively). Part II presents approaches to parti-

cular aspects of conditionals, starting with papers in the tradition of philosophy

and formal syntax and semantics that show how the study of conditionals can

lead to the refinement of syntactic and semantic theories Reinhart, ter Meulen,

and Veltman). It moves on to papers that focus on the intentions of speakers

in using and understanding conditionals from the different perspectives of philo-

sophy, linguistics and psychology Adams, Van der Auwera, and Fillenbaum).

These are followed by detailed linguistic studies of the interaction of condition-

als with other categories of grammar: conjunctive and disjunctive coordinators

Haiman), concessives Haiman and Konig), modals Greenberg), tense and

aspect Harris). Three case studies focus on the development of conditional

constructions in history Harris) and in language acquisition Bowerman,

Reilly). The final papers focus on the pragmatics of conditionals used in con-

structed dialogues Akatsuka) and in actual expository monologic texts Ford

and Thompson). Each of the papers in Part II is preceded by a brief introductory

editorial paragraph pointing to connections with other papers in Part II. Since

different terminologies are used in the different traditions and are not always

exactly translatable from one tradition to another, no attempt has been made

to impose one set of terminology throughout the volume; cross-references in

the index should aid the reader in identifying partial equivalences.

ix



Preface

The p resent volum e arose out of a Symposium on Conditionals and C ognitive

Proce sses, which was held at Stanford University in Dece m ber 1983. A p repara-

tory workshop in May 1982, summarized in a working paper by Traugott and

Ferguson entitled T ow ar d a checklist for con ditionals , laid the g roundw ork

for this Symposium. M ost of the contributions we re extensively rewritten; some

were conceived only during the Sy mpo sium. W e have included widely different

perspectives on conditionals, which despite differences in approach and in ter-

minology nevertheless often address the same or very similar data and pheno-

mena, in the hope that it will inspire genuinely interdisciplinary research with

an improved understanding of the current state of the art in the various dis-

ciplines.



A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

We gratefully acknowledge the su pport of a num ber of organizations. Fund ing

for the Symposium on Conditionals and Cognitive Processes that was the inspir-

ation for this book was provided by the National Science Foundation (NSF

Gra nt BNS-8309784) and by the Ce nter for the Study of Language and Informa-

tion at Stanford University.

Elizabeth Traugott's research on conditionals was largely conducted during

1983-4 while she was a Guggenheim Fellow and a Fellow at the Center for

Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (supported in part by NSF Grant

BNS 76-22943).

Special thanks are due to Randa Mulford for her expert help in editing

and preparing the indexes, and to Penny Carter for her assistance in bringing

the volume to fruition.

XI



PART

GENERAL STUDIES



1

OVERVIEW

•

Charles A. Ferguson,

Judy Snitzer Reilly,

Alice ter Meulen,


If the organism carries a 'small-scale model

1

of external reality and

of its own possible actions within its hea d, it is able to try out various

alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situa-

tions before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing

with the present and the future, and in every way to react in a much

fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies which

face it. (Cra ik 1943:61)

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N

Conditional (if-then) constructions directly reflect the characteristically human

ability to reason about alternative situations, to make inferences based on

incomplete information, to imagine possible correlations between situations,

and to understand how the world would change if certain correlations were

different. Understanding the conceptual and behavioural organization of this

ability to construct and interpret conditionals provides basic insights into the

cognitive processes, linguistic competence, and inferential strategies of human

beings.

The question of what a conditional construction is may be answered in many

different ways, and from many different perspec tives. The linguistic characte ri-

zation of conditionals in different languages provides the basis for linguistic

universals, which presumably at least in part constrain the way we reason.

The diachronic point of view provides knowledge of the possible adaptations

that a system of conditionals may undergo, and may detect dependencies on

developments in other linguistic domains. Studies of language acquisition pro-

vide additional perspectives on a linguistic system, offering not only develop-

mental data but also insights into the basic components and relationships of

the adult system. Cognitive psychology presents us with empirical evidence

about how people not trained in formal logic use and interpret conditionals

in natural language and everyday reasoning. Philosophical logic and philosophy

of language both design abstract formal systems of conditionals with interpre-

tations based on truth conditions or information conditions, defining a precise

notion of inference or entailment.

The linguistic, psychological and philosophical traditions outlined here have

been , and will continue to be , developed relatively independently of each other.



Charles A. Ferguson et al.

This is inevitable, and even to some extent to be desired. They not only have

somewhat different goals, but they use different methods and different types

of da ta, ranging from introspec tion to text analysis to exp erim entatio n. It would

be impossible completely to synthesize all the traditions into one research pro-

gramme. On the other hand, an improved understanding of these various pers-

pectives, their results and their limitations, is essential to the future

development of a more genuinely interdisciplinary approach to conditionals

in cognitive sc ience.

The present volume is the first major attempt at combining the different

perspectives and research traditions. This overview is intended to provide a

guideline to the papers in the book, giving some further background to the

various issues addressed in the papers, and setting the main results in a larger

con text. It also suggests som e possible new lines of re searc h.

2. L I N G U I S T I C T R A D I T I O N S

Linguistic traditions assume that there is some principled correlation between

the psychological and semantic properties of conditionals on the one hand

and their form on the other. Although there may not be a strict one-to-one

relation between meaning and form, the relationship is nevertheless far from

arbitrary, and reflects a finite range of conceptual correlates. Insight into the

mental representation of conditionals is expected from research on such ques-

tions as whether a language has a prototypical conditional construction, what

other constructions can be used as conditionals, and what other semantic func-

tions can be expressed by conditionals.

Some discussion of conditionals can be found in virtually all descriptive gram-

mars of languages. However, linguists working in the generative tradition have

until recently paid surprisingly little attention to conditionals. This may be

in part because conditionals interact so extensively with other domains (e.g.

causals, temporals, modals) that they pose enormous difficulties for analysis;

but it is perhaps largely due to the fact that their syntactic properties tend

to be less interesting than their semantic ones, and semantic theory has only

within the last decade caught up with advances in syntactic theory .

Most recent linguistic work has been either from the perspective of detailed

descriptive studies of certain aspects of conditionals in particular languages,

or from the broad perspective of universals. In addition, some work has also

been done on diachronic aspects of conditionals. We discuss these approaches

in turn .

2.1 Descriptive studies

The central task of linguistic description is the analysis and presentation of aspects

of the grammatical structure of a particular language or language variety, used



Overview

by a given speech community located in space and time. Several thousand

such gramm ars or gramm atical sketches have been prod uce d, based on different

theoretical models and intended for different purposes. Since all natural lan-

guages are assumed to have some kind of conditional sentences, any full-scale

gramm atical description is likely to include an account of conditional c onstruc-

tions, although some models of grammar do not make provision for them and

some methods of collecting language data tend not to result in grammars that

refer to conditionals.

Every hu ma n lang uag e, it may be assum ed, has some way of forming conditio-

nal sentences, in which the speaker supposes that such-and-such is (was, might

be, had been . . . ) so - the //-clause or 'protas is' , also called the 'anteced ent'

- and concludes that such-and-such is (was , would have been . . . ) so - the

then-clause or 'apodosis', also called the 'consequent'. Likewise, every account

of human reasoning, every system of logic, has as a key notion an if-then

relation between propositions: if p, then q. Yet neither the essential semantics

nor the range of possible variation in the form of conditional constructions

has been adeq uately es tablished. The prim e purpo se of the descriptive linguistic

approach is to determine the range of forms and their meanings within and

across languages. Such studies show that the ways of expressing conditionals

may differ substantially from English if-then markers. Furthermore, they show

that people in different societies or different communities within the same

society may have different experiences with conditionals and different uses

for them (se e, for exa m ple, Lava nde ra 1975). It has been argue d that p reliterate

societies do not use overt syllogistic reasoning (Ong 1982: ch. 111). It in no

way follows from this that preliterate languages have no conditionals. On the

contrary, they clearly do (see much of the data in Haiman's chapter in this

volume), but they may be used in other ways and in other contexts.

Despite the wealth of descriptive studies, the question of what constitutes

a conditional construction in a given language has as yet no adeq uate theoretical

answer. Since material implication has a long history and is the most worked-

over and best-known logical relation between propositions that corresponds

to the conditional sentences of natural languages, linguists are often tempted

to use it as the defining basis for conditionals. This is widely recognized as

less than satisfactory, in the first instance because users of natural languages

tend to reject the validity of false antecedent implying true consequent and

often assume some kind of causal conne ction betw een th e propositions (G eis and

Zwicky 1971). Further, the use of material implication for linguistic definition

in no way helps to explain the syn tactic and etymological ties betwe en conditio-

nals and wish clauses, temporal and causal clauses, imperatives, and so forth.

These difficulties have been repeatedly discussed by both philosophers and

linguists. Comrie (this volume) accepts the defining role of material implication

as a matter of convenience, although acknowledging the familiar objections.

Others, such as Smith (1983), preserve the defining value by shifting the




problems to pragmatics and by modifying the usual meaning of material impli-

cation. At the present stage of research it seems likely that if conditionals

are in some sense a natural class of linguistic phenomena, the formulation

of a universally valid definition will be aided by the accumulation of detailed

descriptions of different langua ges.

In practice descriptivists tend to identify conditionals first on the basis of

clear semantic equivalence with if-then sentences in a well-known or well-

described metalanguage, then by the morphological, syntactic, and lexical

markers (or 'diacritics') of such sentences, and finally by extension to (a) sen-

tences with such markers that do not agree semantically with conditionals in

the metalanguage, and (b) sentences that agree semantically but lack such

markers .

A language may have one favoured or 'prototype' conditional construction;

it may have a small set of such constructions; or it may have no such clear-cut

marking of conditionals. Also, the prototypical construction(s) may vary in

degrees of use. Thus English if and Latin si unambiguously mark most condi-

tional sentences in those languages, and it is usually possible to use them to

parap hrase other sentences generally regarded semantically as conditional sen-

tences. By contrast, conditional sentences in (Classical) Arabic are mostly

mark ed by one of two markers , in 'if (noncounterfactual) or

law

'if (counterfac-

tual). In Bengali the two prototypical constructions are with/od/ ' if and with

a cond itional, nonfinite verb form

-/e,

the two being generally equivalent se man -

tically but appropriate under different pragmatic conditions. Hua has an unam-

biguous hypothetical 'if marker, the compound conjunctive suffix -mamo, but

many sentences that can be interpreted conditionally do not contain it. Finally,

Chinese has no clear prototype conditional construction: although there are

some particles trans latab le as 'if, most conditional sentence s are in principle

ambiguous and are interpreted as conditional only from the context.

Conditional markers are most commonly particles, clitics, or affixes, and

these are most commonly placed in or next to the // -clause. These 'diacritics'

may be semantically opaque or in varying degrees transparent (e.g. Russian

esli 'if is a form of 'be' plus the interrogative particle //, thus 'be it that . . . ' ) .

In some languages the

[/marker

is related to or identical with 'when' or 'when-

ever' (see the chapters by ter Meulen and Reilly in this volume), or is closely

related to markers of modality (Greenberg in this volume). Other markers

also occur, however, m ost notably intonation and word orde r, as in the sub ject-

verb inversion which is becoming rare in English but which is still very much

alive in German. Many languages have special markers for negative condition-

als, again varying from transparent (e.g. Latin nisi) to opaque (English unless).

In many languages it will be necessary to describe co nstructions th at specify

different degrees of hypotheticality. Various terminological traditions exist:

irrealis ( un rea l), hy poth etical, po ten tial, future less vivid, counterf actua l,

impossible, 'indicative', and 'subjunctive'. Languages vary from almost no dif-



Overview

ferentiation, as in Ch inese , to such elab orate systems as that of Classical G reek .

The distinction may be made by different markers for the protasis, as in the

two Arabic words already cited, by a special apodosis marker (e.g. Greek

an marking counterfactuals), o r by special patterns of tense/aspe ct forms (e.g.

the habitual, noncontinuous Bengali past in -t- when used in a conditional

sentence has exclusively counterfactual meaning; see also Harris's discussion

of Romance in this volume). In some languages the conditional sentences in

which the protasis has the meaning 'whenever' fit formally into the system

of hypotheticality as the 'generic' conditional, but in other languages, such

as Bengali, 'whenever' may be totally outside the system of conditional sen-

tences, having a syntax parallel to temporal clauses, but not allowing the use

of if.

In languages where conditional sentences have been well-described, it is

invariably found that some sentences with the formal markers of conditionality

are semantically and pragmatically only marginally conditional or not condi-

tional at all. For exam ple, the following political advertisemen t for a newsp aper

columnist called Herb Caen: H erb Caen for President. If he doesn t save the

country, he ll certainly save your day depends on the possible interpretation

of /fas the concessive 'although'. In this volume Van der Auwera and Konig

address the relation of conditionals to concessives. Another example of the

use of a conditional form for nonconditional purposes is provided by such

phrases as If you please, which has a wide range of uses, many of them not

obviously conditional.

To understand the full range of meanings to which conditional forms can

be put requires w ork not only on sentence s out of context bu t also on con ditional

structures in actual continuous texts, whether spoken or written, monologic

or dialogic. One such study is provided in Ford and Thompson's paper (this

volume) on expository monologic texts. Here conditional sentences are not

used to express material implication, and only rarely to open up new possibili-

ties. Rather, they are used to repeat earlier claims, introduce particular cases

illustrating preceding generalizations, establish contrasts with what precedes

(see also Akatsuka in this volume), or, when the protasis is in second position,

to introduce afterthough ts.

The use of conditionals to mark the step-by-step, 'chunked', development

of the exposition can also be found in rathe r different contex ts. March ese (1984)

shows that conditionals are used in Godie, a West African Kru language, to

mark units in the 'procedural genre' (directions for carrying out a task such

as planting rice). She suggests that they m ark places where the 'teac her ' implies

that the 'student' should check whether the appropriate stage in the procedure

has actually been understood. To this extent the conditional protasis coheres

with other devices for developing information flow, including topic develop-

ment.

In Ford and Thompson's spoken texts, conditionals are also used to form




polite requests. Presum ably, the modality of the conditional allows the speaker

to appear less dogmatic or intrusive than would be the case if a nonconditional

form were used - hence such formulaic introductions as /

thought it might

be useful if you knew about yesterday s meeting (note the additional distancing

effect of the past tense). An investigation of the extent to which other logical

relations such as and, or, and because are u sed in similar ways in such formulae

would add significantly to our understanding of precisely which properties of

// are being selected as politeness m ark ers: irrealis, the use of nonpr esen t ten ses,

or even syntactic subord ination.

Politeness formulae with conditional forms typically involve second person

subjects in protases. This ties in with work by Inoue (1983) on the use in

Japanese of cleft conditional constructions (those with

-(no) nara (ba)-

'if it

is that') to convey a sense of uncertainty (hence politeness in some cases,

but also impoliteness and scepticism in others) about a situation which the

speaker cannot really know or experience, e.g. someone else's (typically the

addressee's) emotional or physical feelings. It is striking in this connection

that the experiments reported in this volume by Fillenbaum on conditionals

used as threats and promises involve exclusively sentences with second person

subjects. When Adams reminds us that the reasons may be quite different

for saying If you eat the mushroom you will be poisoned and If I eat the mush-

room I will be poisoned, although they express basically the same propo sition,

it is presumably not irrelevant that the formal difference lies in the subjects

of the protasis and apodosis. A better understanding of the uses to which

conditionals may be put would seem to depen d on the developm ent of a theory

concerning the interaction of conditionals with first versus second versus third

person subjects.

Interactions between conditional protases and the person of the subject sug-

gest a further variable worth investigating: that of genre. Expository genres

are likely to reveal rather different uses of conditionals from other genres,

e.g. strategic plan ning sessions in which speak ers suggest possibilities for peo ple

to act on , legal writs versus cross-examining of witnesses, etc.

Until the evidence is in, it will be difficult to determine the constraints on

possible contexts in which conditionals can be used. What does emerge, how-

ever, is that any adequate theory of conditionals must account for the fact

that they express relationships between situations. Furthermore, it must be

rich enough to motivate the various uses of conditional structures to describe

not only relations between situations expressed in propositions but also situa-

tions between speakers.

2.2 Universalist studies

Research traditions that hold much promise for deeper understanding of condi-

tionals attempt to characterize universal properties of language. O ne tradition,



Overview

often identified with 'universal grammar' and called the 'linguistic universals

tradition', is associated with the work of Chomsky and generative grammar.

It seeks to identify and predict properties of all languages, with focus on lan-

guages as fundamentally rational or comp utationa l systems, and on the qu estion

of what the mental representations of universal properties of language might

be (Chomsky 1975). Most of the work on conditionals in this tradition has

been carried out by psychologists and philosophers, and is discussed more

fully in section s an d 4 . Another tradition, often called the 'language universals

tradition', is associated with the work of Greenberg, and seeks to identify

linguistic generalizations that ho ld true in ma ny, but not necessarily all, natural

languages. The focus here is not so much on language as a rational system

but on language as a system that is both rational (propositional) and communica-

tive (functional). The language universals approach (represe nted in this volume

especially in pap ers by Comrie and H aim an) d epen ds on reliable, valid analyses

of particular languages and com parab le data from sizeable numbe rs of unre lated

languages. It con tributes directly to the characterization of the natu re of human

language and the range of possible variation among languages. It contributes

further, and som e might say even mo re significantly, w hen research ers ex amine

the relationships between overlapping or conflicting generalizations or attempt

to find explan atory principles that accou nt for the gene ralizations.

An early universalist claim about conditionals is Greenberg's Universal of

Word Order 14: 'In conditional statements, the conditional clause precedes

the conclusion as the normal o rder in all languages' (G reen berg 1963:66). This

stood out among the universals of word order proposed, in that it was held

to be valid no matter what the normal or 'basic' order of the simple, active,

declarative sentence, e.g. Subject-Verb-Object, or Subject-Object-Verb.

Greenberg attempted to explain this universal with reference to iconicity, or

parallels betwe en ord er of elem ents in language and ord er of eleme nts in experi-

ence,

including the order of reasoning. He noted also that logicians always

symbolized the ord er imp lying-implied exactly as in spoken languag e.

Lehmann (1974) examined this universal and its explanation. He found the

universal empirically valid - in othe r wo rds, he could find no cou nterex am ples:

whenever another order occurs it is non-normal or 'marked' in some way (e.g.

the // -clause is an afterthought). He found Greenberg's explanation adequate

in so far as it invoked the order of reasoning, but inadequate in so far as

it invoked physical experience, and proceeded to analyse the universal and

its possible explanatory principles in a manner highly typical of the universals

research tradition. He used evidence from: (a) semantic concepts that figure

etymologically o r synchronically in //-ma rkers , such as Rom ance si/se and Latin

si(c) 'thus'; (b) syntactic and/or semantic parallels between conditional and

other kinds of clauses, e.g. verb inversion in German conditional clauses and

questions, or the presupposition of causality in counterfactual conditionals;

and (c) homonymy or polysemy of conditional clauses, as in languages where




the words for 'if and 'o r' are ho m op ho nes . On the basis of these investigations,

Lehmann hypothesized a set of semantic constituents of conditionals, including

volitional, disjunctive, temporal/locative, and causal elements. Finally, he

offered an informal deriva tion of the G reen ber g universal based on a comm uni-

cative strategy whereby the sp eaker b oth engages the addressee in contem plat-

ing a potential disjunction and at the same time uses this potential disjunction

as the ground for developing an argu men t.

Lehmann attempted to characterize the field of conditionals as a whole.

A different kind of approach is to focus on ways in which certain properties

of conditionals intersect with properties of other systems.

1

Various linguists

have claimed, for example, that a protasis is, in some important sense, a kind

of sentence to pic, and also a kind of prototypical subo rdinate clause. A se ntence

topic (as distinguished from a discourse topic - see Brown and Yule 1983:

68-73) is accepted by many linguists as a grammatical unit characterized by

certain syntactic, semantic, and often phonological or prosodic properties.

When the claim is made that conditional clauses are topics (Haiman 1978)

this means that these clauses share critical properties of topics in many lan-

guages. It is clear that not all topics are conditional clauses, and not all condi-

tional clauses (at least in the sense of clauses with 'if) are topics, but to the

extent that the two structures overlap, generalizations about topics are likely

to hold also for conditionals. Thus a whole avenue leading to understanding

about conditionals is opened up. Similarly, when the claim is made that the

conditional clause is the subordinate clause par excellence, the universals

approach would look for crosslinguistic evidence (e.g. the position of clause

negation in Bengali discussed in Ferguson 1963). It would also explore the

implications of this identification, for example in relation to types of conditional

sentences that take the form of coordinated clauses.

2.3 Historical studies

Historical studies of conditionals largely add ress the same questions as descrip-

tive and universalist studies. The difference is primarily one of focus, which

in this case is on sources and outcomes, in other words on the processes by

which conditionals come to be expressed in new ways and by which they come

to express othe r sem antic functions. Q uestions of directionality a nd of stability

of linguistic elemen ts are central he re.

Historical linguistics assumes that combinations of linguistic properties that

are now impossible and unattes ted hav e always been impossible and un attes ted.

This principle, often termed the 'uniformitarian principle' (Weinreich, Labov

and Herzog 1968) suggests that, at least for languages as far back as we can

reconstruct (which is down to c. 5000

BC),

conditional structures in language

will have been somewhat similar. Descriptive studies of a wide range of lan-

guages are essential for determining what the extent of, and constraints on,

possible structures might be.

10



Overview

Syntactic questions concerning the development of conditionals range over

a number of issues. One is how shifts from coordinate 'paratactic' structure

to subordinate 'hypotactic' structure occur, and whether they involve any shift

in semantic function - evidence from Modern English and other languages

that allow for paratactic conditional structures suggests that they do not. Other

questions, which often border more on semantic than syntactic issues, concern

changes in the interaction between connectives such as if

and

tenses or moo ds.

Ha rris's pap er in this volum e illustrates the complexities of such a study. Intera c-

tions with changes in tense and mood marking have led to radical changes

in the details of the verb system of conditionals in the Romance languages.

Yet the basic system has remained remarkably stable across several languages

and over a thousand years of development. How far other language groups

show the same kind of stability remains to be investigated; but, given the

constraints on what conditionals are about, and the limited resources in lan-

guage for expressing such relation ships, it may be tha t the ov erall characteristics

do remain fairly s table, at least when th ere is a prototypical co nditional m arke r

such as Roman ce si .

Semantic questions concerning the development of conditional markers lead

to the interesting result that these are derived from a very small set of no ncond i-

tionals. Some of the sources have been cited above in connection with Leh-

mann's study of the universals of conditionals. Traugott (1985) has

independently suggested a similar set of main sources, specifically: (i) modals

of possibility, doubt and wish, (ii) interrogatives, (iii) copulas, typically of

the existential kind, (iv) topic markers and demonstratives and (v) temporals,

usually of the nonpunctual type, i.e. usually durative or neutral between dura-

tive and punctual (like when). In hypothesizing how the change from modal

etc. to conditional could come about, it is plausible to argue that in each case

the source marked one of the constraints on the conditional relation. Condi-

tionals raise possibilities on an irrealis continuum, hence the use of modals

and interrogatives. Some conditionals presuppose the existence of the situation

inp (see G ree nb erg 's discussion of 'particu lar' conditionals in G ree k) . Cond i-

tionals also treat the situation in p as a constraint on, therefore a frame for,

<7, hence the ap propriateness of demo nstratives and othe r topic markers as

sources for cond itionals. Such frames typically involve a tem pora l relatio nsh ip,

and so motivate the choice of temporals.

We can then say that the diacritics used to signal conditionals originally

index some characteristic of a conditional co nstraint and then come to lexicalize

the fact th at a co nditional constraint is being po sited. In this light, such condi-

tional interpretations as are illustrated by the so-called 'factual' interpretation

of If it s raining we won t go to the park (= Since it s raining/Beca use you

say it s raining .. . ) appear historically to precede the m ore hypothetical inter-

pretations. This may seem a surprising result for those who think of 'factual'

conditionals as 'deriv ed' in special circumstances of use. It should not, how ever,

11



Charles A. Ferguson e t al.

be so surprising for those w ho, like A kats uka (this volu me ), see 'factual' condi-

tionals as indeed not factual but on the border of an irrealis continuum. As

such they convey epistemic mo dality and evidential doub t: 'It's possible b ecause

you say so, but I don 't yet know for sure' - Ak atsuka points out that someon e

who knows it is raining cannot appropriately say If it is raining we won t go

to

the

park

y

only someone who genuinely has no knowledge or who has merely

heard that it is raining (the 'factual' interpretation).

W hat is the proc ess, we may ask, tha t allows three of the s ource s, specifically

types (iii)-(v), usually associated with existence, i.e. with realis situations, to

become markers of irrealis, specifically of conditionals? The answer seems

to lie in the fact that in the course of semantic change, meanings typically

tend to become increasingly evaluative and in many cases increasingly 'speaker

infused' (see Traugott forthcoming). This is true whether we are considering

well-known changes like boor (< 'farmer' , cf. German Bauer), where the later

meaning is more evaluative, or less well-known ones like but (< Old English

be-utan 'on the outside'), where the later meaning involves establishment by

the speaker not only of textual cohesion but also of contrast. An especially

good examp le is the shift of

just

in the sense of 'precisely' to a tem pora l mean ing

'in the immediate future or past' (where time reference is based on speaker

t ime),

and then to a particle signalling negative evaluation roughly equivalent

to 'merely'. In the case of the conditionals, the speaker injects implicatures

of evidential dou bt an d surp rise. The same kind of shift tow ard speaker-infusion

in turn allows conditional markers to acquire concessive meanings and not

vice versa (see Konig in this volume). Although concessives presuppose the

factuality of /?, they inject an even more personal, in this case contrastive,

mean ing than is to be found in the con ditional.

3. P S Y C H O L O G I C A L T R A D I T I O N S

While linguistic research on conditionals has focused predominantly on form

and m ean ing, psychology originally viewed cond itionals as a tool to investigate

the nature of reasoning. More recently, however, conditionals have been per-

ceived not solely as a tool bu t rath er as intrinsic to the reason ing process itself.

The earlier tradition stems from psychology's roots in philosophy; the present

line of research is a result of the cognitive revolution in psychology, spurred

on by Craik (1943), and psychology's concurrent crossdisciplinary interest in

linguistics and language as a cognitive system.

Psychological research on conditionals is distinguished from other traditions

by its me thodo logy and its objectives. Un like its philosophical anc estor, psycho-

logical research avoids introspection and relies on empirically verifiable data,

either experimental or naturalistic. Using data from logically naive speakers,

psychologists have focused on the role of conditionals in everyday situations.

2



Overview

In this section, we discuss some of the specific issues confronted by researchers

in this tradition and review three a ppro ache s psychologists have pursue d: condi-

tional speech acts, the acquisition and development of conditionals in children

and , finally, the role of conditionals in reasoning and thinking.

The first area of psycholinguistic research draws on speech act theory as

developed by Searle and the observation by Geis and Zwicky (1971) that some

conditionals of the form X =) Y 'invite the inferen ce' ~ X ID ~Y. Most notable

in this area is the work of Fillenbaum which is summarized in this volume.

His contribution focuses on conditionals used as bribes, threats and promises

and on their relationship to other linguistic structures with conditional mean-

ings. Examples are: (1)

If you open the door, I ll kill you,

and (2)

Open the

door and Til kill you. Using experimental data, Fillenbaum has elucidated

the complex interaction among speech acts, propositional content, conditional

semantics and linguistic structures, demonstrating that a shift of any one of

these variables may change the meaning o r interpretation of an entire structure.

The second approach to conditionals is that of developmental psycholinguis-

tics,

wh ere researche rs are concern ed with the acquisition and use of conditional

structures by children. In the early 1960s and 70s, much attention was focused

on language acquisition as a result of Chomsky's claims about innate human

capacities for language. Child language data were seen as a potential source

for discovering the character of universal grammar. Specifically, acquisition

data can provide information about possible prototypic structures (the basic

components of a structure and the interaction between them), and about how

linguistic form is ma pped on to sem antic function. Cond itionals are particularly

complex, both morphosyntactically and semantically, but acquisition data pre-

sent a relatively clear view of individual elements that are difficult to tease

apart in the more complex adult system. Therefore, in addition to specific

data, developmental psycholinguistics offers another perspective on language

and can serve as a testing ground for our hyp otheses concerning ad ult langua ge.

Experimental studies investigating conditional comprehension have been

conducted in several European languages on school-age children (for a review,

see Reilly 1982), as have studies on the understanding of related structures,

e.g. unless, when, because an d although. Researchers have found that children

und erstand sentences with assertive functions b etter th an those signalling uncer-

tainty or disbelief, implying that the notion of possibility or un certainty is more

difficult than assertion. Children, however, begin to produce if-then condi-

tionals, where uncertainty is implicit, at about i\ years. This comprehension-

production discrepancy forces us to investigate the nature of early conditional

productions. D o these young children und erstand their own utterances as condi-

tionals? Or do these early apparent conditionals have some other meaning?

Draw ing on acquisition data from Italian, Eng lish, Finnish, Turkish , and Polish,

Bates (1976), Reilly (1982, this volume) and Bowerman (this volume) demon-

strate that children are cognitively, linguistically and pragmatically capable

13




of expressing the basic components of conditionals before the conditional

marker actually appears. These acquisition data confirm the close semantic

ties amon g con dition al, temp oral an d causal sentence s suggested by universalist

and h istorical work in linguistics.

Althou gh research on cond itional acquisition and related structures has made

considerable strides in the past ten years, the vast majority of studies have

used middle-class children of educated parents as their subjects. Often the

children are the researcher's own. This has been a productive approach, but

now there is a need to broa den the research base to children in non-technologi-

cal cultures and from other socioeconomic strata. Before we assume the gener-

ality, even universality, of a development, especially with the later-emerging

conditional types, and their complex morphology, we must determine the func-

tion and meaning of conditionals for children of other cultures and subcultures.

The third area of psycholinguistic research reflects the strong historical

influence of philosophy on psychology. Since philosophy has been traditionally

concerned with the study of reasoning, it was only natural that psychological

research on cond itionals would ap pea r in the context of conditional and syllogis-

tic reasoning. Much discussion has focused on the relationship between the

natural reasoning process of children and adults without formal training in

logic,

and the inference patterns considered valid according to principles of

predicate calculus. One point of view, based on Piaget's research in cognitive

develop men t, holds that during the stage of formal operations (reached during

ado lescen ce), thoug ht is characterized by the dissociation of form from con tent.

A ma jor a chievem ent of the formal op eration al stage is that thou ght is governe d

by the principles of pred icate logic (Inh elde r and Piaget 1958).

Experimental studies with both children and adults yield data which conflict

with Piaget's premise by finding that subjects do in fact commit logical fallacies

in deductive reasoning tasks. Henle (1962), howev er, proposed that these errors

are not a result of faulty inferences, but ra ther stem from basic errors concerning

the nature of the original premises and the subject's attitude toward the logical

task

itself.

Sub sequ ent studies (see W ason and Johnson -Laird 1972) have shown

that varying individual aspects of the logical task change subjects' evaluation

and/or reasoning performance. Some of the influential factors are: the content

of the propositions, whether they are concrete or abstract, the relative realism

of the situation in which the task is pre sen ted , and finally, the 'meaningfulness'

of the relationship between the propositions and the conceptual presuppositions

held by the subject (Fillenbaum 1975; Staud enm ayer 1975). Com plem entary

studies investigating the deve lopm ent of logical reasoning in children generally

confirm the finding that children's interpretations of the conditional connective

do not correlate with a truth-functional analysis, and that increased concrete-

ness improves performance (see Reilly 1982). In summary, these studies all

demonstrate the influential role that social or world knowledge plays in our

reasoning processes, not only in the interpretation of the premises but also

14



Overview

in our ability to evaluate inferences and conclusions. Far from being typical,

as Piaget originally pro po sed , the dissociation of form and con tent in everyday

reasoning is unusual and may be limited to those with training in one variety

or ano ther of formal logic.

Once it was successfully demonstrated that natural reasoning processes and

the principles of logical inference are non-isomorphic, several attempts were

made to construct models of human deductive processes (e.g. Johnson-Laird

1975). These were often dependent on rules of formal inference (e.g. Braine

1978).

Johnson-Laird's contribution to this volume departs from this tradition

and begins to construct a theory of conditionals using Stalnak er's (1968) possible

world semantics as a point of departure; his theory of mental models is further

influenced by Craik's prescient hypothesis on the nature of thought quoted

at the beginning of this chapter. In his chapter, Johnson-Laird demonstrates

that specific cond itionals are given different inte rpre tation s, and he argues that

their logical properties derive from their interpretations. That is, he proposes

that we form a mental model based on the situation in the antecedent clause

and then interpret the consequent according to that men tal model and general

world knowledge. The next step is to find a means to test whether, in fact,

this is how we rea son with con ditionals.

4.

T H E P H I L O S O P H I C A L A N D L O G I C A L T R A D I T I O N

The third tradition to be discussed here is the philosophical-logical. The study

of conditionals is as ancient as philosophy and logic themselves, and indeed,

has been of central importance in the development of these fields. Aristotelian

syllogistic logic analysed conditionals based on two antecedents as premises

with quantificational connections between their terms, and various forms of

consequences. Frege's fundamental insight, in which the tradition of modern

logic is rooted, established the intrinsic connection between universal quanti-

fiers and antecedents as restrictive terms, by analysing 'every A B' as 'for

every thing if it is an A, then it is a B'. This conditional analysis of universal

quantification led to the development of the most fruitful and general formal

system, Predicate Logic, representing our reasoning in extensional contexts.

The material implication interpretation of the conditional, assigning 'true' to

a cond itional with a false a ntec ede nt, was justified by denying that universally

quantified sentences have existential presuppositions, i.e. admitting an empty

set to be the interpretation of the antecedent A and adhering to bivalence.

However, Frege himself stressed that the information conveyed by identity

statements in natural language, such as his celebrated example The Morning

Star is the Evening Star, could not be captured by this extensional analysis

of equivalence of reference, but required an analysis of intensional contexts.

This set the stage for a research programme that has come to be known as

'possible world semantics'.

5




In the subsequent developments of logical systems, conditionals came to

play a dual

role:

( i) a t the level of the object-language as a senten tial con nectiv e,

and (2) at the level of metalanguage as a truth-preserving connection between

a set of true assumptions and its conclusion, characterizing validity of infer-

ences.

The logical-syntactic questions concerning the use of conditionals in

axiom atizations and rules of proof w ere , as a result, sep arated from the se man tic

questions concerning the possible interpretations of conditionals and their truth

con dition s, and the conn ection to its m etath eor etic use in characterizing validity

of inferences. Fundamental results were obtained showing the intrinsic connec-

tions between conditionals used in valid inferences in the formal system and

conditionals used in the proofs admitted in that system. Even more important

to logic were the Godel results demonstrating the inherent limitations of any

formal system in representing its own reasoning, or in reflecting on its own

use of conditionals. These results showed that: (1) some arithmetical systems

contain a valid sen tence w hich is not pro vable w ithin any consistent axiomatiza-

tion of that system; and (2) no consistent formal system can itself express

that it is consistent. The tremors of these deep mathematical results are still

felt today in all branches of logic and philosophy. However, mathematical

practice proceeded to use conditionals without being hampered by its founda-

tional limitative results, and people, as always, kept on expressing in natural

language simple, if puzzling, self-reflective statements such as / am a liar This

sentence

is

false or D on t believe me (see Ho fstadter 1979 for a pop ular expo si-

tion of self-reference). The paradoxical nature of these expressions is clearly

brought out in conditionals: compare If I am a liar, then what I said is true,

so Ym not a liar and // / am not a liar, then wha t I said is false, so I am

a liar.

In search of an appr op riate formalization of reasoning in intensional co ntexts,

philosophical logic has developed a Pandora's box of alternative conditional

logics, each claiming its virtues in giving a more ade qu ate account of the me an-

ing of cond itionals and their use in reasoning (see H arp er, Stalnak er and Pearce

1981).

The motivation of these conditional logics is often derived from some

particular u sage of if-then in natural language. O n the assumption that a natural

language is translated more or less compositionally into a formal language,

all universal quantifiers and if-then sentences are translated by means of the

implication connective, which, it is commonly agreed, runs into problems if

interpreted as true when the antecedent is false. Alternative interpretations

of conditionals have fruitfully used possible world semantics to represent var-

ious aspects of the meaning of conditionals, and especially of the way context

may affect t he mea ning of a conditional statem ent.

Since intensional semantics was originally developed by logicians who had

a primary interest in tensed contexts and modalities, the interaction of condi-

tionals with various tenses and modal auxiliary verbs was studied extensively.

Stalnaker (1968) suggested an interpretation for conditionals which was expli-

16



Overview

citly context-sensitive: if A, then B is true at a possible world W if B is true

at the world most similar to W given the truth of A. Lewis (1981) developed

another logic of conditionals in which the conditional is interpreted as true

if there are worlds which make A and B both true and which are more similar

to the actual world than the worlds which make A true but B false. Although

Stalnaker's interpretation avoided fallacies based on strengthening of the ante-

cedent (i.e. assuming that when if A, then B is true, if A and C, then B must

be true as well for any arbitrary sentence C ), this logic mad e the strong assump-

tion that exactly one world in which A is true is to be selected as the closest

one to our actual world. Lewis's logic is based on comparative similarities

between various possible worlds, which makes the logic weaker (fewer valid

theorems), and brings out an important relation between the denial of a condi-

tional and modalities, interpreting no t {if A, then B) as: if A is true then B

might not be true. Which worlds are accessible options from a given world

must be determined in context, i.e. assuming the truth of the antecedent. This

brings in a host of new questions concerning the way in which the background

against which A is interpreted is modified or preserved by selecting the options

open to us to make B true.

Veltman's paper in this volume addresses the connections between condi-

tionals and modalities. It develops a propositional logic based on a truth-predi-

cate relative to available evidence, i.e. a speaker-dependent relation of holding

a sentence as true. Some sentences will remain true while incorporating new

information, but oth er sentences may becom e true or false depending on which

modal contexts they are embedded in. The formal system in Veltman's paper

is essentially dynamic, analysing the interpretation of a sentence or discourse

as a process of construc ting verifications or falsifications while gradually building

up an interpretation. Various invalid inferential patterns are weeded out in

this logic, but other incorrect uses of conditionals must still be accounted for

by appealing to pragmatic considerations and additional contextual constraints.

Th e pape r may thus be read as a study in motivating the borde rline of semantics

and pragm atics, showing what p roblem s can be solved in a dynamic c onditional

logic and which ones still escape this semantic sieve and fall into the pragmatic

wastebasket.

Ad am s criticizes attemp ts like Ve ltma n's to analyse truth as relative to avail-

able information. H e argu es that it is only if one ad heres to an absolute notion

of truth th at logic may provide guidance for rational actions, and for accepting

true sentences and avoiding false sentences while having good reason to make

inferences in accordance w ith the logical principles held to be truth-prese rving.

If truth is to be approximated, Adams argues, it should employ probabilistic

concepts which have clear relations to actions, beliefs and ration al choice.

Ad dressing the originally Fregea n que stion of how conditionals are employed

in information exchanges, Barwise argues in telling mathematical and natural

language examples that conditionals either provide constraints on possible

17



Overview

this volume, although the papers m entioned above share some of the theoretical

issues of more computationally oriented research. Anaphoric dependencies

still provide an abundant source of linguistic puzzles, especially when we con-

sider the interaction of such dependencies with conditional dependencies and

tense . One topic that certainly deserves closer study is the conn ection betwe en

conditionals and attitudes. Conditional belief is a central concept of theories

of subjective probabilities (Harper, Stalnaker and Pearce 1981), but it has

not been the subject of systematic, theoretical linguistic analysis. Also, the

interaction with conditionals and other than purely epistemic attitudes, like

perception or expectation or sentence-embedding verbs such as

say that,

remains to be explored w ithin the new parad igm of a dynamic and comp ositional

theory of meaning and interpretation based on a sound syntactic co mpo nent.

5. C O N C L U S I O N

The study of conditionals is crucial to our understanding of language. It is

equally crucial to our u nders tanding of how ou r actions are guided. This connec-

tion with action has been a traditional theme in the philosophy of science,

theories of causality and analyses of scientific reasoning (for a recent study,

see Stalnaker 1984). Currently it remains an open area for interdisciplinary

research into the nature of cognitive processes underlying our reasoning in

natural language. Only by reinstating the connection between form, m eaning,

interpretations and actions may we hope to gain an improvemen t in un derstand-

ing how we learn from experience. The present book suggests a few of the

issues that have to be ad dressed in the proc ess.

NOTE

1 After the completion of this overview a monograph on crosslinguistic characteristics

of conditional m arkers came to our attention:

Danielsen Niels. 1968.

Zum

Wesen

des Konditionalsatzes nicht zuletzt im Indoeuro

pdischen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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mann and Y akov M alkiel, 95-188. Austin, T exas: University of Texas Press.

2



CONDITIONALS

AND

CONDITIONAL INFORMATION

•

Jon Barwise


For those of us involved in the attempt to spell out the relation between state-

ments and those aspects

of

reality they are a bou t, conditionals are

a

thorny

issue.

1

Within this semantic tradition, common wisdom can be summ arized

rath er con tentiously as follows: classical model theo ry gives us the seman tics of

the material conditional. It works fine for mathem atical conditionals, but is

a disaster if applied to ord inary language cond itionals , especially counterf actual

conditionals. Within the possible worlds framework, there are various treat-

ments, some of which are quite successful for certain types of natural language

conditionals, including coun terf actuals, but they a re all a disaster when applied to

ma them atical conditionals. I will give exam ples of both sorts of failures below .

My own opinion

is at

odds with this view

of

where things stand.

I

think

that the language of mathematics is continuous with ordinary language, since

discourse about mathematical objects and mathematical activity takes place

in English or some other natural language. While it would not be appropriate

to argue

for

this commonsensical

but

unfashionable position

in

this pap er,

it is appropriate to point out the co nsequences for a theory of conditionals.

To one who takes this line, mathematical conditionals simply are natural lan-

guage conditionals, so an ade quate account of mathem atical conditionals m ust

be part and parcel

of

an ad equa te account

of

natural language conditionals.

Hence, neither

of

the approaches

to

the conditionals m entioned above

is at

all satisfactory and the lack of an adequate account of the semantics of condi-

tionals is a major em barrassm ent.

If the general issue is the study

of

the relation between statements and the

features of the world they are about, the problem with the conditional is pretty

obvious. What

in

the w orld are conditionals a bout?

In

this paper

I

want

to

suggest that an old answer to this question is right, but that it has never been

taken seriously because of the failure of semantics to take the notion of subject

matter seriously. Then I will outline an accoun t of the semantics of conditionals

based on this suggestion within Situation Semantics.

Before getting down to work, I want to mak e a few terminological re m arks,

to help carve things up in what seem s to me a useful way.

21



Jon Barwise

First, the distinction between sentence and statement is very important. A

sentence can be used by different speakers in different situations to make differ-

ent statements. Sentences have meanings, and those meanings have a lot to

do with the truth value of statements m ade with the sentences, but truth values

simply cannot be assigned to sentences in isolation. This is, by now, a familiar

point and one discussed at great length in chapter n of Barwise and Perry

(1983), referred to hereinafter as S&A.

Sec ond , the re is a certain strategy for dealing with a host of loosely rela ted

problems in semantics that I want to be able to refer to easily, so as to

dismiss it. The strategy derives from first supposing that sentences (as

opposed to statements) are true or false, then noticing that many actual

sentences are not rich enough to give you a truth value without various

contextual factors. Instead of having second thoughts about the original

supposition, the temptation has often been to try to salvage it. Consider,

for example, my statement:

(1) If I can state the pro blem clearly, Joh n will solve it

This statement is rife with context-dependent elements. As applied to names,

the strategy in question claims that my use of the name John is really short

for some 'proper' name, or definite description, one that would pick out John

in a unique way, independent of context. As applied to /, it claims that my

use of this noun phrase is really elliptic for some other NP that would pick

me ou t, indepen dent of the fact that I am the speaker. A s applied to the problem,

it would attempt to add some restrictive relative clause that would uniquely

identify the problem I meant among all problems. Other context-dependent

elem ents in this exam ple will emerge in our discussion of cond itionals.

In gene ral, the strategy attem pted to replace a sentence by some less context-

depe nden t senten ce, one where the difference between sentence and statem ent

is negligible (or can at least be handled by the then current theory), and to

claim that an utterance of the one was a telegraphic form of an utterance

of the other. I will call this the 'fleshing out strategy', because it assumes that

sentences whose interpretation depends on some troublesome contextual ele-

ment can be fleshed out to sentences where that contextual element is elimi-

nated. I assume that this strategy is wrong-headed, that it has been shown

to be unworkable, and that it should now be laid to rest. This too is discussed

at length in chapte r 11 of S&A.

Th ird, a remark about my use of the terms 'counterfactual' and 'subjunctive

conditional'. The adjective 'counterfactual' applies to certain conditional state-

me nts, not sentence s, whereas it is the other way around for the term 'subjunc-

tive conditional'. R oughly, a counterfactual statement is one which presuppo ses

that the antecedent is false. These are usually expressed using the subjunctive,

but no t always, and not all uses of subjunctive co nditional sentences a re co unter-

factual. Thus I will be contrasting indicative and subjunctive conditional sen-



Jon Barwise

backwards, that the interpretation of general conditionals is more basic, and

that we can understand the interpretation of specific conditionals best as

instances of the interpretation of general conditionals. I propose to interpret

general conditional statements as describing 'parametric constraints' and speci-

fic conditionals as describing instances of the constraints whe re par am eters

are fixed.

Finally, I want to distinguish between the truth conditions of a sentence

and stronger cond itions. In Barwise (to appear) I argued that we need to move

from truth conditions to information conditions. That is, we need to focus

on two distinct but related things: (i) under what conditions a sentence can

be used to convey information, and (2) what information the sentence conveys

under those conditions.

2

These two questions will be a recurring refrain, as

I attempt to show that the informational perspective provides a useful way

to attack the problem of conditionals.

For the semantics of conditionals, this perspective has two important conse-

quence s. O ne is that in order to begin to answer the two questions, a sem antic

theory has to provide things for informative conditional statements to be about,

sorts of things that are not found in traditional theories, things like situations

and relations between them. The second consequence is an appreciation of

the impo rtance of our ability to exploit environm ental constants when attempt-

ing to convey inform ation. I will return to this point in section 3.3.

In the next section I present a number of traditional puzzles and examples

in the semantics of the conditional. In the third section, I review some points

from Situation Semantics needed for my account of the conditional. In the

final section, I sketch my prop osal for the semantics of conditionals and ex amine

its consequences for the examples.

2. S O M E E X A M P L E S

Some of the examples below are presented because they make certain points.

Others are presented because they pose serious challenges to any semantic

account of conditional stateme nts.

Exam ple A: The case of Virgil and the material subjunctive

Let me start with a real-life example. Back in the late 1960s, Virgil, a student

at the University of Wisconsin, happened to be arrested at a demonstration

with a rock in the pocket of his coat. After pleading innocent to a charge

of carrying a concealed weapon, Virgil was asked: 'If someone had attacked

you, would you have defended yourself with this rock?' This was a question

to which Virgil did not know the answer. However, having just finished a

course in mathematical logic, he quickly recalled the first-order semantics for

24



Conditionals and conditional information

conditionals, and reasoned as follows: 'Since no one attacked me, the antece-

dent of:

(5) If som eone had attacked me , then I would have defended myself with

this rock

is false, hence the whole of (5) is true.' So he answered 'Yes'. Based on this

answer, it was decided that the rock w as a we apo n, so Virgil was convicted.

If Virgil had studied from Quine (1959), he might not have fallen into this

trap, for, as Quine tells us on pages 14-15:

Whatever the proper analysis of the contrafactual conditional may be, we may be sure

in advance that it cannot be truth-functional; for, obviously ordinary usages demand

that some contrafactual conditionals with false antecedents and false consequents be

true and that other contrafactual conditionals with false antecedents and false conse-

quents be false. Any adequate analysis . . . must consider causal connections, or kindred

relationships, between matters spoken of in the antecedent of the conditional and matters

spoken of in the consequent.

Quine's analysis seems right on target in Virgil's case. Under what conditions

could Virgil have known that (5) was true, and so been in a position to make

an informative claim with it? Clearly knowing that the antecedent and conse-

quent were false was not enough. Virgil would have had to know something

about a relationship between two general types of situations, those where he

is attacked, those where he defends

himself.

He would have had to know

that the o ne type of situation leads to the oth er in a systematic way.

Quine is being rather disingenuous in the above quotation. We know from

his other writings that he does not really think any sense can be made of

the subject m atter of a statem ent. By con trast, a key feature of Situation Seman-

tics is its attempt to tak e the notion of subject ma tter seriously, by using situa-

tions to get at subject matter. Hence, the account I propose below could be

seen as an attempt to work out Quine's suggestion that the interpretation of

a conditional should be a relation between the matters spoken of in the antece-

dent and consequent.

Exam ple B: The case of the possible worlds mathem atician

Usually the problems with the possible worlds account have been phrased as

problems about necessary truths like mathematical theorems. Suppose I am

in the middle of some proof in a lecture and I assert, of some specific natural

number n that has arisen in the proof, 'If n is od d, th en n

2

is od d.'

On the possible worlds account, the semantic value of my statement is the

universally true proposition, for one of two reasons: either because the antece-

dent is false in all possible worlds, or because the consequent is true in all

possible

worlds.

Th us , the accoun t simply fails to give any accoun t of the relation

between such a statement and what it is about: odd numbers and the operation

25



Jon Barwise

of squaring, in this case. It gives no hint as to the informational function of

my statement in the proof, which might be a constructive proof of some fact

or might

be a

proof that n

is not odd. My

statement

is

informational because

I know that

n

is a

natural number

and

that

the

operation

of

squaring natural

num bers always takes one from odd numbers to odd numbers.

This is all quite familiar, and largely discounted by those doing possible

worlds semantics, since they

are, by and

large, interested

in

natural language

and its relationship to human activity and don't seem to see mathematics as

part of this. However, the problem about mathematical objects reaches up

and affects the semantics of conditional statements abo ut mathem aticians, their

activity

and

attitudes.

The

following

is not a

true story,

but it

might have

been, if a mathem atician took the possible wo rlds account of subjunctive condi-

tionals seriously

and

applied

it to his

everyday talk about mathematical activity.

Virgil went on to become a number theorist, we suppose, and has been

trying to prove Fermat 's Last Theorem' (FLT) for several years. Also, after

his experience with

the

judicial system ,

he

became

an

advocate

of the

possible

worlds approach to subjunctive conditionals.

O ne

day

Virgil discovered

a

correct

proof

3

that

the

conjecture FL T is equiva-

lent to a conjecture RH tha t his friend Paul had been working on. Upon making

this discovery, he dashed to Paul's office and showed him the proof. Then

Virgil asserted:

(6) If you could give a correct proof of RH, then I could give a correct

proof

of

FLT. '

'Yes , '

said Paul.

'Well, then , ' Virgil add ed,

(7) It is false that if you could give a correct proof of RH, then I could

give a correct proof of not-FLT. '

'Naturally,' said Paul, 'since you couldn't give correct proofs of both

something

and its

negation. '

'But don't you see, replied Virgil, 'that means that FLT and RH are

both true We're famous '

I think the intuitions that Virgil's utterances of (6) and (7) are both true are

fairly robust. What Virgil realized was that a possible worlds account that

could make both of these true would also have to assign true to FLT and

R H .

A possible worlds analysis

has to

decide what truth value

to

assign

to a

conditional 0—>^ in the actual world i in the case where 0 is not true in

any world 7 accessible from i. The most common option, the one followed

by Stalnaker

and

Lewis

in

their theories,

for

example, claims that

in

this case

the conditional is true in world i. Call this Option I. On the other hand, one

might claim that the conditional is undefined (or perhaps false) in world /.

Call this Option II. Virgil's argument is that if either option were correct,

26




then in order to assign true to his statements (6) and (7) in the actual world,

FLT and RH m ust be true.

Here, for the interested reader, is Virgil's argument. Since the natural

num bers and oth er h ereditarily finite objects a re the sam e in all possible wo rlds,

talk about them is absolute between possible worlds. That is, a proposition

about such objects will have the same truth value in all possible worlds. In

particular, being formally provable is absolute between possible worlds, since

formal proofs are hereditarily finite objects. Thus RH is formally provable

in one world just in case it is formally provable in all. Let's first assume that

Option II is right. Then, since (6) is true, there must be a possible world

/ in which Paul gives a correct proof/? of RH. Similarly, if Option I is right,

then since (7) is true, the embedded statement If you could give a correct

proof of RH , then I could give a correct proof of not-FLT

is false, so again

there must be a possible world / in which Paul gives a correct proof

p

of RH.

Now there is no reason to suppose that the actual physical proof

p

found

by Paul exists in worlds other than /, or that, if it does, Paul finds it in other

worlds. However, because it exists in/, RH is formally provable in/ and hence

formally provable in all worlds. But the RH must be provable in the actual

world, and so both RH and FLT must be true.

4

Since Virgil has not, in fact,

proved FLT, his argument that it is true must be absurd.

As Q uine say s, subjunctive conditionals (I would say all conditionals) e xpress

a relationship between the matters spoken of by the antecedent and by the

consequent. Intuitively, the reason that (6) is true has to do with a relationship

between the type of situations where Paul discovers a proof of a conjecture

and the type of situations where his friend Virgil converts Paul's proof into

a proof of something he knows to be equivalent to the conjecture. That is,

(6) seems to have to do with, or be about, the types of situations described

by its antecedent and consequent. The possible worlds framework is too blunt

an instrumen t to let us get our han ds on these types of situations and a relation-

ship between them. Note, for example, that the consequents of the conditionals

in (6) and (7) played absolutely no role in the above argument, aside from

their role in getting us to agree that the statements (6) and (7) were true.

Any statements with the same antecedent and same truth value would have

done as well, regardless of what the con sequ ent w as abou t.

A no the r exa mp le, which is less technical and more persuasive to some p eople

of the point I am trying to ma ke , comes in the discussion in section 3.4.

Exam ple C: Bizet and Verdi, Kennedy and Osw ald

The two previous examples had to do with subjunctive conditionals, a kind

of conditional th at h as, in gen eral, struck logicians as highly problem atic, espec-

ially because they are frequently u sed to ma ke counterfactual claims. Consid er,

for example, the famous pair of sentences that made Quine wonder 'whether

27



Jon Barwise

any really coh eren t theory of the contrafactual cond itional of ordinary langua ge

is possib le at all' (Q uin e 1959: 15):

(8) If Bizet and Ve rdi had bee n com patrio ts, Bizet would have bee n Italian

(9) If Bizet and Verdi had been com patriots, Verdi would have been French

Much ink has been spilt on this pair of statements. For Quine and many others

the inability to decide between them casts doubt on the very existence of a

coherent account of the counterfactual. Lewis, on the other hand, argues that

since there is nothing to choose between them, they are both false, and uses

this to mo tivate his version of a possible worlds account over S talna ke r's.

But why are the problems with this pair only problems about subjunctive

or counterfactual conditional statements? It is hard to see what problems about

these statements, made by a cultured, twentieth-century logician, would not

apply equally to the following pair if either had been made by less knowledge-

able contempo raries of Bizet and V erdi:

(10) If Bizet and V erdi are com patrio ts, then Bizet is Italian

(11) If Bizet and Ve rdi are com patrio ts, then Verd i is French

On the material conditional account, one can say that both are true, since

the common antecedent is false, but one can say nothing about the earlier

pair. Look at them informationally, though. Under what conditions could (10)

be used to convey information? Imagine someone who knows that Verdi is

Italian, knows what it means for two people to be compatriots, but does not

know the nationality of Bizet. This person is in circumstances where he can

use (10) to make an informative statement. These circumstances would not

permit him, thoug h, to use (11) to make an informative stateme nt.

No tice that the person w ho would make an informative claim with (10) needs

to know at least two things: a fact about Verdi, that he is Italian, and a general

fact about compatriots of Italians, that they are also Italians. The latter fact

can be viewed as a relation between two types of situations, one where an

individual is a compatriot of some Italian, the other where the individual is

himself Italian.

Now go back to (8) and (9). Exactly the same can be said of (8) and (9)

as we said of (10) and (11), respectively. If a twentieth-century speaker knew

that Ve rdi was Italian, and knew w hat it meant for two people to be co mp atriots,

but did not know the nationality of Bizet, he could use (8), but not (9), to

convey information. Indeed, the information content of the statements (8)

and (10) (though not the meanings of the sentences used) is virtually the same.

Similarly with (9) and (11). An adequate account should permit of informative

(and hence true) s tatemen ts mad e with any of (8) -(i 1).

It seems dubious, from the perspective of informative communication, that

a theory could get things right about one kind of conditional and have virtually

nothing to say about the othe r. A nd it cuts both ways. The material conditional

28




does not apply to the subjunctive; the possible worlds approach, in Lewis's

version, does not say anything abo ut the ind icative.

Th e usual argu me nt (e.g. Lew is 1973: 3) for a radical difference betw een

the semantics of subjunctive (or counterfactual) and indicative conditionals

contrasts the following pair, the first of which is true, the second of which

is probab ly false:

(12) If Oswald did not kill Ken ned y, then someon e else did

(13) If Oswald had not killed Ke nne dy, then som eone else would have

The difference in truth value of this pair is supposed to show that we need

different sorts of accounts. This seems like a mistake, though. The minimal

change in (13) that gives an indicative is not (12) but (10 ):

(14) If Oswald has not killed Ke nne dy, then someo ne else will have

To see that (13) and (14) could be used, from different temporal vantage

poin ts, to convey the same information , imagine that one of the various conspir-

acy theories of Kennedy's assassination is correct, and that the mastermind

behind the plot has lined up several wou ld-be assassins along the fateful rou te

in Dallas, with Oswald the first. At the end of the appointed hour, the master-

mind looks at his watch and asserts (14). It seems that roughly the sam e informa-

tion would be conveyed if, ye ars later , the ma stermind asserted (13).

The considerations emb odied in Examples A -C suggest to me that Tho mason

and Stalnaker are right in their call for a unified account of subjunctive and

indicative conditionals, but that such an account has to be more fine-grained

than the possible worlds account, to let us get at those relations between the

subject matter of the antecedent and consequent that conditionals are about.

The next four ex amples b ring up a different set of pro blem s.

Exam ple D: The case of the missing pollen

Much of what we know about the world, and how to act in it, is local, or

conditional, in that we know how things work as long as certain conditions

obtain. I know that if it snows, then the sidewalks will be slippery, and so

I must take care. I know that if my 9-month-old daughter Claire rubs her

eyes,

then she is sleepy, and so will take a nap. I know that if the cat comes

into the h ous e, Claire will get bitten by fleas.

In describing these pieces of conditional knowledge, I have used conditional

statem ents , but I am not claiming that conditional know ledge amo unts to know-

ing these conditional sentences. And, indeed, I do not think that such know-

ledge does amount to knowing sentences, but that is beside the point here.

When I speak of certain conditions obtaining, I am not referring to the condi-

tions described by the antecedents of these conditionals, but to other, more

pervasive, background conditions that generally obtain.

9



Jon Barwise

Wh at one has knowledge abo ut, when one has a piece of conditional know-

ledge of the above form, is a feature of the world - what Perry and I have

called a conditional constraint on the world. In the main section of this paper

I want to examine how the meanings of conditional sentences are related to

these conditional constraints on the world. Now, though, I want to give some

examples of how the ordinary reasoning we do using conditional statements

is governed by the conditional natu re of our k nowledge.

It is well known th at ordinary reasoning using conditional statem ents is wildly

different from the logic of the m aterial con ditional. Philosophe rs have realized

this for many years. Recent attention to the problem has arisen in artificial

intelligence (AI). AI workers, in attempting to build machines that act intelli-

gently in the real world, have demonstrated the ubiquity of conditional know-

ledge, and the extent to which the commonsense use of such knowledge is

at odds with straightforward applications of traditiona l logic.

Let's briefly review this discrepancy by examining a few examples of the

difference between the ordinary use of conditionals and that given by classical

logic. First, take the knowledge about what it means when Claire rubs her

eyes,

expressed by my general conditional statement above:

(15) If Claire rubs he r eye s, then she is sleepy

For months this was a sound piece of (conditional) knowledge that Mary Ellen

and I used to understand Claire and learn when we should put her to bed.

However, in early summer it began to fail us. As conditions changed around

us, a frame of mind which in one set of circumstances represented knowledge

of Claire came to represent a false belief about her. Combined with other

symptoms, we eventually figured out that Claire was allergic to something

or other (call it pollen X since we are still not sure what it was) and that

X could also cause her to rub her ey es. And so we changed o ur belief.

Suppose one wants to represent knowledge with sentences and sound reason-

ing with valid deduction. Examples like the above pose a dilemma. Either

one cannot use the obvious conditional sentence, one corresponding to what

I would have said was the case, to represent what I knew, or else one cannot

use a host of inferences that are judged valid in classical logic in representing

my reasoning (or both - and this, I fear, is the real moral). For example,

I cannot use any inference that would justify concluding // Claire rubs her

eyes in the presence o f pollen X, then she is sleepy

from //

Claire rubs her

eyes, then she

is

sleepy. Fo r exam ple, I would have to abandon the Hypothetical

Syllogism as repres enting sound reason ing: from

[If 0 then

y]

and [If

y

then

ip]

infer

[If 0 then

xp]

30




H ere is an example of what is called the n onm onoto nicity of ordinary rea son-

ing. If the cat had come in the house, Claire would have been bitten by fleas.

However, if the cat had not had fleas and had come into the house, Claire

would not have been bitten by fleas. Such examples cause one to abandon

the rule: from

[If 0 then

xp]

infer

[If

p

and%, then

xp]

If I am at all typical, many logicians tend to think of these problems as

analogou s to friction in classical m echanics. Logic is after frictionless infere nce .

If we can get that right, then surely we should be able to add a parameter

later to take care of this problem. After all, isn't the problem straightforward

at some level? Isn't it just that one is not being explicit about what the real

antecedent of the statement is, the one that makes the conditional true and

that the speaker really m eant?

This intuition , which seem s fairly sou nd, suggests a certain strategy of fleshing

out conditionals by adding a syntactic parameter, one that can be used for

making background assumptions explicit. The idea would be to find some way

to move from a conditional statement:

A : If 0 then

xp

to a 'weaker' statement:

A ': If £, then if 0 then

xp

(weaker since it has an additional antecedent), that meets two conditions: (i)

/? describes the conditions under which the original conditional A holds; and

(ii) the person that claims to know (believe, assert) the original conditional

A really knows (believes, intends to assert) the weak er A '.

I think that many workers in AI who have confronted these problems now

believe this assumption is just plain false. I have come to agree. It seems

to me that it is another form of the fleshing out strategy mentioned earlier.

Again it seems to be based on the confusion between sentence and statement,

and on a reluctance to ta ke the context of an uttera nce into sufficient accou nt.

There is simply no reason to suppose that there is any way to flesh out a

conditional statem ent to inco rporate a description of the exact conditions un der

which the conditional holds, or even the conditions under which the speaker

believes it to h old.

However, there seems to be something right about the intuitions behind

the strategy. In all of these ex amples th ere is a none too sub tle shift in context

that somehow affects the appropriateness of the usual inference schemes. We

do need some sort of parameter to take account of this shift in context in



Jon Barwise

an explicit way. Within the possible worlds approach to semantics, this is just

what Stalnaker and Lewis provide. For Stalnaker, for example, the missing

parameter is a selection function / from nonempty sets of worlds to worlds.

For Lewis, it is a similarity relation on possible worlds. The failure of the

above inference schemes for the logic of ordinary language conditionals, and

the fact that they fail in the Stalnaker and Lewis accounts for the right sorts

of reasons, is one of the arguments in favour of those theories. However,

consider the following:

Example E: A proof that i = —i

If you examine statements made by mathematicians in doing mathematics,

as opp osed to the w ay it gets formalized in logic, it turns out tha t the problem s

from the last section arise there too. Just the same sorts of inferences get

you in trouble, for just the same sorts of reasons. Indeed, many of the famous

false 'proofs' can be phrased as improper uses of laws like the above. I will

give the very simplest he re, a 'pro of that i = - i , that uses (or rathe r, misuses)

only true conditional statements and the usual laws of equality. I use / for

V - i, so that / • / = - 1 . 1 also use the fact that V i = i.

(16) If x = a • b,

then

Vx = \/a • Vb

(17) If

x =

1 and

a = -

1 and

b = -1

, then

x-a-b

From these true statements, and the laws of equality, we can conclude, using

the Hypothetical Syllogism, that:

(18) If

x= 1

a n d « = - 1 and /? = - 1 , t h e n * = - 1

There are two, related, ways of looking at this problem, both of which locate

the difficulty with a shift in background conditions, but which differ in a way

that will prove impo rtant.

One analysis of the problem would be to say that the

sentence

used in (16)

can be used, in different circum stances, to make radically different statem ents ,

statements where there is an implicit universal quantification over a domain

of numbers fixed by context. Some such statements would be true, others false.

The sentence can be used in high school algebra courses to make a true state-

ment about all positive real numbers. However, this is not the context in which

it is being used when combined with (17), where we extract square roots of

negative numbers. While there is no problem with taking square roots of nega-

tive num be rs, (16) does no t express a true fact in those circumstances.

A som ewh at different analysis would be to say that an informative statem ent

of (16) is not a complete proposition, but rather is what one might call a para-

metric proposition, something that yields a fact when the parameters are appro-

priately fixed. Just what counts as an appropriate value of the parameters is

32




determined by context. In the case of (16) the appropriate values of the para-

meters are positive real numbers. Thus, in combining it with (17) we are fixing

the parameters of the parametric proposition described by (16) at inappropriate

values.

This example is so simple that it is perhaps not as convincing as it might

be. A bette r exam ple uses the following law derived in the study of triangles:

(19) If sin(a) = sin(/?) then

a= 3

Th ere is an infamous 'p ro of (e.g . Maxw ell 1959: 10-12) that all acute trian-

gles are isosceles, one that revolves around a misuse of this fact. Law (19)

is typically proved in circumstances where one is talking only about angles

that are interior angles of acute triangles, and so smaller than 90

0

. In the infa-

mous proof (19) is applied to two angles which are, as it turns out, exactly

180

0

apart, so they cannot both be interior angles of such triangles. What

is deceptive is the way one strays out of the circumstances where (19) applies

quite without knowing it.

Anyone who has ever had to formalize mathematical proofs in first-order

logic knows that this sort of context relativity pervades ordinary mathematical

discourse. The context dependence of mathematical discourse is part of what

makes formalizing mathematical proofs so very difficult, since the context has

to be formalized too. Of course, in mathematics this is usually (always?) pos-

sible,

even if difficult. The difference is that in real life it is not just difficult

but often simply impossible, because the context may be literally ineffable.

What moral should we draw from this? At least one: that however one

wants to account for the failures, real or apparent, of classical laws like the

Hypothetical Syllogism for natural language conditionals, the failures are not

an argument for a clean break between natural language conditionals on the

one hand, and mathematical conditionals on the other. A theory that accounts

for the facts in one case but misses them in the other is, other things being

equal, less satisfactory than one with a unified account. The account I am

proposing makes explicit the dependence of the information content of condi-

tional statements on background conditions. It predicts that whenever the

Hypothetical Syllogism fails, there is a shift of background conditions involved.

Example

F:

Jack and Jim's quarrel

This is a famous example taken from Downing (1959), of a subjunctive condi-

tional that has been argued to be both true and false. The situation is this.

Jack and Jim are old friends, prone to helping one another under normal

circumstances. Jim is very proud, and so would never ask help of anyone with

whom he had recently q uarre lled. Ja ck, on the oth er ha nd, is a very unforgiving

person, and so wouldn't have helped anyone with whom he had recently quar-

relled. Now, in the particular situation, Jim needs help but he and Jack have

33



Jon Barwise

quarrelled. The counterfactual in question is:

(20) If Jim had asked Jack for help , then Jack would have helped him

Is this true or false, or both? Given all the facts of the case, Jim could not

possibly have asked Jack for help, so if the antecedent is to be seriously enter-

tained some of the facts must be set aside - perhaps because the speaker is

ignorant of them. If one sets aside the fact that Jim and Jack have quarrelled,

then, it is claimed, (20) seems to be true. On the other hand if you ignore

the fact that Jim is stubborn, and so imagine that he might have asked Jack

for help, Jack would not have helped because of the quarrel, so (20) seems

to be false.

Exam ple G: Sly Pete and Mr Stone

One last example, this one due to Allan Gibbard (1981), of two indicative

conditional statements, each of which seems to be true, but which also seem

to be in direct conflict. It has many of the features of the previous example,

but seems, initially, more of a challenge to the kind of account I want to

give.

Sly Pete and Mr Stone are playing poker on a Mississippi riverboat. It is now up to

Pete to call or fold. My henchman Zack sees Stone's hand which is quite good, and

signals its contents to Pete. My henchman Jack sees both hands, and sees that Pete's

hand is rather low so that Stone's is the winning hand. At this point the room is cleared.

A few minutes later Zack slips me a note which says 'if Pete called, he won', and

Jack slips me a note which says 'if Pete called, he lost. ...' I conclude that Pete folded.

(Gibbard

1981,

as quoted in Stalnaker 1984: 108)

Gibbard uses these examples to argue against the idea that these sorts of

indicative conditionals express any sort of proposition at all. His argument

is discussed at length in Stalnaker (1984). The example here would seem to

present a serious obstacle to any sort of informational account of the condi-

tional. After all, both henchmen seem completely justified by the facts of the

situation in asserting what they do, so presumably such an account will have

to call both assertions informational, hence true. But how can they both be

giving us inform ation abou t wh at will hap pen if Pete in fact calls?

Wh ile this is rather similar to Ex am ple F, ou r analysis is com mitted to differ-

ent claims abo ut th e two e xam ples, as we will see later.

3. IN F O R M A T I O N IN S I T U A T I O N S E M A N T I C S

In this section I am going to review some points made in

S&A,

with some

modifications suggested in Barwise and P erry (1985; hereinafter

Ss&sa)

stress-

ing those parts of the theory that are central to my proposal for the semantics

of conditional sentences.

34




3.1 M ean ing, inform ation, and constraints

In Situation Semantics we look at the linguistic meaning w ithin a general theory

of meaning and information. Th e general picture is that a situation

s

can contain

information in virtue of some constraint that holds betwe en types of situations.

5

Let us use S, S', . .. for types of situations, and write s:S if s is of type S.

A type S of situation is realized if there is a real situation s:S.

6

A constraint

is a relation holding between types of situations, S=>S\ If this relation holds,

then it's a fact that if S is realized, then so is S'. We read S^>S' as S involves

S

f

. In S&A we indicated such a constraint C by:

involves,

S, S'

'; 1

A real situation

s

contains information relative to such an actual constraint

C

if

s:S.

It may contain various pieces of information relative to C, but the

most general proposition that s contains, relative to C, is that S' is realized,

that is, that th ere is a real situation

s:S'.

In order to see how one situation can contain information about specific

things, it is important to realize that constraints hold between parameterized

types of situations. Here is an example with a single space-time parameter

/. Consider the constraint that if Claire rubs her eyes, then she is sleepy. This

constraint is a relation betwe en two types of situations, S and S':

S =

the type of situation whe re at /, Claire is rubbing her eyes

which we w rite a s:

[s

I in s: at /: rubb ing, Claire's ey es, Claire; 1]

and, using the same notation ;

S

r

=

[s

I in

s:

at /: sleepy, Claire; 1]

Assume that S really does involve 5', so that if at some specific space-time

location /, s is of type S(l) (the type where the parameter / is anchored to

/) ,

then there is a real situation

s':S'(l).

In othe r wo rds, at that very location,

Claire is sleepy in s'. Thus, the proposition that S'(l) is realized entails the

proposition that at /, Claire is sleepy.

In general a constraint C or the form S^>S' will have many param eters,

and every param eter in S' will also be a para m eter of S.

Given any such constraint, and any anc ho r/f or some or all of the param eters

in 5, that is, any assignment of appropriate values to the parameters, then

the result of replacing the parameters by the values will give rise to an actual

constraint. That is, if:

is actual, th en so is:

35




Roughly speaking, the interpretation of an utterance is the fact, situation

or event it describes. Thus, at a first approximation, an utterance of Claire

is sleeping will describe a real situation s where Claire is sleeping at the space-

time location / referred to by the speaker with the use of the present tense

is, one that tempo rally overlaps the spa ce-time location l

u

of the u tterance:

in

s:

at /: sleeping, C laire; i

However, things are not quite so simple. If there are any such situations,

there will be many such, containing more or less of the rest of what is going

on. And there may be none, if my utterance is false. So we modify this so

that the interpretation is a type of situation, the type

S

of situation where

Claire is sleeping. We take the propositional content of the utterance to be

that the re is a real situation of that type - in othe r w ords , that

S

is realized.

Thus,

we take the interpretation of an utterance to be the type of situation

it describes, and so take the meaning of a sentence to be a relation between

types of situations, the type in which the sentence is used to assert something,

on the one hand , and the type so described, on the oth er. Th at is, the m eaning

of a sentence is itself a constraint. We analyse linguistic meaning as residing

in these sorts of systematic relations b etwe en types of situations.

In S&A we saw that a great many contextual elements can enter in determin-

ing the interpretation of any particular statement from the meaning of the

underlying sentence. This is even more pervasive in getting from the meaning

of conditionals to their interpretation. As we saw in the examples, even in

ma them atics, the context greatly affects the interp retation of a given senten ce.

Th ere are two different sorts of context relativity that nee d to be distinguished

to understand conditionals, distinguished much more clearly than we did in

S&A.

O ne might call them features of language that exploit environm ental

con stants, versus features th at exploit systematic variation . Indexicals are exam-

ples of the latter; the former are a bit harder to identify. Let me give two

examples. Consider the difference between the sentences:

(21) It's 4 p.m .

(22) It's 4 p.m . here

It seems that unde r norm al circumstances the information conveyed by informa-

tional utterances of these sentences is the same, so that the utterances must

have the same interpretation, and so the sentences have the same meaning.

This is the way we treated them in

S&A.

However, this glosses over what

might appear a minor point, which becomes important in the understanding

of conditionals.

There is a slight difference in meaning between these two sentences. If you

and I are talking about calling New York from here in California, and you

ask me what time it is there, I can use (21) but not (22) - at least, not without

simultaneously pointing at a map or something similar - to tell you the time

37



Jon Barwise

there. This suggests that the interpretation of (22) is complete in a way that

(21) is possibly inco mp lete, in that the in terpre tation of (21) does not dete rm ine

the p lace it is abo ut in qu ite so definite a way as (22) does.

Sentence (21) normally exploits the fact that time is relatively invariant with

respect to place. As long as we are in the same time zone, we can simply

ignore the fact that time is a function of place. Thus, the interpretation of

sentence (21) has a parameter whose exact value is usually irrelevant for the

information content. However, it can be set at unusual values by context,

as in our talk of calling New Yo rk.

The use of the word 'here' exploits systematic variation, namely that the

place a person can refer to with 'here' varies in a systematic way with where

the person

is.

A sp eak er can always refer to wh ere he is with 'he re ', if necessary ,

and the interpretation of (22) will contain that place as a constituent, rather

than containing a param eter that gets set at that place by context.

There is an inclination to think that something like the fleshing out strategy

should take care of context dependence, that statements like (21) are always

telegraphic forms of some more complete utterance, like (22), or It's 4 p.m.

in New York,

or some such. H ow eve r, this is just as misguided as the p reviously

mentioned instances of this strategy, and for just the same reason. There is

no reason to suppose that the speaker has , in general, any c ontext-independe nt

way of referring to the place he is talking a bou t.

Let m e be a bit mo re explicit about th e propo sal I am making for a difference

in meaning for these two statemen ts. For the sen tence:

(22) It 's 4 p.m . here

when used in a statement u, describes the state of affairs regarding the time,

at the location l

u

where the statement is made, as being 4p .m . Using our notation:

at l

u

: 4 p.m. ; 1

In terms of type s, we have a param eter-free type

5 = [5 I in

5:

at l

u

: 4 p.m .; 1]

By contrast, a statem ent using:

(21) It's 4 p.m .

gives us a param etric type

S(l) = [s I

in

s:

at

/:

4 p.m .; 1]

Under normal circumstances this parameter is filled automatically by context.

Once one sees examples of this, they come up everywhere. For example,

suppose I say Kansas City is closer than Columbus. There is a three-place

relation lurking here,

x

is closer than

y

to z, but the third parameter is fairly

insensitive and can be filled in by con tex t. N orm ally it is filled in by the location

38




of the utterance, but it need not be. I could be talking to my wife about our

trip to Minnesota next summer, and arguing that we should go to see my

family in Kansas City rather than hers in Columbus, because Kansas City is

closer than C olum bus, closer to where we will be.

Thus,

we will distinguish a statem ent with a param eter-free interp retation

from one with an interpretation that gives one only a parametric type of situa-

tion, where the parameter must be filled by context in a different way. We

will return to this below , in the discussion of para me tric information.

In general, however, the picture of meaning is basically the same. Meaning

consists in constraints between types of situations, and it is such constraints

that allow a situation to contain information.

Th ere a re many different kinds of actual co nstr aints , arising in radically differ-

ent ways: from laws of nature, from the process of individuating the world,

from conv entions, from peo ple's inten tions , among oth ers. This is not the place

to go into this in any detail, so I will assume the reader is familiar with the

account of constraints and m eaning given in S&A.

The interest in the account given below rests entirely on taking constraints

seriously. The m ain thing

we

need to get started on the sem antics of conditionals

is the view of constraints as facts relating types of situations, facts which can

guide people's actions. They are just the sort of relation between matters that

Quine felt were needed for an understanding of subjunctive conditionals. As

indicated earlier, such states of affairs are enormously important in everyday

life. Consequently, it is important for people to be able to describe them to

others. That, I would claim, is why human languages always have a way of

forming conditionals.

3.2 Tr uth conditions versus information conditions

There are many ways of classifying competing semantic accounts. One way

that makes for strange bedfellows is whether they take sentences (or better,

statements) to determine truth values directly or indirectly. Thus, while any

self-respecting seman tic theory m ust give some account of the conditions un der

which a statement is true, there is still a good deal of flexibility as to whether

this account is direct or indirect. In accounts of meaning based on Tarski's

analysis of truth, as in Davidson's programme, for example, it is assumed that

to know the meaning of a sentence just is to know the conditions under which

it is true, so this is a direct theory. Mentalistic theories are indirect, in that

they factor the interpretation of a statement through something mental, like

the idea it expresses , or a sentence of 'me nta lese '.

Situation Semantics is also indirect in its approach to truth, but in a more

radical way. In Situation Semantics, attention shifts from the conditions under

which a statement is true, to something stronger, the conditions under which

a statement carries information, and what information it carries under those

39




If R is some n + iary relation , then it takes n + i objects a

x

. . . a

n

+

i (one

of these may be a space-time location) and a truth value / to determine a

proposition, namely the proposition that the objects stand (/= i) or do not

stand (z = o) in the relation R; equivalently, the propo sition that the para me ter-

free type:

5 = [5 | in 5: R,#i . . ., a

fr

a

n+

\\

i]

is realized. However, if one of these objects,

a

n

+ ]

say, is an environmental

constant, that is, if

a

n+x

is fixed in some way, then it only takes n objects

and a truth value to determine the same proposition. If true, this proposition

can be a piece of information about R, and the objects in question.

Now let's look at it the other way around. What if we are given R and

a

x

, . .

,a

n

and a truth value / explicitly? We do not have eno ugh for a p aram eter-

free ty pe, and hence a prop osition. All we have is a param etric type:

S(a

n4

.j) = [s

I

in s: R , a

u

. . .#

n

,a

n + l

\ i]

Only if the final parameter

a

n

+ x

is anchored to a value

a

n

+ l

in some other

way will we have enough to give us a proposition that represents information,

or misinformation. Until that is fixed, all we have is parametric information

or misinformation - information relative to some assignments, misinformation

relative to others.

We have already seen some concrete examples of this in the discussion of

It's 4 p.m. and Kansas City is closer than Colum bus, and back in the discussion

of Exam ple E . The interp retation of these stateme nts gives information relative

to certain p aram eters that have to be determined by context.

I want to treat the involves relation in a similar way, as a three-place relation

between types of situations:

S

involves

S'

given that

B,

w hich I write as:

We think of

B

as conditions on the situations we are in such that the constraint

between S and S' holds, as long as the situations in question are all of type

B.«

The imp ortant thing to realize is that as long as a given backgroun d condition

B is in force - that is, as long as all situations that arise are of type B - then

there is no reason that one will ever be aware of the dependence on B. It

can be treated as an environmental constant. For example, it was only when

Claire started rubbing her eyes when she obviously was not sleepy that we

had any idea that the constraint that her rubbing her eyes means she is sleepy

is conditional on certain background conditions B obtaining, conditions that

had held until then but of which we were unaware. The actual constraint was

not the constraint S^>S' described earlier, but S^>S'

\

B, where B is the type

of situation w here th ere is no pollen X present at /.

4



Jon Barwise

Th at is, just as we can think of the relation of b eing closer than as a two-place

relation, as long as a fixed vantage point is maintained, so too we can think

of constraints as being absolute relations between types of situations, as long

as background conditions stay con stant.

Problems can arise in communication, when the background conditions are

different for speaker and listener. If I am talking to someone around here

and explain that Kansas City is closer than Columbus, communication should

be straightforward. However, if I am speaking on the phone and say the same

thing, communication is problematic. Similarly, when I told a babysitter in

March that if Claire rubs her eyes, then she is sleepy, then communication

worked, and the sitter obtained useful information about Claire's behaviour.

However, if I had written this on a permanent set of instructions and a sitter

had read it in June, when conditions had changed, communication would not

have wor ked , in that she would have obta ined a piece of misinformation.

Similarly, in a class where angles are always interior angles of acute triangles,

the studen ts and teache r exploit this enviro nm ental con stant to convey informa-

tion with the sentence:

if sin (a ) = sin(/3), then

a —

j8

However, if we inadvertently stray out of this environment into one where

angles grea ter than 90

0

come up , as in Exam ple E , then we may use this sentence

to convey misinformation, and so make mistakes.

A speaker can affect what sorts of background conditions are appropriate

for the interpretation of his utterance. Indeed, the utterance itself can have

an effect on the background conditions that are taken as being in effect. If

I say

Matches struck usually ignite,

and if it is interpreted relative to normal

background conditions, then it expresses a true fact. However, if I say

M atches

struck in the presence of free oxygen usually ignite then the prese nce of free

oxygen is not tak en as being part of the back groun d c onditions of my uttera nc e.

4. I N T E R P R E T I N G C O N D I T I O N A L S T A T E M E N T S

W ith these pieces in plac e, let's turn to co nditionals. To m otivate the discussion,

and tie it up with constraints, I will start by treating general conditionals.

I will first discuss the interpretation of general conditionals, then the interpre-

tation of specific conditionals.

4.1 Interpreting general conditionals

Con sider a pair of stateme nts as follows:

(23) Snow mea ns that the sidewalks are slippery

(24) If it snow s, then the sidewalks are slippery

42




For our purposes, we can take these as synonymous. Moreover, statement

(23) is one that attributes information to situations of a certain type, snowy

ones, by describing a constraint between types of situations. This being the

case,

it is only natural to take the interpretation of (23) and (24) to be a

single constrain t:

2

4

2

4

2 4

)

S'24 =

[s I

in

s:

at /: snow ing; 1]

S

24

= [s I

in

s:

at /: slippery, sidewalks; 1]

where / is a role restricted to range over sublocations of the present location

/ referred to by the speaker of (24). Thus, these are the parameterized types

assigned as the interpretations of the antecedent and consequent, respectively,

with the role / common to both. The constraint means that for every anchoring

of / to some real location /', any situation s

x

of type S'

2A

(/') is part of some

s

2

:

S

2

,(l).

Similarly, (25) and (26) describe a single constraint C

2

:

(25) Claire rubbing her eyes mea ns that she is sleepy

(26) If Claire rubs he r eye s, then she is sleepy

However, this is not quite right. Neither of these constraints is actual. They

do hold quite widely, though, and as long as we are in conditions

B

where

they do hold, we can trust them. Thus, what we assign to these statements

is a param etric constraint, w here a para me ter/? is to be anchored to the prevail-

ing background conditions. Thus, what we want is not C

2

but C

2

\B where

B is anchored to the prevailing background conditions, hopefully to B = [s | in

s: at /: pollen X ; o], or some thing co ntaining it.

Thus,

the interpretation of a general conditional statement is a parametric

constraint C\B, where B is a parame ter an chored to the prevailing backgrou nd,

and where C is S=>5", these types being the interpretations of the antecedent

and co nse que nt, respe ctively. As such, this will not provide a comp lete proposi-

tion, but only a param etric proposition, a proposition relative to the background

conditions B - the proposition that C\ B is actual. This may be information,

or it may n ot.

This makes the exact information content of a statement of a general condi-

tional highly context-dependent, which seems right. However, it might appear

to be too context-dependent, since it could happen that the exact information

content is not even determined by what the speaker knows, in that he or she

might not know what the relevant conditions

B

are.

This may seem an unpleasant consequence of the account, but, sad to say,

it seems right. Moreover, it is just what is needed for many of the puzzling

features of the logic of con ditionals,

as

we w ill

see.

In any ca se, it

is

not restricted

to conditionals. After all, I can obviously say of two objects a and b that

43



Jon Barwise

a is closer than b, that is, closer to me - even if I don't know exactly where

I am. The information content of my statement is that a is closer than b to

m e,

and so is relative to where I am. Similarly, the speaker's environment

determines

B,

and to the extent that the listener shares

B,

the statement can

function informationally in a mo re or less straightforward ma nn er.

4.2 Interpreting specific conditionals

Let us look at some specific conditionals related to the general conditional

discussed above:

(27) If it is snow ing, then the sidewalks are slippery

(28) If it snow ed, then the sidewalks were slippery

These conditionals also describe constraints, but more specific ones, in that

the sp ace -tim e location has been filled out by use of the m ore specific tense :

Q 7

=

^23(^27)

^28

=

^23 ( '28/

where l

21

and /

28

are the space-time locations referred to in utterances (27)

and (28), respectively.

More generally, under what conditions can a specific conditional sentence

0—> t/>

convey information, and , under those cond itions, what information does it convey?

The basic picture is this. The speaker is talking about a specific, highly limited,

situation, say s

u

. Usually just a few things and some relations between them

are involved. He is saying that this is a situation where a conditional constraint

S=$>S'

\B

applies, where

B

is anchored to the background conditions.

S

is the

interpretation of 0, S' is the interpretation of ip . Thus, his utterance will be

informational relative to B if there is an anchor / for the parameters of B such

that

s

u

:B(f),

and if he has the information, relative to

B,

that

S^>S' \B

is actual.

He may have such information simply by being in that type of situation and

knowing how things work there. The propositional content of his utterance is

just that

S(f) => S'(f)

is actual.

Notice that both the specific situation

s

u

and the type of situation

B

play

roles in determining when a specific conditional statement is informational,

but they are not part of the information content. Of course, some of the consti-

tuents of

s

u

will be co nstituents of the types

S

and 5' and hence be constituents

of the information conten t. For exam ple, the values of the param eters anchored

by /w ill be constituents.

Lewis (1973) discusses the annoying vagueness of the truth conditions of

coun terfactuals. H e pu ts this down to a difficulty in knowing what o ther worlds

are most similar to our o wn. On our a ccoun t, the difficulty in deciding wh ether

a given counterfactual statement is true is not due to any vagueness about

what the underlying sentence means, or to difficulty in knowing what other

44




possible worlds are most similar to our own. On the account presented here, the

meaning

is

pretty clear, and there are no other possible

worlds.

Rather, the difficulty

in knowing whether a counterfactual statement is true rests in two other problem s:

9

knowing just what situation

s

u

the speaker is talking about; and knowing

whether there is some background type B such that s

u

is of type B and the

conditioned constraint

C \ B

is actual.

4.3 The examples revisited

The account I have given, while informal, is rigorous enough to commit us

to claims about the examples given earlier. Let's work through some of these

examples to see what predictions our theory makes, and how well it stands

up. I will take them in a different ord er.

Example D. For a first example, I take one that is true, but where both

the antecedent and consequent are false. One of the things that must be

accounted for is how a true c onditional can carry new information to a listener

who already knows that both the antecedent and consequent are false.

To see that this can happen, imagine that Mary Ellen and I are going out

for the evening, and that a new sitter has arrived. Suppose she happens to

see that Claire is annoyed with the cat and fussing at it, that she is not rubbing

her eyes, and that she is not the least bit sleepy. From the other room, though,

I only hea r Claire fussing and say:

(29) If Claire is rubb ing her eye s, then she is sleepy

It seems pretty obvious that my statement carries information about Claire

to the sitter, and that the information is something about Claire other than

the fact that she is not rubbing her eyes. What I am saying is that a certain

constraint C

29

is actual in a particular situation

s

29

.

But just what situation

s

29

am I talking about? Is it the real world where Claire is

not

rubbing her

eyes and is not sleepy, or is it some fictitious but 'near' world where Claire

is rubbing her eyes and is sleepy? Neither; and here is a real advantage of

dealing with situations, which are partial, rather than the whole world. I refer

to the situation with Claire playing on the floor with some toys. This situation

is quite limited in that it does not settle many things, like whether or not

Claire is rubbing her eyes, or whether the cat is present. What I say about

this situation is that it is one where a certain conditional constraint applies,

so that a certain unconditional constraint is actual. As long as there is no

pollen X present there, then the constraint is actual, and my communicative

act is informative.

Let's look at this example in a bit more detail, just to get the feel for what

is going on. Th e c onstraint I am describing is C

29

= S'

29

=>

S

29

where S'

29

is:

[s I

in

s:

at /: rubbing, Claire, C laire's eyes; 1]

a n d S ' ^ i s :

45



Jon Barwise

[s

| in

s:

at /: sleepy, Cla ire; i]

He re / is the particular sp ace-time location referred to in my use of the p resent

progressive. To say that this constraint C

29

applies in the particular situation

s

29

is to say that there is a background type

B

such that

C

29

1

B

holds, and

s

29

is of type B. By assumption, the only sort of constraint of this sort around

is wh ere B is the type of there being no pollen X present. Of course the sitter

does not know just what that condition is, and I might not either, in making

my statement.

As regards subjunctives and counterfactuals, notice that if, a few minutes

later, I say to the sitter // Claire had been rubbing her eyes, then she would

have been sleepy,

I am describing exactly the same constraint, but just from

a different point in time and, perhaps, with the knowledge (or false belief)

that there was no real situation of the type described by the anteced ent.

Now let's contrast (29) with a false statement, but one that would seem

to follow from it using the Hypothetical Syllogism:

(30) If Claire is rubbing her eyes and there is pollen X pre sen t, then she

is sleepy

The antecedent of this conditional changes the conditions under which it can

be used appropriately. The background type can no longer be one where there

is no pollen X present. Whereas (29) was said in a background where it was

a fact there was no pollen X present (at /: pollen X; o), the use of (30) is

not appropriate in a context where this fact is fixed. In order for S^>S' \B

to be a constraint, S f\ B must be coherent if the constraint is to be a constraint

on situations at all.

M ore gen erally, the re will be no problem applying the Hypo thetical Syllogism

if the background conditions B stay constant. It is only as they shift that invalid

inferences will get m ad e.

Example E.

Exactly the sam e thing is at work h ere . With (16) we are describ-

ing a conditional constraint, one that applies to positive real numbers, that

is ,

in those situations where the numbers being talked of are positive reals.

In the 'proof that

1

=

- 1

we have moved out of these conditions and have

attempted to apply the constraint where it is not applicable. The same holds

for the 'pr oo f tha t all triangles are isosceles triangle s.

Example A. Now let's take an exam ple where it is really not clear whe ther

the statement is true or is false - the example of Virgil and the rock. Virgil's

(5) was a specific con ditional state m ent. It asserted that a conditional constraint

C

5

(relating types of situations in which he is attacked and types of situations

in which he defends himself) applied in the situation s

5

he was in at the demo n-

stration . W as (5) indeed true ? It was just if C

5

applied in

s

5

.

W ere there general

psychological facts about Virgil, and facts about how things were back then,

that applied to give a general constraint, of which this was a special case?

Since Virgil had never been in a situation where he was really being attacked,

46




he simply did not know how he would have reacted. But this is why Virgil's

initial puzzlement was in fact entirely appropriate. His answer ought to have

been'I don' t know'.

Example C.

What can we now say about the statements that caused Quine

to despair? L et's start with the indicative versions:

(10) If Bizet and Ve rdi are com patrio ts, then Bizet is Italian

(i i) If Bizet and Ve rdi are com patrio ts, then Verdi is French

Taking the sentence/statement distinction seriously, let's imagine that these

were uttere d by different spe ake rs, A and B , to a comm on listener, C. Co nsider

(10) first. A s we saw earlie r, the conditions und er which this would be informa-

tional would be if A were talking about the situation of Verdi's being Italian.

In this case, (10) does describe an actual constraint, and it is informationally

correct. On the other hand, if B is talking about the situation of Bizet's being

Fren ch, ( n ) too describes an actual constrain t. Both constraints are specific

instances of a general conditional constraints: if x is of nationality z, then if

x and y are compatriots, then y is of nationality z. So there are circumstances

in which (10) and ( n ) both represe nt true statem ents, statemen ts about differ-

ent specific situations, statem ents tha t convey different information about these

situations to C.

What is C's reaction? She might not believe both statements, since they

do sound at odds. On the other hand, she might believe both of these true

statements and so come to know both facts described. That is, she comes

to learn that if Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, then Bizet would have

been Italian and Verdi would have been French. However, the latter is incom-

patible with Bizet and Verdi being compatriots. Thus, C could, in fact, learn

that they were not compatriots, something neither A nor B needed to know

to make informational stateme nts.

Now let us turn to the subjunctive versions, say (8) as contrasted with (10):

(8) If Bizet and Verd i had been com patrio ts, Bizet would have been Italian

We can take this to be about the very same situation, of Verdi's being Italian,

and describing the sam e con straint. It might be used in trying to decide w hether

or not Bizet and Verdi were compatriots. Or, more typically, it would be

used as a counterfactual, where one knew that, in fact, there was no real

situation extending the one being talked about in which the two men were

compatriots. The conclusion, though, is that there is no reason not to say

that both (8) and (9) could be used, counterfactually, to make true statements,

statements that carry information about a certain specific constraint. While

this is in direct conflict with Lewis's account, it seems to square with most

people's intuitions.

Example F. With this under our belt, let us see what the account would

say about Dow ning's examp le:

(20) If Jim had asked Jack for help , then Jack would have helped him

47



Jon Barwise

Consider a particular statement

u

of (20). Such an utterance will determine

a constraint C

20

, one where Jim asking Jack for help involves Jack helping

Jim. However, in addition, the statement has to be made about a specific

real situation s

20

, relative to a set of background conditions,

B

2Q

.

The back-

ground, we will suppose, contains only the fact about Jim and Jack being

willing to help one another when asked, provided they have not quarrelled

recently. W e will leave the rest to the situation being talked abo ut.

