emerging soviet doctrine

7/30/2019 Emerging Soviet Doctrine

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IM PLICATIONS FOR THEUSTASK FORCE DEFENSEA M onographby

M ajor M ichael D. BurkeInfantry

School of Advanced M ilitary StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, K ansas


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Emer qi nq Sovi et Doct r i ne:I mpl i c at i ons f or t he U .S. Task For ce Def ense

Mi chael D Bur keMaj or , I nf ant r y

School of Advanced Mi l i t ar y St u di e sU.S. Ar my Command and Gener al St af f Col l egeFor t Leavenwor t h, Kansas

1 0 J anuar y 1989hppr oved f o r publ i c r e l eas e; di s t r i but i on i s unl i m t ed


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..-.

School of Advanced Mi l i t ar y St udi esMonogr aph Appr oval

Name of St udent : Maj or Mi chael D Bur keT i t l e of Monogr aph Emer gi ng Sov i et Doct r i ne and I t s I mpl i cat i onsf or TF Def ense.

Ippr oved by: /// Monogr aph Di r ect or. ,~. .


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ABSTRFICT

EMEHT.ING SOVI ET DOCTFIIME: I M P L I L A T I O N S F I X THE IJ . '5. TAFj3F:CE DEFENSE, b v i ' i aj or ;I i chael 2. Bur i : . e?9. 5. A rmy .43 pagesThi s monogr aph di scusses sel ect ed aspect s of Sovi etof f ensi ve doct r i ne wi t h emphasi s on t r ends di scussed i nuncl assi f i ed l i t er at ur e. Rel evant U. S. heavy t ask f or cedoctr i ne i s t hen r evi ewed i n l i ght of what t he Sovi et s ar edoi ng and t he i mpl i cat i ons f or def ense ar e hi ghl i ght ed.Subj ect s addr essed i n t hi s paper i ncl ude Sovi et useof sur pr i se, t empo, mobi l e gr oups, f i r e suppor t andhel i copt er s, and sophi st i cat ed combi ned ar ms t act i cs t o

deal Ni t h ii.S. def enses. Sovi et concerns over " nucl ear -l i ke" weapons ar e di scc!ssed al ong w t h r el at i ve vi ews of af ut ur e hi gh i nt ensi t y bat t l ef i el d. Fossi bl e ar eas ofconcer n f or U.S. doct r i ne devel oper s ar e i dent i f i ed anddi scussed al ong w t h some i deas f or adapt i ng our t r ai ni ngt o r ef l ect cur r ent Sovi et doctr i ne.The paper concl udes t hat t acti cal sur sr i se i s l i i : : e?vto be achi eved by t he Sovi et s. and t hat t r ai ni ng anddoct r i ne shoul d r ef l ect t hi s s i t uat i on. The paper al soquest i ons t he val i di t y of t he asser t i on t hat a task: f or cecan def sat a r egi ment , not because of def i ci enci es i n U.S.doct r i ne or equi pment , b u t as a f unct i on of hi gh i nt ens i t y

mobi l e war f ar e. I n addi t i on, t he monoar aph suaqest schangi ne t he composi t i on of t he OPFOF: at t he NTC f r om 3r i i l e reqi ment . t o a tank: r egi ment . i n order t o merec1 osei y model emer qi n g Suvi et: doct r i ne.


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T ab l e of Co nt e nt s.

11.

1 1 1

1nt r o duc t cri . . . . .. . . . . ..'.. .. .. . . . . . .Emer g i ng Sov i e t Doct r i ne. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sur pr i s e...............................Tempo.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..F i r e Suppo r t ...........................Fo r wa r d De t achment s and Deep Rat t l e. . . .Combi ned Ar ms i n t h e Cl o s e Bat t l e. . . . . .Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Nuc l ear Pos t ur e and New Weapons . . ... ..U. S. Task F o r c e Def ens e . . .. .. . . ..De ep Op e r a t i o n s........................Ma i n B at t l e and Re s e r v e Oper at i ons . . . . .Se cur i t y Oper a t i ons....................Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .An a 1 y s s . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . ...Sur pr i s e and Tempo. . . . . .. .. . .. . . . .Combi ned A r m s , Mo b i l e Gr o u ps , a nd De epBatt le. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............F i r e Suppor t ...........................Se cur i t y Oper at i ons . ...................Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C ancl~.~.sio ns.. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I V ,

I ,Y .3 i a q r a m s :1.2.4.5.6 .7.

-l ,a.c9.

Ar t i l l er y Sci ppor t . . ... . . ... . ..1?42 Sovi e t T ank Corps . . . . . . . .. . .So vi e t " shcc! : : s u bu ni t s " , 1945. . . . . .i as k or gani z e d So vi e t bat t al i on. . . .U. S. Tasl:: f or c e. . . . . . . .. . . . . . ... .Ar my f o r war d detachment . . . . . . . . . . . .Di v i s i o n f o r wa r d det ac hment . . . . . .Sov i et di v i s i on mai n at t ac k. . . .. .Sov i et di v i s i on s uppor t i ng at t ac k. .-

AppeR?: 7 :i ....,


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PART I : INTRODUCTIONRegardless o+ t he circurnstancos l eading to war between

_I. t h e Soviet Union and th e U ni ted States, the outcome of tn erc :n i l c t wi l l & s p e n d on t i ?e s c i c c e s s 0.q t h e ihrsaw +. act ' 5o f fens ive . H v th e natu re o i t h e al l i an ce, t h e i n i t i a t i v ew i l l be ceded to Warsaw P act f o r c es, and NATO w i l l a w a i t t h eblow. The sc ~cc ess f t he def ense at everv l e v e l w i l ldetermi ne when, i f ever, f r i en dl v f o r c es go over t o t h ecounter -o f f ensi ve. The s tat i on i ng of 214.019 out of 766,211ac ti v e Army t r oo ps underscores American determi nati on t omeet anv Soviet of f ensi ve head on. '

.-_

R ecogni t i on of t he importance of t h e NFITO mi ssi on andthe enormity of. t he chal l ensge f aci ng t he U . S . A r m y w a sgi ven promi nence b y t he 1776 ed i t i on nf FM 1!:!!::-5:Operati ons. T hat manual f ocused t he A rmy's att ent i on ont h e resul ts of t h e 1973 Y am K ippur w a r and th e thr eat posedbv t h e forces of t he Sov i et Union. With t he adopt i on oSI 8 - ....*.i..tivedei ensc" . At--mv auctr ine , ;ave primacv .C t h e " c e ~ t . r . 5 l3;r t.tie" i n Europe and concentr ated an t h e p o s s i b i l i t v of warb i t h t h e Russians.

Si nce 1976, th e s w i i t growth of S ov i et power and t h ei ncr easi ng pace of technol ogi cal change have .%purred newv i s i o n s of t h e n e x t batt l e f i e l d which both Sov i et 2ndA merican mi i i tar v autho rs have cal led "A ir-L and" i n nature.

- i.,-,ilz ST!., r+... .. ie h e r i:ii A , +r,e prnd!.ict'%.:e,-?;:LQl-,:,.f r=p1 !.!:..-?.


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nu cl e ar c o n f l i c t i n E urope, i n l i g h t oi nuclear p a r i t y . "T he t h r e a t po sed b y t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of t h e Soviet

L inian caused lLI.5. d o c t r i n e t o ai j d ress S o v i et r a c a b i l i t i e s atevery l e v e l . A capstone series of +i el d manual s on t ? , eSoviet A r m y ( FB 100- 2- 1. & and 3 ) w a s p ub l i s hed i n 1984.E very Army branch schoo l ha s instruct ion on t h e way t heS o v i e t armv f i g h t s . C o n f l i c t s c en ar i o s i n v o l v i n g t h e t w osuperpowers are d i s c u s s ed and e x er c i s e d r o u t i n el y . T h i sf o c u s al so l ed to t h e es tab l i sh men t of t h e N at i o nal T r ai n i n gC enter (NTC) at Fort I r wi n , C a l i f o r n i a .

I n t h e M ojave dese r t t h e U.S. Army con st r uc ted perhapst h e most real is t ic combat t r ai n i n g f a c i l i t y ev er bu i l t .3i s f a c i l i t y is an i n s trumented t r a i n i ng area which permi tsA merican task: f o r ces and b r i gades t o engage an GpposiDsForce (OPFOR ) which uses Soviet d o c t r i n e and equipmentmod i f ied to resembl e R ussian material. A s i m i l a r , butsmaller faci! i t . . / is ru t- rent lv be ing es tab l i shed i r, E!-!rooe KCa, l l aw fo rward dep layed u n i t s t h e s.ame t r ai n i ng opporti . . !nitv.