Given appropriate context, one could imagine the speaker talking about

either of two situations, s

2

o,o which omits the qua rrel, or s

2(M

which includes

the quarrel but omits the fact that Jim is stubborn. However, neither of these

situations is one wh ere the con straint ap plies, since neith er is the so rt of situation

where Jim and Jack would help one another. The second is clearly abnormal

in that the quarrel is explicitly present. However, the first only leaves the

quarrel out. It is still not a situation where they have not quarrelled, that

is , one where there is a fact of their not having quarrelled. A speaker who

did not know about the quarrel might feel justified in asserting (20) but he

would not in fact have had enough information to make a true statement.

Only if he had known that there had been no quarrel could he have been

in such a position, and he can't have know n that.

Notice that there is a conditional closely related to (20) that the ignorant

speaker might legitimately fall back on, once learning of the quarrel:

(31) If Jim and Jack had not quarrelled and Jim had asked Jack for he lp,

then Jack would have helped Jim

Here the speaker has explicitly moved part of the background into the condi-

tiona l, so we get a true cond itional closely related to the original. C onve rsational

maxims suggest giving the speaker the benefit of the doubt if that is what

he claims he really m ean t.

What about the following argument? 'But look, if Jim had asked Jack for

help, then they couldn't have recently quarrelled (since then Jim would not

have ask ed ), so sure enough Jac k would have he lpe d.' This cond itional is clearly

changing the backg round conditions, moving the lack of an argument between

Jack and Jim out of the background, into the subject matter, so it is not

an appropriate defence of the statement in (20) in the original background

20

Example G. Zack, you will recall, had enough information to assert If

Pete

called, then he won. Jack, on the other hand, had enough to assert // Pete

called, then he lost. Yet, it seemed, we had conflicting information about what

would ha ppe n in the case wh ere Pe te in fact called.

We can assume that the background type for both utterances was the same,

including facts about the rules of poker, and about how good players use all

available information about their opponents' hands. Zack thinks he has infor-

mation about a particular situation, one that includes Mr Stone's hand and

48




about Pete's having information as to what Stone's hand is. Talking about

that, he asserts (under the prevailing conditions) that if Pete calls, he will

win, because he will only call if he knows his hand is better than Mr Stone's.

Jack, on th e othe r ha nd , is talking about a different situation, one that includes

the facts of the matter about both hands. According to the rules of poker,

if Pete calls with th e ha nds as they ar e, he will lose.

If Jack and Zack really have the information they think they have, then

Pete won't call. What happens if Pete does call? Well, that can only happen

if one of them had misinformation about the situation they were talking ab out,

not information. Th ere could be various reasons for this. Perh aps Jack mistook

one of the two hands. Or perhaps Zack is wrong about Pete's poker playing

ability, or about Pete's having received the information about Mr Stone's hand

from Zack's signals. Or perhaps Pete is about to have a sudden change of

heart, one that makes him unwilling to use illicitly obtained information. All

kinds of things could go wrong. If any of them go wrong, then the situation

being talked about does not match the assumed background conditions, so

the respective sp eake r is just plain w rong.

The fact that both speakers could be right in no way militates against there

being a propo sitional c onten t to their claims. If both are right, then the proposi-

tions combine to yield the right consequence, that Pete will not call. If Pete

calls, then one of them was mistaken. That speaker was conveying the proposi-

tional conten t, not as information but as m isinformation.

Example B. T his leaves us only with attempting to und erstand the information

conditions of statements (6) and (7). First, what are the prevailing background

assumptions Bl W ell, they are certain common sense facts about actual proofs

of conjectures about natural numbers, like the fact that anything that has a

correct proof is true, not false. In addition, there is an actual conditional con-

straint, that if one has a proof that 0 and xp are equivalent, then having a

proof of 0 involves being able to obtain a proof of \p . Finally, there is the

assumption that we are talking about open conjectures, not about propositions

whose truth we already know .

The situation being talked about contains two particular statements, FLT

and R H , and Virgil's proof that they are equivalent. The statem ent (6) describes

a specific actual constraint obtained from the general conditional constraint.

The puzzling case, thoug h, is (7):

(7) It is false that if you could give a proof of R H , then I could give a

proof of not-FLT

It seems tru e, but just why? To answ er this, we must examine the informational

function of

It is false that if

0

then \p,

where the embedded conditional is

a specific conditional.

If the em bed ded statem ent says of a certain situation s

u

that some conditional

constraint applies, giving a specific constraint, then It is false that if 0 then

49



Jon Barwise

xp

asserts that there is no such conditional constraint that applies to

s

u

giving

the constraint in q uestion.

Given the plethora of constraints we recognize, how could it ever happen

that a speaker comes to have the information that there is no such conditional

constraint that applies in a particular situation to yield some specific actual

constraint? Let's look at a couple of examples.

Suppose you say //

you were as poor as I am, you would not buy so many

books. I may know that you are wrong, because I may know that I am po orer

than you. This is just what the material conditional gets at, when it says that

a conditional is false if the antec eden t is false and the conclusion tru e.

H ere is a different sort of exam ple. Supp ose we are ready to distribute some

candy bars to the children, and you, wanting to be the one to hand them

out, say

If I give each child one of

these

bars, every child will get one he likes.

However, I notice that all the candy bars have coconut in them, and know

that some of these children cannot stand coconut. I know that your conditional

statement is false, since there can be no such way of giving the children bars

that will make them all happy, no m atter how good your intentions.

This same idea applies to an example from Stalnaker (1984: 164). Tweedle-

dum and Tweedledee are prevented from tossing a fair coin. Tweedledum

says / /

we had tossed the coin, then it would have come up heads.

Tweedledee

disagrees quite strongly, asserting that if they had tossed it, it would have

come up tails. I claim that they are both wrong. It is just false to make either

claim since general symmetry considerations show that there is no general

law which dete rmin es th e ou tcom e of a fair coin toss before the coin is tossed.

10

It is not, as Stalnaker suggests, that the statements are of indeterminate truth

value, but rather that they are both false. Notice, though, that either Tweedle

would be right in asserting the conditional //

we had tossed this coin, it would

have come up heads or tails.

However, for understanding (7), the tricky case is when the antecedent of the

conditional is necessarily false, something that has not come up in the above

examples. Or has it? What if, in the case of the candy bars, there are fewer bars

than children? In that case, the antecedent is necessarily false, but it still seems

that we would judge the conditional as a whole false, for the observed reason.

Now, let's get back to Virgil. How could it be that he has the information

needed to assert (7)? That is, how can he have the information that the embedded

statement:

If you could give a proofofRH, then I could give a proof of not- FLT

is false? Paul gives the answer to this. In these circumstances,

RH

and

not-FLT

serve not so much to designate particular statements, as to designate parameters

anchored to RH and not-FLT. That is, the best way to understand (7) is as

denying the existence of a general constraint that gets one from a proof of a

conjecture in num ber theory to a proof of something inconsistent with the conjec-

ture. There can be no such general constraint because any number-theoretic state-

ment that

is

provable is true.

50





What in the world are conditionals about? I have attempted to show that the

sort of answer that Quine suggests, that they describe relations between the

matters spoken of by the antecedent and consequent, is in fact quite workable,

and that it applies to a wide range of conditionals, including mathematical

conditionals. The two essential ingredients of my account are constraints as

the interpretation of conditionals and the use of a parametric background type

that is anchored by context. The former is needed to get at the subject matter

of conditional statements, the latter is needed to account for their logic. Both

of these a re suggested by general co nsiderations having to do with information

and its flow.

This account is, admittedly, more complicated than the material condi-

tional. I have the feeling, though, that it gets at what people working on

truth-conditional accounts of conditionals have really been after. What one

really wants is an account th at d escribes the conditions un der which a speaker

is in a position to assert

if

0

then \p,

in terms of the conditions under which

0 and

ip

ob tain . Notice the w ording he re. We assume that there are such

things as conditions under which things hold. The conditions are not descrip-

t ions,

but we can try to describe th em . Tha t is, the cond itions are not linguis-

tic expressions but things that we can try to describe in our theory by using

linguistic expressions.

This is just the kind of account we have sketched of the interpretation

of conditionals. We have suggested spelling out the conditions under which

a speaker can assert a conditional, and the information the conditional

carries, in terms of relations between the types of situations described by

their antecedents and consequents, much as Quine suggested. The account

is compositional to the extent that the meaning of compound sentence (//

0 then \p) is systematically related to that of its parts, even though there

is no simple relation between the particular truth value of the whole and

its parts .

There is another tradition in the study of conditionals, one that takes condi-

tionals as being abo ut dispos itions to change beliefs in the light of new eviden ce.

The intuition is that if I believe that if 0 then \p and come to learn that 0 ,

then I will be disposed, in general, to believe that ip . What does our account

have to say about such matters?

Stalnaker (1984: ch. 6) makes a convincing case for needing to distinguish

betwee n wh at he calls conditional

11

belief and belief in conditional propositions.

He argues that they should be closely related, in that conditional propositions,

whatever they are, are 'propositions about features of the world which justify

certain policies for changing one's belief in response to potential new informa-

tion' (p. 119). But constraints are exactly those features of the world that

underwrite information flow, and so are just the sort of thing one needs to

51



Jon Barwise

know about to be in a justified position in changing one's beliefs in response

to new information.

NOTES

1 This paper, the second in a series with the general title of The situation in logic',

grew out of my reply to Richm ond Th om ason's pape rs (1983a, b), which he presented

to the Symposium on C onditionals and Cognitive Processes. R eading Stalnake r (1984)

inspired me to rewrite the paper and give, I think, a more satisfactory account.

I would like to thank the members of the CSLI Logic Group for many helpful com-

m ents on both dra fts, especially John Etchem endy and David Israe l. Daily discussions

with John Perry in the course of writing the paper were crucial to its development.

Thanks also to Alice ter Meulen, Rich Thomason and Elizabeth Traugott for helpful

comments on the earlier draft, and to Ingrid Deiwiks for help with preparation

of the paper far beyond the call of duty. The research for, and preparation of,

this paper were done at the Center for the Study of Language and Information,

supported by an award from the System D evelopme nt Foun dation.

2 These are the questions for declarative sentences. Other sorts of sentences will have

other informational functions. Questions, for example, are quests for information.

3 To be definite about what I mean by provable, I will take 'proof to mean a proof

in first-order logic from the axioms of some standard true number theory like Peano

arithmetic.

4 On e heroic mea sure tha t might be suggested to avoid this paradoxical situation would

be for all different possible worlds to have non-isomorphic natural numbers. How-

ever, this will not solve the problem as long as each world satisfies the reflection

schema, which asserts that anything provable is true. For in that case, FLT will

be true in world j , but since the integers of j must con tain the actual integers as

an initial segment, FLT will be true in the actual world as well, and hence so will

RH, which is equivalent to it. This was why I took FLT to be a universal number-

theoretic conjecture.

5 In S&A we sometimes used classes of situations, and class membership, to represent

these types. At other times we used event-types and anchorings to represent them.

One of the changes suggested in Ss&sa was to treat these types directly, rather

than representing them with sets or classes. I am following that change here, though

little harm will come from using the notion of event-type from S&A. I use the no tation

[s I . . .

s

...] for the type of situation that satisfies the conditions ...

5

. . . . Borrowing

a notation from computer science, I write s:S to indicate that s is of type 5. This

only makes sense if S has no parameters. There are three operations on types that

are im por tant: fl, U, an d ~~|. The se satisfy the usual laws for a boolean algeb ra,

except for the laws that makes SU~|S a unit element and Sfl~|S a zero element.

Rather than there being a zero element, there is a property of being an incoherent

type, which is satisfied by a filter of types, in particular, by every type of the form

5 f l~ |5 .

There is a partial ordering on the types, SCS', which me ans that every

situation of type S is also of type S '. T hu s, if SCS' an d s:S, then s:S'.

6 If S has parameters, then S is realized only relative to some ancho r for the p aram eters

of S.

7 Any statement will carry some extraneous information, like what language the

speaker is using. What really counts is that it should carry its propositional content

as information. In S&A we stressed the type of situation a statement describes,

and called that the interpretation of the statement. In

Ss&sa,

however, in reaction

52



Conditionals and condit ional information

to Soames' commentary (1985), we admitted that there are associated propositions,

and called them the propositional content of the statement. In this paper I am taking

the propositional content to be the proposition that the type of situation described

is realized.

8 In

S &A

we tried to define this three-place relation in terms of the two-place re lation,

by BDS'^S . Studying conditionals has convinced me that this particular reduction

is incorrect. In this paper I will just treat it as a three-place relation. I will implicitly

use the following five assumptions about this relation in what follows: (1) if B is

fixed, then the resulting two-place relation is transitive:

Sj => S

2

1

B

an d S

2

=> S

3

\B then S

}

=> S

3

\ B.

This is why the Hypothetical Syllogism is valid as long as background conditions

do not vary. (2) If a conditional constraint holds relative to some B and this back-

ground c ondition is tighten ed, then the con straint holds relative to the more restrictive

type of situation B'\ if S^S' \ B an d B'CB, where B' is compatible with S, then

S

=>

5 '

I

B'. (3) If S

=>

S'

I

B then S

is

comp atible with B , that is, SHB is not inco heren t.

(4) If S^>S' B and / is a coherent anchor for some of the parameters of B, then

5(/ )=^>5' ( / ) B(f). (5) If S^S' \B where B has no parameters, and if B is realized

by some real situation, then S =J> S ' is actual.

9 This seems to correspond very well to Stalnak er's intuitions, if not his formal accoun t,

when he says (1984: 131):

Suppose a speaker says something of the form if A then B and a hearer disagrees.

There are two contrasting kinds of explanations for the conflict: (1) it may be that

the hearer has not understood what .. . situation the speaker meant ... or (2) it

may be that the speaker and hearer disagree about some relevant fact.

In Stalnaker's more formal account, both sorts of facts go into determining a single

selection function on possible worlds that de term ines the propo sition.

10 I am assuming that even if some strong form of determinism is true, that fact is

not what the Tweedles were getting at with their conditionals.

11 For Stalnaker this use of conditional has to do with dispositions to change beliefs,

not with the conditions un der which a belief is knowledge, as when I spoke of conditio-

nal knowledge.

REFERENCES

Barwise, Jon. To appear. The situation in logic. 1: logic, meaning and information.

In Proceedings of the ig8$ International Symp osium on the Philosophy, Metho d and

History of Science, Salzburg. Amsterda m: North H olland Publishing C ompany.

Barwise, Jon and John Perry. 1983. S ituations and

attitudes

. Cam bridge, M ass.: Bradford

Books, MIT Press.

Barwise, Jon and John Perry. 1985. Shifting situations and shaken attitudes. Linguistics

and P hilosophy, 8, 1:

105-61.

Downing, P. 1959. Subjunctive conditionals, time order, and causation. Proceedings

of the Aristotelian Society

59 :

149-59.

Dretske, Fred. 1981.

Knowledge and the flow of information.

Cambridge, Mass.: Brad-

ford Bo oks, MIT P ress.

Gibb ard, A llan. 1981. Two recent the ories of conditionals. As quoted in Ro bert Stal-

naker, 1984. Inquiry. Cam bridge Mass.: Bradford Boo ks, MIT Press, 108-9.

53



Jon Barwise

Lewis, David. 1973. Counterfactuals. Cam bridge, Mass.: Harvard U niversity Press.

Maxwell, E. A . 1959. Fallacies in mathematics. C ambridge: Cam bridge University Press.

Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1959. Metho ds o f logic, rev. edn. New York: Ho lt , R inehart

and Winston.

Soam es, Scott. 1985. Lost innocence.

Linguistics and Philosophy,

8 , 1 :

59-71.

Stalnaker, Robert. 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books, MIT Press.

Thom ason, R ichmon d. 1983a. Cond itionals, time and causal independ ence. M S, Univer-

sity of Pittsburg h.

Thomason, Richmond. 1983b. Remarks on mood and conditionals. MS, University of

Pittsburgh.

54



CONDITIONALS

AND MENTAL MODELS

•

P.

N. Johnson-Laird


What would count as a complete theory of conditionals?

1

One goal for such

a theory is to answer the following tw o questions:

(i) Wh at do conditionals mea n?

(ii) What are their logical properti es?

These are matters of logical and linguistic analysis: they concern human compe-

tence. However, a complete theory of conditionals should also answer two

psychological questions:

(iii) How do people understand them ?

(iv) How do people reason with them ?

These are matters of human performance that call for the investigation of

mental processes.

There are a number of theories that provide answers to some of these four

questions. Yet, despite the conceptual analyses of philosophers and logicians,

the semantic and syntactic studies of linguists, and the experimental investiga-

tions of psychologists, there is no single existing theory that provides a unified

and complete account of both competence and performance. My aim in this

paper is accordingly to make progress towards such a theory - a theory that

concerns the everyday interpretation and use of conditionals, not an idealized

philosophical concept, and one that is intended as a contribution to cognitive

science.

The paper has four parts. The first part considers how ordinary individuals

reason with conditionals, and it describes the main approach that psychologists

have taken to deductive reasoning - the theory that there are formal rules

of inference in the mind. It argues, however, that this view is mistaken and

that inference depends instead on a search for 'mental models' of premises

that are counterexamples to putative conclusions. A corollary of this theory

is that the logical properties of conditionals derive from their interpretation

and not from any formal rules associated with them. The second part of the

paper tak es up this question of how peop le interpret conditionals. It establishes



P. N. Johnson-Laird

that they do so in different ways in different contexts. Such interpretations

could reflect an intrinsic ambiguity in conditionals, or alternatively the effects

of context on an underlying univocal concept. The third part thus considers

the attempt by Braine to provide a psychologically plausible univocal analysis,

and the theory proposed by Ramsey, and later elaborated by Stalnaker, that

conditionals are evaluated by a sort of 'thought experiment'. Braine's theory

unfortun ately fails to apply to all cond itionals; Stalnak er's app roac h, and rece nt

alternatives to it, relies on a 'possible worlds' semantics. The fourth part treats

this approach as the starting point for a new psychological theory based on

the notion of mental m odels.

2.

H O W D O P E O P L E R E A S O N W I T H C O N D I T I O N A L S ?

2. i Th e main empirical ph eno m ena

Psychological experiments have shown that people with no training in logic

cope reasonably well with arguments in the form of modus ponens (see Wason

and Johnson-Laird 1972). Given such premises as:

(1) If the red light is on , the stud io is occup ied (If p then q)

(2) Th e red light is on (p)

nearly everyone draws the conclusion:

(3) The studio is occupied (•"• q)

Th e only mystery he re is the m echanism that selects this particular valid conclu-

sion from the potentially infinite set of other valid conclusions that could be

drawn from the same premises. These other conclusions, such as a disjunction

or conjunction of the premises, are obviously trivial, but the mechanism that

leads to the form ulation of nontrivial conclusions has yet to be elucidated defini-

tively. I have argued elsewhere that its operations can be described in terms

of the maintenance of semantic information (Johnson-Laird 1983).

Ordinary reasoners have greater difficulty with arguments in the form of

modus tollendo tollens:

(4) If the red light is on , the studio is occup ied (If p then q)

(5) The studio is not occupied (~ q)

(6) Th eref ore , the red light is not on (.'. ~ p )

Likewise, they m ake m any m istakes, as Wason and his colleagues have show n,

in deciding what evidence would in principle controvert a conditional rule (see

e.g. Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972). For instance, in order to evaluate the

rule:

56



Conditionals and mental models

(7) If the re is a vowel on one side of a card, then ther e is an even num ber

on the other side

the majority of subjects choose to turn over a card bearing a vowel, but they

fail to select a card bearing an odd number. They are often less susceptible

to this sin of omission if the rules and materials are more realistic, but this

man ipulation does not always work, and quite why it should work at all remains

a ma tter of active controversy (see Evans 1982; Griggs 1983; Wason 1983;

Oakhill and Johnson-Laird 1983).

2.2 Th e doctrine of me ntal logic

Psychological theories of propositional reasoning have invariably been based

on the assumption that the mind contains rules of inference or inferential sche-

mata of the sort postulated in 'natural deduction' systems (see e.g. Inhelder

and Piaget 1958; Johnson -Laird 1975; Osh erson 1975; Braine 1978; Rips 1983).

Mistakes in reasoning are then explained in terms of misinterpretations of

the prem ises, failures in perfo rma nce , and even the possible existence of 'path o-

logical' rules of inference. The difference in difficulty between modus ponens

and modus tollendo tollens is accounted for by assuming that there is a mental

rule for the former, but not for the latter - which must therefore depend on

a chain of deductions such as a reductio ad absurdum. Alas, this theoretical

man oeuv re is intrinsically ad ho c, and so too is the way these theo ries of men tal

logic try, if at all, to specify the mechanism that leads to informative rather

than to trivial conclusions. The theorist selects one formalization of the calculus

rather than another, and lays down otherwise arbitrary constraints on the use

of rules of inference.

The doctrine that there are mental rules of logic implies that people have at

least two sorts of knowledge about conditionals: a knowledge of their logical

properties, which is embodied in rules such as modus ponens, and a knowledge

of their meaning and, in particular, of their truth conditions. These two sorts

of knowledge must of course be compatible with one another. However, there

is an important asymmetry between them: a statement of the truth conditions

of conditionals constrains the form of inferences that are valid, but a statement

of the form of valid inferences leaves conditionals open to a number of distinct

semantic interpretations. On the one hand, if the conditional is taken to have

the truth conditions of material implication - true unless its antecedent is true

and its consequent is false - then both modus ponens and m odus tollendo tollens

will be valid. On the other hand, if a conditional is taken to be governed by

these two rules of inference, it does not follow that it has the truth conditions

of material implication. It might instead have 'defective' truth conditions in which

no truth value is assigned in those cases where its antecedent is false. Although

such a conditional,

if p then q

is not equivalent to its contrapositive,

if ~q then

~~p both rules of inference remain valid (see Johnson-Laird and Tagart 1969).

57




3. H O W D O P E O P L E U N D E R S T A N D C O N D I T I O N A L S ?

3. i Th e interp retatio n of conditionals

Psychologists have discovered one u ncon troversial fact abou t cond itionals: they

are interpreted in different ways in different situations. In the first experiment

on the interpretation of conditionals, Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969) asked

subjects to evaluate a set of cards in the light of a conditional, such as:

(8) If ther e is an 'A ' on the left-hand side of the card, then there is a

number '3 ' on the right-hand side

Thus,

a card might have an 'A' on the left and a '4' on the right, and the

subjects' task was to decide whether the card indicated that the conditional

was true (or false), or was irrelevant to its truth valu e. Most subjects p roduce d

a pattern of judgements consistent with a 'defective' truth table: the conditional

was true when its antecedent and consequent were true; it was false when

its antecedent was true and its consequent false; but when its antecedent was

false of a card, then that card was 'irrelevant' to the truth value of the condi-

tional. This defective truth table for ordinary conditionals had been mooted

by various authors, including both Quine (1952) and Wason (1966).

An important qualification to these results was demonstrated by Legrenzi

(1970).

He showed that in a strictly binary situation subjects tend to treat

conditionals as having the truth table of material equivalence: true when the

antecedent and consequent are both true or both false, but false in any other

condition. His subjects watched a ball bearing run down one of two channels,

causing one of two lights to be illuminated. Given a conditional of the form:

(9) If the ball rolls to the left, then the green light is lit

the majority of subjects treated trials in which the antecedent and consequent

were both t ru e, or both false, as consistent with the rule, and any other co mbina-

tion as inconsistent with it.

Some philosophers - notably Grice (1967) - have argued that conditionals

correspond to material implications from which certain implicatures are drawn

in virtue of conversational conventions. Other philosophers have argued that

conditionals never correspond to material implications. For instance, Stalnaker

(1968) wrote: 'the falsity of the antecedent is never sufficient reason to affirm

a conditional, even an indicative conditional' (but cf. Stalnaker 1975). Yet,

certain conditionals with negated antecedents do seem to have truth conditions

corresponding to those of material implication, e.g. the assertion:

(10) If the poem isn't by W ord sw orth , then it is by Coleridge

seems to be rendered true by the mere fact that the poem is by Wordsworth,

i.e. the antecedent is false; or by the mere fact that it is by Coleridge, i.e.

the consequent is true.

59



P. N. Johnson-Laird

Most traditional theories of conditionals draw a distinction, explicitly or

implicitly, between indicative and subjunctive (or counterfactual) conditionals.

Even theorists who attempt to treat indicative conditionals truth-functionally

conced e th at cou nterf actuals such as:

(i i) If the Vien nese had thre e legs, they would march in waltz time

establish some sort of connection between antecedent and consequent, and

accordingly transcend any simple truth-functional account. Such conditionals

can indeed be true even if both antecedent and consequent are false. They

involve further tacit premises which, if taken together with the antecedent,

entail the consequent (see Chisholm 1946; Goodman 1947). There is some

disagreement among theorists about w hether a counterfactual implies that some

such argument exists or is itself an elliptical presentation of it. The problem,

of course, is to specify w hich prem ises should be used with a given ante ced ent.

Philosophers have naturally swept this problem into the pragmatic 'wastepaper

ba ske t': it is all a ma tter of c ontex t.

Undoubtedly, conditionals are interpreted in many different ways, and the

variety of interpretations is even greater, as Fillenbaum (1978) has established,

when illocutionary force is taken into account. This diversity in interpretation

is perplexing, but it does not necessarily imply that if

is

polysemous. Several

theorists have made ingenious attempts to reconcile a univocal semantics for

conditionals with the vagaries of their interpretation, and it is to these attempts

that we now turn .

4. W H A T D O C O N D I T I O N A L S M E A N ?

4.1 A univocal psychological theo ry

Braine (1978) has proposed an ingenious uniform interpretation of conditionals

that is consistent with the doctrine that there are inferential schemata in the

mind. In part anticipated by Ryle (1949: ch. 5), he argues that assertions of

the form:

If p the n q

merely state a rule of inference to the effect that q can be inferred from p:

P

Therefore, q

though they provide in themselves no information about the basis for the infer-

ence.

Thu s, for exam ple, the conditional:

(12) If the red light is on , then the studio is occupied

sanctions the inference:

6



Conditionals and mental m odels

Stalnake r (1968, 1981) went on to pro pos e a set of truth c onditions for condi-

tionals congruent with this method of evaluation and based on 'possible world'

semantics. Subsequently, Lewis (1973), Pollock (1976) and others have formu-

lated alternative ac counts of counterfactual conditionals within the same frame-

work of 'possible wo rlds'. Undo ubted ly, this approach has made a major contri-

bution to elucidating language in general and conditionals in particular. What

I want to consider in the next section is a psychological theory partly inspired

by it, but also based on the assumption that because the set of possible worlds

is infinite in size, it cannot fit directly into an individual's mind (see also Partee

1979;

Johnson-Laird 1982).

5. M E N T A L M O D E L S O F C O N D I T I O N A L S

5.1 Som e assum ptions abo ut the interp retatio n of conditionals

The ideal solution to the problem of 'if would be to establish neither a single

uniform logic of the term, nor a variety of meanings for it, but a single uniform

semantics from which both the diversity of the interpretations of conditionals

and the vagaries in their logical behaviour will emerge. In aiming for such

a theory, I shall begin with a number of interrelated assumptions that I shall

briefly motivate.

First, the meaning of conditionals can be grasped by human beings. This

principle ought to go without saying, but it has to be made explicit - in part

because 'possible world' analyses are too big to fit immed iately inside a nyo ne's

head, and in part because certain theories lead to the view that, in Putnam's

phrase, 'meanings ain't in the head' (see Putnam 1975 for a defence of this

view, and Johnson-Laird 1983 for a rejoinder). Since one cannot prove that

peop le unde rstand the pro per meaning of conditionals, it is necessary to assume

that they do.

Second, the semantic interpretations of conditionals can be built up

compositionally from the interpretations of their constituents. The principle

of compositionality is familiar to students of logical semantics and Montague

Grammar, though of course it is not universally accepted (see e.g. Russell

1905; Chomsky 1977). In my view, compositionality is hardly an empirical

issue: such is the power of compositional semantics that any noncompositional

analysis can probably b e mimicked by a compositional o ne .

Third, there is an immediate and striking observation that can be made

once one accepts compositionality: the interpretation of the consequent of

a conditional is identical to the interpretation of the same main clause if it

occurs in isolation but in a context that is known to satisfy the antecedent

of the cond itional. The re are therefo re no constraints on the form or illocution-

ary force of the consequent. Similarly, there is no need to make special provi-

sions for the interpretation of the consequents of conditionals, since the

63



P. N. Johnson-Laird

ordinary procedures for coping with main clauses suffice. In particular, the

me ntal mo del theo ry of modal auxiliaries such as 'may ' and 'w ill', which assumes

that they are unambiguous but depend on epistemic or deontic beliefs for their

interpretation (Johnson-Laird 1978), can be directly incorporated within the

present account.

The third assumption is borne out by the following observation. If both

speaker and listener are conscious of the content of an antecedent, i.e. of

the imminence of the corresponding state of affairs, then it can be omitted.

For example, a mother observing her child about to grab a forbidden cake

can assert:

(21) I'll smack you

The force of this utter anc e is not tha t the m other will smack the child reg ardless ,

but rather that she will do so if the child takes the cake. Indeed, should the

mother be uncertain about her child's intentions she could equally well assert:

(22) If you tak e the cak e, I'll smack you

Even with counterfactuals, the antecedent can be omitted where the speaker

and the listener are conscious that the antecedent event was imminent but

did not occur. Hence the mother, observing instead that her child has mastered

the temptation to take the cake, can assert:

(23) I'd have smacke d you

where the force of the utterance is that she would have done so if the child

had taken the cake.

Fourth, it is a corollary of the previous assumption that the function of

the antecedent of a conditional is to establish a context, i.e. a state of affairs

that should be taken for granted in considering the consequent. When the

spea ker and listener are conscious that the actual state of affairs do es co rrespon d

to the antecedent, then indeed it is odd to assert the antecedent. The mother

would not say:

(24) If you tak e the cake ...

in a context where the child has plainly taken it. Here, it would only be appro-

priate to use an antecedent that designates a generic state of affairs that sub-

sumes what has happened:

(25) If you tak e cakes ...

Since antecedents function to establish contexts of interpretation, there are

corresponding constraints on their form: they must make a statement, and

their tense and aspect call for a special in terp retatio n.

Finally, although the Ramsey-Stalnaker notion of a 'thought experiment'

has been endorsed by some psychologists (Rips and Marcus 1977), it is an

64




idealization: people do not evaluate a conditional by adding its antecedent

to their complete stock of beliefs (with minimal modifications) and evaluating

its consequent. They do not have ready access to all their beliefs, and it might

take hours for them to review even a relevant sample.

Armed with these assumptions, let us turn to the theory of mental models

to help us to formulate an account of how conditionals are evaluated. The

overall, though over-simplified, scheme can be summarized in two steps:

Step i. Construct a mental model based on the superficial linguistic represen-

tation of the antecedent and on those beliefs triggered during this pro-

cess.

Step 2. Interpret the consequent in the context of the model and general know-

ledge.

Th ere a re, of cou rse, many details that need to be spelt out in order to transform

this simple picture into a more accurate one, and I will consider, first, the

interpretation of the antecedent; second, the nature of the relation between

the antecedent and the consequent; and finally, the extent to which the truth

conditions of the antecedent specify the situation in which the consequent is

evaluated.

5.2 The interpretation of the antecedent

What underlies the meaning of conditionals, according to the present theory,

is the ability to envisage states of affairs that may or may not correspond to

reality, that is, the ability to construct mental models of such states of affairs

and to bear in mind their existential status. The metaphysics of English dis-

tinguishes between three major classes of states of affairs: actual states, real

possibilities and hypothetical states. An actual state is described by a straightfor-

wardly true but contingen t a ssertion, such as:

(26) Elizabeth II is the queen of Eng land

A real possibility is described by an indicative antec ede nt:

(27) If Elizabeth II abdicates ...

which designates an event that is possible in relation to the current state of

affairs. A hypo thetical state is described by a subjunctive antec eden t:

(28) If Elizabeth II had abdicated .. .

which designates a once possible, but now imaginary even t, to be taken hyp othe-

tically in relation to the the n cu rren t state of affairs.

The distinction between real possibilities and hypothetical states is one

between the real history of the world and hypothetical alternatives to it (see

Isard

975

for the description of

a

computer program that interprets conditionals

65



P.

N. Johnson-Laird

abou t games of tic-tac-toe in very much this way). H en ce , there is no difference

in the tru th co nditions of the two sorts of conditional when they refer to future

events, e.g.:

(29) If anyo ne uses nuclear w eap ons , Wo rld W ar III will occur

and:

(30) If anyo ne we re to use nuclear w eapo ns, W orld W ar III would occur

Th e only distinction here is that (30) suggests that th e possibility is mo re rem ote .

There are, however, differences in the acceptability of certain illocutions

depending on whether a reference to the future concerns a real possibility

or a hypothetical event. An antecedent expressing a real possibility can be

coupled with a performative or a request:

(31) If you give her the ring, I hereb y pron oun ce you ma rried

But an antecedent that expresses a hypothetical event in a history that is an

alternative to reality less readily accommodates performatives or requests:

(32) ?If you we re to give her the ring, I hereby prono unc e you married

In referring to past events or to those that are presently occurring, there

are genuine differences in the truth conditions of the two sorts of conditional.

A dam s (1970) provides us with a useful pair of contrasting exam ples:

(33) If Oswald did n't assassinate Ke nne dy, then som eone else did

and:

(34) If Oswald ha dn 't assassinated Ke nne dy, then som eone else would have

The antecedent of the first conditional presents a real possibility, namely, that

Oswald did not kill Ken ned y. T his may be the true state of affairs in the ac tual

history of the world. Since Kennedy was indeed assassinated, it follows that

someone else must have done the deed, and hence the conditional is true.

The antecedent of the second conditional presents a hypothetical possibility,

and it therefore invites us to consider, not the actual history of the world

(which for the speaker includes Oswald as the murderer of Kennedy), but

a hypothetical alternative history in which Oswald did not kill Kennedy. The

conditional asserts that in this alternative Kennedy would nevertheless be mur-

dered - an assertion which is, to say the least, debatable. A similar contrast

can be drawn for antecedents that refer to events presently occurring.

In summary,

if

is a verbal cue to consider real or hypothetical possibilities,

and the co ntent, the gramm atical mood of the clause, and the context, usually

make clear the intended status of the antecedent. The metaphysics of English

is in fact more complicated than I have so far admitted: the contrasting system

of actual states, real possibilities and hypothetical states is all relative to the

66




status of the discourse. Hence, the same tripartite division of conditionals

applies equally to factual or fictional discourse. There are even conditionals

that bridge th e gap from the fictional to the real:

(35) If Ha mle t had killed the king at onc e, then the play would have come

to an abrupt end

and from the real to the fictional:

(36) If 'Ha m let' had been a soap ope ra, he would have married Ophelia

5.3 The natur e of the relat ion between a nteceden t and conseque nt

Once a model of the antecedent has been established, the consequent can

be interpreted in relation to that model. As I have already argued, there is

nothing particularly special about the process of interpreting the consequent

perse but the nature of the relation between antecedent m odel and consequent

is more problematical. The early philosophical analyses of conditionals (e.g.

Chisholm 1946; Goodman 1947) recognized the importance of this relation,

but it has tended to be downgraded in the Ramsey-Stalnaker-Lewis approach

on the grou nds th at a conditional is true if its conseq uent is true in the relev ant

world(s) in which the antecedent is true, regardless of whether there is any

relation betwee n th em . From a psychological standp oint, no one asserts a condi-

tional on such grounds alone. One would hardly claim:

(37) If Elizabeth II abd icates, then some dogs have fleas

merely because the consequent is almost certainly true in the state of affairs

characterized by the anteced ent. Inde ed, such an assertion would be interpreted

as positing some relation between the antecedent and the consequent, and

listeners would attempt to sketch in a plausible scenario that relates them.

As we shall see, we can make sense of certain conditionals only by bearing

in mind that they are invariably taken to mean that some sort of relation is

intended to hold between antecedent and consequent. There are two issues

concerning this relation: its nature, and its degree, i.e. the extent to which

the antecedent determines the state of affairs in which the consequent is to

be evaluated. In this section, I am going to consider the nature of the relation,

beginning with its tempo ral com pone nt.

If the an teced ent of a conditiona l refers to a specific even t or to a temp orally

bounded state, its consequent may refer to an event or state that occurs earlier,

contemp oraneously, or later. An indicative an tecedent referring to the present

can be related to eve nts or states in the past, prese nt, or future:

(38) f was hot yesterday

If it is wet now, then it

\

is ho t now

will be hot tom orrow

67



P. N. Johns on-Laird

An antecedent referring to the future can likewise be related to states that

occur earlier, at the same time, or later:

(39) [ was hot yesterday

T r

. . . . is hot now

If it is wet tomorrow, then it . .

is hot to mo rrow

will be hot th e day after

In this case, both the time of the utterance and events prior to it can occur

before the antecedent state. Not surprisingly, the analogous possibilities are

open for an antecedent referring to the past. And exactly the same possibilities

can arise with counterfactual conditionals:

(40) f had been wet yesterday f would have been hot yesterday

If it i we re wet now it i would be hot now

were wet tomorrow [ would be hot tomorrow

where any combination of antecedent and consequent is feasible.

Granted these various temporal relations, the consequent event does not

necessarily occur at the same time as the antecedent event. It may be necessary

to construct a scenario leading from the antecedent model to the consequent

event, or from the consequent event to the antecedent model. Consider the

assertion:

(41) If it rains in the Sahara , the desert will get wet

An accurate model of the antecedent should represent the fact that the desert

gets wet, and the conditional should therefore be evaluated as true without

the need to construct a scenario. But now consider the related exam ple:

(42) If it rains in the Sa hara, the dese rt will bloom

A model of the antecedent will not represent the blooming desert since that

is not a concurrent event; but it is, of course, a likely consequence in the

near future. Hence, the interpretation of the consequent of the conditional

calls for the co nstruction of a scenario base d on th e initial model of the a ntece-

dent and on beliefs about the relations between the two.

The nature of the beliefs used to develop a scenario will determine the nature

of the relation between the antecedent and the consequent. Conditionals such

as:

(43) If the match had been struck, it would have lit

(44) If the match had lit, it would have had to have been struck

elicit beliefs abo ut causal rela tions . Con ditionals such as:

(45) If it had been m idday just now , it would have been 11 a.m. an hour

ago

68




(46) If it had been 11 a.m . an ho ur ago, it would have been midday just

now

elicit beliefs about temporal measurement that establish the necessary connec-

tion between antecedent and consequent. The role of beliefs in fleshing out

the interp retation of conditionals is easily ove rlook ed, as it has been sometim es

by theorists who have sought to reduce causal assertions to the assertion of

counterfactuals. A comprehensive theory of causal relations should accommo-

date the fact that, as Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) have argued, one event

(or its non-occurrence) can cause, allow, or prevent another event (or its non-

occ urren ce). A counterf actual of a given form is indeed inde term inate . T hu s,

the con ditional:

(47) If the match ha dn 't been struck, it wo uldn 't have lit

is taken to mean that one event caused the other, whereas the conditional:

(48) If the match ha dn 't been dry, it wo uldn 't have lit

is taken to mean that the one state of affairs allowed the other to occur. The

interpretation of conditionals depends on beliefs, if only because the interpre-

tation of auxiliaries and tense dep end s on them , too (see Johnso n-La ird 1978).

5.4 Truth condit ions and the antecedent-consequent relat ion

The truth conditions of a conditional depend on the extent to which the antece-

dent specifies the situation in which the extension of the consequent is to be

evaluated. In principle, there could be three possible degrees of relation

between antecedent and consequent: the antecedent could determine the state

of affairs in which the consequent is to be evaluated completely, partially,

or not at all. In practice, it turns out that there are conditionals in all three

categories, and I will examine each sort in turn. Since it is tedious to have

to keep pointing out that the consequent can serve any illocutionary function,

I shall assume in what follows that whenever I refer to 'truth conditions' the

reader will mentally enlarge this phrase to embrace the meanings of questions,

requests, and o ther illocutions.

At one extreme there is the category of conditional in which the antecedent

has no bearing on the s tate of affairs in which the co nseq uen t's truth conditions

have to be evaluated - it merely stipulates the relevance of the information

conveyed by the co nseq uen t. T his sort of conditional is exemplified by:

(49) If you've run out of pe trol, the re's a garage down the road

Here, the conditional is simply true or false depending on whether or not

there is a garage down the road. The main criterion that distinguishes this

class of conditionals is that the antecedent expresses (or implies) a desire,

69



P. N. Johnson-Laird

need, predilection or state of mind that in principle cannot be related to the

truth of the consequent, but the consequent provides information of potential

use to those in that state of mind. The general schema for such conditionals

is thus :

If p (where p implies x

needs

feels

wants

y

then (x will be in terested to know t ha t) q is the case

Since the consequent, q, describes some state of affairs that is supposedly rele-

vant to x, it must b e either factual or conce rn real p ossibilities:

(50)

If you need m oney , there \ is

>

some in the bank

Granted this analysis, it ought to be possible for a hypothetical need or

predilection to be the occasion of referring to some actual state of affairs or

to a real possibility. Hence, there should be a category of conditionals with

antecedents that refer to alternative histories, and with consequents that refer

to actual states or real possibilities. Such conditionals do indeed exist, e.g.:

(51) If you had need ed some mon ey, there was some in the bank

which asserts that, relevant to a new imaginary state of affairs (your need

of money) at a particular time in the past, there was an actual state of affairs

(money in the bank) which obtained at that time. The conditional is thus true

provided only that there was some money in the bank at the relevant time.

The present theory has thus led to the discovery of a class of conditionals

which com bine coun terfactual antec ede nts with indicative con seque nts - a class

to which I have b een u nab le to find any reference in the lite ratu re.

At the other extreme, there is the second category of conditional in which

the antecedent completely determines the state of affairs in which the truth

conditions of the consequen t are to be evaluated. For exam ple, such a conditio-

nal as:

(52) If som eon e is in a roo m , there is a room that is not empty

is true because its consequent is true in any mental model of its antecedent.

This simple class of conditionals illustrates the way in which truth conditions

can be stated within the framework of mental models. A conditional in this

category with the form:

If

p ,

then q

7



Conditionals and m ental models

is true if and only if q is true in any mental model of p. Hence, in this case

there is a ready translation into the framework of possible worlds. A mental

mod el based on the antec eden t of a conditional is a fragment of many possible

worlds, that is, it is consistent with many alternative complete specifications

of how the world might be, because many propositions will be neither true

nor false in the fragment. The conditional is true if and only if q is true in

all the accessible worlds in which p is tru e.

The third, highly frequent, and most problematical category of conditionals,

contains those in which the antecedent provides part, but only part, of the

specification of the state of affairs in which the consequent is to be evaluated.

An illuminating way in which to consider such conditionals is in the context

of everyday reasoning (see Johnson-Laird 1983). Suppose, for example, that

evidence at a murder trial establishes that the victim was stabbed to death

in a cinema during the afternoon and that the accused was on an express train

to Edinburgh when the murder was committed. One might be tempted to

assert (like many of the subjects whom Bruno Bara and I have tested infor-

mally):

(53) If the accused was on a train when the mu rder occurred , then he (sic)

must be innocent

It is clear from questioning the subjects that they base this claim on a number

of implicit assumptions:

A perso n can not b e in two places at once

The re are no cinemas on trains

Express trains do not pass through cinemas

It is not possible to stab someone in a cinema if one is travelling on

a train

These principles are obviously used in constructing a mental model based on

the evidence given at the trial. They could, however, all be made explicit

in the antecedent of the conditional:

If the accused was on a train when the murder occurred, and a person

cannot be in two places at once, and there are no cinemas on trains,

and ..., then the accused is innocent

Thus,

the natural way in which to think of such conditionals is that the conse-

quen t is evalua ted w ith respect to a mode l of the state of affairs that is described

by the antecedent taken in conjunction with general knowledge.

The point of the informal experiment, however, was to demonstrate that

there is no simple algorithm by which to discover all the possible conditions

that must be fulfilled in order to guarantee innocence: subjects readily raise

7



P.

N. Johnson-Laird

a number of feasible scenarios in which, despite the assumptions above, the

accused is nevertheless guilty. For example, he may have used an accomplice,

or a radio-controlled robot, or a spring-loaded knife hidden in the seat. Of

course one can go on adding explicit denials of each of these possibilities to

the antecedent (just as we do in the experiment), and of course there comes

a point when even the most ingenious of subjects concedes the innocence of

the suspect. Yet, there is no way to ensure that all the possibilities of guilt

have been exhausted. Two morals follow: first, there is no guarantee of the

validity of many everyday inferences, since one cannot be sure that all models

of the premises lead to the conclusion; second, many everyday conditionals

are incom plete: that is, their utteran ce, even when context

is

taken into accou nt,

does not suffice to establish precisely what proposition is being expressed. In

particular, the anteceden t situation may be radically und erdeterm ined.

M ental m odel theo ry copes with the indeterminacy of discourse in the follow-

ing way: an initial model is constructed (perhaps even based on arbitrary

choices) which can be revised recursively in the light of subseq uent informa tion.

O ne obvious source of subse quen t information is the consequ ent of the conditio-

nal.

This point is brought out by Quine's (i960) revealing pair of examples:

(54) If Caes ar had been in com man d in Ko rea, he would have used catapults

and:

(55) If Cae sar had been in com man d in Ko rea, he would have used the

atom bomb

In the first case, the consequent suggests an antecedent model representing

the military technology of Caesar's day; in the second case, the consequent

suggests an antecedent model representing Caesar's hawkish personality.

Granted these respective models, then both conditionals are plausible, though

their antece den ts still rema in too unde rdete rm ined to yield definite truth values.

Th e major conclusion that follows from this tripartite analysis of conditionals

is that the truth conditions of a conditional depend on establishing which cate-

gory it belongs to: if it is a member of the first category, then it will be true

given only that its consequent is true; if it is a member of the second category

it will be tru e prov ided that its conseque nt is true in any model of its a ntec ede nt;

if it is a member of the third category, then it is true if the consequent is

true with respect to the model based on the antecedent and any relevant beliefs

(including those triggered by the consequent) and there is no such model in

which the consequent is false. However, in this third case, the antecedent

may lack clear-cut tru th con ditions, and it will be impossible to establish w hethe r

the conditional is true or false. Since it is impossible to determine which of

the three categories a conditional belongs to merely from its antecedent, it

follows that its truth conditions depend on the relation between antecedent

and consequent.

72




6 . C O N C L U S I O N S

This paper began with four questions, which I will now try to answer, treating

them in reverse order.

How do people reason with conditionals?

They do so by setting up mental

models of conditionals based on their interpreta tion of them , formulating infor-

mative conclusions, and then searching for alternative interpretations that

refute these putative conclusions. They normally make no use of rules of infer-

ence,

depending instead on their ability to interpret conditionals and to search

for counterexamples.

How do people interpret conditionals? They set up a mental model based

on the meaning of the antecedent, and on their beliefs and knowledge of the

context. They then determine the nature and degree of the relation between

antecedent and consequent. This process may lead to a recursive revision in

the antecedent model. Finally, if need be, they set up a scenario relating the

model of the consequent to the antecedent model. The relation may be merely

that the c onseq uent state of affairs is relevant to a protagonist in the a nteced ent

model, or it may be a logical, temporal, causal or deontic relation between

the two models.

Wha t are the logical properties of conditionals? They are many and various.

Conditionals are not creatures of a constant hue. Like chameleons, as I once

put it, they take on the colour suggested by their surroundings. Their logical

properties depend on the relation between antecedent and consequent, and

that in turn d epen ds on beliefs. Ev en w here the ante ceden t specifies completely

the state of affairs in which the consequent is to be evaluated, the relation

may be an entailmen t:

(56) If a man has a suit, then he has a jacket and trousers

or a mutual entailment:

(57) If a wom an has a hus ban d, then she is married

The former supports inferences in the form of modus ponens and modus tol-

lendo tollens; the latte r, in addition, suppo rts valid inferences of the form:

Mary is married. Th erefore, she has a husband

Mary does not have a husban d. Th erefore, she is not m arried

What do conditionals mean? If

is

a cue to consider a possible or hypothetical

state of affairs. Where the relation between antecedent and consequent is one

of 'relevance', the conditional is true if and only if its consequent is true.

Otherwise, the conditional is true if and only if the consequent is true in the

antecedent model and there is no alternative model in which it is false. The

majority of conditiona ls, how ever, lack clear-cut truth conditions because their

antecedents and the beliefs they trigger place insufficient constraints on the

set of possible anteced ent mo dels. If the conseque nt is a requ est, or a ques tion,

or some other illocution, then the extension of the conditional is the same

73



P. N. Johnson-Laird

mutatis mutandis. The states of affairs in which a request, for instance, should

be carried out are those that correspond to the antecedent model.

What I have presented in this paper is not, of course, a complete theory

of conditionals. That would require a much more detailed and comprehensive

account of the compositional semantics of conditionals, of their systemic con-

trast to other structures based on when unless because and of the mental

processes underlying the construction and manipulation of models. Neverthe-

less, mental models do seem to be one way - the only way that has so far

been advanced - to make psychological sense of conditionals in the light of

the work on possible world semantics.

NOTE

i

I am

very grateful

to

David Lewis

and Bob

Stalnaker

for

criticisms

of an

earlier

draft

of

this pap er.

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Cam bridge, M ass.: Harvard University P ress.

75



CONDITIONALS:

A TYPOLOGY

•

Bernard Comrie

1.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The aims of this paper are , first, to attempt a characterization of conditionals

that has crosslinguistic validity and, second and more important, to try to iden-

tify the significant para m eters in the crosslinguistic description of condition als,

looking both at properties that are common to all languages and at properties

that show significant crosslinguistic variation.

1

The claim that a given pa ram eter

of variation is significant is, of course, an empirical claim, and it may well

be that in further work on this topic other parameters, of which I am unaware

or which I consider insignificant, will need to be added to my list.

Two general remarks are necessary before embarking on the characterization

of conditionals and crosslinguistic variation within conditionals: these relate

to the general problem of isolating a given construction, both intralinguistically

and interlinguistically, and to the general problem of identifying the meaning

of

a

construction.

I

assume that

a

given construction

is to be

identified,

in

general, in term s of a pro toty pe rath er than in terms of necessary-and-sufficient

conditions. Thus, I will not be surprised if some sentences having the form

of prototypical conditionals in a given language do not in fact receive the inter-

pretation of conditions (as when English

If you do

that,

I'll hit you

is interpreted

as a prohibitive), nor if sentences tha t do not have the form of prototypical

conditionals nonetheless receive a conditional interpretation cf. the parallel

interpretations

in

English

of / /

he came late, he was punished and Whenever

he came late

he

was punished).

Furthermore, I distinguish strictly between

the meaning of a construction and its interpretation, claiming that many aspects

of interpretation that are traditionally assigned to the semantics of a construc-

tion or sentence are in fact conversational implicatures (in the Gricean sense)

that are not part of the m eaning of the sen tenc e, and can in fact be cancelled

in appropriate circumstances. This last point will become particularly important

in the discussion of degrees of hypo theticality (section 5). As a simple illus-

tration, we may return to the example

(1) If you do that, I'll hit you

Under normal circumstances, this will be interpreted as indicating that if the

addressee does not carry out the action referred to, then the speaker will not

77



Bernard Comrie

hit the addressee, i.e. the if

is

interpr eted as if and only if; how ever, oth er

examples show clearly that English // is not necessarily interpreted in this

way:

(2) If you buy those stocks, then you'll lose your money, but of course

you'll probably lose your money anyway

In terms of the context in which If you do that, I ll hit you is normally uttered,

the conversational implicature that

if

is to be interpreted as 'if and only if

falls out naturally: th e utt eranc e is intended as a prohib ition, giving m otivation

to comply with the prohibition (namely, not getting hit). If the speaker hits

the addressee anyway, or rather, if the addressee assumes that the speaker

may hit the addressee anyway, then the motivation behind the prohibition

is lost, i.e. the uttera nce becom es inc oheren t.

2

2. C H A R A C T E R I Z A T I O N O F C O N D I T I O N A L S

In logic, conditionals (material implications) are defined as a relation between

two propositions, the protasis

(p )

and the apodosis

(q),

such that either

p

and q are both true, or p is false and q is true, or p is false and q is false;

excluded is the possibility of p being true while q is false. I maintain that

this logical characterization is part of the characterization of conditionals in

natural language (though ,

as

will be seen be low, a further restriction

is

necessary

in natural lan guage ). Many conditional sentences in natural language do indeed

receive an interpretation congruent with this range of possibilities allowed in

logic,

e.g.

(3) If today is Sunday, the priest will be in church

(as said by someone who is in fact unsure what day of the week it is - this

caveat is not essential, but makes for more plausible interpretations). This

allows that today is Sunday, and that the priest is in church. However, should

it turn out that today is not in fact Sunday, then the proposition remains true

whether or not the priest is in church. All that is excluded is that today should

be Sunday and that the priest should not be in church.

In examining actual utterances in actual contexts, the interpretation of a

conditional may be more restrictive than this, in particular by excluding the

possibility of '~p and

q\

Th us, if som eone says

(4) If you go out without the um brell a, you'll get wet

then the normal interpretation is that if the addressee does take the umbrella

(and uses it in the appropriate way), then the addressee will not get wet. In

fact, however, this is not part of the meaning of the conditional, but only

a conversational implicature, which can be derived from other aspects of the

interpretation of the sentence in context. Given Grice's overall injunction to

78



Conditionals: a typology

be relevant, and knowing that people in general prefer not to get wet, and

that umbrellas are typically used to prevent getting wet, the only coherent

interpretation of the utterance is as a warning to take the umbrella to prevent

getting wet. If the speaker saying

If you go without the umbrella, you ll ge t

wet

knows full well that the umbrella has so many holes that it won't keep

the addressee dry, then strictly speaking the speaker has not made a false

statem ent, although he has made a misleading one (perversely so).

This suggests a universal, which I will now formulate as a hypothesis. If

a language has any conditional construction, then it will have one where the

logical relation between the two propositions is the same as that given for

material implication in the propositional calculus. From this, it follows that

a language should not

just

have a construction with the meaning: '/? if and

only if

q*

(i.e . the conditional is true if

p

and

q

are both true or both false,

but not otherwise). This does not exclude the possibility that a language might

have,

in addition, conditionals with this more restricted truth table. Thus, in

English the conjunctional phrase

provided that

encodes just such a biconditio-

nal,

e.g.:

(5) Provided that no one objects, we'll have the meeting at 4 o'clock

(from which we deduce, without any appeal to conversational implicatures,

that if anyone objects the meeting will not be held at 4 o'clock and that if

no one objects the meeting will be held at 4 o'clock). English

unless

has a

similar biconditional int erpre tation , though with negation of the protasis, thus:

(6) Un less you leave imm ediately, you'll be late

has the interpretation 'If and only if you do not leave immediately, you will

be late' (see Quirk

etal.

1972: 781 ).

3

One further point that follows from the above characterization of the logical

relation betw een p rotasis and apodosis is that , in the conditional con struction,

neither of these propositions is stated to be true. Apparent counterexamples

come to mind, as in the following dialogue:

A : I'm leaving now

B : If you'r e leaving now , I wo n't be able to go with you

Note that B can say this even fully accepting that A is indeed leaving now.

What is crucial, however, is that the truth of 'A is leaving now' is not part

of the meaning of the conditional sentence, although it may indeed form part

of the overall interpretation of the context of which B's utterance forms only

one part. This can be seen from the contrast between B's utterance above

and the alternative:

(7) Since yo u're leaving now , I wo n't be able to go with you

This alternative states explicitly that A is leaving now, and therefore commits

B to not going with A. The conditional version still leaves open, however,

79



Bernard Comrie

the possibility that, if A changes his mind, then B will in fact go with him.

Thus,

in a conditional

if p then q,

there is no statement of the truth of either

p

or

q,

although this is of course consistent with the truth of

p

or

q

being

established elsew here in the context. T he related question of whe ther condition-

als can express the falsity of p or q is crucial to the discussion of counterf actual

conditionals, and I will return to this problem in section 5. Most descriptions

of English sentences like:

(8) If he had com e, I would have been happy

state that it is in fact false that he came and false that I was happy, but in

section 5 I suggest that this is not the case in English, and that the comparable

data require further investigation for other languages. Thus it is possible that

a stronger generalization may be forthcoming, namely: from a conditional

neither the truth nor the falsity of either p or q can be deduced (though they

may be derived by implicature or from contex t).

One feature of the characterization of material implication in logic is that

the only relation that n eed hold b etween protasis and apodosis is that expressed

in the truth table, so that otherwise totally unrelated propositions may appear

as protasis and apodosis, subject only to the condition that they have appro-

priate truth values, as in:

(9) If Paris is the capital of Franc e, two is an even number

(10) If Paris is the capital of Spain, two is an odd number

(11) If Paris is the capital of Spain, two is an even num ber

This does not carry over to natural language, where conditionals require

a stronger link between protasis and apodosis. In most instances (see below

for exceptions) this link is causal, i.e. the content of the protasis must be

interpretable as a cause of the content of the apodosis. We therefore add

this as a second requirement in the characterization of conditionals in natural

language. One might hypothesize that the causal relation is a conversational

implicature, rather than part of the meaning of the conditional; but, while

I have no strict data arguments against this, it does not correspond to my

intuitions about the anomaly of sentences of the type given above - they are

false because they require a causal relation that is not there.

Conditionals are of course still distinct from causal constructions, in that

causal constructions involve comm itment to the truth of two propositions, thu s:

(12) Since you're leaving now , I won't go with you

commits the speaker to believing that the addressee is leaving now and that

the speaker will not go with the addre ssee, w hereas:

(13) If you're leaving now , I won't go with you

commits the speaker to neither.

8



Conditionals:

a

typology

The causal relation is from the protasis as cause to the apodosis as effect.

In section

6 we

will discuss some conditional constructions with

an

inverse

causal relation, i.e. where the apodosis is a cause for the protasis, as in:

(14)

If

it will amuse

you, I ll

tell

you a

joke

where my telling the joke is the cause of your being amused. Note, however,

that in such examples there is also a causal relation from protasis to apodosis:

your future amusement

is the

cause

for

my telling

the

joke. Thus such construc-

tions

are

actually bicausal,

and

therefore consistent with

the

claim that condi-

tionals necessarily involve a causal relation from protasis to apodosis.

Causal relations

in

language in general may involve

not

only the literal conten t

of propositions but also the speaker's motivation for making the claim that

includes a proposition. Th us, the most usual interpretation of:

(15) John

is a thief,

because

I

saw

him

stealing

is

not

that

my

seeing John steal caused

him to be a thief, but

rather that

my seeing John steal is the reason for my believing that he is a thief (epistem ic).

In the example:

(16) Since

you

asked,

ten

isn't

a

prime nu mber

the add ressee's asking provides the reason

not for

ten being a nonprim e num ber,

but rather

for the

speaker's asserting this (speech act).

4

This same kind

of

causal relation

is

possible

in

conditionals. Under normal circumstances

the

following sentence would

be

rejected

as

incoherent:

(17)

If

Bismarck

is the

capital

of

North Dakota, then Pierre

is the

capital

of South Dakota

because there is no causal link between the two propositions. The sentence

becomes coherent, however,

if

embedded

in the

following dialogue:

A: What's the capital of South Dakota?

B :

I m not

sure. B ismarck

and

Pierre

are the

capitals

of the two

Dako-

tas,

but I m not

sure which

is

which

A: Bismarck is the capital of North Dakota

B : If

Bismarck

is the

capital

of

North Dak ota, then Pierre

is the

capital

of South Dakota

Here , the causal link is not directly between Bismarck being capital of North

Dakota and Pierre being capital of South D akota but rather b etween B s know-

ledge that Bismarck

is

capital

of

North Dakota

and the

epistemic basis

of

B's claim that Pierre

is

capital

of

South Dakota.

An

example

of the

speech

act type would

be:

(18)

If

you want

to

know,

ten

isn't

a

prime num ber

An apparent counterexample to the causal link in conditionals is provided

by constructions with

even

if

81



Bernard Comrie

(19) Even if you pay m e, I still wo n't do it

which clearly does not have as part of its meaning 'Since you will pay me,

I will do it'.

5

In fact, part of the meaning of this sentence is precisely the

denial of a causal link between protasis and apodosis. This last observation

gives a clue to a possible way to incorporate such constructions into our general

characterization of conditionals. Com mon to all types is reference, in the seman-

tics of the construction, to a causal relation between protasis and apodosis;

whether the causal relation is presented positively or negatively simply dis-

tinguishes subtypes. O ne m ight com pare the following exam ple:

(20) I will do this, not because I want to, but because you have forced me

to

where the second clause explicitly denies a causal relation between the speake r's

wanting to do something and his doing it, even though the second clause is

surely still causal.

The characterization of conditionals provided so far is purely in conceptual

terms,

i.e. the logical relation between two propositions and the causal relation

between them. To say that a language has a conditional construction or condi-

tional constructions, we need to add to these conceptual criteria a formal cri-

terion, namely that the language must have a formally identifiable syntactic

construction whose basic function is to encode conditionals as defined above.

The construction may have other uses in addition to that of expressing condi-

tionals, but this must be its basic function. One can weaken the definition

slightly, requiring only that encoding conditionals be one of the basic functions

of the construction in question, and in what follows I will normally use this

weaker characterization. Thus, a German sentence like:

(21) W enn er kom m t, gehe ich weg

will be conside red an instance of a conditional in its inte rpre tation 'If he com es,

I leave', but not in its interpretation 'When he comes, I leave'.

6

The weaker

definition has the advantage of encompassing a broader range of constructions

crosslinguistically, about which it is possible to make significant crosslinguistic

generalizations. It does, of course, also have the disadvantage that it becomes

more difficult to isolate conditionals from other constructions: thus, in Man-

darin, the sentence:

(22) Zhang san he jiu, wo ma ta

lit. 'Zhan gsan drink wine, I scold him '

covers a wide range of possible relations between the two clauses ('If /w hen /be -

cause Zhangsan drinks wine, I scold him'), with little evidence for isolating

a separate conditional meaning.

7

This characterization also allows that o ther constructions may receive condi-

tional interpre tation s, provided that this is not their basic mean ing. Thu s, appro-

82




priate modification of the modality in concessive clauses can produce results

that receive the same interpretation as conditional clauses with

even,

as in:

(23) Although he may look a fool, he's actually very intelligent

and

(24) Even if he looks a fool, he's actually very intelligent

Likewise, insertion of indefinite ever into tem poral clauses can lead to in terpre-

tations identical to those of conditionals:

(25) W henever he came late, he was scolded

and:

(26) If he came late , he was scolded

Note, incidentally, that neither of the last two sentences: (unlike the parallel

version with just when) implies that he did ever come late, although with past

time reference the sentences are not particularly coherent if the potential situa-

tion of his coming late was never realiz ed; the potentiality is clearer with future

time reference:

(27) W heneve r/if he comes late , he will be scolded

3. C L A U S E O R D E R

The definition of the logical relation holding in a conditional construction,

as given in section 2, also distinguishes between the two propositions or their

linguistic reflection as clauses, i.e. pro tasis and apodosis: the conditional allows

that the protasis may be false and the apodosis true, but not vice versa. (The

causal relation from protasis to apodosis reinforces this distinction.) Greenberg

(1963: 84-5) states the following Universal of Word Order 14 concerning the

linear order of the two clauses:

In conditional statements, the conditional clause [=protasis, C] precedes the conclusion

[=apodosis,

C] as

the normal order in all languages.

Work leading up to the present paper has uncovered no counterexamples to

this generalization. Although many languages allow both orders, protasis-

apodosis and apodosis-protasis, many grammars note explicitly that the usual

order is for the protasis to precede, and presumably the same will hold for

many languages where the gram mars are silent on this poin t. In some languages the

protasis must precede the apodosis, in particular in languages with a rigid rule

requiring the finite verb of the main clause to stand sentence-finally (e.g. Tu rkish).

Since the positioning of protases in such languages can be viewed as just a

special case of the general rule whereby subordinate clauses must precede

main clauses, this does not necessarily say anything specific about conditional

8



Bernard Comrie

constructions. H owe ver, this same restriction to protasis-apod osis o rder is also

found in some languages which do not have a strict subordinate-main clause

order restriction, suggesting that there is indeed something special about condi-

tional clauses in this respect, i.e. the preponderance of the protasis-apodosis

order in languages with free clause order is not 'just statistical', but does reflect

something significant about language. In Mandarin, the protasis must precede

the apodosis, irrespective of whether either protasis or apodosis is marked

overtly, e.g.

(28) (ruguo) Zhang san he jiu, wo (jiu) ma ta

lit. '(If) Zhangsan drink wine, I (then) scold him' i.e. 'if Zhangsan

drinks wine, (then) I will scold him'

In Ngiyambaa, with past tense counterfactuals, both clauses have the same

overt marking (with the clitic -ma), and the first must be interpreted as protasis,

e.g.:

(29) Ng inuu-ma-ni bura ay giyi, ngindu-m a-ni yada gurawiyi

lit. 'your-counterfactual-this child was, you-counterfactual-this well

looked-after' i.e. 'if this child had been yours, you would have looked

after it well'

(Example from Donaldson 1980: 251-2)

8

Given the observational universal that the protasis tends to precede the apodosis,

it is interesting to try to come up with possible explanations for this state of

affairs. The suggestions below are necessarily speculative, and it is not necessary

that only one of them be the correct solution: possibly the interaction of all or

some of these factors leads to the observed preferred clause order.

Given that it seems to be commoner crosslinguistically for the protasis to

be marked overtly as nonfactual than for the apodosis to be so marked (see

section 4), placing the overtly marked protasis in front of the unm arked apodosis

avoids the apodosis being interpreted as a factual statem ent. Th us, in English:

(30) If you translate this for m e, I'll give you 100

it is clear from the outset that the speaker is not promising outright to give

the addressee 100, but that this paym ent is contingent on the addressee per-

forming the translation task. With the order:

(31) I'll give you 100 if you trans late this for me

there is the potential danger that the first clause will be interp reted in isolation,

before (or without) hearing the second clause. If this were the whole story,

then som e interesting predictions would follow. In particular, one would expect

that in a language or in a construction where the apodosis is overtly marked

as nonfactual it would be more likely for the apodosis to precede than in

languages/constructions where the apodosis is not overtly marked for factuality.

84




Unfortunately, I know of no evidence that this prediction is in fact borne

out; rather, my current impression is that preposing of the protasis prevails

even where the apodosis is marked for factuality. Moreover, in conditionally

interpreted sentences where the protasis is not marked overtly as nonfactual,

one might expect to find greater frequency of preposing of the apodosis

(whether marked or not), since the protasis does not here serve a function

of indicating nonfactuality overtly. Note, however, that in Mandarin, as men-

tioned abo ve, the protasis necessarily precedes the apodosis, whether the prota-

sis alone is marked for nonfactuality (by a conjunction such as

ruguo

' i f ) ,

whether the apodosis alone is marked (for instance by na and/or jlu 'then,

in that case'), whether both are marked, or whether neither is marked. Like-

wise,

in English one can have the order:

(32) Do that and I'll smash your face

as an equivalent to :

(33) If y °

u

do that, I'll smash your face

even though the protasis in isolation appears to be an instruction to the addres-

see to carry out the action which it is in fact the speaker's intention to prevent;

it is not possible to say:

(34) I'll smash your face and do that

with the same meaning. Thus, if overt indication of nonfactuality is at the

root of the observed clause order, then this factor has been grammaticalized

to such an exten t that its original function is scarcely recognizable.

A second possibility would be that the linear order of clauses reflects the

temporal reference of the two clauses. It is indeed generally the case that

the temporal reference of the protasis is located before, or at least not posterior

to ,

that of the apodosis (see section 6). This explanation would suggest that

if the tempo ral rela tion is reve rsed , the clause orde r should (at least statistically)

shift. In section 6 are discussed conditionals where the temporal reference

of the protasis follows that of the ap odo sis, constructions such as:

(35) If it will amuse you, I'll tell you a joke

The prediction is thus that the orde r:

(36) I'll tell you a jo ke , if it'll amuse you

should be more likely than:

(37) I'll tell you ano ther joke , if that one amused you

(In (37) the protasis precedes the apodosis temporally.) This prediction now

simply requires empirical testing. I doubt whether such testing will be easy,

given the low textual frequency of conditionals where the temporal reference

of the apodosis precedes tha t of the prota sis, but at least the issue is clear.

85



Bernard Comrie

Thirdly, the observed linear order may reflect the cause and effect relation

betw een the two clauses: since cause preced es effect (at least in our concep tuali-

zation of the world), it could be that this is mirrored iconically in the order

of the clauses. Unfortunately for this hypothesis, it does not seem to be the

case that causal clauses typically precede rather than follow their main clause

(except, of course, in languages that have a syntactic requirement that all subor-

dinate clauses precede their main clause). While the discrepancy between pro-

tases and causal clauses may be related to their different characteristic

comm unicative dynam ism (conditional clauses are m ore topical, causal clauses

more rhematic), this just pushes the question one stage back: why is it that

this communicative difference exists between conditional protases and causal

clauses?

The fourth suggestion is that made by Lehmann (1974), and relates directly

to the structure of discourses containing conditional constructions. Lehmann

notes that in any discourse it is necessary for the participants to gain common

ground step by step. In this process of establishing comm on gro und, a condition-

al protasis represents progress in its establishment in a disjunctive situation:

there are two possibilities (namely,

p

and ~/?), and before communication

can progress, it is necessary for the speaker to establish which of the disjuncts

is to be considered; only then can the argumentation proceed. From this per-

spective, the linear order of the clauses is iconic to the sequence of steps in

the argumentation.

A similar idea has been presented and elaborated by Haiman (1978), who

claims that conditionals (i.e. protases) are topics. Since topics tend crosslinguis-

tically to occur sentence-initially, it would follow that conditional protases

should also occur sentence-initially. In this connection it is worth citing Hai-

ma n's characterizations of conditionals and topics:

A conditional clause [=protasis, BC] is (perhaps only hypothetically) a part of the

knowledge shared by the speaker and his listener. As such, it constitutes the framework

which has been selected for the following discourse.

The topic represents the entity whose existence is agreed upon by the speaker and

his audience. As such, it constitutes the framework which has been selected for the

following discourse. (Haiman 1978: 583, 585)

If this approach is correct, then it would still be the case that some degree

of grammaticalization has taken place, since it is, of course, possible to have

conditional protases in discourse that are not topical, as in:

(38) I will leave , if you pay me

in response to :

(39) U nder what circumstances will you leave?

where the protasis is focus (and, like focus in general crosslinguistically, tends

to occur sentence-finally).

9

86




4. M A R K E R S O F P R O T A S I S A N D A P O D O S I S

In this section I am concerned with how a construction is marked overtly as

being a conditional rather than some other formal or conceptual category.

As we have already seen, it is possible for a construction to have a conditional

interpretation even in the absence of any overt indication of conditionality,

as for instance in Mandarin - but this seems to be quite exceptional across

the languages of the world. Most languages mark either the protasis, or the

apodosis, or both. It is important to note that what is at issue here is the

category of conditional as a whole, irrespective of the degree of hypotheticality

of the conditional. T hus , in English:

(40) If he had don e that, we would have been all right

the use of the conditional in the apodosis

we would have been all right

indicates

nonfactuality (indeed , the m ost likely interpretation is counterfactuality). How -

ever, (a) this does not in itself indicate explicitly that this proposition is depen-

dent on some other conditional proposition, and, even more importantly, (b)

in conditional constructions with lower hypotheticality, verb forms are used

which do not in them selves indicate nonfactuality, as in:

(41) If he does tha t, we will be all right

where

we will be all right

could in isolation be a factual prediction. In all

such examples, however, English indicates conditionality by the conjunction

if, therefore this marker (which is part of the protasis) is the overt marker

of conditionality.

Overt marking of the protasis seems to be the commonest situation cross-

linguistically, and languages like Mandarin and Ngiyambaa that do not mark

the protasis overtly seem to be the exception rather than the rule.

10

I know

of no language where it is obligatory to mark the apodosis but impossible

to mark the protasis, although Mandarin does allow as one alternative the

construction w here the protasis is unm arked and the apodosis marked (Zhang-

sdn he jiu, wd jiu ma ta).

Overt marking of the protasis is frequently by means

of conjunctions, such as English

if,

Maltese

jekk

and

kieku

(distinguished by

degrees of hypotheticality - see section 5), Mandarin

ruguo,

Haya

kd

(Salone

1977: 151). But it may also be by verb form, as in Turkish gelirsem 'if I com e',

gelsem 'if

I

were to com e' (where the v erb form also encodes degrees of hyp othe-

ticality- Lewis 1967: 130), Hua

-mamo

and

-hipana

(distinguished by degrees

of hypotheticality - Haiman 1980: 180-7). Other possibilities for marking the

protasis seem to be more restricted, e.g. subject-verb (or subject-auxiliary)

inversion in Germ an and E nglish:

(42) H atte er das geta n, ware ich gliicklich gewesen

'Had he done that, I would have been happy '

where the initial position of the verb in the first clause indicates conditionality.

87



Bernard Comrie

Many languages with overt marking of the protasis typically do not mark

the apodosis. Although English can mark the apodosis explicitly with

then,

it is in fact rather unusual to do so; similarly in Russian with to (in Russian,

the protasis is marked with

esli

'if). In some languages, overt marking of

the apodosis is much more frequent, for instance in German (with

so )

and

in Bengali (Ferguson 1982); and overt marking of the apodosis is claimed to

be obligatory for some native speakers of New Guinea Pidgin (Sankoff and

Laberge 1973), the only language where I am aware of an obligatory apodosis

marker. All cases known to me of overt apodosis marking involve particles,

often (as pointed out by John Haiman) of pronominal origin, and therefore

perhaps analysable as resumptive pronouns.

One interesting observation, tying in with the observations in section 3 on

the functional pressure to mark conditionals overtly for their nonfactuality,

is that there seems to be some interplay between degree of overt marking

in the protasis and degree of overt marking in the apodosis. Thus, in German,

the use of so in the apodosis is more likely if the protasis uses inversion (less

clearly marked for con ditionality) than if it uses the conjunction wenn.

5.

D E G R E E S O F H Y P O T H E T I C A L I T Y

Accounts of conditional constructions, starting with traditional descriptions

of the classical langua ges, typically m ake use of such oppositions as open versus

closed conditions, or real versus unreal, or real (open) versus hypothetical

versus counterfactual, referring to different degrees of hypotheticality of the

truth of the propositions involved. What is characteristic of most of these ac-

counts is that they assume a neat bipartite or tripartite division (according

to language), with a clear-cut boundary between the two or three types. The

view that I wish to expound in this section is that, in fact, hypotheticality

is a con tinu um , with (perh aps) no clear-cut divisions, and that different

languages simply distinguish different degree s of hypotheticality along this con-

tinuum, the choice of form often being determined by subjective evaluation

rather than by truth-conditional semantics. This avoids, in particular, the con-

torted and often empty formulations attempting to distinguish between real

(open) and hypothetical conditionals, formulations such as 'nothing is implied

about the fulfilment or probability of fulfilment' versus 'only conceded as a

supposition and may or may not be fulfilled' (Ken nedy 1962: 98), where it

is difficult to see any rigid difference between the range of the two definitions.

By the term 'hypoth eticality', I mean the degree of probability of realization

of the situations referred to in the conditional, and more especially in the

protasis. I shall use the convention that 'greater hypotheticality' means 'lower

probability' and 'lower hypotheticality' means 'greater probability'. Thus a fac-

tual sentence would represent the lowest degree of hypotheticality, while a




counterfactual clause would repre sent the highest de gree.

In section 21 have already argued that a conditional never involves factuality

- or more accurately, that a conditional never expresses the factuality of either

of its constituent propositions. That one or other of the propositions is true

may be known independently of the conditional, for instance from the rest

of the verbal context or from other sources, but this does not alter the crucial

fact that the conditional itself does not express this factuality. In context, the

sentence:

(43) If it's raining , we won't go to the park

may well receive the interpretatio n

(44) Since it's raining, we wo n't go to the park

but this is not p art of its meaning.

Somewhat more controversially, I will claim that conditionals are also incap-

able of expressing the counterfactuality of a proposition, despite the apparent

counterf actuality of such exam ples as:

(45) If you had arrived on tim e, we 'd have finished by now

which clearly receives a counterf actual inte rpre tatio n (at least, under norm al

circumstances).

11

The motivation for my claim will be the consideration of

so-called counterfactual conditionals in English. The relevant evidence goes

beyond that usually considered in treatments of conditionals in English

(although English is one of the most thoroughly investigated languages from

this viewpoint), and therefore comparable evidence is difficult to find in gram-

mars of other languages. The provisional natur e of the claim, therefor e, should

be understood: I am claiming that English lacks counterfactual conditionals,

i.e. a conditional constru ction from which the falsity of either protasis or apodo-

sis can be deduced logically. I suspect that the same may be true of other

languages where a separate class of counterfactual conditionals is said to exist;

this suspicion is, of course, open to disconfirmation, and I am in fact anxious

that the relevant detailed work should be carried out on languages other than

English which are said to have counterf actuals.

In English , the re a re two cand idates for counterf actuals. First, conditionals

with the past tense (indicative or subjunctive) in the protasis and the conditional

in the apodosis; and second, conditionals with the pluperfect in the protasis

and the conditional perfect in the apodosis. For the first type, it is easy to

show that counterf actuality can be cancelled. Imag ine the following dialogue:

A : Will you buy me a beer?

B : If you gave me a kiss, I'd buy you a bee r

With this particular example it is unlikely that B's utterance would be inter-

preted as counterfactual, i.e. as indicating falsity of a proposition stating that

89



Bernard Comrie

B will buy A a beer. Indeed, this particular utterance is most likely to be

used by B in order to induce A to kiss B, whereupon B will be committed

to buying a beer for A. B could, of course, also have said:

(46) If you give me a kiss, I'll buy you a beer

but what is crucial is the possibility of the version cited in the dialogue. (The

version in the dialogue is more hypothetical than its alternative, i.e. suggests

a lower probability of A's kissing B, which in the given circumstances might

be used by B to avoid too negative an aspersion on A's morals.)

For the second type, it is easy to show that counterfactuality is not part

of the meaning of the apodosis, as can be seen in the following example:

(47) (Even) if I had had a million dollars, I (still) wo uldn 't have given you

the money you asked for

The most plausible interpretation for this sentence (especially if either the

even

or the

still

or both are included) is that the speaker did not give the

money asked for, i.e. that the apodosis is true. It is harder to find convincing

examples where the protasis is not necessarily false, and speaker judgements

do seem to vary somew hat. For m any speake rs, however, the following example

will serv e:

(48) If the butler had done it, we would have found just the clues that we

did in fact find

12

The final clause of (48) makes it clear that we did in fact find the clues in

question, i.e. the apodosis is true; the sentence also leaves open the possibility

that the b utler did indeed do it. Thus, this construction does not have coun ter-

factuality as part of the meaning of either protasis or apodosis. It is interesting

to speculate on why counterfactuality should be a stronger implicature with

conditionals that have past time reference than with those that have future

time reference, with those with present time reference occupying an inter-

mediate position. Presumably, it is connected with the expectation that one

should have greater certainty about past events than about future events, so

that a past situation that is nonfactual will probably be counterfactual, whereas

a future situation that is nonfactual is quite likely to be just left ope n.

Given that the construction with the greatest degree of hypotheticality does

not imply counterfactuality in its interpretation, one might wonder whether

one can perhaps make the inverse correlation, namely that a situation that

is interpreted as counterfactual must receive the construction with the highest

degree of hypotheticality. Even this seems, however, not to be true, as can

be seen in the following dialogue:

A : Ar e we in Bolivia now?

B : If Brasilia is the capital of Bolivia, then we 're in Bolivia

9




Assume that B's reply is in fact sarcastic, i.e. B knows that they are in Brasilia,

therefore in Brazil, and is making fun of A's mistaken belief that they are

in Bolivia. Then both the propositions 'Brasilia is the capital of Bolivia' and

'we're in Bolivia' are counterfactual, B knows that they are counterfactual,

and moreover B believes that A knows that at least 'Brasilia is the capital

of Bolivia' is counterfactual (otherwise the sarcasm would be lost). What is

crucial about this example is that B's utterance leaves completely open whether

or not B rasilia is the capital of B olivia, and thus does not express counterfactu-

ality; indeed the sarcasm resides precisely in the conflict between the openness

of the protasis and the factual knowledge that Brasilia is not the capital of

Bolivia. This example serves to emphasize the point that by choosing a given

degree of hypotheticality within conditional constructions, the speaker

expresses

a certain degree of hypo theticality ; this expressed degree of hypothe ti-

cality need not correspond to his actual belief, m uch less to the real w orld.

We may now turn to the positive task of providing a framework for the

description of degrees of hypotheticality across languages. It should be noted

that there are some languages which make no distinction in terms of degrees

of hypotheticality, for instance Mandarin, where Zh angsan he-le jiu, wo jiu

ma ta

can cover all of 'If Zh angsan has drunk wine, I'll scold him ', 'If Zhangsan

drank wine, I would scold him', 'If Zhangsan had drunk wine, I would have

scolded him' (Mandarin also makes no distinctions of absolute tense). Similarly

in Indonesian:

(49) saya mau pergi dengan kam u, kalau kamu naik kapal-terbang

lit. 'I future go with you, if you mount airplane'

can mean 'I will go with you if you go by plane', 'I would go with you if

you went by plane', or 'I would have gone with you if you had gone by plane',

although it is also possible to distinguish different degrees of hypotheticality

explicitly (Kahler 1965: 180-1; Dardjowid jojo 1978: 159). At least a two-way

distinction in terms of degrees of hypotheticality seems to be common cross-

linguistically, however, and some languages make a three-way distinction.

First, it is useful to deal with a class of conditionals which are completely

open, i.e. where the protasis is simply stated as a hypothesis without any claim

whatsoever to the tru th , falsity, or probability of the prota sis. In actual discourse

such conditionals seem to be very rare, but in English, at least, they do have

some distinctive properties. In particular, in English such protases can contain

a future tense (with will), although normally future tenses do not occur in

protases in English, being replaced by the present except in highly restricted

circumstances (see further, section 6). Usually, the proposition contained in

the protasis has already been entered into the discourse, as in the following

dialogue:

A : Th e Unive rse won 't come to an end for several million years yet



Bernard Comrie

B : If it won't come to an end for several million years yet, we'll still

be able to go to Florida this winter

It is important to note that B is simply accepting, for the purposes of the

argument, the hypothesis that A's proposition is true. In fact, the Brasilia-

Bolivia dialogue above is another example of this kind of completely open

conditional, w here , however, B does not in fact accept the truth of the proposi-

tion 'Brasilia is the capital of Bolivia'. In completely open conditionals of this

type,

English simply uses the verb form that would be used in an independent

clause expressing the same proposition, i.e. with a full range of temporal,

aspectual, and modal distinctions. I am not aware of a sufficient range of detailed

studies of other languages to be able to make any serious crosslinguistic

comments on this construction.

For the remaining conditionals, the distinctions come into play relating to

the speaker's expressed evaluation of the probability of the situation referred

to in the protasis. English here makes a two-way distinction between lower

and greater hypotheticality. Lower hypotheticality involves the indicative with-

out any backshifting in tense, i.e. the past tense is used only if there is indeed

past time refer ence, as in:

(50a) If you come tom orr ow , you'll be able to join us on a picnic

or:

(50b) If the students come on Fridays, they have oral practice in Quechu a

or (with past time reference):

(51) If the students came on Fridays, they had oral practice in Q uechua

Greater hypotheticality involves backshifting in tense, so that with future

time reference one finds the past tense in the protasis (corresponding to the

present tense in conditionals with lower hypotheticality) and the conditional

in the apodosis (correspo nding to the future in conditionals with lower hy pothe-

ticality):

(52) If you came tomo rro w, you'd be able to join us on a picnic

The sam e forms are found w ith present time reference , as in:

(53) If the students came on Fridays, they would have oral practice in Que -

chua

With past time re ference, one finds the pluperfect in the protasis and the condi-

tional perfect in the apodosis, as in:

(54) If the students had come on Friday they would have had oral practice

in Quechua.

13

Similar, though not identical, distributions are found in many European lan-

guages. Thus French, German, Russian, and Latvian have indicative mood

92




without backshifting in tense in the construction with lower hypotheticality,

but use the following verb forms in the construction with greater hypo theticality:

French em ploys the imperfect in the protasis and the conditional in the apo dosis;

German the past subjunctive or the conditional (i.e. form with

wurde)

in both

clauses; Russian and L atvian the conditional in both clauses. In these languages,

degrees of hypotheticality are indicated by choice of verb form, but some lan-

guages also indicate this by different conjunctions. Thus, in Maltese

jekk

'i f

is used for lower hypotheticality and kieku for greater hypotheticality. Yapese

has a distinction between faqdn raa (less hypothetical) and yugu raa or (goo)-

mangea

(described as 'counterfactual' - Jensen 1977: 316-18). In Ngiyambaa,

as already noted in section 3, greater hypotheticality (or counterfactuality?)

is indicated by the clitic -m a in both clauses. Classical Greek seems to be

unusual in having its m arker for higher hypo theticality,

an,

only in the apodosis.

Some languages make a three-w ay distinction in this area, as in the following

Latin examples from Cicero: type I (indicative) Si vales, bene est 'If you are

in good health, all is well'; type II (subjunctive without shift to past tense)

Hanc vlam si asperam esse negem, mentiar

'If I were to deny that this road

is rough, I should lie'; type III (subjunctive with shift to past tense)

Si ad

centensimum annum vixisset, senectutis earn suae paeniteret? 'If he had lived

to his hundredth year, would he be regretting his old age?' (Kennedy 1962:

98-9).

Similarly in Persian, again arranged in order of increasing hypothetic-

ality:

agar miravi, agarberavi, agarmirafti,

respectively indicative, subjunctive,

conditional (formally, a past tense) 'if you are/were going' (Windfuhr 1979:

92).

6. T I M E R E F E R E N C E

In this section we shall be concerned with overt expression of time reference

in conditionals, concentrating on those instances where the time reference of

verb forms is different in a conditional from that found in other constructions.

Two sets of time reference turn out to be particularly interesting here: time

reference in conditionals with high hypotheticality (especially with nonfuture

time reference), and time reference in conditionals with low hypotheticality

and future time reference. I suspect that these two sets of conditionals are

in fact th e most basic, in the sense that they are the m ost used in actual discourse,

and in that grammars of individual languages are more likely to require overt

reference to these classes of conditionals. Grammars of many languages discuss

only these two sets of conditionals, or at least restrict their examples to these

two kinds.

One frequent phenomenon crosslinguistically in conditionals with high

hypotheticality is loss of tense distinctions. In an extreme form, this can be

seen in Russian, which has a three-way tense distinction (pa st/p rese nt/f utu re) ,

but no tense distinction whatsoever in conditionals with high hypotheticality,

93



ernard Comrie

e.g.:

(55) Esli by ty prisel , ja byl by rad

'If you cam e/ha d come I would be/hav e been glad'

A less extreme neutralization is found in Latvian, where the usual three-way

tense distinction (past/present/future) is reduced to a two-way opposition

between past time reference (conditional perfect) and nonpast time reference

(conditional):

(56) Ja es butu aizgajis, jus mani neb utu redzejis

'If I had gone aw ay, you would not have seen m e'

(57) Es strad atu, ja vins man mak satu

'I would work if he paid m e'

(Examples from Fennell and Gelsen 1980: 188, 512)

English shows a similar tense reduction. In conditionals with low hypothetic-

ality, the three-way distinction (past/present/future) is maintained - although

the present/future opposition is neutralized in the protasis, it is retained in

the ap odosis, as in:

(58) If he comes (regu larly) , I run away

versus:

(59) If he comes (tom orro w) , I'll run away

However, in the conditional with greater hypotheticality, the present/future

opposition is neutralized :

(60) If (ever) he cam e, I would run away

and

(61) If he came (tom orro w ), I would run away

One aspect of time reference that is common in Indo-European and Euro-

pean-area languages in conditionals with high hypotheticality is backshifting

of tense, i.e. use of a morphologically past tense with present (or future) time

reference and of a pluperfect with past time reference, as in English:

(62) If he cam e, I would run away

(63) If he had com e, I would have run away

Appare ntly , som e varieties of English can even backshift a pluperfect to 'pluplu-

perfect', a form that does not otherwise occur in English, as in:

(64) If he 'd 've com e, I'd 've run away

- although the analysis of this verb form in the protasis (had/ would have/of

come?)

is controversial. Backshifting of tense is not, however, restricted to

94




these languages. Thus in Haya, in conditionals with high hypotheticality, pre-

sent time reference is expressed by the recent past tense, while past time refer-

ence is expressed by a sequential combination of recent past tense and

intermediate past tense markers (Salone 1977: 155-7). F°

r a

more extended

crosslinguistic study, see Jam es (1982).

The indication of time reference in pro tases of conditionals with low hypo the-

ticality and future time reference is particularly complex crosslinguistically,

as discussed in Comrie (1982). Basically, four types can be distinguished. In

type one , the expected future tense is used, as in Latvian:

(65) Ja tu runasi (futu re), es tevi dzirdesu

'If you speak, I'll hear you'

In type two, the present indicative is used with future time reference, even

in languages where t here are heavy restrictions on this use of the present tense ,

as in E nglish:

(66) If it rains tom orro w, I'll take an umbrella

(cf. *it rains tomorro w)

In type three , present ten se is used, but in a non-indicative m ood, as in Arm e-

nian, where the pre sent subjunctive is used:

(67) Yet

h

e du gas (present subjunctive), yes ka-ganam

'If you com e, I will go '

In the fourth type, a form is used which is neither present nor indicative,

as in Portu guese , where th e so-called future subjunctive appe ars:

(68) Se voce nao vier (future subju nctive), eu vou sair

'If you don't come, I will leave'

Note that in each of these examples, the apodosis remains in the future indica-

tive (or whateve r verb form is usual in the given language for expressing future

time reference).

In fact, the situation is more complex than these straightforward examples

suggest, as can be seen by more de tailed exam ination of English (as an exam ple

of type two) and P ortuguese (as an example of type four). The situation outlined

above, with use of the present indicative or the future subjunctive, holds only

where the temporal reference of the protasis precedes or overlaps that of the

apodosis. This is, as noted in section 3, the usual temporal relation between

protasis and apodosis, but conditionals are perfectly possible where the time

reference of the apodosis precedes that of the protasis. In this case, Portuguese

disallows the future subjunctive, resorting instead either to the compound

future indicative (with the auxiliary ir 'to go') or, preferably, to the compound

future of the future subjunctive:

(69) Se isso vai/for machucar voce , eu nao fa?o

95



Bernard Comrie

that may have topic status (such as temporal clauses).

10 Since most grammars available to me of Australian languages do not discuss conditionals,

it is possible that Ngiyambaa may evince a more widespread areal trait here.

11 Stephen R. Anderson points out to me that English conditionals with if only are

necessarily counterfactual, e.g.

If only I had a thousand dollars I d buy a computer.

Further investigation of such constructions may therefore lead to weakening of the

claim in the text, unless the coun terf actuality can b e attrib uted to some element

not part of the expression of conditionality (e.g. be predicted from the semantics

of only).

12 For further discussion of such examples, see Davies (1979: 157-62).

13 In fact, English overall seems to have more than two degrees of hypotheticality

for nonpast cond itionals, since here dou ble backshifting (pluperfect in protasis, condi-

tional perfect in apodosis) may be used, e.g. //

you had come next Wednesday,

you would have met Grannie,

which is more appropriate than

If you cam e ... you

would meet

... if the addressee has already indicated inability to come on W ednesday

(Dudman 1983: 38-9).

REFERENCES

Co mrie, B ern ard. 1982. Futu re time reference in conditional protases. Australian Journal

of Linguistics

2 :

143-52.

Dardjowidjojo, Soenjono. 1978. Sentence patterns of Indonesian. Honololu: University

Press of H awaii.

Davies, Eitian C. 1979. O n the semantics of syntax. London: Croom Helm.

Donaldson, Tamsin. 1980. Ngiyambaa: the language of the Wangaaybuwan. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Dudman, V. H. 1983. Tense and time in English verb clusters of the primary pattern.

Australian Journal of Linguistics 3: 25-44.

Fennell, T. C. and H . Gelsen. 1980. A gramm ar of modern L atvian. T he Hague: M outon.

Fergu son, Ch arles A. 1982. Cond itionals in Bengali. Paper presen ted at the C onditionals

W orkshop , Stanford University, May 21-22.

Greenberg, Joseph H. 1963. Some universals of grammar with particular reference to

the orde r of meaningful elem ents. In Universals of language, ed. Joseph H. Green berg,

73-113.

Cam bridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Haiman, John. 1978. Conditionals are topics.

Language 54:

564-89.

Haiman, John. 1980.

Hua: a Papuan

language

of the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea.

Amsterdam: Benjamins.

James, Deborah. 1982. Past tense and hypotheticality: a cross-linguistic study.

Studies

in Language

6: 375-40 3.

Jensen, John T. 1977. Yapese reference grammar. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.

Kahler, Hans . 1965. Grammatik der ahasa Indonesia, 2nd ed. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

Kennedy, B . H. 1962. The shorter Latin primer, rev. edn. London: Longman.

Lehmann, Christian. 1974. Prinzipien fur 'Universal 14'. In Linguistic Workshop II,

ed. Hansjakob Seiler, 69-97. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Lewis, Geoffrey L. 1967. Turkish grammar. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Li,

Charles N., and Sandra A. Thompson. 1982. Conditionals in Mandarin. Paper pre-

sented at the Conditionals Workshop, Stanford University, May 21-22.

Quirk, Randolph, Sydney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik.

1972.

A univer-

sity gramm ar of Eng lish. London: Longman.

Salone, Suk ari. 1977. Con ditionals. In H ay a gram matical structure, ed. Ernest R. Byaru-

shengo, Alessandro Du ranti, and Larry M. Hym an, 149-59. Los Angeles: D epartm ent

98




of Linguistics, University of Southern California.

Sankoff,

Gillian and Suzanne Laberge, 1973. On the acquisition of native speakers

by a language. Kivung 6: 32-43. Reprinted in Gillian Sankoff. 1980. The social life

of language. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Windfuhr, Gernod L. 1979.

Persian grammar.

The Hague: Mouton.

99



PART II

PARTICULAR STUDIES



ON THE INTER PRETA TION OF

'DONKEY' -SENTENCES

•

Tanya Reinhart

Editors' note.

Conditionals systematically affect the dependencies

that may obtain between pronouns and their antecedents when they

occur in the two different clauses of conditional sentences. Paradig-

matic of such interactions are the 'donkey'-sentences which have

preoccupied linguistic theory and philosophical accounts of reference

and quantification for

a

considerable time. Reinhart's paper presents

a syntactic and semantic account of such sentences. All indefinite

noun phrases are taken to be bound by other quantifiers and opera-

tors.

This resolves the problem of interaction and shows that the

phenomenon can be generalized to a much wider class, including

some plurals.

1.