A r e ai l of these a t tempts t o r ep l i ca t e combat aga i n s tSoviet f o r c e s on t h e n e x t b a t t l e f i e l d a dequat e? D o w ewiderstand Soviet tactical d oc t r i n e i n l i g h t o f Sovi,stresponses t o the dynamics o f warfare.? T he quest i on i scr i t i ca l i n v iew o f t he wei gnt accorded to l e s son s l ear n edb" t r a i n i n$ !.tni ti . at t h e N T C and i n sombat . - - i m t . ! l a t i o n s !. .:zed

. . .- . .;+ r j :zc;.... ?.!, .r ,7,- I._=i 3 1 1. ...-. .VJ.~;,Z we havr zome' t o expect . t i ien ~e ma.., f i n d ,our-sei',~ez n

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T his paper w i l l examine one element of the question b yfocusing on a bas ic component of the ne xt b a tt l e f i e l d :S oviet att.ac!:: and U.S. tasi:: fo rc e defense. The space.-.

.-.. av ai l ab le i n a i i mite d monograch w i l l not permit a truiyexhaustive study of even a f a i r l y narrow sub ject f i e ld . Fortha t reason 1"ve further l i mi te d my examinatiun t'o asampling of ta c ti c a l concepts which have an impact on theconduct of defensive engagements a t the tas k for ce le ve i.

Imp l i ca ti ons f o r U.S. Task Force level defense ra isedb v developing S oviet do ctri ne w i l l be examined, w i themphasis on examining c e rt a in a spe cts of the Soviet attack.and how the defens ive framework i s affected. There are fourreasons f o r doing th i s . F i r s t , i t has been my experiencetha t ta c t i c a l S ov ie t doc t r ine i s we l l unders tood a= long asi t f i t s i n s ide the "doc t ri na l temp la te", b u t no t we ll knownwhen i t involves forward detachments which operate outsidethe template. Second, th e task fo rc e l e v e l i s a good lacet.2 i l u s t r a t e tt3a.t Sovi c- t doct r ine i s cifi..n.s.m: c and ~e s o rl. to changing t ,a t t? e f ie ld cond i tions . Th i rd , i trlink: i t ~. zimportant t o dis pe l some of the temDlate me nta li ty wi thwhich we view the S oviets. F in a ll v, I bel ieve there aresome conceptual d i f +ic u l ti e = i!i urrent U.S. task f ~ r c edo c trin e which need to be addressed.

I n s tr8- \c turing h i s monograph. I ' v e presumed a workingC C J ; ~~! : ; I ~f T-iir:et-:iiIsn ."=:: f c r ~ e l ~f e ~~i ' i eoctFir,e ~ z c j T

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f ut ure U. S. doct r i ne. Onl y uncl assi f i ed document s andar t i cl es wer e used i n pr epar at i on of t hi s monogr aph. Thi shad t he i mpor t ant ef f ect of l i m t i ng my soecul at i an on t hei mpact of st i l l c l assi f i ed deuel upment s. ana al soci r cumscr i bed any r ef er ence t o act ual Sovi et exer ci ses ot hert han what i s avai l abl e i n open l i t er at ur e.P4RT 11 : EMERGI NG SOVI ET DOCTRI NE

The Sovi et Ar mv may be char act er i zed a s anoperat i onal l y based f or ce. Russ i ans emphasi ze t he nat ur e ofCombat i nvol vi ng armies., f . ~ i . > r t t ~ , ,nd Theater:? ~ : ! f l i l i t a r yOperations ( T VD ) . I n or der t o under st and t he Sovi et ' st act i cal of f ens i ve doctr i ne and f or ce st r uct ur e, i t i snecessary t o exam ne t he oper at i onal f r amewor k:wi t hi n whi ch i t i s embedded.