T H E P R O B L E M

The so-called 'donke y'-sentences pose well-known problems both to the seman-

tic theory of scope and to the theory of an ap h or a:

u

1i) a. If Max owns

a donkey

, he hates

it

b. If

a vampire

checks in, Lucie invites

h im

to dinner

The pronoun in sentence (ia) can be anaphoric to

a donkey,

and the crucial

point is that this is a case of bound-variable a nap hora , rat her than of pragmatic

coreference. This can be observed if we compare such sentences with others

having adverbial clauses, e.g.:

(2) a. Wh en Max owned

a donkey,

he hated

it

b. Since a stranger came in with

a donkey,

we had to provide some

hay for it

In the sentences of (2) the pronoun refers to a specific donkey. Although

the antec eden t is indefinite, it has a fixed va lue; hence , this is a case of pragmatic

coreference. In the sentences of (1), on the other hand, there is no fixed value

for, for example,

a donkey

that the pronoun can refer to. The value of the

pronoun varies with the choice of value for

a donkey,

i.e. it behaves as a

bound variable. The semantic problem is that under a standard interpretation

of such sentences, as given in (3) for (ia), the pronoun is not in the scope

of the quantifier which app ears to bind it, so it cannot be b oun d:

(3) If (3x (x is a donk ey and Max owns x)) then (Max hates x)

103



Tanya Reinhart

(4) *If Max owns

every donkey

he hates

it

That, normally, quantified NPs in the position of a donkey in sentence (ia)

cannot bind pronouns outside the (/"-clause, is shown also by the fact that the

similar sentence in (4), with a universal quantifier, does not allow anaphora.

The prob lem at issue is restricted to indefinite antece dents , or more generally,

as we shall see later, to 'wea k' N Ps.

A p eculiar property of 'donkey'-sentenc es is that an alternative scope analysis

exists in which the pronoun is in the scope of the binding quantifier, as in

( 5 ) , f o r ( i a ) :

(5) Vx (x is a donkey and Max owns x) (Max hate s x)

'For every donkey, if Max owns it, he hates it'

In (5) the indefinite is interpreted as a universal, rather than an existential,

quantifier, and this seems to yield correctly the truth conditions of (ia), since

the sentence entails that Max hates every donkey he owns, if he owns any.

If it turns out that Max has several donkeys and he only hates one of them,

the sentence is false. (For a detailed defence of assuming such entailment see

Heim 1982.)

The same p roblem shows up also in relative clauses, as in (6):

(6) a. Every man who owns a donkey hates it

b.

Vx (x is a man and 3 y (y is a donkey and x owns y)) (x hates y)

(7) Vx, Vy (x is a man and y is a donk ey and x owns y) (x hates y)

(8) If a

man

owns

a donkey, he

hates

it

In the standard scope analysis of (6a), given in (6b), the existential quantifier

is embedded in the restrictive term of every, hence it cannot bind the pronoun.

However, here too the indefinite NP can be interpreted as a universal rather

than an existential quantifier, as in (7) (for every man x and every donkey

y, if x owns y, x hates y), with the same entailment as before. In (7) the

pronoun is bound by this quantifier, so anaphora is permitted. Note that the

analysis in (7) also captures the truth conditions of the conditional in (8).

Since this conditional contains two indefinite NPs, they are both translated

as universal quantifiers.

If the logical forms (LFs) (5) and (7) can be assumed for the sentences

under consideration, the binding of the pronoun is no longer a semantic prob-

lem. However, the crucial problem is how such LFs can be derived from the

surface structures of these sentences, as they appear to require operations

which violate all known restrictions on semantic interp retation rules. The analy-

sis for the 'donk ey'-cases should explain how the indefinite becomes universally

quantified, how it gets scope outside its clause, and what conditionals and

relative clauses have in common (which explains their similarity in the case

of 'donkey'-contexts).

104



On the interpretation of 'donkey'-sentences

As we shall see in section 3, the answer to most of these questions is no

longer a mystery, due to Heim's (1982) analysis of 'donkey'-contexts. Heim

argues that indefinite NPs contain no quantifier, hence they can be bound

by another operator, if they occur in its restrictive term at LF, as is the case

with indefinites in both relative clauses and //-clauses. The universal force of

the indefinites in the examples we examined follows, then, from the fact that

they are bound by some other universal operator in the sentence. The LF

(7) is, then, a case of pair quantification, where one universal operator binds

two variables.

However, questions arise when we consider cases where the operator avail-

able for binding the indefinite is not a universal, as in (9):

(9) a. Most wom en who have a dog talk to it

b. A lmost every wom an who has a dog talks to it

A sentence like (9a) still entails that most women talk to every dog they have.

However, the indefinite NP a dog here is not bound by a universal quantifier

at LF, and the standard interpretation of the pair quantification derived from

it does not yield the right truth condition.

The universal force of the indefinites in such contexts is, then, independent

of the operator in whose restrictive term it occurs. My question in this paper is:

what is the source of this universal force? I argue that the answer follows

from the set-interpretation of indefinite NPs, or 'weak' NPs in general. The

universal entailm ent, then , is indep enden t of the binding relations assumed by

Heim , but this means that her analysis, which is crucial for explaining the anaphora

in such cases, can be maintained. Although, as we shall see in section 2, the

problem at issue is semantic and not p ragm atic, the answer to the interpretation

problem will be based on observing the behaviour of such NPs in discourse.

2. IS T H E P R O B L E M S E M A N T I C O R P R A G M A T I C ?

In view of the difficulties in interpreting 'donkey'-anaphora, a tempting move

would be to argue that the pronouns in the 'donkey'-cases are not, in fact,

bound variables, but are interpreted by some other coreference mechanism.

An extensive critical survey of the various proposals along this line can be

found in Heim (1982). Here we will consider only Evans's (1980) analysis,

which seems the most promising.

Evans argues for the existence of E-type pron oun interpreta tion, under which

the pron oun is taken to refer to the ob ject(s) which satisfy the clause containing

a quantified NP ( QN P) . This type may be illustrated with (10):

(10) a. Lucie has many

cats

and they are so cute

b. Every guest brought three bottles to the party. By midnight, they

were (all) empty

Since the pronouns here occur outside the sentence containing their quantified

105



Tanya Reinhart

antecedent, they cannot be in the QNP's scope. (Evans provides further argu-

ments supporting this which will be mentioned in section 4.) The pronouns

are construed, then, as referential, but their reference depends on the choice

of value for the QNP in the first sentence. In (10a) the pronoun refers to

(all) the cats that Lucie owns. Although Evans does not discuss this, we may

assume that the same interpretation is available also when the indefinite is

in the scope of anothe r quantifier: in (iob ) the pron oun refers to all the b ottles

which turn ou t to satisfy the first quantified prop ositio n.

In the 'donk ey'-con texts, such as (11):

(11) Every guest who brought

three bottles

put

them

in the refrigerator

both the Q N P antece dent and the pronoun are in the scope of another quantifier

{every). The antecedent clause contains a variable bound by every. Hence,

the relevant value selected for the pronouns is the bottles satisfying x brought

three bottles and this value varies with the choice of value for x.

Evans's basic intuition concerning the interpretation of E-type pronouns is,

I believe, correct. In section 4 I argue that a way to capture this intuition

is to view his E-type p ronou ns as set-pronouns (denoting m aximal sets of their

me mb ers). This enables us to avoid certain problems with interpreting Evan s's

proposal that were pointed out by Heim (1982). The crucial question which

rema ins, howev er, is wh ether in the 'donkey '-cases the anapho ra can be viewed,

indee d, as a case of coreference, or whether the set-pronoun mu st, nevertheless,

be interpreted as bound .

Note, first, that some notion of binding is implicit in the analysis of why

the interpretation of the pronoun is different in the 'donkey'-context (11) from

its interpretation in the cross-sentential anaphora in (iob). (The pronouns here

denote different sets: if there were ten guests who brought each exactly three

bottles the pronoun in (iob) denotes thirty bottles while in (11) it denotes

three bottles.) Suppose we assume Evans intends the pronoun to denote in

such a case something like all bottles x brought. This pronoun interpretation

is still dependent on the choice of value for the quantifier which binds x. What

this means is that although the p ronou n is clearly not bound by its antece dent,

its interp retatio n, or the set it den otes, is, in some sense, boun d by the quantifier

every. Probably this is what Evans intends, but this is not a straightforward

case of unbound anaphora, and the relevant sense of binding here needs to

be explicated. Haik (1984) has observed that the relation between

every

and

the pronoun in the 'donkey'-context obeys also surface structure restrictions

typical of bound anaphora, which do not apply in the case of coreference,

and these too need to be explained if we view the phenomenon as a case

of pragmatic coreference.

Two other prop erties of 'donk ey'-type anaph ora are not explained by a prag-

ma tic E-type analysis. First, as we saw, this type is permi tted only with indefinite

NPs (or, as we shall see later, with all NPs with 'weak' determiners), and

106



Tanya Reinhart

In all the examples above the indefinite antecedent does not c-command (or

bind) the pronoun syntactically. In all of them, however, both the antecedent

and the pronoun are in the scope of the

every

quantifier, or the conditional

operator (which will be discussed in section 3). But only in (14a) and (14c)

is the antecedent in the restrictive term of this operator, and these are the

only cases which allow anaphora. (The specific, or wide-scope interpretation

of the indefinite should, of course, be ignored in judging these examples.)

The inap propriatene ss of anaph ora in the other cases of (14) cannot be redu ced

to pragmatic considerations such as linear order (i.e. the fact that the pronoun

precedes the antecedent), since on the one hand 'backward' anaphora with

an indefinite antecedent is possible in (14a) but on the other hand 'forward'

anaphora is blocked in (15). It turns out, however, that Haik's analysis allows

ana pho ra equally in all these sen tenc es, as well as in (13).

3

The analysis of the semantic binding of the pronouns in 'donkey'-contexts

must capture the two specific properties of the distribution of E-type anaphora

S-internally that we observed in this section. As we saw, assuming E-type

interpretatio n alone cannot do tha t, but in section 4 1 argue that a mo re explicit

analysis of this type of interpretation explains the apparent universal force

of the indefinite NPs in this context, which is independent of the issue of how

they are bound.

3.

H E I M ' S A N A L Y S I S O F T H E L O G I C A L F O R M O F

' D O N K E Y ' - S E N T E N C E S

As we saw, the problem at issue is restricted to indefinite N Ps which are trad itio-

nally interpreted as existential quantifiers. For this reason, scholarly attention

has recently focused on the analysis of indefinite NPs. The most promising

solution to the semantic problem stems from the observation that indefinite

NPs are not, in fact, inheren tly existential quantifiers (Heim 1982; Kam p 1984).

Heim's work is most explicitly related to surface structure, and I will therefore

follow it here, focusing only on her LF analyses. The discussion is restricted

to the logical syntax of these sentences. In the next section I examine their

interpretation and the extensions necessary for the analysis to apply in the

full range of cases.

Heim's (1982) point of departure is that the indefinite article is not a quanti-

fier, hence indefinite NPs are not quantified. Rather, they are interpreted as

open formulae containing a variable that needs to be bound by some operator

(e.g. man x) for a man). The different interpretations of indefinites follow

from the selection of the operator. It can be an available universal operator,

an adverbial operator in the sentence, an existential operator introduced by

the LF rules to bind the indefinite formula, or a 'discourse' operator. Let

us see first how this works in the case of relative clauses, since the analysis

of the conditionals is based on the sam e mechanism.

108




Heim assumes LF formation rules similar to those assumed in the governm ent

and binding framework, following May (1977), the difference being only that

unlike Quantifier-raising (QR), her rule of NP-raising adjoins to S any NP,

regardless of its interpretation (excluding pron oun s).

This operation is restricted syntactically, as assumed for QR. The next rule

applies specifically to quantifiers attaching them (out of the raised NP) to the

dominating S. Some results are illustrated, with minor changes, in (16)—(18).

(For ease of presentation I have written some variables in already at this stage.

The binding of variables is obtained in Heim's analysis by an explicit indexing

system, which I will not discuss.)

Every man who, e

}

buys a car worships it

=> I.

NP

[Every man who

}

e

{

buys a

car]

s

[e , worships it]

=̂> II . [Every man who] [a car]

2 s

[z\ buys e

2

]] [ej worships it]

every

car (x) e

y

buys e

x

(17) Every man worships some car

S

every

NP,

A

man (x)

car (y) e

x

worships e

y

109



Tanya Reinhart

(18) We saw a man entering

we saw e

x

entering

Sentences (16) and (17) contain a quantifier every). The way the raising rules

are defined, the higher S always dominates, in such cases, three constituents.

The second of these is defined as the restrictive term of the quantifier, and

the third as its nuclear scope.

When a sentence is quantified, as in (16) and (17), a further LF rule named

'existential closure' applies to such structures adjoining a quantifier 3 to the

nuclear scope of every quantifier. Applied to (17) it yields (19):

(19)

every

car (y) e

x

worships e

y

A structure like (19) yields the existential interpretation of indefinites. The

same rule applies vacuously to the nuclear scope of (16, III), but there will

be no variable it can bind there, since car x) occurs in the restrictive term.

Since the relative clause in (16) is the restrictive term of every, 3 cannot be

inserted there. Hence, the only operator that can bind the indefinite in (16,

III) is the universal operator every. This operator, thus, will bind both variables,

and the LF-representation (20) (with a universal quantification over pairs) is

obtained for the sentence. The system, thus, explicitly determines when an

indefinite is interpreted as an existential, and when it is bound by another

universal operator.

(20) Every x, y (man(x) car(y) x buys y) (x worships y)

no




In (18) no quantifier is present in the sentence, so neither existential closure

nor binding to another quantifier can apply. In this case, it is assumed that

the variable in the indefinite is bound by an abstract discourse operator. The

indefinite may be viewed, then, as a 'discourse referent' or (roughly) as a

specific indefinite.

The LF (20) derived for (16) is the one which we examined in (7) of section

1.

As we saw, this LF captures correctly the truth conditions of the sentence

and allows the prono un it) of (16) to be bound. Heim's analysis, then, provides

an explicit mechanism for deriving this LF from the surface structure of 'don-

key'-sentences.

Turning now to conditionals, the question is what binds the indefinite, as

there is no overt operator in these sentences. Heim argues that conditionals

contain an abstract sentential operator which she labels 'invisible necessity

op era tor ' and w rites as D . In its force this operat or is similar to the necessity

operator - though they are not identical, since the conditional operator

expresses a pragmatic rather than a logical necessity. It functions similarly

to adverbial operators like always, invariably, or universally, which were ana-

lysed by Lewis (1975). Such adverbials may force an apparent universal inter-

preta tion of indefinite NPs as in (21):

* i

T

. . . [ an old-fashioned critic hates an avant-garde piece[Invariably J

6 v

b. All old fashioned critics hate all avant-garde pieces

22) a. [ Som etimes 1 , j

r

i_- J • • ^ 1 J •

I Of an old-fashioned critic attacks an avant-ga rde piece

b. Some old-fashioned critics attack some avant-garde pieces

Sentence (21a) is similar in meaning to the universally quantified sentence

(21b), though they are not precisely equivalent. Different sentential adverbials

may force a different interpretation of the indefinites, as in (22a), where they

are interpreted existentially, pretty much like (22b).

Like the 'universal' sentential adverbs, the conditional operator forces a

universal interpretation of indefinite NPs. In Heim's analysis this is a sentential

ope rator w hich, like an adverbial ope rato r, has the whole sentence in its scope.

If a conditional sentence contains no adverbial oper ator, the conditional opera-

tor is realized as in (23b) (the precise LF of (23a) will be given shortly in

(26)).

However, other adverbials may fill the operator slot, as in (23d), in

which case there is no indepen dent conditional opera tor:

4

(23) a. If a man is hap py, he talks to his dog

b.

• (if a man is hap py, he talks to his dog)

A

. .

\

if a man is hap py, he talks to his dog

Almost always J

F F J 5

in



Tanya Reinhart

d. J OFTEN 1

r

. ,

u u

u ^

^

1 AL M OS T ALW AY S J 0« a man is happy, he talks to his dog).

In this analysis, then (as in Lewis's analysis), the if of the conditional has

no interpreta tion ; or, m ore generally, there is no independ ent conditional inter-

pretation. The interpretation is dependent upon the sentential operator, and

only if no othe r such ope rator is available in the sentence is the abstract conditio-

nal operator realized. The if in conditionals ha s, in this analysis, a purely syntac-

tic role: it marks the restrictive term of the operator. The //"-clause of a

conditional is always the restrictive term, regardless of its position in the sen-

tence. This distinguishes conditionals from conjunctions (e.g. Always Max

comes late and Lucie comes early), where no such requirement holds. The

assumption that the conditional operator functions like a sentential adverbial

operator, rather than originating in the //"-clause independently of other adver-

bial operat ors, is not without p roblem s.

On e major problem is that the sentential adverbial operators allow indefinites

to bind pronouns freely in the adverbial's scope as in (24b):

(24) a. * Lucie throw s some dress away after she wears i t once

b.

Always Lucie throws some dress away after she w ears it once

In the case of 'bare' conditionals, anaphora is allowed only if the antecedent

is in the //"-clause, as in (25b), but not otherwise, as in (25a):

(25) a. *Lucie kisses some guest if ze talks about H egel

b.

If some guest talks about Hegel, Lucie kisses him

I Oft I Luc ie kisses some guest if he talks about H egel

This fact seem s to follow from H eim 's analysis of the //"-clause as the re strictive

term of the conditional operator. However, the problem is that if another

sentential adverbial o pera tor is added to (25a), as in (25c), anaph ora is permit-

ted. If the conditional operator is identical in interpretation and scope to the

sentential adverbials, there is no explanation for why it cannot allow anaphora

in the same way when it is realized independently in (25a).

I believe that the conditional operator originates in the //"-clause and not

in the matrix S-position, and the general condition allowing an operator to

bind an indefinite NP is that it c-commands it at SS. In (24b) and (25c) the

operator

always)

c-commands the whole sentence, including the indefinite

N P, but in (25a) it c-commands only the //"-clause, hence it cannot bind the

antecedent outside it. This stresses the similarity between conditionals and

relative clauses: in both cases the indefinite antecedent can occur only in the

restrictive term, since it is only this part of the sentence which is c-commanded

by the ope rator at SS.

This would mean that the conditional operator is independent of the other

11 2




adverbial operators, and, in contrast to Lewis's proposal, it is realized even

if an adverbial operator is present. The problem of the interaction between

this operator and other adverbial operators should be handled by whatever

analysis handles similar interactions with universally quantified NPs, as e.g.

in Often every guest talks about Hegel, or Sometimes every woman who likes

a guest talks to him about Hegel. Heim's analysis of the scope of indefinites

in conditionals, to which we now turn, is not crucially dependent upon the

assumption. Th e conditional op erato r functions like a sentential adverbial ope r-

ator.

The LF assigned in this analysis to (26a) is (26c):

(26) a. If a m an

t

owns a donkey

2

hej hates it

2

b.

donkey (y) ej owns e

2

c. • Vx y (man(x) & don key(y ) & x owns y) (x hates y)

NP

2

and NP

2

are raised to the initial positions of the //"-clause by the standard

NP-raising operation at LF that we observed above. The //-clause is the restric-

tive term of the necessity operator; hence no quantifier can be inserted there

(the 3 in the nuclear scope of this example is vacuous, as it can bind nothing).

The only operator that can bind both indefinites is, therefore, the conditional

operator, which, as we saw, is similar in force to a universal operator. Hence

we derive here the formula in (26c), which is similar to the universal quantifica-

tion over pairs in (20). If the pronouns in the second clause are co-indexed

with a man and a donkey they are translated as the same variables, hence

they are both bound by the conditional operato r and anaph ora is perm itted.

Note that, unlike the universal quantifier, the conditional operator, or a



Tanya Reinhart

sentential operator in general, does not bind independently an NP-variable

in the sentence. It can only bind a variable in such sentences because of the

specific properties of indefinite NPs which can 'attach themselves' to available

operators. The pair quantification in (26c) is obtained because the //-clause

happ ens to contain two indefinite N Ps. If there is only one such NP the o pera tor

binds only one v ariable, as in (23a), repeated in (27):

(27) a. If a man is hap py , he talks to his dog

b . D x (man(x) & happy(x)) (x talks to x's dog)

In conclusion, we may note tha t H eim 's analysis answers the questions raised

in section 1, of how the indefinites get wide scope in 'donkey'-contexts, and

of why this is possible both in conditional and in relative clauses. (We turn

in the next section to the question of the universal entailment.) It also captures

the properties of 'donkey'-anaphora we examined in section 2. As we saw

in examples (12) and (4), such anaphora is possible only when the antecedent

is indefinite, or existential. This is captured in this analysis since only these

NPs lack an independent binding quantifier. If a universally quantified NP

appears in a relative clause or in an //"-clause, it cannot be bound by the higher

operator. Neither can it leave its clause to obtain wider scope, because of

the clausal restrictions on QR (or NP-raising). Hence its scope is only this

clause, and a pron oun outside this clause cannot be boun d by it.

The analysis also opens the way for capturing the fact we observed in

(13)—(15), that 'donkey'-type anaphora is possible only when the antecedent

is in the restrictive term of another operator. In Heim's analysis, whenever

the indefinite NP occurs in the nuclear term (i.e. outside the restrictive term),

the rule of existential closure inserts an 3 quantifier. The indefinite is, then,

boun d by this quantifier, and it cannot be b ound by the sentential or universal

ope rator. This may be illustrated with a sentence similar to (i4 d) :

(28a) *Every guest who brou ght it

x

put a

bottle

in the refrigerator

(28b)

every

N

guest (y)

who e

y

brought it

e

y

put e

x

in the refrigerator

In the LF (28b) of this sentence, 3 must be inserted, and since there is an

indefinite N {a bottle) in its scope, this NP is bound by it. A bottle, then,

114




cannot be bound by

every.

In the LF obtained, the pronoun

it

is outside the

scope of the ope rato r, hen ce it cannot be b ound by it.

5

4.

W E A K N P s A N D T H E S O U R C E O F T H E

U N I V E R S A L F O R C E

Our next question is: what is the precise interpretation of the LFs derived

by Heim 's analysis? In the case of the L F (20) derived for (16) which is repeate d

in (29), not much more seems to be needed concerning the interpretation of

the formula. Under any interpretation it appears to capture correctly the truth

conditions of the sentence. The question arises, however, if we consider other

strong quantifiers as bind ers, as in (30).

(29) a. Every man who buys a car

2

worships it

2

b.

Every x, y (man(x) & car(y) & x buys y) (x worships y)

(30) a. Alm ost every man who buys a car

2

worships it

2

b. Alm ost every x, y (man(x) & car(y) & x buys y) (x worships y)

c. Alm ost every (x, y) (man(x) & car(y) & x buys y) (x worships y)

d. Alm ost every x, Vy (man(x ) & car(y) & x buys y) (x worships y)

The LF that would be derived for (30a), if we apply Heim's analysis, is (30b),

and the question is what does it mean? A pair interpretation, as in (30c),

does not give the right truth conditions here , as has been pointed out in, among

others, Kempson (1984). If there are ten car-buying men, one of which bought

fifty cars and worshipped all of them, the others of which bought one car

each and neglected to worship it, (30c) is true, since most man-car pairs

enter the worship relation; but the original sentence (30a) is false under

these conditions. What the sentence means, in fact, is that most car-buying

men w orship all the cars they boug ht, i.e. the truth conditions of the sentence

are captured correctly by an LF like (3od) which contains a universal opera-

tor. ((30d) is the 'absorption' structure of Higginbotham and May 1984.)

Roughly, a formula of the form almost every x, Vy,

{cp,

\p) is interpreted

as almost every x, s.t. 3y 0 :]V y s.t. 3 x

cp

:\p].) This is, indeed, the analysis

Heim intended for these cases. The puzzle here, however, is what is the

source of the apparent universal force of the indefinite in this case, since

no standard proce dure can derive (3od) from (30b).

More generally, it seems that indefinite NPs in the restrictive term of

another quantifier always have a universal force, regardless of the semantics

of the quantifier which binds them. A sentence with the form

Qx who owns

a donkey

x

hates it

x

always entails x hates all the donkeys x owns, even if

Q itself is not a universal quantifier (replace, e.g., Q with more than

half,

many or two). It is crucial, therefore, to explain this entailment, especially

if we want to maintain that the indefinite a donkey) here is boun d by the

Q at issue.

Before addressing this question, we should look at another interpretation



Tanya Reinhart

problem which will eventually provide the clues for the answer. So far we

have considered, following Heim, only singular indefinites as antecedents in

'donkey'-anaphora. In fact, the relevant distinction determining which NPs

can serve as antecedents in 'donkey'-type anaphora is that between weak and

strong NPs. This term will be used here to refer to NPs with weak or strong

determiners in the sense of Barwise and Cooper (i981) or cardinal versus non-

cardinal determiners as defined by Keenan (forthcoming).

6

All weak NPs can

bind pronoun s outside of their ap parent scope, when they occur in the restrictive

term of another quantifier. Some examples are given in (31):

30

a. Every

vampire who

invited

two

several

less than five

many

between ten and thirteen

guests for dinner

was through with

them by m idnight

as many guests as you can

imagine

b. If a vampire invites more than fifty guests for dinner, they have a

chance to survive

Clearly, in such examples the interpretation of the plural pronoun them varies

with the choice of a vampire (each vampire might have invited a different

set of guests to which the pronoun refers). Hence, it has the properties of

bound anaphora. As we saw in (4) and (12), strong NPs cannot enter this

type of anaphora relation.

Heim's analysis must be extended, then, to hold for all weak NPs - which

means that all weak NPs lack an inherent quantifier and, hence, can be bound

by another operator in the sentence (or by an 3 operator). This, in fact, is

a plausible extension, since an emerging agreement in studies of weak NPs

is that the determiner in such cases is not a quantifier but a cardinality marker

for the set defined by the NP. (Such an analysis was proposed originally by

Bartsch 1973 and, informally, in Milsark 1974; it was recently developed inde-

pendently by, for example, Higginbotham 1984; Scha 1984; Cormack and

Kempson 1984; Keenan forthcoming; Lobner 1984.) The question, however,

is how such NPs can be boun d by ano ther o perato r in the sentence .

Once the full range of antecedents is considered, it becomes clear that the

quantifier in the derived LFs for 'donkey'-sentences cannot bind an individual

variable, as we have so far assumed. Since the NP bound by the universal

or the conditional ope rato r in exam ple (31) is inter prete d as a set, the quantifier

index corresponding to this NP in the LF must be a set-variable. The same

would be true in the case of a singular weak N P, as in (29), the only difference

being that the cardinality of the set is (at least) 1. Consequently, the pronouns

with the same index also refer to sets (or to each of their m em bers).

With this, then, we can turn to the question of what explains the apparent

116




universal force of weak NPs in 'donkey'-contexts. (The same universal force

shows up with plural weak NPs, e.g. Most men who have more than two dogs

hate them entails that most of these men hate all the dogs they have.) The

answer requires a closer look at the sets defined by weak N Ps.

A stan dard set analysis for weak NPs assumes that the weak NP itself deno tes

a set (which is a subset of the set defined by the noun interpretation). This

is consistent with Heim's analysis where the open formula corresponds to the

NP. So the NP in a sentence like (32a) can be analysed as in (32b):

(32) a. At least two vam pires app eared

b.

X C {z

I

vampire (z)} and

|

X

|

^ 2

(X is a subset of a set of individuals z with the vampire property, and the

cardinality of X (i.e. the number of its members) is equal to or greater than

2.) The set X may be viewed as bound by something like Heim's discourse

3-operator, or stored at the discourse storage, which enables subsequent dis-

course to refer back to it. However, a closer look at the behaviour of weak

NPs in discourse reveals that something more must be going on.

As we saw in section 2, anaphora with weak NPs is possible also across

sentences, where the p ronoun cannot possibly be bound , as in (33):

(33) a. Two vampires appeared and Lucie chased them away

b. Lucie has at

least

fifteen dogs, and Felix takes care of them

Given the analysis of weak NPs as sets with cardinality, we may say that the

pronoun in such sentences refers to a set established in the previous sentence

(as a discourse referent). It is clear, however, that in (33a) it does not refer

to just any set of (at least) two vampires but, as observed by Evans (1980),

to all the vampires argued to have appeared in the first sentence. Similarly,

in (33b) Felix takes care of all of Lucie's dogs. As pointed out by Evans,

the conjunction in example (33b) does not mean something like There exist

at least) fifteen dogs that Lucie owns and Felix takes care of, since the latter

can be true if there are certain dogs which Lucie owns but which Felix does

not take care of, while (33b) will be false under these conditions, since it

entails that Felix takes care of all of Lucie's dogs.

We see then that the apparent universal force of weak NPs in contexts of

anapho ra is not a peculiar property of 'donk ey'-type cases where the antecedent

is bound by another operator, but it is a general characteristic of these sorts

of NPs and it must follow from their semantic analysis. To capture this, the

sets defined by the weak NPs must be determined by their whole clause; for

example, for (32a) it is the set in (34) which is stored for future discourse

reference, and not just the set in (32b):

(34) X = {z I vam pire(z) and z appeared} and | X | ^ 2

(X is the maximal set of individuals z with the vampire property who appeared

117



Tanya Reinhart

and its cardinality is equal to or grea ter than 2.) Since X is defined as a maximal

set, i.e. it contains all the vampires which appeared, if a pronoun refers back

to this set, as in (33 a), it refers to all its m em ber s, i.e. to all the objects satisfying

the previous clause.

I assume, then, that weak NPs are always interpreted as a set defined by

the whole clause. In case the clause contains another quantified NP, as in

Every neighbour has a dog, the set defined for the weak NP contains a variable

bound by that quantifier: {z | dog(z) and x has z}. For this reason a pronoun

can refer to this set only if it is in the scope of the operator which binds the

variable in it. In othe r words, such sets are not available for discourse anaphora

as,

for example in *

Every neighbour

has

a dog and I feed it.

This analysis captures Evans's description of E-type pronouns as pronouns

referring to all objects satisfying the antecedent's clause. However, it is not

the pronouns which have this property: the pronouns here are standard set-

pronouns, i.e. pronouns referring to sets, and there are many other instances

of such pronouns, for example in all cases of plurals. As such, their interpre-

tation is determined by the interpretation of the antecedent, and if the antece-

dent is weak its inte rpre tatio n is the set defined by the clause. This inte rpreta tion

of weak NPs is, then, the source of the universal entailments in cases of ana-

phora with weak NPs, and the indefinite NP itself need not be universally

quantified.

The w eak N Ps in 'donk ey'-sentences are analysed in precisely the same way:

(35) a. If Lucie has (any) child ren, Lucie spoils them

b. X = {z children (z) and Lucie has z} and | X | ^ z

c. • X (X = {z children (z) and Lucie has z} and | X | ^ z) (Lucie spoils

X )

d. *If Lucie has

children

she spoils them, but I can't stand

them

e. * Every man who owns a donkey left, and Felix had to take care

of i t

The clause containing the NP children in (35a) is the //"-clause {Lucie has chil-

dren), hence this NP is interpreted as the maximal set determined by this

clause, as in (35b). How ever, th e difference between a 'don key'-sen tence , such

as (35a), and the case of discourse anaphora we examined in (33), is that

this weak NP is bound, as we saw, by the conditional operator. In Heim's

analysis, its index is copied into the conditional operator. Since the NP is

interpreted as in (35b), this index is a set-index, and the pronoun with the

same index is also a set-pro noun ; he nce th e full analysis of (35a) is (35c).

The fact that the weak NP in 'donkey'-contexts is bound explains why it

cannot serve as an antecedent for discourse anaphora, as witnessed by (35d),

a fact observed by Haik (1984). More generally, discourse anaphora with sets

is possible only when the antecedent is not locally bound in the previous sen-

tence, though it may be bound by a discourse 3 operator - for example, it

118




is impossible also in (35e). This stresses further the po int we observed in section

2, that a pragmatic E-type analysis alone is not sufficient to handle 'donkey'-

contexts.

7

We can return now to the interpretatio n of the LFs derived by Heim 's analysis

for sentences like (30a), repeated in (36a):

(36) a. (Almost) every man who buys a car

2

worhsips it

2

b.

(Almost) every x,y (man(x) and a car(y) and x buys y) (x worships

y -

c. (a car(y) and x buys y) => (Y = {z | car(z) and x buys z} and | Y | ^ 1)

d. (almost) every (x,Y) (man(x) and Y = {z

|

car(z) and x buys (z)} and

YI ^ 1) (x worships Y)

(37) a. Most vam pires who invited more than thr ee guests

2

for dinner were

through w ith them

2

by midnight

b. most (x,Y) (vampires(x) and Y = {z | guest(z) and x invited z for din-

ner} and I Y I > 3) (x was through with Y by midn ight)

Sentence (36b) is just the indexed LF derived for (36a) by Heim's LF rules.

What the indices on the quantifier mean is determined by the interpretation

of the arguments they bind. First, the clause containing a car is interpreted

as in (36c) (that this is a clause at LF can be checked in its derivation-tree

(16) above). Y, then, is a set-variable and all other occurrences of y in the

formula are replaced with the same set-variable, including the pronoun (we

return shortly to what this means for the pronoun). The final analysis is, then,

given in (36d) (for almost every pair consisting of a man x and the set of

cars he buys Y, it is true that the man x worships the cars in the set Y).

Example (37) illustrates the same with plural NPs. This analysis handles the

problems with quantifiers like almost every that we observed in the discussion

of (30): Y denotes the (maximal) set of cars bought by x, and the quantifier

selects almost every pair of an individual x and a set Y (defined on x). If,

as in our previous story, a given individual bought fifty cars, (x,Y) in this

case still denotes only one pair consisting of one man and a set of fifty cars.

The universal entailment that we observed there (that almost every man wor-

ships all the cars he buys) follows, then, from the set interpretation of the

weakNP.

8

A further note is needed concerning the interpretation of the pronouns.

The analysis assigns them set-variables, but it is obvious that each man in

example (36d) worships individual cars and not a set of cars. This, however,

is a general issue of interpreting set relations, and I will assume the general

distributive convention (38) for all cases wh ere an argum ent is a set-variable:

(38) V(Y ) =

df

(Vz£Y)(iMz))

When the pronoun is plural, the decision whether this convention applies

depends on the predicate, i.e. it does not apply when the predicate forces

a collective inter pre tati on : (36d) is then to be replaced by (39):

119



Tanya Reinhart

Keenan, Edward. Forthcoming. A (formal) semantic definition of indefinites. In Th e

representation of indefiniteness, ed. Eric Reuland and Alice ter Meulen. Cambridge,

Mass.: MIT Press.

Kempson, Ruth. 1984. Weak crossover, logical form and pragmatics. Paper delivered

at GLOW, Copenhagen, April .

Lew is, Dav id. 1975. Ad verb s of quantification. In

F ormal semantics of natural language,

ed. Edward Keenan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lobner, Sebastian. 1984. Indefinites, counting, and the background/foreground distinc-

tion. Paper pre sented at the Fifth Groningen Roun d Table , Jun e.

May, R obe rt. 1977. The gram mar of quantification. Ph .D . dissertation, MIT . D istributed

by Indiana Linguistics Club, Bloomington, Ind.

Milsark, Gary. 1974. Existential sentences in English. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT.

Reinhart, Tanya. 1983. Anaphora and semantic interpretation. London: Croom Helm;

and (1985) Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Reinhart, Tanya. Forthcoming. A surface structure analysis of the donkey-problem.

In The representation of indefiniteness, ed. Eric Reuland and Alice ter Meulen. Cam-

bridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Scha, Remko. 1984. Distributive, collective and cumulative quantification. In Truth,

interpretation and information, ed. Jeroen Groenendijk, Theo Janssen and Martin

Stokhof.

GR AS S 2. Do rdrech t: Foris Publications.

Stechow, Arnim von. 1980. Modification of noun phrases, a challenge for compositional

semantics. Theoretical Linguistics 7: 57-109.

1 2 2



G E N E R I C I N F O R M A T I O N ,

CONDITIONAL CONTEXTS AND

CONSTRAINTS

•

Alice ter Meulen

Editors' note.

The semantics of generic statements in conditional

contexts is addressed, and a model-theoretic analysis is developed

in the framework of Situation Semantics. Context-dependent inter-

pretation, including tense and plural anaphora, is discussed for

generic and episodic information. The paper is related to Barwise's

by the formal framework, and to Reinhart's by addressing anaphora.

It analyses Reilly's protogenerics and formulates some specific condi-

tions

for the interchangeability of conditionals and temporal adverbs.

1.


This pape r is concerned with the sem antic interpretation of generic expressions

in conditionals and with their interaction with temporal adverbs and tense,

assuming Situation Semantics as a general framework for a model-theoretic

semantics of natural language.

1

As a theory of meaning and interpretation

which attributes to th e context of an utterance an important role in its interpre-

tatio n, this recently developed semantic theory will provide new and fruitful

concepts for analysing the use of generics in natural language and their role

in structuring meaning as a relation between expressions and situations in the

external world.

2

The issues concerning generics are presented as informally

as possible at first, to clarify the underlying intuitions. Reilly's notion of 'pro to-

generic' (this volume) is discussed as a form of contextually restricted generic

expression and the general question is addressed of the conditions under which

when

and

whenever

are interchangeable with the conditional

if-then

without

distortion of meaning. Conditionals and generics are shown to share an impor-

tant semantic property: persistence of expressed information, or insensitivity

to putative counterexamples.

Generic interpretations of sentences result in the most common cases from

the interaction between the tense and aspect and the interpretation of the

subject noun phrase (NP). Hence the generic interpretation of an expression

is not determined, at any lexical level, in isolation from its context. In section

2 I discuss, at first informally, which NPs may occur in a given VP-context

when the sentence itself is interpreted as expressing information about a kind

of entity but when the V P is neu tral to the ontolog ical level of the inte rpreta tion

of the subject, be it kinds, sets of individuals, or stages of an individual (see

123



Alice ter Meulen

Carlson 1979, 1982). The consequences of the variation of tense are studied

subsequ ently in a context with a fixed subject N P.

A model theoretic analysis of generically interpreted sentences is proposed

in section 3, introducing some of the central concepts of Situation Semantics.

Generic information is shown to be persistent, even in 'recalcitrant' situations,

which dem ons trates some of the usefulness of this semantics of natural language

over the more traditional 'possible world' semantics.

In section 4 the interaction of generic information with conditional contexts

and various sentential temporal adverbs is discussed, and it is argued that the

interchangeability of such adverbs with conditionals is quite restricted. Argu-

ments are presented against the view, advocated by Reilly and many others,

that the degree of subjective certainty a speaker may have concerning the

truth of the antecedent of a conditional is a relevant condition for this inter-

changeability. Supposing that the world is one way or another is not the same

thing as knowing or believing something about the world as it is, although

the relation of cond itionals and attitud es rem ains an interesting area for linguis-

tic and philosophical research: unfortunately this lies outside the scope of the

present paper.

A brief discussion of conditional generics, i.e. generic interpreta tions of con-

sequents of conditionals, concludes the p aper.

2. W A Y S O F E X P R E S S I N G G E N E R I C I N F O R M A T I O N

NPs in generically interpreted sentences

3

may be of four different kinds. Three

are exhibited in the following senten ces within a neutral VP -contex t.

4

(1) Do nkeys are stubborn

(2) A donkey is stubborn

(3) The donk ey is stubb orn

The bare plural NP donkeys, the indefinite NP a donkey and the definite NP

the donkey convey generic information when the pred icate allows of a kind-level

interpretation, denoting a property of kinds. Obviously these three sentences

admit an interpretation which attributes a property to, respectively, a set of

donkeys (possibly determined by context), any arbitrarily selected donkey to

which no prior reference has been made, or to a donkey introduced at an

earlier stage of the interpretation of preceding discourse. The point here is

merely that sentences (i)-(3) may be used to express information about a

kind of anim al, rather tha n ab out any of the mem bers of that kind. Such generic

information is not directly descriptive of what happens to be the case in the

situation in which it is used, or in any particular situation. If we assume that

a sentence is interpreted by the set of situations in which it is true, not only

may situations in which donkeys are manifesting stubborn behaviour be

included in the interpretation of (i) -( 3 ), but also situations that do not contain

124



Alice

ter Meulen

If examples ( i) -( 4 ) are inte rpre ted by different sets of situation s, they should

all be compatible with situations containing donkeys, individuals realizing the

kind, which are behaving stubbornly. T he episodic or 'ephem eral' (Davidson's

word) sentences like:

(5) The re are (some) stubborn donkeys

(6) Chiqu ita, Ped ro's donk ey, is being stubborn again

describe such situations directly. But situations without do nkeys are com patible

with generic information stated in these senten ces. In fact, even when a particu-

lar donkey in a situation hap pen s to beha ve w ell, which I will call a 'reca lcitran t'

situation, this remains compatible with the generic information. In general,

generic interpretation does not preclude such recalcitrant situations, which

render episodic information about individuals true. But recognizing a situation

as a recalcitrant one presupposes adherence to the correlation expressed with

generics, realizing that the current situation does not fit the general pattern.

This is one reason why generic information cannot be expressed by universally

quantified expressions about individuals, which convey episodic information

about m emb ers of a kind. For instance:

(7) Every donkey is stubborn

either describes directly a contextually-determined set of donkeys which are

all behaving stubbornly in a situation, which is the case when the universal

quantifier is restricted to a contextually fixed domain, or, when there is no

such restriction, it describes all situations, actual or otherwise, that contain

donkeys, attributing stubbornness to them. But (7) is falsified by a situation

in which a donkey does not behave stubbornly, i.e. by any situation which

would be a recalcitrant o ne in the case of generic informa tion. Ge neric informa-

tion, contrary to a universal statement such as (7), is persistent in such recalci-

trant s ituation s. Wh at it me ans for information to be persistent will be exp lained

set-theoretically in the next section, when Situation Semantics is introduced

and con straints can be defined p recisely.

The sentences (i)-(4) with the generic interpretations are all in the simple

prese nt te nse . Ind eed , this tense form is often indicative of habits or dispositions

of the denotation of the subject NP, expressing these as a state of affairs,

a stative situation in which no change occurs. Such generic interpretations

of present tense statements are not directly descriptive of a present or actual

situation, or of the discourse situation, but describe something in a 'timeless'

way, true of no specific past, present or future moment. Of course, this does

not mean that generic information cannot be restricted in applying only to

particular space-time locations, or in special contexts, as I will discuss later.

The progressive tense, indicative of changing situations and evolving time,

is seldom used to express generic information. Only with explicit grading

6



Alice ter Meulen

future or past types of situations. Sentences (12) and (13), however, express

episodic information about individual donkeys. Bare plurals referring to kinds

are used in tensed and o ther intens ional contex ts for expressing generic informa-

tion, as kinds are not constituents of particular situations but, rather, abstract

objects in types of situations. Kinds serve in the first place to classify particular

situations as being of a certain type. This is best illustrated by the fact that

sentences (12) and (13) with indefinite determiners, in contrast to (10) and

(11),

allow a paraphrase with a tensed existential context without distorting

their meaning:

(14) Th ere was a stubborn donkey

(15) Th ere will be some donk eys which are stubb orn when they have been

beaten

It should be noticed further that (12) and (13) and their paraphrases (14) and

(15) with non-universal, indefinite determiners are symmetrical; in this they

contrast with the generic interpretations, which are always anti-symmetrical

- as was shown abo ve.

Although the following sentences are perfectly acceptable:

(16) Th ere will be donk eys which are stubb orn when they are beate n

(17) The re were donkeys which were stubborn

and (10) and (11) entail them respectively, there is a subtle, but important

loss of meaning, which is best brought out by an explicit comparative in their

conte xt. T he ge neric information in (11), for instan ce, modified with an explicit

comparative to:

(11') Do nkeys were more stubborn than they are these days

implies that donkeys are nowadays less stubborn than donkeys in the past.

It admits of an interpretation of the anaphor they as an entirely disjoint set

of donkeys with respect to the set of donkeys interpreting its antecedent. None

of the donkeys of that past time when they were stubborn may still be in

existence. Sentence (17), on the contrary, when modified in a similar way

to:

(17') Th ere were donkeys which were more stubborn than they are (?) these

days

does not necessarily compare donkeys of the past to our present donkeys,

if it is at all acceptable. Here the comparison can only be carried out with

respect to each individual donkey for its past and current degree of stubborn-

ness. The anaphor they in (17) is interpreted as dependent upon the interpre-

tation of the bare plural donkeys in such a way that the degree of stubbornness

depends on the choice of donkey. For a comparison of kinds across situations

128



Generic information, conditional contexts and constraints

the generic bare plural is req uire d, w hereas in an existential context the p redica-

tively occurring bare plural NP, just like the other quantifiers which are accep-

table in such contexts, is interpreted existentially and is dependent on the

temporal location determ ined by the tense.

Th e same point is sup por ted by the following sen tences :

(18) Do nke ys are less stubb orn than they were

(19) Th ere are donk eys which are less stubb orn than they were

Only (18) compares at the kind-level, across types of situations. Sentence (19)

compares only the stubbornness of some presently existing donkeys with their

past behaviour in this respect. The plural pronoun they in (19) depends on

the set of donk eys interpre ting its ante ced ent. In (18) the ana pho r is interpre ted

in a way which mu st take into accoun t tha t the set of donke ys in a past situation

which serves as reference set for the comparison may be completely disjoint

from the set of donkeys in the present situation, so it cannot simply pick up

its reference from the set interpreting the antecedent. Pending a formal and

more explicit and descriptively adequate theory of plural anaphora, the main

points that this is intended to demonstrate are that existential contexts never

convey generic information and tha t tense in a generically interprete d sentence

has no deictic force and does not serve to locate the interpretation of the

subject NP in tim e.

3. K I N D - T Y P E S , C O N S T R A I N T S A N D C O N D I T I O N A L S

After this informal exploration of the various ways in which natural language

expresses generic information, the central notions need to be given precise

content in a model-theoretic framework. For this purpose I adopt the Situation

Semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983), which is developed with particular

emphasis on context-dependent interpretation, and which employs partial func-

tions and intensional properties as constituents of situations to present a new

account of intensional contexts, scope and informational dependencies in

natural language. A brief exposition of the theory is in order here (see also

Barwise in this vo lum e).

Situations, s

o

,Sj..., are sets of triples of the form:

(l,(R

n

,

Xl

,...x

n

),pot>

where / is a location in space-time, R

n

an n-place relation, Xj . . . x

n

individuals

(together called a constituent sequence) and pol is a polarity, either yes or

no, affirming or denying that the relation holds between the mentioned indivi-

duals.

Locations, relations, individuals and polarities are the primitives of the

theory. Situation-types, S

}

, S

2

, .. . , are situations which contain indeterminates

/, R , x for location, relation or individual, which are abstract objects that serve

as place holders for the real objects. An anchor is a (possibly partial) function

129



Alice ter Meulen

assigning real objects to the indeterminates in a situation-type. This provides

the means to classify a real situation as being of a certain type. It is defined

as:

s

0

is of type S

o

iff for some an ch o r/, S

0

\f] is pa rt of

s

0

where the 'part of notion between situations is just the inclusion relation

between their constituent-sequences, i.e.:

Sj

is part ofs

0

iff all constituent-sequences of Sj are constituent-sequences

of

s

0

(preserving polarity, of course)

Situations are organized into structures, which determine a numbe r of impor-

tant relations between them, according to the following definition. A structure

of situations consists of a collection of situations, S, and a non-emp ty subcollec-

tion S

o

satisfying the following conditions:

(i) Eve ry situation in S

o

is coherent (i. e. no polarity conflicts, and ev erythin g

is identica l to itself)

(ii) If s

e S

o

and

s

0

C

s

then

s

o

e S

(parts of actual situations a re factual)

(iii) For any subset X C S the re is an s in S

o

such that every s

n

e X is part

of

5

(every factual situation is part of an actual s ituation)

(iv) S respects all cons traints in S, which are relations betw een situation-

types in S

The situations in S

o

are actual situations, and the situations in S are factual.

This structure defines compatible sets of situations, and constraints determine

further structure on these sets, giving rise to meaningful relations between

situations in the struc ture . This general n otion of a constraint will be illustrated

further below.

Persistence of information is analysed as a binary relation on collections

of situation s, respectively the collection of 'meaningful op tion s' for a particular

factual or actual situation and the collection of situations which are not 'pre-

cluded' by that situation. These notions are given the following definitions.

Let

s

0

be of type

S

o

and s

7

be of type

Sj,

then

Sj

is a

meaningful option

for

s

0

iff. for every anchor / for all indeterminates in

S

o

,

if

S

0

[f]

is part of

s

0

,

then

Sj\f]

is part of s

7

, given the constraint

C

which correlates

S

o

and

Sj

in

the structure of situations. The collection

P

of all meaningful options for

s

0

given C captures the information which is persistent relative to another collec-

tion of situations, namely the ones that are not precluded by s

0

, again given

C. The precluded situations may be thought of as situations inaccessible from

s

0

, in the structure of situations. It would require a revision in the structure

or in its constraints to make such situations accessible to s

0

. The definition

capture s this formally. A situation

s

0

precludes a situation Sj if they are inco mp at-

ible,

which is a primitive notion in Situation Semantics, or if no anchor/such

130




that S

0

[f] is part of s

0

can be extended to an anchor/ such that Sj\f] is pa rt

of Sj. Let X stand for the collection of situations not precluded by s

0

, then

the intersection PC\X= \[s

o

]\

c

which is persistent in X, as for any s

2

, s

2

eX

if Sj is part of s

2

and s

2

e \[s

o

]\

c

then s

2

e \[s

o

]\

c

. Persistence in this sense is

a kind of stability un de r extensions of the a vailable information.

Using this notion of persistence of information to give precise content to

the claim, informally argued for above, that generic information is persistent

in recalcitrant situa tions, we need first an app rop riate characterization of kinds.

Let S

o

be the situation-type:

S

o

= at /:

donkey, a;

yes

where /is a location ind eterm inate, and a indicates an individual indeterminate

and let S j be the situation-type:

Sj = I: stubborn, a; yes

which each cap ture similarities across situations at the individual-level. To raise

these situation-types to the kind-level required for generic interpretations, Sit-

uation Semantics provides the general means to construct complex indetermi-

nates or 'roles' from any situation-type. Let x be an individual indeterminate

an d S

n

be a situation-type which contains x, then (jr, S

n

) is a complex indeterm i-

nate ,

called a role. Having such a complex abstract object, a new definition

of a kind-type can be formulated along the lines of object-types (Barwise and

Perry 1983: 75). Just as situation-types classify situations, kind-types classify

kinds which themselves classify situations. A kind-type is a situation-type K((x,

S

n

)) with exactly one complex indeterminate. This makes the definition of

members of a kind which realize the kind-type quite straightforward. A kind-

type

K((x, S

n

))

is

realized

by an individual

a

if the situation S

n

[a] is factual,

and if a realizes K((x, S

n

)) the n a is a member of the kind K.

6

This definition constructs kinds as complex object-types and provides a very

general m etho d to abstract from similarities across situations consisting of indi-

viduals to the k inds the individuals are m em bers of, giving a purely set-theore tic

analysis of the relation of 'realization' between a kind and its members.

Obviously, as the situation-types may be arbitrarily complex, this allows a

bewildering variety of possible kinds. This should not worry the semanticist,

whose task it is to clarify the n atur e of the objects interp reting natura l languag e

and their relations and dependencies, working within a programme to provide

a theory of reasoning and inference that explains how information is obtained,

preserved or lost in manipulations.

Returning to the first example of a generic sentence (1), its interpretation

can now be represented as follows. Let S

o

and 5

7

be the two situation-types

as defined above. K

0

((x, S

o

)) represents the generic interpretation of the bare

plural NP donkeys, and Kj((x, S

}

)) the abstract property of being stubborn,

i.e. the generic or state-of-affairs interp retatio n of the VP

are stubborn.

The



Alice ter Meulen

sentence as a whole expresses a relation between these two kind-types

K

o

an d

* , :

C =

at l

u

:

involve, K

o

, Kj\

yes

where l

u

is taken to be the universal location, which, if we had not required

that every situation or situation-type contain a location, could be dropped,

making

C

an unlocated constraint (this is actually allowed in recent modifica-

tions of the theory). The primitive relation involve should not be taken to

be descriptive in any sense. It merely states the correlation between the two

kind-types, as abstract objects satisfying its argument places. Note that there

is no requirement in C that K

o

and Kj be realized simultaneously. C does

not express any correlation at the episodic level, but only an abstract co rrelation

between abstract objects. Constraints determine which situations in a given

structure of situations are m eaningful optio ns, given a particular situation

s

0

.

Take s

0

to be the situation in which Jackie, a dog, encounters Chiquita,

a donkey, on a narrow mountain trail. If Jackie is attuned to C, i.e. if she

has learned the connection between K

o

and K

}

as a meaningful relation which

is useful in determining one's actions, and if Jackie rightly assesses

s

0

to be

of type S0, and realizes the applicability of C in this situation, then there are

several possibilities she may choose from. First, guided by C, Jackie may return

on her path, not even testing out whether Chiquita who realizes

K

o

will ac tually

realize K

}

as well (situation s

2

). Or Jackie may start barking to see whether

Chiquita will realize K

}

or not (situation s

3

). If, h ow ever, a recalcitrant situation

arises, and Chiquita is not stubbornly standing on the path but moves away,

then Jackie may pursue her way (situation

s

4

).

Now

s

2

and

s

3

are clearly mean-

ingful options for Jackie in s

0

, given C. Even thou gh Jack ie draws two different

conclusions from the situation s

0

and her attunement to C, the two courses

of action are equally employing the meaningful relation stated by C. Other

constraints, but also moods or irrational preferences, may determine which

course of action is to be followed, given such a choice. On the other hand,

when s

4

arises Jackie rem ains attun ed to C; the generic information she adh eres

to is in no sense invalidated by this particular episode of complaisant donkey

behaviour. In s

4

Chiquita realizes K

o

but not /C

7

, so it cannot be a meaningful

option for s

0

. But s

4

is not p recluded by s

0

either; the information that Chiquita

is a donkey and that she is not stubborn is compatible at an episodic level.

So in this case

s

0

is part of

s

4

, s

0

e

U ^ ] ]

c

trivially, and by persistence of [[s^Hc

in the collection of situations not preclu ded by C, s

4

e \[s

o

]\

c

.

A general characterization of the important notion of a recalcitrant situation

relative to a cons traint is now straightforward . Let

C

be of the form:

C =

a t l

u

:

involve, S, S

f

; yes

then a situation

s

is recalcitrant with respect to

C

when for some anchor /

S[f] is part of s but for no extension f o f / S'\f] is par t of s. When S an d

132



Alice ter Meulen

Such conditionals may, however, have two quite different interpretations.

Either (21) is interpreted episodically as expressing that all donkeys which

behave stubbornly (once, twice, often or constantly) are beaten by Pedro.

Or, when the antecedent is interpreted generically, Pedro beats donkeys no

ma tter whe ther each donk ey actually behaves stubbornly or not. G eneric infor-

mation in the antecedent of a conditional may serve to set special conditions

on the types of situations which may interpret the consequence. The difference

between the two interpretations of (21) may be clarified by considering their

interaction with universal episodic sentences and temporal adverbs.

Information equivalent to the first interpretation of (21) is expressed by

the universal senten ce:

(22) Every donkey that behaves stubbornly is beaten by Pedro

which, due to its present tense, still leaves open how often each donkey mani-

fests stubborn behaviour and, furthermore, does not require that the stubborn

behaviour occur as often or in any temporal relation to Pedro's beatings. The

use of a temporal adverb as in (23), instead of the conditional in (20), does

seem to require that the manifestations of stubborn behaviour and the beatings

are in some way tempo rally related.

(23) Wh en a donkey is stubb orn, Pedro beats it

This would equally be required with a universal temporal adverb such as when-

ever, independently of the tense in the sentence. This shows that conditionals

with indefinite NPs in subject position may be paraphrased with temporal

adverbs, which only add the requirement of temporal relations to the situations

described by the antecedents and consequents.

The secon d, generic interpretation of (21) cannot be paraphrased by a univer-

sal senten ce like (22), nor by temp oral adverbs w hich universally quantify over

situations at an episodic level. In accordance with the observations made in

section 2 about existential contexts, (20) and (22) and the nongeneric interpre-

tation of (21) convey the same information as the conditional existential in

( 2 4 )

I f t h e r J

i s

1 [

d

°

k e y

l being stubborn, Pedro beats [

\

are donkeys

t n e m

Th e generic inte rpre tation of (21) is not redu cible to such a conditional existen-

tial expression, since the antecedent expresses a correlation between kind-

types, which is itself a condition w hich must be m et by the structu re of situations

before the situation-type interpreting the consequent can be determ ined. Hen ce

the cond itional in (21) states a correlatio n b etwe en a constraint C, as formalized

in the previous section, and a situation-type 5

7

of the form:

Sj = at/: bea t,p,x; yes

134



Alice ter Meulen

is here not of the type described by the constraint, or it cannot provide an

anchor for the situation-types in the constraint. Such information cannot be

expressed by temporal adverbials, since they always locate the situations in

time and impose a particular mapping between situations or dependencies

between anchors for situation-types. Neither can conditional existential sen-

tences convey such generic information, as they force predicative interpre-

tations of bare N Ps.

From these observations and theoretical considerations the following conclu-

sions can be dra wn :

1.

/ / i n a condit ional: if S then S

f

is interchangeable under preservation

of its meaning with a temporal adverb when/whenever used as a senten-

tial connective, if the head NP in S is an indefinite NP, independently

of the tense in S or S'.

2. Un iversal NPs with a restrictive relative clause that S express the same

information as ifS' then S , w here S' is S excep t for having an indefinite

head N P, instead of the universal NP in S, living on the same h ead-n oun

interpretation, and S contains an anaphor dep ende nt on it.

3. Con ditional existential sentence s convey only conditional episodic infor-

mation.

4. Gen eric interpretations of antecedents in conditionals are never reduc-

ible to sentences connected by temporal adverbials when or whenever.

Obviously, the interchangeability of conditionals and temporal adverbs used

as sentential connectives is entirely independent of the degree of subjective

certainty a speaker may have concerning the truth of the antecede nt, or co ncern-

ing the question whether the situation described by the antecedent actually

occurs or will occur later. To discredit the surprisingly common idea that there

is such a conne ction b etwe en c ertainty and cond itionals, the following exam ples

may suffice:

8

(28) If two and two are four, Pe dro beats a stubb orn donk ey

(29) When Chiquita is stubb orn, Pedro beats her

In (28) a relatively uninformative sentence puts a liberal constraint on the

situation-type described by the consequent. Such a sentence may be used to

say that Pedro always beats stubborn donkeys, as the supposition in the antece-

dent is supposedly an 'eternal' truth of arithmetic, which most, if not all, struc-

tures of situations will respect. Sentence (29), on the other hand, might be

considered true even though Chiquita never in her life behaves stubbornly.

Contrary to Reilly's claim (this volume) that the interchangeability of conditio-

nals and temporal adverbs increases with the degree of certainty a speaker

has concerning the antecedent, (28) and (29) demonstrate that even the most

certain of things may be supposed in the antecedent of a conditional, whereas

situations which may never arise - and the speaker may well be aware of

136




that - can be described in sentences connected with temporal adverbs. How-

ever, it may very well be the case that the order of acquisition of conditionals

and temporal sentential adverbs is partly determined by the child's subjective

certainty concerning the antecedent or first sentence. If this is the case, an

explanation must be offered as to why and how eventually a child comes to

recognize the irrelevance of this subjective factor in adult sp eech.

Reilly introdu ces the interesting n otion of a 'proto gen eric', which is a general

stateme nt abo ut familiar ob jects in distinctive contexts. The following sentences

are given as exam ples of such pro toge nerics :

(30) W hen rain com es, we put an um brella on top of us

(31) We go to bed when it's dark

(32) When men have beards they look so handsome

(33) You eat medicine when yo u're sick

First, it should be noted that the an teced ents and con sequen ts in these sen tences

all state some more or less causal or reason-giving connection, requiring some

temporal connection between the situations so described, further supported

by the use of temp oral adve rbs. A lso, all examples are in the present indicative

tense, most commonly interpreted as habituals. Sentences (30) and (31) are

clearly about a contextually determined set of individuals, the interpretation

of the indexical

we

in the discourse situation. The correlation expressed is

thus restricted to a particular contextual setting, which could be formalized

by an additional restriction on an cho rs. If the correlation C between the antece-

dent and c onseq uent of (30) is of the form:

C = at /; involve, Sj, S

2

, yes

the situation-types Sj and S

2

must be anchored within the contextual setting,

anchoring we to the speakers in the discourse situation. Given the temporal

relation suggested by the content of the antecedents and consequents in (30)

and (31), it is hard to give them a genuinely generic interpretation in which

the temporal connection is not playing an important role. Instead, the correla-

tion expressed seems to be of a universal nature: i.e. all rain-occasions are

situations in which we put an umbrella up; or all darkness-situations make

us go to bed. If this interpretation is correct, these sentences do not allow

for recalcitrant situations, like the generic information in constraints. Proto-

generics are in this respect lacking the force of generics, which correlate kind-

types and serve an important function in determining meaningful options and

are preserved in recalcitrant situations. If we wear a raincoat and do not need

an umbrella, or when we stay up late are situations which seem precluded

by the temporal adverbs in (30) and (31), just as conditionals with indefinites

would preclude them .

In this context I would like to discuss briefly how the 'unless' conditions,

which indicate what situations are precluded by a given correlation between

137



Alice ter Meulen

situation-types, serve the function of constraining counterexamples to the

universal sentences and conditionals, and how they are related to constraints

which preclude situations. In more logical literature, and more recently in

artificial intelligence research, it has frequently been pointed out that antece-

dents cannot be strengthen ed by arbitrary sentences while preserving the corre-

lation between antecedent and consequent. Stalnaker (1975), among others,

has developed a conditional logic in which addition of antecedents does not

generally preserve validity (see also Barwise in this volume). The phenomenon

is called 'non mo noto nic reaso ning' and the much cherished example is:

(34) If I pu t sugar in my coffee, it will taste nice

Hence:

(35) If I pu t sugar and diesel oil in my coffee, it will taste nice

The antecede nt in the first conditional de termines on the one hand what situa-

tion-types may serve to interpret the consequent, by restricting the class of

possible ones to th e ones which are com patible with the antece dent situation-

type in polarities and anchors. Putting sugar in my coffee to make it taste

nice precludes a host of situatio ns, not only adding diesel oil, but also situations

in which I am allergic to sweetening, or in which the coffee is cold and bitter.

Setting an antecedent for a conditional is introducing a new situation, and

indicating what background assumptions should be maintained in using that

antecedent in reasoning towards a new conclusion or in determining what situa-

tion-types may be correlated to its interpretation. Background assumptions

most often play the role of precluding situations, and precluding other con-

straints or correlations between situation-types, or of determining a hierarchy

of constraints which apply in a certain o rder to the c urrent situation.

Universal sentences do not admit of any exceptions, as I have argued above.

But a conditional sentence d etermines a universal correlation between the situa-

tions conforming to its antecedent and its consequent. A counterexample to

a conditional can only be acc epted as such if it conforms not only to the situation-

type of the antecedent but also to all the other assumptions and background

constraints. Gen eric information, as a correlation b etween kind-types, tolerates

putative counterexamples, since it does not require a universal correlation

betw een rea lizations of each kind -type. It is adh ered to even when its kind-types

are not realized, or when some of their realizations do not provide instances

of the correlation. In defending a conditional against a counterexample, one

seeks to understand the situation described by the counterexample, to find

reasons for precluding it as not conforming to the background assumptions.

A constraint, however, does not need to be defended against recalcitrant situa-

tions,

as it is persistent. To modify one's constraints requires much more than

a simple counterexample which conforms to the antecedent and all of its back-

ground assumptions. It requires a change in the entire structure of situations

138




in which one op era tes , and I dou bt tha t constraints may be modified in isolation,

as they form a closely knit network of meaningful relations which we impose

on the situation in which we find ourselves. Co ntrary to the diesel oil exam ple,

we are all too often n ot aw are of what situations are pre cluded by the constraints

we go by. Perhaps the best strategy to convince someone to employ another

constraint, or to modify his constraints, is to show that there are significant

situations included in one's new constraint that are precluded by his and, fur-

thermore, that the new constraint makes more sense or fits better with other

constraints which are already shown to work well.

Conditional statements are in general monotone in compatible situations

which preserve background and anchors. Sentence (21), for instance, may be

strengthened to:

(36) If donk eys are stubb orn and slow, Ped ro beats them

Also spatio-temporal restrictions may determine contextual settings for condi-

tionals and for generic information that m ust be preserv ed in additional antece-

dents or new information. Witness:

(37) If donk eys are stubb orn in Spain, Pe dro beats them

which does not entail (21); nor doe s:

(38) If Spanish donk eys are stub bo rn, Ped ro beats them

This indicates that the information contained in the generic interpretation of

an antecedent is not in general preserved, i.e. is not persistent under arbitrary

supersets of the interpretation of the VP or subject NP.

9

To return to Reilly's examples of protogenerics, sentences (32) and (33)

are importantly different from (30) and (31). Sentence (32) contains a bare

plural NP as head, and (33) is based on the indexical

you,

but used in the

sense of one, any arbitrary person. The correlation between men and the beards

they grow, stated in (32), may be interpreted as generic information with a

restrictive condition, to which I will return in the next section on conditional

generics.

5. C O N D I T I O N A L G E N E R I C S

In this section generic interpretations of consequents in conditionals are dis-

cussed, and a brief outline is presented of how nongeneric antecedents may

serve to restrict such generic information in consequents, information which

often is supported by anaphoric depende ncies. The correlation between antece-

dent and consequent in conditional generics is importantly different from the

constraints which generic antecedents may impose on the situation-types inter-

preting the consequent, as was discussed in the previous section. Again the

139



Alice ter Meulen

question of interchangeability of conditionals and temporal adverbs is con-

sidered , and it turns out tha t in conditional gene rics with only generically inter-

preted consequents the interchange is more liberal, due to their nongeneric

antecedents.

Th e following exam ple is ado pted from Carlson (1979 ), with a slight variation.

(39) Do nkey s are stub bo rn, if they have green eyes

This is a conditional generic, in which the antecedent presents a condition

for the generic interpretation of the consequent. In this example, the conse-

que nt, which, as it contains the head NP , must precede the anteceden t contain-

ing the dependent anaphor, conveys generic information. In line with the

analysis of generics propo sed earlie r, (39) is of the form:

(39 ' )

C, if S

o

where C is a constraint, correlating kind-types based on donkey and stubborn

as properties in situation-types, and S

o

is here a situation-typ e:

S

o

at /: green eyes, x; yes

have,y, x;

yes

where

y

is an individual indeterminate to be anchored by extending the anchors

of individuals which realize the kind-type K

o

, i.e. donkeys. S

o

provides an

additional restriction on individuals which realize the kind-types correlated

in the con straint. This is why C in (39) is a conditional cons traint.

In Carlson (1979) it is argued that sentences like (39) with bare plural NPs

as heads are interpreted as equivalent to:

(40) Do nke ys that have green eyes are stubbo rn

where the restriction expressed in the antecedent is put into the relative clause

restricting the head NP. Carlson also argues that (39) cannot be equivalent

to a universal sentence or to an indefinite NP in a conditional existential c ontex t,

as these would impose too strong interpretations on generics, which would

not admit of recalcitrant situations. In the analysis in Situation Semantics it

is easy to build this restriction directly into the kind-type, as follows:

K

2

((x, S

2

))

where S

2

is a situation-type

S

2

= at /: donkey, x; yes

green eyes, y; yes

have, x,y; yes

with the constraint C, which repre sents the generic information in (40) as

a correlation between kind-types K

2

and K

h

as defined abo ve. This is a general

method to construct kind-types out of any complex situation-type. lfs

0

contains

a particular green-eyed donkey which realizes both K

2

and Kj, there are mean-

ingful options to s

0

in which it behaves stubb ornly; but also, situations in which

140




the donkey does not behave stubbornly are meaningful options to s

0

, since

C

would persist in such recalcitrant situation s.

In Farkas and Sugioka (1983) an interesting argument is put forward against

Carlson's analysis, which also bears on the analysis outlined here, constructing

kind-types from any complex situation-typ e. They show that, though th e restric-

tive relative clause analysis seems to have an initial plausibility for simple sen-

tences like (39), it cannot easily generalize to conjoined sentences with

dependent anaphors:

(41) Donkeys are stubborn, if/when they have green eyes and they are stupid

if/when they have brown eyes

(42)

*Donkeys

that have green eyes are stubborn, and

they

are stupid,

if/when they have brown eyes

When the restriction is in the antecedent of a conditional sentence, or in its

temporal

when-dause,

a conjoined sentence S' with an anaphor depen dent

on the plural head NP in S is acceptable. But when the restriction is contained

within a restrictive relative clause belonging to the head NP in S, no such

coreferential dependency is possible if S' contains an incompatible restriction

(assuming that donkeys cannot have both green and brown eyes).

Farkas and Sugioka use this argument to support a translational semantic

analysis of gen erics, with an adverbial generally quantifying over cases or instan -

tiations of unbound variables of open formulae, containing the restriction in

the antecedent of a nonmaterial conditional. Although I cannot subscribe to

their analysis, as it makes episodic information bear on the truth of generic

statements and I favour a direct semantic interpretation in set-theoretic models,

their argument shows convincingly that anaphoric dependencies on kind-types

should be indep end ent of restrictions on the individuals realizing the kind-type

for the interp retation of (41). Of c ours e, the una cceptability of (42) is accounted

for by the general requirement that in order to be interpretable conjoined

expressions must contain compatible information. Note that the intended ana-

phoric dependency on the NP with the restrictive relative clause would be

perfectly acceptable if the restriction in S' were compatible with S, as in:

(43) and

they

get worse, if/when you beat them

For the interpretation of (41) a method is needed for constructing entities

by addition of simpler ones, which allows the joining of the kind-type and

the situation-type of the restricting condition as independent constituents in

a complex entity. A ddition is defined in Barwise and Perry (1983) for situation-

types by their union of constituents. It is noticed (p. 91) that even though

a situation s may be of type S and of type S , s is not necessarily of type

S + S' as the anchors of the two situation-types may conflict on some value

assigned to the common indeterminates. Since kind-types have been defined

as special situation-types, the addition of a kind-type and a situation-type is

141



Alice ter Meulen

simply their union of consti tuents: K + S. This can be a first argument in a

constraint C, which represen ts the generic information abou t green-eyed

don-

keys and their s tubbo rnness w ithout having to appeal to complex kind-types.

C = at /: involve, K

0

((x, S

o

)) + S

2

, Kj((x, S

7

» ; yes

where S

o

= at /: donkey, JC; yes

S

7

= at /: stubborn, JC;

yes

5

2

=

at /: donkey, JC;

yes

green eyes, y; yes

have, JC y;yes

Similarly, the second conjunct of (41) expresses generic information restricted

by

an

additional condition:

C = at /: involve K

0

((x, S

o

)) + S

3

, K

4

((x, S

4

));

yes

where S

o

is as defined abov e and

5

3

= at /: donkey, JC;

yes

brown

eyes,y\

yes

have,x,y\ yes

5

4

= at /:

stupid,

JC;

yes

(The co-indexing of the kind-type and the situation-type on which it is based

is only a mnemonic aid, which has no further seman tic significance.) Sente nce

(41)

is now

interpre ted

by a

conjunction

of C and C, and

expresses generic

information, persistent in recalcitrant situations;

i.e.,

green-eyed d onkey s that

are never s tubborn , or smart brown-eyed donkeys, cannot be counterexamples

to (41).

Al though the difficult issues co nc ern ing the interpretation of the anaphora

remain outside the scope of the present p aper , the fact that C and C have

K

o

as a consti tuent in com mon may serve as a first ste p tow ard s a more satisfac-

tory account

of the

interaction

of the

conditionals

and

plural ana pho ra

for

which Kamp (1984) provides the essential analytic tools (cf. Reinhar t in this

volume) .

In a cond itional g eneric statem ent the generic NP is usually par t of the conse-

quent , as in (39). Wh en it is conta ined in the antecedent the whole expression

is interpreted more easily as a generic conditional, expressing a constraint on

complex kind-types

as

in:

(44) If donk eys have green eyes, they are stubb orn

The condition expressed in the antecedent of (44) can be represented by a

complex kind-type (green-eyed donkeys) which serves as an antecedent for

the anaphor in the con seque nt. This preferred gen eric interpretatio n of (44)

is even str ong er in the counterfactual:

(45) If don keys had g reen ey es, they would be s tubborn

4




which, according to my intuitions, does not admit of a nongeneric interpretation

of the antecedent, restricting the first argument in the constraint correlating

donkeys and stubbornness by a situation-type.

In conditional generics temporal adverbs can replace if in the antecedent

without loss of meaning, as the antecedent expresses a universal condition

('all the ones that have green eyes'), which is episodic. This use of when in

a restrictive condition on generics is often called the atemporal use (Carlson

1979). Especially when used with stative VPs it does not locate the situation-

types in space-time. In the case the restrictive clause with the temporal adverb

expresses episodic informa tion, the co nseq uen t, if it is to be interprete d generi-

cally, must contain a verb denoting gradual change:

(46) ^ , I b e c o m e 1 ,, f when 1 ,

A

Don keys * stubbo rn, *.. they get older

Sentence (46) expresses a generic correlation, a constraint, between the degree

of stubbornness and age. One could argue, however, that when here is not

so much atemporal as om nitemp oral. The cond itional

if is

clearly unacc eptable

in such contexts of gradua l cha nge.

The episodic antecedent of conditional generics hardly admits of existential

parap hrase, as it prohibits the necessary anapho ric dependency. Sentence (39)

is equivalent to the questiona ble:

(39 ) Do nke ys are stub bo rn, if they are (the) ones with green eyes

Returning once more to Reilly's example (32) of a protogeneric:

When men

have beards, they look so handsome, it is, on a generic reading, a conditional

generic analysed as:

C

at /: involve, K

0

((x, S

o

)) + S

2

, * , « * , S , » ; yes

where

S

o

=

at /:

man, x;

yes

S

1

; = at /: man,x; yes

beard, y; yes

have, x,y; yes

S

2

= at /:

look handsome, x;

yes

So bearded men that do not look handsome are not precluded by C, but hand-

some looks are said to be meaningful option s for any given beard ed ma n.


I have argued tha t the re are various ways in natu ral language to express generic

information. Ge nerics serve primarily to form the basis of expla nation s, expec-

tations of what the present situation may evolve into, and to determine the

meaningful options for a given situation. Generic information can be repre-

sented set-theoretically as constraints on situation-types and kind-types. The

initially guiding idea that generic information serves to classify parts of the

143



Generic information, condit ional contexts and constraints

employed as a model, properties are extensionally interpreted to be sets of individuals

or functions from possible worlds to these. The individuals in Situation Semantics

are just the individuals of type e of PTQ; atomic entities and the polarities yes /no

are identical to the truth values assigned to propositions of type

t.

Roles are doing

the job of lambda-abstracts of PTQ, and anchoring roles amounts to lambda-conver-

sion. The co nstruction of kind-types might be com parable to type-lowering in Chierchia

(1984),

since it treats the complex indeterminate based on an 'individual-level' situa-

tion-typ e as if it were an ind ividual-level entity itself. S ituation Seman tics allows entities

of any complexity as constituents of situations, which is inheren t to its type-free model

theory. I argue in another paper that the fundamental distinction between properties

and individuals that Situation Semantics adheres to is not necessary if one constructs

individuals from properties, resulting in an even more type-free model theory. The

complex issues concerning self-application and the avoidance of paradoxes cannot

be addressed in this pape r; but see C hierchia (1984) for detailed analysis.

7 The analysis of (1) assumes that sentences are interpreted as relations between the

subject NP interpretation and the VP interpretation, rather than taking the latter

to be the argument to the functor interpreting the former. I have in mind that the

INF L node establishes this relation configurationally.

8 See Reilly (this volume) and also Stockwell, Schachter and Partee (1973) in support

of this mistaken idea.

9 These facts about generics can be rendered as:

(i) D A B a n d A C A ' J ^ D A ' B

(ii) D AB and B C B ' £> D A B '

which tell those familiar with Generalized Quantifiers that the context-dependency

of generics sets them apart from proper names or definite NPs as being neither (i)

persistent, nor (ii) monotone-increasing. See van Benthem and ter Meulen (1985)

for recent research in Generalized Quantifier Theory.

REFERENCES

Barwise, Jon and John Perry. 1983. Situations and attitudes. Cambridge, M ass.: Bradford

Books, MIT Press.

Benthem, Johan van and Alice ter Meulen (eds.) 1985. Generalized quantifiers in natural

language.

GR AS S 4, Dordre cht: F oris Publications.

Carlson, Gregory. 1979. Generics and atemporal

when. Linguistics and Philosophy

3:

49-98.

Carlson, Gregory. 1982. Generic terms and generic sentences.

Journal of Philosophical

Logic 11:

145-81.

Chierchia, G en na ro. 1984. Topics in the syntax and sem antics of infinitives and ge runds.

Ph .D.

dissertation, University of Massachusetts.

Farkas, Donka and Y. Sugioka. 1983. Restrictive

if/when

clauses.

Linguistics and Philo-

sophy 6:

225-58.

Ka m p, Hans . 1984. A sema ntic theory of truth and interp retatio n. In

Truth, interpretation

and information

, ed. Jeroen Groenendijk, Theo Janssen and Martin

Stokhof.

GRASS

2,

Dord recht: Foris Publications.

Stalnaker, Robert C. 1975. Indicative conditionals. Philosophia 5: 269-86.

Stockwell, Ro bert, Paul Schachter and Barbara Parte e. 1973. The

major

syntactic

categor-

ies of English.

New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Linguistics and Philosophy.

March 1985. Special issue on Situation Semantics.

145



DATA SEMANTICS AND

THE PRAGMATICS OF

I N D I C A T I V E C O N D I T I O N A L S

•

Frank Veltman

Editors' note.

This chapter proposes a clear criterion for a demarca-

tion between the semantics and pragmatics of indicative conditionals,

based on a dynamic logic known as data semantics and a relative

notion of truth (for which it is criticized by

Adams).

Gricean maxims

are given a central explanatory role in accounting for conditionals.

As a model for information processing, data semantics shows similari-

ties to Situation Semantics (see the chapters by Barwise and ter Meu-

len).

Discussion of the interaction between modals and conditionals

is also to be found in Greenberg's contribution.

1.


Some arguments are logically valid but pragmatically incorrect.

1

Others are

pragmatically correct but logically invalid. Grice's

Logic and conversation

(1975) taught us to draw these distinctions, but unfortunately most of us draw

them differently. What one calls a logically valid argument form with a few

pragmatically incorrect instances is for another a logically invalid argument

form with many pragmatically correct instances. For example, if you believe

that indicative conditionals behave like material or strict implications, you will

be ready to point out that the intuitively absurd argum ent.

2

(1) If Jones wins the election, Smith will retire to private life

If Smith dies before the e lection , Jon es will win it

.'. If Smith dies before the election, he will retire to private life

is just a pragmatically incorrect instance of the logically valid Hypothetical

Syllogism:

(2) If

B

then C

If A then B

.- . I f AthenC

If, on the other hand, your favourite semantic theory attributes the logical

properties of variably strict implications to indicative conditionals, in which

147



Frank

Veltman

case you will find the Hy poth etical Syllogism logically invalid, you will ma intain

that the intuitively sound argum ent:

(3) If Jon es wins the elect ion, Smith will have to leave the W hite House

If Smith goes on antagonizing his sup porters , Jones will win the election

.'. If Smith goes on antagonizing his supporters, he will have to leave

the White House

is at best a pragm atically correct instance of this inference pa tte rn.

3

The literature on conditionals is full of examples like (1), put forward by

one author as a clear-cut counterexample to a putative logical principle, only

to be explained away by another author as an innocent pragmatic exception

to an otherwise faultless semantic rule. The strategy described in connection

with (3) is less frequently followed. Still, every now and then some author

feels called upon to explain why a given inference pattern, in most cases a

classical logical principle which 'as recent investigations show' is 'nevertheless'

logically invalid, has for so long kep t out of ha rm 's way. Usually, the ex plana tion

offered involves a partial rehabilitation of the inference pattern concerned:

although not logically valid, most of its instances turn out pragmatically sound.

The issue is not just verbal. In most cases the 'pragmatic' arguments put

forward by the one party are quite different in character from the 'semantic'

arguments put forward by the other. That does not mean, however, that both

parties put forward the same kind of pragmatic arguments, much less that

they need have the same conception of semantics. Actually, the pragmatic

differences are the least pronounced: most people working on conditionals

agree that pragmatic theories begin where semantic theories end and that they

should take the form of a theory of conversation a la Grice. But then - and

this is typical for the field of conditionals - there is no consensus at all as

to what form a semantic theory should tak e: that of a theory of truth ?

According to the majority of logicians, who take the classical standard of

logical validity as the starting point of their investigations, yes. (Roughly: an

argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for all its premises to be true

while its conclusion

is

false.) No, answer the relevance logicians:

4

truth preserva-

tion may be a necessary condition for the logical validity of an argument,

but it is by no means sufficient (the premises of the argument must in addition

be relevant to the conclusion). No, answer Adams et al.

5

, believing as they

do that the proper explanation of validity is to be given in terms of probability

rather than truth. (Roughly: an argument is valid if and only if it is impossible

for all its premises to be probable while its conclusion is improbable.) And

no, I shall answer in this paper. The proper explication of logical validity is

this: an argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for all its premises

to be true on the basis of the available evidence while its conclusion is not

148



Data semantics and the pragmatics of indicative conditionals

true on that basis. Co nseq uen tly, a semantic theory should supply an explication

of what it means for a statem ent to be true on the

basis

of the

available

evidence.

In this paper I will sketch such a semantic theory. The above remarks should

have made clear, however, that there is little sense in discussing a semantic

theory - if, at least, it presents a semantics for conditionals - without paying

any attention to its ramifications for pragmatics. Therefore a good deal of

this paper is devoted to pragmatic questions: if indicative conditionals do have

the semantic properties ascribed to them here , what will their pragmatic prop er-

ties be? Which logically invalid arguments will become pragmatically correct

and which logically valid arguments will on pragmatic grounds become absurd?

The answer to this question can be much less arbitrary than the literature

suggests. Indeed, semantics and pragmatics can be so attuned that the dividing

line between logical validity and pragmatic correctness is drawn exactly as

a criterion of cancellability prescribes.

2.

I N F O R M A T I O N M O D E L S

What does it mean for an English sentence, in particular an English conditional

sentence, to be true on the basis of the available evidence? Following usual

logical practice, I shall not try to answer this question directly but introduce

a logical language L, the sentences of which will serve as formal 'translations'

of English sentences. L is given by:

(i) a vocabulary consisting of countably many atomic senten ces, two paren-

theses, three one-place operators

~~|,

must, and may and three two-place

operators A

,

v, and

—>

(ii) the formation rules that one would expect for a language with such

a vocabulary

As usual the opera tors

~~|,

v and

A

are meant as formal counterparts of English

negatio n, disjunction and conjunction respectively. If A and B are formal trans-

lations of the English sentences A' and B', then (A-»B) is meant to be a

formal translation of the indicative conditional with antecedent A' and conse-

quent B'. The operator may represents the English expression 'it may be the

case that', in its epistemic sense, and the operator must the expression 'it must

be the case that', also in its epistemic sense. It will appear that the semantic

and pragmatic properties of indicative conditionals are closely tied up with

the properties of these expressions.

In presenting the semantics for L, I shall again follow usual practice and

first specify the admissible models for L.

Definition i. An information model (for L) is a triple (S , ^ , V) with the

following properties:

i

S ± < >

149



Frank Veltman

(ii) ^ is a partia l orderin g of

S;

each maximal chain in

(S ,

^ ) contains a

maximal element

(iii) V is a function with domain S; (a) for each seS, V

s

is a partial function

assigning at most one of the values i or o to the atomic sentences of L;

(b) if s ^ s ' , V

s

c V

s

>; (c) if sis a maxim al element of (S , ^ ) , V

s

is total

The basic entities of an information model,

6

the elements of S, are called

(possible) information states:

the speakers of the language

L

- one speaker

at different times, or different speakers at the same time - can have different

information about reality.

For our purposes, all there is to know about any information state is covered

by the relation ^ and the function V. V tells for each atomic sentence A and

each information state s whether A is true on the basis of the evidence available

at s, in which case V

S

(A) = i, or whether A is false on that basis, in which case

V

S

(A) = o, or w hether the evidence available at s does not allow any definite

conclusion about the truth value of A, in which case V

S

(A) is undefined. The

relation ^ determines the position of each information state among the others.

In this connection it is particularly important to know, given the evidence at

a certain information state, what the outcome of any further investigations might

be.

W henever s ̂ s', we say that it

is possible

for s to grow into s'. So understood,

it will be clear why ^ is taken to be a partial order.

The requirement that K

s

c ^ if s ^ s ' constrains the semantic properties

of atomic sentences considerably: once an atomic sentence A has turned out

to be true (or false) on the basis of the evidence, it will remain true (or false)

whatever additional data may come to light. As we shall see in the next section,

not every sentence of L is stable in this sense. Notice that it may very well

be that s < s ' while V

s

= V

s

>: accumulation of evidence need not necessarily

mean that more atomic sentences get a definite truth value. (Suppose it is

possible for s to grow into an information state where both the atomic sentence

A and the atomic sentence B are true. It may very well be that this possibility

is excluded once s has grown into s\ That does not mean, however, that it

must be clear at s' which of the a tomic sentences A and B is false.)

If s is a maximal e lement of (S, ^ ) s is called a complete information state.

The choice of terminology will do here as an explanation for the requirement

that at maximal elements s the function V

s

must assign a definite truth value

to every atomic sentence. The requirement that each maximal chain in (S,

^) must contain a maximal element implies that every incomplete state can

grow into a complete information state

7

- in principle that is, not necessarily

in practice.

One of the maximal elements of (S , ^) is rather special. At that point,

say s

0

, the information is not only complete, but also correct: the evidence

available at s

0

is derived from the actual world. Since the speakers of the

language

L

cannot but get their data from the actual world, they will always

be in an information state that can grow into s

0

.

8

However, as long as their

150




data are incomplete, they do not exactly know what the actual world is like.

That is where the information states that cannot grow into s

0

come in: a speaker

may at

a

given point have to reckon w ith the possibility that further investigations

will bring him in such an inform ation state even if this does not in fact hap pen .

Notice that the information models (5, ^ , V) are so defined that it may

very well occur that for a given atomic sentence A and an information state

s the following holds:

(i) f o r n o s ' ^ s , V

S

.(A) = o

(ii) V

S

(A ) is undefined

From (i) it follows that

V

S

> A)

= i for every com plete s' ^ s . So it may very

well occur that a certain atomic sentence A is not true on the basis of the

evidence available at s, while on the other hand it is impossible for s to grow

into an information state at which A will turn o ut false. Indeed , s will inevitably

grow into an information state at which A is tru e.

One may wonder whether we should allow this. Wouldn't it be plausible

to call A true on the basis of the evidence available at s? Shouldn't we demand

that V

S

(A) = i if for no s' ^ s, V

S

.(A) = o?

I do not think so. I think it would blur an important distinction - that between

direct and indirect evidence - if one were to maintain that it is solely on the

basis of the evidence available at s that the sentence A is true. Someone in

the information state

s

is not directly aqua inted with the sta te of affairs described

by A. His data at best constitute indirect evidence for the truth of A: A must

be true, all right, but it may take quite some time before this is definitely

shown.

3. S E M A N T I C S T A B I L I T Y A N D I N S T A B I L I T Y

Let M

(S , ^ , V) be an information model, s an information state in S and

A a sentence of L. In the sequel 'Mlh

5

A' abbreviates 'A is true (in M) on

the basis of the evidence available at s', and 'M

S

HI A' abbreviates 'A is false

(in M ) on the basis of the evidence available at s.'

Definition 2. Let M = {S, ^ , V) be a model and s an information state.

If A is atom ic, then

Aflh

5

AiffV

s

(A) = i

M

s

-UAiffV

s

(A) = o

M lh

s

nAif fM

s

H IA

A f

s

HnAif fMI | -

s

A

M\\-

S

may A iff for some information state s' ^ s,

M\\-

s

>

A

Mf\\ may A iff for no information state s' ^ s, M||-

s

< A

M\\-

S

must A iff for no information state s' ^ s, M

S

HIA

M fWmust A iff for some information state s' ^ s, M

S

HIA



Frank

Veltman

M l h

s

A A B i f f M | h

s

A a n d M l h

5

£

M

s

HI AABif f M

s

HI Aor M

s

H IB

M l h

s

A v B i f f M l h

s

A o r M l h

s

B

M

s

H I A v B i f f M

s

H I A a n d M _ | | B

M lh

s

A—>B

iff for no informa tion state s' ^ s , M\\-

s

> A and M

S

HIB

M

s

-\ \ A—>B iff for some information state s' ^ s , M\\-

s

> A andM

s

H IB

In discussing this definition I shall often refer to the following information

states:

Information state i. You are prese nted with two little box es, box i and box

2. The boxes are closed but you know that togeth er they contain three ma rbles,

a blue one, a yellow one and a red one, and that each box contains at least

one of them.

Information state 2. As 1, except that in addition you know that the blue

marble is in box 1. (Wh ere the oth er two m arbles are remains a secret.)

3.1 May

Suppose you are in information state 1. Somebody says: 'The blue marble

may be in box 2.' Would you agree? Suppose you are in information state

2. Som ebody says: 'The blue marble may be in box 2 .' Would you still agree?

According to definition 2, your answer to the first question should be 'Yes',

and to the second question 'No'. Definition 2 says that a sentence of the form

may A is true on the basis of the evidence available at a given information

state s as long as it is possible for s to grow into an inform ation state s' wher e,

on the basis of the then available evidence, A is true ; and that such a sentence

is false on the basis of the evidence available at s if and only if this possibility

is exclud ed. In information state 1 you must still reckon with the possibility

that the blue marble will turn out to be in box 2. Therefore the sentence

The blue marble may be in box 2 is true on the basis of the evidence available

there. In information state 2 you do not have to reckon with this possibility

anymore. Once you know that the blue marble is in box 1, it is wrong to

maintain that it may nevertheless be in box 2. At most, you can say that it

might have been in box 2.

Unlike atomic sentences, the truth of sentences of the form may A need

not be stable. They will often be true on the basis of limited evidence only

to become false as soon as new evidence becomes available. Once their falsity

has been established, however, it has been established for good. In terms of

the following definition: sentences of the form may A, though in general not

T-stable, are at least F-stable.

Definition

3 . Let A be a sentence.

152




A is T-stable iff for every model M

(S , ^ , V) and information state

s € S, if M lh

s

A then M lh

S

' A for every information state s' ^ s

A is

F-stable

iff for every model

M = (S,

^ ,

V)

and information state

s € S, if M

S

HIA then M

S

HIA for every information state s' ^ s

A is stable iff A is both T-stable and F-stable

The theory of m ay developed here differs w idely from those developed within

the framework of possible world semantics. It renders the sentence:

(4) The blue marble is in box

1

and it may not be there

contradictory, just like:

(5) The blue marble is in box 1 and it isn't

According to all other theories (4) is a pragmatic absurdity rather than a logical

contradiction: (4) can be perfectly true although nobody can ever sincerely

assert it.

Is there any evidence in favour of this claim, that sentences like (4) are

pragmatically rather than logically absurd? I am afraid not. The only empirical

support which it could conceivably get should consist in an informal example

which shows that the apparent inconsistency of sentences of the form

A/\may~~\A

can sometimes be cancelled. I am pretty sure, however, that

no such example will ever be found. Anyone asserting a sentence like (4)

fails to fulfil the conversational maxim of quality, as for example Groenendijk

and Stokhof (1975) are ready to explain. (Roughly: by asserting the right-hand

conjunct The blue marble may not be in box /, the speaker indicates that

the sentence

The blue marble is not in box 1

is consistent with everything

he believes. But according to the maxim of quality he is not allowed to assert

the left-hand conjunct if he does not believe that the blue marble is in box

1.) So if there is any example showing that the apparent inconsistency of these

sentences can really be cancelled, it must be one in which the speaker indicates

(either explicitly or implicitly, but at least in a way clear enough to the hearer)

that he is stating something he does not himself believe, but that he is doing

so for some good reason, i.e. one which can be reconciled with the overall

Cooperative Principle. I am afraid that no hearer will ever be found who is

able to detect what good reason that might be.

That it is impossible to breach the maxim of quality and yet observe the

overall Cooperative Principle has been noticed before.

9

For example, Gazdar

(1979: 46) notices that an implicature arising from the maxim of quality 'differs

from those arising from the other maxims because it cannot be intelligibly

cancelled'. Yet the only conclusion which is usually drawn is that the maxim

of quality has a privileged position among the other maxims. Everybody seems

to accept, if reluctantly, that the criterion of cancellability offers at best a

sufficient condition for calling something pragmatic instead of logical.

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Frank

Veltman

The one argument I have to offer in favour of the position that sentences

of the form A A m ay

~~|A

are logically rath er than pragm atically absu rd is highly

theoretical. Consider the following (re)formulation of the maxim of quality:

Do not assert a sentence A unless A is true on the basis of the evidence at

your disposal. Notice that every sentence which owes its pragmatic absurdity

simply and solely to the fact that it can never be asserted without violating

this maxim is also absurd for semantic reasons - for dflta-semantic reasons

at least. Hence the question of cancellability need not arise. By doing data

semantics instead of the usual truth-conditional semantics, we have, so to speak,

annexed part of what was always called pragmatics. As a consequence, the

border between logical and pragmatic-but-not-logical inconsistency and that

between logical and pragmatic-but-not-logical validity has been redrawn.

Actually, it seems that now cancellability can serve as a condition which an

argum ent must satisfy in ord er to b e classified as pragmatically bu t not logically

valid.

3.2 Must

I already hinted at the truth condition for the operator must near the end

of section 2. According to definition 2, a sentence of the form must A is true

on the basis of the available evidence if and only if no additional evidence

could make A false. Hence, if one keeps on gathering more information, A

will inevitably, sooner or later, turn out true. As long as A could yet turn

out false, must A is false.

It is worth noting that in many cases this analysis renders a sentence of

the form must A weaker than A

itself.

If an atomic sentence A is true on

the basis of the available evidence, then must A is true on that basis as well.

But must A can be true on the basis of the evidence without A being true

on that basis. In the latter case the data constitute at best indirect evidence

for A, in the first case direct evid ence.

That must A is weaker than A on many occasions has been noticed by a

number of authors. Karttunen (1972: 12) illustrates this with the following

examples:

(6) John must have left

(7) John has left

His informal explanation fits in neatly with my formal analysis:

Intuitively, (6) makes a weaker claim than (7). In general, one would use (6), the

epistemic must, only in circumstances where it is not yet an established fact that John

has left. In (6), the speaker indicates that he has no first hand evidence about John's

departure, and neither has it been reported to him by trustworthy sources. Instead

(6) seems to say that the truth of John has left in some way logically follows from

other facts the speaker knows and some reasonable assumptions that he is willing to

154




entertain. A man who has actually seen John leave or has read about it in the newspaper

would not ordinarily assert (6), since he is in the position to make the stronger claim

in (7).

Similar remarks can be found in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1975), Kratzer

(1977),

and L yons (1977).

10

Still, despite the unanimity on this point, no theory

has yet been proposed which actually predicts that on many occasions must

A is a logical consequence of A . M ost theories treat

may

and

must

as epistemic

modalities and, dep ending on w hether the underlying epistemic notion is know-

ledge or

belief,

must A turns out to be either stronger than A or independent

of it.

Notice that sentences of the form must A are T-stable though they are not

in general F-stable. Consider, for exam ple, the sentence:

(8) Eith er the yellow or the red marble must be in box 2

For all you know in information state 1 it may very well be that the blue

marble is in box 2 while both the yellow and the red marble are in box 1.