The Sovi et s pr i de t hemsel ves on bei ng t he f i r st nat i ont o r ecogni ze t he changi ng nat ur e o f war and t he f i r st t oadj ust t hei r m l i t ar y ar t t o t hose changes... ( Thus. t o i t scredi t , Sovi et m l i t ary t henret i cal t hought , havi ng f i r s tsc! cceeded i n seei ng t hese t endenci es i n t he devel opment of: mi t : ary af f ai r - . . . or- rect l x/ per cei ved and revea!+d t h e newcomponent of m l i t ar y art . . sperat i on Csi cl art ' . "

The oper at i onal nat ur e of t he Sovi et Gr my i s embodi edi n t he ei ght ! Sovi et ) pr i nci pl es gover ni ng moder n war f ar e:1 ) Fl eci bi l i t y and hi gh t empo of combat oper at i ons. 2 jConcent r at i on of ef f or t , 5 ) Sur pr i se, 4) Combat act i veness.5 ) Preser vat i on of combat ef f ect i veness. 6 ) Real i sm 7', - , - . , : , ~~! ~: ~~t . ~, ~~, ~,j ~ & c t i g n ! - ~r ~uq?~h s e r : e n i ' i ' s d e c t n . T i ? s = ~pr i nc i ol ~sal so gui de -the e~ol i ! t ;on of Zovi et f o?- ceces?. cr,s.na aor t r i ne.

7. -

l - he . qoGi et s ver cei . ve t h a t t he n a t u re of fL!ti !rr

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Operat lOnS w i l l b e cha rac t e r i zed by " d ec i s i veness , h i g hmaneuverabi l i t y , i n t en s i t y , f a s t and sharp changes , and_ .d. ivcrs i t .q of methods i n ccmhi ned arms. L 's The S o v i e t s seet h e nex t b a t t l e i i e i d as i non- l i near , f l ~! i d . and charac ter i zedby h i gh i n t e n s i t y f i r e s . T hey c h a r a c t er i z e "air-land"batt l e as bl endi ng " combined arms battl e" and " threedi mensi onal combat oper at i on s" i n t o one concept.

T he Soviets r ec ogn i z e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of conduct ing anoperational of f ens iv e .7 They acknowledge th e f o rmidabl ec a p a b i l i t i e s o i a prepared A merican def ense and would seekt o o b v i a t e i t i n f i v e ways; 1) S u r p r i s e , 2 ) Tempo, 3) T heuse o f f i r ep ower to adjust f o r c e ratios, 4) T he use off orw ard detachments, maneuver grou ps, and v er t i c aienveiopments t o d i s r u p t t h e c o n t i n u i t y of t h e de fense , and5 ) C a r e s u l l y structured combined arms u n i t s to carry out t h eat ac ::s . SURPRISE

T he m o s t c r i t i c a l elemert i n Soviet c a l c u l a t i o n s w i l lbe the achievement of s u r p r i s e, p r ec i p i t a t i n g an o i fenc i . i eagai ns t an unprepared or pa r t i a l l y prepared NATU dei ense.=s S o v i e t e x pe r i e n c e i n t h e b a t t l e s on t h e E a st er n F r o ntdemonst rated , su r p r i se alters t h e c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c es i ni av o r of t h e attacker, and i s t h e co rne rs t one of op e ra t i o na ls u c c e ~ s . T he B r i t i s h Arm:, states t h a t t h e S o v i e t s w i l l nptS.+:.:~C;: '.J U;.>! ~ , ! , . = i s i~tr..si- i .ss 1.3 puaranteed, s,;.?i!tha: 1 f.-

.. a.t.taci:.plains w e r e detec.ted earl '?,. t h e en t i r e o i f e n i i . i e w n ~~l abe ;-.-.t.poned."-,+


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It fo l lo ws tha t there are th ree poss ib le ooerationa lscenarios t o consider. F i r s t , the S oviets do not achieves urpr is e . but go ahead and a ttac k a f u l l y prepared defenseanyiua'y. Second, the S ov ie ts achieve p a r ti a l s iurcris e,attack a p a r t i a l l y prepared defense. T hird, NATO i s caughtcompletely unaware, to ta l s ur pr is e i s achieved, and the reare no defenses a t a l l . The f i r s t . c a s e i s un1ib:ely giventhe premium S oviets put on s urpris e. The l a tt e r scenario,whi le nightmarish, i s un l i k e l y g iven the cons iderab le e f f o r tNATO makes t o avo id being caught asleep. T his leaves themiddle case, a S oviet of fe ns ive against a p a r t i a l l ycompleted defense, as a lo gi c a l po in t of departure fo rexamining po ten tia l S oviet ac t ions . The S oviet perc eptionof what degree' of s u rp r is e has been achieved ! . r i l l determinethe tac t i c a l dec is i on.

TEMPO"The S ovie t Army," it has been s aid, "f igh ts- t o move?

whereas Western armies move to f i qh t . " 9 Soviet eomm.ander+in te rn a li z e tempo i n terms of depth. simultaneous ac tio nag ain s t the enem)., and speed of operations . iJ hile v i r t u a l l yevery curre nt Western pu bl ic a t ion on S oviet doc trinedescribes ope rations as "fa s t paced" and gives e xc el l en texamples of depths of o bj ec tive s , few address the "why".The compression of time i n terms of the s eo ara tion o iba tt!e ? ie !d e.~c,erit.spr?!:iatei. uraivs i 3 wi th in the ,cnmm&.nd 3.nt

: k e r n . i4e i n tr?e U.3. A r m i h. ccminec tr!eexpression "turning ins.ide the enemy's decision c v r l e " tc.friescriue t b , e nesire-J outcome.


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T oda y, t he So vi e t s ar e s eek i ng t o i nc r e as e t he" s i mu l t a ne i t y " of c ombat at e ver y l evel and i n gr eat dept hs .T he l at e Br i t i s h m l i t ar y aut hor Ri c har d Si mpk i n di s c us s edt h i s i n h i s book Rac e t o t he Swi f t . Hi s i deas t r ans l at e t ua vi s i on of " s i mu l t a ne o us " c o mb at o ve r a gr e at de pt h whi c hc ont r i but e s t o par al y s i s of t h e c ont r ol mec hani s m of af orce. ' O T h i s t heme i s ec hoed i n Pol i s h m l i t ar y wr i t i ngs ,whe r e he l i c o pt e r and f i r e s t r i k es ar e s ee n a s a me ans of" s p l i t t i ng t h e enemy f r o m wi t hi n" a s oppos ed t o bat t er i ngt hr o ugh t h e e ne my f r o m wi t ho ut . As s u m ng t ha t t h e P o l i s hof f i c er s a r e wr i t i ng wi t h some k no wl e dg e of So vi e t t h ou gh t ,i t i s l ogi cal t o c onc l ude t hat t he Sov i et s ar e s t r i v i ng t oi n c r e a s e t h e " t e mp o" of t a ct i c al c o mba t by ma ki ng d ee p,mai n, and r e ar ba t t l e oc c ur t oget her . T hi s i s i n c o n s o n an c ewi t h t h e c o nc e pt of nuc l e ar s c a r e d o pe r a t i ons , f or wa r dde t a c hme nt s , h el i bo r ne a s s a ul t s , and unc onv ent i ona l war f a r e .Goi ng a s t e p f ur t he r , i f t h e So vi e t s s e e ni mul t a ne ouso f f e n s i v e c omba t as a r eal pos s i bi l i t y , t hen t hey a r e goi ngt o be pr e pa r e d t o e ng ag e i n s u c h ba t t l e s , but on t he i r ownt er ms.

F I RE SUPPORTA s t her e woul d be onl y one ma i n a t t ack at f r o n t , ar my.

and di v i s i on, Sov i et f i r e s uppor t f or t he mai n ef f or t woul dbe l avi s h. A Sov i e t r egi ment maki ng t he ma i n at t ack coul de : . ;?ec t t u r r cei ' , ve !ha sui j 3or t i l i q f i r e c c.f at i sast tour t -si x bat t al i ons of di v i s i on cont r o l l ed ar t i l l er v i n addi t i unt o t he ar - t i l l er . , y of t he r egi ment . I f t h e a t t a c k we r e

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operat i onal l y important , f i r e s from Army- level a r t i l l e r ywould be added. F i gur e 1 on page 44 g i v e s some p o s s i b l epl anni ng f i gures. I n addi t i on, forward detachments andmobile groups w i l l recei ve powerful f i r e support from attackhe l i co p te r s of t h e di vi si onal squadron and army l evelhel i co pt er regi ments. T he emphasis on aerial f i r e suppor tis one of t h e most di s t i nc t i ve f eatures of emerging Sov i etdoctr ine. H e l i c o D t e r s answer many of t h e probl ems th eSov i ets f o rsee i n main tain i ng a high tempo i n t h e attack.