Hence it is not the case that either the yellow or the red one must be in box

2. But as soon as you are told that the blue marble is in box 1 this is different.

At least one of the marbles is in box 2 and it cannot be the blue one. So

it must be the yellow one or the red o ne.

3 3 K

According to definition 2, a sentence of the form A—>B is true on the basis

of the evidence available at a given information state s if and only if s cannot

grow into an information state s' at which A is true on the basis of available

evidence and B is false. If, by any chance, further investigations should reveal

that A is true, they will also reveal that B is true. Furthermore, it is stated

that

A—>

B is false on th e basis of the ev idence available at a certain information

state s if and only if it is still possible for s to grow into an information state

at which A is true and B false on the basis of the available evidence.

As a consequence, we find that sentences of the form A—>B are not in

general F-stable. Consider the sentence:

(9) If the yellow marble is in box 1, the red one is in box 2

Ag ain, the evidence available in information state 1 allows for the possibility

that both the yellow and the red marble are in box 1. So on the basis of

the limited evidence available there, (9) is false: it is not so that if the yellow

marble is in box 1, the red one is in box 2. In information state 2, however,

(9) is not false any more. Once you know that the blue marble is in box 1,

you can be sure that if the yellow marble happens to be in box 1, the red

one will turn out to be in box 2.

155



Frank

Veltman

Now consider the negation of (9):

(10) It is not so that if the yellow marble is in box 1, the red one is in

box 2

This sentence is true on the basis of the evidence available at information

state

1

- at least if we apply definition 2 to it. Suppose you are in information

state 1 and som ebody - Mrs S. - asserts (9): 'If the yellow marble is in box

1,

the red marble is in box 2.' Would it be appropriate, then, to reply like

this: 'No, you are wrong, it may very well be that both the yellow and the

red marble are in box 1. So it is not the case that if the yellow marble is

in box 1, the red o ne is in box 2 '?

Such a reply would only under very special circumstances be correct. Only

when you know for certain that Mrs S. is not better informed than

yourself,

because only then can you be sure that she is mistaken. Certainly, for all

you know (in information state 1), sentence (9) is false and sentence (10)

is true, but sentence (9) is not F-stable and sentence (10) is not T-stable. If

by any chance the blue marble should be in box 1 and if Mrs S. should know

this, then what she says is true on the basis of the evidence available to her.

So perhaps she is better informed than yourself; perhaps she is telling you

something about the marbles you did not yet know. Therefore, instead of

denying the truth of her statement you'd better ask her on what evidence

it is based.

In normal conversation every statement is meant to convey some new infor-

ma tion, and only when this new information is incompatible with some T-stable

sentence that is true on the basis of the evidence gathered may one raise doubts

about it - as when you are in information state 2 and Mrs S. says, 'Maybe

the yellow marble is in box 1 and

if so , the red one is in box 1 too.

However,

even in this case it would be inappropriate to reply with a simple denial: 'No,

it may very well be that the yellow marble is in box 1 and th e red one is

in box 2.' Again, such a sentence is not T-stable; it might owe its truth to

a lack of information on your part - that is certainly what Mrs S. will think.

So what you will have to reply is something much stronger: 'No, it cannot

be that the yellow and the red marble are both in box 1. So if the yellow

marble is in box

1,

the red one isn t.

These considerations may help us to understand some of the peculiarities

of negated conditionals. F or one thing , they explain why a conditional statem ent

A—>

B is so often refuted with a counterconditional A—»~~|B rather than with

a negated conditional ~1(A—>B). But they do so without thereby equating

sentences of the form A—»~|B with sentences of the form

~~|(A—»

B). On the

account given here, ~~|(A—>B) is not logically equivalent to A—>~~|B, as it

would be if —> behaved as Stalnaker (1968) and A dam s (1975) pre dict.

Nor is it equivalent to A A ~~|B as it would be if

—•

behaved like material

implication. We find that ~~|(A—»B) is equivalent to may (A A ~]B). There

156




is nothing w rong in believing both

( n ) It is not the case that if Jon es wins the election, Smith will retire to

private life

(suppose Smith dies before the election)

and

(12) It is not the case that if Jones wins the election, Smith won't retire

(suppose Smith does not die before the election)

Moreover, neither of these beliefs would commit one to the belief that

(13) Jones will win the election

Jones m ay win the election, that is the only thing one can say about it.

Let A be F-stable and suppose that A is false on the basis of the available

evidence. Then according to definition 2, A—>B is true on the basis of the

evidence for any sentence B. Similarly, if B is T-stable and true on the basis

of the available evidence then A—»B is true on the basis of the evidence for

any sentence A. In other words, the present treatment of conditionals does

not meet the requirement that a sentence of the form A—>B should never

be true unless the antecedent A is somehow 'relevant' to the consequent B.

The well-known 'paradoxes' of material implication turn out logically valid.

We find, for exam ple, that from a logical point of view, there is nothing wrong

with:

(14) The blue marb le is in box 1

.'. If the b lue marble is in box 2 , it is in box 1

If you do find it difficult to accept the validity of this argument, please read

the conclusion once more without losing sight of the premise. The argument

does not run like:

(15) The blue marble is in box 1

.'. If the blue marble had been in box 2, it would have been in box 1

Or perhaps it helps to compare (14) with:

(16) The blue marble is in box 1

'. The blue marble is in box 1, if it is anywhere at all

(Anywhere ..., then why not try box 2?) If this does not help either, the

reader is referred to section 4.2 where I shall argue that (14), though logically

valid, is nevertheless pragmatically incorrect.

By now it will be clear that the logic attributed to indicative conditionals

by the theory presented here cannot easily be fitted into the spectrum formed

by the theories proposed so far. One more example: the principle of modus

7



Frank Veltman

tollens, which holds both in classical and in intuitionistic logic, and also in

the systems of strict and variably strict implication, and even in such a weak

system as the system of relevance logic, fails. It is not generally so that one

can conclude ~~|A from A—»B and

~~1B.

The closest approximation available

is this: if B is F-stable then must ~ |A follows from A—>B and ~~|B. If B is

not F-stable even this weakened version of modus tollens fails. Consider, for

example, the premises A—>(B—>C) and ~1(B—>C), where A, B and C are

three distinct atomic sentences. Neither A nor

must

~~|A follow from these

sentences, we only have that may ~|A is true on the basis of the available

evidence if A—> (B—> C) and

~~|(B—>

C) are. (Suppose you are in information

state i. Then for all you know it may very well be that neither the yellow

nor the blue marble is in box 2. So it is not the case that if the yellow marble

isn t in box 2, the blue one is. However, if the red marble happens to be in

box 1 things are different. Ind eed , if the red marble is in box 1, then if the

yellow marble isn t in box 2 the blue one is. Now, by an application of modus

tollens, it would follow from the italicized sentences that the red marble isn't

in box 1, but obviously it may very well be the re. )

So we find that in certain respects data logic is weaker than the weakest

logic in the literature: modus tollens is not always valid. In other respects,

how ever, it is at least as strong as any of the oth ers: we saw that A—> B follows

from B, at least if B is T-stable. In yet other respects it lies somewhere in-

betwe en: we saw that

~1(A—>

B) is equivalen t to may (A

A

IB ), which is exactly

what one w ould find if —> were the implication and may the possibility operator

of one of the Lewis systems.

11

The arguments which on my account are logically invalid cannot easily be

explained away as 'just' pragmatically unsound. Notoriously difficult (for those

who believe that indicative conditionals behave like material implications)

are,

for exam ple , the schemes ~~|(A—»B)/.'. A and

( A A B ) — » C / . ' .

(A—>C) v (B—>C). So far, no satisfactory pragmatic explanation has been

offered for the fact that m any instances of these inference patter ns seem an om a-

lous.

On the other hand, those who think that my theory is too strong, that

too many of the wrong arguments come out valid, can produce a lot of intuitive

counterexamples to make their point. Here I am the one who has to produce

the good reasons for saying that these are 'just' pragmatically unsound instances

of valid a rgum ent forms. I shall turn to this in section

4.2.

(For more information

on the logic of —> the reader is referred to Veltman 1985.)

3.4 Conjunction, disjunction and negation

I trust that the truth and falsity conditions for sentences of the form ~~|A,

A A B , and A v B do not need any further explanation.

12

The reader will have

noticed tha t sentences of the form A v ~~1A are not always true on the basis

of the available evidence: the Principle of Excluded Middle does not generally

158




hold. That does not mean, however, that sentences of the form A v ~~|A can

be false on the basis of the available evidence: must (A v ~~]A) is logically

valid. Besides, we get a Principle of Excluded Muddle in return. No matter

what the exact evidence is, the sentence must A v must

~~]A

v (may

A A may

~~|A)

is always true on th e basis of it.

In the sequel, I shall sometimes discriminate between the sentences which

contain no operators other than

~1

v and A , and the othe r ones by calling

the former descriptive and the latter nondescriptive. All descriptive sentences

are stable, most nondescriptive sentences are not. Intuitively, the difference

between these two kinds of sentence amounts to this: by uttering a descriptive

sentence a speaker only informs his audience of the evidence he already has.

By uttering a nondescriptive sentence he also expresses his expectations about

the outcome of further investigations.

Notice tha t at complete information states s the following ho lds:

M lh

5

AorM

s

H IA

Aflr -

s

A->Bif fMI | -

s

Aor Mlh

s

B

M\\-

s

mayAif£M\\-

s

A

M\\-

s

mustAffiM\\-

s

A

In other words, it does not make much sense to use the phrases if-then, must

and m ay in a context where the information is com plete. If-then gets the mean-

ing of the material implication while the meaning of both must and may boils

down to that of the empty operator. However, in such a context there is no

need to use nondescriptive sentences; the information is complete, so what

good could speculations on the outcome of further investigations possibly

be?

A few remarks are due here on the relation between the relative notions

'true/false on the basis of the available evidence' and the absolute notions

' t rue'

and 'false'. In deed , the reader may have wond ered whether these notions

are related at all. Wouldn't it be better to say that definition 2 deals with

the notions of verification and falsification rather than the notions of truth

and falsity? After all, it is obvious that nothing is verified or falsified except

on the basis of evidence. But it is far from obvious that this evidence, or

rather the availability of it, could make a difference to the truth value of the

sentence concerned. Truth and falsity depend only on the facts of the case

and not on information one may have gathered .

13

The absolute notions of truth and falsity can be defined in terms of the

relative notions as follows: a senten ce is true /fals e if and only if it is true /fals e

on the basis of the evidence that will be available when the data are complete.

In formulae:

MH-AiffMlh

So

A

MHIAiffM

So

HIA

159



Frank

Veltman

Here s

0

is the rather special information state discussed near the end of section

2: the information state in which any speaker, if he should ever get there,

would be acquainted with all the facts that constitute reality. Hence, it is indeed

the facts and nothing but the facts that determine whether a sentence is true

or false in the absolute sense.

We saw, however, that there are many sentences for which the absolute

notions of truth and falsity make little sense. There is a lot to learn from

what is in fact the case, but not which sentences may be true or must be

true or will be true if only . . . . The re is no way to decide the question whe ther

the red and the yellow m arble may both be in box

1

by just opening the boxes.

A question like that can only be judged in the light of what may be the case:

the possibilities left o pen by the facts as far as they a re k now n.

Given the possibilities left open by the facts known in information state

2, the yellow and the red marbles cannot both be in box 1. The sentence

The yellow and red marbles may both be in box 1 is false on the basis of

the evidence available in information state 2. Now, I have no objections against

replacing this phrase by another one - 'falsified by the available evidence'

or 'refutable in information state 2', whatever you like. The real issue is, I

think, which notions are fundamental: the absolute notions of truth and falsity

or the relative ones, whatever you call them. In this paper we are exploring

the idea that the relative notions are fundamental. So far it has proved fairly

fruitful: it has enabled us to draw the distinction between direct and indirect

evidence and that between stable and unstable sentences - important distinc-

tions it would seem, even in purely logical matters.

4. P R A G M A T I C C O R R E C T N E S S A N D I N C O R R E C T N E S S

Recall the Principle of Excluded Muddle:

must

B v

must

~|B v

(may

B A

m ay

~~|B)

is a logical law. This means tha t the possible contexts in which a cond itional

with anteceden t A and consequ ent C can be uttered all fall into the nine categor-

ies in table 1.

Claim:

Assume that A and C are descriptive sentences. Then the only con-

texts in which a speaker can assert A—> C without violating any conversational

maxim are the ones in category 5. In other words, an indicative conditional

stateme nt w ith a descriptive antece dent and consequent will normally implicate

that neither the truth nor the falsity of its antecedent or consequent are defin-

itely established.

The claim itself is not new.

14

What is new is the straightforward proof of

it. Consider first the contexts fitting into category 2, 3 or 6. In such contexts

the sentence

A—>

C is false on th e basis of the evidence available to th e speak er

- it is left to the reade r to check this with the help of definition 2. So anyone

who says A—>C in one of these contexts is saying something for which he

lacks adequate evidence, which according to the maxim of quality (the one

160




i.

must A

mustC

4. may A

may ~ lA

mustC

7. must ~ |A

mustC

Table 1. T he square of modal possibilities

2.

must A

mayC

may

~~|C

5.

may A

may ~ lA

may C

may ~\C

8. must~\A

mayC

may i C

3.

must A

must

~ |C

6. may A

may ~\A

must ~|C

9. must~\A

must ~\C

Note: Read the table as follows: in category 1 must A is true on the basis of the evidence

available to the speaker and must C, too, etc.

formulated in section 3.1) he is not supposed to do. Anyone who knows, or

at least could have known, that A cannot be true, and who therefore falls

within one of the categories 7 , 8 or 9 could, according to definition 2, truthfully

assert that A—>C. But if he did so he would be sinning against the maxims

of quantity and manner. By definition 2, must ~~|A is stronger and therefore

more informative than A—>C. Apart from that, it is also less wordy. So if

he said must

~~\A

he would be being more helpful. The only remaining categories

are 1 and 4, in both of which the speaker knows that C must be the case.

Again: must C is both stronger and less wordy than A—>C. If the speaker

were to state A—>C, he would not be telling us all he knows, and that in

too many words.

So, indicative cond itionals are typically utte red in contexts fitting in catego ry

5,

the centre of table 1. This is not to say, of course, that any conditional

statement will automatically be correct when uttered in such a context. For

one thing, in such a context the sentence A—>C cannot be true on the basis

of the available evidence unless the antecedent A is somehow 'relevant' to

the consequent C. Let C be any descriptive sentence - for example, The red

marble is in box 1. Suppose you do not know whether C - maybe the red

marble is in box 1, maybe not. Likewise, let A be any descriptive sentence

- It is raining in Ipanema. Again, you do not know whether A - maybe it

is raining in Ipanema, maybe not. Now consider A—>C: If it is raining in

Ipanema,

the red

marble

is

in box 1. Clearly, there must be some noncoincidental

connection between A and C if it is really to be so that no additional evidence

can establish the truth of A without establishing that C must be true; how

on earth could the weather condition in Ipanema have anything to do with

the position of the marbles?

In section 2.2 we noted that definition 2 itself does not guarantee that a

conditional is true on the basis of the available evidence only if its antecedent

is relevant to its consequent. We can now see why this does not matter too

much. Pragmatic constraints ensure that an indicative conditional will normally

161



Frank

Veltman

be asserted only in circumstances where this requirement is fulfilled. Those

contexts

in

which definition 2 makes

a

conditional true without the antecedent

being relevant to the co nsequent are contexts in which so much is known about

the tru th and falsity of either of these that it canno t be asserted without v iolating

some conversational maxim.

4.1 Odd conditionals

Should conditionals never be uttered in other circumstances than the ones

fitting in category 5, just because this violates one or the other conversational

maxim? Of course not. There are plenty of good occasions for doing just this,

only it must be clear to the h earer that

a

maxim has been overruled and why.

Contexts fitting into

2, 3 and 6 are not

among these occasions. There

the

conditional

is

false

on the

basis

of

the evidence available

to the

speaker and,

as

we noticed in section

3.1,

any violation of the maxim of quality

is

incompatible

with the overall Cooperativ e Principle.

15

But

the

literature

is

full

of

ifs

and

thens with

the

most eccentric things

in

between and all those I know fit quite neatly in that part of table 1 formed

by the categories 1, 4, 8 and 9. In fact this categorization is of great help

when we want to classify the figures of speech beginning with if.

All of the examples which go

(17)

If...,

I'll eat my hat

belong to category 9: the speaker is clearly not intending to eat his hat and

the hearer

is

expected

to

complete

the

(weakened version

of)

modus tollens

for

himself,

which gives

(18) It cannot be the case t h a t . . .

Why say (17) rath er than (18)? Surely in order to make the claim that the

antecedent is as definitely false as the applied modus tollens is valid. The same

rhetoric occurs in constructions like:

(19) If... , I am a D utchman

(20)

If..., I

am the Em press

of

China

16

(21) I'll be han ged , if . . .

which all implicate the falsity of their an tecedents (unless of course the speaker

could be a Du tchman, or the Empress of China , or sentenced to de ath ).

There are also plenty of examples of which the antecedent is trivially true

and the hea rer is supposed to apply modu s ponens:

17

(22) She is on the wrong side of thirty , if she is a day

(23) If there is one thing I cannot stand, it is getting caught in the rush-hour

traffic

162




It will be clear that these examples belong to

category

i.

Category 4 is the most diverse. In addition to examples where if is used

for purely rhetorical reasons, as in:

(24) This is the best boo k of the month , if not of the year

it also contains exam ples where // serves as an opting out device:

(25) Th ere is coffee in the po t, if you want some

(26) If the re is anything you need , my nam e is Marcia

(27) I paid back tha t fiver, if you rem em ber

(28) If I may interrup t you, you 're wanted on the telephon e

Let us first discuss (24). The speaker supposes that the hearer is well aware

of the trivial truth that this book will certainly be the best of the month if

it is the best of the year. In formulae, the hearer is supposed to know that

B ^ C. From this , toge ther with what the speaker tells him, ~~|B- ̂C, he could

(by data-logical means), conclude must C: this must be the best book of the

month. Just as in the above examples the speaker intends the hearer to draw

this conclusion.

Example (25) works differently. The hearer knows that the speaker is not

in a position to know whether he (the hearer) wants some coffee or not. From

this he can infer that the conditional is asserted in one of the categories 4,

5 or 6. It cannot be category 6, for then the statement would be false on

the basis of information available to the speaker. For the same reason it cannot

be category 5 (unless the speaker happens to be a genie who could just make

coffee in the pot on command - but let us assume that the hearer knows he

is not). So the only possibility left is category 4: there must be coffee in the

pot.

To what good purpose - if any - does the speaker prefer the

if-iorm

to

the statement that

there is coffee in the pot?

I think that the speaker in simply

asserting the consequent would run the risk of defying the maxim of relevance,

by saying something which does not interest the hearer at all. With the antece-

dent the speaker indicates that he is well aware of this: it provides a condition

under which the consequent will be interesting. The examples (27) and (28)

show that it is not always the maxim of relevance that is involved. In (27)

the speaker indicates with the antecedent that he is opting out of the maxim

of quantity;

18

to account for (28) we must appeal to a maxim of politeness.

19

-

20

Also in category 8 one can breach the conve rsational maxims to good effect:

(29) If it does not rain tom orro w, then it is going to pou r

(given as a summary of a dismal wea ther forecast)

(30) If I do n't bea t him , then I'll thrash him

(a boxer boasting before his fight)

163



Frank

Veltman

Both (29) and (30) convey that their antecedent will turn out false, but they

leave their consequent undecided. The reader will be able to work out these

implicatures himself ((29) and (30) both mirror example (24)).

I have not been able to find any good (idiomatic) conditionals fitting into

category 7. Nor can I offer a satisfactory explanation why there aren't any.

A rather unsatisfactory explanation runs like this: saying A—> C and conveying

by this both the more informative must ~|A and the more informative must

C involves violating the maxim of quantity not once but twice. It could be

asking too much of a heare r to expect him to work this ou t.

The examples discussed above must look odd, if not perplexing, to those

who hold the view that a conditional statem ent cann ot be true unless the antece-

dent and the consequent are in some sense 'causally' connected. How could

any causal chain ever bridge the gap between the antecedent she is a day

and the consequent she is on the wrong side of

thirty

of (22); or that between

the antecedent there is anything you need and the consequent my name is

Marcia of (26)? Given that how the dots are filled in is irrelevant to the truth

of if . . . , I ll eat my hat as long as they are filled in with something which

is false, what could such a senten ce exp ress if not a simple truth-functional

connection between the antecedent and the consequent?

These examples suggest that the ifoi natural language could be ambiguous:

usually it expresses a causal connection, but in some exceptional cases it does

not. I do not think that this is the right way to see it. One of the advantages

of the data-sema ntic ap proach is that we can uphold the idea of an unamb iguous

if . The // that enables a spea ker (in information state 1) to formulate the general

constraint th at t he blue marble is in box 2 if the o ther two are in box 1 is

the very same if that enables him (in information state 2) to say that the blue

marble is in box

1

if it is anyw here at all.

4.2 A test for prag m atic correctne ss

Consider the following well-known example.

(31) If there is sugar in the coffee, then it will taste good

.'. If there is sugar in the coffee and diesel-oil as well, then it will taste

good

This argument sounds suspicious. In fact, it is often claimed that it is quite

possible to accept the premise while rejecting the conclusion. So it would seem

that (31) provides a clear-cut cou nterexam ple to the Principle of S trengthening

the A ntec ede nt. But is it really so clear-cut? Com pare (31) with (32):

(32) Maybe there is diesel-oil in the coffee

If there is sugar in the coffee, then it will taste good

• . If there is sugar in the coffee and diesel-oil as well, then it will taste

good

164



Frank Veltman

implicate that the blue marble may not be in box i (the conclusion belongs

to category i rather than category 5).

Note that no instance of the argument form C/.'. A—>C will pass our test

unless its conclusion is an odd conditional belonging to category 1 or category

4.

In this respect the argument form C/A • . A—>C differs from argument

forms like the Hypothetical Syllogism B^> C, A-+ B / . \ A-> C and the Princi-

ple of Strengthening the Antecedent A-> C/.*. (A A B ) ^ C , which have many

pragmatically correct instances with conclusions belonging to category 5. Yet,

even if this so-called paradox of implication had no correct instances at all,

it would still not follow that it is logically invalid rather than pragmatically

unsound.

NOTES

1 This paper overlaps

in

some passages with Veltman (1981).

I am

grateful

to

Ernest

Ad am s, Mark Cobler, Jon Dorling, Fred Land man , Michael M orreau , Stanley Peters,

Marjorie Pigge and Alice

ter

Meulen

for

comments, corrections, suggestions, discus-

sions, translations, criticism, and help.

Throughout this paper

I

shall assume that the re ade r is familiar with G rice (1975).

2 This example is drawn from Adams (1975).

3 This strategy is followed

in

Stalnake r (1976).

4 See in particular A nde rson and Belnap (1975).

5 See Ad am s (1975) and also Co ope r (1978).

6

The

information mod els defined here closely resemble

the

Kripke models

for

intui-

tionistic logic.

See

Kripke (1965). Form ally,

the

main difference with intuition istic

logic lies in the trea tme nt of nega tion. See Thom ason (1969) for still ano ther trea tme nt

of negation w ithin this fram ework.

7 Actually,

the

assumption

is

somewhat stronger;

it

excludes

the

possibility

of

there

being

any

sequence

of

successive information states that does

not

ultimately

end

in

an

information state that

is

com plete.

I

have made this stronger assumption just

for technical convenience. As

far

as logic is conc erned , it does not make any difference

which

one you

make.

In

fact, from

a

logical point

of

view,

you

might even ma ke

the still weaker assumption that

for

each seS

and

each atomic sentence

A

there

is

an s' ^

s such that

V

s

>

(A ) is defined.

8

I am

ready

to

admit that the word

information

as

it

occurs

in

the phrase 'information

state'

is not used in its ordinary sense. P erhap s it would be better to speak

of

'evidence

states'.

9 Cases

of

irony

and

me taphor will perhaps

be

considered

as

counterexamples

to

this

claim.

But I

think these phenomena

are

best explained

as

involving

an

apparent

infringement

of the

maxim

of

quality.

In

short: since

a

literal interpretation

of an

ironical

or

metaphorical statement

is out of the

question,

as it

would immediately

lead

to the

conclusion that the speaker is breaching the maxim

of

quality,

the

hearer

tries

to

reinterpret

the

words

of the

speaker

in

such

a way

that they

can yet be

reconciled with this maxim

- the

maxim

of

quality

itself.

Cases like these must

be

clearly distinguished from cases wh ere

the

hearer ultimately concludes that

a

maxim

-

any

maxim other than

the

maxim

of

quality

- has

really been overruled, albeit

in

a

manner that

can be

reconciled with

the

supposition that

at

least

the

overall

Coop erative Principle

-

but not the m axim in question

-

has been observed.

166



D ata sem antics and the pragmatics of indicative conditionals

10 A nice illustration of the differences between must A and A is given by Akatsuka

(this volume). Compare / am hungry with / must be hungry and you are hungry

with you must be hungry.

11 I mean the C . I. Lewis systems he re: see Hu ghes and C resswell (1972).

12 This does not mea n that they are above suspicion; for a defence, see Veltman (1981).

13 These critical remarks were made by Stanley Peters in his discussion of my talk

at the Stanford Symposium on Conditionals.

14 Already in Strawson (1952: 88) we find the remark that 'the hypothetical statement

carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or disbelief in, the fulfilment

of both the antec eden t and co nseq uen t'. See also Stalnaker (1976) and Ga zdar (1979).

15 The statement He is a fine friend, if he is really telling all these lies belongs - after

reinterpretation - to category 5. Com pare no te 9.

16 Unlike Akatsuka (this volume), I do not think that a special truth value must be

introduced to account for the rhetorica l force of sentences like this on e.

17 Note that within our framework modus ponens takes the form A, A—»C/.'. must

C. (A conditional sentence A - » C with descriptive A and C is true on the basis

of the available evidence if and only if any further data which supply direct evidence

for A supply at least indirect evidence for C.)

18 Admittedly, this remark leaves a lot of questions concerning the example (27) open.

For one thing, it is unclear why English speakers prefer (27) to the sentence I paid

back that fiver, if you don t remem ber. Given our explanation for (25), one would

expect things to be the other way round - as they are when one uses in case instead

of if. {In case you don t remem ber, I paid back that fiver sounds better than In

case you remember, ...) Only if the antecedent contains a negation can one safely

say that it provides a condition un der which the conseq uent w ould be informative.

19 Many of the examples discussed in this section have been taken from Lauerbach

(1979). For a further discussion of, in particular, examples involving a maxim of

politeness, the reader is referred to pp. 240-50 of Lauerbach's book.

20 English allows both clause orders antecedent-consequent and consequent-antece-

den t. Fro m the ex amples given so far, it app ears tha t this is so even for conditionals

that implicate the truth of their consequ ent. N otice, howe ver, that one cannot overtly

mark the consequent with then in some of these conditionals without affecting their

original impact. This is particularly so for conditionals where if is used as an o pting

out device, witness // / may interrupt you, then you are wanted on the telephone.

In Dutch and German changing the word order in the consequent has the same

effect: it seems obligatory to give the consequent the word order of a single main

clause (finite ve rb seco nd) when 'if is used as an opting out dev ice, while in all

other cases with the antecedent preceding the consequent the verb of the consequent

gets second position with respect to the antecedent clause and thus precedes the

subject of the consequent. This means that the whole conditional construction is

treate d as a single main clause with the an teced ent taking the front adverbial po sition.

21 See Coope r (1978: ch. 8) for many other ex amp les.

REFERENCES

Ada ms, Ernest W. 1975. T he logic o f c onditionals: an application of probability to deduc-

tive logic. Dordrecht: Reidel.

And erson, Alan R . and Nuel D . Belnap, Jr. 1975. Entailment,

VOL.

I . Princeton: Prince-

ton University Press.

Coop er, WilliamS . 1978. Foundations of logico-linguistics. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Gazdar, Gerald. 1979. Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press.

167



Frank Veltman

Grice, H. Paul. 1975. Logic and conversation. Syntax and semantics, VOL. 3 , Speech

acts,

ed. Peter Cole and Jerrold M . Morga n, 64-75. New York: A cademic Press.

Groenendijk, Jeroen and Martin

Stokhof.

1975. Modality and conversational informa-

tion. Theoretical Linguistics 2: 61-112.

Hughes, G. E. and M. J. Cresswell. 1972. An introduction to modal logic, 2nd edn.

London: Methuen.

Karttunen, Lauri. 1972. Possible and must. In Syntax and semantics /, ed. John P.

Kimball, 1-20. New York: Seminar Press.

Kratzer, Angelika. 1977. What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean. Linguistics and

Philosophy 1:337-55.

Kripke, Saul A. 1965. Semantical analysis of intuitionistic logic 1. In Formal systems

and recursive functions, ed. J. N. Crossley and M. A. E. Du mm ett, 92-130. Am ster-

dam: N orth-Holland.

Lauerbach, Gerda. 1979. Form und Funktion englischer Konditionalsdtze mit if. Tub-

ingen: Niemeyer.

Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics,

VOL.

2. Camb ridge: Cambridge U niversity P ress.

Stalnaker, Robert C. 1968. A theory of conditionals. In Studies in logical theory, ed.

N.

Rescher, 98-112. American Philosophical Quarterly monograph series, no. 2.

Oxford: Blackwell.

Stalnaker, Robert C. 1976. Indicative conditionals. In

Lang uage in focus,

ed. A. Kasher,

179-96.

Dordrecht: Reidel.

Strawson , P. F. 1952. Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen.

Thomason, Richmond H. 1969. A semantical study of constructible falsity. Zeitschrift

fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 15: 247-57.

Veltman, Frank. 1981. Data semantics. Reprinted 1984 in Information, interpretation

and inference, ed. Jeroen Groenendijk, Theo Janssen and Martin

Stokhof,

43-65.

Do rdrech t: Foris Publications.

Veltman, Frank. 1985. Logics for conditionals. Doctoral dissertation, University of

Amsterdam.

168



REMARKS ON THE

SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS

OF CONDITIONALS

Ernest W Adams

Editors' note. Emphasizing truth as a property of sentences, Adams

criticizes relative conceptions of truth such as are developed in Velt-

man's contribution, for overemphasizing the distinction between

semantics and pragmatics. A probabilistic semantics for conditionals

that includes pragmatic considerations and maxims can account for

the kinematics of belief and model the dynamics of belief change

appropriately, without relying on relativized truth definitions. Some

similar aspects of the dynamics of belief are also discussed by Akat-

suka, Fillenbaum and Greenberg.

The first part of this chapter will discuss aspects of Veltman's chapter in this

volume 'Data semantics and the pragmatics of indicative conditionals', and

particularly his semantics for conditionals, while the second will comment on

more general methodological issues having to do with relations between three

seemingly disparate theories: (i) Grice's theories of meaning and conversa-

tional implicature, (2) the Bayesian theory of decision making, and (3) my

own probabilistic theory of conditionals. The discussion of Veltman's chapter

will presup pose familiarity with technical aspects of the theory p resente d the re.

The central concept of Veltman's theory is that of a sentence being true

in an information state in an information model, which is a ternary relation

between sentences, information states, and information mod els. What we want

to ask is how this ternary relation is related to the

property

of truth, which

is what Tarski (1944) insists the sort of truth that satisfies Convention T must

be. Looking ahead to pragmatic matters, to be commented on later, we shall

also want to insist that what is important for those purposes is the property

of truth, and not truth relative to this or that abstractly defined model.

The usual way of transforming relative definitions of truth, such as truth

in a model or truth in a possible world, into definitions of truth simpliciter

is to stipulate that sentences (or propositions or statements, these distinctions

need not concern us here) have the property of truth if and only if they are

true in the actual model or possible world. There is nothing to object to in

this, assuming that we can distinguish clearly between atomic and non-atomic

sentences, that we are only interested in the truth conditions of non-atomic

sentences, and that these can be defined recursively in terms of the truth

169



rnest

W

Adams

conditions of their parts (i.e ., we are only concerned with the recursive clauses

of truth definitions). It should be kept in mind, however, that taking these

things for granted begs a myriad of logical questions which have concerned

most of the leading logicians from Aristotle to the present day. But let them

be begged: we must still ask how Vel tm an s definition of truth in an information

state in an inform ation m ode l might be derela tivized to yield a definition

of truth simpliciter.

I would suggest the following as a natural generalization of the method of

defining truth as a property from relativized truth definitions, which might

apply to Veltm an s theo ry: a sentence may be stipulated to be true simpliciter

if and only if it is true in some information state in the actual information

model. To explain this suggestion in detail would not only require us to enter

into the complexities of the information state and model concepts, but also

to explain how what I have here called the actua l information m odel might

be distinguished among all possible such models. There is not space for such

a discussion he re , and I will confine m yself to suggesting tha t the actual informa-

tion model (or an actual information model) must be one whose valuation

function only assigns the value i to true atomic sentences and the value o

to false ones. This stipulation would at least imply that atomic sentences must

satisfy Convention T, and hence the most basic criterion of material adequacy

would b e satisfied by Veltm an s theory of truth in its application to a tomic

sentences. The question of whether this criterion of adequacy is also satisfied

in application to non-atomic sentences is more delicate, but I am now going

to arg ue, not that T arski s criterion is not satisfied, but rath er th at Veltm an s

theory does not meet what might be called a pragmatic criterion of adequacy

when it applies to co nditionals.

The following example is described in embryo in Adams (1975). A diner,

D , is seated at a table with a plate of nonpoisonous mushrooms before him

that he is thinking of eating (D is not sure that the mushrooms are nonpoison

ous) and an observer, O, who thinks the mushrooms

are

poisonous, is standing

looking at him. O has a thou ght that he expresses to himself as:

O

t

: If D e ats the m ushroom s he will be poisoned

and wishing to inform D he says to him th e sen tence:

O

s

: If you eat the mushrooms you will be poisoned

He aring this in turn instils in D s mind the though t which he expresses to

himself as:

D

t

: If I eat the mushrooms I will be poisoned

and in virtue of coming to believe this, D decides not to eat the mushrooms.

It is intuitively evident that as formulated here all of the conditional sentences

O

t

, O

s

, and D

t

express the same proposition, though it will later be important

170



Rem arks on the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals

that O s and D s reaso ns for thinking and saying these things may be qu ite

different. Ho we ver, let us now consider their truth as characterized in Veltman s

theory, augmented by my stipulation concerning the derelativization of the

truth concept.

It follows immediately from the truth conditions of conditionals that are

assumed in Veltma n s theo ry that the thre e conditionals just described would

have to be true. This is because D did not eat the mushrooms, and because

in application to conditionals whose p arts are atom ic sentences, Veltm an s

theory yields the same truth conditions as apply to the material conditional.

The fact is that by a not uninteresting circuitous route Veltman arrives at

the same conclusions about simple conditionals (ones whose parts are atomic

formulae or boolean combinations of them) as does Grice (1975) and which

Lewis (1976) also accepts for indicative cond itionals.

Now I want to argue that any theory of truth such as Veltma n s that entails

that the proposition which D expresses to himself as D

t

is true, fails to satisfy

a requirement of adequacy which I would hold to be part of the rationale

of logic: for specifiable reason s and in specifiable circum stances, persons should

wish to accept propositions held to be true and to avoid accepting ones held

to be false. Vague as this is - and I will not attempt a more careful statement

here - it is at least intuitively plausible that this requirement is not met in

D s situation. W hatever o ther requ ireme nts of adequacy may be met in defining

truth in such a way that D

t

turns out to be true in this situation, D certainly

would not have wished to accept D

t

, since accepting it led him not to eat

the mushroom s when in fact they were not poisonous.

One may argue that meeting the foregoing pragmatic requirement should

be part of the rationale of logic as a normative theory, which purports to

explain how persons ought to reason. Logic formulates principles whose ratio-

nale is to guide persons who follow them to true conclusions and to help them

to avoid falsehood. But what if the conclusions like D

t

that are baptized tru e

in some logical theo ry a re ones which perso ns would in fact not wish to accept?

In such a case I would say that persons will be well advised to ignore theory,

since it has no rationale. To follow theory in such circumstances would be

like following prescriptions for playing a game, the following of which could

be expected to lead to unwanted consequen ces.

The foregoing applies to a much wider range of theories than Ve ltma n s.

Orth odo x logic s material conditional analysis of conditionals clearly fails to

satisfy the pragmatic requirement of adequacy, and I suspect that it is the

intuitive recognition of this by students and teachers alike that leads them

to treat the theory as no more than an artificial formalism, not to be applied

to the practical problems of life. A similar, though somewhat weaker, criticism

applies to many no n-orthodo x theories of conditionals, such as ordered possible

worlds theorie s, relevan ce theo ries, causal or necessary condition theo ries,

and most of the amazing host of ad hoc theories that have been excogitated



rnest

W Adams

to try to account for the unwelcome counterexamples to the orthodox theory.

It is not so much that these theories fail to meet the pragmatic requirement

as that no effort has been made to demonstrate that they do meet it. In the

absence of such an effort, the presumption is against them. (Can it be argued

that it is to the dine r s interest to reject D

t

on the grounds that in the nearest

possible world in which he eats the mushrooms he will not be poisoned?)

Note too that the pragmatic requirement explains the importance of insisting

that truth should be a property . It is to D s interest to accept D

t

if it is true

simpliciter, and it will be of no concern to him which models or possible worlds

or information models it is true in unless he knows which among them is the

actual one. In fact, one may wonder what practical interest D could have

in any world other than the actual one. This could have to do with logical

validity, which leads to a couple of asides on Ve ltm an s cha racterization of

this concept before we turn to the m ore im portant topic of pragm atics.

In a generalized sense, V eltma n s is a kind of truth value gap theory in

that it allows that sentences may be neithe r true nor false in certain information

states and models. This means that the definitions of logical validity must be

modified to tak e this into accou nt. V eltm an s definition closely parallels that

of three-valued logic in which the only designa ted truth value is tru th (as

against truth together with neither truth nor falsehood): i.e., an inference is

valid in this theory if its conclusion is true in all information states and models

in which all of its premises are true. Given trivalence together with this defini-

tion of logical validity, we have the standard consequence that the Principle

of the Excluded Middle is not valid: i.e., A v - A is not a logical consequence

of the empty set of premises. Without attempting to develop this point in

detail, I want to raise a query as to whether this definition meets another

pragmatic requirement of adequacy, this time not for definitions of truth but

rather for definitions of validity. The requirement is that persons should have

good reason to reason in accord with principles held to be valid. In particular,

when they have good reason to accept the premises of such inferences and

they know that the inferences are valid, this knowledge should give them good

reason to accept their conclusions. The requirement defined here is not the

same as the pragmatic criterion of adequacy for truth definitions and I have

no argum ent to show that V eltm an s definition fails to meet the require m ent.

However, I feel that it is desirable that an argument be given that such a

non-o rthodox validity definition as Veltm an s does meet the req uirem ent, for

if it fails to do so it loses its rationale as a characterization of how persons

should re ason . But now we must turn to pragmatics.

As will by now be eviden t, I use pragm atics in an enlarged sen se, according

to which the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is an artificial one

because definitions of key semantic notions such as truth are required to meet

pragmatic criteria of adequacy. Of course, this merely returns to the more

traditional philosophical sense of pragmatism, which stresses the practical

172



Rem arks on the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals

utility of holding true beliefs and which relates it to the contex tual factors

that are currently regarded as specifically pragmatic because it is dependent

on the contexts in which beliefs are held and acted upon or uttered. The current

usage of pragmatics focuses on utteran ce largely independen t of belief and

accep tance, but I can t be sure how im porta nt that is so far as concerns the

interpretation of V eltman s the ory, and it may be that I have been unduly

critical in the above com ments on the sem antica l aspect of the theory in

tacitly assuming that is the only aspect of the theory that has to do with belief

and action. In any event, interpreting his pragmatics as having implications

for belief and action, i.e., as having utilitarian implications, there is much

in that aspect of the theory which seems to me extremely good. I will point

out just one of what I regard as the theo ry s excellences in this respect, and

raise a methodological query.

It seems to me absolutely right to relate the conditions of correct utterance

of conditionals to what I would call practical m oda lities , namely the

musts

and mays that are discussed in their connection with conditionals in section

3 of Ve ltman s pa per. These are intrinsically epistemic ideas, as Ve ltman

stresses, and I am inclined to regard the exp ression of a practical

m ay

as describ-

ing a possibility that c an t be neglected und er given circumstances. Ve ltman s

theory admirably captures Straw son s intuition that the expression of a hypo-

thetical carries the implication of uncertainty concerning its antecedent, and

I see it as having great potential for dealing with the sadly neglected topic

of enthymemes involving conditionals, which are common patterns of reasoning

which d on t conform to this or that formal theory of validity. This leads to

the methodological query.

Why, given that the practical modalities in Veltm an s theory are epistemic

notio ns, as is indeed the whole theo ry since it is based on the idea of an informa-

tion state, are these ideas not quantified probabilistically in the way that is

now usual? The probabilistic formulation would also naturally accommodate

two things which don t fit in so easily with the static approach to seman tics.

One is that for the so-called unstable sentences of Veltman s theory their truth

values may change within a single information model. Value change is some-

thing more commonly associated with probability than with truth, and this

suggests that what Veltm an labels tru th may really be some thing like qualita-

tive probability by ano the r nam e. But making the probab ilities explicit and

quantitative would have several advantages, one of which for me would be

to make it possible to link Veltm an s theo ry with my efforts to account for

enthymematic reasoning involving conditionals along probabilistic lines

(Adams 1983). The other, and I think greater, advantage of an explicit probabi-

listic formulation would be that it would link up the theory more naturally

with the actions whose practical utility is involved in pragmatic criteria of ade-

quacy of definitions of truth and validity. In what follows I will turn from

explicit consideration of Ve ltm an s theo ry to unsystematic speculations on the

173



rnest

W

Adams

link between utte ranc e, acceptance and action, which I am suggesting the quan-

titative formulation would make possible and which involves aspects of Gricean

theory, of Bayesian decision theory, and my own theory of conditionals. This

will be discussed primarily with reference to the semiotic situa tion (with apolo -

gies to Professors Barwise and Perry) involving the Diner, the Observer and

the mushrooms previously described.

I think an adequate semiotics should be able to account for, and link, each

of four stages in the proces s involving the Observer, the Din er and the mush-

rooms, as follows:

(I) O having the tho ugh t he expresses to himself as O

t

:

If D eats the mu shrooms he will be poisoned

(II) O uttering the sentence O

s

:

If you eat the mu shroom s you will be poisoned

(III) D accepting O s statem ent and coming to the belief he expresses to

himself as D

t

:

If I eat the mushrooms I will be poisoned

(IV) D deciding not to eat the mushrooms. Of course there is more to the

story than this - for instanc e, D might initially have asked the question D

q

:

If I eat the mu shroom s will I be poisoned?

and D s decision will in turn have consequen ces; but w e may for now concen-

trate just on the four given stages. It is in explaining their causal connections

that the different theories mentioned above are involved, and we work back-

ward s, beginning with the link between D s thinking D

t

and his deciding not

to eat the m ushrooms.

Bayesian decision th eory (see Jeffrey 1983) is involved in explaining how

D s thinking D

t

led him to decide not to eat the mushrooms. Very roughly,

this decision is dete rm ined by two factors: D s de sires, particularly those for

the pleasant experience of eating nonpoisonous mushrooms and for not being

poisoned by poisonous ones, and his conditional degrees of belief as to the

chances of any of these consequences following if he eats the mushrooms.

In this case we can assume that being poisoned is overwhelmingly undesirable,

and the most imp ortant degree of belief factor is D s regarding the chances

of his being poisoned if he eats the mushrooms as high. Though it would be

overly simple to hold that the sentence that D expresses as D

t

means that

this probability is high , the tw o are clearly conne cted , since D s coming to

hold the belief he expresses as D

t

also led him to regard the chances in this

way and not eat the mushrooms. It is in explaining the connection between

the conten t of D

t

and the probability, that my own theory of conditionals

(Adam s 1975,1981) enters , though I cannot pursue this m atter in detail here.

The next causal link, moving backwards, is between O s utterance expressed

by O

s

and D s com ing to the belief D

t

, and it is in explaining this th at Grjce s

174



Remarks on the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals

theory of mean ing (G rice 1969) comes into play. O s utte ranc e is an assertive

speech act, the primary intention of which is to elicit a response in D, and

which employs certain means to achieve this end. Here we may assume that

O s inten tion w as just to induce D to hold the belief expressed as D

t

. According

to G rice s analysis, part of the m eans em ployed to bring this about is that

D should come to realize that this is what O intends him to think. This of

course is the point at which the meaning of the sentence O

s

comes into play,

since D s unde rstand ing of it is what enable s him to recognize w hat it is that

O wants him to think (of course the sentence O

s

has various nonstandard

usages, such as in irony and so on, but we can put those aside here). However,

just getting D to recognize that O

wants

him to come to accept D

t

is not

enough by itself to explain D s acceptance (that doe sn t give D a rea son

for holding this belief), and to complete the explanation we must bring in

other factors.

Very generally, we must take into account belief kinematics such as is dis-

cussed in Jeffrey

(1983:

ch. 11), since that is what is involved when D changes

from not thinking D

t

to thinking it. Passing over issues of great complexity,

the sort of belief change described in this theory must be brought about by

giving the believer rational reaso ns for changing his or her mind, and in D s

case they could not be his recognition of O s inten tions alone. What m ight

provide such sufficient reasons would be D s coming to think that O himself

holds the belief exp ressed as O

t

, and mo reover for reasons that D would accept.

One supposes that what O hopes for in uttering O

s

is that D will come to

think that O believes O

t

and for good reasons: O hopes that D will think

he is sincere and well-inform ed . Of course it is extreme ly difficult to exp lain

what it is that might make D think O is sincere and well-informed, and I

will only say that it seems to me most likely that this involves D s general

belief that O values his credibility - the very thing O needs if the primary

intentions of his speech acts are to have a chance of being realized - and

O w ouldn t risk tha t in a situation in which a lie or rash assertion could easily

be found out.

Moving back to th e step from O s having the thou ght h e expresses to himself

as O

t

to his asserting O

s

, we may not say that the thought causes the uttera nce ,

but it is clearly part of the explanation for it. We may imagine that another

important factor in the explanation is O s desire to be helpful (e.g. by respond-

ing to the question D

q

), and it is here th at Grice s conv ersational maxims

enter the picture. Again issues of great complexity are involved, and the only

one I will select to comment on has to do with the nature of the help that

D seeks and O offers. We might be inclined to think that what D really wants

is just to be told what to do - to eat or not to eat the mushrooms - and

that O is helping him by telling him in an oblique way not to eat the m ushroom s.

That might be the case in this situation, but there is a more interesting possibi-

lity. What D wants is to be placed in possession of information that will enable

175



rnest

W

Adams

him to make up his own mind whether or not to eat the mushrooms, and

that is what O provides him with in asserting O

s

. Though D presumably wants

to avoid being poisoned, O cannot be certain of this (D might be hoping to

experience some sort of ritual purification involving a bit of mushroom poison-

ing),

and whichever result D wants - to be poisoned or not - O helps him

to choose between eating the mu shrooms or not when he offers him the informa-

tion O

s

. The way in which this ethically neutral information helps D to make

his decision has already been commented on (in the step from stage III to

stage IV), but a special remark may be made about the character of this sort

of inform ation, which is not of the ruling out of possibilities type.

What is essential to the help that is given D in telling him O

s

is that D

comes to think th at th e chances of his being poisoned if he eats the m ushroom s

are high. A conditional probability becomes high, though nothing is ruled out

with com plete certainty , and that isn t im portant so far as concerns D s decision.

Reflecting on this shows the m istakenness of G rice s claim tha t asserting th e

conditional O

s

in circumstances in which O has good reason to think that D

won t eat the mu shroo ms (in fact what gives O good reason to think it is

that he knows he is going to assert O

s

) violates a maxim of quality. This is

because, though both are true, saying to D that he wouldn t eat the mushrooms

would give information of a much poorer quality than the conditional, since

it wo uldn t provide what D wa nts, namely information that will help him make

up his own mind whether or not to eat the mushrooms. Factual claims may

function to prov ide information of the conventionally conceived ruling out

of possibilities sort (and th at is wha t Grice presupposes in his theo ry of conver-

sation),

but here I am at least in general agreement with the ordered possible

worlds theorists that conditionals are not factual in any simple sense.

All of the foregoing is terribly sketchy and I would not want to have to

defend it in any of its details. However, I feel more confident of the Tightness

of the general a ppro ach, and in particular of the claim tha t an adeq uate semiotic

theory must involve aspects of speech act theory and of Bayesian decision

and belief change theo ry - and this must involve the probabilities of conditionals

when assertions and thoughts are expressed by them. The problem is to work

out the details, for as I see it, it is only by doing so that we will put ourselves

in a position to choose b etween rival analyses of conditionals and o ther contro-

versial forms. That is the fundamental import of the view that the distinction

between semantics and pragmatics is an artificial one, and the test of such

a composite theory of speech and action must be its ability to account for

semiotic processes such as those just discussed. This cannot be further deve-

loped he re , bu t I will end by describing a kind of tes t semiotic situation due

to Vann Mcgee (1984), which involves a striking counterexample to modus

ponens, and which an adequate theory should be able to explain. Except for

noting that the situation shows the untenability of the inference warran t theory

of conditionals (Toulm in 1958: 99), I will eschew co mm ent.

176



Remarks on the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals

Imagine two persons A and B looking into the murky waters of a shallow

lake whose depth they cannot judge. They dimly make out two forms swimming

near the bottom and A says to B There are two large fish B agrees and adds

Yes

and if they are fish then if they have lungs they are lungfish But neither

concludes by modus ponens that If

they

have lungs they are lungfish Whatever

the formulists may claim modus ponens is not the universal bedrock of reason-

ing that many have supposed it to be.

REFERENCES

Ad ams, Ernest. 1975.

T he

logic

of conditiona ls: an application of probability to deductive

logic. Dordrecht: R eidel.

Ada ms, Ernest. 1981. Tru th,

proof

and

conditionals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

10:340-53.

Ada ms, Ern est. 1983. Probabilistic enthyme mes. Journal of Pragmatics 7: 283-95.

Grice, H. Paul. 1969. Utterers meanings and intentions. Philosophical Review 78:

147-77-

Grice, H. Paul. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Syntax and sem antics VOL 3 Speech

acts ed. Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan . New York: Academ ic Press.

Jeffrey, Richard. 1983.

The logic of decision 2nd

edn. Chicago: U niversity

of

Chicago

Press.

Lewis, David. 1976. Proba bilities

of

conditionals

and

conditional probabilities.

Philoso-

phical Review 85:

297-315.

Mcgee, Vann. 1984.

A

counterexample

to

modus ponens. Journal

of

Philosophy

82:

462-71.

Tarsk i, Alfred. 1944. The seman tic conception

of

truth.

Philosophy and Phenomenologi-

cal Research 4.

Toulmin, Stephen. 1958.

The

uses

of argument.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

177



THE USE OF

CONDITIONALS IN INDUCEMENTS

A N D D E T E R R E N T S

•

Samuel

Fillenbaum

Editors' note.

Using data from

a

variety of experimental

tasks,

Fillen-

baum discusses threats, bribes, and promises phrased both con-

ditionally and disjunctively in terms of interrelations between

propositional content, speaker attitude, speech act and linguistic

structure. These topics are also of concern to Akatsuka, Greenberg,

Haiman, Konig, and especially Van der Auwera.

1.


I shall be concerned with the use of conditionals in inducements, conditional

promises and bribes, and their use in deterrents, conditional threats and warn-

ings.

1

This paper will examine the logic and possible phrasing of such conditio-

nals the principal function of which is purposive, i.e., constitutes an attempt

on the part of the speaker to get the addressee to do something (// you fix

the car I'll give you $100) or to refrain from doing something (// you come

any closer I'll shoot).

It is hoped that the account to be developed here will

provide an analysis for this special class of speech act conditionals, and serve

in some m easu re as a mo del for approaching the study of oth er sorts of conditio-

nals; also that some of the kinds of considerations that emerge as critical here,

e.g. the importance of knowledge of the contents of the

p

and

q

propositions

involved in the conditional, will be of more general relevance.

Conditional promises and threats clearly involve something more than the

statement of a contingency between the

p

and

q

propositions involved, more

even than the statemen t of some causal connection betw een these propositions.

Conditional promises and threats are essentially tied to their perlocutionary

effects on the addressee (Ad). The point of a conditional promise is not merely

to inform Ad of the good consequences to Ad of some action, but, rather,

to try to enforce that action by a (tacit) offer of these consequences. The

point of a conditional threat is not merely to tell Ad of the negative conse-

quences to Ad resulting from action on his or her part, but, rather, to deter

Ad from that action by warning of such consequences. An inducement or deter-

rent really amo unts to a speak er's request to A d to do or not do certain things,

toge ther with information spelling out conseq uences for Ad designed to enforce

the request. Principally, I shall be interested in determining when inducements

179



Samuel Fillenbaum

and deterrents may or may not be phrased with

if, and

and

or.

It is hoped

that this will reveal how the se op erato rs are used , as well as exhibiting som ething

of the role of incentives in persuasive com mu nication.

In the frame If p, q we may represent recognition of incentives starkly by

a 'plus' or 'minus' sign on the

q

proposition, thus symbolizing something that

the Ad wants or does not want to happen. If, indeed, recognition of the incen-

tives offered is critical to the un dersta ndin g of conditional prom ises and th rea ts,

this suggests that recogn ition of the con tent of the

q

proposition is indispensable

because, among other things, this will permit Ad to determine the signing

and extremity of signing of the q proposition. While most attention here will

be directed to the role of the rewards and punishments offered, knowledge

of the

p

proposition that permits the Ad to assess its signing and the extremity

of that signing is also highly relevant. Indeed, the relation between the p and

q propositions with regard to sign and degree will determine the plausibility

of any attempt at inducing or deterring action, and therefore presumably the

outcom e of any such a ttem pt.

From the perspective of the psychologist, let me make two kinds of com-

ments, first something substantive and then something more methodological.

The role of rewards and punishments as 'regulators of human conduct' has

a long history outside of psychology proper. Within psychology, substantively

and conceptually, there has been enormous concern with the ways in which

rewards and punishments may be used in seeking to control and modify action

and be hav iour . A nd , in so far as incentives are verbally offered, psychologists,

although hardly any would use the terminology, have been concerned with

what speech act theorists might call the perlocutionary effects of an utterance

on the target or addressee. So, in this area the substantive concerns of the

psychologist and of the speech act philosopher readily come together (although

the concep tual framew orks within which they work may differ).

I have already pointed out that Ad's ability to recognize the nature and

extremity of the incentive being offered requires - indeed takes for granted

- an understanding of the content of the q proposition. K nowledge of semantic

content is thus absolutely essential if Ad is to be able to determine whether

the speaker is trying to get him to do something (the content of/?) or is trying

to deter him from doing that. Very likely, propositional content figures in

additional ways in the proper understanding of these and other conditionals.

2

Historically, in the study of conditionals by psychologists, especially with reg ard

to the understanding of conditionals in reasoning and inferential tasks, the

dom inant tenden cy has been to purge conditionals of semantic content as much

as possible. Attempts have been made to come as close as possible to the

syntactic frame If p, q, with p and q often quite arbitrary and unrelated, as

if they were almost dummy propositions. More recently, even in this domain,

matters of substantive semantic content have been addressed, and, m ore gener-

ally, there has come to be much concern with semantic memory, world know-

180



The use of conditionals in inducements and deterrents

ledge and assumptions about communicative conventions which affect under-

standing (on these matters see Fillenbaum 1977b, 1978). The present chapter,

as will be obv ious, is in this latter m od e.

Now to the methodological comment: I think it is part of the professional

formation, or perhaps deformation, of psychologists that they try to get data

or information in various ways from subjects other than themselves. Psycholo-

gists want to fiddle with things experimentally, to manipulate things, to see

what does or does not make a difference, and so on. Indeed, with regard

to the study of conditionals, there are all sorts of ways to investigate how

such sentences are understood and used. It is perfectly possible to ask people

to make judgements of equivalence - whether or not two sentences are the

same in meaning. It is perfectly possible to give people sentences, ask them

for paraphrases, and to examine properties of their productions. It is perfectly

possible to give people sentences and ask them to classify or categorize them,

specifying the kinds of categories to be employed. It is perfectly possible to

give people pairs of sentences and to ask whethe r, un der norm al circumstances,

given the first one would infer the second. It is perfectly possible to have

people m emorize sentences and then to look at their performance on a recogni-

tion task, with particular attention to the systematic errors made. All of the

above tasks, as well as others (e.g. procedures looking at response latencies)

have indeed been used in the study of conditionals (see Fillenbaum 1978).

I want to consider the overall shape of the results yielded by such techniques

with regard to inducements and deterrents in particular, and to see what sort

of an account these results de man d.

The analysis will seek to interpret the phenomena in terms of pragmatic

factors such as the context in which inducements and deterrents are offered,

as well as their communicative function as attempts to control the behaviour

of Ad, a function which depends on certain assumptions held in common

between the speaker (Sp) and Ad. Some suggestions will be made about infer-

ences that may be drawn from inducements and deterrents phrased as condi-

tionals, and the relation holding between inducements and deterrents phrased

as conditional sentences, conjunctive sentences and disjunctive sentences.

Essentially, all this concerns the relation between the logical form and the

illocutionary force of certain kinds of sentences that figure importantly in

attempts at manipulating the beh aviour of others.

I shall be concerned with one class of purposive uses of the conditional.

What is said explicitly appears to involve a causal connection. Given

If p,

q, p on your part will be the cause of q on my part. What is implicit and

primary, however, is a purposive or an intentional notion because q on my

part is really being 'offered' to get something done or not done with regard

to p on your part. This purposive or intentional notion is what defines an

inducement or deterrent as such. I shall try to show that the relations holding

among propositions phrased with

if, and,

and

or

are systematically affected

181




and contingent upon his or her own action, which Sp is seeking to control

through the inducement or deterrent offered. The conversational implicature

follows quite directly if Ad assumes that Sp is conforming to the maxim of

quantity in saying no less than is appropriate to the circumstances. So in this

context, the fallacious invited inference is not only plausible, but not to make

it would appear at best foolish, if not perverse.

2.2 Inferences:

if not

and

unless

We have just seen that in the case of a proposition and its obverse (e.g. the

relation between

Ifp, q

and

If not

p,

not q)

inducements and deterrents behave

in a very similar fashion, the invited inference being accepted overwhelmingly;

and I have indicated why this ought to be so in terms of

a

Gricean conversational

analysis. Now I want to look at another case involving inducements and deter-

rents, those phrased with

if not

and

unless,

where they behave rather differently

with regard to the acceptability of invited inferences. For deterrents (condi-

tional threats),

if not

and

unless

propositions are seen as very tightly related

(following from each other 86 per cent and 90 per cent of the time, respectively).

For inducements (conditional promises), the relationship is considerably

weaker

{if not

and

unless

propositions follow from each other only 52 per

cent and 59 per cent of the time, respectively).

3

How can one explain these

results, which reveal substantial and significant differences between deterrents

and inducements?

Propositions phrased with if not and unless often appear intimately related,

if not equivalent. However, compelling arguments have been offered by Geis

(1973) against the identification of unless with if not. Rather, Geis offers as

a gloss for

Unless p, q

something like under all circumstances except p,

q'

or in any event other than

p, q\

Why should

if not

and

unless

statements,

nevertheless, often appear to be intimately related? Recourse to a principle

of invited inference may help toward providing an explanation. Start with:

(1) Ifnotp,q

which readily invites the inference of its obverse:

(2) Ifp,notq

Taken together (1) and (2) license:

(3) Only if p , not q

and:

(4) Only if not p,q

both of which are consistent and compatible with Geis s gloss of

unless

as:

(5) under all circumstances except p, q

183



Samuel Fillenbaum

with (4) doing this directly and (3) doing it indirectly by focusing on the only

circumstance,/?, unde r which q would not result. W hich of these is the preferred

understanding of

unless

propositions? Fillenbaum (1976) gives some reasons

in terms of behaviour under sentence negation for choosing (3) Only if p,

not q, w herea s Clark and C lark (1977: 457) opt for (4) O nly if not p q. Perhaps

consideration of the results from the invited inference task may allow us to

decide between these alternatives, and also reveal something about the kinds

of knowledge involved in, and necessary for, understanding.

First consider conditional threats or warnings (If notp, q-) where an utter-

ance such as If you don't give me your money I'll kill you can readily be para-

phrased as, or license the inference to,

Unless you give me your m oney I'll

kill you. On the rendering of unless as :

(3' ) On ly if

p ,

not q -

th e

unless

phrasing leads to such an interpretation as

Only if you give me

your money, I won't kill you which quite directly specifies what Sp wants Ad

to do and also indicates this as the unique condition under which q- will

not occur. On this account the

unless

version is indeed very close to the original

phrasing with

if not,

where Sp is trying to get Ad to do

p

and seeks to enforce

that action by the threat of q—. On the rendering of Unless p, q— as:

(4') Only if not p, q -

th e

unless

phrasing leads to such an interpretation as

Only if you don't give

me your money, I w ill kill you. Sp would seem to be conc erned w ith the variety

of circumstances where q— will hold rather than the unique circumstance under

which it doesn't hold, which in fact Sp is trying to bring about. So on this

rendering, the if not and unless versions do appear different in some respects,

and should not overwhelmingly be regarded the one as leading to the other.

The fact that they are so regarded therefore argues against (4')

Only if not

p q-

and supports (3')

Only if p, not q-,

on which account the results are

as expected, as the m ore app ropriate rendering of unless.

Next consider inducements or conditional promises (If not p, q+), where

a sentence such as //

you don't give me a ticket I'll give you 20

does not

seem to be quite properly paraphrased by Unless you give me a ticket I'll give

you 20. The latter sentence seems to suggest that in the ordinary run of things

Sp would give Ad the $20 and only a ticket could prevent Sp from doing

that, something strange and not to be expected, given our knowledge of the

ways of the world. In contrast, the source promise makes it clear that the

bribe is being offered just to avoid a ticket and has very much the force of

Only if you don't give me a ticket will I give you 20, rather than Only if

you give me a ticket won't I give you 20.

On the Clarks' account where

Unless

p,q+ is glossed as;

(4 ) On ly if no t p , q +

184




th e unless sentence should be understood as O nly if you don't give me a ticket

will I give you 20 which does indeed appea r to be a proper or close rendering

of the original or source inducement. Hence, if this is right, one might expect

inducements phrased as

Unless

p,q+ and If not p, q+ to be acceptable infer-

ences from each other. The fact that this is often not the case would thus

seem to tell against the Clarks' account. On Fillenbaum's account where Unless

p,q+ is glossed as

(3 ) Only if

p ,

not q+

the unless sentence should be understood as Only if you give me a ticket won't

I

give

you

20 which I have suggested abov e in importa nt respects m isrepresents

the source inducement. So, on this account, one might expect inducements

phrased as

Unless

p, q+ and If not p, q+ often not to be acceptable inferences

from each other. This is what was found, and may be taken as providing some

me asure of sup port for Fillenbau m's acc ount. Thu s in the context both of threa ts

and promises as attempts to control or manipulate behaviour, the rendering

of

unless

as (3) Only ifp, not q seems to be the more app ropriate o ne.

4

Th e main po int of the foregoing is not th at it provides any definitive groun ds

for choosing the one account for unless over the other, although it may be

of some suggestive value on that sc ore, nor th at it provides any sort of a deq uate

or complete analysis of why the relation between

if not

and

unless

is much

closer for deterrents than inducements, although the findings are consistent

with the suggestions that I have offered. R ath er, it should be of interest because

it again highlights the role of our know ledge of the ways of the world in interp re-

tation and understanding. One does not generally assume that good things

will be offered without special reason, and that only some action on the part

of Ad might choke off the flow from the cornucopia (the traffic ticket example).

Further, it suggests that communicative strategies may affect both phrasing

and understanding . Th us, if Unless

p, q

is glossed as 'in all circumstances other

than/?, q, an d if 'all circumstances o the r tha n/ ?' would characteristically consti-

tute a much larger set than p, then given the choice between Only if p, not

q

and

Only if not p, q

as renderings of

unless,

the former may come to be

preferred just because it specifies things more precisely and specifically by

using the language of (the unique) exception.

2.3 Th e phrasing of inducem ents and deterren ts with

if, and,

and

or

Now consider the relations holding among inducements and d eterrents phrased

with if, and and or, and how thes e relations are systematically affected, depe nd-

ing on whether an inducement or deterrent is involved. To justify this interest

in the phrasing of inducements and deterrents as conjunctives and disjunctives,

a word is first needed on the results yielded by the paraphrase task for all

sorts of conditionals. Both conditional promises and conditional threats were

185



Samuel Fillenbaum

Table I. The phrasing o f inducemen ts and

deterrents

Promises Threats

If you fix

the car

I'll

give

you

100

If you

come any closer

I'll

shoot

( 2 ) p A N D q + ( 2 ) p A N D q -

(3) p OR not q+ (3) *p OR not q -

(4) *not p OR q+ (4) not p OR q -

Note: The ' + ' or ' —' sign indicates desirability or undesirability of q for the addressee and

*

indicates that the p araphrase is not accep table and in some ways strange .

quite commonly paraphrased with arcd-statements, and were just about the

only kinds of conditionals that elicited such paraphrases. Conditional promises

were very rarely parap hrased with or-sen tences, while conditional thre ats w ere

very often paraphrased as disjunctives. This was especially common if they

involved a negatively stated antecedent proposition (thus statements like //

you don't shut up, I'll hit you were more often than not paraphrased as some-

thing like Shut up or I'll hit you).

A conditional promise phrased with

if (If you fix the car I'll give you 100)

can readily be paraphrased with and (Fix the car and I'll give you 100). The

same holds for a conditional threat (// you come any closer Fll shoot may

be paraphrased with and as C ome any closer and Fll shoot). But what happens

when one attempts to phrase or paraphrase these as disjunctives? In the case

of the conditional promise, one might paraphrase If you fix the car I'll give

you 100 as Fix the car or I won't give you 100. While this is acceptable

and coherent as an attempt to elicit a particular action, it appears to differ

from its source sentence in one important respect: the source sentence is a

conditional promise while the disjunctive paraphrase above is really a sort

of conditional threat, involving the conditional withholding of an incentive

as con trasted with its conditional offer in the // ph rasing. If, on the oth er han d,

one negates the first proposition in an attempt at a disjunctive paraphrase,

one gets Don't fix the car or I'll give you 100 which is not an acceptable

para ph rase of the source // sentence. M oreo ver, it is strange and almo st incoher-

ent to boot (why this should be will be discussed below). Now, how about

phrasing a deterrent disjunctively?

Nega ting the first propo sition yields Don't come any closer or I'll shoot which

is coherent and a perfectly acceptable paraphrase of // you come any closer

I'll shoot.

On the other hand, negating the second proposition leads to

Come

any closer or I won't shoot which is both unacceptable as a paraphrase and

a somewhat strange and puzzling statement. Thus, in paraphrases with or,

inducements and deterrents behave very differently. This is laid out for refer-

ence in table 1.

The results from the equivalence judgement task are completely consistent

186



Samuel Fillenbaum

they differ in that the if version tries to do this by promising an incentive

while the or version seeks to do it by threatening the withdrawal of that incen-

tive.

Here I have presented some data or phenomena; what is needed now is

an analysis that accounts for the ways in which inducements and deterrents

may or may not be phrased, and which exhibits some of the implicit rules

that govern the purposive use of conditionals as well as revealing how expec-

tations about consequences affect the form and phrasing of such conditionals.

I shall try to sketch out such an analysis, working mainly from the point of

view of Ad, just because inducements or deterrents are 'essentially tied' to

perlocutionary effects. They constitute attempts to get Ad to do something

or refrain from doing something via 'enforcers', positive or negative incentives

which are explicitly spelt out.

Begin with the simple (perhaps tautological) assumption that Ad wants to

get good outcomes and to avoid bad outcomes. Assume further that Ad has

the requisite knowledge that allows him or her to recognize the properties

of the outcome that is actually being offered (i.e. to determine the sign and

extremity of signing of the

q

propo sition ). Then an inducem ent will be effective

in so far as Ad wants q+ enough to do something, /?, in exchange (with p

not too costly, or at least less costly than q+ is valuable). A deterrent will

be effective in so far as Ad wants to avoid

q—

enough to not do something,

p

in exchange (with p not too valuable, or at least less valuable than q—

is costly). With this in mind, consider the phrasing of inducements and deter-

rents w ith

if, and,

and

or.

2.4 Interp retat io n of induc eme nts and deter rents phrased as condit ionals

First consider the if phrasing. An inducement phrased with if will have the

form If p, q+. Recognizing q+ for what it is, viz. that it is positively signed

and is therefo re d esirab le, A d might employ a legitimate argum ent form, m odus

ponens, and affirm the antecedent; Ad wants g+, Ad has just been told that

tf P* <7

+

holds, so Ad does p and q+ will follow. Note that even in this case

Ad must go beyond what is said, i.e. Ad must recognize that Sp wants him

or her not just to notice the contingency between p and q+ but also to act,

and enact p (for which Ad is being offered the incentive or bribe of q+).

5

A deterrent phrased with Z/

7

will have the form If p q-. Recognizing q— for

what it is, viz. that it is negatively signed, and wishing to avoid it, what is

Ad to do? By enacting p, Ad will get just what is not wanted. So a direct

use of modus ponens is out. But by conforming to Gricean maxims, Ad will

readily lapse, or better, rise into a 'fallacious' invited inference, namely //

not p, not q— will be inferred from If p q— . If Ad then commits something

amounting to modus ponens, not q—, the desired outcome is reached. Given

that the invited inference h ere is very seductive (and inde ed, as repo rted earlier,

188




overwhelmingly seduces our subjects), and given that reasoning conforming

to modus ponens is quite easy for subjects (see Wason and Johnson-Laird

1972),

the above seem s a plausible a ccoun t.

With regard to conditional promises (inducements) and conditional threats

(deterre nts), the imp ortant point m ay not so much be that a deterrent involves

an extra inferential step beyond what is required for an inducement (via a

Gricean-sanctioned invited inference), but rather that bo th deterren ts and indu-

cements can be explained only on some theory of indirect speech acts. This

theory needs to show how an addressee can or

must

understand an explicitly

phrased conditional, or conjunctive or disjunctive, as amounting to a request

to do or not do p (enforced by means of the incentive offered in q). I do

not know of any such account for inducements or deterrents corresponding

to ,

or analogous to, the account developed for requests and categorical pro-

mises,

e.g. in Searle (1969). Perh aps the 'accou nt of categorical promises . . .

can easily be extended to deal with hypothetical ones' (1969: 56), but this

still needs to be done. (See some comments and suggestions on this issue in

Van der Auwera, this volume.) Among other things, such an analysis will

have to take into account the ways in which Ad's wanting or not wanting

q

will get Ad to do or refrain from doing

p.

A Gricean notion of 'relevance'

may operate her e, since the content of the p p roposition is particularly relevant

for Sp and that of the q proposition for Ad, with the conditional nexus or

link between p and q providing a device to mesh the separate goals and desires

of

Sp

and A d.

2.5 Interp retat ion of inducem ents and deterren ts phrased as

conjunctives and disjunctives

Next consider the and phrasing. The form sp and q+ and/? and q— are presum-

ably und erstoo d with and as an ordere d or asym metric causal or ca usal-tempo ral

operator which directly exhibits the consequences of doing p, whether these

be positive or negative. So in the first case, wanting q+ you do /?, and in

the second case , wan ting to avoid q- you refrain from doing p.

Finally, consider the

or

phrasing, which is perhaps the most interesting and

revealing case. Used in the context of inducements or deterrents, the form

p or q involves an asymmetric use of or with the force of otherwise. If an

inducement or deterrent is to be appropriately phrased as a disjunctive, it

must begin with a command that explicitly expresses what Sp wants Ad to

do, and then it must present, as an alternative, the relatively bad outcome

which will result from not going along with the command. Only if the second

proposition has a negative force, either q— or not q+, can it serve to make

Ad take the other alternative, and thus function adequately as an inducement

or deterrent.

First consider inducements or conditional promises phrased disjunctively,

say a source promise of the form

If p, q+

which is phrased as

p or not q+

189



Samuel Fillenbaum

(Fix the car or I won't give you 100). This disjunctive version is sensible:

Ad wants

q+

so will not wish to take the second alternative,

not q+\

thus

there is an incentive to take the first alternative, p. Next consider a rendering

of If p, q+ with or that negates the first proposition, namely Not p or q+

(Don't fix the car or I'll give you 100).

This is puzzling and almost inco here nt,

and in any case must be ineffective. Since you want

q+

, that constitutes a

desirable alternative, and there is no reason at all to choose the other alterna-

tive, not p. An inducement of the form Not p or q+ is additionally strange

in that it appears to command

not p

in circumstances where you as Ad will

generally know that Sp really wants to elicit

p.

So this is a case where Sp

appears to be commanding or requesting an action that Sp does not want,

and offering as an alternative, to enforce this request, something that Ad does

want. Such a statement is incoherent and useless as an inducement, and at

the very least is in violation of Grice's maxim of manner (which, among other

things, requires Sp to avoid obscurity).

Certainly such a statement may appear at first to be incoherent or perverse

and to violate all sorts of assumptions governing the logic of conversation,

even the very basic assumption of a cooperative speaker. But just because

such an assumption is absolutely basic, it may force a reinterpretation of the

apparently incoherent or perverse statement. Let me comment on this issue

in terms of an example offered by Van der Auwera (this volume) which essen-

tially represents the same case and problem. Open the window or I'll kiss

yo u would appear to be an incoherent and ineffective inducement to open

the window, based on the usual assumption that being kissed is desirable.

This would have the force of

p or q+

and, both in terms of my account and

in terms of Van der Auwera's analysis, should be ineffective in moving Ad

to take the first alternative: But hearing this statement, I am very much driven

to identifying the speaker as a Grendel monster rather than a Marlene Dietrich

(or locating the utterance in a scenario where a little girl is talking to a little

boy who is at an age and stage where there is nothing worse than being kissed

by a little girl). Th us , if we modify the assu mption that being kissed is desirable

to the assum ption that b eing kissed is terrib le, this becom es a fairly conve ntional

deterrent phrased in a disjunctive form porq- (for analysis of tha t see be low ).

Thus, given a choice between regarding some statement as perverse and inco-

herent with the usual interpretation as to the meaning and signing of

q,

and

having it coherent and sensible with an extraordinary interpretation, which

may require an unusual or very special scenario or contextualization, we may

be very much tempted by the latter alternative, and we may embrace that

temptation. This may be yet further testimony to the great robustness of our

assumptions about the cooperativeness of speakers, and of the richness of our

know ledge of the wo rld, as well as our ingenuity in marshalling tha t know ledge

in an attem pt to m ake sense of things and put things into a cohe rent framework

- all of which goes far beyond issues of strictly seman tic knowledg e.

190




After this aside, and before turning to deterrents phrased as disjunctives,

one additional comment is warranted on why it is difficult, if not impossible,

to phrase co nditional prom ises disjunctively. If a promise is to remain a promise

when phrased disjunctively, then the second proposition in the or sentence

must have a positive force, i.e. it must be either q+ or not q-. But if the

second proposition has such a positive force, then it loses any incentive value

to getting Ad to take the first alternative. Since Ad can always advantageously

take the second o r positive altern ative , such stateme nts cann ot serve as sensible

or plausible inducem ents to get Ad to take the first alterna tive.

Now look at deterrents phrased disjunctively. As has already been pointed

out, the first disjunct amounts to an imperative and the second disjunct is

a statemen t of conseq uence s for A d, w hose role it is to enforce the first disjunct,

i.e. to get Ad to obey the order by choosing the first disjunct. So consider

a source threat of the form

If p, q—

which is phrased

Not p or q— (Don't

come any closer or I'll shoot). You as Ad are being presented with two alterna-

tives, one of which will come about - you are to choose. You don't want

q~,

by hyp othesis, so the re is some incentive to take the other altern ative,

not p.

And everything seems sensible and reasonable enough in this version

where the first proposition is negated. But what happens if the second proposi-

tion is negated in a disjunctive form, resulting in p or not q— (Come (any)

closer or I won't shoot)?

Since you want to avoid

q—

,

not q—

constitutes a

desirable alternative and th ere is no reaso n to tak e the first disjunct, p. Indeed,

a deterrent of the form p or not q- is addition ally strange in tha t it seems

to command

p

as an alternative in circumstances w here you as Ad will generally

know that Sp is really trying to elicit

not p.

The whole point of a deterrent

is to get Ad t o choo se the first disjunct desired by Sp by offering as an alternative

in the second disjunct consequences that are unacceptable to Ad. Therefore,

a threat of the form

p or not q-

where Sp comm ands an action he does not

want and offers as an alternative something that Ad does want, must appear

incoheren t and useless. The argum ent h ere is exactly parallel to that concerning

induc em ents, and the same com men t also holds here abou t our strong proclivity

to contextualize app arently incoherent statements so as to make them coherent

and sensible.

2.6 Disjunctive phrasing reveals wh ethe r an uttera nce is

an inducement or deterrent

In all the foregoing I have assumed that an understanding of the

q

proposition

will permit Ad to determine its signing and the extremity of that signing, and

thus to know whe ther Sp is trying to induce or dete r Ad from doing som ething,

as embodied in the

p

proposition. But on occasion, at least to a third-party

audience, matters may be qu ite opaque or obscure as to whether an inducement

or deterrent is being offered. I should like to point out that while both the

191



Samuel Fillenbaum

phras ings with // and

and

maintain this opacity, the ph rasing with

or

can pro vide

a diagnostic frame to indicate what is in fact involved. Consider the following

example: Professor to student: If you date my daughter you will get a C in

the course or Date my daughter and you will get a C in the coursed Is Sp

trying to get Ad, who is an F student, to date his daughter offering the C

(up)grade as an inducement or bribe, or is Sp trying to deter Ad, who is an

A stu dent, from dating Sp's daughter by threatening to give the C as a (down)

grade? As an outsider one cannot tell from the

if

and

and

versions (although

presumably Ad, who is privy to all sorts of additional knowledge about Ad's

own status, knows). But now consider the possible disjunctive phrasings: If

Sp says Date my daughter or you wont get a C in the course, it has to be

an (attempt at) inducement, of the legitimate form

p or not q+

(and we may

infer that Ad is a D or F student). Whereas if Sp says Don't date my daughter

or you will get a C in the course it has to be a conditional threat or deterrent

of the legitimate form

Not p or q-

(and Ad must be a B or A studen t).

The general point is that given the assumption of a cooperative speaker who

is producing something that is sensible and coherent, and given knowledge

of how inducements and deterrents may be phrased disjunctively - and that

they have to be phrased differently as disjunctives - the particular disjunctive

phrasing em ployed will reveal or betray th e natu re of the speech act involved.

2.7 K now ledge of q is not en ough ; p also counts

With regard to the understanding of inducements and deterrents, however

phrased, I have concentrated so far on the understanding of the

q

proposition

which permits Ad to determine its sign and thus further to determine whether

Sp is trying to induce Ad to do something or to deter Ad from doing it. But

as has already been hinted, and as must in any case be obvious, for a promise

or threat to be plausible it is not sufficient simply that the q proposition be

appropriately signed, positively or negatively, for Ad. The sign and the extre-

mity of the signing of the p proposition and the relation between the values

of the signs of the p and q propositions must also be considered. If you do

that I'll give you 100 may be a commonplace sort of inducement with p as

a sort of dummy proposition of unspecified or zero sign; but matters become

quite different if p is (extremely) negatively signed for Ad. Thus if that is

break your mother's arm, the resulting If you break your mother's arm I'll

give you 100 is ludicrous and presumably ineffective as an inducement, just

because of the disproportion between the extreme cost of the act being

demanded of Ad and the moderate value of the incentive being offered. If

Sp believes Ad to be some sort of utilitarian who weighs the costs and values

of various courses of action, then for an inducement to be effective for Ad

the absolute positive value of q needs to be greater than the absolute negative

value of p. In the case of a deterrent, the absolute negative value of q needs

192




to be greater than the absolute positive value of p. In general, inducements

or threats that involve a disproportion in value are not likely to be effective,

and therefore are not likely to be offered by Sp with realistic hopes of getting

his or her way. Examples are cases in which the action being sought has a

greater cost than the value of the incentive being offered, or where the action

being forbidden has a greater value than the cost of the punishment being

threatened. Such inducements and deterrents are not likely to be encountered

under normal circumstances and, if encountered, presumably ought to be

regarded as strange or extraordinary. Any such assessment of relative values

and costs obviously req uires that people understand the contents of the

p

and

q propositions sufficiently to be able to do just that. This again means going

far beyond treating p and q as dummy propositions in some syntactic frame

or inferential schema.

In fact, people are sensitive to 'felicity' conditions on inducem ents and deter-

rents,

i.e. conditions that must be met if an inducement or deterrent is to

be pragmatically appropriate or plausible (the work I mention briefly below

can be found fully reported in Fillenbaum 1977a). Subjects judged certain

patterns of signing to represent more or less normal sentences, whereas others

were regarded as strange or extraordinary. Thus, sentences of the form //

p — q++ (If you get up very early I'll take you fishing) a n d / / / ? + , q— ( / /

you goof off any more I'll fire you)

which may be taken to represent fairly

comm on, ordinary sorts of inducements and deterren ts were judged to be nor-

mal or ordinary on the average 87 per cent and 80 per cent of the time, respec-

tively. Sentences of the form

If p

— ,

q+ (If you break your mother's arm

Til give you 100)

and / / / ?+ + ,

q— (If you save the child's life I'll spit in

your face) seem perverse and presumably ought to be ineffective in controlling

the behaviour of Ad, since the reward offered in the inducement is much less

than the cost involved, and since the punishment offered in the deterrent is

far less than the positive value of the act being forbidden. Indeed, sentences

of these kinds were on the average judged extraordinary 75 per cent and 60

per cent of the time, respectively. Other results were also consistent with a

general condition on the pragmatic plausibility of inducements and deterrents

in terms of the relation betw een the value /c o st of the act being requ ested

or forbidden and the value /c o st of the incentive being offered.


The work presented here has a simple moral, which qua moral may be read

as a quite general lesson toward the study of all sorts of conditionals. It has

been shown for the limited domain of speech act conditionals used in induce-

ments and deterrents that knowledge of the contents of the component p and

q propositions is essential to proper understanding. Further, that a pragmati-

cally oriented analysis which considers the social context in which a speech

193



Samuel Fillenbaum

act occurs and the role it serves in that context is necessary. Also, that one

needs to develop an account in terms of the purposes of the speaker and of

the understanding of those purposes by the addressee. In short, one needs

to determine what Sp is trying to do by saying what Sp does, and one needs

to examine how the illocutionary point of a proposition may control its logical

form and manifest expression. Finally, it seems very possible that all of the

above hold not just for uses of conditionals in inducements and deterrents,

but in the uses of conditionals quite generally.

NOTES

1 This pap er is largely based on work repo rted fully in Fillenbaum (1976,19 77a, 1978).

2 Consider (after Ducrot

1972) the

difference between Will

you go for a

walk

if

the

weather is beautiful? and Will you go for a walk if the weather is filthy?,

where

the

former

is

taken

as

representing

an

implicative relation

and the

latter

a

concessive

one. Ducrot argues very plausibly that

the

interpretation

is

implicative only

if the

interlocutor considers

p

as a condition favourable to

q

and it is concessive only if

it is admitted that

p

would ordinarily lead to

not q.

So again, what is important

is the semantic content of

p

and

q

and the relation between these contents taken

in the context of our extralinguistic knowledge of the world and how we conduct

ourselves in it.

3 These results are consistent w ith tho se yielded by the paraphra se task, w here induce-

ments were m uch less likely than deterren ts to be paraph rased with unless.

4 The suggestions offered h ere as to the relation between if not and

unless

for

conditional

promises and thr ea ts differ from thos e offered in Fillenbaum (1976), where what

Sp wants Ad to do or not do was taken as defining the emphasis or focus in an

inducement statement. The two sorts of accounts draw a ttention to different aspects

of the speech act situation and of relevant background assumptions or knowledge,

and are not necessarily incompatible.

5

Consider

how

close

I ll give you 10 0 if y ou fix the car is to I ll give you 10 0 to

fix

the car, and how

difficult

it is to

identify

and

delimit precisely

the way in

which

these two expressions differ in illocutionary point.

6 I owe this exam ple to Charles Fillmore.

REFERENCES

Clark, Herbert H., and Eve V. Clark. 1977.

Psychology

and

language.

New York:

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Du crot, Oswald. 1972.

Dire etnepas dire.

Paris: Herma nn.

Fillenbaum, S amuel. 1975. IF: some uses.

Psychological

Research

37:

245-60.

Fillenbaum, Samuel. 1976. Inducements: on the phrasing and logic of conditional pro-

mises, threats, and warnings.

Psychological

Research 38 : 231-50.

Fillenbaum, Samuel. 1977a. A condition on plausible inducements.

L anguage and Speech

20:136-41.

Fillenbaum, Samuel. 1977b. Mind your p s and q s: the role of content and context

in some uses of and,

or,

an d

if.

n The psychology

of

learning and motivation, V O L

11, ed. Gordon Bower, 41-100. New York: Academic Press.

Fillenbaum, Samuel. 1978. How to do some things with IF . In Semantic factors in cogni-

194



10

C O N D I T I O N A L S

AND SPEECH ACTS

•


Editors' note.

The interaction of conditionals with assertions, ques-

tions and imperatives is considered with a view to determining how

conditionals are understood. Van der Auwera's discussion of the

interpretations of conditionals as threats and promises or as conces-

sives,

and of coordinate constructions as conditionals, provides direct

links

with chapters by Fillenbaum, Haiman, and Konig.

1.


In this chapter I will discuss the following four q uestio ns:

(i) Is there a difference between conditional speech acts and speech

acts about conditionals?

(ii) Is supposing a separate speech ac t?

(iii) Why is it that an interrogative if is easily interpretable as even

iff

(iv) How is it that ap par ent imperative-arcd-assertion and im perative-

or-assertion constructions such as (i) contain a conditional mean-

ing?

(i) T ak e tha t job or I'll leave you

What these problem s have in common is that they essentially involve the in terac-

tion of speech acts and conditionals.

1

Before I start I must say something about limitations and methodology.

First, speech acts will be discussed at a very general level. Although one can

do thousands of things with words, I assume that most, if not all, speech acts

are at some level of description assertions, questions, or imperatives. Therefore

these three speech acts are basic (see Van der Auwera 1980). It is the relation

between basic speech act notions and conditionals that is at issue in this paper.

Second, many conditionals are ambiguous or vague between what one can

call 'indeterminacy' and 'contingency' readings. When something is indetermi-

nate, it is possibly true and possibly false, but as such neither true nor false.

When something is contingent, it is neither necessary nor impossible. Consider

this distinction for the following conditional about the species of kangaroos:

(2) If a kan garo o has no tail, it topp les over

197



Johan

Van

derAuwera

In its indeterminacy reading, (2) says that it is possibly true and possibly false

that kangaroos have no tails; the speaker (Sp) doesn't know, or pretends not

to know, too much about kangaroos. In its contingency reading, (2) says that

it is a contingent, i.e. non-necessary, feature of individual kangaroos that they

have no tails (the speaker kno ws, or preten ds to know, that there are kangaroo s

with tails, and kangaroos without). For reasons of space, I will not analyse

the relation between the two readings (see Van der Auwera 1985: 203-13)

and will concentrate on inde terminacy readings. Third, each of the phen om ena

to be discussed is somewhat odd. How should one deal with odd phenomena?

One piece of advice was offered more than a century ago by C. S. Peirce;

he formulated the following Practical Maxim of Logic:

Facts cannot be explained by a hypothesis more extraordinary than those facts them-

selves; and of various hypotheses the least extraordinary must be adopted. (1982: 452,

lecture notes of 1865)

I further assume that an hypothesis becomes less extraordinary the more it

relies on, or generalizes over, hypotheses that are independently needed in

the account of the o rdinary.

2. C O N D I T I O N A L S P E E C H A C T S O R S P E E C H A C T S

A B O U T C O N D I T I O N A L S ?

2 1

Consider the following dialogues:

(3) If you inh eri t, will you invest?

Yes

(4) If you saw Jo hn , did you talk to him?

Yes

The point of interest lies in the way the addressee (Ad) would normally expand

on this yes. In (3) Ad wo uld normally affirm the entire cond itional:

(3 ') If you inh erit , will you invest?

Yes, if I inhe rit, I will invest

In (4) this kind of expansion is strange; it seems more natural for Ad to assent

to the truth of both the pro tasis and a pod osis, or just to affirm the ap odosis:

(4') If you saw Jo hn , did you talk to him?

Yes, if I saw h im, I talke d to him

(4") If you saw Jo hn , did you talk to him?

Yes,

I saw him an d I talked to him

(4'") If you saw Jo hn , did you talk to him?

198



Conditionals and speech acts

Yes, I talked to him

The distinction between the yes of (3') and that of (4'") has led Holdcroft

(1971:

129; see also Zuber 1983: 100-1) to think that Sp in (4'") takes it for

granted that Ad saw John; Sp only wants to know whether Ad talked to John.

According to Holdcroft, the //"-question in (4'"), in contradistinction to that

of (3'), is not really a question about a conditional; it is instead a conditional

question. In a conditional question, Holdcroft claims, one only asks whether

the apodosis is true, yet the very act of asking is presented as dependent on

the condition that th e protasis is true .

2

If a distinction betw een speech acts abou t conditionals and conditional speech

acts is useful for questions, one should test it on the other basic speech acts,

too.

3

(5) If you ph one M ary, ask her to dinne r

Is (5) an imperative to make a conditional true or is it an imperative made

conditionally? Holdcroft

(1971:

130, 132) believes that imperatives have two

interpretations; Dummett (1959: 150), on the other hand, contends that the

distinction is vacuous. It is no less vacuous in the case of assertions, according

to Du mm ett (1959: 152). But then Qu ine (1950: 12), von Wright (1963), Belna p

(1970),

Holdcroft

(1971:

134-5), Long (1971), Mackie (1973: 103), and Lauer-

bach (1979: 217) maintain that there is indeed a genuine distinction between

assertions about conditionals and conditional assertions. In any case, it seems

that we are left w ith an imp ortant problem (see also Davison 1983: 505 -7).

2 2

If one considers exa mples such as (6) to (8):

(6) If I can speak frankly, he do esn 't have a chance

(7) W here we re you last night, if you wo uldn't mind telling me?

(8) Op en the windo w, if I may ask you to

then it is hard not to grant that there are truly conditional speech acts, i.e.

if p, then q speech acts that are not about any conditional relation between

p and q, but represent p as a condition for a speech act about q. Sentences

(6) to (8) illustrate a very idiom atic type of speech ac t. Laue rbach

(1979:

215-53;

cp. also Heringer 1976: 38-50; Van Dijk 1979: 454-5, 1981: 172-3) has given

sentences of this type a Gricean analysis: the p rotasis is a com ment on a conver-

sational or politeness maxim and functions as a politeness or opting ou t device.

4

Lau erba ch's term for this kind of conditional speech act is 'com m enta tive'.

Though we are here concerned with the question of whether there are such

things as conditional speech acts, the admission of the class of commentatives

does not really settle the issue. Implicitly, but no less essentially, the issue

199




Hypothesis allows us to make sense of the notion of a speech act about a

conditional and to maintain the generalization that speech act operators have

widest scope. I therefore suggest that all noncommentative if-then speech acts

are speech acts about conditionals, and that only commentative

if-then

speech

acts are cond itional speech acts. If this is tru e, I can drop th e term 'comm enta-

tive'.

2-3

A question I haven't touched upon yet is whether speech act operators have

widest scope even in true cond itional speech acts. Tak e the conditional imp era-

tive of (8) ag ain:

(8) Op en the window , if I may ask you to

As described above, the problem with a conditional speech act analysis is that

it embeds in the scope of —>.

(8') (I may ask you to open the w ind ow )-* ( (you open the window))

This goes against the gene ralization th at speech act ope rator s have widest scope

and it disregards the fact that (8) as a whole functions as an imperative. How

do we tak e ca re of this difficulty?

Notice first that embedding a speech act operator in the scope of —• doesn't

prevent us from employing a second speech act operator, represented with

a speech act operator variable, $, and em bedding —> in its scope.

(8") $((I may ask you to open the window)—* ( (you open the windo w)))

This may seem ad hoc, yet there is at least one other linguistic construction

that requires an analysis with two speech act operators, viz. the echo construc-

tion (see Seuren 1976, 1979: 6). Normally, a degree adverb like still cannot

be immediately preceded by a negation:

(12) You do not still have cold fingers

Sentence (12) is gram ma tical, how ever, if still has emp hasis and (12) as a whole

echoes a positive asse rtion:

(13) I still have cold fingers

What are you talking about? You do not

still

have cold fingers. You

never h ad cold fingers

The analysis of

You do not still have cold fingers

with the emphasis on

still

is:

(14) h(~ (h (y o u /1 still have cold fingers)))

Thus we see that echo constructions require a double speech act analysis.

Admittedly, this analysis is a little strange, but so is the echo phenomenon

itself,

and so , I claim, are cond itional speech acts.

20 1




is asserted to be a sufficient condition for a speech act about the apodosis.

Thus no discussion is needed about the status of (2) or (8). What about the

If you

saw

John, did you talk to him?

of (4), however? As mentioned in section

2.1,

Holdcroft (1971) considers this to be a conditional speech act, too. This

is not self-evident. It certainly isn't obvious how the protasis comments on

a maxim or represents a sufficient condition for a question about the apodosis.

We furthermore lack the idiomaticity typical for all conditional speech acts

considered so far. On the other hand,

If you saw John, did you talk to him?

isn't normally a simple question about a conditional either. One would expect

a positive answer to a question about a conditional to be the assertion of that

conditional. In the case of

If you saw John, did you talk to him?,

however,

this expectation is not borne out. A positive answer normally asserts the truth

either of the apodosis alone or of both protasis and apodosis, and this was

why Holdcroft (1971) favoured a conditional question analysis.

In my opinion,

If you saw John, did you talk to him?

is a question about

a conditional which contextually implies a conditional question. The basic idea

is this: in the context in which p is taken to be true, the question whether

p is sufficient for q implies the question whether q. What is involved is a speech

act sensitive modus ponens rule, formulated tentatively as (16):

(16) (?(p^q)AGIVEN(p))^?(q)

Similar rules exist for conditional assertions and imperatives:

(17)

(18)

Expressions (17) and (18) say that the givenness of p makes assertions and

imperatives about conditionals imply conditional assertions and imperatives.

Consider (19) and (20):

(19) . . . so I saw John

All right now. If you saw John, then you saw how miserable he felt

(20) . . . so I saw John

All right now. If you saw John, tell Mary about it

In (19) seeing John is asserted to be sufficient for seeing his misery. In (20)

Ad is impered to see to it that seeing John is sufficient for telling Mary about

it. So both (19) and (20) are real speech acts about conditionals. Yet, a special

feature of (19) and (20) is that their //"resumes the contextually given

p

(see

Inoue 1983; Akatsuka in this volume, on resumptive

if ,

and relative to the

givenness of/?, the speakers end up, respectively, asserting or impering that

q.

3.

A SPEECH ACT OF SUPPOSING?