I n co n t ra s t to U.S. doctr ine , attack hel i copters areconsi dered f i r e suppor t assets, providing both close andanti - tank fires. They are t h e modern vers i on of t h e 11-2S t o r n o v i k , t h e "f l yi ng tank" of WWII fame. On t h ebat t l e f i e l d hel i copters would prov ide close ai r support.p a r t i c u l a r l y to mobi le groups. H el i copter s w i l l be giventh e mi ssi on of prot ecti ng advanci ng tr oops from U.S.counterattacks. i s

I n a recent l v publ i shed arti el e, rlajcr J . F. Holcomc c+t h e U.S. Army, working w i t h t n e Sovi et Studi es Center atSandhurst, poi nted out ',the cr i t i ca l i mportance t h e So v ie t sp l a ce i n hel i co p ter s as mobi l e f i r e support . These assetsr a p i d l y alter t h e co r re la t i cn o f forces tnrough pi npoi ntdes t ruct ion of enemy tank , a r t i l l er y , and anti - tank means.T heir usequl ness i s even greater i n suoport of forwaradet3chments amd mobi ? c yroupc_. T hrv Dr ovi de sec ur i t v f orf.:~z+_ sltjving forwcrd f n r : : z ' : : r s p i d l .I ~ ~ L ! n ~ ~ r ~ t ~ ~ , = ~ . : lqr;c!ndth rea ts .And i f required. o.ther hel icopters . l 4 T heapporti onment of combat he1 coatern would be i n r onsnnanc?


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w i t h the importance of the mission; th e army forwarddetachment and d iv is i o n a l forward detachment of th e maine f f o r t d i v i s io n would be heav i ly supported by organic andArmy le ve l assets; suppo rting a ttac ks P J O U ~ ~eceive fewerso r t es .

The importance of f i r e s upport t o the attack cannot beoverest imated. T akt ika indic ate s th a t the dens i ty of NATOan ti-ta nk systems cou ld reach 50 or. mare weapons pe rk i lometer i n a main defens ive s ec tor. However, th e ma jo ri tyof these weapons w i l l be concentrated i n "groupings o f f i r eweapons" w i t h i n 1.5 k i lometers o f the f ron t . D i re ct andi nd i rec t f i r e s m u s t achieve greater than 50% suppression toensure the success of th e attack.'"

F i r e s u ppo rt i s used t o change t h e i n i t i a l c o r re l a t i o nof forces. F or example, S oviet planners cons ider a f i v e t oone r a t i o of tanks t o anti - tank systems per k i lometer off ro nt as prov id ing a 92% pro ba b i l i t y o f success f o r theattack." I f we a ~i s ~mehat there a re 2?!5 t a nk s andapproximately 6i M . a dd iti o na l heavy and medium anti - tanksys tems ( l es s he l i co p te rs ) i n a U. S. mechanized d iv is io ns ec tor of 40 ki lo me ters width, it fo l l ow s tha t the averageant i - tank !AT) weapons d en s ity i s a pproximately 22 weaponsper k i lometer. T h is would req uir e a den s i tv of over l!Mtanks per ki lome ter of a ttac k frontage. B u t i f suDportinqeirtiller'.,' : - : e u . t r . i ? ! . r e i ;: ! X of the AT weztnons. tnen +? err.q-~.:irernentfn r tanks drops t o 5 i ) tanks per i:icmeter GFi:--ont:.. I n t h i s case. a motor r i f l e d i v i s i o n w i th 27!:! t35l::z.


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could expect success i f ti le attslck fr on tag e were le s s than 5ki lometers, which i s approaching the "doctrinal" norms forsuch an attack.

FORWARD-DETACHMENTS AND DEEP RATTLEThe pr in c ip le , "ac t ion through the enemy's dec th"pro vides th e foundation fo r the S ovie t concept of deepba t t le . Deep b a t t l e i s a comprehensive concept involvingcombined arms and j o i n t op era tions . The ce nterpie ce ofcombined arms deep b a tt l e appears t o be th e "mobile group".M obi le groups, ( o r maneuver groups) may be des igna ted a td iv is ion, army, or front. I n genera l, the So v iets usemobile groups as spearheads f o r la rg e r formations. T heirmi s s io ns a re i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d t o the S ov ie t theo ry of deer,b a t t l e wnich demands s imultaneous combat through th e deDtnof th e enemies formation. The S ov ie t concept o f mobilegroups s tr i k i n g t o the enemy's depth ahead of l a rg e rformations i s re ce ivi ng great emphasis because of the needt c destrov "rerosmaissance s t r i : :e ectnpl sxesj " and ?c~cles.rdelivery means. l 7

S ov ie t s tudy i n to th e phenomenon of pa s t wars, andpresent cond i t ions re in forced S ov iet theo ret i c a l conceptsconcerning the nature o f deep b a ttl e . The genes is of'combined arms deep b a t t l e can be found i n the hard lessonsof the Eas.tern fro nt. E arl y attempts us ing pure tanks t r i k i n g . ' o r c e s rnattureiJ i n t o a1 l-.srms formation; capab;e ,zf

L'f the ene,r>v ,2e+er I=e ~ . ' - i ~e;.:ploi ti g t o oper at i gnal depth. "Mob i 1e Grnuos" w w - e+ l j t - m r d t..c z.aerlr-hrnd o i f e n s i v e s i t cioth t h e t ac t i c ai an3


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opera t iona l le ve l . I n the Manchurian o f fen s ive of A u g U s t1945, t.he Red Army demons trated th a t i t had mastered theemployment o i maneuver groi-ips when i t encLi lfed a l l o f

..

Mancnuria i n an of fens ivr - la s t i n g .ten a a y s . !F:gc!rc 2 onpage 45 i l l u s t r a te s the makeup of a W W I I tank corps, th etype of un i t f req ue ntly charged wi th condu cting deepoperat ions. )

.-.

A va r i e ty o f evidence i nd i ca tes tha t S ov ie t pl anne rscon sid er op era tion s conducted a t Manchurian temposiundamenta i t o ach iev ing s t ra te g i c ob je c t ives w i th them i n i m u m pos s ib le r i s k of nuc lea r ho locaus t. r e S ov i e texper ience on the E astern F ront and i n Manchuria convincedthem tha t the use of very mobi le spearheads a t ta c t i c a l andop e r ati on a l l e v e l c on t ri b u te d d e c i s i v e l y t o th e r a @ i dde s truc t io n of th e enemy. ' "Deep b a tt l e concepts haveacco rdingly evolved from narrow s tr i k e s deep i n to thesnemy's r e w t o broad f ro n t enc i rc lement on F r : > n t and m u l t i -F r o n t leve!s, ,using armv .s ized mob il e aro;!ps. 3 . i r assaul .ts,and airborne landings. " I 9

H el i co pters are the pr imary means b y which a i r a s sau l tforce s are ins er ted behind the cover ing fo rc e area, ;2erhapsi n conjunct ion wi th th e act ion s of forward detachments.S ov ie t the o r i s ts be l ieve th a t the combination o f forwarddetachment.=, ai r asaa~!l ts;. nd ccmbat he l ic op ter f i r e:> t . i p~: ,~ .3?~i '5 the "iTc35l: Tau'! -3~!er~ei;.:.al:ing ;:he erleniy s t;ti:.ti::,zl de f e r , -ce qL,icpl~.,:e:- s D ~./

..

.. .al l owl ni : th e I-ii!?her commcnder t o exp1ui.t i n t o th e enemy:'i.


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operational depths". 2uS oviet forc e s truc ture appears t o be evolv ing to meet

th e demands of deep b a tt l e by providi ng mobile groups a tevery 1eve1:

C urrent sophi s t i ca ted S ov ie t maneuver concepts,invo lv ing concerted use o f mu l t ip le tac t ic a l and operationa lmaneuver groups, e xp lo its the f a c t tha t q ua ntity has aq u a l i t y of i t s own. M u l ti p l e maneuver groups op era te i ntandem, employing techniques s p e c i fi c a l l y designed t o pre-empt, unhinge, and pa ra lyz e a defense. T he ir sheer numberc o n t ri b u tes t o t h e l i k e l i h o o d of th e ir success.'maneuver in di c a te s tha t they must con tinue t o pay cl o s ea t ten t i o n t o th e s t ru c tu r e of opera t ional and ta c t ic a lmaneuver.