3-1

If some if p, then q speech acts are really speech acts which have q as their

3




b. Go if John goes

(24) a. I will go even if John goes

b. Go even if John goes

In questions, however, it turns out to be much easier to interpret if as even

if, a fact discovered by D ucro t (19 72:1 71-4 ). Sentence (25a) can be par aph rased

in two ways:

(25) a. Will you go

if John

goes?

b.

Will Joh n's going ma ke you go? (if)

c. Will Joh n's going prev ent you from going?

(even if)

Ducrot clearly demonstrates how the choice between the concessive and the

nonconcessive reading is determined contextually, but he fails to explain what

it is about interroga tive

if,

different from assertive and imperative

if,

that makes

it prone to be read as even //"(see Konig in this volu me ). Haim an (this volum e)

has suggested that the if of (25a) is easily interpretable as even if, because

it follows its apodosis, as concessive

if

clauses typically do in English. Yet

th e ifs of (23a) and (23b) follow their apodoses, too, without being particularly

easy to interpret as even if M oreo ver, if interrogative //"precedes its apodosis

(25d), its pote ntial concessiveness does not seem to d ecrea se:

(25) d. If John goes will you go?

My attempt at explaining the discrepancy between interrogative

if and

asser-

tive or imperative if is based on two independently needed hypotheses: (i)

a claim on the m eaning of

even if,

and (ii) a claim on th e mean ing of questions.

Even if is composed of even and if It is natu ral to assume that the even plus

th e if is not an idiom. Given this assumption, I first turn to if.

The only claim about if

I

need is the Sufficiency Hypothesis. In a somewhat

mo re sophisticated phrasing tha n the on e offered in section 2.2,

7

the Sufficiency

Hypothesis says that ifp, then q means that it is true of some state of affairs,

say r, that p is sufficient for q. As to even, the only presently relevant claims

are the following:

(i) the sentence without even, say p, is true of the state of affairs r

that the sentence with even is true of

(ii) there is some feature of r, say s, that makes it unexpected that

p is true of r; in more logical terms, s is ceteris paribus sufficient

for not p

An exam ple will clarify this:

(26) a. Even Joh n gave M ary a kiss

b.

It is tru e of some s tate of affairs

r

that John gave Mary a kiss and

that something (s), e.g. the fact that John hates Mary, is ceteris

paribus sufficient for it not being the case that John gave Mary a

kiss

5



Johan

Van

derAuwera

It follows that even if p, then q, when true of r, means that it is true of r

that p is sufficient for q, and that it is also true of r that there is some s that

is ceteris paribus sufficient for it not being the case that

p

is sufficient for

q.

The important point is that

even if

crucially invokes both the truth and

the falsity of the sufficiency of/? for q.

What now does an if-then question do that is different from an if-then asser-

tion or imp erative and th at can be related to the m eaning of

even

if Questioning

whe the r/? is sufficient for q is asking w he the r it is tru e o r false tha t/? is sufficient

for q. In other words, an if-then question essentially invokes both the truth

and the falsity of the sufficiency of p for q. Here then, I propose, lies at least

a partial explanation of why interrogative if is easily interpretable as even if.

both even if and interrogative if essentially involve the truth as well as the

falsity of the sufficiency of

p

for

q.

Assertive and imperative

if

do not have

this pro pe rty: the y only express that it is / b e true th at/? is sufficient for q.

A n indirect a rgum ent in favour of the abov e hypothesis is that if the question

is biased, it is much harder to interpret if as even if. In a neutral question,

truth and falsity carry equal weight. Not so in a biased question. Consider

27 :

(27) W on 't you go if Joh n goes?

In the intended reading, (27) suggests that Ad will go: the negation only func-

tions to evoke a pos itive answ er, i.e. an assertio n tha t it is tru e that/ ? is sufficient

for q. In this reading , if cannot be interpreted as even if.

5. IF-LESS C O N D I T I O N A L S W I T H AND A N D OR

5-1

Our fourth puzzle derives from Lawler (1975) and Fillenbaum (1975, 1976,

1977, 1978 and this volume). Sentences (28) to (31) seem to be imperatives

with a conditional m eaning:

(28) O pe n the window and I'll kill you

(29) O pen the window and I'll kiss you

(30) Op en the window or I'll kill you

(31) ?? O pe n the window or I'll kiss you

On the assumption that killing is undesirable and kissing desirable, (28) acts

as an imperative not to open the window. Its implicit conditional meaning

can be phrase d as follows:

(32) If you ope n the windo w, I'll kill you

Sentence (29) is an imperative to open the window and its implicit conditional

is (33):

2 6




(33) If y °

u

° P

e n

the window, I'll kiss you

Like (29), (30) is an imperative to open the window; its implicit conditional

is a little different:

(34) If you do not ope n the wind ow , I'll kill you

One would then ex pect that (31) is like (28) and that it effectuates an im pera tive

not to open the window, but that is not the case. It can be an imperative

to open the window, but then it implies that kissing is undesirable. Note that

the unacceptability of (31) as an imperative not to open the window cannot

merely be due to the fact that a literally expressed

Open the window

cannot

mean Do not open the window, for this kind of reversal does take place in

(28).

There are three problems I want to focus on in the rest of this paper, (i)

What is the speech act analysis of (28) to (31); more particularly, are they

conjunctions or disjunctions of imperatives and assertions? (ii) Just how can

and and or be said to carry a conditional meaning? (iii) How can we account

for the

and-or

asymmetry?

8

5-2

At first sight, (28) to (31) are counterex am ples to the generalization th at speech

act operators have widest scope: it seems that

and

and

or

connect imperatives

and assertions. Take (28):

(28') ( (you open the window )) & (h(I'll kill you))

Under the analysis in (28'), Sp makes the unconditional assertion that Sp will

kill Ad. This means that (28') is either wrong or incomplete: in some way

or another, an analysis must say that Sp is only committed to kill Ad in case

the latter open s the window. If one assum es that (28') is correct but inco mp lete,

one could say that the claim that Sp makes an unconditional assertion only

applies to the literal meaning. The literal meaning would then be enriched

by contextual meaning and it is the context which would relate and condi-

tionalize the killing to the window opening. Alternatively, one could claim

that (28') is wrong and that the relation between killing and window opening

is a matter of literal meanin g. I will defend the latter accoun t.

For a start, I propose to conjoin the killing and window opening under

the imperative operator:

(28") ((you open the windo w)

A

(I'll kill you ))

My argumentation is the following. First, if (28) were really the conjunction

of an imperative and an assertion, one could expect it to be (virtually) synony-

mous with a m ere serialization of the assertion and the im perative:

(35) Open the window . I'll kill you

7



Johan

Van der Auwera

This is manifestly not th e case. In (35) Sp mak es a literal uncon ditional assertion

that Sp will kill Ad . So (28) must be som ething e lse.

Suppose one still contends that the Sp of (28) makes some kind of uncondi-

tional assertion . N ow if it were true that it is the co ntext tha t relates th e killing

and the window opening, why then would it be much harder for the context

to establish this connection in the case of (35)? The presence or the absence

of a conjunction should not make any difference. Compare (36a,b):

(36) a. H e ope ned the window and I killed him

b. He op ene d the window . I killed him

In the right context, both (36a) and (36b) suggest a conditional relation. It

does not matter whether and is expressed. It does matter in the case of (28)

and (35). Hence (28') is implausible.

My second, third and fourth arguments can be put together. (28") does,

while (28') does not, (i) obey the generalization that speech act operators

have widest scope; (ii) respect the intuition that the whole of (28) counts as

an impe rative; and (iii) allow for a uniform account of (2 8 )/ (29) and (3 0 )/ (31)

(see below ).

Expression (28") still doe sn't say that th e killing is dep end ent on the window

opening. In this respect, (28") is like (28'). I will not, however, go as far as

to say that the conditional element is not a part of the literal meaning. It

seems to me that it may well have been a nonliteral, contextual meaning,

more particularly, a conversational implicature based on 'linguistic precedence

reflects world precedence' and 'post hoc, propter hoc' assumptions, but, if

so, it has been fully conventionalized. I do not think that one can consistently

say som ething like:

(37) O pen the window and I'll kill you, but I will not kill you if you open

the window

One way to symbolize the conditionality is to say that (28) is simultaneously

an imperative to see to it that

p

and

q

and an assertion that

p

is sufficient

ioxq:

(28'") ( ((you ope n the window) A (I'll kill you)))

& (h((you open the window)—> (I'll kill you)))

Is (28'") ad hoc? Perhaps not. A speech act such as (28) is a little special.

So one could expect the analysis to be a little special too. I do not think that

(28'") is too special. It is not miraculous, for example, that (28) is associated

with two kinds of speech acts, an imperative and an assertion. Remember

(from section 3.2) that

if-then

speech acts consist of two speech acts, too:

one about the sufficiency of protasis for apodosis, and one an assertion about

the possibility of protasis and apodosis. Another special feature of (28'") is

that both p and q are within the scope of an imperative, while only the

8




protasis verb has imperative form.

9

Again, this is not really bizarre. 'Normal'

ifp, then q imperatives only have one imperative form, too:

(38) If he ope ns the win dow , kill him

Of course, in (38) it is the apodosis verb that has imperative form, while in

(28) it is the protasis verb. In (38) Ad is impered to do q, given /?, and Ad

should not worry about p. In (28) we find the exact opposite: Ad is impered

to d o p and not to worry about q, w hich, given/?, will come a bout automa tically.

A po int of interes t is tha t the d oub le speech act analysis of (28'") is com patible

with the fact that some speech acts of the form of (28) seem to be primarily

imperative, while others seem primarily conditional. Sentence (28), for exam-

ple, is first and foremost an imperative. 'General imperatives', however, such

as (39):

(39) Scratch a Russian and you'll find a Ta rtar

(due to Jespersen 1940: 475) capitalize on the conditional meaning. This is

also the case when the

q

verb has a past tense. Sentence (40) is again due

to Jespersen (1940: 476-7, 1963: 314-15):

(40) Give him tim e, and he was generally equal to the dem ands of suburban

customers

5 -3

The

( ( / ? A ^ ) )

&

( -(/?—• <?))

analysis holds good for both (28) and (29).

The difference between (28) and (29) lies in their contexual meaning.

In (28) the contextual meaning is generated by a kind of modus tollens

»<?)

A

~q)—>~p). Informally:

(41) i If Ad opens the window , Sp will kill Ad

ii Ad doe sn't wan t to be killed by Sp

iii Hen ce Ad shouldn't open the window

This argument is so obvious that Sp must be judged unco opera tive if Sp doe sn't

want Ad to think this way. Given the conclusion that Ad should not open

the window, (28) turns into an imperative not to open the window.

In (29) the con text allows for a quasi-logical argum ent b ased on th e desirabi-

lity of the apodosis. Here the argument doesn't generate a new imperative

mean ing: it only reinforces the literal on e.

(42) i If A d open s the windo w, Sp will kiss Ad

ii A d wo uldn 't mind a kiss from Sp

iii Hence Ad wouldn't mind doing something that is sufficient for Sp

to kiss Ad

209




iv Given that (i) Ad happens to be impered to open the window, and

(ii) opening the window is sufficient for a kiss from Sp, Ad now

has two reasons for opening the window

5 4

Is (30) really a disjunction of an imperative and an assertion?

(3°') (-(y°

u

° P

e n

t n e

window)) v (h (I'll kill you))

If so, (30) is a very curious type of speech act: it is either an imperative or

an assertion, yet as such it is neither. (30) would furthermore provide a counter-

example of the rule that speech act operators have widest scope. An analysis

that avoids these pitfalls and that is in line with that of (28) and (29) is (30"):

(30") ((you open the window) v (I'll kill you))

Expression (30") represents (30) as an imperative to see to it that a state of

affairs results in which Ad opens the window or gets killed by Sp.

Just like p

—»q

imperatives and p A q imperatives of the type illustrated in

(28) and (29), (30) contains an assertion. It is inconceivable to me that one

can consistently say something like:

(43) Open the window or I'll kill you, but it is not the case that you open

the window or that I'll kill you

On this basis, I suggest that/7 v q is both impered and asserted:

(30'") ( ((you open the window) v (I'll kill you)))

& (h((you open the window) v (I'll kill you)))

If this is correct and we have an account in which p v

q

implies ~p—><?, we

have an immediate explanation of the conditional content of (30).

What remains to be explained is the discrepancy between (30) and (31). In

(30) the undesirability of being killed triggers a logical argument reinforcing

the literal imperative meaning. This argument is based on the Disjunctive Syllo-

gism p v q

A ~q)-*p):

(44) i Ad opens the window or Sp will kill Ad

ii Ad doesn't want to be killed by Sp

hi Hence Ad should open the window

In some respects, (30) is like (29). Both count as imperatives to do/?, supported

by a (quasi-)logical argument based on the (un)desirability of

q.

If

and

and

2




or

were symmetrical, (31) should be like (28) and there should be a (quasi-)

logical argument based on the (un)desirability of q, generating a contextual

imperative meaning different from the literal one and which turns (31) into

an imperative

not

to do p. In (28), this kind of argument is based on modus

tollens. In (31), however, there can't be any such argument. First of all, there

can't be a logical argument. From p v q (o r ~p^>q) and the desirability of

q, it does not follow that p is undesirable. Second, there is no quasi-logical

argum ent eithe r. If the re w ere on e, it would hav e to be structured as follows:

(45) i If A d doe sn't ope n the windo w, Sp will kiss A d

ii A d wou ldn't mind being kissed by Sp

iii Hence Ad wouldn't mind doing something that is sufficient for Sp

to kiss A d

iv Given that (i) Ad happe ns to be impered not to open the window,

and (ii) not opening the window is sufficient for a kiss from Sp,

Ad now has two reasons for not opening the window

The tro uble with (45) is that the first prem ise in iv is false; A d h as been impered

to open the windo w. If

we

correct the premise, however, the argument becomes

invalid. Conclusion: (31) cannot function as an imperative not to open the

window in the way (28) doe s, nor in the way (29) and (30) function as imp era-

tives to open th e windo w.


As I have raised four qu estion s, I have four sets of conclusions:

(i) a. There is a difference between speech acts about conditionals

and conditional speech acts.

b.

The true, commentative conditional speech acts are (like) per-

formatives.

c. Noncommentative conditional speech act meanings are deriv-

able from speech acts about conditionals through a speech act

sensitive modus po nens rule.

(ii) It is unnece ssary to regard supposing as a sepa rate speech act.

(iii) A n explan ation of why interrogative if is easily interpreted as

even if is that both interroga tive //"and even //"essentially involve

the truth as well as the falsity of the sufficiency of/? for q.

(iv) a. W hat look like conjunctions or disjunctions of imperatives that

p and assertions that q are simultaneously imperatives that p

a n d / o r

q,

and assertions about a conditional relation between

p and q.

b. The asymmetries between these and and or structures follow

from gene ral logical and conversational principles.

211



Johan Van derAuwera

NOTES

1 Thank s are due to Ernest Adam s, Osten Da hl, Teun De Ryc ker, Samuel Fillenbaum,

Steven Geukens, John Haiman, David Holdcroft, Ekkehard Konig and Elizabeth

Traugott for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

2 Note that (3) and (4) exhibit not only a potential speech act difference, but also

a tense difference. It seems to me that the conditional question interpretation is

facilitated by the use of a past tense in the protasis. They do not necessarily go

together, however. On the one hand, Sp can ask whether Ad talked to John if

he (Ad) saw him, without taking it for granted that Ad saw John - compare (4').

On the other hand, in a context in which it is fully certain that Ad will inherit,

(3) may be meant as a conditional question. In this paper I will leave all problems

about tenses aside.

3 The term 'conditional speech act' is used in a different way by Wunderlich (1977:

256-8), who employs it to characterize such speech acts as warning, threatening,

advising, and proposing. Co mp are also Van Dijk

(1981:

136).

4 This is not always the case, however. In If you really know all the answers, where

then did Napoleon die? the protasis does not serve any politeness or opting out

function.

5 One solution, which surfaces in Mackie

(1973:

93, 103; cf. section 3, however) is

to say that if-then is itself a speech act op era tor.

6 I use the Ross (i97o)-Heringer (1976) neologism to refer to the act common to

all imperatives, i.e. to what subsumes things like requests, orders, and suggestions.

7 The element of sophistication is the use of a dyadic

true of

operator. There is more

on this in Van der Auwera (1985: 100-15, 157-69)

8 For some other possible answers and for further problems see Culicover (1972),

Fillenbaum (1975, 1976, 1977, 1978), Geukens (1978: 270-1) and Wexler (1978).

On conditionals with

and,

see also Haiman (1983, this volum e).

9 In English, imperatives and infinitives look alike. Crosslinguistic evidence suggests

that we are indeed dealing with an imperative, however. See Kiihner (1914: 5, 165)

on Latin, Kiihner (1898: 237) on classical Greek, Erdmann (1886: 120) on German

and G revisse (1980: 1369, 1385) on Fr enc h. See also Brugm ann (1918: 53), Jespe rsen

(1963: 314), and Culicover (1972: 207-8). For the hypothesis that the protasis is

not imperative, see Bolinger (1967: 340-6) and Lawler

(1975:

372-3).

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methodology and linguistics, ed. Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka, 243-58. Dor-

drecht /Boston: Reidel .

Zuber, Richard. 1983. Non-declarative sentences. Am sterdam: Benjamins.

214



11

CONSTRAINTS ON THE

FORM AND MEANING OF

THE PROTASIS

•

John Haiman

Editors' note. Of central importance in defining conditionals is a

full understanding of the constraints on (i) which structures can be

interpreted as conditionals, and (ii) when conditionals can be inter-

preted as nonconditionals. Haiman focuses on the circumstances

under which conjoined clauses can be interpreted as conditionals

and conditionals as concessives, so providing a direct link to the

papers by Van der Auwera and Konig. Using extensive crosslinguistic

data, Haiman argues that an explanation for the constraints lies in

the nature of the diagrammatic iconicity of Si S2 constructions,

thereby also showing that semantic change is not arbitrary.

1.


The recurrent interchangeability or identity of conditional and interrogative

markers has been noted in a number of unrelated languages, among them

the members of the Uralic family (Beke 1919), Germanic, French and Greek

(Havers 1931: 21) and C hinese (C hao 1968: 81 -2).

l

The phenomenon is

explained on the assumption that conditional protases are the topics of the

sentences in which they occur (Haiman 1978; for further discussion, see Akat-

suka, Ford and Thompson in this volume). As topics constitute information

whose validity is (perhaps only provisionally) agreed upon by all parties to

the discourse, it is natu ral for a speaker to establish their given status by asking

for assent or recognition from his interlocutor. In some languages, the semantic

equivalence of protasis and topic is directly reflected by the identical mor-

phology and syntax of these two catego ries: represen tative examples are Turkish

(Lewis 1967: 217), Tagalog (Schachter 1976: 496), Tabasaran (Magometov

1965:

271), Korean (Martin and Lee 1969: 146, 159), Vietnamese (Hoa 1974:

103,

341), Middle Egyptian (Gardiner 1957: 125) and, once again, Chinese

(Chao 1968: 81-110).

2

Nevertheless, it is clear that the semantic relationship

between conditionals and topics (ex hypothesi, a relationship of identity) is

quite different from that between conditionals and questions: rather than iden-

tity, the relationship is one of usage. A protasis is established as a given, or

topic, by means of

a question. The formal identity of topics and questions is

thus pragmatically rather than semantically m otivated. This observation suggests

the question to which this chapter is devoted: given that cognitive categories

215



John Haiman

may be related by extrasemantic means, are there any limits in principle to

the chain of associations whereby any two categories may be related?

Common sense, everyday experience, and the evidence of lexical semantic

change would all indicate that th e answer to this question m ust be 'no '. Pavlov 's

famous dogs associated th e ringing of a bell with food and salivated accordingly;

filmgoers who have seen Raging Bull associate the intermezzo from Cavalleria

Rusticana with Jake La Motta - again, on the basis not of similarity, but of

accidental contiguity. One of the most banal principles of lexicography (and

one which is totally devastating to any theory of essentialism) is that words

change th eir me anings on the basis of extralogical and no ndefinitional associa-

tions of this sort: see in particular Darmesteter (1886/1925) and a host of

later scholars. By a chain of associations of this sort, 'the toebone', ultimately,

'connecta to da headbone', which has nothing in common with it. A series

of associations, characterized by Darm esteter as enchainement, seems to affect

the expression of the conditional protasis clause. In many ways the prototypical

subordinate clause, it is repeatedly expressed, in a number of languages, by

a clause which is syntactically coordinate, or paratactic, with the apodosis (see

Haiman 1983). Nevertheless, there are certain limits to the polysemy of the

paratactic construction Si (and) S2: in particu lar, th ere is one possible m eaning

of the 'true' conditional which, in general, the paratactic conditional cannot

share. This is the meaning of the concessive conditional, typified by utterances

such as those of (1) below:

(1) a. Eve n if the econom y collapses, we'll survive somehow

b. I w ould n't m arry you, if you were the last man on ea rth

c. If prison b rok e his bod y, it could not shatter his indom itable spirit

d. Greetings from your affectionate, if absent-minded, son

The chapter is divided into three parts. First, I want to show how //-clauses,

on the basis of widely accepted morphosyntactic criteria, are subordinate clauses

par excellence. Second, I will illustrate how the // -clause, even in languages with

a rich subordinating morphosyntax, is nevertheless often expressed as a clause

in parataxis with or coordinate with the final clause. In section 4 I will propose

the obvious iconic explanation for the inability of paratactic constructions to bear

the concessive meanings of (1), and deal with some examples of apparently non-

iconic parataxis which call this explanation into question .

2. T H E S U B O R D I N A T I O N O F T H E P R O T A S I S

Although the distinction between coordination and subordination is by no

means entirely clear, a number of diagnostics for distinguishing the two are

mo re or less widely accepted in the litera ture . Th e following list is by no m eans

exha ustive. W ith respect to every one of the m , the protasis is impeccably subor-

dina te, and recognized as such.

216



Constraints on the form and meaning of the protasis

To begin with some very languag e-particular d ata. In the history of Rom anc e,

the unm arked subo rdinator (Latin

UT,

Romance quej che) has been o ne possibi-

lity for introducing the protasis. In German, subordinate clauses - like the

protasis - are characterized by verb-final order; moreover, in German, subordi-

nate clauses are embedded within the sentences where they occur, in as much

as a sentence-initial subordinate clause functions as the first constituent domi-

nated by S, and thus, given the verb-second constraint in that language, must

be followed directly by the finite verb of the se nten ce. So too m ust the prota sis,

as witness the following senten ces:

(2) a. W enn du mich liebst, (da nn) bin ich glucklich

3

If you love me then am I happy

b.

Du liebst mich, und ich bin glucklich

you love me and I am happy

In the Papuan language Hua (and in an unknow n num ber of related languages),

nonfinal clauses in complex sentences (Si in the notation used here) may be

either coordinate with or subordinate to the following clause. The semantic

distinctions are the subject of Ha ima n (1980: ch. 17). Co ordin ate clauses occur

with a characteristic desine nce -ga- (possibly cognate with the phrasal coord inat-

ing conjunction -g/-; see Haiman to appear: 11.1.5), which disappears when

the subject of the nonfinal clause is identical with the subject of the following

clause. Subordinate clauses occur with a characteristic desinence

-ma( )-

which

never disap pears , i.e. is not able to mark switch-reference. Cond itional prota ses

pattern with subordinate Si clauses, occurring with the desinence -ma, followed

by the to pic-m arkin g suffix -mo.

More convincing are some of the widely accepted crosslinguistically valid

criteria for sub ordin ation . A gain , we need consider only a few of these .

A well-known property of subordinate clauses of various types in English

is that they may be freely preposed without radically changing the meaning

of the sentence in which they occur. A mo ng the coo rdinated clauses, in contrast,

the order of clauses reflects the order of events and such moveability is impos-

sible.

By this criterion (adduced by Anderson 1975, among others), protasis

clauses are found to pattern with subordinate adverbial clauses.

Clauses which are conjoined correspond to reduced structures putatively

'derived' from them by transformational operations of 'coordination reduc tion',

'gapping', and 'right node raising', the mechanics of which have been described

by Ross (1970), Tai (1969), and others. Whether or not these operations are

meaning-preserving transformations at all is not at issue here: rather, what

is at issue is that n o com parab le red uction is gramm atical when a su bordin ating

conjunction is substituted for and, in cases like the senten ces b elow:

(3) a. I opened the window and (* be fo re/a fte r/w he n . . . ) looked

out

b. I opened and (* be fo re/ aft er/ w he n . . . )Ma ry shut, the window

217



John Haiman

c. Mary and (* before /af te r /w he n . . . ) I left

Not unexpectedly, // patterns with the subordinating conjunctions once again.

Conjoined clauses must preserve a symmetrical internal articulation (that

only gapping may disturb), with the consequences noted by Ross (1967) and

explained by Schachter (1977): no w/z-element may be removed from one

member of a coordination unless it be removed from each member in the

same po sition. A gain , // -clauses, by this criterion, a re not co ordin ate w ith the ir

apodosis:

(4) W hat will you do to me if I tell you the truth?

Finally, as the topics or givens of their sentences, // -clauses are neither chal-

lenged nor denied by material in the apodosis. Rath er, they are (pre-)supposed

to be true, and thus constitute the framework or starting point from which

the sentence proceed s. Either conjunct of the coordination:

(5) I have seen the future , and it works

may be challenged by the response That's not true'. By contrast, the complex

sentence:

(6) W hen I saw you last, Ro se, you we re only so high

when so challenged, retains its protasis unshaken. In the same way, // -clauses

are immun e to challenge or den ial.

3. N E V E R T H E L E S S , T H E P R O T A S I S IS O F T E N P A R A T A C T I C

W I T H T H E A P O D O S I S

We are familiar with colloquial English (often pseudo-imperative) paratactic

protases:

(7) a. O nce admit tha t they have a

case,

and your moral superiority collapses

b.

I go out at night, she'll challenge me to a fight

c. H e's so sma rt, h e can fix it himself

d. Cry, and you cry alone

These should not be dismissed as marginal idiosyncrasies of English. Rivero

(1972: 203, 209) points out the same possibilities in Spanish of 'surface strings

which are seman tically con ditionals but in which the two clauses are juxtap osed

or coo rdin ate d'. H arris (this volum e) no tes that this has always been a possibility

in Rom ance gen erally. In V ietnam ese, the canonical conditional sentence con-

sists of Neu Si thl S2, where neu

= i

\V

and thi = topic mark er. But both of

these w ords are o ption al, with the resulting possibility of paratactic conditionals

that are indistinguishable from simple coordination (Hoa 1974). In Cambodian,

the canonical protasis is introduced by baa, but the style is more 'colloquial

and vivid' if it is left out (Jaco b 1968: 92), yielding simple parata ctic cond itional

8




structures. In Mandarin, the protasis may be introduced by a number of par-

ticles, and conclude with a topic marker, but the conditional may also be

expressed, as in Vietnamese, by the simple juxtaposition of 5/ and S2 (L i

and Thomp son 1981: 642, 643, 649). In H ua , conditional protases are m orpho-

logically subo rdina te clauses. Bu t in spite of the perva sive, clear-cut, and other-

wise rigid differences between subordinate and coordinate nonfinal clauses,

nonfinal different-subject coo rdina te clauses in the future ten se may have the

semantic force of hypothetical protases (and, it should be noted, of no other

subordinate clause type); see Haiman (1983). Coordinate constructions in a

num ber of other P apuan languages, among them Fore (Scott 1978: 131), Kate

(Pilhofer 1933: 154), O no (Wa cke 1931: 197), and W ojokeso (West 1973: 21 -2,

24), manifest the same polysemy. In early Modern English, an 'if occurs,

derived from and. In fact the OED points out that the orthographic distinction

between an and and is a relatively recent convention, not observed before

c. 1600. We also find examp les like:

(8) Now kep e him we l, for and ye wil ye can

Examples could be multiplied. There are, in short, many languages in which

parataxis or the coordinating conjunction

and

acquires a conditional meaning.

The converse phenomenon, whereby the conditional morpheme may acquire

a purely coord inate m ean ing, seems to be considerably less frequently attes ted.

In fact, I have encountered only one language, Xinalug of the Soviet Caucasus,

in which the conditional verbal suffix -k i comes to function as a coordinating

conjunction throu gh what D eseriev (1959: 183) calls a 'broaden ing of its mean -

ing'.

There is, nevertheless, another way in which conditional structures of the

form If Si, S2 seem to approxim ate co ordinate structures: this is the gram mati-

cal parallelism b etwe en Si and S2 , to which H arris draws attention in his contri-

bution to this volu me . It is a com mo nplace that th e apodosis of a counterfactual

protasis must itself be cou nterfactua l. Co m pare th e relative acceptability of:

(9) If it had rained I (would have / * will) taken my umb rella

In many langu ages, this seman tic parallelism is reflected in morphological pa ral-

lelism as well, com pare the Rom ance languag es, Russian (where both counter-

factual protasis and apodosis occur with the irrealis particle by), Hungarian

(both counterfactual protasis and apodosis verbs are in the conditional with

suffix -nE), and Cebuano (where both counterfactual protasis and apodosis

occur with th e irrealis word (pa) onta). Th e parallelism is broug ht to its ultimate

in languages wh ere the pro tasis and ap odosis are totally identical in the co unter-

factual mood : Ge nde (Brandson to appe ar), Kobon (Davies 1981: 39), Daga

(Murane 1974:258), and Maring (Woodward 1973: 13) among languages of

New Guinea; Guugu-Yimidhirr (Haviland 1979: 145), Pitta-Pitta (Blake 1979:

22) and Ngiyambaa (Donaldson 1980: 252) among languages of Australia; and

219



John Haiman

a tendency towards the same kind of parallelism in other languages as well.

4

Possibly the most spectacular example is afforded by Hausa, where the irrealis

marker in both protasis and apodosis, da, also means 'both .. . and' (Taylor

1959:57,76).

Th ere is, as well, a mild tenden cy for conditional sentences to unde rgo w hat

looks something like coordination reduction: that is, where the mood marker

in both protasis and apodosis is the same, it is not always repeated. For some

examples of this tendency see Haiman (1983).

The twin conflicting pressures - on the one hand, to maximize parallelism,

on the other, to avoid repetition by abstracting elements common to both

constituents - are characteristic of coordinate constructions, as they also are

of conditional constructions.

There is, then, sufficient evidence that the categories of conditional clause

and coo rdina te clause are frequently confused in languages which have sepa rate

expressions in general for the two. It remains now to account for the polysemy

of the structure

Si {and) S2

- by showing what limitations there are on this

polysemy.

4. IM P O S S I B L E R E A D I N G S F O R T H E S T R U C T U R E SI S2

In general, paratactic conditional sentences cannot be interpreted as concessive

conditionals: Si S2 may mean 'If Si, S2', but not 'Even if Si, S2'. Before

we proceed to accou nt for this unsurprising re sult, let us dispose of the possible

objection that even // -conditionals are not really conditionals at all, but some-

thing else - pseudoconditionals, or the like. Such an objection is implicit in

the definitions of conditionals proposed by ordinary language philosophers like

Ramsey

(1931:

248), who have argued that true conditionals are the hypotheti-

cal counterparts of causal constructions: or, that 'If A, B' is exactly equivalent

to 'Because A , B \ w here 'A ' is hypothetical.

It seems to me that such narrow definitions violate the lexical and m orphosyn -

tactic generalization that languages tend to make. Not only do conditionals

pattern with concessives in a number of ways (Haiman 1974); in the majority

of langu ages, as in Eng lish, concessive cond itionals are morphologically similar,

if not identical, to causal conditionals. Thus, familiar examples like German

auch wenn, French meme si, Latin etsi, Hungarian ha . . . is , are paralleled

by Votyak he + no = 'if + an d' (Sereb rennik ov 1963: 376), Tab asaran

s + ra = 'if + an d' (Ma gom etov 1965: 271), V ietnam ese thi cung= 'TOPIC

+ also' (Hoa 1974: 105), among many others. Even ap parent counterexamples

like Spanish aun cuando 'also when' are seen to follow the same pattern when

it is recalled that 'if and 'w hen ' are morphologically identical in many lan-

guages.

5

Granted, then, that concessive conditionals are no less 'true' conditionals

than are causal conditionals, why is it that in so many languages Si S2 cannot




(16) a. You major in ma them atics or porrology and IBM will want to hire

you

b. You major in mathematics or theology, and IBM will want to hire

you

where knowledge of the world is either of no use - as in (16a), or actively

militates against the causal interpre tation - as in (16b).

Know ledge of the world virtually compels us to unders tand (16b) as a conces-

sive conditional: IBM must be so desperate for bodies that they don't care

what you study. And yet this sentence is ungrammatical with a concessive

reading unless theology is pronounced with a kind of contemptuous squeal.

Which squea l, I subm it, is the m oral equivalen t of a diacritic.

Similarly, knowledge of the world tells us nothing about porrology, a word

which I just made up. On a normal intonation, (16a) is interpreted as a causal

conditional, and we are left to infer, given our knowledge of the world, that

porrology is some kind of arcane scientific discipline. O n the squ eal inton ation ,

and only on this intonation, the same sentence is interpreted as a concessive

conditional, and porrology is provisionally identified as a discipline akin to

theology or butterfly collecting.

That is, the linear order Si or S2, S3 may have concessive force, but only

if this non-iconic relationship is marked by a special intonation which, like

the word even, overrides the expected causal interpretation of the sentence.

Consider now some colloquially com mon cases whe re S2, counter-iconically,

is und erstoo d as the protasis, while Si is the ap odosis:

(17) a. Y ou 're gonn a kill yourself, you k eep driving like that

b. Let him fix it, he's so goddam smart

It is clear that th e ord er of protasis and apo dosis has been inverted here without

any lexical diacritic to indicate which is which. Once again, no ambiguity gener-

ally arises in the spoken language, the backgrounded nature of S2 being iconi-

cally reflected in its 'subordinate tone of voice'. Such sentences as (17) are

ungrammatical if they are uttered with the same intonation as the polysemous

coordinate structure (15).

Finally, let us consider paratactic constructions where the semantic relation-

ship betwe en Si and S2 is one of balance or antithesis or symmetry in general.

6

(18) a. You stab me with your pitchfork, I'll shoot you with my gun

b. Bright prom ise, conventional performance

c. You can tell him the most interesting stories, and he'll just stare

at you

d. In pace ad vexandos cives, acerrimus; in bello, ad expugnandos

hostes, inertissimus

'In peacetime, he was most fierce harassing citizens; in wartime he

was most sluggish driving out the enem y'

3



John Haiman

Clearly, there is only the thinnest of lines separating such antitheses as (i8d)

from ordinary concessive constructions.

The reason for this, I believe, is that the structure

Si S2,

particularly if

the internal articulation of Si and S2 is parallel, is an icon of symmetry, as

well as of temporal or causal sequence: and one exponent of symmetry is

that of opposition.

7

Nevertheless, if the same construction may iconically

express both (temporal, logical, or causal) asymmetry on the one hand, and

symmetry on the other, then it would seem that there is no limit in principle

to the range of meanings of which the diagram Si S2 may be an icon. And

the h ypothesis (10) is utterly vitiated e xcept for rath er artificial e xam ples, such

as (16a), involving made-up words.

I cannot maintain that the conditional construction, any more than other

constructions, has an inviolate essential me aning ; and it may be tha t, in time,

there will be complete overlap between paratactic constructions and con-

ditionals of every type. Nevertheless, for the time being there is still an impor-

tant difference between concessive clauses and paratactic antithetical clauses,

a difference that relates to what is (now, it seems to me) the most important

property of conditionals: their backgrounded nature. Concessives, whether

introduced by even if or although, are backgrounded relative to the main clause;

an tith eti ca l expressed by paratactic constructions are not. O ne syntactic reflex

of this difference is that diacritically marked concessives are not tense-iconic:

they may either precede or follow the main clause; antithetical, on the other

han d, are ten se-iconic: clause inversion of any of the exam ples of (18) produce s

impossible senten ces.

W e are left at this stage with table 1 of inter pre tatio ns, b oth acceptable

and impossible, of the paratactic diagram Si S2.

Table 1. Interpretations of Si S2

Possible interpretations Impossible interpre tations

If S i,S 2 Even if S i, S2

After S i, S2 Before S i, S2

Because S1, S2 Because S2, S1

S i:

on the other hand, S2 Although S i, S2


In the preceding discussion, I have tried to make two points. The first is that

there is a trade-off between linear order and other means (including morpho-

logical, lexical, or prosodic diacritics) of expressing the semantic relationships

between two clauses. In the absence of such diacritics, linear order and internal

articulation are the only means available for expressing these relationships.

Altho ugh it was illustrated with unfamiliar exam ples, this point is recognizably

4




a variant on the familiar truism that there is some kind of inverse correlation

between freedom of word order on the one hand, and rich morphology on

the other. In general, such a point is difficult to make because its proof requires

minimally contrasting structures within the same language. Coordinate struc-

tures which have the force of conditionals in languages which distinguish para-

taxis from hypotaxis offer us examples of exactly the sort we need to

demonstrate the reality of the trade-off principle.

The second point is that there may be some general constraints on enchaine-

ment association, or abduction: i.e. on the identification of two categories

which share nondefinitional properties. The structure Si S2 I have argued,

may be associated only with those meanings of which it is itself a motivated

diagram.

NOTES

1

For

friendly discussion, devastating coun terexam ples,

and

insight,

I am

indebted

to

the members of the conditionals symposium, in particular E kkeh ard Konig, Joseph

Greenberg, Martin Harris, Elizabeth Traugott and Thomas Bever.

2 For further exam ples, see Harris and Konig's chapters in this volum e, and Traugott

(1985b).

3 Konig notes that in what Johnson-Laird has called 'relevance conditiona ls' this con-

straint does not obtain. T hus, Wenn du mich brauchst, ich bin hier If you need me,

I 'm here. ' It is as if, in relevance conditionals, the protasis is less incorporated into

the body

of the

sentence,

a

grammatical phenomenon which iconically reflects

the

greater conceptual distance between protasis and apodosis in these sentences. For

some discussion, see Haiman and Thompson (1984).

4

A

possibly related phenomenon

in

German counterfactuals

was

pointed

out to me

by Ekkehard Konig. In these conditionals, as opposed to hypothetical conditionals,

the speaker may either treat the protasis as the first constituent of S or as a separate

sentence with respect to the verb-second rule: both of the following are gramm atical,

at least

for

some speak ers:

(a) Wenn ich Urlaub hatte wiirde ich sofort verreisen If I had a vacation, I

would leave im mediately'

(incorporated protasis)

(b) W enn ich U rlau b ha tte , ich wiirde sofort verreisen

(non-incorporated protasis)

The grammaticality of (b) may be interpreted as a kind of tendency to render protasis

and apodosis

parallel

in this case.

5 This widespread identity of if and 'when' is itself an argument against the popular

assumption that conditional protases

are

essentially hypothetical

in

nature.

For a

survey of languages where 'w hen' and if are identical, see Traugott (1985b).

6

I am

grateful

to

Ekkehard Konig

and

Tanya Reinhart

for

drawing such examples

to my attention. Som e, though not all, of Konig's counterexamples to hypothesis

(10) in his cha pter in this volume are of the sort (18).

7

For

some discussion

of the

systematic polysemy

of

coordinate structures (equally

foregrounded, hence tense-iconic) on the one hand, and conceptually symmetrical

(hence iconically adequate for the exp ression of opposition) on the other, see Haiman

(1985). Traug ott (1985 a) draw s atten tion to the same systematic polysemy of lexical

forms like English against / again and German wider / wieder.

5



John Haiman

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Kegan Paul.

Riv ero, M aria-Lu isa. 1972. On con ditionals in Spanish. In Generative studies in Romance

languages,

ed. J. Casagrande and Bohda n Saciuk, 196-214. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury

House.

Ross, John. 1967. Constraints on variables in syntax. Indiana University Linguistics

Club.

Ross, John. 1970. Gapping and the order of constituents. In Progress in linguistics,

ed. Manfred B ierwisch and Karl Heido lph, 141-54. The Ha gue: M outon.

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Schachter, Paul. 1976. The subject

in

Philippine languages: topic, ac tor, a ctor-topic,

or none

of

the above?

In

Subject and topic, ed. Charles N. Li, 491-518. New York:

Academic Press.

Schachter, Paul. 1977. Constraints on coordination. Language 53: 86-114.

Scott, Graham. 1978. The Fore language of Papua New G uinea. Pacific Linguistics

B-47. Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

Serebrennikov, M.

1963.

Istoriceskaja morfologijapermskix jazykov. Moskva: Akadem ia

Nauk.

Tai, James. 1969. Coordination reduction. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois.

Taylor, F. W. 1959. A practical Hausa gram mar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1985a. Confrontation and association.

In

Papers from the

Sixth International Conference on Historical Linguistics,

ed.

Jacek Fisiak, 5 15-26.

Am sterdam: Benjam ins; Poznan: Ad am Mickiewicz University Press.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1985b. Conditional markers. In Iconicity in syntax, ed. John

Haiman, 289-307. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

W acke, O. 1931. Form enlehre der Ono -Sprache. Zeitschrift fiir Eingeborenen-Sprachen

21:161-208.

W est, Do rothy . 1973. W ojokeso se ntenc e, paragr aph , and discourse analysis. Pacific

Linguistics B-28. Canberra: Research School

of

Pacific S tudies, A ustralian National

University.

Woodward, Pamela. 1973. Maring sentences. Workpapers

in

New Guinea languages

1,1-26.

Ukarumpa: Summer Institute of Linguistics.

7



Ekkehard

Konig

as German, Dutch or Japanese. In nonpast contexts, the German conjunction

wenn may correspond to if or when in English.

2

(3) W enn ich Paul sehe , werd e ich es ihm sagen

'If /w he n I see Paul, I will tell him'

A close relatedness betw een tem poral and conditional clauses also m anifests

itself in the historical development of conditional connectives in many lan-

guages: temporal notions provide one of the major lexical sources for con-

ditional connectives (see Traugo tt 1985). The d istinction'between conditionals

and causals, too, is not easy to draw in some cases. In exam ples like the follow-

ing, //see m s to be m ore or less equivalent to a causal connective (see A katsu ka

in this volum e):

3

(4) Speaker A : Ken says that he lived in Japa n for seven years

Speaker B: If he lived in Japan that long, his Japanese must be pretty

good

M oreove r, con ditional sentences with /f tend to be inte rpreted as concessive

conditionals in interroga tive sentences (D ucro t 1972: 171ft) and in all sentences

with exp ressions suggestive of a scale like (5b):

(5) a. Will you tak e the car if it is snowing?

b.

I wo uldn't marry yo u, if you were the last man on earth (see Haim an

in this volum e)

Finally, both if and even if can be used in a purely concessive sense, i.e.

they may practically b e interchang eable with even though or although:

(6) He looked at me kindly, (even) if somew hat sceptically

The problem of identifying conditional sentences, and of delimiting them

from related adverbial constructions, plays an important role in several of the

chapters of this volume. Harris notes that the classes of adverbial clauses identi-

fied in traditional grammar are not clearly distinguished throughout the history

of Romance languages and concludes that the category 'conditional sentence'

is not a discrete one, either at the semantic or at the morphosyntactic level.

One way of dealing with this problem of classification and delimitation is to

identify a construc tion in term s of a prototype rather than in terms of necessary-

and-sufficient cond itions (see Comrie in this volum e). Such an approach should

be complemented, however, by a systematic investigation of the relations exist-

ing between conditional and related adverbial constructions. This is exactly

what the present chapter proposes to do: to investigate the territory between

conditionals and related adverbial clauses, notably concessives and concessive

conditionals. I will try to state prototypical properties for each of the three

constructions and to specify as precisely as possible the conditions which lead

3



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relations like the following w hich make such an analysis plausible:

(8) If p, then q and if ~ p , then q = Whether p or ~ p , q

Such an analysis is also confirmed by morphological facts: the connectives used

in structures of type (7a) frequently derive from conditional connectives. Latin

sive .. . sive 'whether . . . or ' (si 'if) and Finnish jos . . . tai

Jos

'if) are particu-

larly good examples. But even in languages such as German, where different

connectives are used in conditionals and concessive conditionals, connectives

in the latter construction frequently had a conditional use in earlier periods.

The morphological facts are even clearer as far as sentences of type (7c) are

concerned. Sentences of this type are regularly formed by adding a focus particle

such as even to a conditional anteced ent (see Haim an in this volum e).

The classification of even if constructions with sentences of types (7a) and

(7b) as one specific type of conditional is also supported by the semantic facts.

5

All semantic properties that differentiate even if conditionals from ordinary

conditionals can be shown to be due to the contribution that even makes to

the meaning of such constructions (Bennett 1982). This contribution depends

on two parts of the sentence: the focus of

even

and the scope of this particle

(Karttun en and Pe ters 1979). The focus of even, or of a focus particle in general,

is the constituent it relates to, i.e. the constituent which typically carries the

nuclear tone and which partly determines the possible positions of the particle.

The scope of a particle can be identified with the rest of the sentence with

a variable inserted into the position of the focus.

6

The contribution made by

even to the meaning of a sen tenc e, which is usually assumed to be a presupposi-

tion or conventional im plicature (F raser 1971; Kem pson 1975; Ka rttunen and

Peters 1979; Bennett 1982), can now roughly be described as follows: even

presupposes (a) that there is an alternative to the focus value which satisfies

the open sentence in its scope, and (b) that the value given in the focus is

the least likely and therefore most surprising of all values under consideration

in a given context. Whether or not even if conditionals entail their consequent

depends on the mood of such sentences and on the focus of even. If this particle

focuses just on one part of the antecedent, neither indicative or 'subjunctive'

conditionals entail their consequ ent.

(9) a. Even if you drink just a little, your boss will fire you

b.

Even if you d rank just a little, your boss would fire you

Indicative even // conditionals do, however, entail their consequent whenever

the particle focuses on the whole antecedent, as in the following examples:

(10) a. Th e match will be on even if it is raining

b. Even if he is a little slow, he is actually very intelligent

In such cases, the negation of the antecedent is a plausible alternative value

so that - due to their truth conditions (if p, then q) and to their presupposition

3



Conditionals, concessive conditionals and concessives

(if —/?, then

q) -

these sentences function more or less like those of type

(7a).

As was shown by Ben nett (1982: 411), 'subjunctive' or 'p as t/

were-woulcT

conditionals may also entail their consequent. The essential condition in this

case is that even focuses on the antecedent plus the conditional connective.

Bennett gives the following example uttered by a person who is looking at

the raging waters of a river and the ruins of a bridge:

(11) Even if the bridge were stand ing, I would not cross

In this case, even is not introduced into a sentence which happens to be a

conditional, but the conditionality is itself a result of the operation of

even.

This sentence presupposes (and perhaps also entails) something like:

(12) I will not cross (as it is now)

And (12) can be derived as a presupposition on the basis of the rules sketched

above if they operate on the following simplified semantic representation:

(13) Even,( ifp) ,q

In cases such as these, the real world is the alternative to the value of the

focus,

i.e. to the hypothetical situation described by the conditional antecedent.

What we said above about the semantic properties of concessive sentences

does not exhaust the contribution made by connectives like although or even

though to the meaning of a sentence. The use of such connectives also implies

that there is an incompatibility or conflict between the propositions expressed

by the relevant clauses. This implication can roughly be described as follows:

(14) even though p, q implies ifp, then normally ~ g

Because of the abn orm al projection behaviour of this implication - it survives

embedding into negative, interrogative and conditional contexts as in (15) -

and because of its cancellability in reductio argum ents like (i 5d ), we will regard

it as a presupposition:

(15) a. It is not the case that Fred wants to go for a walk even though

it is raining

b. Do es Fred wan t to go for a walk even though it is raining?

c. If Fred wants to go for a walk even though it is raining, he m ust

be crazy

d. Even though I put this chemical into the wate r, the water does not

change its colour. This shows that the chemical does not affect the

colour of water in any way

One reason why concessive conditionals have so often been grouped together

with concessives is the fact that they too m ay carry an implication of incom pati-

bility between two situations. Given the fact that such conditionals relate a

series of antecedents to a consequent, one of those antecedent propositions

33



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(either

p

or

~p

in alternative concessive conditionals or one substitution

instance of p

x

7

in universal concessive conditionals) will normally be regarded

as being in conflict with the proposition expressed by the consequent. Whether

this implication is part of the conventional meaning of such constructions or

due to conversational maxims is a question we will have to leave open at the

present time.

Our preceding discussion can now be summarized as follows:

(16) i. Conditionals

a. typical form: if p, (then ) q

b. entailments: —

ii. Concessive (irrelevance) conditionals

a. typical form: (i ) W hethe r p or ~ p , q

( 2 ) ( Vx) ( i f p ,q )

(3) Even if p , q

b.

entailments: q

c. im plica ture: ( x) (if

x

then normally ~q)

iii.

Concessives

a. typical form: even tho ugh /alth oug h p, q

b. entailments: p, q

c. presupposition: if p , then normally ~q

3. C O O R D I N A T E S T R U C T U R E S U S E D A S C O N D I T IO N A L S

It is a well-known fact that conditionals can appear in the form of coordinate

structures. In the following section we will take a closer look at the relations

existing between coordinate structures and the three types of constructions

distinguished above, with the aim of throwing additional light on their shared

properties as well as those that differentiate them. The existence of paratactic

conditionals has been demonstrated for a wide variety of languages (Bolinger

1967;

Ibanez 1976; Davies 1979; Haiman 1983). Such paratactic conditionals

frequently have a pseudo-imperative as first conjunct, and their adverbial use

may be reflected in syntactic properties ('negative-polarity items', backward

pronom inalization, co rrelative elements) normally associated with genuine con-

ditionals rather than coordinate structures:

(17) a. M ake one m istake, and there'll be trouble

b.

Un dersta nd C hinese, and I'd need you for a teacher

c. You so much as touch alcoho l, and your boss will fire you

d. Store ihn nicht, dann wird er dich auch nicht storen 'D on 't disturb

him and he wo n't disturb you ei ther'.

Not all conditionals have an imperative or paratactic paraphrase. Davies

(1979:

1053) notes, for instance, that neither 'relevance conditionals' nor those

34




relating to a single eventuality have such a paraphrase:

(18) a. If you fancy a shower, the water is hot

b.

*Fancy a shower and the wa ter is hot

(19) a. If you are Joh n Sm ith, the message is for you

b.

*Be John Smith and the m essage is for you

Haiman (this volume) approaches the problem of relating coordinate struc-

tures to 'adverbial' interpretations from a different angle: instead of looking

for constraints on possible paraphrases of conditionals, he tries to formulate

constraints on the possible interpretations of paratactic structures. In his view,

the interpretation of unmarked structures like

Si (and) S2

is constrained by

iconicity: 'Without additional diacritics, the structure Si S2 may have only

those meanings of which the linear order of the constituents is itself an icon'

(Haiman in this volume). Hence, Haiman argues, paratactic structures cannot

be interpreted as concessive conditionals or genuine concessives although they

are interpretable as'If S i, S2', 'After S i, S2', or 'B ecau se S i, S2'.

As far as I can see, however, this hypothesis is not borne out by all the

relevant facts. The following examples look like clear counterexamples to Hai-

man 's claim:

(20) a. You drink (o nl y/ ju st /s o much as /e ve n) a drop of alcohol, and

your boss will fire you

b. We can give him the VIP trea tm ent, and he is not content

c. I can drink a bottle of alcohol, and my boss won't fire me

d. (French) Je vivrais cent ans, je n'oubliera is jamais cette scene

'I could live a hundred years, I would never forget that scene'

e. (G erm an) Du m agst dich noch so sehr anstren gen , du wirst es nicht

schaffen

'You can try ever so hard , you won't succeed'

f. (Chinese) Wo mai shenmo wode taitai dou bu xihuan

'I buy anything, my wife does not like it/Whatever I buy, my wife

doesn 't like it'

One might want to argue that the examples in (20) cannot be considered as

counterexamples to Haiman's claim since they contain one of the diacritics

explicitly said to override the constraints imposed by iconicity. Elements that

could conceivably be considered as such diacritics are the focus particles in

(20a) or the expressions denoting an extreme value (not drink a drop, VIP

treatment, etc.) in the other examples.

8

This is not a possible line of defence,

however, for the following reason: the conditions that have to be met for

a coordinate structure to be interpreted as a concessive conditional are more

or less identical to those necessary for a 'concessive' interpretation of a simple

conditional, as will be shown immediately below.

Conditionals introduced

by a

simple connective cannot normally be interpreted

35



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Konig

as concessive conditionals. The following two sentences are very different in

those aspects of meaning th at go beyond their truth conditions;

(21) a. If Pe ter com es, I will not stay

b.

E ven if Pe ter com es, I will not stay

This difference in their overall impact is due to an interpretative principle,

which Geis and Zwicky have called 'conditional perfection', and which they

formulated as follows:

(22) A sentence of the form XD Y invites an inference of the form -X D — Y

(Geis and Zwicky 1971: 562)

This inference looks very much like a Gricean generalized conve rsational impli-

cature and, despite claims to the contrary (Levinson 1983: I45ff), it seems

possible to give a straightforward Gricean account of this phenomenon. A

sentence of the form 'if

p

q and the more categorical counterpart 'q (anyway)'

can be assumed to form a scale: (q (anyway), if p, q). So, on the basis of

the maxim of quantity, the assertion of the weaker statement 'if

p, q

will

give rise to the implicature '~~q (anyway )' and thus to the inference that p

is also a necessary condition for q (Du crot 1972: 170; Cornulier 1983).

Concessive conditionals, by contrast, exclude conditional perfection as an

admissible inference pattern by entailing or presupposing that the conditional

relationship holds for a whole series of antecedents. Now, given that simple

conditionals typically allow conditional perfection whereas concessive con-

ditionals never do, it is clear that the former can only be interpreted as the

latter if conditional perfection is excluded . This is the case whenever the p rotasis

of a simple conditional contains an expression that marks an extreme point

on a scale, thereby licensing the inference that the conditional relationship

holds for all other values of the same scale and thu s for a series of antec ede nts.

9

Expressions which fulfil this function include the following:

(i) all focus particles

{but, just, only, even, so much as)

which may evaluate

their focus value as ranking low on some scale

(ii) all expressions specifying extrem e values in a certain propositional

schema (e.g. not drink a drop, drink a who le bottle)

(iii) all superlatives and pseud osuperlatives like the following:

(23) If I were Rockefeller, I would not be able to pay for this

(iv) free-choice quantifiers like any.

But th ese a re just the expressive devices that are also responsible for a conces-

sive-conditional interpretation of coordinate structures. For any of the examples

given in (20) we can thus formulate a simple conditional which is interpreted

as a concessive conditional on the basis of the same component:

(24) a. If you drink (b ut /o nl y ju st /s o much as /e ve n) a drop of alcohol,

your boss will fire you

236




b.

If we give him the VIP treat m ent , he wo n't be content

c. If I drink a bottle of alcohol, my boss wo n't fire me

d. Si je vivrais cent ans, je n'oublie rais jamais cette scene

The only difference between examples like (20) and (24) is that the former

may contain an element (e.g. a modal verb) which marks the nonfactual char-

acter of the first clause. This function is fulfilled by the conditional conjunction

in (24). None of the structures in (20), however, can be argued to contain

a diacritic, because the same diacritic would then have to be posited for the

examples in (24), which - according to Haim an - ought to have a wider interpret-

ation range on the basis of the 'diacritic' // alone.

A concessive interpr etation of paratactic structu res is possible if the conjuncts

in question are 'factual' in character (i.e. they cannot be pseudo-imperatives)

and if the propositions expressed by them are judged as being normally incom-

patible on the basis of world knowledge. Again, there are no diacritics required

and iconicity does not seem to impose any constraints which preclude such

an interpretation:

(25) a. I have to do all this wo rk, and you are watching TV

b. Even th ough I have to do all this work, you are watching TV

(26) a. He plays the piano very well, and he can't read a single note

b.

Even though he can't read a single note, he plays the piano very

well

The preceding discussion has revealed the essentially semantic and pragmatic

character of the distinctions drawn by the terms 'conditional', 'concessive con-

ditional', and 'concessive'. Even though typically associated with certain formal

properties, the three constructions analysed and compared in this chapter may

be formally indistinguishable. W hat should also have become clear is the hetero-

geneous character of our class of concessive conditionals. There are many ways

of indicating that a consequent holds for a series of antecedents and that one

of those conditions is normally incompatible with the consequent. Moreover,

this discussion should have made it clear in what way it is justified, and in

what way it is not, to speak of a separate class of even if conditionals. It is

now accepted by many linguists and philosophers alike (Bennett 1982) that

as far as truth conditions are conce rned the re is no class of even // conditionals.

Even does not affect the truth conditions of a sentence, whether it is a con-

ditional or not. Nor does it seem possible to establish such a subclass of con-

ditionals on formal grounds.

Even,

and its counterpart in other languages,

is just one of several formal devices which may characterize a conditional as

a concessive conditional by characterizing a given value as extreme and by

including other values of the same scale for a given propositional schema.

There are other focus particles which may have this effect (e.g. only, but,

so much as, just) and, like these other particles, even may directly precede

a given focus within the p rotasis :

37



Ekkehard

Konig

(27) If you ev en /s o much as/ jus t MENTION HIS NAM E, I will never speak

to you again

The only difference between even and these other particles is that even may

focus on the whole protasis and that it typically precedes if (to indicate wide

scope),

whatever the exact focus may be. As was pointed out above, it is

only when the whole protasis (± connective) is the focus of even that such

conditionals can be said to entail (or presuppose) their consequent. And this

is exactly the situation that has led to the view that even if conditionals form

a separate subclass of 'concessive conditionals'.or 'semifactuals'.

4. C O N D I T I O N A L S U S E D A S C O N C E S S I V E C O N D I T I O N A L S

We are now in a position to specify in more detail the exact contextual conditions

that lead to a neutralization of the distinction normally drawn between con-

ditionals and concessive conditionals. One of those conditions has already been

discussed: whenever a conditional protasis contains an expression marking a

suitable extrem e value on som e scale for some propositional schema, th e condi-

tional is interpreted as a concessive conditional.

10

If the consequent is asserted

to hold for the given 'extreme' antecedent, it can also be assumed to be true

for less extreme cases.

11

Therefore, conditional perfection is ruled out as an

admissible pattern of inference.

Another context that may lead to a concessive-conditional interpretation

of simple conditionals is that of interrogative sentences. This was first pointed

out by Ducrot (1972: 171 ff), who gives examples like the following:

(28) a. Will you take the car if the roads are icy?

b. Will John go if Peter comes?

Given our knowledge about the dangers of driving in the winter, (28a) would

normally be interpreted as a concessive conditional, whereas (28b) is open

to both that and a straightforward conditional interpretation. How can we

account for this tendency to interpret if in conditional questions as 'even if

or, looking at the problem from a different angle, why can we leave out even

in interrogative sentences without the danger of ambiguity or vagueness? Of

cou rse, conditional perfection is not applicable to interrogative utt erance s, since

this principle is based on the assumption that the strongest possible assertion

has been m ade . On the othe r han d, it does seem possible to base the inference

from 'q if pT to q even if pT on maxims of cooperative conversation. In

a situation where conditional questions like (28) are asked, speaker and h earer

may have a certain opinion abou t the normal relationship between the eventua-

lities expressed by p and q. Up is known to be a favourable condition for

q, then 'q if pT is not a very relevan t or informative question , since it canno t

lead to a very informative answer. On the other hand, a protasis known to

express an unfavourable condition for q may lead to a very informative answer.

238




An affirmative answer to such a question n ot only answers the question actually

raised but also implies 'if x, q for more favourable instances of x than a given

p . So, the inference in question could be argued to be based on the Gricean

maxim of quantity suitably reformulated for interrogatives. Alternatively, we

could assume that som ething like the principle of informativeness as formulated

by Atlas and Levinson

(1981:

4off) is involved, which roughly says that the

best interpretation among several competing ones (which are all consistent

with the common ground) is the most informative proposition. Again, this

principle only applies to declarative sentences and would have to be reformu-

lated in order to apply also to interrogative sentences. In the case of questions,

the interpretation that leads to the most informative answer may be regarded

as the most informative one.

12

Sentences like the following exemplify a third type of simple conditionals

which tend to be interpreted as concessive conditionals:

(29) a. If Calvin was still hold ing her hand , she could not feel it (L 'En gle

1962:

n o )

b. If they saw the children, they gave no sign (Ib id.)

c. II ne reva pas . S'il le fit, en tou t cas, il ne deva it pas s'en souvenir

(Simenon 1969: 29)

'He did not drea m . If he did, he could not rem em ber anyway'

Here, the apodosis typically contains an anaphoric reference to the protasis.

Such sentences therefore have the form 'If

p

NP NE G VP ' (where VP contains

a gap or an anaphoric reference to /?), and entail their apodosis. Another

property of such examples is that p is known not normally to go together

with

q.

This means we have at least two of the ingredients which above were

found to be typical of concessive conditionals, and it should not come as a

surprise that such sentences are more or less equivalent to those of type (7a).

5.

C O N C E S S I V E C O N D I T I O N A L S U S E D A S C O N C E S S I V E S

It is only rarely the case that sentences introduced by a simple conditional

connective have a clear concessive meaning.

13

An example of such a situation

is provided by parenthetical adjectival constructions in English:

(30) This is an intere sting , if com plicated , solution

The distinction between concessive conditionals and concessives, on the other

hand, is frequently neutralized. Of the three types of concessive conditional

distinguished above (16 ii), it is the third type in particular (i.e. conditionals

introduced by even if), that may be indistinguishable from genuine concessive

sentences. But some of the free-choice connectives (e.g. anyway, regardless,

however),

which belong to the second type, have also developed a concessive

use. Given the factual character of concessives as opposed to the hypothetical

239



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Konig

or 'op en ' charac ter of condition als, it is clear what kind of contextual conditions

are relevant for a concessive interpretation of concessive conditionals: both

the protasis and the apodosis must be entailed, either by the context or by

the concessive conditional

itself.

Whether a concessive conditional introduced

by even if entails its apodosis or not depends on the focus of even. If the

whole protasis p is the focus of even as in (10), ~p is a plausible alternative

so that both p and ~/? satisfy the open sentence if x, then q. Hence, q is

entailed:

(10) a. Th e ma tch will be on even if it is raining

b.

Even if he is a little slow, he is actually very intelligent

Whether or not the protasis is given, however, depends on the context. In

(31a) p is given in the preceding context; in (31b) it is established as given

through the use of the adverb evidemment 'clearly'.

(31) a. It was the loneliness of the neig hbo urhood , they supp osed , that kept

the house next to theirs empty .. . The house stood two hundred

yards from the Bartlebys' and A. liked looking out of the window

now and then and seeing it, even if it was empty. (Highsmith 1978:

6)

b. Qu elqu 'un qui a fait du Latin . . . accede aisement en quelques

semaines a la lecture de l'espagnol ou de l'italien, voire du portugais,

meme si les parler est evidemment une autre affaire, (he Monde

3 Nov. 1984: 11) 'Somebody who has done Latin ... has easy access

to reading Spanish, Italian or Portuguese, even if speaking those

languages is clearly a different m att er. '

If, as in the preceding examples, p and q are established as given on the basis

of the context and the relations contracted by even with a constituent of the

sentence in question, then the resultant sentences are practically equivalent

to genuine concessive constructions. The only remaining ingredient of conces-

siveness is provided by the evaluation that

even

gives to its focus.

These conditions that lead to a neutralization of the distinction normally

drawn between concessive conditionals and concessives in modern European

and non-European languages can be assumed to have played an important

role in the historical development of many concessive connectives and a wide

variety of languages. Concessive connectives are frequently composed of an

originally temporal or conditional connective and a focus particle that corres-

ponds to English even, also, or and. Some examples are:

(32) English: even though, even so; German: ob-woh l, ob-gleich, ob-schon,

wenn-gleich, wenn auch; French: quand meme; Latin: et-si

and-if;

Finnish: joskin 'if-also'; Serbo-Croatian: iako

and-if;

Malayalam:

-enkil-um 'if-even'; Iranian: (a)gartscheh 'if-?'; Sotho (Bantu): te ha

even-if;

Bahasa Indonesian: wa-lau-pun 'and-if-even'; etc.

4




It is plausible to assume that connectives like these were originally used in

conditionals and concessive conditionals, and that the distinction between con-

cessive conditionals and concessives was entirely a matter of context. As far

as English (or German) is concerned, the evidence is very clear. Though was

used in the sense of 'even if in Middle English and also in early Modern

English:

(33) I'll speak to it though hell itself should gape and bid me hold my peace .

(Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1.11.)

The subsequent differentiation between concessive conditionals and concessives

must have taken its origin from the factual contexts described above.

6 . FOUR USES OF ANYWAY

In order to round off our discussion of the conditions responsible for a neutral-

ization of the semantic distinction between concessive conditionals and conces-

sives and thus also for the developm ent of the corresponding formal distinction,

we will take a brief look at the different uses of the connective anyway. A

discussion of the meaning and use of this and rela ted expressions is particularly

well suited to highlight the specific properties of concessive conditionals, their

affinity to other semantic domains and the change from concessive conditionals

to concessives.

Anyway is a member of the large group of related expressions containing

a universal quantifier as one component and a very general, nonspecific noun

or pronoun as the o ther:

(34) English:

anyhow, at any rate, in any case, in any event, at all events;

German: jedenfalls, aufjeden Fall, injedem

Fall;

French: de toutefagon,

en tout cas; Dutch: in ieder/ elk geval; Turkish: herhalde; Arabic: 'aid

kullhal; etc.

Anyway has at least four different uses in Modern English:

14

(i) concessive-conditional use (= whe ther p or ~ p ) :

(35) You can give me your let ter. I have to go to the post office

anyway

(ii) concessive use (= neverthe less):

(36) a. He may not like my visit. (But) I will go and see him

anyway,

b.

Thanks, anyway

(iii) restrictive use (= at least):

(37) Na tural language expressions tend to have simple, stable

and unitary senses (in many cases, anyway)

241



Ekkehard

Konig

(iv) change of topic / retu rn to previou s topic :

(38) a. Jim He nderso n told me about this. He is our neighbour.

Our kids go to school together ... Anyway, Jim told

me . . .

b. W hat's the matter with him, anyway?

Of the four uses under discussion, the use of anyway as a mark er of a conces-

sive-conditional relationship is clearly the primary one. This use of anyway

can be observed whenever p and q, the sentences linked by this conjunct,

denote eventualities that typically go together, as in (35) or in the following

example:

(39) I did not invite him. He would not have come anyway

Ano the r condition for this use is that one of the two sentences linked by anyway

does not de no te a fact, i.e. it must contain a modal as in (35) or (39).

The contextual conditions relevant for the concessive use of anyway are

the very opposite of the conditions just mentioned. Anyway has a concessive

reading whenever p and q denote facts and the facts are known to be in conflict,

i.e. they typically do not go together.

The restrictive reading, too, derives from a basic concessive conditional read-

ing. In this and the fourth use, anyway relates to epistemological rather than

causal notions. Asserting that a fact expressed by a preceding utterance is

irrelevant for a fact mentioned subsequently amounts to emphatically asserting

the truth of the second statement. The contextual condition responsible for

the restrictive reading of anyway is the specific relationship between p and

q, the two sentences linked by anyway in cases like (37). The first one (=p)

expresses a much stronger claim than the emphatically asserted second sentence

(= p in many cases). So, the speaker in using anyway is in fact retracting a

stronger claim and replacing it by a weaker one in accordance with the Gricean

maxim of quality ('Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence').

The fourth use of anyway is based on a transfer of the notion 'irrelevance'

from a conditional relationship between propositions to the idea of irrelevance

of parts of a conversation to a general topic. In interrogative sentences like

(38b),

anyway not only signals a change of topic but also characterizes the

question expressed by the sentence as a basic, central one.


To summarize, many of the categories traditionally used for the classification

and characterization of adverbial clauses are not discrete ones. Under certain

contextual conditions, a clause that is formally marked as one type of construc-

tion may be interpreted as another. Hence, it is not possible to identify the

adverbial constructions examined in this chapter by a list of necessary-and-

4




sufficient conditions. One way of dealing with this problem of delimitation

and identification is to use the concept of a prototype (see Comrie in this

volume), even though the exact implications of such an approach have yet

to be spelt out. The preceding discussion was meant to make a contribution

to such an approach by systematically investigating the contextual conditions

that are responsible for a neutralization of the contrasts expressible by certain

types of adverbial constructions. This discussion has shown that, of all the

adverbial clauses discussed, conditionals are the most flexible in meaning since

they are open to interpretation as causals, concessive conditionals and conces-

sives, given the right contextual conditions. Concessives, by contrast, are the

most determinate construction type. While constructions formally marked as

either temporals, conditionals, concessive conditionals or causals

15

can all be

interpreted concessively, a concessive construction formally marked as such

does not seem to be open to any of the other interpretations.

l6

This determinate

character of concessives is also reflected in certain syntactic properties, as well

as in the fact that concessives are at the very end of semantic changes involving

all of the other types of adverbial clauses discussed.

NOTES

1 The research reported on here was initially undertaken at the Netherlands Institute

for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar. I wish to

express my gratitude for this fellowship and for the help of the Institute

staff.

I

am also indebted to John Haiman, Detlef Stark and Elizabeth Traugott for reading

and criticizing an earlier version of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank the

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for some financial support.

2 Of course there are many formal means of unambiguously marking a clause intro-

duced by

wenn

as a conditional protasis: a stress on the connective, correlative

so,

subjunctive mood, existential adverbs like uberhaupt at all , the use of focus particles

nur

versus

erst),

or of a time adverbial in the main clause (which prevents the

wenn-dause from functioning as a temporal). Structures like the following are thus

clearly conditional in meaning:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

Wenn (p), q

Wenn p, so q

Wenn uberhaupt p, dann q

Nur wenn p, dann q (versus Erst wenn p, dann q; cf.

not

. . .

no t... until)

Wenn p sollte, dann q

Wenn p, q Adv

Time

unless versus

3 Akatsuka points out that a conditional rather than a causal construction is used

if a contextually given

p

represents newly learned information rather than the

speaker's own knowledge.

4 The form of the corresponding conjuncts also reflects these different ways of specify-

ing

the

relevant

set of

co nditions:

(i) German: sowieso, so oderso, (i.e. so p) oderso (~p), as in (7a)

(ii) English: anyway, in any case; German: injedem Fall (universal quantifica-

tion), as in (7b)

43



Ekkehard

Konig

(iii) German: ohnehin, ohnedies, selbst dann, as in (7c)

5 There may be clear formal differences, however, between concessive conditionals

introduced by even if and those of type (7a-b). Constraints on the sequence of

tenses and mood in conditionals are normally also valid for those introduced by

a focus particle, but not for the other two sentence types. Furthermore, there may

be differences in word order, as for instance in German, where clauses introduced

by auch wenn can be constituents of the main clause and can therefore be followed

by the finite verb. The subordinate clauses in sentences of type (7a-b) can never

be integrated into the main clause in this way. The facts of German also suggest,

however, that sentences of type (7c) tend to adopt formal properties of the other

two types of concessive c onditionals.

6 The following simplified semantic representation of (7c) illustrates this distinction

betwe en focus and scope of a particle (see K onig 1981):

(i) (E ven , a little, X x (if you drink x, your boss will fire you)) )

7 In this paper x is used as a variable for various parts of the clause or for the clause

itself.

8 These e leme nts introduc e a scale of values for some propositional schema and there by

indicate that the first conjunct does not d eno te a single eventuality or fact.

9 See Faucon nier (1975a, 1975b, 1979) for a discussion of scalar ph eno me na.

10 The use of this term is meant to indicate that only one of the two extreme values

on a scale triggers a chain of inferences for a given prop ositional schema (see Fauc on-

nier 1975a, 1975b,1979):

(i) a. If you drink only a dro p of alcohol, your boss will fire you

b.

If you drink a glass of alc oho l, your boss will fire you

c

(ii) a. If I drink a who le bot tle of alcoh ol, my boss wo n't fire me

b. If I drink several glasses of alcohol, my boss w on't fire me

11 Whether such inferences are based on entailments or conversational implicature

is still a m atter of much deb ate .

12 See Van der Auwera (this volume) for a different explanation of the same phenome-

non.

13 This situation seems to be m uch m ore com mon in colloquial Fren ch, as in the follow-

ing examp le in which a do ctor is giving his report of a post mo rtem :

Si son sang contenait une certaine quantite d'alcool, il n'etait pas ivre. (Simenon

1969:55)

'If his blood con tained a certain qu antity of alcohol, he was (certainly) not d run k.'

14 Not all expressions in (34) have the four uses in question, but each seems to have

at least two of them. Furthermore, all of these uses derive from a more con-

crete meaning glossed as ' in any way/manner/measure' in the Oxford English

Dictionary.

15 An example of a construction formally marked as causal with a concessive interpre-

tation:

Jim Thompson amassed a collection of Far Eastern statues, paintings and pots, and

not having sufficient room to display them, built his own wooden mansion beside

a klong - a splendid house that is no less comfortable because it dispenses with

air conditioning. (Spectator 3 Aug. 1980: 8)

44



Co ndition als, concessive conditionals and concessives

16 Concessive sentences with a modal in the 'antecedent' look like an exception to

this claim, since they a re m ore o r less equivalent to even // conditionals (see Comrie

this volume).

(i) Althou gh he may look a fool, he's actually very intelligent

(ii) (= ) Eve n if he looks a fool, he 's actually very intelligent

But note that in (i), too, the 'antecedent'

(He may look a fool)

is entailed and

that we also have exactly the concessive presup position that we ex pect.

REFERENCES

At las, Jay David and Steph en C. Lev inson. 1981. If-clefts, informativeness, and logical

form: radical pragmatics. In

Radical pragmatics,

ed. Peter Cole, 1-61. New York:

Academic Press.

Bennett, Jonathan. 1982. Even if. Linguistics and Philosophy 5: 403-18.

Bolinger, Dwight. 1967. The imperative in English. In To honor Roman Jakobson,

VOL.

1, ed. Morris Halle

etal.,

335-62. The Hague: Mouton.

Cornulier, Benoit de. 1983. 'If and the presumption of exhaustivity. Journal of Pragma-

tics 7: 247-9.

Davies, Eirlys E. 1979. Some restrictions on conditional imperatives. Linguistics 17:

1039-54.

Ducrot, Oswald. 1972. Dire et nepas dire. Paris: Herm ann.

Fauconnier, Gilles. 1975a. Pragmatic scales and logical structures. Linguistic Inquiry

4:353-75-

Fauco nnier, Gilles. 1975b. Polarity and the scale principle. Papers from the nth Regional

Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 188-99.

Fauc onnier, Gilles. 1979. Implication reversal in a natura l language . In Formal semantics

and pragmatics,

ed. Franz Guenthner and Siegfried J. Schmidt, 289-302. Dordrecht:

Reidel.

Fraser, Bruce. 1971. An analysis of 'even' in English. In Studies in linguistic semantics,

ed. Charles J. Fillmore and D. Terence Langendoen, 151-80. New York: Holt, Rine-

hart and Winston.

Gazdar, Gerald. 1979. Pragma tics: implicature, presupposition and logical form. New

York: Academic Press.

Geis, Michael L. and Arn old M . Zwicky. 1971. On invited inferences. Linguistic Inquiry

2:

561-6.

Ha iman , John . 1983. Paratactic if-clauses. Journal of Pragmatics 7:

263-81.

Highsmith, P. 1978. A suspension of mercy. Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin Books.

Ibanez, R. 1976. Uber die Beziehungen zwischen Grammatik und Pragmatik: Konver-

sationspostulate auf dem Gebiet der Konditionalitat und Imperativitat. Folia Linguis-

tica 10: 223-48 .

Karttunen, Lauri and Stanley Peters. 1979. Conventional implicature. In Syntax and

semantics n: Presupposition, ed. Choon-Kyu Oh and David Dinneen, 1-56. New


Kempson, Ruth. 1975. Presupposition and the delimitation of semantics. Cambridge:


Konig, Ekk eha rd. 1981. The m eaning of scalar particles in Germ an. In Words, worlds,

and contexts, ed. Hans-Jiirgen Eikmeyer and Hannes Rieser, 107-32. Berlin: de

Gruyter.

Konig, Ekkehard and Peter Eisenberg. 1984. Zur Pragmatik von Konzessivsatzen. In

Pragmatik in der Gram matik, ed. Gerhard Stickel, 313-32.

Diisseldorf:

Schwann.

45



Ekkehard

Konig

L'Engle, Madeleine. 1962. A wrinkle in time. New York: Dell Publishing Co.

Levinson, Stephen. 1983. Pragmatics. Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simenon, Geo rges. 1969. Ma igret et le tueur. Paris: Presses de la Cite.

Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1985. Conditional markers. In Iconicity in syntax, ed. John

Haiman, 289-307. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

246



13

T H E R E A L I S - I R R E A L I S

CONTINUUM IN THE

CLASSICAL GREEK CONDITIONAL

Joseph H. Greenberg

Editors' note. In describing the system of conditional sentence types

of a given language, the linguist must identify both the basic formal

(i.e. morphosyntactic) categories and the basic semantic categories

deployed by that language. In his summary and reanalysis of the

well-studied system of Classical Greek, Greenberg shows how the

three moods of the Greek verb interact with conditional particles

and the tense /aspect forms of the verb to express a set of nine types

along the semantic dimensions of hypotheticality (particular, general,

counterfactual) and time (past, present, future). This paper provides

links to Veltman's in the discussion of mood and modality, Fillen-

baum's on threats and promises, and Harris's on tense and aspect.

1.


This chapter focuses on an analysis of the conditional in Classical Greek , gener-

ally excluding the preceding Homeric period and the following Koine, both

of which show differences in the relevant constructions from the intervening

Classical period.

1

Of course, many of the properties of the Greek conditional

are not unique to that language. However, it does command special interest

for two reasons, its complexity and the fact that it has been so intensively

investigated. Apart from the specific hypotheses, the central point is that it

is incumbent on the linguist to account for the formal similarities among con-

structions, and to employ in addition to hypotheses stemming from formal

logic those arising from semantic similarities based on the typical factors found

in semantic change in g eneral.

In regard to the syntax of Greek conditionals, the use of the verbal moods

will be the focus of interest. Grammars generally distinguish four moods, the

indicative, subjunctive, optative and imperative. Of these, the imperative does

not occur in the protasis of the prototypical conditional, i.e. one introduced

by ei 'if, thoug h it can occur, as in other languages, in the apodosis, e.g.

English If he is guilty of the crime, punish him The other three show a gradient

from the indicative through the subjunctive to the optative on the basis of

a realis - irrealis contin uum which will undergo a certain am oun t of modification

and refinement in the cou rse of the discussion.

The notion that of the two non-indicative moods (outside of the imperative)

47



Joseph H. Greenberg

the subjunctive is closer semantically to the indicative while the optative repre-

sents the irrealis end of the continuum derives ultimately from the discussion

in D elbriick (1871: especially 17, 25). A distinction betw een two non -indicative ,

non-imperative moods is found only in Homeric and Classical Greek, Vedic

Sanskrit and Av estan. By New Testam ent times the optative is merely a literary

reminiscence, and the subjunctive does not survive in the later Classical Sans-

krit. In his treatment of the topic, Delbriick left Avestan out of consideration,

comparing Vedic Sanskrit and Homeric Greek usage in main clause positive

uses.

He arrived at the conclusion tha t the earliest basic mean ing of the subjunc-

tive was 'will' (Wille) and that of the optative 'wish' (Wunsch). Delbriick's

analysis still survives in its essentials.

Since we can only will what is possible and capable of fulfilment, the subjunc-

tive is closer to the indicative. Indeed, it is often used as a future in earliest

Indo-European. The optative as wish can have an unattainable or even impos-

sible content, and can even refer to the past (contrary to fact). This latter

possibility opens the way for the use of the optative in the Greek sequence

of tenses, in which the optative occurs in subordinate clauses when the verb

in the main clause is in a past tense while the subjunctive appears when the

verb in the main clause is in a nonpast tense.

For Greek, the standard treatment of the whole topic is Goodwin (1889),

devoted in its entirety to the system of moods and tenses of the Greek verb.

Even recent studies like Lightfoot (1975) rely on Goodwin's collection of data.

Goodwin divides Greek conditionals into eight types and this classification

has gone into most pedagogical grammars of the language. However, in the

present treatment one of the types is split into two and the nine which result

are rearranged into two dimensions in a 3 x 3 arrange me nt. In particular, types

I.3 and II.3 of table are, in the standard treatment, considered mere variants

of the same typ e.

In arriving at this symmetrical division of construction types, we are basically

paying attention to linguistic form.

2

The semantic labelling is therefore to some

extent arbitrary, and even results in the, at first blush strange, collocation

'future counterfactual' for type III .3. However, similarity of form presumably

exists for a reason and leads to a search for the gro und s, basically m etaphorical,

which underlie analogous formal treatment.

2. I N F L E C T I O N A L C A T E G O R I E S O F T H E V E R B

Before discussing in detail the various forms of conditionals and their classifica-

tion, a few preliminary remarks concerning the structure of the Greek verb

are in order, for readers unacquainted with this topic. The Greek verb is highly

inflected. It displays the inflectional categories of (i) person and number of

the subject, including a dual second and third person; (ii) voice (active, middle

and passive); (iii) mood (indicative, subjunctive, optative, imperative); and

48



The realis-irrealis continuum in the Classical Greek conditional

Table i. Types of conditional

sentences

in

Classical

Greek

I

2

3-

Past

Present

Future

Particular

I

Protasis

ei + past

indie.

ei + present

indie.

ei + future

indie.

Apodosis

open

open

open

General

II

Protasis

ei + opt.

edn

+ sub.

edn sub.

Apodosis

imperf.

indie.

present

indie.

future

indie.

Counterfactual

III

Protasis

ei

+ aor.

indie.

ei +

imperf.

indie.

ei opt.

Apodosis

aor. indie.

an

imperf.

indie.

an

opt. + an

(iv) tense (present, imperfect, aorist, perfect, pluperfect, future, future per-

fect). However, there are many categories which do not occur (e.g. a future

subjunctive) or which are syncretized (e.g. the middle and passive everywhere

except in the future, aorist, and the perfect tenses). Moreover in the non-

indicative moods certain tenses do not occur at all, namely those with the

prefixed 'augment' e- which marks pastness and which forms the imperfect

based on the present, and the pluperfect based on the perfect. Further, in

many clause or sentence types including the protases of conditionals, what

remains expresses aspectual rather than tense differences. The most important

are the present and aorist of the non-indicative moods, including infinitives.

Of these, the aorist is punctual and the present nonpunctual, e.g. durative

or habitual. The aorist is the unmarked form and is often used where nonpunc-

tual aspect can be inferred from context.

3

The perfect also is found as an

expression of com pleted action , but is relatively infrequent.

In the following ana lysis and classification of cond itiona ls the aspectual differ-

ences in the non-indicative moods are not taken into consideration, nor is

voice, both being by general agreement irrelevant in a typology of conditional

sentences in Greek.

Before proceeding to a classification into typ es, it is also necessary to men tion

two particles, namely ei and an. The former is the usual word for 'if and

introduces the protasis. The latter always indicates some degree of hypothetica-

lity. It occurs both in the protasis and the apodosis. Whenever it occurs with

the subjunctive, and this is always in the protasis, it must immediately follow

ei , with which it then contracts to edn or sometimes to en . With the indicative

and optative an is much freer in order, often gravitating to a position adjacent

to the verb. Fu rther, under these conditions it is never subject to contraction.

3. C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

In table i, columns i, 2 and 3 in the vertical dimension are past, present

and future, while on the horizontal dimension I is factual particular, II is

249



Joseph H. Greenberg

(factual) general and III is counterfactual. Table i is schematic in the sense

that it presents the usual types. There are some occurrences of mixed types,

especially in regard to the tense distinctions indicated in i, 2 and 3. As in

English, we may, for example, have contrary to fact sentences in which the

protasis refers to a different time period from the apodosis. Suppose that a

day which starts with cool weather begins to heat up and promises to become

even hotter. We might say to someone at noon, who has had no opportunity

to change clothing, If you had dressed lighter this morning, you wouldn't be

so uncom fortable at the concert

this

evening.

Before exemplifying and commenting on the system, the following formal

similarities in the arrangement may be indicated. In constructions of type I

(factual particular) the protasis always has e i + the indicative. In II, the general

conditions, th e apo dosis always has the indicative and the protasis never d oes.

Moreover, because of the rule of sequence of tenses previously mentioned,

in certain constructions such as purpose clauses and in indirect discourse the

optative occurs in subordinate clauses with 'secondary tenses' in the main

clause, whereas the subjunctive appears with 'primary tenses'. The secondary

tenses are the imperfect, aorist and pluperfect and the primary are the present,

perfect, future and future perfect. This division between primary and secondary

tenses agrees basically with a division between past and nonpast. The perfect

is primary: it expresses the present result of a past act or a state of affairs

continuing into the present. Thus the protases of II in the table in their use

of the subjunctive and the optative are parallel to other subordinate construc-

tions in Greek and may be considered the normally expected variants of the

same basic construction. The use of edn with the subjunctive in II.2 and II.3

parallels the optional use of an with the subjunctive after the resultative particles

hos, hop6s, and ophra, e.g. hos an mathks, antdkouson (Xenophon, Anabasis

2.15,16) 'That you may learn (aorist subjunctive), hear the other side.' F urthe r,

classifying together the three entries in the apodoses of III is justified by the

existence of a close parallelism w ith the th ree ind epende nt forms of the p otential

construction, to be discussed later. The putting together of the protases of

III receives further support by their parallels with the independent optatives,

also to be discussed late r.

We now discuss the nine forms of Table 1.

3.1 Particular conditionals

Types I.i and 1.2 are relatively unproblematical. In both there is no assumption

concerning the truth or falsity of the condition. In I.i the protasis may contain

any past indicative tense, most commonly the imperfect or the aorist, more

rarely the perfect or pluperfect. As noted above, the differences are here basi-

cally aspectual; in the case of the pluperfect, aspect is combined with relative

time i.e. completion + relative past. The apodoses of I are omitted

5




from the table and are usually called 'open' in the sense that not only the

appropriate indicative tenses can be used but also the imp erative, the hortatory

subjunctive and the optative of wish. However, indicatives with an may not

occur, these being reserved for type III.

Here, as in general, there are stronger limitations on the forms that may

be used in protases (see Haiman in this volume). For this reason, most of

the classifications in Greek grammars of conditional sentences have been based

on the form of the protases.

An exam ple of 1.1 is Plato , Republic 408 C.:

ei theou en, ouk en aischrokerdes

'If he was the son of a god (literally 'if he was of a god') (imperfect

indicative), he was (imperfect indicative) not avaricious'

4

Type 1.2 is exemplified by Aris top hanes , Frogs 579:

kdkisf apoloimen, Xanthian ei me philo

'May I perish most miserably (aorist optative), if I do not love Xanthias

(present indicative)'

Note that the negation in the first of the two quotations is ou, but in the

second me. The rule is that in the main clause ou is used with the indicative

or optative; in most subordinate clauses, including protases,

me

is used with

all moods). The topic of negation will be considered later in this paper.

We now come to 1.3 in which the future indicative is found in the protasis.

The types classified under 3 which concern the future obviously present greater

difficulties for analysis than those assigned to 1 or 2. Strictly speak ing , there

are no future facts. As noted earlier, Goodwin considers our 1.3 and II.3 to

be variants of the same type, his 'future condition, more vivid form' as against

III.3 his 'future condition, less vivid form'. However, as can be seen from

table 1, the formal parallelism of 1.3 with the two others in the first column

is obvious, as is that of II.3 with II. and II.2 in the second column. It seems

reasonable to search for some underlying rationale for these similarities in

the formal treatment.

For the moment we are mainly concerned with 1.3, which has the future

indicative in the protasis, as against the subjunctive in II.3 and the optative

in III.3. Given the general scale of realis-irrealis in the Greek use of the moods,

we expect that there will be some justification for the position of 1.3 on the

realis end of the scale with III.3 on th e othe r e nd.

As has been seen, Goodwin put together 1.3 and II.3 as a single type, more

vivid, as against III.3 less vivid. This analysis which occurs in earlier editions

of Goodwin's work led Gildersleeve (1877) to raise the question as to whether

there is not, in fact, some systematic difference between the two more vivid

types.

In his study of this question the most important, but not the only, data

consisted in the listing of every examp le of either of these forms of the conditiona l

5



Joseph H. Greenberg

in the writing of the three great tragic dramatists Aeschylus, Sophocles and

Euripides. He cites the play, the line and the verb form of the protasis for

each example. In many instances he adds a descriptive epithet to characterize

the force of the verb of the protasis in the particular passage. I have examined

each of these passages myself. This is necessary because Gildersleeve only

cites the cond itional pa rticle and th e verb which accompanies it and gives neithe r

the text nor the translation of the whole passage.

The descriptive epithets used by Gildersleeve with forms characteristic of

I.3 fall into two distinct classes. One which he calls 'minatory' includes such

characterizations as 'threat', 'remonstrance' and 'solemn warning'. The second

is a set to which he gives no general name but includes such phrases as 'is

to ' , 'have to' and 'must'. They all seem to involve the notion of inevitability

or, at least, very strong likelihood. In contrast to 1.3 there is only one instance

of II.3 being characterized as m inatory, nam ely Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus

814.

With this exception no occurrence of II.3 has any characterization at all.

In the plays of Aeschylus, Gildersleeve cites 22 examples of the occurrence

of I.3, of which ten are accompanied by the characterization 'minatory'.

Actually, the passage Libation Bearers 273 is also clearly minatory, although

not labelled as such by Gildersleeve. The others bear notations implying neces-

sity or very high likelihood of occurr ence .

The existence of a minatory subtype involving the future indicative in the

protasis was accepted by Goodwin (1889) in the second edition of his standard

work, but did not lead him to abandon his earlier classification in which 1.3

and II.3 were considered m ere variants of the same fundamental type .

Subsequently Clapp (1891), while not denying the existence of a minatory

use of the future indicative, in a critique of Gildersleeve pointed to the oc-

casional occurrence of what is, on the surface, the complete opposite. The

protasis m ay refer to a state of affairs w hich is ardently desired .

Since the 'libidinal', as he called this use, is well attested, the basic question

regarding 1.3 may be stated in the following terms. Why should the indicative

be used in these three classes of instances, given that the indicative is at the

realis end of the continuum? It should be added, however, that in Sophocles

there are a fair number of occurrences of 1.3 which are uncharacterized, and

this is even more the case for Euripides, chronologically the latest of the three

dramatists.

The following are a few examples of the minatory use. I believe it is sufficient

to quote the English translation. The first to be considered is Sophocles' Ajax

I2

55~6. Agamemnon reproves Teucer, who has defended Ajax's erratic be-

haviour by saying that Ajax is an independent

chief.

Agamemnon says: A

like corrective is in store for thee, if thou acquire not some small sense soon.

The verb acquire is in the future indicative. The corrective is not specified,

but in the immediately preceding lines Agamemnon has said that the ox is

driven down the

straight

path by

the

goad.

5




The second example to be cited is Aeschylus'

Prometheus Bound

311-16.

Prom etheus , chained to a rock in the Cau casus, has been reviling Zeu s. Oceanus

visits him and says:

But if thou hurlest forth words so harsh and of such whetted edge, peradventure Zeus

may hear thee though throned afar in the heaven, so that thy present multitude of sorrows

shall seem but childish sport.

Here the protasis has rhipseis the future second singular indicative, while the

apodosis has as its verb kluoi third person present optative. This is an example

of what in Greek grammars is called the potential optative. It is also relevant

to note that the apodosis is grammatically complex, in that the consequence

of Zeus' hearing is expressed by

hoste

'so that' followed by the infinitive. This

construction normally expresses an actual outcome.

An example of the libidinal use is Sophocles' Trachiniae 1246. Heracles says

to his son Hyllus: This is not an impiety if you will make my heart glad. Here

Heracles, who is being consumed by the magic robe given him by Deianira,

seeks to make his son burn him on a funeral pyre and then marry Iole whom

Heracles loves. The reward is his father's approval of what Hyllus views as

an act of impiety.

The question here is why the protasis should have the future indicative in

the minatory and libidinal constructions. I conjecture that in both instances

there is a virtual certainty which leads to the use of the indicative, but that

it does not reside in the protasis as such. In a threat, the act expressed in

the protasis must have some probability greater than zero. If there is zero

likelihood that the person will carry out an act that will have some dire conse-

quence there is no need for the threat. By the same reasoning, there must

not be zero likelihood of the speaker not carrying out an act that is highly

desired by the speaker or, once more, there will be no need for the promise.

The very high probability, approaching certainty, lies in the relation between

the act and its consequences, whether greatly abhorred or ardently wished,

and in either case there is obviously a strong emotional element involved.

In typological studies a notion of statistical implication has been widely

employed which takes the following form: if X, then Y with high probability.

In the first example there is virtual certainty that Teucer will receive some

punishment if he does not show more sense than to defend Ajax's conduct.

In the second example, which is grammatically more complex, the probability

of Zeus' hearing at such a distance is expressed by the optative, which is at

the irrealis end of the scale. B ut the rea l point is that even this small probability

is not worth risking because th e conseq uences are so terrifying.

We now see that we have a kind of betting situation in which the probability

of a dire outcome cannot be zero but if the outcome is extremely dire this

nonzero probability need not be very great. Pragmatically one may say the

purpose of the threa t is to change the probability to zero of the person addressed

53



Joseph H. Greenberg

doing or not doing something, by noting the dire consequences that will follow.

Correspondingly, when something is ardently desired, even if the probability

is very high, its attainment is so strongly sought that there is a promise whose

purpose is to increase its probability to i.

Th ere is a further assumption of a general Gricean n atu re, namely the ration-

ality of the person to whom the warning is delivered. If Prometheus is a maso-

chist who would like to be punished even m ore by Zeus, then the threat changes

from a dete rren t to an incen tive. Similarly a prom ise is ineffective if the person

to whom it is addressed is an ascetic who, for example, is not enticed by the

promise of a gourmet meal (cf. Fillenbaum, in this volume, on threats and

promises).

The third basic subtype of 1.3 is that in which there is a strong necessity

or likelihood of som ething happening bu t the high degree of probab ility includes

both the protasis and its causal connection with the apodosis. The result itself

is something evil or abhorrent. An example is Sophocles' Electra 1209-10,

in which Electra says: O h woe for thee Orestes, woe is me, if I am not to

give thee burial. At this point Electra believes that her brother Orestes is dead

but she is speaking to a strange r who is actually Orestes in disguise.

The semantic connection of the apodosis with reality is here quite like the

semantic relation of the English adverb

really

to

real.

It would usually not

be out of place if really were to be inserted in the translation of the protasis:

if this will really happen, how horrible As with the minatory use of 1.3, the

apodosis normally expresses something unfavourable. A further citation which

will illustrate this is Aeschylus' Libation Bearers 181-2. Orestes, who has sec-

retly returned to Argos with his friend Pylades, has deposited a lock of his

hair on the tomb of his father Agamemnon, who had been murdered by his

mother Clytemnestra and her paramour Aegisthus. Orestes' sister Electra and

the Chorus of Libation Bearers then come to the tomb. Electra notes that

the hair resembles that of her brother Orestes. The Chorus then asks whether

this means that Orestes has arrived in order to avenge his father. Electra,

however, takes a pessimistic view, saying: He hath but sent this shorn lock

to do honour to his sire, whereupon the Chorus says (181-2): In thy words

lies still greater cause for tears, if he shall never set foot on this land. Here

the protasis has the future indicative and the apodosis once again expresses

an unfavourable issue, and it would be quite reasonable to insert really in

the protasis: if it

is really

so that he

will

never set foot on this land.

3.2 General conditionals

Thus far we have considered conditions which involve an existence assumption,

but this does not hold for the types of the second column of table 1, labelled

'general' in accordance with the usual practice of Greek grammarians. If we

identify these with the general propositions of logic, they would be symbolized

54




by means of the general quantifier (x) and would be paraphrased as 'for all

values of x ... ' . Such propositions are usually interpreted as not involving

existence assum ptions.

However, the story is not that simple. The general affirmative of traditional

logic (A-type propositions) e.g. 'All men are mortal' would be rendered in

Gree k in its hypothetical form 'If all men are m o r t a l . . . ' not by a construction

of column II but by the present indicative, and would be classified as type

1.2. The propositional forms of column II would more appropriately be called

'indefinite' and paraphrased 'For any x ... ' . Neither construction involves an

existence assum ption.

In the present chap ter the traditional terminology 'gen eral' versus 'particular'

is retained, although the terms 'indefinite' versus 'definite' would be more

accurate. The existential, in contrast to the forms just discussed, takes the

form 'there is an

a

such that ... ' . The interesting question is why, in general,

natural languages very rarely make a formal distinction along these lines. In

this respect Classical Greek is unusual.

The reason for claiming that there is a formal distinction is that the same

marker, ei or edn, is used as in other conditions but with a special combination

of tense and mood not found in other types of conditional constructions. The

general condition as a distinct type was widely accepted after its proposal by

Goodwin and has appeared to be relatively uncontroversial among Greek

scholars.

5

In fact, although in a mino rity of instances, forms of the particular conditiona l

are used instead of the general, especially for the present and the past, that

is 1.1 and 1.2 for II. and II.2 respectively. An example is Sophocles' Trachiniae

943-5: If anyone counts on two or perhaps more days, he is a fool. Here the

verb forms in the protasis and the apodosis are both present indicative, the

construction of 1.2. What may be involved, however, is the same factor as

that noted earlier with regard to 1.3.: If anyone (really) counts on two or three

days, he is

a

fool. Furt her investigation would be required to discover whether

this is a major explanation of oth er exceptions of this sort.

Another characteristic of this example is worth noting, namely the presence

in the protasis of the indefinite generalizing pronoun tis 'anyone'. This use of

the indefinite pronoun in the protasis of a general proposition is related to the

fact that any general conditional sentence in Greek could probably be replaced

by a so-called 'conditional relative'; this is true in many languages which have

no special syntactic features to distinguish gen eral from particula r cond itions.

Thus the sentence often cited in Greek grammars as a model of type II.2

is edn tis kleptei koldzetai 'If anyone steals he is punished', in which the verb

of the protasis is in the subjunctive with an and the verb of the apodosis is

presen t indicative. This could be equivalently expressed as hds an kleptei koldze-

tai 'Whoever steals is punished', with exactly the same verb forms as in the

corresponding conditional sentence.

55



Joseph H. Greenberg

It should be noted, though, that an indefinite pronoun need not appear

in general conditionals. An example is Euripides' Alcestis 671, If

death

comes

near, no one is willing to die. Here the protasis has en , followed by the aorist

subjunctive elthei, and the apodosis contains the present indicative bouletai.

We may say that ever or any time is to be supplied. If ever death comes near,

etc.

In most instances however there is an overt indefinite pronoun.

There is in Greek a close formal parallelism which may be stated as an

analogical propo rtion

6

:

Ge nera l question : w/?-question

ei

an + subjunctive : w/z-question word + an + subjunctive

There is the further formal parallelism that the connection between ei or the

vv/z-question word with an is so close that it must not only follow immediately

but in some instances contraction to a single word is compulsory. This is true

for ei + an which is never uncontracted. An example of a w/z-question word

is

pote 'when?' which corresponds to hopotdn 'whenever' . Here ho- is a relati-

vizer. In all these instances there is the further regularity that, following the

Greek rules for sequence of tenses, these interrogative-relatives occur with

the optative without

an

when past tense is involved, thus formally paralleling

II.1.

Presumably, the reason why languages tend not to establish a separate syntac-

tic construction for general conditions is that the use of indefinite pronouns

is sufficient and/or that there is an alternative means of expression by means

of relativization; a third possibility is to use a temporal conjunction.

The verb form for the apodoses of type II is specified in table 1, unlike

the forms for type I (the factual particular), in which the apodoses are basically

open. Even in type II there are additional possibilities not indicated in the

table. Although presumably we cannot 'mix tenses' any more than in English

{*If anyone steals, he was punished),

we can, as in English, have certain non-

indicative forms such as hortative or imperative (//

any one steals, let him

be

punished).

As usual it is row 3 which raises most problems. What justification is there

for considering II.3 general? In some instances it clearly is not, e.g. Xenophon,

Cyropedia 5.3.27: If therefore you go now, when shall you be at home? with

edn and the present subjunctive in the protasis and the future indicative in

the apodosis. In numerous other examples the condition is indeed clearly

general, as in Xenophon, Anabasis 7.3.11: If anyone opposes us, we shall try

to overcome him.

However, the most important reason for considering II.3 general is that,

as Gildersleeve (1877:9) points out, it is 'invariably used in laws and it may

also be called the Legal condition'. There are numerous examples of this use.

The promulgation of laws necessarily refers to future events and is also

256




necessarily general in nature. This provides the rationale and the conceptual

point of depa rtur e for a construction w hich, as can be seen from table i, belongs

in the position II.3 on formal grounds. Whether it was also historically the

earliest use I am unable to say.

There is a further consideration regarding the construction in column II.

As we have seen, the general condition as analysed by logicians makes no

existence assumptions, unlike the particular conditions of column I. Collateral

knowledge generally m akes it clear that the condition is sometimes fulfilled;

but strictly speaking this does not have to hold. This is particularly obvious

regarding the 'legal conditions

1

of II.3. The punishment may be so dire, or

the act itself so unlikely, that no instance will ever occur. This absence of

existence assumptions for the condition, it may be conjectured, is what gives

this form the degree of hypo theticality reflected in the use of the irrealis moods

and the particle an in the pro tasis. Th e reason for assigning the general condition

to a position intermediate between I (the factual particular) and III (the counter-

factual) are as follows. It seems more hypothetical than type I for the reasons

just discussed. On the other hand, as noted earlier, general conditions in Greek

are often expressed by the forms of the first column (factual particular), thus

supporting a close relation between types I and II.

I believe that this relatively close relationship between I and II is based

on the following factors. In regard to the nonfuture conditions, there is no

basis for specifying the consequences of fulfilling the condition unless in fact

it has been known to occur on the basis of experience. One should, however,

except here discourse of a logico-mathematical type, where the relationship

might flow from deductive p rinciples.

Even for the future consequences of a future act, the consequences may

be foretold from past experience. In regard to laws which, as we have seen,

are the typical instance of future general conditions, there is a connection

with factuality in that normally there is no reason to have a law which forbids

an act which is not known to have occurred in the past. However, the absence

of an existence assumption in the protasis does bring with it the possibility

of the enactment of laws which are dead letters. For example, it is possible

that the injunctions in Leviticus 11:13

a n

d Deuteronomy 14:12 against eating

the osprey have never been violated in the history of the Jewish people but

that they occur as a consequence of the tendency of the legal mind towards

deductive reasoning and flow from the general principle of not eating animals

which devour carrion.

3.3 Counterfactuals

On the other hand, type III (the counterfactual), for all the difficulties of its

analysis, refers normally to the consequences of acts which are not performed,

and seems by this very fact to belong at the irrealis extrem e of our co ntinuu m.

57



Joseph H. Greenberg

The intermediate position of II between I and III is reinforced by formal

considerations. The hypothetical particle an is always present in III but never

occurs in I. While it is usual in the Classical period in II, the subjunctive

without an occurs in a fair number of instances, while its omission in Homer

in general conditions is the rule. Another fact pointing to the intermediate

position of II is that it neutralizes the opposition between I and III, in that

in general conditions there is no formal distinction between the contrary to

fact interpretation of type III and the absence of this assumption in type I.

However, the earlier discussion regarding the absence of an existence

assumption in the general condition suggests that we may really be dealing

with two logically different dimensions. Absence of an existence assumption

(II) contrasts with its presence (I, III). Within the latter we have a probability

range with limits of truth value o (falsity) to i (truth). The case of o as a

limit is considered later in the discussion of the counterfactual. With regard

to i (tr uth) , the justification is that no matter how likely the truth of a condition,

if it is simply asserted as true it is no longer a condition. Still, as usual there

are occasional nonprototypical uses in which what are formally conditions are

to be interpreted as assertions. Examples in English of the type If John is

stupid, he was born that way

belong he re.

Turning now to column III (the counterfactual), our basic concern will not

be to add one more to the numerous discussions of the nature of counterf actuals

but rather to point out the formal grounds and the semantic factors for the

assignment to position III.3 of the most problematic type, that in which the

protasis is in the optative and the apodosis is in the optative + an.

Onc e mo re the formal considerations are obv ious, and in this instance involve

both the protasis and the apodosis. In the protasis a comparison of 1.3, II.3

and III.3 shows the sequenc e indicative, subjunctive and o ptative , which echoes

the realis-irrealis gradation of the moods resting on many other facts about

Greek outside of the constructions in question. In the apodosis the use of

the particle an clearly aligns III.3 with III. and III.2 in regard to placement

in the same column.

Semantic justification is given by examples in which a clause with the same

or similar formal characteristics to that of the protasis appears as a type of

indep enden t senten ce, and a parallel situation exists with regard to the apod osis.

These two types of sentences could, alternatively, be described as related to

those of column III by the suppression of the apodosis or the protasis respecti-

vely, without any synchronic or diachronic assumptions about the relationship

between the fuller and briefer types of sentences.

Let us consider the suppression of the apodosis first. We obtain sentences

which consist of ei followed by the aorist (III.

1),

imperfect (III.2) and the

optative (III.3).

7

These are all expressions of wish. In III. and III.2 in Attic

Greek ei always takes the strengthened form eithe or ei gar much like English

if only, and it always implies nonfulfilment of the wish. An exam ple is Eu ripides '

58




Electra

1061:

eitK eikhes

beltious

phrenas

'O that thou hadst better understand-

ing', in which the verb is in the imperfect indicative. In III.3 the optative

may occur by itself that is without

ei ,

and this construction has led to the

use of the name 'optative' for this form of the Greek verb. However, it can

occur with the simple form ei as well as the strengthened forms eithe or ei

gar (the form with ei, however, can only occur in poetry). The negative is

me, as would be expected if in fact this construction is related to the protasis

of the conditional form.

There is a striking similarity to Classical Arabic in the resemblance between

independent sentences expressing wish and the statement of conditions contrary

to fact. This language differs from Greek in having two different words for

'if: ?in where th ere is no assumption regarding the truth of the con dition,

and law which is used to introduce counterfactuals. The same particle law

is used as an optativ e particle to in troduce wishes in main clauses or ind epen den t

sentences.

4. I N D E P E N D E N T C L A U S E S

The indep end ent or main clause use of the protasis forms is called the 'indicative

of wish' in Greek grammars. The fact that a wish is involved is indicated by

the strengthened conditional particles already mentioned. The indicative of

the verb itself evidently suffices, since there is no point in a wish relating to

the present or the past if the speaker knows that the state of affairs wished

for has in fact occurred or is in the process of occurring. Greek here resembles

many other languages in a connection between counterfactuals and wishes,

but differs in the use of the indicative. It agrees with languages like English

and German in the use of strengthening particles. These would, however,

appear to be more of a requirement in Greek: as we have seen, under certain

circumstances they are compulsory in so far as Greek uses the indicative while

English and German use the subjunctive. Thus in English we have If

she

were

(only) here and in Germ an Wenn sie (nur) gekommen ware

With regard to the future construction, many languages agree with Greek

in showing a relationship between wishes relating to the future and future

conditions; for e xam ple, we have in English If they w ould give me

a

fellowship,

I would be very pleased, as compared with // they would (only) give me a

fellowship There are, of course, no future facts for anything to be contrary

to , but we do have a kind of calculus much like that discussed under 1.3.

There is the same combination of the probability of the event actually occurring

and the ardency of the wish that it should occur. Hence it is likely to be used

if the probability of occurrence is very small, but also when the probability

is fairly large but the im portan ce of fulfilment is very g rea t.

There are, in fact, instances in Greek, as in other languages, in which a

form which is usually used in future wishes refers to what is virtually a logical

259



Joseph H. Greenberg

or factual impossibility even when it refers to the future. A famous example

in Greek literature is the watchman's speech at the beginning of Aeschylus'

Agamemnon in which (referring to the horrible deeds which had occurred in

Agamemnon's palace) he says (37-8) oikos d'autos, eiphthongen Idboi, saphes-

tat' an lekseien 'Yet the house

itself

could it but speak (e i + aorist opta tive)

might tell (aorist optative) a tale full plain' (literally, 'would speak most

clearly').

Note that not just any protasis in Greek, or in other languages in which

there is a relation between optatives and the protasis of a counterfactual, can

occur as an optative. The frustrated or unlikely outcome must be one wished

for by the speaker, yet the conditional clause of a counterfactual may well

express som ething w hich is feared or is a mat ter of indifference. Thus it would

seem strange in English to derive from the counterfactual condition If

his

gun

had been loaded, I would now be dead an optative //

his

gun had (only) been

loaded

With regard to this, however, there are two qualifications to be made. One

is that for this not to be appropriate the typical and usually present strengthener

(compulsory as we have seen in the Greek indicative of wish), if not present,

permits in languages like English a statement identical to the protasis - but

one which does not express a wish, e.g. If the gun had been loaded . . . (just

imagine the consequences ).

The second proviso is that, as in the instance of type 1.3, there is some

kind of assumption of rationality on the part of the he arer which is presuppo sed.

Suppose we say, If

the

gun had only been loaded and interpret this as a wish,

as would be permissible in Greek as well as in English. It could have been

said by someone who had been planning the act as a bizarre form of suicide,

an act which failed because of the oversight of the hired killer in not loading

the gun.

It is, however, noteworthy that wish, as against apprehension, is as it were

the unmarked category in spite of the frequent presence of a strengthening

particle to emphasize the expression of wish. Languages often have inflected

optatives to express wish, but I know of no example of a category 'apprehensi-

tive'.

It is usually expressed by the negation of an optative, as in Greek mi

genoito (aorist optative) 'May it not happen '

In the preceding section we have considered the suppression of the apodosis.

In Greek, if we suppress the protasis we get acceptable kinds of sentences

for all the types in the third column, that is sentences in which the only clause

is the main clause or the main clause with types of dependent clauses other

than a conditional apodosis. We thus obtain a past indicative with

an

or an

optative with an. In Greek grammars these are called the 'potential indicative'

and the 'potential o ptat ive', respectively. With the potential indicative, depen d-

ing on whether the verb is aorist or imperfect, the assumption is that the event

did not occur or is not true in the present. Thus elabe an (aorist indicative)

260




can be translated as 'He would have take n' and eldmbanen an (imperfect indica-

tive) as 'He would be taking'. Corresponding to III.3 is the potential optative,

e.g. Idboidn 'He might take.'

This phenomenon is, of course, well-known in many languages, including

English. The condition which prevented a past action or prevents a present

action, or makes a future action unlikely, is not overtly stated but is left vague

or is deducible from the context.

We would not be apt to refer directly to, or imply, conditions, as indicated

by the presence of an and the complete parallelism with the apodoses of condi-

tional sentences of type II I, unless these conditions were no t fulfilled. If they

were fulfilled and ther e were hind ering circumstances wh ich, how ever, w ere

not sufficient to prevent th e even t, ther e are other modes of expression, namely

the concessional conditional in English as well as in Greek, e.g. even though

... in English and ei kai in Greek. In such instances, obviously, the expression

is no longer contrary to fact and the e ven t, in fact, too k pla ce.

5. N E G A T I V E C O N D I T IO N A L S

In Greek, the potential optative is frequent with the negative. The negation

is ou in conformity with the fact that the potential optative is equivalent in

form to an apodosis and, as we have seen, the apodosis takes ou as its negative.

8

The following are examples of ou (regularly ouk before a vowel) with the

potential optative: Herodotus 4. 97 ouk an leiphtheien 'I would not be left

behind (in any case)'; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1172 b32

oucT

dllo ouden

tagathdn an eie 'The chief good cannot be anything else'; Aristophanes, Frogs

830

ouk an metheimen tou thronou

T will not give up the th ron e'.

As can be seen from these examples, what we have is an emphatic negative,

something close to a negative certainty, and the addition of phrases like under

any circumstances, would never, etc. would be consonant with the meaning

of this class of s entences.

It was suggested earlier that what might be called the basic realis-irrealis

continuum (that is, excluding general cond itions) could be conceived as a proba-

bility function whose limits are o 'falsity' and 1 'truth'. Now it is a general

linguistic phenomenon across languages that negatives with a cardinal number

normally exclude not just the number itself but all lower numbers, and this

extends to all quantitative expressions. This was noted for English by the ever

observant Jespersen (1940: 457). If I say There are not four good restaurants

in Copenhagen, it is a kind of feeble joke if I then add that there are actually

five. From this, as noted by Jespersen, not one comes to mean none, no since

not even one in relation to countables becomes zero. The case is similar with

non-numerical quantifiers, e.g. not much means a small amount not a large

amount. The French, formerly emphatic, negatives ne ... pas, ne . . . point,

etc. also belong he re.

261



Joseph H. Greenberg

Given, then, that the potential in Greek is formally equivalent to a future

contrary to fact, its basic meaning is that the possibility is very small. The

negation, then, in conformity with the general fact just discussed, becomes

'not even the slightest possibility', hence an emphatic negation. It may be

looked on, consequently, as a zero limit by asserting that the possibility is

even smaller than any number one might assign to estimate the probability

expressed here by the op tative. B ut this is precisely o as a limit.

Finally, the existence of two separate negatives, me in the protasis and ou

in the apodosis, which we find in Greek, can be placed in a wider typological

perspective as involving an implicational scale based on the realis-irrealis conti-

nuum. In Greek, me is also used in prohibition, negative wishes, negative

exhortatio ns in the first and third pe rsons and in a variety of subordin ate clauses

(e.g. purpos e). On the o ther hand ou is the usual factual negation .

Me

is

of Indo -Eu rope an date and occurs in Old Indie, Old Persian, Tocharian

and A rm enia n, including in all these languages the prohibitive among its uses.

On the other hand, ou has no certain etymology. In other Indo-European

languages a negation in

n

is the factual negation but it survives in Greek only

as the derivatio nal prefix a-, an- 'without, not having'.

Since a prohibition as a negative imperative is not even an assertion, it is

at the irrealis extrem e. W hen a language has a separate ma rker for the prohibi-

tive it is almost always used as a negative h orta tory in the first and third persons ,

e.g. Hausa kada. A shift from this to the use in subordinate clauses of the

sort / fear lest ... is easy and then a spread to other sorts of subordinate

clauses can follow - particularly th ose involving possibility rather than actuality,

such as negative clauses of purpose. Perhaps the final stage in this development

is its use in the protases of conditional sentences where there is no assumption

regarding the truth or falsity of the condition, as with m e in Greek.

Akkadian provides a striking typological parallel with Greek. It has two

negations la and ul Of these , the former is employed in prohib itions but also

in a variety of other uses including the protases of conditional sentences. More-

over, like the Greek me, la is reconstructible for the ancestral language and

occurs elsewhere in prohibitions. On the other h and, ul

is

apparently an innova-

tion and is restricted to the negation of the indicative. Like Greek ou , it is

regular in the apodosis of conditional sentences. These are, of course, mere

indications still to be explored of yet another implicational hierarchy, that

of negation in its relation to the realis-irrealis continuum.

6 . C O N C L U S I O N

The conditional sentences of Classical Greek can be classified into nine types

based on considerations of linguistic form. These nine can be organized on

two basic dimensions: times with values past, present and future, and a realis -

irrealis continuum with the values factual, general and counterfactual. The

262




distinction between factual and general usually used in Greek grammars is

found to be better expressed as definite versus indefinite.

A closer examination of the nine types shows that while there is a general

conformity to truth-value semantics, a fuller understanding requires attention

to similarities based on metaphor reflecting historical change on the one hand

and pragmatic factors on the other. More particularly, certain uses of future

conditionals can be better understood by positing minatory and libidinal sub-

types involving an attempt on the part of the speaker to use the utterance

to increase the likelihood of averting an undesired outcome or of effecting

a strongly desired one.

The protasis and apodosis of counterfactuals are found to be related in their

mo de of linguistic expression to ind epe nde nt clauses expressing wish and poten -

tiality respectively. Such a relationsh ip holds quite generally across languag es.

A more unusual property of Classical Greek is the use of different negative

particles in the protasis and apodosis. The distinction of two particles, one

on the irrealis side of the continuum and the other on the realis side, recurs

in a number of languages. A preliminary consideration of these instances sug-

gests that the irrealis type of negation starts with prohibitions. A more detailed

linguistic, diachronically oriented study of languages with more than one type

of negation would be required to develop a fuller understanding of this pheno-

menon.

NOTES

1 I am grateful to Charles Ferguson and Elizabeth Traugott for valuable comments

and suggestions regarding an earlier version of this paper.

2 The only earlier source in which I encountered this classification was Sonnenschein

(1894).

He noted that it was based on similarity of linguistic form.

3 The terms 'marked ' and 'unmarked' are employed to designate hierarchical relations

among two or more grammatical or other categories (e.g. phonological). The more

unmarked is the preferred or hierarchically superior. The distinction involves a parti-

cular cluster of properties which generally co-occur. Among these are that the

unmarked often receives zero expression. Thus English is representative of many

languages with plurality in that the unmarked singular is indicated by the absence

of an overt mark while the plural is expressed by -5. Another common characteristic

of the unmarked illustrated in the present instance is that it is employed in the

function of the marked when the latter can be deduced from context. Thus many

languages (e.g. Turkish) use the singular form with all numerals including 'two'

or more since plurality can be deduced automatically. For a fuller discussion, see

Greenberg(i966).

4 Greek citations in the paper are based on the Loeb Classical Library text and the

translations there. This accounts for their archaic flavour. However, I have modified

the translation in some instances in the direction of literalness in order to indicate

more clearly the underlying Greek text in its usage of

tenses

and moods.

5 Goodwin believed that he was the discoverer of the existence of the category of

general conditions in Greek. It was actually pointed out earlier by Baumler (1846).

6 Read A:B, C:D as 'as A to B, so C to D'.

263



Joseph H. Greenberg

7 The resemblance of the protasis of the counterfactual to the independent optative

of wish was noted at least as early as the beginning of the nine teenth century. Ko ppers

(1959) contains an historical discussion of alternative theses. On e is that the condition

results from parataxis of an originally independent wish followed by an independent

sentence embodying the apodosis. The rival theory is that the expression of wish

is derived by ellipsis of the apodosis of the con ditional sen tence . In fact, both condi-

tions contrary to fact an d ind epen den t o ptatives of wish occur in the earliest texts.

8 As noted earlier, this is the general rule. However, there are instances of ou in

the protasis. These are as might be expected with the indicative. Many, but not

all, are explainable as involving a logical scope restricted to the verb, as in the

common ou phemi 'I deny' (literally T do not say'); in others ei is really causal.

However, there is a residue. It is not unreasonable to see in these a survival of

the general use of ou at the realis end of the continuum, me being a relatively late

spread by generalization from other types of subordinate clauses. This hypothesis,

discussed below, is already advanc ed in M onro (1891), a gram mar of Hom eric G ree k.

REFERENCES

Baumler, Wilhelm Friedrich Ludwig von. 1846.

Untersuchungen ilber die griechischen

Modi und die Partikeln ken und

an .

Heilbronn: J. V. Landherr.

Clapp, Edward B. 1891. Conditional sentences in the Greek tragedians. Transactions

of the American Philological Association 22: 81-9.

Delbriick, Berthold. 1871. Der G ebrauch des Konjunktivs und Optativs in Sanskrit und

Griechisch. Halle.

Gildersleeve, Basil L. 1877. On conditional forms in the tragic poets. Transactions of

the American Philological Association 7: 5-23.

Goodwin, William Watson. 1889. Syntax of the moods and tenses of the Greek verb.

Boston: Ginn.

Greenberg, Joseph H. 1966. Language universals. The Hagu e: Mouton.

Jespersen, Otto. 1940. A modern English grammar on historical principles: P art

5.

Copen-

hagen: Munksgaard.

Koppers, Bertha Theodora. 1959. Negative conditional sentences in Greek and some

other Indo-European languages. The Hague: Pier Westerbaan.

Lightfoot, David. 1975. Natural logic and the Greek m oods. The Hague: Mouton.

Monro, David Binning. 1891. A gramm ar of the Homeric dialect, 2nd edn. Oxford:

Clarendon.

Sonnenschein, Edward

Adolf.

1894. A Greek grammar for schools,

VOL.

2. London:

Sonnenschein.

264



14

THE HISTOR ICAL D EVELOPM ENT

OF si-CLAUSES IN ROMANCE

•

Martin B. Harris

Editors' note. This paper traces the two-thousand-year history of

conditional sentence types from Latin to the modern Romance lan-

guages. The rich documentation of these languages allows detailed

consideration of the thoroughgoing changes in the tense/aspect/

mood systems of the ve rb. In spite of successive shifts and new forma-

tions, the system of conditionals remains fundamentally the same

in terms of basic semantic par am eters of hypotheticality (real, po ten-

tial, unreal) and time (past, nonpast). However, the boundary

between potential and unreal conditionals is less clear-cut than

between real and either of them, and the time parameter is less

clear-cut in potential and unreal than in real conditions. This paper

relates to those of Konig, Bowerman and Reilly in its dynamic

app roac h, and to ter M eulen 's and Reilly's in its focus on tem porality.

1.


The historical study of conditional sentences in a particular language or lan-

guage family is a complex and difficult task. One of the major reasons for

this is the nondiscrete nature of the category involved, in that the meaning

of conditional sen tences seem s to shade off imperceptibly into adjacent semantic

areas,

in particular those of concession, cause and time. Equally, even where,

as in the case of Romance, there is one favoured structure for conditional

sentences (a biclausal sentence incorporating a protasis introduced by the con-

junction si), this will not always carry the relevant value, while conversely

there will be other structu res with diverse functions which can and do in certain

circumstances serve to mark a hypothetical antecedent-consequent relation.

Any presentation of the history of si-clauses in Romance, then, must be seen

as only one p art of a bro ade r pictu re, namely the history of conditional sentences

as a whole,

1

while it will also involve comments on usages which are not in

any sense conditional. It is to be hoped that it will nevertheless give some

insight into the factors affecting the evolution of conditional sentences in a

group of languages which probably offers on e of the best da tabases in existence

for the study of historical syntax.

One might perhaps be forgiven for asking what contribution an historical

view of conditionals can make to a better overall understanding of the field

265



Martin B. Harris

as a whole. Two obvious answers present themselves. Firstly, at the level of

content, it would clearly be of great significance if one could show that there

had been some

fundamental

change in the underlying semantic choices open

to a Romance speaker in the two-and-a-half thousand years with which we

are concerned. Such a discovery - and equally, any demonstration to the contr-

ary - would interact with the work of semanticists of every persuasion, and

also with that of psycholinguists concerned with how children come to acquire

and use the conditional system of their native language. Secondly, at the level

of form, one may seek to show whether all of the semantic choices postulated

are consistently made through time, and if not, whether or not the

types

of

structure in use to express conditional meanings have significantly changed.

In the same vein, the historical data must be examined in the light of recent

synchronic work showing formal overlaps between certain conditional markers

and the markers of various other constructions hitherto not generally felt to

be semantically linked to conditionals, to see whether the relevant patterns

have recurred through time, a hypothesis which, if substantiated, would greatly

strengthen the case for the purported semantic links. It is hoped that this paper

will throw at least some light on each of these questions and thereby enrich

our un derstanding of the field as a who le.

In the analysis which follows, we shall make use, initially at least, of the

three time-ho noured categories of conditional sentences, namely 'real', 'poten-

tial ' ,

and 'unreal' (= 'counterfactual'), in senses to be defined shortly. We shall,

how ever, be attempting to dem onstrate two things more clearly than is generally

the case: firstly, that the distinction between the last two categories of condi-

tional sentences just mentioned and between the associated temporal opposi-

tions is very much less clear-cut than is often supp osed , a fact overtly app aren t

at several points in the history of Rom anc e; and secondly, tha t massive changes

in the morphosyntax of the verb system of Romance often initially obscure

the fact that the fundamental set of choices open today within the conditional

sentence 'system' may actually not differ greatly, if at all, from that open to

a speaker of Latin over two thousand years ago.

2. s i- C O N D I T I O N A L S IN L A T IN : R E A L , P O T E N T I A L ,

U N R E A L ; P A S T , N O N P A S T

One favoured pattern for marking conditional sentences in Latin, we have

seen , consisted of a protasis introdu ced by the conjunction si and incorpo rating

a finite ve rb, an d an ap odo sis, likewise including a finite ver b. This conjunction

si is in fact cognate with the first morpheme of sic 'thus' (Ernout and Thomas

1953:

374) and a pp ears t o have develo ped its cond itional value via use in origi-

nally paratactic structures. For example, Palmer (1968: 331) cites the Plautine

example 5/ sapias, eas ac decumbas domi which he construes as 'Thus you

would be wise (i.e. if you've got any sense): go home and lie down'. It is

266



The historical developm ent of si-clauses in Romance

Table i. Traditional schema of the interaction between unreal conditionals and

subjunctive in Latin

Potential

Unreal

Nonpast

P si + pres.

subj.

A pres.

subj.

P si + imperf.

subj.

A imperf.

subj.

Past

P si + imperf.

subj.

A

imperf. subj.

P si +

pluperf.

subj.

A

pluperf.

subj.

Note:

P = protasis, A = apodosis

this si, and an ap pare nt Vulgar L atin alternative SE (Gra ndg ent 1962: 97),

which is the etymo n of

si/se

in Frenc h, Spanish and Italian. A synthetic negative

form

NISI

was not destined to survive, being rivalled and ultimately replaced

by the analytic si ...

NON,

and later by other complex structures

(a moins

que, a menos que,

etc.).

In all periods of Latin one finds a fundam ental distinction betw een sentences

where the hypothesis expressed in the protasis is seen as likely or even certain

to be fulfilled, or at least where there is no presupposition that it will not

be (or has not been) fulfilled (Blatt 1952: 312; Vairel 1981; Fun k 1985), and

the converse. The former group, known as 'real' conditions, normally had

protases who se verb was in the indicative m ood , any tense of that mo od, includ-

ing the future, being in principle acceptable. (For the fact that the use of

certain tenses leads to a nonconditional interpretation , see below.) The apodo-

sis also was normally in the indicative mood, but not necessarily so, in that

whenever a subjunctive form was appropriate in a main clause - not at all

an infrequent possibility in Latin - then it was of course similarly possible

in an apod osis: thus

Adeat {subjunctive), si quid volt {indicative

'Let her come,

if she wants some thing' (E rnout and Thom as 1953: 375). W here the speaker's

assum ption, ho we ver, is that the relev ant hypothesis is unlikely to be fulfilled,

or indeed incapable of fulfilment, then we are dealing with 'potential' and

'unreal' conditions respectively, and the subjunctive mood is normally found

in both protasis and apodosis. These dimensions are in principle (largely) inde-

pendent of the dimension of the binary temporal opposition between past and

nonpast. Leaving aside real conditionals, and noting but setting on one side

the occasional use of the future perfect to stress posteriority rath er than simply

nonp astness within p otentia l pro tase s, we arrive in table 1 at the so mew hat

idealized schema so beloved of Latin grammarians (Harris 1978: 237). It will

be noted that nonp ast po tential conditions are marked by the present subjunc-

tive in both clauses (with the perfect available to m ark co mpleted aspect when

required), whereas past potential conditions share with nonpast unreal condi-

tions the imperfect subjunctive in both protasis and apodosis. (Note the tem-

poral ambiguity of this paradigm even within the traditional presentation.)

267



Martin B. Harris

Past unreal conditions show the pluperfect subjunctive in both halves of the

com plex. Th us the system is said to be :

(1) a.

Potentialnonpast

Si ven iat, me videat (present subjunctive)

'If he were to come, he would see me (he probably won't, but he

might) '

b.

Potential past

Si ven iret, me videret (imperfect subjunctive)

'If he were to have come, he would have seen me (maybe he did,

maybe he didn 't) '

(2) a.

Unreal nonpast

Si ven iret, me videret (imperfect subjunctive)

'If he cam e, he would see me (but he w on 't)'

b.

Unreal past

Si venisset, m e vidisset (pluperfect subjunctive)

'If he had com e, he would have seen me (but he did n't)'

In fact, the situation was much more fluid than this, not only in early and

late Latin but ev en, app arently, throug hout the Classical period. In early La tin,

the present subjunctive was normally used for all 'nonreal' (i.e.

fictionnel

in

the sense of Sechehaye 1905: 324) nonpast conditions, whether or not they

were being pres ente d as still capable of fulfilment. In the words of Woo dcock

(

X

959

: J

53)> '

n o

c

l

e a r

distinction is made between what may yet happen and

wha t is no longe r capa ble of fulfilment', and he cites (inter alia) the Plautine

example Hand rogem te, si sciam 'I should not be asking you if I knew', where

the know ledge is clearly denied . At the same time, the pluperfect subjunctive

seems to have been relatively uncommon (although certainly not unknown)

in early Latin, past unreal conditions frequently being marked by the imperfect

subjunctive.

2

Seen in this light, we may say that it is the po tential:u nrea l oppo si-

tion which is less than rigidly maintained. The basic opposition in early Latin,

Table 2.

Schem a of the interaction between unreal conditionals and subjunctive

in

earlier

Latin

Nonpast

Past

Potential

Unreal

Potential

Unreal

P si + pres.

subj.

A pres.

subj.

P si +

imperf.

subj.

A

imperf.

subj.

Note: P = protasis, A = apodosis

2 68




then, excluding real conditions, seems to have been as set out in table 2. The

perfect subjunctive is available to mark 'completion' in nonpast conditionals,

and the pluperfect subjunctive serves as an alternative to mark past unreal

conditions.

Already in Plautus, however, the distinction between potential and unreal

was coming to be more clearly made, at least within nonpast time, by an exten-

sion of the use of the imperfect subjunctive into nonpast unreal conditionals,

the role of the present (and perfect) subjunctive being thereby restricted. The

temporal ambiguity created in respect of the imperfective subjunctive, and

already alluded to above, was resolved, in the case of the Classical language

at least, by the increased use of the pluperfect subjunctive, the temporal and

aspectual values of which were

prima facie

appropriate to past unreal con-

ditions. The imperfect subjunctive was not, however, lost from past conditions

but was supposedly reserved for instances where the fulfilment or otherwise

of the (past) condition was unknown or unimportant, a usage which, following

tradition, we have labelled 'past potential'. In the light of these changes, one

arrives at the system shown in table 3 with a caveat that, for native speakers

of English at least, the distinction between potential and unreal past condition-

als is not always easy to grasp .

3

There are several general points to observe here before we pass on. The

Table 3. Schema of the interaction between un real conditionals and sub junctive

in later Latin

Nonpast

Past

Potential

Unreal

Potential

Unreal

P si + pres.

subj.

A pres.

subj.

P si +

imperf. subj.

i

A

imperf. subj.

P si + pluperf.

subj.

1 A

pluperf. subj.

Note: P = protasis, A = apodosis

first is the (often noted) extent of the formal parallelism between the protases

and apodoses of both potential and unreal conditional sentences, the morpho-

syntactic structures selected thereb y h ighlighting the very high degree of seman-

tic cohesion between the two clauses of such sentences (Harris 1978: 234-45).

Equally striking on closer inspection, however, is the lack of stability one

observes not only in the opposition between potential and unreal conditions

on the one hand

4

(a fluidity one might perh aps expect in such a clearly subjective

area of modality), but also in the opposition between past and nonpast, which

269



Martin B. Harris

is

prima facie

more surprising, but nonetheless a recurrent feature in the history

of the Romance languages. Suffice it to note at this point that it is in the

case of potential and unreal conditionals - i.e. those with pronounced modal

value - that time oppositions are clearly felt to be as it were 'optional': one

recalls in this connection both M oign et's observa tion (1959, 1: 99) that the

subjunctive is a mood 'du temps amorphe, de la duree indifferenciee' and

also the fact that in con tem pora ry spo ken Frenc h only the 'asp ectu al' op position

vienne.soit venu

persists, the time opposition with

vint

and/wf

venu,

respecti-

vely, having been neutralized.

3. F A C T O R S I N F L U E N C I N G T H E D E V E L O P M E N T O F

s i -C O N D I T I O N A L S IN E A R L Y R O M A N C E

Table 3 suggests, fairly uncontroversially, that there were morphologically dis-

tinct paradigms, all subjunctive, used as the major markers of the four types

of cond itional sen tences in Latin wh ere fulfilment of the hypo thesis was con-

sidered to be unlikely or impossible. In any presentation of the sources of

the earliest Romance structures, however, we need to take account of two

sets of factors which were at work in the spoken langu age. Firstly, there existed

a number of attested alternatives to the 'paradigm' combinations listed above;

and secondly, various major morphological changes were underway within the

verbal system of Latin during and after the Classical period. Of the latter,

the most significant for our purposes was that the imperfect subjunctive - not

only in conditional sentences but everywhere - was at first rivalled and later

ousted throughout much of the Romance domain by the pluperfect, which

paradigm however initially continued also to retain its original functions, at

least within conditional sentences. In oth er w ords,

Si venisset, me vidisset

came

to subsume not only all 'past' counterfactual conditions, but also the nonpast

potential usage already discussed: in translation terms, it came to mean not

only 'If he had come, he would have seen me', but also 'If he were to come/If

he came, he would see me.' When we recall, therefore, that the imperfect

subjunctive was, in effect, temporally ambivalent from an early date, and that

the pluperfect subjunctive was clearly already so as early as the tim e of Vitruvius

(first century

BC),

5

and that the present subjunctive had only a very limited

future in conditional sentences in Romance, it seems possible to argue that

the entire distinction between past and nonpast in the realm of nonreal condi-

tions was to some ex tent res tricted to m ore formal reg isters and was not consis-

tently maintained in the popular language. The only opposition clearly made

at all times was that between real conditions marked by the indicative mood,

and nonreal conditions, marked by the imperfect subjunctive

(VENIRET)

and,

later, the original pluperfect subjunctive (VENISSET) paradigm, this latter form

having certain more specialized alternatives, at least in certain circumstances

in certain reg isters.

7



The historical development of si-clauses in Romance

This one no nrea l struc ture , involving as it does the 'pluperfect b ecom e imper-

fect' subjunctive in both clauses, and with a very wide range of modal and

temporal values, clearly formed a major part of the inheritance of all the

Rom ance langu ages. Only in Old F rench , howev er, do we find structures such

as:

Se je nefusse en tel priso n, bien achevaisse cest afere

retaining much (though not all, as we shall see) of the semantic ambivalence

of their late Latin antecedents. Out of context, this could mean either 'If I

were not in such a prison, I would settle this matter' or 'If I had not been

in such a prison, I would have settled this matter.'

6

This, it should be stressed,

was noticeably the commonest conditional structure in Old French, whenever

counterfactuality was implied, the temporal opposition therefore once again

being neutralized.

Th e 'double imperfect ( < pluperfect) subjun ctive' structure was not, how-

ever, lost elsewhere. While only Old French maintains descendants of

Si venis-

sem, me vidisset

with the wide range of values described above, Old Spanish

(Lapesa 1980: pa ra. 9 7.5) and O ld Italian (Rohlfs 1954, m: pa ra. 744; Tekavcic

1972, 11: 652) also retain comparable structures, but limited from a very early

date to nonpast contexts (Brambilla Ageno 1964: 363 ni). Indeed, they are

so found in many southern Italian dialects to this day. The structure was,

however, rivalled - and eventually ousted completely from the Romance stan-

dards - both by derivatives of other forms already present in spoken Latin,

and by the creation of compound subjunctive (and conditional) paradigms ana-

logous in form to all the oth er perfective parad igms in Rom anc e. The comp eting

structures already found in Latin had a more limited semantic range than the

'imperfect subjunctive 4- imperfect sub junctive' com bination discussed above -

which, it will be recalled, was not unambiguously marked in respect of either

of the two central oppo sitions und er discussion (poten tial versus un real; no npast

versus past) - and were available for use when occasion demanded. I have

listed and exemplified the most important possible structures (Harris 1971:

28) and will not repeat them now: suffice it to say here that there were two

important alternatives to the 'pluperfect > imperfect' subjunctive paradigm in

spoken Latin in the apodoses of past conditional sentences, namely VIDERAT

(the original Latin pluperfect indicative) and (later) VIDERE HABEBAT/HABUIT,

the source of the modern 'conditional' paradigms. The former survived into

the peninsular languages, where its original function was to provide, via its

use in apodoses, a 'past' structure complementing the 'double imperfect sub-

junctiv e' structure w hich we have seen to have been restricted to nonpast values

in Spanish. (F or a detailed discussion of the position in Old Span ish, see Mend e-

loff i960.) A similar structure is widely attested in Old Italian (Rohlfs 1954,

111:

pa ra. 7 51), and survives to this day in nu me rous dialects (Tekavcic 1972,

11:653).

271



Martin B. Harris

The second Latin form mentioned above, VIDERE HABEBAT/HABUIT, was des-

tined to prosp er in Ro m an ce, and not only in conditional senten ces. D erivatives

of the former are found in French and Spanish and in Italian dialects, and

of the latter in Tus can, later stan dard Italian. (Fo r the distribution of derivatives

of

VIDERE HABEBAT

and

VIDERE HABUIT

in Italy, see Tekavcic 1972, 11: 407.)

As

verraitIveria/vedria

and as

vedrebbe

respectively, these forms developed

primarily as markers of later time on the past axis (Harris 1978: 137), an evolu-

tion outside the scope of the present paper. Within the apodoses of conditional

sentences, however, they were from the outset modal in value and, as we

have seen, their initial time reference was past. By the time of the earliest

texts,

how ever, in France and Italy, they had becom e (in their moda l accep tion)

nonpast in value, w hereas in Old Spanish the conditional paradigm was temporally

ambivalent (Harris 1971; Pountain 1983: 178), caught as it were part way through

the past > nonpast change. Old Spanish, therefore - like Old French - had

one frequent cond itional structure which was, out of con text, temporally am big-

uous. A t the same time, however, O ld Spanish had two unambiguous structures,

while Old French had a structure showing a conditional in the apodosis

(S i

je venais, il me verrait)

which was unambiguously nonpast and which generally

represented the protasis as being potential rather than counterfactual.

7

(For

the use of the imperfect indicative in the protasis, see below.) In standard

Italian, however,

se

+ imperfect sub junctiv e/con ditiona l early emerg ed as the

favoured (and unambiguous) marker of all nonpast nonreal conditions.

3.1 Th e dev elop me nt of com po und verb forms in cond itional sentence s

It is to the creation of temporally unambiguous compound paradigms that

we must now turn our attention. One general feature of the development of

the verbal system from Latin to Romance was the emergence of a set of com-

pound paradigms incorporating the auxiliary verb

HABERE

and its derivatives,

to mark anteriority whenever this formed part of the value of the paradigm

in question. (For a general discussion of this process in relation to conditional

senten ces, see Pou ntain 1983: i84ff.) T he gradual assumption by

HABEO FACTUM

of some of the functions of

FECI

is well documented, and this new syntagm

provided a model for a number of other parallel forms. One of these was

a new analytic pluperfect subjunctive,

HABUISSET FACTUM,

which is in fact

attested as early as Vitruvius and which app ears to have bee n fully gramm atica-

lized earliest in Italian. (Brambilla Ageno 1964: 362 says that the pattern of

which this paradigm forms part Si pud dire, obbligatoria gia neWantico italiano

'may be said to be obligatory already in Old Italian'.) Perhaps the only note-

worthy thing about this development is how long it took for this compound

pluperfect subjunctive to become the norm in past unreal conditionals both

in France (where the temporal ambivalence of the commonest structure has

already been discussed) and in Spain (where the former pluperfect indicative

7




still occupied the past unreal slot). Indeed, the slow acceptance of the new

paradigm can readily be traced during, and indeed after, the medieval period,

as can that of a new 'conditional perfect

7

paradigm formed along precisely

the same lines. Thus, the original temporally ambiguous pattern in French

(imperfect subjunctive + imperfect subjunctive) provided the model for a new

'past' patt ern (pluperfect subjunctive + pluperfect subjunctive) which was

widely found by the sixteenth century. Equally, an analogical past conditional

form developed in apodoses, first appearing in the thirteenth century and gra-

dually becoming general (Haase 1969: para. 66B), to the point where the sub-

junctive is today almost entirely absent from apodoses. (For developments

in protases, see below.) It is interesting to note that the resolution of the

temporal ambiguity of 'subjunctive' hypothetical sentences in French did not

suffice to save th em , for reaso ns we shall allude to briefly la ter. Parallel ch anges

occurred in Spanish, with the added factor that the original Latin pluperfect

indicative, no doubt for morphological reasons, gradually came to be inter-

preted as nonpast, and thus itself provided a model for a new compound 'past

subjunctive'

hubiera visto

alongside

hubiese visto

and

habria visto.

(For a

detailed survey of this process, see Ha rris 1971: 30.)

3.2 Th e use of the imperfect indicative in conditional sentenc es

As any descriptive grammar of Latin or of any medieval or modern Romance

language will show, there is a multiplicity of other paradigm combinations

which are attested in hypothetical sentences, particularly those involving a

change of modal and/or temporal perspective between the protasis and the

apodosis, and it would be quite impossible to discuss all these here. One other

theme does, however, warrant attention, and that is the use of the imperfect

indicative at various times with various values. In Latin

itself,

the imperfect

indicative is attested in the apodoses of past unreal conditions (Gildersleeve

and Lodge 1895: para. 597, Rem 2), seemingly to stress the 'reality' of the

apodosis in question given mere ly the fulfilment of a certain cond ition. This

usage appears to have survived somewhat tenuously in Old Spanish (Pountain

1983: 179) and throughout the history of French (Sechehaye 1905: 334), but

has been particularly favoured in Italy, where the imperfect indicative has

spread also to protases (Rohlfs 1954, in: para. 749). (A parallel situation is

found in Rumanian: see Lombard 1974: 295.) Having been most frequent at

first, apparently, with verbs which were themselves modal in value, this use

of the imperfect indicative is now possible with any verb. A morphologically

parallel structure is found in Spanish and in particular in Portuguese, but here

generally with the more expected nonpast value, the pluperfect indicative,

coming to play an analogous role in relation to past time.

8

(The parallelism

with the Latin use of the pluperfect indicative discussed earlier, is clear.)

As an apparently quite separate and rather later development, the 'real'

73



Martin B. Harris

conditional syntagm present indicative + future indicative provided the model

for the widespread introduction of the imperfect indicative into the protases

of nonpast potential conditional sentences, although such usage was found

as early as Plautus.

9

This use of the imperfect indicative flourished in the Latin

of Gaul and emerged as a (nonpast, and originally not very frequent) partial

alternative to the imperfect subjunctive in protases of nonpast potential con-

ditionals in Old French, as we have seen. Interestingly, the imperfect subjunc-

tive resisted the imperfect indicative in protases much longer than it did the

conditional in apodoses, perhaps because of the more explicitly modal value

of this latter paradigm (Sechehaye 1905: 367, 369). One also finds a structure

analagous to French

Si je venais, il me verrait,

albeit rarely, in Italian (Rohlfs

1954, HI:

para. 750), apparently in particular in Sardinia and Corsica: the one

imperfect indicative paradigm has thus been used with both past and nonpast

values in the history of Italian, a blurring of the temporal opposition which

we have come to find unsurprising.

3.3 A note on certain language-specific developments

Before concluding this necessarily highly abbreviated survey of the develop-

ment of 'convention al' conditional sentences in Rom ance , there are three speci-

fic points one might m ak e, one each abou t Fren ch, Spanish and Italian. In

French, the subjunctive mood has been wholly ousted from hypothetical sen-

tences in all but the most formal registers, the standard language preferring

the imperfect indicative + conditional for nonpast potential conditionals, as

we have just seen, and - by virtue of a process we described earlier - the

compound equivalents pluperfect indicative 4- cond itional perfect in past u nreal

conditionals. (For a detailed discussion of the introduction of compound para-

digms into past conditional sentences in French, see Sechehaye 1905: 388ff.)

Note the restoration of a perfect morphological symmetry in the somewhat

idealized contem porary French system:

(no np ast, real) s'il vient, il me verra

(no np ast, pote ntial) s'il ven ait, il me verrait

(past, un real) s'il etait ven u, il m 'aura it vu

However, from very early on, there has been a further pressure for the con-

ditional (and therefore likewise the conditional perfect) to be used in the pro-

tases also (see Haase 1969: para. 66C and, for the contemporary language,

Grevisse 1975: pa ra. 1037 bis, 5 ), despite continual den unciation by prescriptive

grammarians. This can be seen as the result of two complementary pressures.

On e is the pres sure, already n oted on several occasions, towards morphological

harmony between the two parts of 'modal' conditional sentences. The second

is the pressure for the conditional and related paradigms to emerge (especially

74




in French) as the true markers of modality in the modern language while the

subjunctive becomes more and more a syntactically conditioned variant used

only in certain sub ordin ate stru ctures (H arris 1981). (Recall our earlier observa-

tion that not even the tempo ral disamb iguation of the subjunctive-using patte rn

could prevent its eventual dem ise.) This latter process is attested also in po pular

registers of Spanish and Italian, although the semantic weakening of the sub-

junctive mood is not so far advan ced in these languages - not least, one suspec ts,

because it is still found in m oda l prota ses

10

Certainly, the protasis of a 'nonreal' conditional sentence is a modal context

par excellence. One further consequence of this fact can be seen in Spanish,

where the original Latin pluperfect indicative which we have discussed before

has come to be interpreted, in the standard language at least,

11

exclusively

as a modal form,

viera

( < V I D E R A T )

being seen as semantically equivalent to

viese ( < VIDISSET). What has not been satisfactorily explained is why this form

(having essentially lost its original indicative function) should have persisted

with a modal value in a language where not only was the original marker

of modality, the subjunctive form

viese,

still viable, but a sturdy alternative,

veria, the con ditiona l, was already flourishing.

Th e final point in this section con cerns Italian. We have n oted th at the imper-

fect indicative in Italian is used in either the protasis or the apodosis or both

of past unreal co ndition s, that is, as the equiv alent of the pluperfect subjunctive

and the conditional perfect. It is worth recalling that this partial synonymy

in Italian between the imperfect and the conditional perfect is not limited to

conditional complexes. The Italian equivalent of 'He said he would come' is

Disse che sarebbe venuto, literally 'He said he would have come'. Also widely

found, however, is Disse che veniva, literally, 'He said he was coming'. It

is also of interest to recall that nonpast potential protases in Italian still show

the imperfect subju nctive, in accordance w ith the analysis we presented earlier.

This is in general true even for those native speakers of Italian who have

ceased to use the past simple in conversation: for whereas in French close

morphological similarity between the relevant paradigms is widely believed

to explain why the imperfect subjunctive did not survive the loss in the spoken

language of the past simple, the imperfect subjunctive in Italian is formed

on the present stem of the verb and therefore independent of the fate of the

past simple. The imperfect indicative is not used in nonpast pro tases in standard

Italian, because, as we have just seen, that paradigm has been pre-empted

for the past functions described earlier, which have apparently persisted

unchanged since Latin. There is, however, in addition to the double imperfect

subjunctive mentioned above as surviving in many southern dialects, one

further a lternative to the favoured se + imperfect subjunctive/conditional struc-

ture in

italiano popolare

and in dialects, namely the use of the conditional

in its various forms in both clauses (Tekavcic 1972, 11: 654 ), along the lines

discussed earlier for Fren ch.

12

75



Martin B. Harris

4. C O N D I T I O N A L S E N T E N C E S IN M O D E R N R O M A N C E

The modern Romance languages, for all the formal differences between them,

do seem to have developed a comparable system in this domain of syntax.

The distinction between 'real' and 'nonreal' conditional sentences is largely

maintained, and the 'indicative:subjunctive ~ other modality marker' opposi-

tion continues. W ithin the 'no nre al' category, however, the distinction betw een

'potential' and 'unreal' conditions is not formally made (as it apparently was

at least for a time in Latin, and later, it would seem, in French, and perhaps

now once again in some forms of Spanish - Lavandera 1975) within either

of the two time categories nonpast and past, at least not in the case of the

most widely used paradigms. In effect, 'nonpast potential' ('If he came ... ')

is opposed to 'past unreal' ('If he had come . . . ' ) . All sentences carrying either

of these values have a modal (i.e. a subjunctive or a conditional) paradigm

in one or both clauses, in Spanish and Italian usually both. We have noted

also a recurrent theme whereby forms having past time value come to be used

for past counterfactual conditions and then drift into nonpast counterfactual,

and ultimately nonpast potential, conditions. The Classical Latin imperfect

subjunctive, then pluperfect subjunctive, and the Vulgar Latin pluperfect indi-

cative have all broadly followed this route, although in French, at least, the

conditional appears to have been used for nonpast potentials before nonpast

counterf actuals. Instanc es of the imperfect an d /o r pluperfect indicative in the

protasis have been described, but so too has clear popular pressure for these

to be replaced by conditional forms, restoring the formal parallelism of Latin.

One special case, that of the double imperfect indicative in Italian, has been

discussed, and its ambivalence noted. Finally, we should note that the time

distinction between nonpast and past, uncertain at times in Latin and positively

set aside in many cases in Old French (and to some extent also in Old Spanish

and O ld Ita lian ), is now fairly systematically m aintain ed, even in popular regis-

ters, by virtue of the opposition between simple and compound tenses. All

in all, the 'c or e' system seems - at prese nt - to be both simple and clear.

5. si IN I N D I R E C T Q U E S T I O N S

We must now look briefly at one quite separate use of si/si/se in Rom ance,

namely as the complem entizer requ ired when the em bedde d sentence was origi-

nally a polar qu estion . Th e Classical Latin particle

NUM

('wh eth er') was rivalled

and eventually replaced, just as is happening in (spoken) English, by si (If),

to the point at which si/se are the norm al markers of indirect polar in terroga tion

in French, Spanish and Italian. The development appears to have been via

the meaning 'in case' from the conditional value of si, rather than from the

original value of sic, discussed at the start of this paper. This process can

be seen clearly in a Ciceronian example such as Canes aluntur in Capitolio

ut significent si fures venerint 'Dogs were fed in the Capitol to warn whether/if

76



The historical development of si-clauses in Rom ance

robbers were getting in', and, from Petronius, Temptemus tamen, si adhuc

(ova) sorbilia sunt

'L et us see w heth er/if the eggs are still able to be sw allowed.'

As early as Plautus, one finds si in an 'interrogative' sense after certain verbs:

note how one might translate the Terentian example

Visam si domi est

as

either 'I shall see (him) if he is at home' or 'I shall see whether/if he is at

home. '

13

The overlap appe ars to have been reinforced by the shared 'nonreality'

of most conditions and of indirect questions (Tekavcic 1972, 11: 610). Despite

this fact, the subjunctive mood has largely been ousted from indirect questions

in Romance, although it may still be used to reinforce 'nonreality' in Spanish

or Italian, thus Ci chiese se potesse (subjunctive) venire, 'He asked us if he

might come.' As one might expect, this role of positively marking modality

in French is now frequently assumed by the conditional, as in this example

cited by Grevisse (19 75: pa ra. 1039.4):

Elle attendit

encore

unpeu pours'assurer

que ces intentions seraient solides 'She waited a while longer to make sure

that these plans were firm.'

6. U S E O F si IN N O N C O N D I T I O N A L A D V E R B I A L C L A U S E S

Finally, we must turn our attention to the use of

si/si/se

serving to introdu ce

clauses modifying 'adv erbially' the m ain prop osition , that is, to uses functionally

comparable to protases but with distinct semantic values. Such si-clauses may

have a variety of interpretations in context: we shall limit ourselves, not alto-

gether arbitrarily, to instances of causal, concessive or temporal value only.

Consider first the sentence If John came, then Peter went. This is clearly liable

to be interpreted in the sense that John's arrival caused Peter's departure.

Naturally, the whole sequence may still be hypothetical - we may not know

for certain, or may not choose to admit, that John did in fact come - but

conversely it may now be taken to be true. (Compare also, // you believe

that, you are a fool or If you only paid 5 for that, you got a bargain.) What

we find is that wh ereas a future-referring condition is in general seen only

as m ore or less likely to be fulfilled ('re al' o r 'po ten tia l' respectively ), in the

present or past,

14

it may be (taken to be) actually realized, and hence no longer

a hypothesis at all. As Lehmann (1974: 236) puts it, 'it is a well-known fact

that the proposition in the antecedent of a conditional sentence is not asserted

but "left open". This constitutes the main difference between conditional and

causal sentences .. , '

15

Once the truth of the antecedent is presupposed, then

we pass immediately from 'if to 'in as much as', 'granted that' or even 'since'.

Ho we ver, pragm atically, the whole sequence may still be regarde d as hypotheti-

cal and hen ce 'if (= 'assuming th at', 'grante d th at') is still felt to be appro-

priate.

16

Certainly, both si in Latin and

si/se

in Romance are used with this value,

with verbal forms appropriate to causal clauses. Interestingly, Gildersleeve

and Lodge (1895: para. 595) gloss si as 'when' in contexts where it occurs

77



Martin B. Harris

with indicative tenses which do not 'leave open' the question as to whether

or not the pro tasis will be fulfilled. Ou r prefere nce, for the reason s just stated ,

would be for 'in as much as' or 'granted that', although the choice is by no

mean s as critical as one w ould infer from the categories of traditional gram mar.

All the descriptive grammars of the Romance languages give examples of si/se

in this sense. We shall cite from Italian: Se e partito a tem po, ha preso il treno

'If he left on time, (then) he caught the train', where the value of se is clearly

ambiguous between 'if and 'since' (see also Lepschy and Lepschy 1977: 235),

and from French II fut

hero'ique;

et s'il le fut, adm irez-le. 'He was heroic; and

as he was, admire him', where the conditional reading of si is entirely ruled

out.

Let us now turn to an examination of concession clauses. These seem to

be at the opposite end of a spectrum from causal clauses in that, as Haiman

(1978: 579) puts it, 'far from asserting a causal connection between antecedent

and co nse que nt, the y actually deny it'. We may say that a causal clause req uires

the listener to add the facts contained within it to his stock of knowledge

and then to evaluate the co nseq uen t, wh ereas in the case of a concession clause

there is no need to do so in order to evaluate the consequent: indeed, the

consequent is quite independent of the antecedent. (This argument relies

heavily on Haiman 1978: 578-80, who in turn draws on Stalnaker 1975.) True

conditionals lie between these poles, requiring the listener to proceed on the

basis of a

tentative

addition of the information to his stock of knowledge, and

to consider the likelihood of the consequent on this basis. As will have been

apparent from what has gone before, there are no clear-cut divisions within

this spec trum , an impression reinforced by the ubiquity of si and its derivatives

and compounds across the range of meanings just described.

In Latin, there were a number of conjunctions used to mark concession,

in the sense just desc ribed. Leaving aside words such as QUAMQUAM 'although',

we note ETSI and ETIAMSI 'even if, the syntax being 'tha t of conditional clauses'

(Ernout and Thomas 1953:351). This means, of course, that the indicative

was used for 'rea l' concessions, particularly tho se already know n to be fulfilled,

and the subjunctive was used for potential or unreal concessions, likely or

certain not to be fulfilled. In Rom an ce, the distinction betw een the indicative

and the subjunctive (or, increasingly, the conditional in French) is made with

certain conjunctions but not with others: in general, the modal forms have

tended to encroach on the indicative rather than vice versa. Thus in Spanish,

for exa mp le, the indicative sub jun ctiv e distinction is generally m aintained w ith

si bien

'even if , but not always with

aunque

'although' (Harmer and Norton

1957:

para. 237). (A detailed discussion of concessive clauses in early and

classical Spanish is found in Rivarola 1976.) Likewise, in French, the subjunc-

tive is the norm al mo od with most conjunctions even when the dom inant n uance

is 'real'; but the indicative is found not only with si itself and with meme si

and other related forms, but also, perhaps increasingly, with forms such as

78




bien que 'although' which, by the rules of prescriptive grammar, require the

subjunctive; one also, as so often in French where there are genuine modal

nuances, finds the conditional. Significantly, when the 'temporal' conjunction

quand

(with or without

mime)

is used to indicate a pote ntial or unreal conces-

sional condition, the conditional forms of the verb are most common (and

have been since Old French, see Sechehaye 1905: 343), the indicative being

used to indicate a real condition. In this latter case, the sense is clearly 'even

when' or 'even though' (factual) rather than 'even if (potential/unreal). (Gre-

visse 1975: pa ra. 1032 lists many exam ples, and a range of conjunctions which

beha ve in this way.)

Let us turn, finally, in this section, to the overlap between conditional and

temporal clauses. Essentially, we may say that a time clause relating to past

t ime,

or to present or future time where the intended reading is not doubtful

or counterfactual, can be eq uated with a real condition, whereas a time clause

whose actual realization is uncertain equates with a potential condition. From

this it follows that cond itional conjunctions are frequently used with a tem pora l

value and that temporal conjunctions are often best interpreted conditionally.

To consider the 'rea l' cases first, how narro w ind eed is the distinction betw een:

If he

did

com e, it still didn't solve the prob lem

Given that he did com e, it still didn't solve the problem

Even though he

did

com e, it still didn 't solve the p roblem

When he d id com e, it still didn 't solve the problem

In each case, his coming is admitted and taken as factual: ideally, therefore,

(and very largely in practice also), all such clauses should have their verb

forms in the (u nm ark ed ) indicative m ood . Th e read er will recall that in 'prota ses

not left open', Gildersleeve and Lodge (1895: para. 595) gloss si as 'when';

we suggested 'in as much as' or 'granted that'. How minimal the semantic

distinction is in such a case is now clear (see Haiman 1978: 581). Put at its

simplest, si

(si/se)

used in this way is assimilated to the syntactic behaviour

patterns of the group in which it finds

itself,

a similar position being found

with dacd in Romanian. The overlap between iterative temporal and 'real'

conditional clauses is quite clear: an antecedent which has on more than one

occasion been fulfilled and has on each occasion led to a given outcom e gives

rise to a (factual) statement

whenever x, then y (=if x, then always y).

A s

Alice ter Meulen (this volume) points out, when and if are primarily dis-

tinguished by the degree of certainty they convey. Such an epistemic notion

is just not relev ant to generic s tatem ents : hence in this case the very significant

degree of overlap between */and when(ever). Conversely, a time clause the

content of which may or may not actually be realized is very close indeed

to a potential condition. Latin

DUM

'while', for example, is normally found

with the indicative, but the same form in the sense of 'until' often co-occurs

with the subjunc tive. W e have already discussed quand (meme) w ith a potential

279



Martin B. Harris

sense in French; Schmitt Jensen (1970: 483ff) discusses the overlap between

se

and

quando

in Italian, a discussion pursued in detail in Herczeg (1976).

All in all, therefore, one can see that there are good reasons for considering

simultaneously a number of clause types which have traditionally been con-

sidered as quite sep ara te. Given thr ee sema ntic oppo sitions thought of primarily

in connection with conditional sentences - namely real, potential and unreal

(counterfactual) - we have seen that the differences in meaning between such

time-honoured categories as 'condition', 'cause', 'concession', and 'time' are

often slim indeed. We have also seen that certain common conjunctions (espe-

cially

si/si/se/daca)

may need (in context) to be interpreted in one of a num ber

of ways which shade imperceptibly into one another so that, whether or not

Haiman's view of these clauses as marking topics is accepted, his underlying

premise that they are a cohesive group is hard to reject. Equally, we find

conjunctions whose primary value is not 'conditional' used in this sense when-

ever the tem por al/m oda l value of the sentence as a whole imposes this interpre-

tation. We thus conclude that, while we needed at the outset to make certain

clear distinctions for expository reasons, we are indeed dealing with an area

where a complex range of pragmatic, semantic, syntactic and morphological

facts interact in such a way that a watertight system of classification or analysis

is just not possible, a point clearly made in this volume by Konig regarding

conditionals and concessives.

7. C O N C L U S I O N S

As we stated at the outset, the study of si-clauses is in no way coterminous

with the study of cond itional se nten ces, and this will necessarily limit somew hat

the generality of conclusions we may draw. One thing is, however, quite clear.

Recent descriptivists - in one sense rightly - have been at pains to break the

equation between //"-clause and protasis; not all //"-clauses function as protases,

and n ot all pro tases are m arked by //"-clauses. Nev ertheless , we have now seen

that //"-clauses do have something in common: they apparently serve to mark

the topic of the sentence, the 'apodosis' providing the comment. These 'con-

ditional topics' share with conventional topics all the normal constraints of

relevance (Fillenbaum 1978: 173; Haiman 1978: 586), varying in respect of

the presuppositions they require or invite the listener to make. Factual"presup-

positions bring us into the area where //-clauses overlap with causals, iterative

temporals and some concessives; potential presuppositions lead us into the

area of overlap with future time temporals, some concessives, etc. The 'core'

territory of

if is

'Let us suppose for the sake of advancing this discussion';

even her e, other conjunctions (or even structures) compete for favour, w hereas

in the areas of cause, concession and time, it is //"itself which is the minority

form, more specific conjunctions generally being preferred. The use of verb

forms in a Romance //"-clause depends entirely on the presupposition implied

280




in respect of that particular clause; or, in more familiar terms, what the precise

adverbial value is of the clause in question. In this way, overlap between these

various clause-types, far from being surprising, is quite expected. A similar

point in respect of interrogatives has been made at various points in this paper.

In sum, there is good reason to agree with Haiman (1978: 586) that the morpho-

logy of any language will tend to undergeneralize. One special privilege of

the diachronic Romance linguist is that there is a uniquely well-documented

corpus for the study of historical syntax. In this case, perhaps the most striking

thing to observe is how little the

fundamental

situation, the range of choices

and the relevant parameters, have changed through time. Changes, yes, but

visibly the same game with the same rules. Insofar as Romance data sustain

a particular analysis, therefore, they have the added advantage of a substantial

time depth. It is my hope that the data I have presented from within my own

specialist field will help to illuminate the broader theoretical questions con-

sidered in this volume.

NOTES

1

As a

result

of the

severe limitations

of

space necessarily imposed

on

this volume,

the present article represents

a

substantially sh ortened version

of

the pape r delivered

at

the 1983

Symposium.

The

full version

of

that paper, amended

in the

light

of

comments

at the

Sym posium

and

thereafter,

is

published

as

Harris (1986).

I

would

like

to

acknowledge here with gratitude

the

support provided

at all

times

by the

organizers

of

the Symposium, and in particular by Elizabeth Traugott.

2

Cf.

Ernout

and

Thomas

(1953: 377):

Plautus,

Av. 742:

Deos credo voluisse;

nam

ni vellent,

non

fieret, scio

I

believe

the

Gods willed

it; for if

they

had not

willed

it,

it

would not have h appen ed,

I

know.'

3 Consider,

for

example, two Ciceronian examples cited by Ernout and Th omas

(1953:

377): 5/

diceret,

non

crederetur

If he had

spoken,

he

wouldn't have been believed',

and Quis audiret {eos),

si

maxim e queri vellent? 'Who w ould have heard them , even

if they

had

wished

to

complain?'

For

comparable examples from other a uthors,

see Woodcock

1959: 155. At

times

(as in all

languages

- see

Rojo

and

Montero

Cartelle 1983),

the

time axis

may be

felt

to

change between protasis

and

apodosis,

thus explaining certain instances

of

paradigm shift:

5/

mihi secundae res

de

amore

meo essent {imperfect),

iam

dudu m, scio, v enissent {pluperfect)

If any

success

was

going to com e

to

me

in

my love a ffair,

it

would have com e long ago,

I

know.'

4 This lack of a clear-cut boundary has often been noted by Rom ance scholars: see,

for example, the views of M erlo (1957: 275-6) and M endeloff (i96 0: 5).

5 See Moignet

(1959,1:

156) and Vaananen (1967:

142).

6 The example

is

taken from Foulet (1968: 211 ).

For a

thorough survey

of

conditional

sentences

in Old and

Middle French, with

a

wealth

of

exemplification,

see

Wagner

(1939).

7

One

sees here

the

partial re-emergence

of the

opposition between potential

and

unreal within

the

nonpast category,

the

former expressed increasingly

by the new

construction, with

the

latter still being expressed

by the

inherited

5/ +

imperfect

subjunctive/imperfect subjunctive structure.

8 Thus Fazia-o {imperfect indicative) se pudesse

I

would

do it if I

could',

and

Tinha-o

281



Martin B. Harris

feito (pluperfect indicative) se tivesse podido 'I would have done it if I could have.'

Note that ter (<TENERE) replaces haver (<HABERE) in Portuguese; for a discussion

of this pheno me non , see Harris 1982: 59-60 .

9 Recall that the new analytic future tense consisted of an infinitive followed by the

present tense of

HABERE,

thus

VIDERE HABET.

The 'past' equivalent of this,

VIDERE

HABEBAT

the conditional, has already been discussed, and the formal parallelism

between the present:imperfect auxiliary opposition in such apodoses and a simple

present:imperfect opposition in protases is clear. The normal operation of the

sequence of tense rules in indirect speech would also lead mechanically to this syn-

tagm, which was apparently not resisted in French.

10 In this connection it is interesting to note that the preferred patterns for potential

and unreal conditional sentences in standard Rumanian involve the conditional or

the conditional perfect respectively, in both protasis and apodosis. Examples (taken

from Lombard 1974: 295) are: Ar veni (conditional) dacd ar puted (conditional) 'H e

would com e if he could' and Arfi venit (conditionalperfect) dacd arfiputut (conditional

perfect) 'He would have come if he could h ave .'

11 The form retains its original pluperfect indicative value in literary Portuguese, and

in certain Spanish dialects (see, for exam ple, Lapesa 1980: par as. 117, 188.4, 33-3)-

12 Tekavcic (1972: 654) goes so far as to speak of '// terzo tipo fondamentale di periodo

ipotetico, quello che ha il condizionale sia nell apod osi sia nella protasV 'the third

basic type of conditional sentence, the one which has the conditional in both the

apodosis and the protasis' .

13 The example is from Erno ut and Thom as

(1953:

para. 321 ). Interestingly, the Rum a-

nian conditional subordinator dacd is also used to introduce indirect questions. We

thus find that dacd originally ap paren tly a topic ma rke r, is used now as a conditional

marker and as a marker of (indirect) interrogation. Haiman (1978: 571-2), following

Jespersen, suggests that conditionals are questions with implied positive answers:

that is, hypotheses which, for the purpose of the discourse, will be regarded as

given.

14 Actually, the same possibility exists in the future if the speaker chooses to assume

that the hypothesis in question will certainly be realized. Compare Assuming he'll

have arrived by then, we'll be able to settle this problem with (OK, then, I believe

yo u . . . ) if he'll have arrived by then (as you say), we'll be able to solve

this

problem.

It follows that any tense of the indicative is in principle possible in an //"-clause

used in this sense. This point is made explicitly with respect to Italian by Herczeg

(1972: 489), who cites an instance of a conditional perfect in a nonconditional se -

clause, a usage which

'sarebbe uno

sbaglio

grossolano in proposizioni

ipotetiche

auten-

ticheV 'would be a gross error in a true conditional sentence '

15 Lehmann (1974) points out in this connection the complete acceptability of the dis-

junction of two opposite conditions

(if X

then

Y, but ifX' then Y'),

but the impossibi-

lity of two disjoined contradictory conditions (because X then Y, but because X'

then Y'). Clearly, two contradictory reasons cannot be simultaneously presup posed.

Haiman (1978: 564), in effect, argues that all //"-clauses in English have an important

function in com m on, n amely to establish the topic of the sentence in question , which

is accordingly presupposed, the comment then being the apodosis. The difference

between hy po the tic al, causals, temporals and givens then lies in the extent to which

the listener is expected to, or required to, add the content of the protasis to his

stock of beliefs (19 78: 58 0-1 ).

16 Leh m ann (1974: 236) has , in two nearby senten ces of Ciceronian La tin, a particularly

clear exam ple of just how slight the change of perspective may be betwe en a sentence

where the hypothesis is, at least in theory, left open and one where it is not: Si

8




peperit, cum viro concubuit 'If she has borne a child, she has slept with a man'

an d Quoniam peperit, cum viro concubit 'Since she has borne a child, she has slept

with a man.' Note that si could be used in either sense, whereas quoniam could

not. Herczeg (1972: 489) suggests that the use of 'if,' rathe r than 'beca use' in such

contexts is to avoid being 'too c atego rical', remo ving all vestige of doubt. For further

discussion of the relationship between conditionals and causals, see Haiman (1978:

578-9). We are also reminded by Fillenbaum (1978: 192) of another point of contact,

namely that counterfactual conditionals are closely related to negative causals. Com-

pare,

to use his examples: Because he did not catch the plane he did not arrive on

time and If he had caught the plane he w ould have arrived on time.

REFERENCES

Blatt, Franz. 1952.

Precis

desyntaxe

latine.

Lyon: Edition I AC .

Brambilla Ag eno , Franca. 1964. //

verbo nellitaliano antico.

Milan and Naples: Ricardo

Ricciardi.

Er no ut, Alfred, and Franc, ois Th om as. 1953. Syntaxe

latine,

2nd edn. Paris: Klincksieck.

Fillenbaum, Samuel. 1978. How to do things with IF. In Sem antic factors in cognition,

ed. John W. Cotton and Roberta L. Klatsky, 169-214. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erl-

baum.

Foulet, Lucien. 1968.

Petite

syntaxe de

Vancien

frangais, 3rd edn. Paris: Cham pion.

Fun k, Wo lf-Peter. 1985. On a semantic typology of conditional sentences.

Folia

Linguis-

tica

xix, 3/4: 365-413.

Gildersleeve, Basil L. and Gonzales Lodge. 1895. Gilder sleeve's Latin gramm ar. New

York and London: Macmillan.

Grandgent, Charles Hall. 1962.

An introduction to Vulgar Latin.

New York: Hafner.

Grevisse, Maurice. 1975.

Le bon usage,

10th edn. G embloux: Duclot.

Haase, August. 1969. Syntaxe francaise du XVlie

siecle,

7th edn. Paris: Delagrave.

Haim an, John . 1978. Conditionals are topics. Language

54:

564-89.

Ha rm er, Lewis Cha rles, and Frederick John N orton.

1957.

A manual of Modern Spanish,

2nd edn. Lon don: University Tu torial Press.

Ha rris, M artin B . 1 971. The history of the conditional complex from Latin to Spanish.

Archivum Linguisticum:

25-33.

Harris, Martin B. 1978. The evolution of

French

syntax:

a

com parative approach. London:

Longman.

Harris, Martin B. 1981. On the conditional as a mood in French. Folia Linguistica

Historical: 55-69.

Harris, Martin B. 1982. The 'past simple' and the 'present perfect' in Romance. In

Studies in the Romance verb, ed. Nigel Vincent and Martin Harris, 42-70. London:

Croom Helm.

Ha rris, Martin B . 1986. The historical develop me nt of conditional sentences in Ro m anc e.

Romance Philology

xxxix, 4: 405-36.

Herczeg, Giulio. 1972. Proposizioni subordinate formalmente ipotetiche. In Saggi

linguistici e stilistici,

ed . G uilio Herczeg, 483-90. Firenze: O lschki.

Herczeg, Giulio. 1976. 'Se ' / 'qua nd o'

-I-

presente/passato del conjunctive Archivio Glot-

tologico Italiano

61:

146-55.

Lapesa, Rafael. 1980.

Historia de

la

lengua espanola,

8th edn. Madrid: Gredos.

Lavandera, Beatriz. 1975. Linguistic structure and sociolinguistic conditioning in the

use of verbal endings in 'si'-clauses (Buenos Aires Spanish). Ann Arbor: University

Microfilms International.

Lehmann, Christian. 1974. A universal about conditional sentences. In Linguistica

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Martin B. Harris

Generalia i: Studies in linguistic typology, ed. Milan Romportl et al.

231-41.

Prague:

Charles U niversity.

Lepschy, Anna Laura and Giulio C. Lepschy. 1977. The

Italian language

today. London:

Hutchinson.

Lombard, Alf. 1974.

La langue roumaine: unepresentation.

Paris: Klincksieck.

endeloffHenry i960. The evolution of the conditional sentence contrary to fact in

Old Spanish. Washington D C : The Catholic University of America Press.

Merlo, Felice. 1957. La congiunzione 'se' e il sistema semantico dei periodo avverbiali.

Romanische orschungen

69:

273-304.

Moignet Gerard. 1959. Essai sur le mode subjonctif en latin postclassique et en ancien

francais

1. Paris: PU F.

Palmer, L. R. 1968. Th e Latin

language.

London: F aber.

Pountain Christopher J. 1983. Structures and transformations: the Romance verb. Lon-

don:

Croom Helm.

Rivarola Jose Luis. 1976. Las conjunciones concesivas en espanol medieval y cldsico.

Tubingen: Niemeyer.

Rohlfs Gerhard. 1954. Historische

gramm atik der

italienischen

Sprache und ihrer Mun-

darten

III:

Syntax und Wortbildung Bern: Francke Verlag.

Rojo, Guillermo, and Emilio Montero Cartelle. 1983. La evolution de los esquemas

condicionales (P otenciales e irreales desde el poem a del Cid hasta 1400). Verba, Anexo

22 .

Universidade de Santiago de C omp ostela.

Schmitt Jensen, J. 1970. Subjonctif et hypotaxe en italien. Odense: Odense University

Press.

Sec heha ye, Alb ert. 1905. L'imparfait du subjonctif et ses conc urrents dans les hypotheti-

ques normales en francais. Romanische Forschungen 19: 321-406.

Stalnaker, Robert. 1975. A theory of conditionals. In

Causation and conditionals,

ed.

Ernest Sosa, 165-79. Lon don: Oxford University Press.

Tekavcic P. 1972. Grammatica storia deWitaliano II: morfosintassi Bologna: il M ulino.

Vaananen, Veikko. 1967. Introduction au

latin vulgaire.

Paris: Klincksieck.

Vairel, H. 1981. Un modele d'analyse linguistique des conditionnelles: latin si di sunt,

si di sint, si di essent. BSLP

76 :

275-326.

Wagner Robert L. 1939. L es phrases hypothetiques commencant par \sf dans la langue

francaise

des

origines

a la fin du XV Ie

siecle. Paris: Droz.

Woodcock, Eric C. 1959. A new La tin syntax. London: Methuen.

84



15

FIRST STEPS IN

A C Q U I R I N G C O N D I T I O N A L S

•

Melissa Bower man

Editors' note.

Bowerman's chapter represents a search through the

semantic, cognitive and pragmatic prerequisites for conditionals to

discover why they appear late in a child's grammar, relative to other

complex sentence types. Drawing on crosslinguistic acquisition data

from English, Finnish, Italian, Polish, and Turkish, her exploration

highlights the basic components of conditionals and the interaction

between them. It also suggests some possible implications for univer-

sal

grammar. This paper complements Harris's treatment of

the

com-

ponents of the conditional system in Romance, as well as Reilly's

on the acquisition of temporals and conditionals.


This chapter is about the initial flowering of conditionals,

if-{then)

construc-

tions,

in children's spontaneo us speech .

l

It is motivated by two major theoretical

interests. The first and most immediate is to understand the acquisition process

itself.

Conditionals are conceptually, and in many languages morphosyntacti-

cally, complex. What aspects of cognitive and grammatical development are

implicated in their acquisition? Does learning take place in the context of parti-

cular interactions with other speakers? Where do conditionals fit in with the

acquisition of other complex sentences? What are the semantic, syntactic and

pragmatic properties of the first conditionals?

Und erlying this first interest is a second, m ore strictly linguistic one . Resea rch

of recent years has found increasing evidence that natural languages are con-

strained in certain ways. The source of these constraints is not yet clearly

understood, but it is widely assumed that some of them derive ultimately from

properties of children's capacity for language acquisition. If this is true, chil-

dren's speech - e.g. typical error patterns, meanings initially associated with

forms, order of emergence of forms - might provide clues to basic properties

of language. Such clues might be especially useful in helping us understand

constructions that, like conditionals, are difficult to isolate crosslinguistically

and to cha racterize semantically or syntactically in a unified way.

The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first takes the form

of a detective story: why do

if-(then)

constructions emerge late in children's

speech, relative to other structurally similar complex sentences? The cause

85



Melissa Bowerman

of the delay, if found, might help us to determine how conditionals differ

essentially from other ways of relating propositions. The second section exam-

ines the meanings of children's early conditional utterances, both in cross-

linguistic perspective and with special attention to whether English-speaking

children are sensitive to a semantic distinction that is critical in English but

not in many other languages.

Th e primary data to be analysed com e from three. English-speaking children

whose language development has been followed closely from the time of first

words by taping and , especially, by daily diary

notes:

my two daug hters, C hristy

and Eva, and Eve Clark's son Damon. These records are supplemented by

reference both to the literature on English, Polish, and Italian and to unpub-

lished notes on the expression of 'contingent relations' by children learning

Turkish or Finnish. These were written by Ayhan Aksu and Dan Slobin, and

m e, respectively, during a workshop held at the Max-Planck In stitute, Nijmegen

in 1981; they will be referred to as 'MP I no tes '.

2. W H Y D O C O N D I T I O N A L S E M E R G E L A T E?

Children typically produce their first explicitly marked conditional utterances

in the second half of their third year (see Reilly 1982; McCabe et al. 1983,

for En glish; Bate s 1976, for Italian; C lancy, Jacobsen and Silva 1976, for Italian,

German, Turkish, English; Smoczyriska 1986, for Polish). An example from

Damon at 2;8 is the following: If somebody takes the newspaper, I ll be sad.

Development beyond this point lasts many years, as children gradually gain

control over the full verb morphology and range of meanings associated with

conditionals (B ates 1976; Reilly 1982).

Seen in broad developmental perspective, the emergence of conditionals

is part of a more general advance of the third year in which children begin

to combine propositions in a variety of ways to form complex sentences (see

Bowerman 1979, for an overview). Viewed at closer range, however, condi-

tionals pose a puzzle. Even though they are morphosyntactically similar to

sentences with conjunctions such as and, when, because, so, etc., and share

certain elements of meaning with these, they are consistently among the last

to appear (see Clancy et al. 1976; Bloom et al. 1980). W hat causes this delay?

Research over the last decade has focused on two major determinants of

the order in which grammatical forms (construction patterns, inflections etc.)

appear in children's speech: cognitive complexity and formal complexity.

2

The

meaning expressed by a form is thought to set a lower limit on when it will

be acquired (Slobin 1973). That is, children will not acquire productive control

over a form until they at least roughly grasp what it m ean s. How eve r, cognitive

readiness is not enough for acquisition, as Slobin (1973) has argued convinc-

ingly. Children also must identify and m aster the formal devices conve ntionally

used in their language to encode a given meaning (e.g. morphology, word

286



First steps in acquiring conditionals

order or intonation). Some devices appear to be inherently harder than others

for children to acquire (Slobin 1973; Joh nston and Slobin 1979). H en ce, acqui-

sition of a form can lag behind the po int at which its mean ing is unde rstoo d.

In recent resea rch, inv estigators have atten ded increasingly to a third possible

influence on timing of acquisition: pragmatic factors, or how a form is used

in context. Eisenberg (1981), for example, argues that within a semantic

domain, children may sometimes learn first those items that 'get things done'

- i.e. that allow them to perform important interpersonal negotiations effi-

ciently.

It seems clear that t he late em ergenc e of condition als is not due to difficulties

with form per se. In English and the other languages for which acquisition

data are available, conditionals share an overall structure with a variety of

complex sentence types. By the time if or its equivalent appears, children have

typically been conjoining clauses with other connectives for several months,

and there seems to be no formal reason why they could not do so with if

as well.

3

This means that the lateness of conditionals is more likely to be due

to cognitive or pragm atic facto rs. L et us see if we can identify the culp rit.

2.1 Cognitive complexity

Cognitive complexity was first implicated as a determinant of the order in

which complex sentences emerge in a crosslinguistic study by Clancy et al.

(1976).

These authors found that children learning English, Italian, German,

or Turkish began to juxtapo se prop ositions to express notions like coordination,

antithesis, sequence, causality, and conditionality - and later to mark these

relations explicitly - in a fairly consistent order. Since the conjoining devices

differ formally across the languages, Clancy et al. concluded that the order

of emergence reflects the sequence in which the relational notions appear in

children's developing cognitive rep erto ires. In a later study of children learning

English, Bloom et al. (1980) found a consistent order of emergence of both

conjoined and emb edde d senten ces. They propose that this order is determined

by the cumu lative complexity of the meaning relations expressed : later-learned

relations incorporate all the meaning elements of earlier-learned relations, and

more besides.

These studies are suggestive, but the evidence they provide for the role

of cognitive complexity is only circumstantial (see also Kail and Weissenborn

1984). What is it exactly about the meaning of conditionals that makes them

so difficult? Is there some key cognitive ingredient that children still lack when

they produce other kinds of complex sentences but not yet conditionals? Alter-

natively, do they control all the necessary cognitive components without being

able to combine th em in the right configuration?

Identifying the cognitive pre requ isites for con ditionals is comp licated by the

semantic diversity of sentences with the if-(then) format. It has been difficult

287



Melissa Bowerman

for philosophers, logicians, and linguists to find the common denominator that

links,

for exam ple, simple future predictives {If John comes, we ll go out), coun-

terfactuals (If John had come, we would have gone out), generics //[?= when-

ever]

you press this, the machine starts), comm ents on the circumstances under

which the information given is relevant (If you re hungry, there s a sandwich

on the table), and other subtypes.

4

It is corresp ond ingly difficult for d eve lopm en-

talists to isolate the critical cognitive ability or constellation of abilities that

would enable children to acquire at least one subtype of conditional. Neverthe-

less we can outline a set of concep ts that, in various com binatio ns, must unde rlie

the ability to acquire the major categories of conditionals. In what follows,

I review these under the headings 'contingency', 'hypotheticality', 'inference',

and 'generic eve nts'.

Using the longitudinal rec ords of Christy, Ev a, Dam on an d, to a lesser exte nt,

children learning languages other than English, I will look for linguistic and

behavioural clues to see whether these concepts are controlled in the period

preceding the first conditionals.

5

1 also refer to relevant findings of Bates (1976)

and R eilly (198 2). If certain critical concepts or comb inations of concepts cann ot

be documented until the first conditionals emerge, then the hypothesis that

conditionals are late because of their cognitive complexity can be supported.

Conversely, if the concepts seem to be well in place when other complex sen-

tences are produced but conditionals are still absent, the hypothesis is weak-

ened.

Contingency

A central property of most conditional utterances is that the situation (= event,

state of affairs etc.) referred to in the consequent clause somehow depends

on, or is conditioned by, the situation mentioned in the antecedent clause.

This contingency is typically causal (Co mrie in this vo lum e), often with a tem-

poral aspect as well.

Bates (1976) has argued that the concept of contingent relations is not the

stumbling block in children's learning of conditionals. By the time her Italian

subjects produced their first utterances with se 'if, they had been produc ing

complex sentences with perche 'because' and sennd 'if-not, otherwise' for

several mo nth s. In fact, the re is evidence for a grasp of contingency long before

the onset of complex sentences. From at least the middle of the second year,

Christy and E va called successfully on contingen t relations in setting up gam es,

justifying noncompliance and requests, and generally explaining behaviours.

For example:

(1) C

;4.

M is trying to feed C, but C playfully tries to avoid the spoon.

Every time M brings it toward her face, she grabs her bottle and sticks

it in her mouth. She does not drink, however, but waits expectantly

with a teasing smile until M snatches it away, and then accepts the

288




food. This procedure is repeated several times while both C and M

laugh.

6

(2) C

I ; IO .

(M has just told C she must take some medicine. C looks

anxious, says):

Christy throat better

(Justify noncompliance. C's throat is not in fact sore, but both M's

and F's were recently, so for C being sick is linked with having a sore

throat.)

To create the game described in (1) C must have recognized the contingent

relation between two states of affairs: bottle in mouth-cannot be fed; bottle

out of mouth-can be fed. The game's underlying logic might be phrased as

'If I'm drinking , surely you can 't expect me to eat ' An utteran ce like (2)

does not serve the speech act for which it is intended unless both speaker

and listener recognize a legitimate contingency between the justification or

explanation and the behaviour it is designed to illuminate. You don't need

medicine if your sickness is better.

After abou t age 2, children's expressions of contingency becom e mo re explicit

as connectives are added to their rep erto ire. Th e following utterance s are repre-

sentative (see also Clancy etal. 1976; Bloom etal. 1980):

(3) C 2;2. (C holding package of candy ; F due hom e soon from w ork):

Daddy like some when he come hom e

(4) C

2;

1. (Trying to open porch d oor to let dog out ):

I open doo r so Klaus come out

(5) C 2;2. (Holding toy beetle with line painted on for m ou th):

It don't bite me cause it do n't have no m outh

(6) Katarin a 2;2 (Finnish, Bow erman MPI notes)

M (re : sore on K's arm ): Mistas toi tuli? 'Wh ere did that come from?'

K: Se tuli kun Kata eilen kaatuu rappusi(lla) 'It came when Kata yester-

day fall (on the) stairs' (kun = 'when, since, because')

(7) 2;o (Tu rkish, Clancy et al. 1976) Pis olunca temizliyor 'When it's dirty,

she cleans'

Examples (i)-(7) illustrate not only that 'preconditional' children are capable

of recognizing contingent relations, but also that they appreciate contingencies

of several different kinds. For instance, direct causal agency or instrumentality,

with temporal linkage as well, is shown in (4) and (6); temporal triggering

in (3) and (7), and what may be called 'static precondition' in (1) and (5):

the recognition that an even t's occurrence may be contingent on the satisfaction

of a stative physical prerequisite, for example, in (1) eating requires the mouth

to be unblocked; in (5) a creature's potential for biting depends on its having

a mouth. The examples also show that 'preconditional' children grasp con-

tingencies that obtain at different times relative to the moment of speech.

289



Melissa Bowerman

For instance, the situations referred to in (3) are temporally sequenced in

the future , th ose in (6) in the pas t, and tho se in (5) co-occur in the pres ent.

In summary, long before if-{then) constructions appear in their speech, chil-

dren show a grasp of contingent relations that is strong enough to support

a variety of conditional su btypes in a range of temp oral se ttings.

Hypotheticality

Complex sentences with because, so, when , etc. generally make assertions abou t

situations in the real world (Bates 1976). Conditional sentences, in contrast,

specify hypothetical situations. Children might therefore fail to produce condi-

tionals, even when they are capable of complex syntax, because they are still

closely tied to the real world and cannot yet conceive of situations not coinciding

with actuality. This hypothesis might seem especially attractive since there

is a literatu re argu ing that th e capacity for hypo thetical thinking does not deve-

lop until 4;6 or even later (see Kuczaj and Daly 1979, for a review and some

counterevidence).

However, Bates (1976) has argued that the late emergence of counterfactual

conditionals in the speech of Italian children is not caused by an inability to

conceive of situations that diverge from reality. She notes that already during

their second year, children engage in behaviours showing they know how to

'suspend truth', for example, pretending to go to sleep. Sometimes they also

mark the non truth of their behaviour with a remark like 'No no '.

My own data accord well with Bates' conclusions on counterfactuality. To

her brief and mostly nonverbal evidence more elaborate illustrations can be

added. The appropriate use of almost, which appeared before age 2 in the

speech of both Christy and Eva, requires the speaker implicitly to compare

the actual situation with another situation that came close to occurring or has

not quite yet oc curred:

(8) C I ; IO (M has just caught a pitcher that C had set down on the edge

of the sandb ox):

Almost fall

Thought and wish, which appeared at about the same time, imply that the

situation referred to in the embedded clause is not true (see Lyons 1977: 795

on wish as a counterfactual m arke r):

(9) C 2;o (C is upset when she finds that M has screwed the nipple on

her b ottl e; she likes to do this h erself):

I

thought

me do that

(10) C

2;

(C and M are sitting chatting):

I wish Christy have a car. I wish me have a airplane

In sum, well before children produce conditionals they appear to be not only

290




capable of entertaining situations contrary to reality but also in some cases

of marking them as counterfactual.

Many conditionals refer not to counterfactual situations but to situations

about whose realization in the past, present, or future the speaker is uncertain

(e.g. If John came home past midnight, he found the door locked - past; / /

John comes tonight, we ll go out- future). D o children in the 'precon dition al'

period experience uncertainty about the occurrence of a situation, and if so,

can they mark their un certainty explicitly?

The answer is clearly 'yes' to both questions. As early as the one-word stage,

children express unc ertainty abou t past, prese nt and future situations with rising

intonation in languages that use this device for asking questions. By age 2,

or soon after, Christy, Eva and Damon started to indicate uncertainty with

additional markers of nonfactivity like maybe, probably, might,

could,

I think,

and I guess (see also Reilly 1982 on maybe, and Shatz, Wellman and Silber

1983 on the early use of 'mental state' verbs like think to express uncertainty).

For example:

(11) C ;i (F enters with pack of pho tos):

Dadd y buy pictures? (past)

(12) C

1;

(C outdo ors; friend has vanished):

Missy inside maybe? (present)

(13) C 2;2 (C struggling with pro ject) :

I think daddy could do it (future)

(14) E ;i (F hiding un der th e cov ers; M has asked wh ere he is):

I don't know.

Probably

in bed (present)

Intermediate between counterfactual situations and uncertain situations in

degree of hypotheticality (see Comrie in this volume on hypotheticality as

a continuum) are undesirable situations that might result unless steps are taken

to prevent them or as a consequence of actions now contemplated. Samples

from the languages I have looked at contain many references to such situations

from abou t age 2 on , for ex am ple:

(15) C 2;2 (Playing with tiny book s that fit into a box ):

I going put them in a box so them w on't fall down

(16) C 2;3 (C inside on rainy day ):

I don't want go outside 'cause I get wet in my diapers and in my shirt

(= would get wet)

(17) D 2 3 (In respon se to M: Ok ay, would you like to climb on your

pla te-your sea t?) :

I too big to climb on my pla te. I might fall and cry

(18) Jas

2;

(Polish, Smoczyriska 1986)

Nie rzucam piorka do wody, bo mokre by bylo 'I don't throw a feather

into the w ater because it would become wet'

(19) 2 ;o (Tu rkish, Slobin and Ak su MP I notes)

9



Melissa Bowerman

Igeri gir, igeri. Usiirsun. fok soguk 'Come inside, come. You'll get

cold. It's very cold'

(20) 2;o (Italian , Clancy et al. 1976) (Re: untied shoelaces):

Cudi allora . . . senno e perdo 'Close then . . . if-not (=or; otherwise),

I'll lose them'

The ability to produce utterances of the form You (/ ) do X so that Y won t

happen and You (I) don t do X, otherwise Y will happen seems to presuppose

the ability to grasp the conditional relationship If you (I) do (don t do) X,

Y will happen. Yet conditionals lag behind sentences like (i5)-(2o) by up to

as much as 9 mo nths. W hy?

Clancy et al. (1976) propose that sentences like (20) with senno 'if-not' pre-

cede those with

se

'if in the speech of Italian children because th e first conjunct

of sentences with senno 'is supported by the immediate context and the child

must deal with only one hypothetical event' (p. 78), whereas with se both

of the events are hypothetical. This proposal comports with a more general

hypothesis by Bates (1 976). Ba tes suggests that the conce ptual eleme nts ne eded

for conditionals are built up singly and are present before conditionals emerge.

Ho we ver, th e child has difficulty in combining the m . Eve n qu ite young children

can refer to one non-actual or hypothetical event, according to Bates. But

sentences with if mak e reference to tw o hypo thetical even ts. Syntactically simi-

lar sentences with because come in earlier, argues Bates, because they specify

only events in the real w orld.

This hypothesis, although plausible, does not find support in the data I have

reviewed. Many early utterances specifying an action taken or not taken to

avoid an undesirable consequence could not be produced if the child were

unable to conceptualize two contingently-linked hypothetical events, or even

thre e (see also Smoczyriska 1986). In orde r to produc e (1 8), Jas had to imagine

both the hypothetical action of throwing a feather into the water and the hypo-

thetical consequence of this act, the feather's getting wet, in order to decide

not to do it. Christy's projection in (16) is similar. In (17) Damon imagined

a hypothetical three-event sequence: climbing on his plate, falling, and crying.

At about the same age Damon also referred to a sequence of two desired

hypothetical events:

(21) D 2;2 (H e has just taken his shoes off):

I get my socks off

M: K eep yo ur socks on so your toes'll be warm

D :

I get my socks off my toe s be warm too

This sentence provides a context for if, but Damon's first conditionals are

still 6 months away (see Reilly 1982, on similar examples in her daughter's

speech 4 months before conditionals appeared). I conclude from these data

that ne ither a general inability to conceive of hypothe tical events nor an inability

29 2




to imagine or refer to a sequence of two such events accounts for the delay

of if-(then) constructions in children's speec h.

7

Inference

The logical function of conditionals, according to Braine (1978), is to state

inference rules: 7 / . . . then . . . is taken to be a grammatical frame such that,

when the blanks are filled in with propositions (say, a and /?), the result is

the following inference rule: a//3. That is, if a has been established, then /?

can immediately be concluded' (p. 8). Put more informally, conditionals 'pro-

vide an explicit machinery by which inferences may be drawn' (Fillenbaum

1978: 174). According to Donaldson (1971), important prerequisites for infer-

ence are the ability to recognize that there is something unknown to oneself

that is in principle knowable, and the ability to project what this something

might be on the basis of what would or would not be compatible with a known

situation. Pe rhaps the reason children do not produ ce conditionals, even though

they understand contingency and hypotheticality, is that they have difficulty

starting from a known situation and inferring something unknown but compat-

ible with it, such as the situation 's likely cause, co nseq uen ce, or further implica-

tions.

However, the records of Christy and Eva indicate strongly that this is not

the case. Starting in about the middle of their second year, the children showed

a growing skill at moving from a known situation to an appropriate inference

about the unknow n. For exam ple:

(22) C i;4 (When C is in bed in her room , F drops some silverware in

the kitchen. H earing the crash, C leaps up, saying):

Spoon

(When she is brought to the kitchen, she searches the floor carefully.

Inferred cause.)

(23) C

I ; IO

(C and M about to play in tubs of water outside. M has just

put a (dry) shirt on. C pats it, saying):

Momm y shirt wet

(Inferred consequence)

In these examples the inference is fairly straightforward. But to be able to

produce certain kinds of conditionals the child must also be able to reason

indirectly (no te, for exa mp le, how circuitous the relationship is betwee n antece-

dent and consequent in If

it s

Tuesday this must be Belgium). My data suggest

that children are capable of relatively indirect inference at a remarkably young

age.

For example:

(24) E i;8 (As family waits for service in resta ura nt, waitress gives E's

sister a glass of water. E im med iately looks all aro un d, says anxiously):

Where? Where?

293



Melissa Bowerman

(Then subsides when waitress returns with a glass for her. 'If Christy

gets a glass of wa ter, th ere must be on e for me to o. W here is it?')

In summary, the ability to draw inferences about unknown situations on

the basis of known situations emerges very early, as much as a year before

conditionals app ear in children's speech.

Generic events

Many conditionals have a habitual or 'timeless' meaning: the situations men-

tioned in the two clauses are seen as contingently linked whenever they occur

or even if they never occur at all. Reilly (1982) terms the cognitive notion

relevant for generics 'timelessness' - the ability to decentre in time, i.e. to

view events from outside one's place in the time continuum. On the basis

of spontaneous speech data and pther evidence, Cromer (1968) has argued

that children do not develop a sense of timelessness until about age 4 to 4;6.

In accordance with Cromer, Reilly (1982) proposes that children's early condi-

tionals with the superficial look of generics are not actually statements about

habitual or timeless relationships, but refer instead to a particular instance

of the relationship. As evidence, Reilly notes that when her youngest subjects

produced utterances that looked like generic conditionals, the situations

referred to were always taking place at the time of speech (but see Reilly

in this volume, for a more detailed and somewhat modified interpretation of

the developm ent of generic conditionals).

In the data I have reviewed I find evidence that children grasp habitual

and timeless events, and in some cases even contingent relations between two

such events, well before conditionals of any type emerge. Between about age

2 and 2;6, various ways of marking generic events begin to come in. In adult

Turkish, the aorist tense is used to express habitual activity, potentiality, or

likelihood; it is also the main tense used in conditionals. On the basis of data

from several children, Aksu (MPI notes) reports that the aorist is used produc-

tively by age 2,0 to remark on the habitual behaviour of people, animals,

or things. The referent event is not necessarily ongoing at the time of speech

- see (30) below. At about the same age, Christy and Eva began to use the

present tense (distinguishable from an unmarked verb only in the third person

singular) for hab itual events , as is app rop riate in Eng lish, e.g. (C 2;o) Sh e

barks, while looking at a new neighbourhood dog who often barked but was

not currently barking. Words like supposed to, sometimes, and other ways

of expressing generalizations also appeared in the speech of Christy, Eva, and

Da mo n du ring this tim e, e.g. (25) and (2 6), also (27):

(25) C 2 ;o (Trying to put a plastic part back on humidifier):

This s'pose be on

(26) D 2;5 (At playgrou nd):

294




This a ladder for kids to climb up, and some ladders for ... mens to

climb u p

Evidence that at least some 'preconditional' children can conceive of tw o

habitual events, contingently linked, is found in utterances like (27)-(3o); note

again that the referent events are no t occurring at the time of speech:

(27) C 2;2 (pointing to bag of 'Instan t Brea kfast' powd er-mix on cou nte r):

Som etimes I have 'Br eak fast' when I sick

(28) D 2;o (D riding in car, talking abou t his toy dog that barks when

pulled by the ha ndle ):

Puppy dog go wuff-wuff. Ho ld a ha nd le, pupp y dog go wuff-wuff

(D 's first conditional is still 8 mo nths away.)

(29) D 2;o (In the morn ing D has been listing the events of his bedtim e

ritual. He ends up with):

H erb turn light on Dam on go sleep

(30) (Turkish, Slobin and Aksu MPI notes)

Adult: Nicin iciyor? 'Why does (the dog) drink?'

Child (2;o): Ben su veririm ona icer 'I give (AOR) water, he drinks

(A O R )' (Aorist is app ropriate since referent events are habitual.)

From examples like these I conclude that 'preconditional' children do have

some notion of habitual and timeless events, and at least some children can

conceptualize a contingency b etwe en two such events well before if-(then) con-

structions emerge. Their appreciation of such events and contingencies may

be limited to familiar contexts (see French and Nelson 1981), but within such

limitations there seems to be no cognitive reason why utterances like (27^(30)

should not be marked with if once connectives begin to come in.

Summary: cognitive prerequisites

Although previous researchers have proposed that the order of acquisition

of complex sentence s is dete rmin ed by cognitive com plexity, the present search

has yielded no evidence that the relatively late emergence of conditionals can

be attributed to the absence of any obvious cognitive prerequisites or combina-

tion of prerequisites. In fact, 'preconditional' children appear remarkably com-

petent. They can appreciate contingencies of various sorts, entertain

counterfactual, uncertain, and hypothetical situations and even sequences of

two or three contingently linked hypothetical situations (although probably

not seq uences of counterf actual situa tions ), draw inferences, recognize gen eric

even ts, and, at least in some cases, relations betw een such even ts. These cogni-

tive skills should in principle put a num ber of conditional su btypes within reach .

Why then are conditionals so late? What are they waiting for? Let us explore

whether there might be a pragmatic explanation for the delay.

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Melissa

Bowerman

2.2 Pragmatic factors

Speech acts.

A recent study by McCabe et al. (1983) gives evidence for considering w hethe r

conditionals might be acquired relatively late because they are functionally

superfluous at first: the speech act niche into which they will fall is already

occupied by other constructions. McCabe and her colleagues studied 24 sibling

pairs age 2;io~7;3. They found that 38 per cent of the conditionals recorded

were used to deliver threats arid bribes, such as If you break that I ll hit you

(Fillenbaum 1978, terms this category of conditionals 'inducements'). This was

th e only way in which some of the children w ere observed to use cond itionals.

The speech act qf 'inducements' was established well before the onset of

conditionals in my English-speaking subjects. It was typically performed by

sentences like D on t break that (or/;) /('//) hit you (see p. 292 on this general

sentence format). It is understandable that such constructions should precede

conditionals as techniques for delivering inducements: children are known to

prefer 'direct' directives to indirect ones at first (Ervin-Tripp 1977), and Don t

break that or I ll hit you makes direct reference to what the speaker wants

of the listener, whereas If you break that I ll hit you does not. Perhaps, then,

conditionals are slow because children already have a serviceable and more

congenial way of formulating inducements.

However, this hypothesis is not borne out by the data. With only a few

exceptions, the first productive conditionals in the English, Finnish, Turkish,

Polish, and Italian data I have reviewed are not threats and bribes but simply

'comments', with no obvious interpersonal function at all (examples will be

given shortly ).

8

Th e speech act of 'com m ents ' is presen t from the very beginning

in young children's speech. The lateness of conditionals therefore does not

seem to be attributable either to lack of a functional need for them or to

the absence of the speech act genre for which they will initially be used.

Discourse

De Castro Campos (1981) has proposed that the acquisition of conditionals

is linked to a particular ad ult-child interaction pa ttern . In a study of two Brazi-

lian Portuguese -speakin g c hildren, she found that the emerg ence of conditionals

was prec eded by dialogues like this:

(31) Dan iella 2;8 (Every time D asks if she can drive, M refuses by saying

that it is too d ark or that the street is crowded with cars. Toda y's conv er-

sation in the car goes like this):

D : Ta escuro, mae? 'Is it dark , M umm y?'

M: Nao 'N o'

296




D : Enta deixa eu guiar 'Then let me drive'

In such dialogues an implicit conditional (e.g. 'If it is not dark, then you should

let me drive') is segmented across turns. The child asks a question, the mother

confirms it, and the child then uses this agreement to draw out a plausible

inference. De Castro Campos notes that this interaction conforms to the ques-

tion-confirmation-implicative assertion sequence hypothesized by Jespersen

(1940) to underlie the historical development of if-(then) conditionals. She

suggests that children eventually learn to produce full conditionals by internaliz-

ing such dialogues.

Other investigators have also explored the hypothesis that the acquisition

of conjoined sentences is mediated by children's participation in dialogue

exchanges in which component propositions are distributed across adult-child

turns (however, to my knowledge, only de Castro Campos has looked at condi-

tionals). Findings have been m ixed. Some research ers repo rt that at least certain

conjunctions appeared first in their data in clauses linked through discourse

cohesion to preceding adult utterances (e.g. Aksu 1978, for Turkish; Eisenberg

1980,

for Eng lish; Kail and W eissenborn 1984, for Fre nch ). On the other han d,

Bloom et al. (1980) found that the conjunctions they looked at in their four

English-speaking subjects all occurred overwhelmingly more often* from the

very beginning, in strings where both propo sitions were supplied by the child.

If the acquisition of conditionals is indeed tied to discourse reciprocity, would

this explain why conditionals come in late? Emergence in dialogue does not

seem per se to be associated with lateness; in fact, if anything, the opposite

may more often be true (see Aksu 1978). However, some types of discourse

cohesion are appare ntly ha rder for children than oth ers. Specifically, Eisenb erg

(1980) found that although certain exchanges came in early (e.g. using

but

. . . ' to deny expectations set up by a previous adult utteran ce), drawing condi-

tional inferences based on another person's speech was infrequent and late,

not appearing in her data until 40 to 46 months. Possibly, then, conditionals

are late because ch ildren do not participa te in the kind of dialogue that suppo rts

their acquisition until after most other complex sentence patterns have been

acquired.

However, this hypothesis finds no support from Christy, Eva or Damon.

Dialogues of the kind de Castro Campos reports were rare or non-existent

in their rec ords before full

if-(then)

conditionals were produce d. Equally problem-

atic,

the semantic content of most early conditionals (see section 3) does

not seem to reflect a process of posing a question, presupposing an answer,

and then drawing out an inference. Conditionals in the data I have examined

follow the pattern reported by Bloom et

al.

(1980) for othe r complex senten ces:

the children could generate both clauses themselves without adult support

before they participated in dialogues where clauses were segmented

across speaker turns. The lateness of conditionals therefore does not

297



Melissa Bowerman

seem to be due to the need for special discourse patterns between children

and adults.

2.3 Sum ma ry: why are cond itionals late?

The search for a pragm atic exp lanatio n, like the search for a cognitive ex plana-

tion, has turned up no reason why conditionals are acquired late relative to

othe r complex sen tenc es. Of cou rse, I have not studied all the relevant cognitive

and pragmatic factors exhaustively, and there may be important ones I have

missed. A br oa de r investigation might also have shown that althou gh the cogni-

tive prerequisites for conditionals are in place well before conditionals come

in, the concepts needed for earlier-learned complex sentences are acquired

even earlier. In other words, the sequence of linguistic development might

mirror the sequence of cognitive development, but with a lag. If so, however,

we would need to explain why meanings, once mastered, should queue up

in an orderly fashion to await expression. What is going on between the time

of cognitive read iness an d the time a form is acquired?

One important task, as Slobin (1973) has stressed, is simply for children

to identify the forms that can be used to express the meanings they have in

mind. A second task may be semantic rather than either cognitive or grammati-

cal.

Before forms can be matched to meanings in a particular conceptual

domain, the child's general nonlinguistic understanding may have to be re-

worked into mental representations geared toward linguistic expression, in that

they reflect to some e xtent b oth specific sem antic distinctions that are imp ortant

in the language being learned and the way in which that language partitions

complex events into smaller components (Schlesinger 1977; Bowerman 1985,

1986).

The processes involved in this transformation of knowledge are still

little understood. There may be other problems for the child to work out as

well. In sum, a more precise account of the time at which linguistic forms

emerge must await a better theoretical understanding than we currently have

of the complex processes und erlying their acq uisition.

3. T H E S E M A N T I C S T R U C T U R E O F E A R L Y C O N D I T I O N A L S

Our failure to establish why conditionals are acquired relatively late is disap-

pointing, since it leaves us with no answer to an intriguing developmental puz-

zle. Yet it also makes first conditionals, when they do appear, more interesting

for the study of universal grammar. If conditionals were delayed because chil-

dren initially lacked the conceptual skills necessary to understand them, the

properties of the first conditionals would reflect the point at which conceptual

growth finally intersects with the sema ntic range of adult cond itionals. W heth er

these properties should be taken as relevant to the study of conditionals in

adult language would be unclear, since adults do not operate under the same

cognitive constraints as children. However, if children command a wide range

298




of relevant conc epts well before their first conditionals ap pea r, then th e sem an-

tic properties of these conditionals might reflect selectivity, a 'choice' from

a range of subtypes whose meanings are all in principle accessible. In this

case,

first conditionals would have enhanced potential for suggesting what

meanings are fundamental to conditionals in human languages.

Future predictives

Children 's initial conditionals are indeed selective. Across samples from several

languages, one semantic pattern predo min ates, Schachter's (1971) 'future pre-

dictives' (see also Reilly 1982, this volu me ). Futu re predictives make reference

to a sequence of two future situations, with the first possible but uncertain

and the second causally/temporally triggered by the first. For example:

(32) C 2;4 (C getting up on a rainy Sund ay. This is C's first observed condi-

tional):

If we go out the re we haf' wear hats

(33) C 2;4 (C wearing a bead crown which M has knock ed off once by

kissing h er) :

D on 't kiss me 'cause it will fall off if you do tha t

(34) E

2

; 8 :

If Christy d on 't be careful, she might get runne d o ver by a car

(35) D 2;7 (Go ing to a picnic, D has seen sheep in a field. First observed

conditional):

The s heep m ight run away if I don't pat them

(36) 2;7 (Turkish, Aksu MP I notes ):

D oku lur m u acarsak 'Wou ld it spill if we open it ?'

(37) Katja 2;8 (Finnish, Bow erman MPI notes) (K and M are looking at

a picture of

boats.

M asks 'W hat are they doing ?' K indicates a trajectory

for one boa t):

Jos se ajaa tuos sa, sit' ne men ee 'If it drives the re, then they [= the

other boats] go'

The predominance of future predictives among children's early conditionals

suggests a possible link between universal grammar and children's linguistic

predispositions. Picture a continuum of hypotheticality with counterfactuals

at one end, 'given-that' clauses at the other, with clauses ranging from highly

hypothetical to possible but uncertain in the midd le. Haima n (1978) and Com rie

(this volume) have shown that ther e a re crosslinguistic differences in how condi-

tional constructions partition this continuum . According to H aima n, the sem an-

tic range of the English conditional extends from counterfactuals up through

hypotheticals-uncertains, but does not include 'given-that' clauses. In contrast,

299



Melissa

Bowerman

the conditional in Hua (a language of Papu a New G uinea) extends from hypo-

theticals-uncertains through 'given-thats', but does not include counterfactuals

(these are accorded a completely different grammatical trea tm ent) .

Notice that despite these differences the middle portion of the continuum

falls within the range of the conditional in both languages. What meanings

are most basic to this middle portion? According to Comrie (this volume),

conditionals with low hypotheticality and future time reference - (i.e. future

predictives) are one of the two most basic types of conditionals in the world's

languages, as judged by frequency of use and likelihood of receiving overt

marking. (The other type is highly hypothetical constructions especially with

nonfuture time reference, including counterfactuals.)

If, as the pres ent study suggests, children are predispo sed tow ard associating

the conditional construction of their language with a category of meaning that

is central to conditional semantics across languages, this would be highly func-

tional. It would allow them to make an accurate initial mapping between form

and meaning even with relatively little linguistic evidence, and then go further

by extending the conditional to other categories of meaning on the basis of

language-specific experience.

If versus w hen

in

future predictives:the role of certainty

The closest neighbours of low-hypothetical future predictive conditionals in

English, both semantically and syntactically, are sentences that refer to two

contingently-linked future even ts, with the anteceden t regarded by the speak er

as certain to occur. Sentences of the two types are identical except for the

conjunction: uncertain future antecedents are introduced with if and certain

ones with when (compare If John comes we ll go out and When John comes

we ll go out). The obligatory distinction between certain and uncertain antece-

dents in future predictives is language-specific: many languages use a single

construction for both meanings, e.g. German wenn, Dutch als, Polish ja k plus

indicative:

Wenn J komm t, gehen wir aus

Als J kom t, gaan we uit

7 //w hen John c ome s, we'll go out'

9

Future predictives with when emerge before those with if in children learning

English. Since the choice between when an d if in future predictives rests on

a fine semantic distinction that in many languages is not obligatorily marked,

and since when and if overlap in other portions of their semantic range (see

Reilly in this volume), we might anticipate that it takes time for English-

speaking children to work out the division of labour between the two forms

in future p redictives.

3




To see whether this is so, I analysed the future predictives produced by

Christy, Eva and Damon in the first few months after this construction type

appeared in their speech. Each utterance was categorized according to (a)

whether the conjunction was when or if and (b) whether the child was likely

to have regarded the an tecedent as certain o r uncertain. The question of inter-

est, of course, is whether when coincides with certainty and //"with uncertainty.

The results are presented in figure i.

when

Certain

Uncertain

Christy 2 ;0-2;6

when

2

4

Eva2;6-3 ;1

Certain

Uncertain

when

8

(1?)

3

when

5

5

Damon 2;6-3;0

Figure i.

Damon3;0-3;6

The results show overwhelmingly that children appreciate the distinction

between when and if from the very beginning (only one conjunction w as (possi-

bly) mischosen out of 40 examples across the three children).

10

Since the out-

come is so clean, the reader might wonder whether it is due to an artifact:

that my classification of the antecedent as certain or uncertain was itself

influenced by whether the child used when or if. I have tried to avoid this

by excluding from the analysis shown in figure 1 all exam ples in which the re

are no inde pen den t grou nds for assessing w hethe r the child regarded the antec e-

dent as certain or not. U tteran ces like the following, for exam ple, were om itted:

(38) C 2;2 (C has just taken a red filter off her doll's eye ; she sometimes

must wea r this on her own glasses, and calls it her 'ligh t'):

3 01



Melissa Bowerman

She wo n't see me when her pu t her light on

(Does C intend at this time to have the doll wear the 'light' again?

Can't be determined.)

The remaining whens fall into rather clear categories, where their use is

semantically well motivated:

(a) The antecedent refers to the next instance of a dependably recurrent

event, e.g.:

When Daddy comes home

. . . (C) ;

When we re eating dinner

. . .

(E) ; When I come home from Ana s . . . (D; Ana is his babysitter); . . . when

it s

your birthday (D ) .

(b) The antecedent refers to a future time when a child or (occasionally)

an inanimate object will be older: When I get bigger . . . (D ) ; W hen I m four

. . . (C) ; W hen this house

gets

very old ... (D).

(c) The antecedent refers to the completion of an ongoing, clearly bounded

event or process: And me shake it up when I through (as C screws nipple

on her bottle); Push my chair back in when you finish with me (as M brushes

E's hair);

W hen that honey is used up

. . . (E) .

(d) The antecedent refers to an event the child is currently planning and

can reasonably expect to carry out, usually within a few minutes, or which

another person is about to perform: .. . when I go outside (D ) ; . . . it s gonna

shrink very little when you cook it (E to M, of a 'Shrinky-Dink' E is preparing ;

these have to be ba ked in the oven and M has said she would do this).

When none of the above conditions hold, the child has no basis on which

to project with certainty that a given future event will take place. Under these

circumstances the child never selects

when,

but always

if: If I get my graham

cracker in

the water, it II get all soapy (D sitting in bath ), and examples (32 )-(35).

In summ ary, young English speak ers are remarkably accurate, from the very

beginning, in selecting between when and if in future predictives on the basis

of whether the antecedent event can be expected with certainty or not. This

accuracy is especially striking since there are m any c ontexts in English in which

both when and if are acceptable, and since non-native speakers often have

difficulty selecting the right conjunction when their mother tongue does not

obligatorily mark the distinction.

Other conditionals

Although future predictives predominate among the early conditionals of chil-

dren in several linguistic communities, three other kinds of conditionals also

occur fairly frequently: expressions of pure hypotheticality, of present-time

contingencies between specific situations (Schachter's (1971) 'present condi-

tionals') and of habitual or generic contingencies (see also Reilly 1982, this

volume).

In pure h yp ot he tic al, the child probably does not anticipate, however uncer-

tainly, that the antecedent situation will take place. The antecedent, with or

3



Melissa Bowerman

Other conditional subtypes that, although rare, have been recorded in the

period just after the emergence of conditionals include (a) statements of rules

for establishing the identity of objects on the basis of whether they have a

property entailed by that identity; (b) logical entailments; (c) conditionals with

antecedents that are neither uncertain nor hypothetical but well-established,

used in the sense of since to justify the proposition in the consequent; and

(d) statements of a contingency holding between recurrent past events. It is

difficult to assess the significance of these rare conditional subtypes, but they

suggest that children's preference for certain categories of conditionals does

not constitute a strict constraint on the way they can use the if-(then) sentence

format.


I have pursued two themes in this study of children's early conditionals: why

th e if-{then) construction is acquired relatively late, and what the semantic

properties are of first conditionals. Formal complexity was ruled out as the

cause of lateness on groun ds that con ditionals share overall structure with many

earlier-learned complex sentences. Despite the widespread assumption that

conditionals are late because they are cognitively difficult, a review of skills

and concep ts relevant for conditionals turne d up no cognitive reason why condi-

tionals could not be acq uired e arlier. N or did the pragm atic factors investigated

- speech act function and discourse cohesion - seem to be responsible. These

negative outcomes suggest that further work is needed on our theoretical

assumptions about what determines timing of acquisition.

The study of the sema ntic structure of early conditionals showed that children

proceed with an admirable blend of the universal and the particular. On the

one hand, they 'cut in' to the semantic range of adult conditionals with a cate-

gory of mean ing that is app arently central to conditional sem antics in languages

around the world: low-hypothetical future predictives. This puts them in a

good position to extend their usage to more language-specific categories of

meaning on the basis of linguistic experience. On the other hand, children's

linguistic predispositions are not initially so strong as to preclude sensitivity

to the specific seman tic contrasts drawn by the language being acq uired: learners

of English choose between when and if in future predictives with remarkable

accuracy from the beginning.

NOTES

i I am grateful to Robin Campbell, Eve Clark, Herbert Clark, and Marilyn Shatz

for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. I also want to

thank Eve Clark for her generosity in allowing me to analyse data from her diary

study of her son Dam on.

3 4




2 A factor that received considerable attention in an earlier era was frequency of

modelling: it was assumed that forms heard more often would emerge earlier than

forms heard less often. However, tests of the hypothesis have indicated that the

influence of frequency is very slight com pare d to tha t of cognitive and formal co mplex-

ity (Brown 1973, Pinker 1981).

3 The complex verb forms required by counterfactuals and other kinds of conditionals

may indeed be formally difficult for children (Bates 1976; Reilly 1982), but this

cannot explain the overall slowness of conditionals since: (1) there are indicative

conditional subtypes in English and many other languages; and (2) children in any

event at first simply use simpler tenses wh ere m ore complex ones are req uired (Bates

1976; Kuczaj and Daly 1979; Reilly 1982).

4 See Haiman (1978) for discussion. Haiman argues compellingly that similarity of

grammatical form should be taken seriously as a guide to underlying similarity of

meaning. This means that one cannot simply set the more recalcitrant if-(theri) con-

structions aside by ruling that they are 'no t really conditionals', as has often been d one .

5 This period extends to 2;8 for Damon, 2;4 for Christy, and probably 2;8 for Eva.

(It is hard to be certain about Eva since she produced a contextually appropriate

conditional fragment at I ; I I ; however, no more conditionals were recorded until

2;8.) My Finnish subject Katarina did not yet produce conditionals in the period

from 2;o to 2;2 when I observed her. For Turkish, Italian and Polish I have relied

on the judgements of Aksu and Slobin (MPI notes), Bates (1976), and Smoczyriska

(1986) that the children w ere not yet producing conditionals.

6 Th e following notation is used in e xam ples: C = Christy, E = Eva , D = Da m on,

M = Mother, F = Father. Nam es of other children are given where known; subse-

quen t reference is with the child's initial. Age is shown in years; mo nths.

7 However, it is possible that the cognitive prerequisites for counterfactuals are not

yet established at this age since - d espite children 's production of single counterfactual

propositions - 1 find no evidence that they can conceptualize the sequence counterfac-

tual antecedent situation-counterfactual consequent situation.

8 I stress 'produ ctive' bec ause in both Turkish and Japa nese th e equivalent of //"occurs

first in fixed or near-fixed syntactic frames that do have specific interpersonal func-

tions. Turkish children use ister-(-se- = if)-n 7/you want . . . ' to make requests or

ask permission (Aksu and Slobin MPI notes), and Japanese children use one or

two sentences like sawat-tara dame

-tara

- if) 'touch-//", no good' (= don't touch)

to issue prohibitions (Clancy 1986). These are conventional ways of performing these

speech acts in adult speech as well. In other languages routine acts of requesting,

permission-asking, and prohibition are performed with nonconditional constructions

by both children and adults.

9 Languages of this type may have other connectives that do differentiate the two

me anings, but these are often less colloquial and learn ed later by children. Add ition-

ally, sentences containing the if/when connective can be made clearly hypothetical

by use of the subjunctive or conditional mood in place of the indicative. The first

conditionals of children learning such languages appear similar in meaning to the

future predictives shown in (32^(37) (Clancy et al. 1976, for German; Smoczynska

1986, for Polish); but since children are not forced to choose between two conjunc-

tions on the basis of certainty it is difficult to determine whether they conceive of

the relationship between the propositions as temporal or conditional.

10 Errors in a speaker's choice between if an d when are striking to native ears. If

they had occurred in the speech of Christy and Eva I feel confident that I would

have noticed them, especially since I paid particular attention in collecting data

on errors of all kinds (e.g. Bo werm an 1985).

3 5



Melissa Bowerman

REFERENCES

Aksu, Ayhan. 1978. The acquisition of

causal connectives

in Turkish. Papers and Reports

on Child Language Development (Stanford University Department of Linguistics)

15:

129-39.

Bates,

Elizabeth. 1976. La nguage and context: the acquisition of pragmatics. New York:

Academic Press.

Bloom, Lois, Margaret Lahey, Lois Hood, Karin Lifter and Kathleen Fiess. 1980. Com-

plex sentences: acquisition of syntactic connectives and the semantic relations they

encode. Journal of Ch ild Language 7 :

235-61.

Bowerman, Melissa. 1979. The acquisition of complex sentences. In Language acqui-

sition, ed. Paul Fletcher and Michael Garman, 285-305. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Bowerman, Melissa. 1985. Beyond communicative adequacy: from piecemeal knowledge

to an integrated system in the child's acquisition of language. In Children s language,

VOL. 5, ed. Keith E. N elson, 369-98. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum .

Bowerman, Melissa. 1986. What shapes children's grammars? In The crosslinguistic

study of language acquisition, ed. D an I. Slobin. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbau m.

Braine, Martin D. S. 1978. On the relation between the natural logic of reasoning

and standard logic. P sychological Review

85:

1-21.

Brown, Roger.

1973.

A first language. Camb ridge, M ass.: Harvard University Press.

Clancy, Patricia. 1986. The acquisition of Japanese. In The crosslinguistic study of lan-

guage acquisition, ed. D an I. Slobin. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum .

Clancy, Patricia, Terry Ja cobsen and M arilyn Silva. 1976. The acquisition of conjunction:

a crosslinguistic study. Papers and Repo rts on Child Language Developm ent (Stanford

University Department of Linguistics) 12: 71-80.

Cromer, Richard. 1968. The development of temporal reference during the acquisition

of language. Ph .D . dissertation, Harvard University.

de Castro C am pos, M aria Fausta P . 1981. On conditionals as dialogue constructs. Paper

for International Encounter in the Philosophy of Language, State University of Campi-

nas,

Brazil.

Dona ldson, M argaret. 1971. Preconditions of inference. In Nebraska symposium on

motivation, ed. J. K. C ole, 81-106. Lincoln, Ne b.: University of Nebraska Press.

Eisenberg, Ann R. 1980. A syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic analysis of conjunction.

Papers and Reports on Child Language Development (Stanford University Depart-

ment of Linguistics) 19: 70-8.

Eisenberg, Ann R. 1981. The emergence of markers of current relevance. Papers and

Reports on Child Language Development (Stanford University Department of

Linguistics) 20: 44-51.

Ervin -Trip p, Susan, 1977. Wait for m e, roller-skate In Child discourse, ed. Susan Ervin-

Tripp and Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, 165-88. New York: Academ ic Press.

Fillenbaum, Samuel. 1978. How to do some things with IF. In S emantic factors in cogni-

tion, ed. John W. Cotton and Roberta L. Klatzky. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

French, Lucia A. and Katherine Nelson. 1981. Temporal knowledge expressed in pre-

schoo lers description s of familiar activities. Papers and Reports on Child Language

Development (Stanford University Department of Linguistics) 20: 61-9.

Haim an, John . 1978. Conditionals are topics. Language 54: 564-89.

Jespersen, Otto. 1940. A modern E nglish grammar on historical principles, VOL. V: Syntax.

London: George Allen and Unwin.

Johnston, Judith R. and Dan I. Slobin. 1979. The development of locative expressions

in English, Italian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish. Journal of Child Language 6: 529-45.

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Kail, Michelle and Jiirgen Weissenborn. 1984. L'acquisition des connecteurs: critiques

et perspectives. In

Ontogenese des processus psycholinguistiques et leur actualisation,

ed. M. Moscato and G. Pieraut-le Bonniec. Rouen: PUF.

Kuczaj,

Stanley A. II, and Mary J. Daly. 1979. The development of hypothetical refer-

ence in the speech of young children. Journal of Child Language 6: 563-79.

Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics, VOL. 2. Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press.

McCabe, Anne E., Susan Evely, Rona Abramovitch, Carl M. Corter and Debra J.

Pepler. 1983. Conditional statements in young children's spontaneous speech. Journal

of

Child

Language 10: 253-8.

Pinker, Steven. 1981. On the acquisition of grammatical morphemes. Journal of Child

Language 8: 477-84.

Reilly, Judy S. 1982. The acquisition of conditionals in English. Ph.D. dissertation,

University of California at Los Ange les.

Schach ter, Jacquelyn C . 1971. Presupp osition and counterfactual conditional sentences.

Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles.

Schlesinger, I. M. 1977. The role of cognitive development and linguistic input in lan-

guage acqu isition. Journal of Child Language 4: 153-69.

Shatz, Marilyn, Henry Wellman and Sharon Silber. 1983. The acquisition of mental

verbs: a systematic investigation of the first reference to mental state. Cognition 14:

301-21.

Slobin, Dan I. 1973. Cognitive prerequisites for the development of grammar. In

Studies

in child language development, ed. Charles A. Ferguson and Dan I. Slobin, 175-208.

New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Smoczyriska, Magdalena. 1986. The acquisition of Polish. In The c rosslinguistic study

of

language

acquisition, ed. Dan I. Slobin. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum .

3 7



16

THE ACQUISITION OF

T E M P O R A L S

AND CONDITIONALS

•

Judy Snitzer

Reilly

Editors' note.

As has been widely noted, conditionals are closely

related to both temporal and causal adverbials. Reilly approaches

this aspect of conditionals from the vantage point of their acquisition,

focusing on the interplay of linguistic and cognitive factors, as evi-

denced by both naturalistic dialogue and experimental data from

preschool children. This paper bears a direct relationship to Harris's

account of the historical development of conditionals in Romance

languages and Bowerman's discussion of emerging conditionals.

Reilly's approach to generic temporals is discussed at length by ter

Meulen.


(i) Kate 3 ;3 (pouring water on cement):

When you put water on it, it sparkles/

Adult: What?

Kate:

If you put water on, it spark les, see?

In a volume such as this, a reader might well ask, 'Why is a chapter about

toddlers and preschoolers included? Of what value can it be to scholars dealing

with this complex and weighty topic?' We hope to show that the process of

child language acquisition presents a fertile resource for researchers interested

in the basic nature of conditional sentences and their interaction with related

language structures.

1

As (i) demonstrates, children at an early age display

knowledge of some of the interesting relationships of their language, such as

the interchangeability of

when

and

if'm

some contexts. The emerging cognitive

and syntactic systems of preschoolers provide a different perspective on con-

ditionals and allow us to see the basic building blocks of the adult system.

In the adult model, the complete conditional system is incredibly complex:

morphologically, syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically. Because of this

complexity and the number of interacting variables in the adult system, it can

be difficult to isolate the individual components and evaluate their roles.

Although the child's developing system is by no means simple, or even neces-

sarily straightforward, it does provide a more skeletal version of conditionals,

and by watching the system flesh out we can see the basic not ions, both mo rpho-

logical and semantic, underlying our own adult system.

309



Judy Snitzer Reilly

Returning to the example that opened this introduction, as Kate's utterances

demonstrate, in English there are certain instances in which a when temporal

and a conditional clause are roughly synonymous. In fact, in many languages

there is only one morpheme for some of the functions served by

if

and

when

in English, e.g. German wenn in the present and future tense: (3a) and (3b)

would not be distinguished in German. However, in other cases in English

when

and

if are

not usually interch angea ble:

(2) a.When Kate was six mo nths old, she pulled a ceramic lamp down

on her head

But:

b.*If Kate was six months old, she pulled a ceramic lamp down on

her head

(although the re is probably a context where sentence (2b) might be acceptable).

Additionally, there are situations in which the meanings of if and when,

although similar, express different degrees of expectation or certainty, as in

the following:

(3) a.When Clare comes ho m e, we'll have lunch

b.If Clare comes ho m e, we'll have lunch

In the case of (3b) we may all go hung ry.

Given that

when

and

if

do share some semantic functions, as well as reflect

their own unique semantic fields, the acquisition and interaction of these two

morphemes and their attendant semantic functions provide an excellent oppor-

tunity to investigate several issues: (a) how a child divides semantic space and

maps linguistic forms onto these semantic fields; (b) how the child's cognitive

abilities are linguistically realized; and (c) under what particular conditions

the conceptual components can be integrated and manipulated with the appro-

priat e, complex linguistic structu re.

Several researchers have examined the acquisition of temporal concepts and

temporal reference (Cromer

1968;

Clark 1970,1971,197 3; Piaget

1971;

Ferreiro

and Sinclair 1971; Beilin 1975; French and Nelson 1982); oth ers have focused

on conditionals alone (Ba tes 1976; Em erson 1980; Jakubow icz 1981; Reilly

1982,

1983; McC abe

et

al. 1983; Bow erman in this volum e). Additional studies

have surveyed complex sentence acquisition (Lim ber 1973; Clancy, Jacobsen

and Silva 1976; Hood et al. 1977; Bowerman 1979; Bloom et al. 1980), but

only Amidon (1976) has directly compared temporals and conditionals, and

her study is limited to older ch ildren , as are those devo ted to conditional reason-

ing (Taplin, Staudenmayer and Taddonio 1974; Kodroff and Roberge 1975;

Kuhn 1977; Staude nm ayer and B ourne 1977).

As reported in the various surveys of complex sentence acquisition, children

begin to produce complex sentences between the ages of 2 and 3 years, with

tokens of most complex sentence types being produced by age 3;i (Limber

310



The acquisition of temporals and conditionals

1973).

In the vast majority of cases, the temporal conjunction

when

appears

in a child's grammar before

if.

Researchers focusing on the interaction of con-

junctive forms and their functions (Bloom et al. 1980) have reported that the

acquisition of

when

preceded that of

if,

but that, more interestingly,

when

was used by two of their subjects for a temp oral and also an epistemic function.

When //"was finally acquired, it too was used for an epistemic function.

2

These

data suggest that, quite early on, children are sensitive at some level to the

semantic overlap of

when

and

if

Providing a crosslinguistic perspective on

conjunction acquisition, Clancy

et

al. (1976) carefully examined the acquisition

of temporal co ncepts. As in othe r studies (Hood etal. 1977), they first reported

the appearance of unmarked juxtaposed propositions, then conjoined clauses

which expressed a variety of functions: coordination, antithesis, sequence and

causality, and lastly, conditional no tion s. They found that soon after the appear-

ance of conjoined clauses, when was used for both conditional and sequential

temporal functions, and then for the expression of habitual occurrences.

Further,

when

in signalling sequential notions preceded its use in simultaneous

or overlapping phenom ena.

From these reports, we might conclude that temporal subordinate clauses

precede the acquisition of conditional clauses. However, like conditional sen-

tences (and other com plex structure s),

when

temp oral sentences are not limited

to expressing one semantic function. And, as previous work has shown (Reilly

1982),

children do start to produce conditional sentences at about age 2i, but

they do not fully control the entire conditional system until about 8 years

of age. We should, therefore, expect to find that acquisition of the full set

of meanings associated with

when

subordinate clauses is not instantaneous,

but rather extends over a period of time. This period should in part coincide

with the acquisition of conditionals.

Th e specific goal of

this

chapter

is

to provide a detailed picture of the sequence

of acquisition of the linguistic forms

when

and

if ,

which will in turn provide

a means to answer the original questions of how children map these forms

onto the various semantic functions associated with them, and in what contexts

the child can integrate the necessary conceptual notions with the appropriate

linguistic form. These results will hopefully provide another perspective on

the nature of the adult conditional system.

The remainder of the chapter includes a discussion of the role of when and

if

in adult speech, the experimental subjects and procedures, the sequence

of acquisition of when and //"and, finally, discussion and conclusions.

2. WHEN A N D IF IN A D U L T S P E E C H

Before looking at the acquisition data, it may be helpful to present a short

description of conditional and when temporal sentences, and show where they

overlap semantically, in the adult model. For a description of conditionals,




Table i. Types of conditional sentences, based on Schachter

1971)

Simple conditionals

Present

If I touch my eye , it hurts

If the cat is in the kitchen, he's eating the meat on the counter

Past

If it raine d last year in Egy pt, the Nile overflowed

Generic

If the tortoi se has a runny no se, he sleeps in the house

(Reflecting

a less dependency)

Predictive

If Kate sees the ice cre am , she will want som e

(Forecasting a real

world event)

Imaginative conditionals

Hypothetical If he ate all those do ugh nut s, he would be ill (Might occur)

Counterfactual If I were a boy , I would have curls (Present counter/actual: could

not occur)

If you had been awake, you would have heard the coyote

(Past coun-

terfactual: did not occur)

their morphologically comparable

when

temporals we find degrees of semantic

overlap. Heinamaki (1978) suggests that this overlap occurs in cases where

there is a regular co-occurrence relationship between two events, for example:

I w h I J

a rm e

drinks cranberry juic e, he gets a rash

In (4), a generic conditional, when could be replaced by whenever reflecting

a regular relationship; and since //-clauses refer to a possible instance of this

regular co-occurrence, //-clauses are also acceptable in these cases (Heinamaki

1978).

This interchangeability also holds true for present conditionals.

The semantic overlap decreases for predictive (5) and past conditionals (6)

where the speak er's expectations pertaining to the occurrence of the anteceden t

event or state distinguish the two structures. For predictive and past con-

ditionals, the speaker is supposing the antecedent; it is a possibility. In predic-

tive

when

temporals, however, the antecedent is expected to occur, and in

past temporals the antecedent is in fact known to have occurred:

I Wh I *^

e s t r a w

t

)

e rr ie s are in, we'll make fresh strawberry pie

I Wh I *

l r a m e c

* *

a st v e a r m

EgyP

1

'

t r i e

Nile Delta flooded

Thompson (personal communication) has suggested that the more regular

the co-occurrence relationship between the antecedent and consequent events,

the more interchangeable the

when

and

if

structures. This characterization

would allow inclusion of all those conditionals based in reality, i.e. the simple

conditionals, as well as allowing for the decreasing interchangeability due to



Judy Snitzer Reilly

the changing attitud e of the speaker toward the antecedent event in the predic-

tives and past conditionals.

Assuming that th e area of overlap between when and if is generally restricted

to the simple conditionals (an exception is discussed below), we are left with

the imaginative conditionals which refer to hypothetical and counterfactual

situations. This is exactly where the when and //"structures are not interchange-

able:

(7) J If 1 Kate told that joke to her grand mo ther, I would be morti-

*When I fied

I *w ^- « ^ Kate were a boy, she would be Batman

I *wk— ^ ^

a t e

^

ac

* b

e e n

a

boy, she would have been taller

In general, then, there is semantic overlap for when and //"where they refer

to situations occurring, having occurred, or predicted to occur, in the real

world, i.e. the simple conditionals: present, p ast, generic, and predictive condi-

tionals. Thus if is left to refer uniquely to hypothetical and counterfactual

situtions (the imaginative conditionals). This distinction, where if and when

overlap in the semantic areas referred to by the simple conditionals, holds

true except in those cases where the speaker knows what actually occurred

in the past:

10

j *

Tf

r

Kate w as 6 mon ths old, she was bald

This exception holds, of course, because //"signals supposition and possibility;

if //"were used in (10) it would leave open the possibility that Kate did not

exist. However, since we know she exists and was once 6 months old, we

cannot (with a simple conditional) readily suppose, as

if

does, that she was

never 6 months old.

5

In contrast,

when

implies some sort of factual knowledge

or certainty, and in speaking of past events,

when

exclusively refers to events

which have actually occurred.

6

To summarize, when and //"structures overlap semantically in so far as they

both link real-world sequential or simultaneous events. It appears that the

more regular the co-occurrence relationship between these events, the more

interchangeable the when and //"structures. Furthermore, w/ien-clauses, includ-

ing those referring to past events, are restricted to refer to fact and reality,

whereas //"-clauses suppose the possibility of a state or event in potentially

real as well as irrealis situations.

From this discussion we can see that the semantic overlap and non-overlap

of when and if reflect fairly subtle and complex distinctions and provide an

314




interesting context for looking at how children map forms onto semantic fields,

as well as how they divide the semantic pie in the process of acquiring adult

form-function relationships.

Given the partial ove rlap in semantic function, as well as the exten ded acqui-

sition period, there are several possible outcomes in the sequence of acquisition

of these two linguistic forms, if and when , and their interaction with the sem antic

functions to which they refer. The hypothesis is that the child will produce

those types of

when

temporals and conditionals that are semantically simpler

before producing o r comprehend ing the m ore complex types. Since the con tent

of children's early language concerns the 'here and now', we can assume that

those structures referring to reality are conceptually simpler than those where

the child must envision an imaginary si tuation . This is supp orted by the findings

of Kodroff and Roberge (1975), where children were more successful with

hypothetico-deductive tasks when the content was concrete rather than

abstract. With regard to conditionals and temporals, this would indicate that

those semantic functions referring to the real world (that is, the indicative

or simple conditionals and temporals) would emerge prior to hypothetical and

counterfactual conditionals. Further, since the semantic overlap occurs with

reference to reality situations, it is anticipated that neither the

when

temporal

nor the conditional system is acquired first completely and independently, but

rather both will be acquired concurrently and interactively.

3. S U B J E CT S A N D P R O C E D U R E S

Naturalistic data were collected in the form of a diary of the speech of my

daughter Kate from age 12 months to 52 months. Two other children were

audio-taped for between ii and 2 hours every three months from ages 2,9

to 4;

1

years in naturalistic play situa tions, and a third child was audio-tap ed

every three weeks from 2;6 to 2;n. Also used were diary data on temporals

and conditionals from a fourth child from 2;4 to 3;6.

For the experimen tal d ata on conditionals, tasks based on Schachter's frame-

work were designed and administered to 28 children, ranging in age from 2|

to 9 years. There were four children in each of the age groups: 2, 3, 4, 5,

6, 7, and 8 years. From diary data it appears that the full system of when

temporals is controlled by about age 4. Tasks were given to a second group

of children to test temporal and conditional production and comprehension:

three children in the 2;6-3;o age group, three 3 year olds, and three 4 year

olds. In all cases, attempts were made to embed the task questions into the

ongoing conversation so that they app eared naturally mo tivated.

Task I:

What if?

Given that cond itional types vary according to the auxiliary

verbs in both clauses, the children were asked What if? questions with different

auxiliaries to elicit different consequent responses. Many of the questions were

based on

a

story

we

were reading togeth er. It

was

assum ed that different auxiliary



Judy Snitzer Reilly

verbs in the response, triggered by the auxiliary in the antecedent question,

reflected the child's morphological capabilities as well as understanding of the

function of different conditional types. For example,

What if you eat three ice

creams?

might elicit a present tense response

You get sick

(a present or generic

consequ ent) or the simple future You

will get

sick (a predictive consequent).

Task II: Bears and pigs. To test counterf actual com prehen sion and to elicit

counterfactual consequents, the

What if?

paradigm was extended. The child

was read

The three little pigs

and

The three bears,

and then shown a picture

with a known result, e.g. the straw house which is blown down by the

wolf.

Then the child was asked a series of questions where each situation was varied

in some crucial aspect: for example,

What if the straw house had been made

of bricks?

Task III:

Pretend.

To investigate the child's comp rehension of hypotheti-

cals,

we played a 'pretend' game and the child was asked to pretend to be

or do something. The experimenter provided several model hypothetical con-

ditionals, for example, / / / ate ioo marshmallows, I would get

sick.

Then the

child was asked to pretend to do something and tell about it. If the child

used a different syntactic form, a prompt was given:

Can you say it just like

I did?

Task IV:

When sentence completion.

To test com prehen sion of the different

types of when temporal clauses, children were given when subordinate clauses

with different verb tenses (present and past, punctual and stative or durative).

They were then asked to complete a sentence,

When you get home

. . . o r

When your Daddy was at work

... If the child hesitated or asked

What?

th e

adult promp ted: Tell me or You tell me.

Task V: Familiar items and familiar events. To elicit generic w/ieft-clauses,

the children were asked what they did with certain familiar items that are

used for or occur in very specific and well-defined contexts, e.g.

What do you

do with rain boots? Prompts included All the time? or Every day?

4. S E Q U E N C E O F A C Q U I S IT I O N

This section integrates the naturalistic and experimental data to present a de-

scription of the acquisition sequence of temporals and conditionals (schema-

tized in table 2). 'Stage' is used to help organize the data in reporting it; it

is not meant necessarily to imply a linear sequence, as a child may be at two

stages simultaneously or stages may be collapsed. Many of the examples are

taken from Kate, as her data are more complete, having been collected very

frequently and over the longest time period. However, her development is

consistent with the other data .

Stage I. As in the developme nt of other complex stuctures, in these data

the children first juxtapose two independent propositions before the marked

complex structure appears in their grammar. For example:




(11) Kate 2 ;4 (climbing into her crib):

Climb in/

Be fun/

and she toppled in, laughing. Using rich interpretation (Brown 1973), we can

infer that some semantic relationship exists between these two clauses, be it

tem poral, cond itional, an d/ or causal, and further, that it is based in the ongoing

situation. A week or so later Kate prod uced a similar example:

(12) Kate 2 4 (she was on top of the jungle gym with a sheet draped over

it. She pointed to the she et):

Sit here/

Fall down/

In this particular instance, Kate did not in fact enact her prophecy, thereby

expressing a burgeoning sense of hypotheticality as well as the notion of

sequence, conditionality, and causality. These early collocations nicely support

the points made by Mann and Thompson (forthcoming) with regard to adult

usage of juxtaposed propositions to imply complex relationships. At this point,

then, the germs of these relationships are all available to the child, even though

Kate has not yet independently produced any complex sentences where these

relationships are explicitly marked with subordinate conjunctions.

Stage II.

The next developm ent is formal: complex sentences with marked

subordinate clauses. For our p urposes, those d enoting sequence (13) and parti-

cularly the first

when-c\auses,

(14) and (15), which initially signal predictive/

future sequences, are of interest:

(13) Ka te 2;6 (at bedtim e, after collecting bugs in a ja r):

I go see jar then go to b ed /

(14) Kate 2;6: Can I have some gum?

Mother: N o, we don't have gum /

—> Kate: I have gum when I'm ol de r? /

(15) Lau ren 2;6: When I go to Gram m y's, I'll eat with my fingers/

The use of when for predictive sequences is not limited to Kate and Lauren,

but rather appears throughout the data from other children, as well as other

available sources (Clancy et al. 1976; Bloom et al. 1980; Bowerman in this

volume).

Stage III.

For some children , the next step after

when

predictives involves

using

when

for a new semantic function, to relate familiar objects to their

distinctive contexts:

(16) Adul t: What are um brellas for?

Lauren 2;7: When rain com es, we put an umbrella on top of us /

317




be tempted to think of this first conditional (20) as a potential generic, it seems

prem ature to draw this conclusion, since the verbs are bar e, rathe r than neces-

sarily present tense. (Third person singular marking on present tense verbs

for Lauren at this stage appears to be optional, e.g.

cry/cries

and

want/wants

in (20) above.) Data from the other 2 year olds, including Bowerman (this

volume), support this trend; the first conditionals of six of the other seven

2 year olds are also present or predictive conditionals (i.e. sequences where

the antecedent may or may not be present or in the process of occurring):

For example, Kate

(2 ;

10

has hurt her eye:

(21) Adu lt: How does your eye feel?

Ka te (with her finger in her eye ):

If I touch it, it hurts/

Another development at this stage is Lauren's production of w/ie/t-clauses

to refer to co-temporal past events where a punctual incident occurred within

the time frame delineated by the w/ien-clause, as in (22). Since Lauren does

not consistently mark tense, it is only by knowing that Lauren had just spent

four days at her grandm othe r's house that we could know that the when-dause

refers to an extended period in the past:

(22) Lau ren 2;8 (pointing to a bite on her arm ):

This bite /

Ad ult: Wh at sweetie?

Lauren: Bite m e/

Ad ult: Wh at bites you?

—> La uren: One time I had a [siydow] bi te /

Ad ult: You had a mosqu ito bite?

Lauren: Umhmm/

When I go to my Gramm a's ho use/

As in previous instances where new complex structures and new functions

for complex structures appeared, here too the child uses several turns, relying

on discourse support. The additional turns providing the opportunity to repair

and elabo rate seem to allow the child to extend or surpass her previous syn tactic/

semantic productive abilities (but see Clark and Andersen 1979 and Reilly

1981 for further discussion).

In this same perio d, a fourth use of

when

appeared in the sentence com pletion

test when Lauren was asked to talk about her older sister Clare. She gave

the following response:

(23) Ad ult: When Clare was a baby . ..

Lauren 2;8: Her drowned an' her/ an' her Mommy quickly saved her/

Upon questioning the mother, this turned out to be pure fantasy. It appears,

then, that for Lauren at this stage, when with a stative past tense where she

has no true knowledge to draw upon can be equated with

Once upon a time.



Judy Snitzer Reilly

The other 2 year olds given

when

completion tasks also responded this way,

e.g.:

(24) Ad ult: Right this m inute , you're this teeny? (holding hands

8 inches apa rt)

Am anda 2 ; n : I was tha t/ this little when I was when I wa s/ when

I was that small and then, um (X3) that that, um that

(X3) that / the panda bears bite m e/

The amount of repetition and hesitation suggests that Amanda was trying to

think of an answer, and that its truth value was not a major consideration.

Later on in the conversation with Amanda when we were doing sentence com-

pletions, Amanda denied her response in (24):

(25) Adult: When the panda bears bit Am anda . . .

Amanda 2;i

1:

He din' t/

He din't hit me or din't bit me/

Example (25) shows that Amanda does in fact differentiate reality and irrealis

in the past, but she still uses

when

for fantasy in the past (24) as well as in

when predictives:

(26) Am anda 2;i

1:

W hen I older than Lindsay, then I'm the big sister/

However, she uses //for protogenerics:

(27) Adu lt: Can you tell me what um brellas are for?

Amanda 2 ; I I : They a re for putting on ( ) if it rains then we have to

have umbrella/

Althou gh similar to La uren 's form-function mapp ing, Am and a's

when-if

dis-

tribution for semantic functions differs slightly as she uses

if

and Lauren uses

when

for protogenerics. As in the initial stages of acquiring conditionals, there

is individual variation in the m apping of linguistic forms o nto th e various seman-

tic functions (Reilly 1983). How eve r, after the ch ild's initial entry into a particu-

lar grammatical/semantic system, the choices are fewer and developmental

sequences exhibit more uniformity.

In the case of temporals and conditionals, when a form is first acquired

there seem to be several means of parcelling out the shared semantic functions.

Some children, like Lauren, acquire one form and then two semantic functions

before acquiring the alternative form if . Once the second form appears, it

shares both semantic functions. Other children, like Amanda, show a prefer-

ence for 1-1 mapping, initially using separate forms for separate functions:

if 'for protogenerics and when for predictive sequences.

8

Soon thereafter, Am an-

da's use of when generalized to include the protogeneric function:

(28) Ad ult: D o you go to bed at night?

Am anda: W e go to bed when it's d ark/

32




Stage V.

The next deve lopm ent is the produc tion of hypothetical con-

ditionals:

(29) Ryan 2 ;io : If Bulldozer man saw a fire, he would call the fire depart-

ment /

9

even though the adult-initiated questions are often still denied:

(30) Ad ult: What if your car brok e on the way?

Ryan 2;io : W ell, but when we drove here , our car didn't b ro ke /

Adu lt: W ell, what happ ens, what if your car did break?

Ryan: It doesn't brea k/

I told you

At this same point in time, Ryan was also denying the possibility of past

when

statives outside his personal experience:

(31) Ad ult: What about when D itter was a little boy?

Ryan 2;i o: Ditter isn't a little boy, this day/

He 's a big brother this day /

These denials may stem from an inability to hypothesize a departure from

reality at the request of another speaker, and/or they may be due to misinter-

preting the intended speech act as a suggestion and then denying or rejecting

that suggestion. This is especially possible when the question proposes some-

thing implausible to the child as in (30). It is as if he can only suppose those

states or events which he has personally im agined or experienced.

1

"

Stage VI.

The next step towards recognizing the delineation between actual

fact and supposition, and by implication differentiating some of the functions

of when and if , is for the children to be able linguistically to suspend reality

at the implicit request of the interlocutor hypothesizing any situation. This

occurs for most children some time between the ages of 3 and 4 years:

(32) Ad ult: Molly, what if you ate three chocolate cakes?

Molly 3;6: You would have a tummy ach e/

Stage VII. In this last stage , at abou t age 4, ther e are developm ents in

several areas which may reflect a significant cognitive reorganization, corrobor-

ating the change found at this point by Crom er (1968).

First, the individual and non-overlapping functions of when and //are more

clearly differen tiated, as shown by the following repa ir:

(33) Grant 3; 10: When I w as/i f I was a tiger, I would cook pa /p op co rn /

Grant's repair suggests that when and if are linked, and since this is a self-

rather than an other-initiated repair, it dem onstrates his awareness that //ra th er

than when is the appropriate choice for irrealis situations.

321



Judy Snitzer Reilly

Also during this period, individual semantic functions of when expand. In

contrast to the earlier protogenerics, where specific objects were associated

with their usual contex ts, when now begins to reflect more abstract and genera-

lized notions:

(34) Kate 3;

11:

D add y, I want you to have a bea rd/

You look so handsome/

Mother: What?

—> Kate: I want D addy to have a beard 'cuz when men have beards

they look so hand som e/

Kate has never seen her father with a beard, so not only is this a hypothetical

situation but it also reflects a generalized relationship where specific instances

are abstracted from their individual occurrences in real time and generalized

to a timeless status ('w hen eve r'), as in a true generic.

Third, there is much greater success on the counterfactual tasks for the 4

year olds (93 per cent correct as opposed to a low of 36 per cent for the

3 year olds).

Fourth, spontaneous utterances reflecting counterfactual notions also begin

to appear as in (35):

(35) Kate 4 ;

1

(driving in a sedan with eight peop le):

We shoulda taked the grey car 'cuz it has a way-back (The grey

car is a station wagon.)

Finally, we also find at this point generalized and habitual past activities

which are now within the child's own mem ory. Th ese reflect an ability to genera-

lize instances of specific events over time and suggest that the child has differen-

tiated th e individual functions of//"and when:

(36) Kate 4 ;i : W hen I was thr ee, I used to brush my teeth with plain w ate r/

4.1 Review of the developm ental sequ ence

/. As in the developmen t of other complex sentences, in acquiring when

tempo rals and conditionals, children first produce u nm arked juxtapo sed p ropo-

sitions.

// . Th en, at about age 2;6,

when

(as well as other subordinators) appears

and is used spontaneously for predictives. These refer to future sequences

where the events referred to in both clauses are yet to occur, or in which

one of the events is presently occurring in the immediate context.

// /. Soon thereafter, given the approp riate context,

when

is used for simul-

taneous events (in these d ata , to relate familiar objects to their specific con texts,

as in You eat medicine when you re sick). To some degree, the time at which

a linguistic form is acquired is arbitrary and varies with individual children.

322




I.

II.

III.

IV .

V.

V I.

VII.

Table 2.

The acquisition

Function

Sequence

Predictive

(future sequence)

Predictive

Simultaneous

(proto-generic)

Predictive

Simultaneous/present

Co-temporal past punctual

*Past fantasy

Predictive

Present and generic

Co-temporal past punctual

*Past fantasy

Hypothetical production

Hypothetical

(comprehension)

Predictive

Generic

Past punctual

Past stative or habitual

(reality)

Hypothetical

(production and comprehension)

of temporals and conditionals

Forms

Juxtaposed propositions

(unmarked)

when

when

when and/or if

(individual variation)

when

when and if

when

if

if

when and if

when

if

Note:* Not in the adult model except when a fantasy narrative has been established.

It may be that for some children this function (protogeneric) does not appear

until the next stag e, after the child has acquired

if .

IV . At this stage (from ages 2

;6~3 ;2

in this set of da ta ), the first conditionals

marked with //"appear. Some children use

when

and

if for

both functions, i.e.

for this group of children, once the conditional structure is established it is

used to relate familiar items to their contexts (protogenerics) as well as for pre-

dictive sequences. Other children initially use when constructions to refer to

one semantic function and conditionals to refer to ano the r. Soon therea fter, how-

ever, the scope of both forms is extended to include both semantic functions.

These initial

when.-and

//"productions are often dep end ent on discourse supp ort.

Also at stage IV, when acquires two additional functions: (1) it is used to

refer to cotemporal events in the past, where at least one clause refers to

a punctual event; and (2) in cases where

when

occurs with a past stative, and

children have no person al experience to draw up on , they may use it to introduce

fantasy or make-believe. This function is appropriate in the adult model only

when a fantasy m ode or context has been established by the speaker. Children

323



Judy Snitzer Reilly

may be unaware that when is limited to factual assertions except in this special

instance, or it may be that they lack the pragmatic/discourse knowledge or

the ability to signal that they are initiating a fantasy sequ ence.

V.

At stage V (which may begin as early as 2;io and continue until 3 ; u )

children begin to produce hypothetical spontaneously. However, they gener-

ally respond to the What if? questions which demand hypothetical responses

by denying or rejecting states'outside their personal experience, or situations

they may view as implausible or undesirable. This grounding in reality occurs

in response to adult-initiated probes and task situations. It seems to reflect

an inability to integrate the component cognitive abilities with the necessary

linguistic structure and a difficulty in suspending present reality at the implicit

request of the other speaker. It could also stem from a misinterpretation of

the adult's intended speech act. This ability to produce hy po th eti ca l, but inabi-

lity to respond to

What if?

questions implies that often children can manipulate

the linguistic and cognitive components more easily when they have created

the fantasy scenario than when they must disambiguate another's perspective

(but see Reilly 1983 for a discussion of individual variation in this particular

area).

That analysing another's perspective can increase complexity is further

supported by the fact that children do better with hypothetical questions when

the adult gives the additional cue to 'pretend' and a model. In these cases,

children who deny the hypothetical and subjunctive counterfactual

W hat if?

questions are often capable of producing subjunctive

(were/ would)

counterfac-

tuals:

(37) Adu lt: What if you eat thre e ice cream cones?

Katie M. y,j: You don't have three hands/

(38) Ad ult: Can you preten d to be some thing, like, 'If I were a horse ,

I 'd w ear a sadd le'/

Can you think of something like that?

Katie M. 357: If I was a elephant , I should have a tr un k/ '

VI.

In this next period (which begins as early as 2;i o and as late as 3;8

in my data) hyp othetical q uestions are no longer denied and they receive app ro-

priate conditional responses. Counterfactuals, however, continue to be proble-

matic until about age 4 (all the 4 year olds were very successful on the

counterfactual comprehension test).

With the produ ction and com prehension of hypotheticals, children have suc-

cessfully generalized their suppositional abilities to hypothetical situations of

anoth er's cre atio n, and the sem antic scope of //"begins to expand and distinguish

itself from that of

when.

VII.

At stage V II,

when

is limited to real past events and, eventually, past

habituals become frequent in the naturalistic data .

In essence, then, children first acquire those semantic functions that refer

to the real world, which just happen to be where the two forms overlap. Then

324




gradually the independent functions, hypotheticality and counterfactuality

(irrealis) for

if ,

and past stative (reality) for

when,

emerge.


The general trends found in the interaction of temporal and conditional acquisi-

tion in this study confirm and sup port the m ajor results of conditional acquisition

reported on earlier (Reilly 1982, 1983). The data show the process of language

acquisition to be a constant readjusting of the balance between linguistic forms

and their semantic functions, reflecting the largely separate but interactive

systems of language and cognition. The structural linguistic sequence usually

reflects the child's semantic capabilities, which are in turn dependent on the

ability to manipu late the requisite cognitive n otions.

To counterbalance this, it is also true that a child will use specific linguistic

forms,

in this case both temporals and conditionals, without controlling the

entire semantic system to which these structu res refer. The

2

year olds producing

predictive

when

tempo rals and predictive conditionals do not use

when

tempor-

als for past habitual activities, nor do they productively use hypothetical or

counterf actual condition als. L earning the va rious semantic functions of a parti-

cular linguistic structure requires an extended period of time; the acquisition

of a new semantic function for an already acquired linguistic form appears

to be motivated by the child's increasing capacity to incorporate developing

conceptual abilities into the app ropriate linguistic structure. T hese independ ent

spurts of growth in the domains of linguistic form and semantic abilities lend

further support to the view that semantic and syntactic competence, while

interactive, are largely inde pen dent.

A recurrent theme characterizes the acquisition of temporals, conditionals,

and the interaction of these structures. Both structures are used initially to

refer to the familiar and to the immediate context. D evelo pm ent is a progression

from the 'here and now' to the more general and abstract. These changes

reflect the child's developing cognitive abilities, i.e. the increasing ability to

handle more complex and abstract ideas and to integrate these ideas with the

appropriate linguistic form.

This sequence from specific to general is evident across the entire domain

of tempora ls and condition als as well as within any one specific type of tem pora l

or conditional sentence. The acquisition of timeless or generic structures pro-

vides a good exam ple. T he child's first generic type of utterance

is

single propo si-

tions such as

Cows say moo

or

Brooms are for sweeping.

Cromer (1968) calls

these 'timeless characterizing descriptions' (see also Bowerman in this volume).

Next,

when

temporals relate known and familiar items to their unique and

specific contexts. Then, once conditionals are productive, they also appear

in the same context. In script data, where children told about familiar activities,

French and Nelson

(1981,

1982) found generic conditionals very occasion-

ally in data from the 2 ; I I - 3 ; I O group and more frequently in the 3 ; I I - 4 ; I O

325



Judy Snitzer Reilly

group. Finally,

when

temporals are used to encode more abstract generic con-

cepts into generic or habitual relationships, as in Kate's example of

when

men have beards they look so handsome .

From a broader perspective, the trend from concrete to abstract and specific

to general is apparent in the way that the two structures are acquired. It is

those struc tures which refer to the real world that are the earliest to be acquired,

and they are first used in present and familiar situations. They happen to be

the semantically overlapping structures. Compared to the imaginative con-

ditionals (hypothetical and counterfactuals) where only f/is appropriate, the

indicative or simple conditionals and temporals (the structures where

if

and

when

overlap) refer to the real world and are the conceptually less abstract.

Given a semantic complexity metric such as Brown's (1973), the indicative

structures would be predicted to be acquired first.

It is interesting th at initially the child uses new structu res in the most concre te

contexts, even though the components required by the more abstract uses may

be accessible independently. For example, children pretend a great deal by

2 | years, and comments such as

I m teasing, I m just pretending

or

I m just

joking

are comm on by age 3. They do not seem to be able, however, to integrate

and encode this conceptual ability of hypothesizing imaginary situations into

the conditional struc ture at the initial stages of their conditional caree rs. R ath er,

they need some tim e for the structure to establish itself before they can incorpor-

ate this additional sem antic complexity to produc e and respond hypothetically.

(See Bowerman, this volume, on the late acquisition of conditionals despite

the presence of their prerequisites.) It may be that the acquisition of a new

structure taxes children to the point where they can only focus on one aspect

at the time and are thereby limited to the simpler conceptual use(s) that the

structure signals; or it may be that in learning any new structure, as Piaget

(1954) has suggested, regardless of the children's level of performance and

cognitive abilities in oth er areas, they proceed through the develop mental stages

with regard to that particular structure.

As we have seen in this form-function balancing ac t, children vary and exhibit

individual mapping strategies. Some children, like Amanda, divide the shared

semantic field between the two forms, resulting in 1-1 mapping. Others, how-

ever, have a more inclusive strategy. Once a semantic function is controlled

and a specific form acquired, it is used in addition to any existing forms to

refer to that semantic function. The greatest variation seems to be in the initial

stages, when the child first enters the system. Once the forms are established,

however, progress is general. Both forms expand their semantic roles in accord-

ance with Slobin's adap tation (1973: 184) of W erne r and K aplan 's (1963) adage,

'New forms first express old functions, and new functions are first expressed

by old form s.'

Once both forms are used for two functions, from our data we can infer

that the child is continually readjusting the form-function balance within the

326




domain of temporals and conditionals, rather than performing a wholesale

reanalysis after all the functions have been acquired. Fo r instan ce, Ka te's repair

in (i) demonstrates that before she controlled all of the semantic functions

of either

if

or

when,

she was equating the two forms for that particular semantic

function.

This brings us to the question of whether and in what contexts the child

differentiates when and if In the present and protogeneric examples, the forms

appear to be interchangeable. For predictives, Bowerman (this volume) has

found evidence that children distinguish

when

and //"predictives based on their

expectation of the antecedent's occurrence, although some children also use

predictive conditionals where the antecedent is in fact in the process of occur-

ring:

(39) Kate 2;

10

(she hit m e with a string bag as I was laughing)

Adult: D on' t hit me /

Kate:

I'll do it again if you laug h/

In past structures there appears to be some confusion between forms, at

least in the initial stages of acquiring new semantic functions, as we saw with

Lauren and Am and a's use of

when

for past tense fantasy and Da mon 's examples

below:

(40) Da mo n 2;8: When I was a big boy, I used He rb's k nife/

(Diary notes, '= future irrealis conditional')

(41) Da mo n 2;8: When I put these in my hair, I would look like a w om an/

(Diary notes, 'hypothetical')

It appears then that conditionals and temporals may be distinguished by

children in certain contexts, but not in others, at least in the initial stages

of using them for new semantic functions. And what the exact distinctions

might be may well vary with individual children because of their differing initial

mapping strategies.

With respect to the specific area of child language acquisition, there are

several conclusions to be drawn from these data:

(i) Given that the tem pora l and condition al systems overlap semantically,

they are acquired concurrently and interactively.

(ii) With the acquisition of a new linguistic structure for a particula r func-

tion, there appears to be a step-by-step reorganization of the system.

(iii) Children are generally able to prod uce more complex and abstract struc-

tures when they establish the context themselves than when it is neces-

sary for the child to read and disam biguate the inte rlocu tor's persp ective.

This suggests that certain pragmatic variables play a role in determining

those contexts in which children can maximally display their linguistic

competence and linguistically realize their conceptual abilities.

327



Judy Snitzer Reilly

(iv) W hen the child enters a gram m atical/sem antic system, there is indivi-

dual variation in how the form-function relationship is distributed. As

he or she progresses, the acquisition sequence becomes more uniform

and general.

(v) These da ta confirm previous findings that language and cognition stem

from largely independent sources developing in parallel, although not

necessarily at a matched pace. It appears that the semantics of a struc-

ture,

and implicitly the underlying cognitive notions, are responsible

for the general course of language acquisition. Children acquire the

semantically simpler structures before the more complex and abstract.

In contrast, children are also using forms, both temporals and con-

ditionals, before they control the entire temporal and conditional sys-

tems.

To 'acquire' a certain structure then, it appears that the child

need only master a sliver of its potential semantic pie.

Concerning the broader issues of the adult conditional system, not only do

children's first conditionals reflect a semantic type found in most of the world's

languages synchronically (see Bowerman and Comrie's chapters in this

volume), but according to Harris's discussion (this volume) on the history of

conditionals in R om anc e, children use their first conditionals in a manne r that

has been available to speakers of Rom ance languages for the past two thousand

years

Another relevant facet of the acquisition data is children's generalizing of

semantic functions to other linguistic forms and the complementary use of

alternate forms for similar semantic functions. These phenomena demonstrate

that, even in the initial stages, children are sensitive to the nondiscreteness

of conditionals as a semantic category. The subtle fading of conditionals to

neighbouring semantic fields, e.g. temporals and causals, is also evident in

the first conditionals, where the most frequent relation between antecedent

and consequent is causal in nature. Once again, this seems to be an extension

of the child's pre-existing semantic abilities appearing in the guise of a new

form; complex sentences marked with

so

and

because

precede the appearance

of

if.

It also reflects, however, the child's awareness, at some level, of the

multiple semantic functions of conditionals. These acquisition data, much like

Harris's historical data, provide further motivation to look at conditionals from

a broader semantic perspective. Acquisition data, then, elucidate the develop-

mental process and also serve as an investigatory tool which not only corrobor-

ates hypotheses and data from other sources but can also suggest new questions

concerning the na ture of the adult system.

NOTES

i I would like to thank S andra Tho mp son, E linor Ochs, Daniel Kem pler and Alice

ter Meulen, Elizabeth Traugott, Marina Mclntire and Charles Ferguson for their

328



The acquisit ion of temporals and conditionals

thoughts and criticisms. Also, I am extremely grateful to Eve Clark for her ge nerous

sharing of Damon's diary notes. I would further like to acknowledge the support

and patience of the m others and children w ho participated in this study.

2 They define epistemic as 'a dependency relation involving certainty or uncertainty

about the event or state in the second clause' (p. 245). The example sentences are

/

don 7 know X

and /

think that X.

3 For a different perspective on generics, see ter Meulen (this volum e).

4 In Schachter's model, the categories 'reality' and 'unreality' are also used to classify

conditionals; predictives, which forecast an event in the real world, are classified

as unreality conditionals along with the imaginatives because they refer to something

which has not yet occu rred.

5 For this examp le, as in the case of many starred sen tence s, exceptions can be found

and an appropriate, if somewhat bizarre, context can be constructed if sufficient

effort is expended.

6 As briefly mentioned earlier, this is true except in narratives where there are ad-

ditional linguistic cues that one is leaving reality, e.g. Once upon a time . . . o r Long

ago ...

7 Adu lts also deny What if? questions in certain instances, responding as if the question

were a suggestion, e.g. Wha t if we go to the beach today? No, it s gonna rain, or

OK. The difference here lies in the fact that in the task data there is a qualitative

change in responses from the 2 year olds' denials and acceptances to uniquely con-

ditional conseq uent responses by age 4.

8 From these data, it is not clear whether Amanda used when for a protogeneric

function or if that function did not arise until the acquisition of //. In any case,

soon thereafter, Amanda began to use when as well as //for the present or generic

function.

9 Damon, Ryan and Lauren are certainly very verbal children and appear to be quite

precocious. As with all child language data, the chronological age varies a great

deal with individual children and is not particularly significant, but the sequence

in which the various constructions and semantic functions occur, after the initial

entry into the system, is quite g enera l.

10 Personality or differences in personal style may play a role in how comfortable a

child is in imagining unusual or hypothetical events.

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of language. Ph .D . dissertation, H arvard University.

Emerson, Harriet F. 1980. Children's judgements of correct and reversed sentences

with 'if.

Journal of Child Language

7: 137-55.

Ferreiro, Emilia and Hermina Sinclair.

1971.

Temporal relationships in language.

Inter-

national Journal of Psychology 6: 39-47.

French, Lucia and Katherine Nelson. 1981. Temporal knowledge expressed in pre-

schoo lers description of familiar ac tivities.

Papers and Reports on Child Language

Development (Stanford University Department of Linguistics) 20: 61-9.

French, Lucia and Nelson, Katherine. 1982. Taking away the context: preschoolers

talk about 'then and there '. The Quarterly Newsletter of the Laboratory of Comparative

Human Cognition

4: 1—12.

Heinamaki, Orvokki. 1978. Semantics of English temporal connectives. Ph.D. disser-

tation, University of Texas, Austin.

Ho od, L ois, M argare t Lah ey, Karin Lifter and Lois Bloom . 1977. Obse rvational descrip-

tive methodology in studying child language: preliminary results in the development

of complex sentences. In

Observing behavior,

ed. G. P. Sackett,

VOL.

I :

Theory and

applications in m ental retardation.

Baltimore, Md.: University Park Press.

Jakubo wicz, C elia. 1981. L'acquisition des phrases conditionnelles. In Problemes etpers-

pectives

en

psycholinguistique de Venfant,

ed. J. P. Bronkart, M. Kail, and G. Noizet.

Gene va: Delachaux et Niestle.

Kodroff Judith K., and James J. Roberge. 1975. Developmental analysis of the con-

ditional reasoning abilities of primary grade children. Developmental Psychology 11 :

21-8.

Kuhn, D ean na. 1977. Conditional reasoning.

Developmental Psychology 13:

342-55.

Limber, John. 1973. The genesis of complex sentences. In

Cognitive development and

the acquisition of language, ed. Terence E. Moore, 169-85. New York: Academic

Press.

Mann, William C. and Sandra A. Thompson. (Forthcoming) Relational propositions

in discourse. M S.

McCabe, Anne E., Susan Evely, Rona Abramovitch, Carl Carter, and Debra J. Pepler.

1983.

Conditional statem ents in young children's spontaneous speech. Journal of C hild

Language 10:169-85.

Piaget, Jean. 1954.

The construction of

reality

in the child.

New Y ork: Ballantine Books.

Piaget, Jean. 1971.

The child s conception of time.

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Reilly, Judy S. 1981. Children's repairs. Paper presented at the Second International

Congress for the Study of Child Language. Vancouver, British Columbia.

33



17

CONDITIONALS ARE

D I S C O U R S E - B O U N D

Noriko Akatsuka

Editors' note.

Akatsuka argues against a truth-conditional perspec-

tive in favour of

a

linguistic, specifically

a

pragmatic, approach. Using

Japanese, English and some German data, she shows that we must

consider discourse context as well as the speaker's attitude and prior

knowledge to account for the semantics of conditionals. Conditionals

in context are also the focus of Ford and Thompson's chapter; atti-

tudes and beliefs are discussed by Adams, Barwise, and Fillenbaum.

Akatsuka also suggests a 'core' meaning for conditionals that may

or

may

not

be

morphologically defined, providing

a

link

to

the various

discussions of

marking,

and of

the

relation of conditionals to causals,

concessives, and to temporals and other domains.

1.


What I want to show in this chapter is that conditionals do not belong to the

static domain of mathematical logic, but to the dynamic domain of discourse

where individuals with different belief systems confront each oth er

now.

1

I will dem ons trate that we must consider discourse factors in (i) the preceding

context and (ii) the speaker's attitude; and also that there is a connection

between

p

and

q,

that is, every construction with the meaning 'if p,

q"

shares

an abstract, grammatical meaning similar to 'correlation/correspondence

between

p

and

q\

2

The evidence will be deve loped as follows: section 2 will

examine two types of English conditionals, both of which have generally been

regarded as counterexamples to the 'connection' theory; section 3 will show

that consideration of factors in (i) and (ii) leads us to distinguish information

and knowledge; section 4 will show that this distinction leads us to reject Hai-

man's (1978) view that conditionals a re givens; section 5 is a conclusion.

2. T H E C O N N E C T I O N

2.1 Indicative counterf actuals

Consider the following example, taken from Smith (1983):

(1) If you're the policeman, I'm the King of China



Noriko Akatsuka

It is widely held that the antecedent and the consequent of (i) have truth

values 'F ' and (i ) as a whole has the truth value T . The refore, conditionals

of this type are sometimes called 'counterfactuals' in the literature. I will hence-

forth refer to them as 'indicative counterfactuals'. What is the difference then,

if any, between indicative counterfactuals and subjunctive counterfactuals such

as in (2)?

(2) If only I ha dn 't given her the car keys, this accident would n't have

happened

For example, is there any difference between the two 'F's in the antecedents

of the two counterfactuals?

Now, compare (1) with (3b). Example (3) is a true story that was reported

in the

Chicago Sun Times

in July 1979:

(3) a. Pop e to a telephone op era tor in a small Swiss village: I'm the Pop e

b. O pera tor: If you 're the Pop e, I'm the Em press of China

It has been observed that indicative counterfactuals such as (1) are used to

assert ~p. However, since conditionals have usually been discussed without

their discourse contexts, it has escaped the attention of previous researchers

that/? does not originate in the spea ker's own m ind.

Indicative counterfactuals always require a preceding context.

3

This is

because such conditionals are always in emp hatic disagreement with som ebody,

conveying the message, 'That's absurd ' Subjunctive counterfactuals, on the

other h and , can initiate discourse. Consider (4):

(4) (At the funeral of a dau ghte r who was killed in a car accident)

M othe r: If only I hadn 't given her the car keys, this accident w ouldn't

have happened

Father: Do n't blame yourself If you hadn't given her the keys, she

would have taken the extra set

Observe the difference of emotion associated with indicative counterfactuals

and true counterfactuals. Indicative counterfactuals can never express, as do

the true coun terfactuals, the heartfelt sorrow or longing of the speaker. Instead,

they invariably express the speaker's cynical or sarcastic attitude toward the

believer of p. I am not aware of any formal system which can explain on

a principled basis the inherent differences between the two types of counterfac-

tuals we have observed here .

W here does the reading, 'Th at's absurd ' come from? I propose that the

answer lies in the inh erent connection betw een/? and q.

It is generally believed that the connection between

p

and

q

is not a part

of the meaning of conditionals. Indicative counterfactuals have been widely

used as examples to show the correctness of that position. Still, logicians have

long noted that normally there is some kind of connection between p and

4



Conditionals are discourse-bound

q in any construction with the meaning if p, q. It was partly due to difficulty

in pinpointing the exact nature of this connection that they generally concluded,

irrespective of their personal stand on the analysis of

if,

that this connection

should be treated as a problem of pragmatics rather than grammar (e.g. Quine

1950; Stalnaker 1968, 1976; Grice 1975; D. Lewis 1976). The position of these

logicians has been more or less inherited by linguists (e.g. Geis and Zwicky

1971; Kem pson 1975; Haim an 1978; Ga zdar 1979; K arttunen and Peters 1979;

McCawley 1981; Smith 1982).

However, in contrast to this standard practice of taking a purely pragmatic

approach, I believe the 'connection' to be an integral part of the 'if p, q con-

struction's linguistic meaning. That is, each conditional sentence shares an

abstract, grammatical meaning similar to 'correlation/correspondence between

p

and

q\

W hat is contextua lly determ ined is the specific nature of the 'conn ec-

tion/correspondence' in each conditional sentence, for example, 'causal link'.

Since the major concern of logicians has been tru th values, virtually no atten -

tion has been paid to the speaker's attitude towards

p

and

q.

I maintain that

there is indeed a connection between

p

and

q

of indicative counterfactuals

in the evaluative judgement of the speaker: namely, the degree of absurdity

in

p

correlates/corresponds to the degree of absurdity in

q.

Thus, in (3) the

telephone operator is asserting, 'Your claim is just as absurd as saying that

I am the Em press of China ' He nce the reading of 'Tha t's absurd ' N otice

that the speaker is not just saying that

p

is 'F'. Rather, she is emphatically

claiming ' F + '. ( F + is not a logical notation.) My analysis fits well with

the common observation that

q

of indicative counterfactuals must be a blatant

falsehood.

It has often been claimed that indicative counterfactuals exemplify the cor-

rectness of the j / -as-3 theory because there is no connection between p and

q and because they are instances of the fourth line of the classical truth table.

However, to my knowledge, no truth functionalist has ever provided an ad-

equate explanation for why

q

must be a blatan t falsehood, nor for why indicative

counterfactuals are marked by a special disbelief intonation, as observed by

Smith (1983). It will be interesting to see how Sperber and Wilson's (1981)

theory of irony, which is intended to supersede Grice's maxim of relevance

in explanatory power, will account for the fact that indicative counterfactuals

are always an ironical way of rejecting someon e's claim/belief.

Recall that Gazdar (1979), who subscribes to Stalnaker's (1968) non-truth-

functional theory of

if ,

has remarked that Geis and Zwicky's (1971) invited

inference phenomenon remains just as puzzling to Stalnaker's framework as

to the systems of other philosophers. I maintain that invited inference is a

natural consequence of the inherent connection between

p

and

q,

and also

the speaker's and hearer's understanding of what type of speech act the con-

ditional is being used for.

Working within the framework of the /f-as-3 theory, Geis and Zwicky noted

5



Noriko Akatsuka

that th ere is a strong tend ency for beginning students in elem entary logic courses

to interpret the meaning of 'if/7, q as a biconditional. For example, given

(5):

(5) If you mow the law n, I'll give you five dolla rs

many students propo se (6) and (7) rather than (6) alone:

(6) M => G

(7) ~ M I D ~ G

They hypothesize th at this phenom enon is due to 'a connection b etween linguis-

tic form and a tendency of the human mind' to 'perfect' conditionals into bicon-

ditionals.

Unfortunately, Geis and Zwicky failed to notice that their example (5) is

normally understood to mean (8):

(8) If you mow the lawn, I'll give you five dollars as a reward

A reward must be earned. Hence the reaction of students, as in (7). Their

hypothesis forced Geis and Zwicky to claim that indicative counterfactuals

also suggest ~pz>~q. The ir claim notwith stand ing, few non-logicians will

infer (10) from (9), taken from McCaw ley (1981):

(9) If Nixon was innocen t, then geraniums grow on the moon

(10) If Nixon was not innoce nt, then geraniums do not grow on the moon

Both Geis and Zwicky's example (5) and McCawley's example (9) share the

abstract, grammatical meaning, 'correlation between p and q\ What differen-

tiates them is the type of speech act they are being used for.

2.2 Subjunctive counterfactuals

Consider the following example, which differs from our earlier example (2)

in that there is no explicit

q

in the mother's statement - overwhelmed by

sorrow, she could not finish what she wanted to say:

(11) (At a funeral of a daughter who was killed in a car accident)

M other: If only I had n't given her the car keys . . .

Father: Do n't blame yourself If you hadn't given her the keys, she

would have taken the extra set

Everybody will agree that the mother is blaming herself for the fatal accident

and the father is trying to comfort his mourning wife. The question I wish

to raise is this: why is it that we reach this unanimous agreement, even though

there is no

q

in the mother's statement? I claim that this is because we know

that the essential form of the dialogue in (11) is the following, and we also

know that the father is rejecting the m othe r's assertion:

336




(12) Mother: I f ~ p , ~ q

Fath er: (Even) if ~ p, q

Compare (11) with the following:

(13) M oth er: If only I ha dn 't given her the car keys, this accident wouldn't

have happened

Father: Do n't blame yourself (Even) if you hadn't given her the keys,

this accident would still have happened, since/because she

would have taken the ex tra set

The essential difference between (11) and (13) is that the missing q has been

supplied. The true

q

is often missing in natural conversation when it is under-

standable from the context. For exam ple, consider:

(14) If you get hungry, the re's a ham burg er in the fridge

The true q is, I claim, not the existential statement, as usually assumed, but

rather the speaker's suggestion, 'eat the hamburger' which does not appear

in the sentence. This is much easier to see in Japanese syntax, where the

sentence can end with Japanese counterparts of

because / since p,

implying that

q is missing. Compare (a) and (b) below, both of which are Japanese counter-

parts of (14):

(15) a. On aka ga suitara, reizooko ni hanbaag aa ga aru kara

stomach SBJ. emp ty if fridge in ham burger

SBJ.

exist because

ne

PARTICLE

Lit. 'If you get hungry, because ther e's a ham burge r in the fridge

(eat it)'

b.

On aka ga suitara, reizooko ni hanbaagaa ga aru yo

stomach SBJ. empty if fridge in ham burger SBJ. exist PARTICLE

'If you get hungry, there's a hamburger in the fridge'

Likewise, in the Japanese counterpart of (11), the father's statement can end

with 'because/since/?':

(16) Om ae ga kagi o yaran akat-ta ra, yobi no kagi o tsukatta

you SBJ. key OBJ. gave-not-if extra of key OBJ. used

daroo kara ne

would have because PARTICLE

Lit: 'If you had n't given her the keys, (this accident would still have

hap pen ed) , because she would have used the extra keys'

To recapitulate, in order to understand that the mother is blaming herself

merely by hearing her say If only p, it must be the case that we know :

(i) This is an unfinished conditional sta tem ent, 'If ~ p, ~ q'

337



Noriko Akatsuka

(ii) A conditional statem ent is the speaker's claim about the connection

(= correlation) between the antecedent and the consequent

(iii) 'If — p , ~ q' he re conveys something like 'Ther e is a connection

between the mother's having given the car keys to her daughter

and the fatal accident'

In order to understand that the father is trying to comfort the mother, it must

be the case that we know:

(iv) 'If ~ p, q' here conveys something like, 'The re is no such connection

as you claim '

In short, in ( n ) both the m other and the father know that the following two

events actually occurred:

(17) /?: Mothe r gave her daughte r the car keys

q:

The fatal accident happened

The mother believes that the two events are related, whereas the father is

rejecting her belief as incorrect. We have seen, then, that to understand the

two people's speech acts in (11), we must conclude that the connection between

p

and

q

of 'if p ,

q

1

is necessarily an integral part of the meaning of 'if/?,

q\

It turns out that logicians, notably Chisholm (1946) and Goodman (1955),

have long been aw are of the interaction b etween negation and the 'connection '.

4

In his now classic chapter 'The problem of counterfactual conditionals', Good-

man n otes as follows:

Ordinarily a semi-factual conditional [false antecedent and true consequent] has the

force of denying what

is

affirmed

by

the opposite, fully counterfactual conditional.

The sentence

Even had the match been scratched, it still wouldn't have lighted,

is normally meant as the direct negation of

Had the match been scratched, it would have lighted.

That is to say, in practice full counterfactuals affirm, while semi-factuals deny, that

a certain connection obtains between antecedent and consequent. (Goodman 1955: 5-6)

Both logicians and linguists generally believe that the above observations show

that to maintain the 'connection' hypothesis, one has to abandon semifactuals

as conditionals (e.g. Stalnaker 1968; Haiman 1978).

5

Thu s, Stalnaker proposed

a formal system which 'can avoid this difficulty by denying that the conditional

can be said, in general, to assert a connection of any particular kind between

antecedent and consequent'. However, this well-recognized 'difficulty' disap-

pears when we realize that the speaker of semifactuals, just like the speaker

of indicative counterfactuals, is rejecting the previous speaker's assertion.

It has often been assumed that indicative counterfactuals and semifactuals

are counterexamples to the connection between

p

and

q.

I have shown that

such a view is an artifact of analysing conditionals in terms of truth values

8




rather than making an appeal to such notions as prior contexts in the discourse

and the speaker's attitude towards what the interlocutor has just said. A simple

appeal to the falsehood of the antecedent of indicative counterfactuals and

semifactuals will not allow us to explain why it is that the former is interpreted

as a judgement of the absurdity of another's assertion while the latter is not.

Also,

the connection itself can only be understood if the two counterfactuals

are taken as a way of rejecting the previous speaker's assertion.

3. C O N T E X T U A L L Y G IV E N

p

3.1 New information

The form of the dialogue between the Pope and the operator (3) in section

2 can be represented as follows:

(18) Pope: p

O perato r: If p, as you say, q

Note that/? here stands for a quotation. Indeed, manyps are quotations, espe-

cially quotations of the new information which has been just 'given' to the

speaker at the discourse site. And q is the speaker's reaction to the newly

provided information,/? (see Akatsuka 1985).

How the speaker reacts to the new information, namely the speake r's attitude

towards

p,

will largely depend on the content of the information and the

speaker's familiarity with the source of the information. Even when p does

not represent as incredible a claim as 'I am the Pope', the speaker's reaction

can still vary , as in the following:

(19) Speaker A: Ken says that he lived in Japan for seven years when he

was a kid

Speaker B: I didn 't know that If he lived in Japan that long, his Japa-

nese must be pretty good

(20) Speaker A: Ken says that he lived in Japan for seven years when he

was a kid

Speaker B : W ell, if he lived in Japan that long, why doesn't he speak

any Japanese at all?

In (19), speaker B readily accepts p to be 'factual' information, while in (20)

speaker B does not.

The quotative nature of //"can account for the otherwise puzzling behaviour

of the future tense marker

will

It has been observed that the future

will

does

not usually occur in /?, as illustrated in the following contra st:

(21) a. If it rain s, I'll tak e an um brella

b. *If it will rain, I'll tak e an umbrella

339



Noriko Akatsuka

However, as Comrie (1982) points out, examples such as the following are

grammatical only if p is already provided at the discourse site, typically having

been uttered in the preceding context:

(22) If it'll definitely rain , (as X says), then I'll tak e my um brella

It should be noted that this quotative nature of if

is

not shared by when. The

following example is ungrammatical in any context:

(23) *I'll take my um brella when it'll definitely rain

To my knowledge, Ross (1969) was the first to recognize the relationship

between the exceptional behaviour of the future tense marker

will

and contex-

tually given p. He conjectured that 'probably such sentences [sentences with

future marker

will

in

p]

are only acceptable with a sense parallel to that of

"if yo u're so smart, why are n't you rich? " which, as Paul K iparsky has observed ,

means "if what you say is right, why aren't you rich?'" Observe that the

speaker's attitude towards the utterer oip is similar in (24) and (25) below:

(24) If you 're the Po pe, I'm the Em press of China

(25) If you're so sm art, why are n't you rich?

In both, the speaker is communicating the message, 'I don't believe you ' The

parallelism between conditionals such as (25) and indicative counterfactuals

has long escaped the attention of previous researchers because, according to

logicians' standard analysis, questions do not have truth values, and because

what the speaker is communicating with those conditionals has not been the

researchers' central concern.

3.2 Unsharable knowledge/belief

The form of dialogue in (26):

(26) Speak er A: p

Speaker

B:

I f p , q

can be regarded as a reflection of epistemological reality that unsharable know-

ledge /belief necessarily exists betw een the two T s at any given

now.

The inner world of consciousness of other people belongs to unsharable

knowledge. It is impossible for anyone to enter other people's minds and dir-

ectly experience their feelings, emotions, or beliefs. What is registered in their

mind

now

is only indirectly accessible to us as 'information' through observa-

tions of external evidence, including linguistic communication. This is reflected

in the use of

if in

the following dialogue:

(27) (A mothe r and her son are waiting for the bus on a wintry day. The

son is trembling in the cold wind .)

a. Son: Mo mm y, I'm so cold

4




b.

M other: Poor thing If you 're so cold, put on my shawl

(She puts her shawl arou nd his shoulders).

First, note that the son cannot express his present state in the form of if p.

Instead of //h e must use

because

or

since.

(28) Son: *If/because/since I'm so cold, please let me use your shawl

Second, even though the mother regards

p

to be 'factual', it is newly learned

information to her rather than he r own know ledge , and the refore , it is expressed

in the form of

if p .

That the m othe r's being an external observer, and not the actual experiencer,

is a crucial factor to this situation becom es clearer when we examine the follow-

ing exam ple:

(29) Son (looking out of the window):

It's raining, Mommy

M othe r: If it's raining (as you say), let's not go to the park

Observe that the son, who is a direct experiencer of/?, cannot say, if p .

(30) Son: (Look ing out of the window and noticing the rain)

*If it's raining , let's not go to the park

Similarly, the m oth er's reply is acceptable if and only if she remains an indirect

experiencer. Assume that upon hearing her son she too goes to the window

and sees that it is indeed raining. Then, the dialogue in (29) is no longer felici-

tous.

The following is not acceptable:

(31) M othe r (going to the window and noticing the rain herself):

Y ou 're righ t. *If it's raining , let's not go to the park

In this context, she will have to use

bec use p

or

since p.

(32) M other: Y ou're right. Le t's not go to the park because/since it's raining

The above discussions show that epistemologically,

because p

and

since p

belong to the same conceptual domain as /?, while

if p

does not. The fact

that

p

and

if p

are epistemologically distinct sheds light on the incorrectness

of the widely held view that the if in indicative counterfactuals is identifiable

with the =). Compare (33) and (34):

(33) Speaker A: Nixon was innocen t

Speaker

B:

If Nixon was inno cent , then geraniums grow on the moon

(34) P

The form of a dialogue shown in (33) looks like unfinished modus ponens.

The resemblance, however, is only superficial. The two

ps

in modus ponens

34i




equivalence between the two categories, but it does follow from the identifica-

tion of conditionals as topics, namely , givens. (See also Haim an in this volum e.)

Haiman's argument is based on Jespersen's (1940: 374) suggestion that condi-

tionals are questions with implied positive answers. Consider Haiman's exam-

ples (i8)-( 2o ) and his explanation for th em :

18 A : Is he coming?

19 B : (Yes)

20 A : W ell, then , I'll stay

What is speak er A's purpo se in asking question 18 of his interlocutor? He is obtaining

B's assent to the validity of the proposition expressed in the declarative counterpart

of 18. Once this assent has been given, either aloud - or, as is usually the case, by

silence - it follows tha t bo th A and B will agree on th e validity of 18 which then functions

as the basis for further discussion (20).

By 18-19, the declarative counterpart of 18 is

est blished s given, or topic in 20.

(Haiman 1978:

571;

my emphasis - NA )

To begin with, it must be noted that questions with implied positive answers

are marked questions. In unmarked questions the speaker does not know the

answer in advance. Just like 'contextually given

p\

the answer is to be 'given'

to him by his interlocutor. Since both Jespersen and Haiman have failed to

take into account the existence of 'contextually given/;', their hypothesis cannot

explain why in the following example conditionals and questions are inter-

changeable in A's answer to B.

(36) B : He's coming

a. A: G ee Is he coming? Th en , I'll stay

b. A: G ee If he's coming, then I'll stay

Contrary to Haiman's claim, I maintain that it is precisely the shared abstract

meaning, i.e. the spea ker's uncertain ty/uncon trollability of the situation, which

is responsible for the close relationship between conditionals and questions.

Perhaps the best way to show that the relationship cannot be explained by

claiming that conditionals are givens or shared knowledge between the speaker

and the hearer, will be to ask why sentences such as (37) are unacceptable

and why they become acceptable if they are read with question intonations

or with tag questions:

(37) *You feel col d/h ung ry/tir ed/b ored , etc.

(cf. You feel cold?/You feel cold, don't you?)

In section 3.2. we have already seen that the world of inner consciousness

of other people belongs to the domain of conditionals precisely because it

represents

unsharable knowledge

between the speaker and the hearer. In the

early days of transformational grammar, the unacceptability of sentences such

4



Noriko Akatsuka

as (38) attracted the attention of Ross (1969) and Jackendoff (cited in Ross

1969).

Both felt, correctly, that (37) ought to be accounted for on the same

principle as (38):

(38) Blondie annou nced to Dagwoodj that

felt cold

For Ross, (37) and (38) presented another piece of evidence for postulating

an abstract indirect object YOU in his performative hypothesis. That is, there

is a syntactic constraint that the subject of such 'subjective' predicates as be

cold, be hungry, love,

etc. cannot be identical to the indirect object of the

immediately higher sentence. Sentences such as (37) and (38d), which describe

the internal state of the interlocutor, are unacceptable because the speaker

is acting like a mind reader. It is normally understood that in (38) the referents

of /,

you

and

they

let their internal state be known to Blondie prior to her

speech act.

4.2 Hypotheticality

My position that th e prototypical m eaning of 'if/?' is the speaker's uncertainty/

uncontrollability of

p

is meant to be an elucidation, and not a denial, of the

intuitive insight of the popular characterization of conditionals as 'hypothetical'.

Ha ima n's view that conditionals are givens (old information, shared knowledge

between speaker and hearer), on the other hand, has led him to make the

unique claim that conditionals are not necessarily hypothetical. Let us examine

the factors which led Haiman to this conclusion.

First, in languages such as Japan ese and G erm an, exactly the same sentences

can be translatable into English

ifp, q

and

whenp, q.

S o, for exam ple, consider:

(39) Japanese:

Syuzin ga kae tte ki-tara , tazun e masyoo

husband SBJ. return ing come if/when ask will

'If/When my husband comes home, I'll ask'

German:

Wenn mein Mann zuriick kom m t, werde ich fragen

W hen /If my husband back come will I ask

'If/When my husband comes home, I'll ask'

Haiman contends that this morphological identity of if and when argues for

his position that conditionals are not necessarily hypothetical (see also Haiman

in this volume). However, it is because he has not considered the speaker's

attitude that he has been led to make such a claim. For it is only when the

speaker is uncertain about the readability of p that sentences such as (39)

44




get the 'if p reading in those langu ages. That is, if the speaker takes for granted

that her husband will come home, it is a temporal expression. If she is not

absolutely sure that he will come home, it is a conditional. Haiman is aware

that the subject-verb inversion takes place both in questions and in the antece-

dent of conditionals in many languages, including English. Unfortunately, how-

ever, he has failed to notice that the inversion in German takes place in (39)

only when the antecedent has the 'if/?' reading, yielding (40):

(40) Kom mt mein Mann zuriick, werde ich fragen

come my husband back will I ask

'If my husband comes home, Til ask'

The fundamental view underlying Haiman's claim is that conditionals are

morphologically

definable. If that is indeed the case, however, why is it that

any native speaker of English knows that in the following example the missing

word in (41a) is when and in (41b) it is if?

(41) (On an extremely cold day in Chicago)

a. Speaker A: jz( spring com es, even th e ice in Lake M ichigan will melt

b.

Speaker B (Ironically): D on't you mean ^?

Similarly, why does any native speaker of Japanese know that in the following

example, (42a) only has the 'when

p, q

readin g, while (42b) only has the

'if

p ,

q

readin g, and it only makes sense as a joke?

(42) a. Speaker A:

Haru ga kitara, Michiganko no koori mo tokeru

Spring SBJ. come-when lake's ice even melt

yo

particle

'When Spring comes , even ice in Lake Michigan will melt'

b. Speaker B (Ironically):

Mosi Ha ru ga kitara ne

by any chance Spring SBJ. come-if partic le

'If Spring comes at a l l . . . '

The difference between {/and when in both English and Japanese is epistemolo-

gical. Based on their experiences, the speakers of English and Japanese know

that Spring comes to Chicago without fail every year. Bu t, the speaker can pretend

that he is not certain about the arrival of Spring, and, of course, he knows that

the interlocutor knows that he is pretending. It is this tacit knowledge shared

by the two speakers about the difference between if and when that enables if

to function as an irony-creating device. Notice that questions can also be utilized

to obtain exactly the sam e effect, as illustrated by the following example:

(43) Speaker A: W hen Spring com es, even the ice in Lake Michigan will

melt

45



Noriko Akatsuka

Speaker B : Well, is Spring coming at all?

Now, in light of the above discussion, compare the dialogue in (44) with

the conditional in (45), taken from McCawley (1981).

(44) A: My client is innocent

B: You really think so?

A: Is2 + 2 = 4?

(45) If 2 + 2 = 4, my client is innocent

At first, conditionals such as (45) look like counterexamples to my analyses

in two ways; (a) there is no connection between p and q, and (b) p is a certainty

to the speaker, since it invariably expresses an obvious truth. Now, it is usually

said that this type of conditional is used to assert

q.

However, McCawley

has pointed out that in (45) 'the speaker is conveying not just that his client

is innocent but that his client's innocence is as clear as the obvious fact that

2 + 2 = 4'. I argue that as in the case of indicative coun terfactuals, there is

indeed a connection between

p

and

q

here in the evaluative attitude of the

speaker; the deg ree of certainty of/? correlates with/co rrespon ds to the d egree

of certainty of q. Jespersen's and Haiman's view that the antecedent of condi-

tionals is the question with implied positive answers does not explain ordinary

conditionals, but it does explain this type of conditional, which is a rhetorical

device for the sp eake r to ironically assert,

'q

+ '. In (45), the speaker is utilizing

the grammatical meaning, while in (44) the speaker is utilizing conversational

implicatures for accomplishing the same purpose.

Now, again returning to our examination of Haiman's claims, we see that

he loses sight of the fact that in many lang uages, including G erm an , the neutrali-

zation of

if

and

when

is possible when

p

refers to the future tense, that is,

p

represents the state of affairs not yet realized. This brings us to his argument

from Hua. Compare the (a) and (b) sentences below, taken from Haiman

(1978:581):

(46) a. hi - s u - mamo 'if I do it'

future

b. h u - mamo 'given (w hen/ beca use/s ince ) that I do it'

In Hua, the 'given that /?' construction expresses the meaning of English

when

p ,

bec use

/?, and

since p.

The 'given that /?' construction and the 'if/?' construc-

tion in Hua share the verbal ending mamo, where ma is the relative desinence

and mo is the topic particle. Haiman argues that since the two constructions

share mamo, we are forced to identify both of them as conditionals in Hua,

i.e. one is a 'nonhypothetical conditional', the other a 'hypothetical condi-

tiona l'. Notice, how ever, that H aiman cannot explain, first, why Hu a has chosen

to differentiate between the 'if /?' construction and the 'given /?' construction

at all, and second , why it is that Hua has chosen the future tense for symbolically

346




marking the 'if/?' construction. I say 'symbolically', since the 'given/?' construc-

tion also can refer to a future event, as in (46b) above.

I maintain that the Hua data do not show that their 'given that p' and 'if

/?'

are both conditionals. Nor do they support Haim an's claim that conditionals

are not necessarily hypothetical. What they actually show is that the two con-

structions in Hua are the subcategories for a single supercategory, 'topic' (cf.

mo =

topic mark er).

There are good reasons to believe that the dichotomy of 'given that /?' and

'if /?' in Hua corresponds to the dichotomy of 'them atic' topics and 'contrastive'

topics. I would like to sub stantia te this view in the next section.

4.3 Conditionals are 'contrastive' topics

It is well-known that 'topic' is still a very elusive concept and that there is

no universally accepted analysis for it. However, many researchers seem to

agree that functionally the re are two types of topics, 'thematic ' and 'contrastive'.

For example, Kuno (1972) analyses the discourse function of Japanese topic

marker

wa

in

X w

as follows:

(47) them atic = 'Speaking of X ' - X must be old information

contrastive = 'As for X' - X can be new information

Haiman (1978), on the other hand, explicitly rejected the necessity of dis-

tinguishing between the two categorie s, claiming that all topics are 'old informa-

tion, shared knowledge between speaker and hearer'. However, I suggest that

conditionals are only related to contrastive topics and not to thematic topics.

Moreover, it is likely that only when the spea ker is uncertain about the intention

of the interlocutor does a close meaning relationship obtain between the con-

trastive topic reading and the conditional reading.

Consider Haiman's (1978: 577) Tagalog example, taken from Schachter

(1976:

496):

(48)

Kung

tungkol kay Maria hinuhugasan niya ang mga pinggan

if about PROPER washing she the PL . dishes

'If it's Maria you want to know about, she's washing the dishes/As

for Maria, she's washing the dishes'

Haiman thought this example was a case 'where the regular mark of the condi-

tional is also the regular mark of the topic'. However, according to Schachter

(personal communication),

kung

is not a regular topic marker, but a regular

question marker. The fact that

kung

is a regular question m arker com es to make

sense when we realize that the paraphrasal relationship as in (48) obtains when

the speaker is uncertain about the intention of the interlocutor, for example:

(49) (Speaker A notices that Speaker B is looking for som eone )

347



Noriko Akatsuka

A to B: If it's Maria you want to know ab out, she's washing the dish es/

As for (*Speaking of) Maria, she's washing the dishes

Speaker A is not certain if Maria is the person Speaker B is looking for.

Japanese also offers illuminating examples. In Japanese, conditionals with

the contextually given p are grammatically realized as a separate conditional

pattern,

p no nara q.

This pattern cannot function as a temporal expression.

Consider the following:

(50) Am e ga zettai ni huru no nara (*hu t-tara), kasa

rain SBJ. definitely fall tha t if (fall if/when) um brella

o m otte ikimasu

OBJ.

taking go

'If (it is the case that) it'll definitely rain, I'll take my umbrella '

Quite significantly, it is nara and not tara which can replace wa only when

wa

marks a contrastive topic. Consider (51), which is parallel to the Tagalog

example:

(51) (Speaker A notices that Speaker B is looking for som eone )

A : Maria w a/n ara sara o aratte imasu

if dishes

OBJ.

washing is

'As for (*Speaking of) Maria, she's washing dishes/If it's Maria you

want to know a bou t, she's washing the dishes'

It is clear that Maria in (51) cannot be said to be 'old information, shared

knowledge between the speaker and the hearer'.

In this section, I have argued that conditionals are not givens. However,

I am not disagreeing with Haiman's view that conditionals are topics. I am

only disagreeing with his premise that all topics are givens. Not all topics are

givens. I maintain that only by admitting that conditionals are not givens can

the study of conditionals and th e study of topics benefit from each oth er. Despite

the fact that the discourse notion 'topic' was his major concern, Haiman's

(1978) analyses of the semantics of conditionals were essentially static and

not discourse-oriented. This was because he attempted to unify the logicians'

analyses of the semantics of conditionals and the linguists' study of topics.

That is, underlying Haiman's analyses was a belief that the semantics of condi-

tionals can be accounted for in the domain of mathematical logic. Thus, sub-

scribing to S talnaker's (1968) possible world sem antics, Haim an, like Stalnaker,

explicitly rejected the connection between

p

and

q

as an integral part of the

meaning of the 'if/?,

q

construction. Simply identifying conditionals as topics

does not by itself lead us to a correct understanding of the semantics of natural

language conditionals.

48





Conditionals are discourse-bound because they do not make sense without

their discourse contexts. The semantics and workings of conditionals can be

understood, not by referring to the truth values of their component parts,

but only by referring to such pragmatic factors as (i) the preceding context,

and (ii) the speaker's attitude. In section 2 I have demonstrated that, far from

being counterexamples, both indicative counterfactuals and semifactuals are

evidence for the connection between the antecedent and the consequent. But

this connection can only be understood by appealing to the context in which

they can be uttered: the speaker is rejecting the previous speaker's assertion.

Conditionals are discourse-bound because the fundamental question, 'What

is a conditional in na tural language s?' itself

is

unanswerable without postulating

a specific speaker and that speaker's attitude towards the state of affairs

expressed by the antecedent. Conditionals are not only definable morphologi-

cally. In section 4 I have shown how a simple reliance upon static morphology

without necessary consideration for discourse factors has led Haiman to claim

that conditionals function as givens (old information, shared knowledge

between speaker and hearer) in the discourse. The findings of section 4 that

(i) p of 'if p can be new information to the speaker, and (ii) a speaker's use

of 'if /?' is sometimes a reflection of epistemological reality that unsharable

knowledge/belief necessarily exists between / and

you

at any given

now,

are

sufficient to refute Haiman's claim.

NOTES

1 This pape r is a product of my long-range research project, Subjectivity and gramm ar.

I am using 'subjectivity

1

in the sense of Benveniste (1971). Earlier versions were

presented at UCLA in March 1983, and at the University of Chicago in May 1983.

I have benefited from comments offered on these occasions and at the Conditionals

Conference at Stanford University in December 1983. My special thanks go to Ber-

nard Comrie, S.-Y. Kuroda, Jim McCawley, Paul Schachter, Sandy Thompson and

Elizabeth Traugott for stimulating discussions and valuable criticisms.

2 I hope that in my future publications I can say something more specific than 'correla-

tion/correspondence between

p

and

q\

what I have said is symmetric between

p

and

q,

and I need something asymmetric. Recall that all the well-known analyses

of //"proposed by logicians (i.e. C. I. Lewis 1912; Stalnaker 1968; D. Lewis 1973;

An derson and Belnap 1975; Grice 1975) treat

if

'on a par with the coord inate conjunc-

tions

and

and

or .

Consequently, nobody's framework requires that

p

precede

q

in

any sense. However, McCawley (1981) observed that in all English conditionals,

p

is temporally and/or causally and/or epistemologically prior to

q.

3 The preceding context does not have to be verbal; observe Thompson's example

(personal comm unication):

(Noticing th at a friend is trying to lift a huge box)

Speaker: If you can lift that box, I'm a monkey's uncle

349



Noriko Akatsuka

4 Through Stalnaker (1968) I have learned the important observation made by Chis-

holm (1946) and Goodman (1955).

5 The terms 'semifactual' and 'concessive conditional' are often mistakenly used inter-

change ably: a lthough all semifactuals are concessive con ditionals, all concessive con-

ditionals ar e not semif actuals, i.e. indicative concessive conditionals such as Even

if it rains, the game will continue.

F or further discussions on concessive co nditionals,

see Haima n, K onig, and Van der A uwera in this volume.

REFERENCES

Akatsuka, Noriko. 1985. Conditionals and epistemic scale. Language

6 1:

625-39.

An derson , Alan R., and Nuel D. Belnap , Jr. 1975.

Entailment, VOL.

I . Princeton : Prince-

ton University Press.

Benveniste, Emile. 1971. Problems in general linguistics. Miami, Fla.: University of

Miami Press.

Chisholm, Roderick M. 1946. The contrary-to-fact conditional. Mind

55:

280-307.

Comrie, Bernard. 1982. Future time reference in the conditional protasis.

Australian

Journal of Linguistics 2

: 143-52.

Gazdar, Gerald. 1979. Pragma tics: implicature, presupposition and logic l form. New


Geis, Michael L., and Arn old M . Zwicky. 1971. On invited inferences.

Linguistic Inquiry

2:

561-6.

Goodman, Nelson. 1955. Fact, fiction, and forecast. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univer-

sity Press.

Grice, H. Paul. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Syntax and semantics 3 : Speech acts,

ed. Peter Cole and Jerrold L. M organ, 45-5 8. New York: Academ ic Press.

Haiman, John. 1978. Conditionals are topics.

Language 54:

564-89.

Ha rper, W illiam L ., Robe rt Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearc e. 1981 (eds.). Ifs: conditionals,

belief, decision, chance, and time. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Jespersen, O tto. 1940.

A modern English grammar

on

historical principles

,

VOL.

5:

Syntax.

London: George Allen and Unwin.

Karttunen, Lauri, and Stanley Peters. 1979. Conventional implicatures. In Syntax and

semantics, 11 : P resupposition, ed. C.-K. Oh and D. A. Dinneen, 1-56. New York:

Academ ic Press.

Kempson, Ruth M. 1975.

Presupposition and the delimitation of sem antics.

Cambridge:


Kuno, Susumu. 1972. Functional sentence perspective.

Linguistic Inquiry 3:

269-320.

Lewis, C. I. 1912. Implication and the algebra of logic.

Mindws 21 : 522-31.

Lewis, David. 1973.

Counterfactuals.

Cam bridge, Mass: Harvard U niversity Press.

Lewis, David. 1976. Probab ilities of conditionals and conditional pro babilities. In H arpe r

etal.

(1981), 129-47.

Li,

Charles N. 1976 (e d.) . Subject and topic. New York: Academ ic Press.

McCawley, James D. 1981. Everything that linguists have always w anted to know about

logic* *but were ashamed to ask). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Quin e, Willard Van Orm an. 1950. Methods of logic. New York: H enry Holt and Co .

Ross, John Robert. 1969. On declarative sentences. In R eadings in English transforma-

tional gramm ar, ed. R. Jacobs and P. Rosenbaum. Waltham, Mass: Ginn.

Schach ter, Pau l. 1976. Th e subject in Philippine languages. In Li (1976), 491-518.

Smith, N. V. 1983. On interpreting conditionals. Australian Journal of Linguistics 3:

1-23.

5



Condit ionals are discourse-bound

Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1981. Irony and the use-mention distinction. In

Radical pragmatics, ed. P eter Cole, 295-318. New Y ork: Academic Press.

Stalnaker, Robert. 1968. A theory of conditionals. Reprinted in Harper

et al.

(1981),

41-56.

Stalnaker, Robert. 1976. Indicative conditionals. Reprinted in Harper et al. (1981),

193-210.

35 1



18

CONDITIONALS IN DISCOURSE:

A TEX T-BASED STUDY FROM ENGLISH

•

Cecilia E. Ford and Sandra A. Thompson

Editors' note. The discourse function of conditionals is a major con-

cern in virtually every paper in this volume. Ford and Thompson's

contribution is, however, the only one which analyses actual, rather

than constructed or experimental, data. It sets out to test Haiman's

(1978) hypothesis that conditionals are topics, and to ascertain simi-

larities and differences in the function of conditionals depending on

clause order.

1.


The literature on natural language conditionals, including many of the contribu-

tions to this volume , has contributed much to our und erstanding of the internal

structure of conditional sentences and of their 'meanings'.

1

What has been

less well discussed is the discourse function of conditionals. Two grammars

of English are exceptions: Modern English by Marcella Frank (1972) and The

grammar book

by Marianne Celce-Murcia and Diane Larsen-Freeman (1983),

both of which begin to characterize conditionals with reference to their patterns

of occurrence in discourse. M ead and H enderson (1983) also provide an enlight-

ening discussion of conditionals in a particular context, looking at how they

function in an economics tex tbook. Winter (1982) discusses some of the gen eral

factors involved in the positioning of various adverbial types, including condi-

tionals. Linde looks at some of the factors which play a role in the positioning

of //"-clauses either before or after a main clause. Her basic finding is that,

with the exception of certain irrealis //"-clauses, the order of clauses does not

'reverse the order of events in real time' (Linde 1976: 280). However, Linde's

database is limited and may be representative of only one discourse type, 'dis-

courses whose organizing principle is temporal ordering' (1976: 283). We have

used a somewhat less restricted database here.

In his provocative article 'Conditionals are topics', Haiman (1978) presents

crosslinguistic evidence for a relationship between topics and conditionals in

terms of marking and function. Unfortunately, Haiman supports the parallel

by citing authoritative definitions of 'topic' and misses the chance to use dis-

course evidence for his characterization of the work performed by conditionals.

Neverthe less, the central insight of his paper will turn out to be qu ite powerful

5




as we refine our ability adequately to define both topics and conditionals in

discourse terms .

While Haim an's bringing together of the concepts of 'topic ' and 'conditional'

has provided a research question for further study of conditionals (Akatsuka

in this volum e), we insist tha t w hat is lacking

is

a perspective on how conditionals

are used in authentic, naturally occurring texts. Perhaps this is a general pro-

blem in linguistics at the present time, but it seems strange to us that contrived

examples, isolated sentences and utterances taken out of context should provide

the initial source of data for a comparison of conditionals with such an inhe rently

discourse-based notion as topic. What we have attempted to do in the present

study, with the aim of testing Haiman's proposal on real texts, is to contribute

a portion of the necessary groundwork for an adequate description of condi-

tionals as they occur in English discourse. Baseline data on what types of

conditionals occur and how they relate to their discourse contexts are essential

if we hope to explain how conditionals are used rather than how we

think

they are used.

If we simply consider conditional clauses in terms of frequency, two observa-

tions can be made. First, there is good evidence that conditionals occur with

greater frequency in spoken English than in written. For our corpus, we found

that our spoken data contained an average of 7.2 conditionals per 1000 words,

while our written data contained an average of only 4.6 conditional clauses

per 1000 words. Our findings confirm those made by Hwang (1979): she found

an average of 4.2 // conditionals per 1000 words in a spoken corpus of 63,000

words but only 2.7 // conditionals per 1000 words in a written corpus of 357,000

words taken from newspapers and

Scientific

Am erican.

Second, in both written and spoken English, initial conditional clauses out-

number final conditional clauses by a ratio of about three to one. The prepon-

derance of initial versus final conditional clauses appears to be a language

universal. In at least one other language that we know of, Godie (Marchese

1976),

text counts reveal an even more striking tendency for initial conditionals

(100 per cent in 135 pages of transcribed speech), and on an intuitive level

grammarians seem to agree that initial order for conditional clauses is either

preferred or required; Greenberg (1963) states this as a universal and Comrie

(this volume) claims to have discovered no counterexamples to it.

From the perspective of Haim an's suggestion that conditionals can be thou ght

of as a type of topic, this skewing may represent evidence for the discourse

function of conditionals. Haiman's definition of conditional clauses reflects

the similarity in function he sees betw een topics and cond itionals:

A conditional clause is (perhaps only hypothetically) a part of the knowledge shared

by the speaker and his listener. As such, it constitutes the framework which has been

selected for the following discourse. (1978: 583)

Further insight into this notion of 'framework selected for the following

354



Conditionals in discourse: a text-based study from English

discourse' can be gained by a consideration of Givon's concept of 'unchallenge-

ability' (1982: 98-9). As Lee puts it, in talking about the Korean 'topic marker'

nin,

The speaker can propose certain information and expect it to be unchallengeably shared

for the subsequent discourse. That is, the addressee is expected to take it as GIVEN

- i.e., as a premise in the sense that it implies an agreement between the speaker

and the addressee to take for granted its relevance to the ongoing discourse.

(to appear)

Topics, then, can be defined in discourse terms as constituting an agreement

on the unchallengeability of the information they are conveying, and it is this

property that allows them to serve as a 'framework' for the subsequent dis-

course, the function which Haiman correctly attributes to them. We will refer

to Haiman's claim throughout our discussion; for now, the point is that this

definition of conditional clauses provides us with a partial explanation for their

tendency to occur before the material for which they are the 'framew ork'.

This way of viewing the notion of topic as a strategy of communication

goes quite far in eliminating one of the greatest weaknesses in using the concept

of topic to understand the discourse function of conditionals: the notion is

not a theoretically stable one, each scholar adhering to one or another defini-

tion. Furthermore, topics are often analysed as elements in units defined at

the sentence level. In our analysis we will look at conditionals as they function

in relation to both preceding and following discourse material, and attempt

to relate these functions to Haiman's definition of topic.

Let us now turn to a discussion of the discourse functions of conditional

clauses in the English data which we examined. Section 2 looks at conditionals

in written E nglish and section 3 considers conditionals in spoken English.

2. C O N D I T I O N A L S IN W R I T T E N E N G L I S H D I S C O U R S E

2.1 The database

The texts used for the written English portion of this study were three books,

representing three different 'genres':

1.

Bertrand Russell's Unpopular essays (= BR), a series of twelve essays

exemplifying highly skilled uses of argum entation

2.

Randall K. Rich ard's Auto engine tune-up (= A E ), a book for pro-

fessional auto mechanics, containing both description and procedures

3. Herbert Terrace's

Nim

(= N), a personal narrative account of a project

to train the chim panzee N im Chimpsky to use American Sign Language

All the conditionals in these books, comprising 854 pages, were tabulated

according to position, as well as a number of other parameters. Because we

were primarily interested in the work that conditionals do with respect to the

355



Cecilia E . Ford and Sandra A. Thompson

Table i. Numbers of

initial

and final conditionals in each of the three written

texts

Initial (%) Final (%) Total (%)

Bertrand Russell 111(69) 49 (3 0 160(100)

Auto engine tune-up 189(86) 32(14) 221(100)

Mm 7 7 (7 0 32(29) 109(100)

Totals 377(77) H3 (23) 490(100)

discourse in which they occur, we excluded four types, represented by small

numbers of tokens. We excluded conditionals which appeared somewhere in

the middle of the 'conseq uen t' clause, as in:

(1) The sudden transition will, if it occurs, be infinitely painful to those

who experience it, . . . (BR 35)

(2) Mr. Ho m o, if he has a good digestion and a sound income, thinks to

himself how much more sensible he is than his neighbour so-and-

s o , . . . (BR82)

We also excluded truncated conditionals without subjects such as

if possible,

if necessary, if so, etc.; conditionals preceded by only or even; conditionals

whose connector is unless. However, three conditionals beginning with had

or

were

instead of

if

were counted, since it was felt that the question of clause

orde r would not be affected by the more formal inversion style.

As can be seen in table 1, the number of conditionals in initial position

in each of our text types is much g reate r than the nu mber in final p osition.

2.2 Typ es of initial conditionals in the written texts

The most striking observation about sentences with initial conditionals in the

written English tex ts that we looked at is that ther e is a small set of relationships

which the conditional clause can bear to the preceding discourse. In this section

we will discuss and exemplify those relationships (see also Longacre and

Thompson 1985). The first three of these relationships are tied in very direct

ways to the preceding discourse.

2

Perhaps the most obvious way in which a conditional clause can serve as

shared knowledge for the following material is the case of a conditional which

repeats an earlier claim. A schematic formula for this relationship, exemplified

in (4) and (5 ), is:

(3) X. Assuming X, then Y

(4) From the very start of the project friends kidded me about being Nim 's

'daddy'. After all, I had no children of my own. ... //indeed there

was a sense in which I was regarded as Nim's father, it would really

356




be as paterfamilias of an often unruly family, breadwinner, listener,

comforter, and peace m aker. (N 189)

(5) But pe rha ps , if the Alliance were sufficiently powerful, war would not

be necessary, and the reluctant Powers would prefer to enter it as equals

rather than, after a terrible war, submit to it as vanquished enemies,

//this were to happen, the world might emerge from its present dangers

without anoth er great war. (BR 42)

A cond itional clause, the n, may serve as a framework for the following discourse

by assuming something which has been m entioned in the preceding discourse.

A second way in which a conditional clause serves as a topic by providing

shared knowledge for the following m aterial is the case in which the conditional

offers a contrast to something which has gone before. The formula for this

subty pe, exemplified in (7), is:

(6) X. (Bu t) if not X , then Y

(7) Th ere is ano the r intellectual virtue, which is that of generality or impar-

tiality ... When, in elementary algebra, you do problems about A,

B,

and C going up a mountain, you have no emotional interest in the

gentlemen concerned, and you do your best to work out the solution

with impersonal correctness. But if you thought that A was yourself

B your hated rival and C the schoolmaster who set the problem, your

calculations would go askew, and you would be sure to find that A

was first and C was last. (BR 31)

In cases like (7), a hypothetical contrast with a preceding claim is presented

in the initial // -clause, and the consequent presents a new outcome, often un-

desired, that would result from that hypothetical situation.

Another way in which contrast can be indicated, of course, is by means

of a counterfactual. Here is a very clear case from

Nim

illustrating a counter-

factual conditional clause which serves to indicate contrast with a previous

claim:

(8) Nim 's aggression increased mainly because of the necessity of introduc-

ing more and more teachers into his life ... //it had been possible

for him to have grown up with a small and stable group of caretakers,

he would have experienced far fewer separations from his trusted care-

takers and had far fewer opportunities to test his dominance through

aggression. (N145)

The third type of situation in which an initial conditional can provide a

shared information 'framework' for the following material is that in which

it provides exemplification. This type of conditional introduces a particular

357




case or illustration of a generalization.

3

The schematic formula for this function

would be:

(9) Gen eralization. (For exam ple) if X , then Y.

H ere a re two examples of this function:

(10) Th e who le philosophy of econom ic nation alism , which is now universal

throughout the world, is based upon the false belief that the economic

interest of one nation is necessarily opposed to that of another . . . / /

you try to explain to someone, say, in the steel industry, that possibly

prosperity in other countries might be advantageous to him, you will

find it quite impossible to make him see the argument, because the

only foreigners of whom he is vividly aware are his competitors in the

steel industry. (BR 155)

(11) Any solution , if it is acid, ba se, or salt, can be used as an electrolyte

if it will act chemically more readily on one electrode than it will on

the other. For example, if electrodes are placed into an orang e, a poten-

tial difference will app ear betw een the elec trode s. (A E 47)

In each of these cases, the sentence containing the conditional is serving to present

a special instance of the generalization expressed in the previous discourse.

The fourth and final situation in which a conditional clause can serve as

a topic for the following material is a situation in which it has none of the

direct relationships with the preceding material described above, but rather

opens up new possibilities whose consequences are to be explored. As shown

in table 2, this subtype accounted for more than 50 per cent of our written

data, and, in fact, included most of the initial conditionals (79 per cent) from

Auto engine tune-up. A formula for this function would look like this:

(12) X. If Option Y, then Z.

Let us consider an exam ple of the exploring of option s function of conditionals:

(13) If things are allowed to drift, . . . th ere will be an atom ic war. In such

a war, even if the worst consequences are avoided, Western Europe,

including Great Britain, will be virtually exterminated. //America and

the U.S.S.R. survive as organized states, they will presently fight again.

(BR37)

The above example illustrates an instance of a single option being ex-

plored. It can also happen, of course, that a pair of contrasting options is

presented:

(14) The condition of a discharged battery may be tested by passing curren t

through it ... //the cell voltages vary more than 0.1 volt, replace the

battery, //the cell voltages are all within 0.1 volt, test the total battery

voltage (charger still opera ting). (A E 61)

358



8

i8

ii

79

5

7

7

5

57

7 5

7 5

8


Table 2.

Initial conditionals in the written texts

Nim Auto

Russell Overall

Exploring of options

Contrasting

Particular cases

Assuming

To ta ls 100 100 100 100

(n = 84) (n = i9 3) (n = i2 8 ) (n = 4O5)

So far, then, we have seen that the initial conditionals in our written English

data serve as a framework for the following clause, either in direct reaction

to something in the preceding context or by exploring options relevant to the

situation expressed in the preceding context.

Table 2 summarizes the types of initial conditionals occurring in our written

texts.

The table also shows the frequency with which each type appears.

2.3 Final conditiona l clauses in the written texts

Earlier we remarked that initial position for conditional clauses seems to be

the unmarked position in terms of the discourse function which conditionals

have,

that of providing a 'framework' for the following material. In English,

however, it is obvious that conditionals do occur, both in writing and in speak-

ing, in final position, that is, after the consequen t. T able 1 shows that in our

written co rpus final cond itionals account for only

23

per cent of the conditionals,

but the question remains as to why even this small a percentage of conditional

clauses should occur in final position, given the discourse function for con-

ditionals that we have described. Ou r research suggests that there are p atterns

which account for a majority, roughly 85 per cent of final conditional clauses.

We turn to these now .

When a conditional clause occurs within a nominalization, an infinitive, or

a relative clause, there is a tendency for it to occur in final position. Here

is an examp le of each type of situa tion:

(15) Imagine the difficulty of understanding this inform ation if it were pre-

sented one word at a tim e. (N 10)

(16) The pressu re or blowoff valve .. . acts as a safety valve to relieve the pres-

sure in the system if it should increase above the safe level. (A E 139)

(17) Similarly the men who devote their lives to philosophy must consider

questions that the general educated public does right to ignore, such

as ... the characteristics that a language must have

if it

is to be able,

without falling into nonsense, to say things about

itself.

(BR 23)

359




Thus,

one of the most striking factors which seem in written English to preclude

a conditional occurring in initial position, before its consequent, is the embed-

ding of the conditional and consequent within a nominalization, an infinitive,

or a relative clause. While we are not in a position to offer an explanation

for this fact, it seems to have som ething to do with the incom patibility between

the discourse work of qualifying a noun or verb perform ed by these inco rpora ted

clauses and the 'topic for the following clause' work performed by the con-

ditional clause.

4

On e of the factors w hich seems to work against a conditional clause ap pearing

in initial position is the tendency for an 'interesting' subject to be introduced

in a nondependent, rather than in a dependent, clause. Consider the following

conclusion to a Be rtrand Russell argum ent:

(18) Our confused and difficult world needs various things if it is to escape

disaster, and among these one of the most necessary is that, in the

nations which still uphold Liberal beliefs, these beliefs should be whole-

hearte d and profoun d, not apologetic towards dogmatisms . . . (BR 20)

The subject of the first clause in this passage is Our confused and difficult

worl which is a new, heavy, and important referent in the text. Now, if

we are correct in suggesting that conditional clauses provide shared, unchal-

lengeable, background for the following proposition, then it stands to reason

that interesting, new, or heavy subjects don't really belong there, but rather

deserve to be mentione d in the ttcwbackground portion of the sentence.

5

H ere is anoth er exam ple, also from Bertra nd Russell:

(19) Collective fear stimu lates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity

towards those who are not regarded as members of the herd. So it

was in the French Revolution, when dread of foreign armies produced

the reign of terror. The Soviet government would have been less fierce

if it

had me t with less hostility in its first years. (BR 109)

In this passage, the subject of the consequent,

the Soviet government,

is being

compared with the preceding mention of

the French Revolution;

it is clear

that the comparison between the French Revolution and the Soviet governm ent

with respect to the question of collective fear is most effective if the compared

items both appe ar in main clauses.

Written English, then, prefers to introduce new, heavy, or compared NPs

in the main clause instead of in the dependent clause; this will sometimes

necessitate postposing a conditional clause which might otherwise appear in

initial position.

Another factor which seems to warrant a conditional's tendency to migrate

to final position is its length. While not all the final conditionals were longer

than their con sequ ents, m any were, and for thos e, this seemed to be the primary

360




factor precluding their appearing in initial position. Here is an example from

Nim:

(20) If Lana wanted a piece of app le, she had to press the sequence please

machine give apple.

Lana would not receive any apple

if

she pressed

such incorrect sequences as:

please machine apple give

or

machine please

give apple. (N 24)

Though very little work has been done on length of initial dependent clauses

as a variable in difficulty in processing of sentences in discourse contexts, we

predict that such research might provide processing evidence to support the

tendency of writers to avoid initial dependent clauses which are disproportion-

ately long with respect to their associated main clauses.

What we have tried to show in this discussion of final conditional clauses,

then, is that there are several factors which seem to conspire to warrant a

writer's deciding to place a conditional after, rather than before, the clause

for which it provides the co ndition . W e do not claim to have offered an explana-

tion for the choice of final over initial position, but we do hop e to have suggested

what some of the factors are which motivate this choice. Genuine explanations

will have to wait until we know more about how written language is processed,

and about how writers adjust their style to respond to their understanding

of these processing factors.

2.4 Sum m ary: cond itionals in written English

Conditionals in written English occur much more frequently in initial position

than in final position with respect to the main clause with which they are as-

sociated. We have suggested that this is related to the fact that conditionals

do serve, as Haiman (1978) suggests, as topics, that is, as shared knowledge

which serves as a framework for the following material. What we have tried

to do here is to show the way in which these initial conditional clauses offer

information which is appropriately termed 'shared'. That is, we have tried

to show that the information in the conditional clause relates to the preceding

discourse in one of just four ways: (i) by repeating an assumption present earlier

in the text; (ii) by offering a

contrast to an earlier assumption;

(iii) by providing

exemplification

of an earlier generalization; (iv) by

exploring options

made

available by earlier procedural or logical steps.

Conditionals in final position, on the other hand, while they may bear these

relationships with the preceding discourse, seem to be used when other factors

are at work in the discourse to make the shared background function less

important than such considerations as incorporation of other clause types, parti-

cipant tracking, comparative focus on other elements, or clause length. In

the next section, we will see that many of the same generalizations are valid

for spoken English as well.




3. C O N D I T I O N A L S IN S P O K E N E N G L I S H D I S C O U R S E

3.1 Th e datab ase

The sources of data for the spoken English portion of this study include the

following:

1.

A university engineering lecture ( = E N G ) , a lecture on the measure-

ment of failure criteria for specific materials (c. 4060 words)

2. A university man agem ent lecture (= M A N ), a lecture on the dynamics

of oligopoly, i.e. several larger firms sharing a ma rket (c. 8000 words)

3. A presenta tion by a gradua te student (= G S), a lecture on the language

situation in Belize, Central America (c. 1400 words)

4.

Transcripts from a set of conversations centred around Treasu ry Secre-

tary Henry Mo rganthau ( = M D ) ; meetings transcribed include any-

where from two to 18 per son s, usually with a task at hand - i.e. not

'free'

conversation (c. 43,000 words)

In isolating conditionals in the spoken data, we observed the same general

exclusions listed in the section describing the written data. In total there were

406 conditionals in our spoken data, 331 initial // -clauses and 75 non-initial

// -clauses.

Even more so than in the written data, there is a strong preference for

placement of the // -clause before associated utterances. Table 3 shows initial

// -clauses appearing in 82 per cent of the conditionals in the spoken data.

Again, this is not surprising; it seems reasonable that rather than take the

risk that a listener might misinterpret one's meaning, a speaker would provide

the crucial background or qualification prior to delivering the propositions

that are to be qualified. Once again, the proposed parallel between topics

and conditionals seems appropriate.

Table 3. Distribution of

initial

and non-initial if

-clauses

in the spoken texts

Initial (%) Final (%) Total (%)

Conversations 256 (81) 60 (19) 316(100)

Lectures 75(83) 15(17) 90(100)

Totals 331 (82) 75 (18) 406 (100)

In a paper which describes topic-like elements in spoken English, Keenan

and Schieffelin (1976) examine what have been termed ieft-dislocated' ele-

ments in spoken discourse. Because the notion of left-dislocation carries the

suggestion that the initial element in question is in some way a part of the

associated proposition, Keenan and Schieffelin prefer to use the label 'Referent

+ Proposition' for constructions which are characterized by a noun followed

362




by a related proposition. Avoiding the terms 'topic' and 'left-dislocation' allows

the researchers to view these constructions as reflecting a strategy used in

spoken discourse as speakers call different referents to the attention of their

interlocutors and thus into focus in the discourse

itself.

They suggest that this

strategy may in a sense be creating referents for subsequent propositions rather

than embodying referents which are already assumed to be shared by both

listener and spe aker:

Rather than presenting information that is already in the foreground of the listener's

consciousness, the speaker brings a referent into the foreground of a listener s conscious-

ness .

.. With respect to the interactional history of the interlocuto rs,

the referent is

usually not currently a center of attention .

(1976: 242; emphasis in original)

Continuing to expand on Haiman's comparison of conditionals and topics,

we will try to compare initial // -clauses in spoken English discourse with the

'referents' described by Keenan and Schieffelin. This will maintain our focus

on // -clauses as they tie in with their discourse contexts and as they represent

strategies of comm unication ra ther than elem ents in sentence-level units.

3.2 Typ es of initial cond itionals in the spoke n tex ts

A large portion of the initial {/-clauses in the spoken data fell quite naturally

into the four basic types introduced in section 2 on written discourse: assuming,

contrasting, expressing particular cases, and exploring options. In addition to

these, we have found that an interpersonal function of {/-clauses involving

polite requests is recurrent in the spoken data and w arrants a separate category.

We begin with the four types of conditionals which are most like those which

occur in the written texts.

As in written discou rse, initial {/-clauses in spoken discourse may encapsulate

an assumption from the preceding discourse; the following clause or clauses

are related to, and interpretable with reference to, the assumption in the

if-

clause. The following example contains an 'assuming' conditional:

(21) D : W ell, didn't you tell me last night at supper that you were disturbed

about it [a letter] going out?

M: I'm very much disturbed and ...

D : W ell, that 's what I thoug ht.

M: Wel l , I . . .

D :

You were - {/ you were disturbed, you need n't ann ounce to the

Press that - express surprise that we didn 't like it. (MD )

In example (21) speaker D restates the claim that both he and his interlocutor

have made, and then comments on that claim. Twenty-five per cent of initial

conditionals in the spoken data tie in with the discourse context by encapsu lating

or restating an assumption. In the written data a much smaller proportion

of the initial conditionals fits into this category. Possible explanations for this

363




difference in frequency might be that a listener needs to have frames of reference

more explicitly stated than a reader does, and that a writer can control the

building up of background to a greater degree than can a speaker, especially

in conv ersation.

Initial // -clauses in spoken discourse may also offer a contrast to an assump-

tion from the prior discourse. Clauses following the contrasting // -clause take

the situation introduced in that clause as their background. The following exam-

ple has such a contrasting // -clause:

(22) B: D o you want to write a letter to the Director of the Budget?

M: No. I won't write any letter. // I do I will say I am opposed to

it. (MD)

Another type of relation which a conditional in spoken discourse may have

with its discourse context is one of providing a particular case of an abstract

idea under discussion, //-clauses which embody illustrations of concepts from

the preceding discourse function similarly in both our spoken and written data.

In the next example an abstract discussion is made more concrete through

an illustration:

(23) On e point may be worth repeating, that the Fund is always worth the

same amount in gold; it always has the same value, //you start with

an eight billion dollar Fund, it is always worth eight billion, //currency

depreciates, either by one circumstance or another, or // there should

be a default or liquidation, a country has to put in more of its currency

to make up for the difference. So that money in the Fund is always

wo rth the same am ount. It is always worth eight billion dollars. (MD)

An initial // -clause may also represent a step subsequent to a situation estab-

lished in the preceding discourse, a step which involves one or more possible

options whose consequences are to be considered. Conditionals which develop

the discourse by exploring options are different from assuming and contrasting

conditionals. They open up options, but they do not restate or contradict what

has come before them in the discourse. In examples (24) and (25), the condi-

tionals develop the discourse by exploring o ptions:

(24) Well, let me do this, will you? Let me send you a copy of this thing that

I had prepared and

if it

doesn 't mak e horse sense, call me back. (MD )

(25) (Discussing 'borrowing an em ployee')

M : . . . I want him for his professional k nowledge of finance and b ankin g.

O: Yes.

M: And

if I

say to you that I want him for a year and you say, 'Now,

please don 't come to me in Dec em ber and beg me to make it anothe r

year' - why I wo n't do it, that's all. (MD )

In addition to the four basic relations an initial conditional can have with

the preceding discourse in both written and spoken English, there was one

364




Table 4.

Initial conditionals in the spoken texts

Exploring of options

Assuming

Contrasting

Particular case

(Illustrating)

Polite directives

Totals

Conversational

data (MD)

3 0

25

2 1

15

9

1 0 0

(n = 256)

Lecture data

(ENG, MA N, GS)

43

25

1 1

2 1

—

1 0 0

(n = 75)

Overall

frequency

33

25

18

17

7

1 0 0

(n = 33O

type that occurred only in the spoken data: the conditional expressing a polite

directive. The fact that conditionals can encode polite directives may be due

to a combination of the softening effect of hypotheticality and the fact that

conditionals seem to imply an option with alternatives. Twenty-three out of

331 initial {/-clauses in the spoken data, or 7 per cent, express polite directives;

all of these are found in the conversational data. Since this use of the conditional

form is one of the least com patible with logical inte rpre tatio n, it is not surprising

that in many cases a consequent clause is very difficult to isolate. As can be

seen from the following examples, the response of the interlocutor to whom

a polite directive is addressed quite often reflects the understood intent of

the utteranc e: the second sp eaker responds with assent:

(26) M: / / y o u could get your table up with your new sketches just as soon

as this is over I would like to see you.

T: All right. Fine. (MD )

(27) M: But

if

you'll call Irey over and get together with him on Tuesday

or Wednesday, whenever you fellows are ready I'm ready.

J: Ye s, all right, tha t's fine. (MD )

Table 4 summarizes the types of initial conditionals occurring in our spoken

data. The table also indicates the frequency with which each type appears;

the ord er of the list reflects the relative frequency of the types.

As reflected in the ca tegorizations , initial //-clauses in our spoken data consti-

tute pivotal points in the creation of texts. This is especially true for the four

core categories which include an overwhelming majority (93 per cent) of initial

conditional clauses in the data: assuming, contrasting, illustrating and exploring

conditionals. These initial // -clauses create links between prior and subsequent

discourse and provide explicit frameworks for the interpretation of propositions

which follow them .

365



Cecilia

E .

Ford and Sandra

A. Thompson

3.3 Final condition al clauses in the spok en texts

Unlik e initial // -clauses, final / -clauses do no t serve this linking and backgroun d-

creating function. While non-initial // -clauses do serve to qualify associated

utterances, they do not seem to work, as do initial // -clauses, as pivotal points

in the development of a text. However, given the strong preference for initial

placement of //-clauses, the question of why an // -clause should ever follow

the clause it modifies (18 per cent of the conditionals in our spoken data)

is worth pursuing.

As was the case with non-initial conditionals in our written data, a substantial

portion of those which occur in the spoken data (89 per cent) show patterns

that suggest possible explanations. We offer a summary of these factors with

the inten tion of providing a focus for further study.

In spoken E nglish , as in written , ther e is a tendency for conditionals occurring

with nominalizations and infinitives to be postposed. The following is an exam-

ple in which tw o iden tical // -clauses qualify successive infinitive phra ses :

(28) They feel tha t coun tries who have the responsibility ought to be subject

to some pressure through the Fund - penalty charges which we will

indicate later - to force the countries, // they can, or to influence the

cou ntrie s, // they can (MD )

Although this pattern can be described as grammatically conditioned, it is also

likely that the syntax of these conditionals reflects the relative importance of

their work at particular points in the formation of texts. The qualification that

this type of // -clause ma kes has a scope which is limited to an em bedded clause.

The grammatical pattern which results from the encoding of a clause as an

infinitive can ultimately be traced back to the discourse factors which have

made the embedding of a clause a favourable option. For example, the fact

that a clause is encoded as an infinitive probably has everything to do with

the role that that clause is playing in the development of the discourse.

In the following example, gold is what is being discussed. Evidence for the

topicality of

gold

in this stretch of discourse can be found in the sheer frequency

with which it

is

mentioned relative to other

nouns.

The // -clause qualifies

dollars,

a referent introdu ced as an oblique ph rase.

(29) S: Will the re always be the same am oun t of gold in the Fun d?

W: No, the currency will always be worth the same amount of gold.

The gold will be used for the purpose of dollars

if

they get scarce.

O the r countries need money because they are borrowing —

S: Is the re a minim um of gold that will always be in the Fund? (M D)

Again, the grammar of stating a qualification on an oblique phrase may condi-

tion the app earance of a final // -clause, but the d iscourse processes which result

in the appearance of dollars as an oblique phrase are the factors which must

be understood if we are to explain this type of conditional.

366




With respect to another factor that reflects the pragmatics of complex clause

formation, there are cases in our spoken data in which an // -clause comes

after the qualified clause when the slot preceding the main clause is already

burdened with one or more other adverbial clauses. The following is one such

case:

(30) It has to be don e more slowly than that. Even if it used up its dollars

in gold, the Fund functions almost exactly the same; even if the Fund

then has the power to borrow, if it wishes it can borrow,

if

somebody

will lend it. (MD )

In this example two adverbial clauses lead up to the main clause. While the

final // -clause could be preposed (with an adjustment in anaphora), the fact

that that slot is already to some extent occupied probably influences its place-

ment.

A further similarity between final // -clauses in our written and spoken data

is the possible influence of length on the positioning of a conditional clause

with regard to the proposition it qualifies. There were several cases in our

spoken data in which a final conditional was notably heavy. In the following

exam ple, the // -clause is long and , in addition, contains a complem ent clause:

(31) Then it would be up to the Congress to determ ine whether or not they

would go in the subsequ ent bill // the Attorne y Ge neral should convince

them that he was right and change the language of the bill or appro priate

the five hund red and seven million dollars (MD )

We emphasize again that further study is necessary if we are to understand

the roles that length and complexity play in the sequencing of clauses in dis-

course.

There are several factors peculiar to the spoken mode which play a role

in the positioning of a conditional clause with respect to an associated proposi-

tion. While conditionals are normally placed before the utterances they qualify,

speakers sometimes produce conditionals as afterthoughts or reminders. This

may be due to the less planned natu re of spoken discourse; the need to rem ind

the listener of background assumptions is probably a factor as well.

In the following example, a condition is originally introduced through an

initial // -clause; the // -clause introduces a situation in which a company lowers

its prices. The co nsequent clause states that othe r com panies will change their

prices. A few clauses later, another speaker restates the same original conditio-

nal, this time placing the // -clause after the consequent. We suggest that the

second // -clause, rath er than establishing an explicit framework or b ackg round,

serves as a reminder. In this example, the speakers are the Instructor (T)

and a Student ('S'):

(32) I: You are here at this price [pointing to a diagram] and uh you raise

it, you lose your customers. Too bad for you. Other people are

367




happy to gain market share at your cost. But if you lower yours

to try to gain the market share, everybody follows you, because

they don't want you to take away from them. [Responding to a

raised hand] Yes.

S: I mean, the assumption is ... one assumption is that they could

not follow you if you lower your price because they can't. (MA N)

In this example the suggestion that the firms could not follow is in contrast

with the prior statement everybody follows, which is the claimed consequence

of the original initial // -clause. Serving as a reminder, the second // -clause

keeps the original backgroun d operatin g.

Th ere are a numb er of cases in our conversational data in which one speaker

adds qualification to a claim made in the preceding text by another speaker.

In these cases, the speaker who states the condition does not repeat the main

clause, but merely gives the condition which relates to a preceding proposition

(albeit not the speaker's own claim). In the following example, the instructor

responds to the student with a qualification:

(33) S: Is it practically impossible to have that [a certain dem and curve]?

I: // yo u have this base. (MAN )

When a second speaker qualifies what another speaker has said, it is often

in response to a question or some hypothesis-checking structure.

The natu re of face-to-face com munication also carries certain rules for polite-

ness.

As we have seen, initial //-clauses can be polite forms for directives.

Am ong the non-initial conditionals in our data, a large propo rtion serve another

politeness function, that of showing deference. In these cases, the speaker

either proposes action or makes a request in the main clause. The // -clause

then expresses the speaker's respect for, or deference to, the authority of the

interlocutor. The con ditional in the next example shows the speak er's deference

to the judgement of the addressee:

(34) I'd like to talk to him abou t the possibility of his getting a leave of

absence from your bank to come with the Treasury,

if

that would be

agreeable to you. (MD )

Another point to be noted is that a large number of the non-initial // -clauses

in the spoken data (39 per cent) are associated with main clauses which either

make evaluations of, or form questions regarding, the situation expressed in

the // -clause. While there is no obvious explanation why such a pattern should

exist, we believe it is a finding that should be both reported here and examined

mo re thoroughly in future work.

Twenty per cent of the non-initial conditionals in the spoken texts have

main clauses expressing evaluations. In the following example, the main clause

evaluates the // -clause:

(35) I think it would be be tter // you're the re (MD)

368




The fact that only 10 per cent of the initial conditionals have evaluating

main clauses suggests a trend, but any explanation would be mere speculation

at this point.

Finally, 19 per cent of the non-initial conditionals in our spoken data and

only 5 per cent of initial conditionals appear in questions. Here is an example:

(36) M: Well, he - the norm al thing would have bee n, he would have been

up there at 10:30.

D: Well, why should he come this morning if he hadn't been sitting

in [on the meeting]? What - he's not been helping any. (MD )

In this exam ple the inform ation in the // -clause is to some d egree sha red .

It has already been established in the discourse previous to this quote that

the individual being discussed had not been going to meetings. The statement

in (37) comes three transcript pages earlier:

(37) Well, to tell you the tru th, he's not been doing anything down here,

so Stam tells m e, he's not been even meeting with them . (MD )

For a number of the non-initial

{/-clauses

occurring with questions, the con-

tent of the // -clause is to some extent shared information. Final // -clauses in

questions may be functionally related to the reminder-type final conditionals

described abo ve.

We have repo rted here some of the patte rns which characterize the non-initial

conditionals in our spoken data. As was the case with the written data, at

particular junctures in a text, discourse and grammatical factors seem to com-

bine to make initial placement of an // -clause a less favourable option. We

have not explained non-initial placem ent of conditional clauses in our discussion

here,

but we hope to have provided some possible foci for future research .

3.4 Sum m ary: cond itionals in spoke n English

Conditionals in our spoken data display patterns of occurrence remarkably

similar to those found in our written data. As the locations for explicit back-

ground information, initial // -clauses are pivotal points in the local organization

of a text. N ot only do they limit the frame of reference for subsequent discourse

but they also connect to the preceding discourse in a limited number of ways.

Final conditionals in the spoken data, as in the written, seem to occur in dis-

course contexts w here a shift in frame of reference is not the central organizing

principle for the text.

6

4. SU M M A R Y : C O N D I T I O N A L S IN E N G L I S H D I S C O U R S E

Taking the notion of 'top ic' to include relations with both p receding and follow-

ing discourse, we have found that Haiman's claim that 'conditionals are topics'

369




provides a productive starting point for the investigation of the discourse func-

tions of conditionals in written and spoken English. We have seen that initial

conditionals create backgrounds for subsequent propositions. Furthermore,

in terms of their connection with preceding discourse, initial conditionals (with

the exception of the polite directives in the spoken data) can be classified

into four basic types: assuming, contrasting, illustrating/particular case, and

exploring options.

An

assuming

conditional makes explicit an assumption present in the preced-

ing discou rse, while a

contrasting

conditiona l offers an alternative to a preceding

assumption. Assuming and contrasting conditionals are tied to their preceding

discourse in a manner similar to what Keenan and Schieffelin (1976) have

called 'alternative' referents. They also describe a type of referent which con-

nects to the preceding discourse as a 'particular case'. Their 'Referent + Propo -

sition' constructions represent strategies by which a speaker brings referents

into the discourse, which become background for subsequent discourse. It is

this type of strategy that initial conditionals also seem to perform. In English,

a conditional brings a complex referent - explicit background information

expressed in a clause - into the discourse. Subsequent propositions take the

content of the //-clause as their necessary background. Whether an //-clause

reiterates an assumption, makes a contrast, introduces a particular case or

explores an option, it represents a limitation of focus and provides an explicit

background for utterances which follow.

One thread which runs throughout the cases of non-initial conditionals in

the data is the question of the degree to which information in an //-clause

may be said to be shared or background information in the discourse. N on-initial

conditionals may tend to occur in places where such background is either less

crucial to the understanding of the main clause, or where other material is

more felicitously placed at the beginning of an utterance. A non-initial //-clause

qualifies an associated proposition, but it does not display as clear a connection

with preceding and subsequent discourse as does an initial //-clause. In the

discourse contexts of the non-initial conditionals in our spoken data, as in

our written data, identifiable factors seem to be working to make the option

of initial placement the less favourable one. In addition, at least in the spoken

data, certain types of main clauses (i.e. evaluations and questions) are particu-

larly associated with non-initial //-clauses. While these patterns are suggestive,

we stress that any real explanation will have to await further research on dis-

course organization and processing.

NOTES

We are pleased to acknowledge the help we have received in the preparation of

this paper from the following people: Marianne Celce-Murcia, David Hargreaves,

Hyo Sang Lee, Lynell Marchese, Christian Matthiessen, Tom Payne, Anne Ste'wart,

37



Con ditionals in discourse: a text-based study from English

R. McMillan Thompson and Elizabeth Traugott. The authors have made roughly

equal scholarly contributions to the paper; Cecilia Ford is primarily responsible for

the spoken English database, and Sandra Thompson for the written.

2 The relationships we are drawing on here are of the type discussed by Mann and

Thompson (to appear) as 'relational propositions': relationships among clauses in

a text which account for the text's cohesiveness, for its being perceived as a text.

These relationships are often not explicitly signalled.

3 This category was inspired by similar ones proposed in the analysis of Keenan and

Schieffelin (1976) and Mead and Henderson (1983).

4

See

Haiman and Thompson

1984)

for a brief discussion of'inc orpo ration ' of clause type s.

5 It might be argued that this tendency for 'interesting' subjects to occur in the main

clause does not rule out the possibility of an initial conditional clause, since we could

have a sentence in which the conditional clause is initial and contains a cataphoric

reference to the 'interesting' subject in the next clause. In both (18) and (19), and

in the other such instances in our data, there are other text-based reasons why this

would not be an option: the cataphoric reference would be mistakenly interpreted

as an anaphoric on e.

6 A limitation in our analysis of the properties of non-initial conditionals in our spoken

texts is that we have not analysed them with respect to intonation. Chafe (1984)

makes some provocative suggestions regarding the distinct behaviours of adverbial

clauses depending on what types of intonation patterns they display with regard to

main clauses. Certainly, future research should look closely at the degree to which

intonation conto urs may reflect the status of clauses in discourse.

REFERENCES

Celce-Murcia, Marianne, and Diane Larsen-Freeman. 1983. The grammar book: an

ESLjEFL teacher s course.

Rowley, Mass.: Newbury H ouse.

Chafe, Wallace. 1984. How people use adverbial clauses. In Proceedings of the Tenth

Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics

Society.

Frank, Marcella. 1972.

Modern English.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Givon, Talmy. 1982. Logic vs. pragmatics, with human language as the referee: toward

an empirically viable epistem ology.

Journal of Pragmatics

6: 81-133.

Greenberg, Joseph. 1963. Some universals of grammar with particular reference to the

order of meaningful elements. In Universals of language, ed. Joseph H . G reenbe rg,

73-113.

Cam bridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Haiman, John. 1978. Conditionals are topics. Language 54: 564-89.

Haim an, John, and Sandra A. Th omp son. 1984. 'Subordination' in universal gramm ar.

Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. Berkeley:

Berkeley Linguistics Society.

Hwang, Myong Ok. 1979. A semantic and syntactic analysis of // -conditionals. Unpub-

lished M. A . thes is, Univsity of California at Los An geles.

Ke enan , Elinor O chs, and Bam bi B. Schieffelin. 1976. Foreg rounding referents: a recon-

sideration of left-dislocation in discourse. Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting

of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. B erkele y, C a.: Berkeley Linguistics Society.

Lee, Hyo Sang. To appear. Discourse presupposition and discourse function of the

topic ma rker N+N in Korean. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Linguistics Club.

Linde, Charlotte. 1976. Constraints on the ordering of // -clauses. Proceedings of the

Second Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. Berkeley, Ca.: Berkeley

Linguistics Society.

Longacre, Robert, and Sandra A. Thompson. 1985. Adverbial clauses. In Language

371




typology and syntactic description, ed. Timothy Shopen. Cambridge University Press.

Ma nn, William C , and Sandra A. Tho mpson . To appear. Relational propositions in

discourse. Discourse Processes.

Marchese, Lynell. 1976. Subordination in Godie. MA thesis, University of California,

Los Angeles.

Mead, Richard, and Willie Henderson. 1983. Conditional form and meaning in econo-

mics text. The ESP Journal

2:

139-60.

Winter, Eugene. 1982.

Towards a contextual grammar of English.

London: Allen and

Unwin.

SOURCES

OF

DATA

Richard, Randall K. 1968. Auto engine tune-up. Indianapolis, Ind.: Theodore Audel

and Co.

Russell, Bertrand. 1950. U npopular essays. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Terrace, Herbert . 1979. Mm: A chimpanzee who learned sign language. New York:

Washington Square Press.

37



I N D E X O F N A M E S

Abram ovitch, R<5ha 28 6,2 96 ,31 0

Ad am s, Ernest W. 8, 17, 66, 148, 156, 166,

170,

173, 174

Aka tsuka , Noriko 7, 12, 97, 167, 203, 229,

230,243,339,354

Aksu, Ayhan 286,291, 294, 295, 297, 299, 305

Am idon, Arlene 310

And ersen, Elaine S. 319

Anderson, Alan Ross 166,349

Anderson, Lars-Gunnar 217

Anderson, Stephen R. 98

Ao un, Joseph 120

Atlas, Jay David 239

Austin , J. L. 61

Bara, Bruno 71

Bartsch, Ren ate 116

Barwise, Jon 17, 22, 34 ,40 , 116, 129, 131,

138, 141, 144,174

Bates,

Elizabeth 13, 286, 288, 290, 292, 303,

305,310

Baum ler, Wilhelm Friedrich Ludwig von 263

Beilin, Harry 310

Bek e, Odoen 215

Belnap , Nuel D. Jr. 166, 199, 349

Beneviste, Emile 349

Ben nett, Jonath an 232, 233, 237

Benth em, Johan van 145

Blake, Barry 219

Blatt, Franz 267

Bloom, Lois 286, 287, 289, 297, 310,

311,

317

Bolinger, Dwight 212, 234

Bou rne, Lyle 310

Bow erman, Melissa 13, 286, 289, 298, 299,

306, 310, 317, 319,

325,

326, 327,

328

Brain e, Martin D. S. 15, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 293

Brambilla Ag eno, Franca 271 , 272

Brandso n, Lee 97, 219

Brow n, Gillian 10

Brown, Roger 305,317 ,326

Brugm ann, Karl 212

Carlson, Gregory 124, 127,

140-1,

143, 144

Carter, Carl M. 286 ,296 ,310

Celce-M urcia, Ma rianne 353

Chafe, Wallace 371

Chao , Yuen-ren 215

Chierchia, Gen naro 145

Chisholm , Roderick M. 60, 67, 338, 350

Chomsky, Noam 9, 13, 63

Clancy, Patricia 286, 287, 289, 292, 305, 310,

3 H , 3 i 7

Clapp, Edward B. 252

Clark , Eve V. 184-5 , 286, 310, 319

Clark, Herbert H. 184-5

Com rie, Bernard 5, 9, 95, 230, 243, 245, 288,

291,299,300,328,340,354

Coop er, Robin 116

Cooper, WilliamS. 166,167

Cormack, Annabel 116

Corn ulier, Benoit de 236

Craik , Ken neth 3, 12, 15

Cresswell, M. J. 167

Cromer, Richard 294,3 10,32 1,325

Culicover, Peter W. 212

Daly, Mary J. 290, 305

Danie lsen, Niels 19

Dardjow idjojo, Soenjono 91

Darm esteter, Arsene 216

Davidson, Donald 39,12 6

Davies, Eirlys E. 234

Davies, Eitian C. 98

Davies, John 219

Dav ison, Alice 199

De Castro Cam pos, Maria Fausta P. 296, 297

Delb ruck, Berthold 248

Deseriev, Jurij 219

Donaldson, Margaret 293

Do naldson , Tamsin 84, 219

Downing, P. 33 ,47

Du crot, Oswald 194, 204, 205, 230, 236, 238

Dud man,V . H. 98

Du mm ett, Michael 199

Eisenb erg, Ann R. 287, 297

Eisenb erg, Peter 231

Em erson, Harriet F. 310

7



Index of names

Erdm ann, Oskar 212

Er nou t, Alfred 266, 267, 278, 281, 282

Ervin -Trip p, Susan 296

Eva ns, Ga reth 105-6, 107, 117-18, 120

Evans, Jonathan St B. T. 57

Eve ly, Susan 286, 296, 310

Farkas, Don ka 141

Fauco nnier, Gilles 244

Fenn ell,T. G. 94

Ferguso n, Charles A . 10, 88

Fer reiro , Emilia 310

Fiess, Ka thleen 286, 287, 289, 297, 311

Fillenbau m, Samuel 8, 13, 14, 60, 181, 182,

184, 185, 193,194, 206, 212, 254, 280, 283,

293,296

Fillmore, Charles 194

Ford , Cecilia E. 7

Foulet, Lucien 281

Fran k, Marcella 353

Fraser, Bruce 232

Frege , Gottlieb 15, 17, 18

French, Lucia A. 295,311,3 25

Funk, Wolf-Peter 267

Gard iner, Alan 215

Gaz dar, Gerald 153, 167, 231, 335

Geis,

Michael L. 5, 13, 183, 236, 335-6

Gelsen , H. 94

Ge uken s, Steven K. J. 212

Gib bard, Allan 34

Gildersleeve, Basil L. 251-2, 256, 273, 277,

279

Givon,Talmy 355

Go odm an, Nelson 60, 338, 350

Goo dwin , William Watson 248, 251-2 , 255,

263

Gra ndg ent, Charles Hall 266

Green baum , Sydney 79

Green berg, Joseph H. 5, 6, 9-10, 11,83,

2 2

i ,

263,354

Gre visse, Mau rice 212, 274, 277, 279

Gr ice , H . Paul 59, 78, 147, 148, 166, 169, 171,

175-6,

182, 190, 199, 254,335,349

Griggs, Richard A. 57

Gro enend ijk, Jeroen 153,155

Haa se, August 273, 274

Ha ik, Isabelle 106, 107, 108, 118, 120

Haim an, John 5, 9, 10, 86, 87, 88, 97, 205,

212,

215,

216,

217,

219, 220, 221,

225, 230,

232,

234, 235, 237, 251,278,279-80,282,283,

299^ 305^

333.

335^ 338 ,342 ,343 ^ 344^ 34 5.

346,347,348,349,350,354,355, 361,363,

37 i

Har mer , Lewis Charles 278

Har per, William 16,19

Harris, Martin B. 7, 11, 217, 218, 219, 220,

225,

230,

267,

269, 271, 272, 273,

274,

281,

328

Hav ers, Wilhelm 215

Haviland , John 219

He im, Iren e iO4ff

Heinam aki, Orvokki 313

Hende rson, Willie 353,371

He nle, Mary 14

Hercze g, Giulio 279, 282

Herin ger, James Tro mp 199, 212

Herzo g, Marvin 10

Higginbo tham, Jim 115,116

Highsm ith, P. 244

Hoa, Nguyen-Dinh 215,2 18,22 0,221

Hofsta dter, Doug las R. 16

Hold croft, David 199, 200, 203

Ho od , Lois 286, 287, 289, 297, 310, 311

Hug hes, G. E. 167

Hw ang, Myong Ok 354

Ibanez , R. 234

Inheld er, Darb el 14, 57

Ino ue, Kyoko 8, 203

Isa rd ,S .D. 65

Jackendoff Ray 344

Jaco b, Judith 218

Jacobse n, Terry 286, 287, 289, 292, 305, 310,

3 i i , 3 i 7

Jakubowicz, Celia 310

James, Deborah 95

Jeffrey, Richard 174,175

Jensen, John T. 93

Jespers en, Otto 209, 212, 261, 282, 297, 343,

346

Johnso n-Laird , Philip N. 14, 15, 56, 57, 58,

59 ,

63,

64, 69, 71 ,

97 ,

189, 225, 235, 313

John ston, Judith R. 287

Kahler, Hans 91

Kail, Michelle 287, 297

K am p,H an s 18, 108, 133, 142, 144

Kaplan, Bernar d 326

Ka rttun en, Lauri 154, 232, 335

Kee nan, Edw ard 116

Kee nan, Elinor Ochs 362, 363, 370, 371

Kempson, Ruth 115,116 ,232,335

Kennedy, B. H. 88,9 3

Kiparsky, Paul 340

Kodroff

Judith K. 310,31 5

Konig, Ekk ehard 7, 12, 205, 225, 231, 244,

280,350

Koppers, Bertha Theodora 264

Kratzer, Angelika 155

Kr ipk e, Saul A. 166

Kuczaj,

Stanley A. 290, 305

7



Index of nam es

Kuhn, Deann a 310

Kiihner, Raphael 212

Kun o, Susumu 347

Laberg e, Suzanne 88

Labo v, William 10

Lahey, Margaret 286, 287, 289, 297, 310, 311

Lapesa, Rafael

271,

282

Larsen-Freeman, Diane 353

Lauerb ach, Ger da 167, 199

Lavandera, B eatriz

5 276

Lawler, John M. 206, 212

Lee, Hyo Sang 355

Lee,

Young-Sook C. 215

Lee ch, Geoffrey 79

Legrenzi, Paolo 59

Lehmann, Christian 9-10,

11,

86, 277, 282

L Eng le, Madeleine 244

Lepschy, Ann a Laura 278

Lepschy, Giulio C. 278

Levinson, Stephen C. 231, 236, 239

Lewis, C. I. 158, 167,349

Lewis, David 17, 28, 29, 32, 44, 47, 63, 67,

111,112,113,171,335,349

Lewis, Geoffrey L. 87, 215

Li, Charles N. 97,21 9,221

Lifter, Karin 286, 287, 289, 297, 310, 311

Lightfoo t, David 248

Limber, John 311

Linde , Cha rlotte 353

Lobn er, Sebastian 116

Lodge , Gonzales 273, 277, 279

Lom bard, Alf 273,282

Lon g, Peter 199

Longacre, Rob ert 356

Lyon s, John 155 290

Mackie, John L. 199,20 4,212

Magometov, A. 215,220

Mann, William C. 317,371

March ese, Lynell 7, 354

Marcus, Sandra L. 64

M artin, Samuel 215

Maxwell, E. A. 33

May, Ro bert 109, 115

McCabe, Anne E. 286,296 ,310

McCawley, James D. 335,3 36,34 6,349

McGee,Vann 176

Mead , Richard 353, 371

Mendeloff

Henry 271,281

Merlo , Felice 281

Miller, George A. 69

Milsark, Gary 116

Moignet, Gera rd 270, 281

Mo nro, David Binning 264

Mo ntero Cartelle , Emilio 281

Mu rane, Elizabeth 219

Nelson, Katherine 295,310, 325

Norto n, Frederick John 278

Oakh ill,J . V. 57

Ong , Walter J. 5

Osherson, Daniel N. 57

Palm er, L. R. 266

Parte e, Barbara Hall 63, 145

Pear ce, G. 16, 19

Peirce, Charles Sanders 198

Pepler, Debra J. 286, 296, 310

Perry, John 22,3 4,40 ,52,1 29,13 1,14 1, 144,

174

Peters, Stanley 167,232,335

Piaget,Jean 14,15,57,310,326

Pilhofer, Ge org e ,219

Pinker, Steven 305

Pollock, John 63

Poun tain, Christo pher J. 272, 273

Putn am , Hilary 63

Quine , Willard Van Orm an 25, 27, 39, 51 , 5 9,

72,199,335

Quirk, Randolph 79

Ram sey, Frank Plumpton 56, 62, 67, 220

Reilly, Judy Snitzer 6, 13, 14, 123, 124, 136,

137,

139, 143,

145, 286, 288,

291,

292,

294,

299,300,302,303, 305,310,311,319, 320,

324, 325

Re inh art , Tan ya 18, 120, 142, 225

Rescher, Nicholas 62

Richar d, Randall K. 355

Rips,

Lance J. 57, 64

Rivarola, Jose Luis 278

River o, Maria-Luisa 218

Roberg e, James J. 310,315

Rohlfs, Ger hard 271, 273, 274

Rojo , Guillerm o 281

Ross,

John R ober t 212, 217, 218, 340, 344

Russell, Ber trand 63, 355, 360

Ryle,

Gilbert 60

Salone, Sukari 87,95

Sankoff

Gillian 88

Scha, Rem ko 116

Schachter, Jacquelyn C. 299, 302, 312, 328

Schachter, Paul 145,21 5,218,3 47

Schieffelin, Bamb i B. 362, 363, 370, 371

Schlesinger, I. M. 298

Schmitt Jense n, J. 279

Scott, Graham 219

Sea rle, John 13, 189

Sechehaye , Alb ert 268, 273, 274, 279

Serebrenn ikov, M. 220

Seuren , Pieter A. M. 201

375



INDEX OF LANGUAGES

Akkadian 262

Arabic

241:

Classical 6, 7. 259

Armenian 95,262

Avestan 248

Bengali 6,7,10,88

Cambodian 218

Cebuano 219

Chinese 6. 7, 215

Daga 219

Dutch 167,230,241,300

Egyptian, Middle 215

English, 6, 11, 13 ,77 ,79 ,80 ,84 ,85 ,87 ,88 ,

89,

9 1,

92, 94,

95-6,

97, 98,

167,

212, 217,

218, 220,

221,

222, 225,229,230,239-41 ,243,

247, 250, 254, 256,

258, 259,

263, 269,

276,

282, 287,

288,

294, 296, 297, 299, 300,

302,

310,

342, 344, 345, 346, 349, ch. 18

passim:

Early Modern 219,

241;

Middle 241 ;

Old 12

Finnish 13, 232, 240, 286, 289, 296, 299, 305

Fore 219

French 92 -3 , 212, 215, 220, 229, 235, 237, 239,

240,

241, 244, 261, ch. 14

passim,

297:

Old

270-1,

272, 276,279,281

Gende 97,219

Germ an 6, 9, 12, 82, 87, 88, 93, 97, 167, 212,

217, 220,

225,

230,

232,

234,

235,

240, 241,

243, 244, 259, 286, 287, 300, 305, 310, 344,

345,346

Germanic 215

Godie 7,354

Greek 215: Classical 7, 11, 93 , 212, ch. 13

passim; Hom eric 247, 248, 264

Guugu-Yimidhirr 219

Hausa 220,262

Haya 87,95

Hua 6,8 7, 217, 219,

221,

300,342,346-7

Hungarian 219,220

Indie , Old 262

Indo-European 94,248

Indonesian 91,240

Iranian 240

Italian 13, 229, ch. i^passim, 286, 287, 288,

290, 292, 296,305: Old

271.

272 , 276

Japanese

348

8,

230,

305,

337, 342, 344,

345, 347,

Kate 219

Kobon 219

Korean 215,355

Latin 6, 9, 93, 212, 217, 220, 223, 232. ch. 14

passim:

Classical 276; Vulgar 266, 276

Latvian 93,94,95

Malayalam 240

Maltese 87,93

Mandarin 82 ,84 ,85 ,87 ,91 ,97 , 219, 221, 235

Maring 219

New Guine a Pidgin 88

Ngiyambaa 84,87,93,98,219

Ono 219

Papuan 217,219

Persian 93: Old 262

Pitta-Pitta 219

Polish 13, 286, 291 , 296, 300, 303, 305

Portuguese 95, 273,281, 282,296-7

Romance 7. 9, 11, 217, 218, 219, ch. 14

passim, 328

Rumanian 273,279,282

Russian 6,88,93,219,229

Sanskrit 248

Serbo-Croatian 240

Sotho 240

Spanish 218, 220, ch.

i^passim:

Old 271-2,

273,276

77



Index of languages

Tabasaran 215 220 Vietnamese 215 218 220 221

Tagalog 215 342 347 348 Votyak 220

Tocharian 262

Turkish 13 83 87 215 241 263 286 287 Wojokeso 219

289

291

294

295 296 297 299

305

Tuscan 271 Xinalug 219

Uralic 215 Yapese 93

8



INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Acquisition 3: errors in 306; individual

differences 32 0,3 23 , 326, 327,

328;

of

complex sentences 285, 286, 295, 304, 310;

of conditio nals 13-14 , 137,

ch.

i$passim,

ch. 16passim; of logical reasonin g 14; of

temporals ch. 6 passim

Actions 19,291

Adequacy: criterion of material

adequacy 170-1; pragmatic criteria of 170,

171,172,

173

Anaphora 18-19,

cn

- 5 passim, 128, 129, 141,

142, 144

Anchors 1290°

Antecedent see also

protasis)

5, 15, 18, 70,

r

33>

3 4 -5 '

r

36, 138, 288,

301,

304, 312, 318;

false

5,

16, 25 , 162; indefinites

in 104;

principle of strengthening of 17, 164, 166

Antithesis 287,311

Apodosis see also

consequent)

5, 78 , 219,

266,

267: open

250-1;

suppression

of 258-9

Artificial intelligence 18, 30,

31, 138

Aspect

see

also

temporals, tense) 7,

123,

249,

250, 268, 270,302: generics and

habituals 137,322,324,325,328

Assertions (see speech

acts)

Atomic versus non-atomic sentences

169

Background assumptions

see

also

given)

17,

18,31,138,356-7 ,363-4 ,370

Background conditions see also

situations)

290°

Backgrounding

see

also

information/flo w) 224

Beliefs 17, 19 ,51 ,53 ,62 ,73 , 173, 174-5, 282

Biconditionals 79,336

Binding 18, 105, 106

Bivalence 15

Boolean algebra 52

Bribes

(see

promises)

Cardinality 116

Causality 19,287,289,311,317

Causals (see also

contingency

,

/actuality)

4,5,

8, 9, 10, 14, 80, 137, 229, 230, 243, 244, 264,

277, 278, 279-80, 282, 283 , 286, 292, 299, 312,

328: bicausal constructions 81; causal links

between beliefs 174-5; causal relations

(cross-clausal) 5, 25, 68, 80-2, 96, 164, 181,

220, 222, 223, 254, 288,3 17,3 28

C-command

108,112,120

Certainty see

modality/epistemic)

Clause order see

ordering of clauses)

Cognition: related to language

acquisition 286 -95, 298, 310, 324, 325-8

Cohesiveness, textual see

information /flow)

Communicative acts (see

speech acts)

Comparatives 128

Complexity see also

syntax):

cognitive 286 -95; morph osyntactic

2

^5,

28 6-7 ,3°4 ; semantic 287,

328;

syntactic 285ff, 310, 317

Comprehension 13,58,63,315

Concessive conditionals see also

semifactuals) 205, 216, 220-1, 222-3, ch. 12

passim, 261, 350

Concessives 7, 12, 83, 216,

220-1,

224, ch. 12

passim,

277 -9, 280: concessive reading of

conditionals 194, 205 -6, 211

Conditional generics (see

generic conditionals)

Conditional perfection see

inference/invited)

Conditionals see also coun terfactuals,

discourse, general conditionals, generic

conditionals, indicative conditionals,

interpretations

of conditionals, mathematical

conditionals, specific conditionals, subjunctive

conditionals):

characterized 3, 4- 8, 55, 57,

60,

73, 77, 78-83, 285; compositional account

of 63 , 74; contingency readings of 188,

197-8;

in speech versus writing 5, ch. 18

passim;

in text 7, 353ff: informational

account of (see also

discourse/functions)

24,

34;

interacting w ith speech acts ch. 9

passim, ch.

10

passim;

logical properties

of

15,

17, 55, 57, 5 8,

61 ,

6 3,

73;

semantic

properties

of 4,

285,

286,

297, 298-304;

types of ch. passim, ch. 2 passim, ch . 3

passim, ch. 4passim, ch. 13passim, ch. 14

passim, 288ff, 3 11-15 , 316, 326, ch. 18passim

379



Index of subjects

Conjunctions (see also

markers, operators,

syntax)

8,8 7, 181, 185-8, J89, 216, 217, 219,

286,

287, 289, 295, 300,3 05,3 11,3 17,3 22

Connectives (see

conjunctions, disjunctions,

markers, operators)

Consequent (see also

apodosis)

5, 15, 18, 25,

70, 133, 134, 138,

140,

288, 318

Constants: environmental 37, 40-1

Constraints

350°,

63, 125-6, 127, 129-33, 134,

135, 13 7-8, 285: on conditional

contexts/relations 8, 11 , 15-18; on meaning

of conditionals (see also

meaning)

ch. 11

passim;

on possible linguistic

structures io-n

Context (see

constraints, discourse/contexts,

situations, world

states): conditio nal 124,

133-9,144

Contingency (see also causals,

temporals) 288-90,294,295,302-4

Convention T 169,170

Conversational implicatures 59 ,7 7- 8, 153,

164, 165, 169, 183, 202, 208, 236, 244, 346

Conversational maxims 48, 153-4, 160-4, 165,

166,167,175-6, 183,188-90, 199,234,236,

239,242,335

Coo pera tive Principle 153, 162, 166, 190

Coordination (see

conjunctions, syntax)

Copulas 11

Core ference 18, 103, 107

Counterfactuality (see

factuality)

Counterfactuals (see also conditionals) 6, 7, 9,

22ff, 60, 63, 64, 68, 69, 80, 84, 87, 89-91, 9 6,

98 , 135, 219, 225, 250, 257-9 , 260, 262, 263,

264, 266, 267 -8, 270, 272, 283, 288, 290, 299,

300, 303, 305, 312, 3 15,316,3 22,324,3 25,

326,

333:

distinction between potential

conditio nals and 268, 271, 276; future 248;

indicative 333 4, 335, 33&-9, 3 4 ^ 346, 349;

subjunctive 324, 334, 336

Crosslinguistic generalizations (see

universals)

Data semantics 154,164 ,165

Demonstratives 11

Depen dencies: conditional 19, 144;

informational 18, 129, 144

Dete rm ine rs 1040°, 124

Deterrents (see warnings)

Discourse (see also conditionals,

information/flow)

105, 296-7: contex ts

(situational) (see also

situations, world

states) 33, 179-94, 292, 295, 317 ,318 , 322,

323-4, 325, 327, 334, 349, speaker attitude

toward 310, 313, 327, 335, 342, 346; factors

affecting conditionals (pragmatic

interpretations) (see also

interpretations

o f

conditiona ls, speech acts)

6 , 7 , 8 , 1 6 , 1 8 , 6 0,

72,73,179-94, 263, 287,296-8,304,342;

functions (use) (see also conditionals/

informational account of) 3, 5, 64, 181, 185,

296,

316, 318, ch. 18

passim;

storag e 117

Disjunctions (see also markers, operators,

syntax)

10,181,185-8,189-92

Distrib utive conven tion 119

'Donkey'-sentences ch. 5passim

Entailm ent 3, 73, 104, 231, 232, 240,3 04, 312:

univ ersal 105, 118

Epistemic (see modality/epistemic)

Events (see also situations) 288,313-14,327:

generic 288,294-5;

habitual/timeless 294-5; recurrent 302;

temporal relations between 289, 299

Evidence 17: direct versus indirect 151,154,

160,

167

Excluded Middle , Principle of 158-9, 172

Existence assumptions 254- 5, 257, 258

Existential closure n o

Existentia l condit ionals 134, 135-6

Factuality (see also causals, general

conditionals, specific conditionals)

11-12,

89,229, 290,313-15, 320,321,323,324-5,

328,342

Focus particles 231 ff

Form-function mappings (see also

markers,

interpretations of conditionals)

285, 315,

320,

326

General conditionals (see also

conditionals,

factuality, contrast specific conditionals)

23-4, 42 -3 , 250, 254-7, 258, 261, 262, 263

Generative grammar 4, 9

Generic conditionals (see also conditionals) 7,

18,124,139-43, 288,294,302-3,312,313,

319,325

Gener ic expressions ch. 6passim

Genre 8

Given (see also background assumptions,

interpretations I of conditionals as

nonconditionals)

203, 258, 282, 339, 342,

348,349,355

Go del results 16

Government and binding (GB)

framework 109

Grammaticalization 85,86

Historical change 3, 4, 10 -12,2 16, 247, 263,

ch. 14

passim,

297 ,328 : semantic 11, 12, 243

Homonymy 9

Hypotaxis (see

syntax)

Hypothetical conditionals 302 -3,3 12,3 15,

316,321,324,326

Hypotheticality 11,1 73, 249, 257, 265, 273,

274, 277, 282, 288, 290-3,31 7, 32 4,344:

380



Index of subjects

Model theo retic semantics 123, 129

Modus ponens 57,73, 162, 167, 176-7, 188-9,

203,211

Modus tollendo tollens 56 ,57 ,73

Mo dus tollens 157-8, 162, 209, 211

Montague Gram mar 18, 63, 144

Mood (see also imperatives, indicative

conditionals, modality, subjunctive

conditionals) 11, 66, 244, ch.

13

passim:

hortative 256; imperative 247, 248, 256;

indicative 6, 247, 248, 259-6 0, 267, 2706°,

305, 312; irrealis 6, 8, 220, 257, 353;

optative (see also

libidinal constructions)

247, 248, 250, 253, 258,

260-1,

264;

realis-irrealis continuum ch.

13 passim;

subjunctive 6, 247, 248, 249, 251 , 259, ch. 14

passim

, 305

Necessity: pragm atic versus logical 111

Negatio n 6, 10, 26, 149, 156, 158-60, 166, 187,

201,

206, 251, 259, 260-3 ,338 : of

conditionals 156

Noun phrase: definite 124, 127, 145;

indefinite 105, 124, 127, 133, 134, 136;

plural 18, 107, 124, 127, 129, 139;

universal 136

Object-types 131

Operators (see also

conjunctions, d isjunctions,

modality):

adverbial 108, i n , 112;

conditional 16, m - 1 2 , 118; conjunctive

(and, or)

112, 149, 158-60, 200, 204,

206-11;

discourse 108, i n , 117;

existential 108; mod al (may, must) 4 , 1 1 ,

16, 149, 152-5, 158, 159, 160-1, 163; of

invisible necessity 111, 113; speech

act 200-1,207-8,209,210,212;

unive rsal 108, 113

Ordering of clauses (see also

markedness,

syntax) 7, 9, 83-6 , 96, 167, 205, 221-2,

223-4,

312, 349, ch. 18passim: length as a

factor in 360 ,361 ,367

Parallelism 7,9,219,224,225,269

Parameters 35ff

Parataxis (see markers/absence of, syntax)

Peano arithmetic 52

Performatives (see

speech acts)

Philosophy (see also

methodology)

14

Polari ty 129, 138, 145

Politeness 7, 8, 163, 167, 199, 212, 363, 365,

368,370

Polysemy 9, 219, 220, 225, 277-8 0, 287, 311 ,

328

Possibility (see modality/epistemic)

Possible world semantics 15, 16, 18 ,2 1,2 5- 6,

27,2 9,32 ,40,5 2,56 ,63,7 1,74 , 124, 153,

169,171-2, 176, 204, 348

Potential conditionals 250, 263, 266, 267, 268,

269,

273-4, 279-80: distinction betw een

counte rfactual s and 268, 269, 271 , 276, 281

Pragm atic corre ctness 147, 149, 160-6

Pragmatic factors (see

discourse/factors)

Pragmatics (see also semantics/versus

pragmatics) 6,215,335

Pragmatism 172

Pred icate calculus 14

Predictive conditionals 288, 299-303 , 304,

305,312

Present conditionals 302-3

Presuppositions n , 14, 15, 232-3, 2 45, 280,

297,314,318

Probab ility 148, 173, 174, 252, 253 -4, 259, 261

Prohibitions (see also

warnings)

78, 262, 263,

305

Promises (see also

imperatives, speech acts)

8,

13,

179-94, 206, 254, 296: categor ical 189;

incen tives 180, 188, 193

Pronouns 18: E-type pronoun

inte rpretation 105-8, 118: indefinite 139,

255-6; plural 116, 129; referen tial 106;

set-p ron oun s 106, 118

Propositional content 13,14

Protasis (see also antecedent) 5, 7, 8, 10, 78,

219, 266, 280: suppressio n of 258, 260-1

Pro tog ene rics 123, 137ft, 318ff

Prototype conditionals 4, 6, 11, 13

Qua ntification: pair 105, 114; universal 15,

18,

23,32, 126, 134

Quantifier raising (Q R) 109, n o , 113

Qua ntifiers: existential 104, 108;

free-choice 231,2 36; general 255;

generalized 145; universal 15,16 ,23,10 4,

105, 126, 231,241

Quan titative expressions 261

Questions (see interrogatives, speech acts)

Raising rules n o

Reality (see factuality)

Reasoning (see also syllogisms) 3,5 ,9 , 12,

14-15,

16, 19^ 55- 9^7 ^73 ^ 171, 172, I73<

HI-

290:

enthymematic

173;

nonmonotonic 31,

133,

138,164

Registers 270, 274 -5, 276

Relative clauses 18, 104-5,

I Q

8, 112, 140-1

Relativity to context 33, 37

Relevance 69,

73:

conditionals 225, 288

Requests (see also

imperatives, speech acts)

8,

66 ,

189,288,305,363

Scale (see focus particles)

Scope 103, 120, 129: nuclear n o , 113;

versus focus 232,244

382



Index of subjects

Seman tics 18: static approach to 173; versus

pragmatics see also pragmatics 17, 148-9,

154, 172, 176

Semifactuals see also

concessive

conditionals)

238, 338-9 , 349,

350

Semiotics

174, 176

Sentence: versus statement 22, 29, 31,36

Set theoretic models 141

Situation Semantics 18, 21, 24, 25, 34-5 , 39,

123,

124, 126, 129, 130, 140,

144-5

Situations see also

background conditions,

discourse/contexts

,

events, world states

8,

ch .

2 passim

, ch. 6

passim

: types of 290-3,

295,313

Situation-types 35, 36, 37, 40, 129, 131, 133,

134

Specific conditio nals

see

also

conditionals,

/actuality,

contrast

general

conditionals)

23-4, 44, 46, 249, 250-4, 255,

256, 257,

262

Speech acts see also

discourse/factors,

imperatives, interrogatives, promises,

requests, warnings) 13,

45,

60,

61

1

63,

66,

69 ,

175,

176, ch.

^passim,

202, 289, 296,

304,

305, 321,

324: about conditionals versus

conditional speech acts ch. 10 passim;

supposing as a speech act 197, 204,211

Stability, semantic I5off

Subjunctive

see

mood)

Subjunctive co nditionals see also conditionals,

mood) 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 39, 46, 60, 233

Subordination (see syntax)

Sufficiency hyp othesis 200, 205 , 208

Syllogisms see also reasoning) 5, 14, 30, 32,

33,46,53,147-8,166,210

Symmetry (see

parallelism)

Syntax see also

complexity

,

conjunctions,

disjunctions, markers, ordering of clauses,

word order

4: cleft conditionals 8;

conditional embedded in a subordinate

clause 359-60,361,366,371;

coordination i o - n , 216, 220, 221, 225,

234-7,

287,

311;

hypotaxis 11, 225; left-

dislocation 362-3; parataxis 11, ch. 11

passim,

234-5, 237; subject-verb

inversion 6, 9, 87, 356; subjects of

conditionals

8;

subordination 8,10 -11 ,

217,

219, 312; syntactic frames

305;

temp oral relations (cross-clausal) 288, 305,

317; time reference 12, 66, 67, 83, 85, 90,

93-6, 126, 127, 129, 134-5, 248, 249, 250, 2 51,

257, 259, 260, 26 1, 262, ch. 1 4

passim,

290,

295,

300, 304,

ch.

1 6

passim,

division between

past and nonpast 250, future 299,3 00,

302,346;

when

6 ,1 1 ,1 3 ,7 4 ,1 3 3 , 134, 136,

141,

143, 225, 277, 279, 286,3 00-2 ,304 , 305,

ch. 16

passim\ whenever

133, 134, 136, 279

Tense

see

also aspect

temporals) 7,8, 11, 16,

19,

23 , 44,

69,

84, 91-3, 96,

123, 124,

127,

129, 134,

135-6, 224, 244,

ch.

13

passim,

ch . I4passim, 305, 312, 316, 319:

aorist 294-5 ; backshifting 9

2

~3; 94< 96, 98;

division between primary and

secondary 250; neutralization of distinctions

of 93- 4,9 6; nonpresent

8;

past 209,212,

319; present 23,46, 126, 137, 294, 319;

sequence of tenses 250, ch. 14passim

Theories: Bayesian theory of decision

making 169, 174, 176; causal or necessary

condition

171;

DRS 133,144;

Gricean 169, 174-5; inference warrant

theory of conditionals 176; mathe matical

logic 24, 30, 333, 342, 348; mental m odel

theory 15; model theory, first order 21,

40 ; nontruthfunctional theory of

if

355; of

action

173;

of validity

173;

probabilistic

theory

of

conditionals

169, 173;

psychological theory of conditionals 57, 60,

63 ;

semantic 39; truth 148; truth

conditional 51

Threats (see

prohibitions

,

warnings)

Time reference see

temporals)

Topic 215,34 2,347: conditional as 10,86,

280,

282, 348, 353-9, 3 61,363-4 ,369,370 ;

contrastive 342,347; thematic 342,347

Truth: based on available evidence ch. 7

passim;

of antecedent, consequent 17, 124,

198; prob abilistic

17;

property of i69ff;

relative definitions

of i69ff;

relative versus

absolute notions of 17,159,160

Truth conditional semantics 154, 263

Truth conditions 3, 16, 18, 24, 39-40 , 44, 6 1,

63 ,

65, 69, 72,

73,

104, i n , 115, 169, 171

Truth table 59

Truth values 22, 26, 29, 80, 145, 150, 159, 167,

172,258,320,334,335,338:

[elizabeth closs traugott] on conditionals

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