E xtens ive S ov iet study of past operat ional and ta c t i c a l

The S ovie t Army S tudies O ff ic e ( SASO ) sees a return b:ithe S ov ie ts to the f l e x ib le , ta i l o red , co rps and br igades truc ture which cha racteriz ed the mobile groups of theSecond World War:

W ithin combined arms armies, tank o r mechanized co rpsw i l l conduct o pe ra tio na l maneuver and employ i t s ownta c ti c a l maneuver forc e i n the process. S eparate tank corpsor br igades w i l l s erve as army fo rward detachments.M o to riz ed r i f l e d i vi s i o n s w i l l employ separate tank ormotor ized r i f l e brigade=. as the i r i o rward

COMBINED ARMS I N THE CLOSE RATTLEThe S ovie ts a re ree:.!amining the balance of a l l arms

necessary t o conduct hig h tempo warfa re a ga ins t a we ll armedadversary. The rece nt re pu bl ic a tio n of G eneral F ;otmis trov's1946 speech on B er l i n opera tions i s i nd i c a t i ve u f Sov ietconcern with lrhe nature o i cnmbat i n Western Euroce.r ~pe~:: i ; i i i - . ,n 1 i jh.! : #>+ ~ir:Ie tniza tianand r e ~c r ~s t a t i o n . r,;-, 1 ~ - e e c h , Genera? F:m::ni s tr c v anal'.yzrd tna a r u t . ? ?mi- t?:athampered the S ovie ts when they ca cture d R er? n . Genera?


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Aotmistrov s tresse d the completely d i f f e re nt nature ofcombat, p a r ti c u l a r l y i n "an ti- tan k" terms. What wori::ed i nP oland d i d no t wori:: i n B e rl in . He s ta te d th a t combined arms

.- b.slance arc! ta i l o r i n g down to the subunit le ve l werec r i t i c a l t o the teinpo of th e attac k. The former commandero f 5 th Guards Tank Army spoke o f "shock; s ubunits " and theimportance o f i n f a n t r y i n prosecuting round-the-clockf i gh t i ng . ( F i gu re 3 on page 46 de pi c ts shock u n i ts of theWWI I var ie ty . ) H e a ls o emphas ized' the f l e x i b i l i ty inherent.i n the mechanized co rps s t ruc ture t o f a c i l i ta te o f fens iveope rations i n fore s ted and urbanized terrain."" Whether t h i spresages eventua l reorganiza t ion o f S ov iet ba tta l io ns i n tocombined arms formations i s not yet c lea r , a lthough there i sa s tro ng p o s s i b i l i t y t h i s i s occurring.z4 S ov iet ba tta l io nsare normal ly he avi ly re i nfo rc ed when i n the f i r s t echelon oroperating independently. Hut the arguments concerning forces truc ture s necessary t o ma intain o ffe ns ive momentum i n c l osete rr a i n would appear t o he a5 'Valid tGda:v as i n V74c.. T h e ? ?appears t o be a. growing rea l i z a t io n tha t whi le ba tt l e mightbe c en tra l ly p lanned, i t s execution w i l l be decentra l ized:

The increase i n the s pa t ia l scope o f combat demandsc re a ti v i ty , decis ivenes s, and independence on theba t t l e f i e l d . The Motor R i f l e (Tank) B a t ta l i o n i s the bas i ccombined arms s ubun it and the b as is fo r org an iz ingco ordina t ion of sub units of th e branches of troops.. . Thechanges which have taken p la ce i n weapons and i n equ ippingthe H atta. lio n w ith va rio u5 armament and equipment have a ls ija f fa cted the nature of scornbat. o f small subunits: T hecn i i d i t i ~r - : . . ! c f con5~~ct lng~mh.xt a:.,e chanqei : i t s::,r.yaniziEi;r,n ha5 ktecnme mars i mzle::: T he oepth ci i , .a -1. .I:.a:xts ~ncreas. j d: and th e r-.s,i:e ij.t advar,:e i n 3.n ,27.te~.s i...eh - 35 incrc.xz.ed.. . A commander v r h u cperates aecor c i ng t 3 ap r e s e t plan without tal.::inq i n to .accoc;nt changes i.r!lich C a i eoccvr r id , as a ru l e , w i l l su f fe r fa i:u re i n comaat: f o rc!?mma.n!:! and cont ri i l i n th i s t i a e k r i l l lag behind th e


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development of the actua l s itua tio n. 2s

G reater f l e x i b i l i ty i s necessary a t the company andeven pla too n le ve l because these u n i ts must be prersared t ooperate i n "sepa rate se ctors, sometimes F ar away from themain forces.. .Mistakes and s tere otypi ca l tac t ic s canneu t ra l i ze the e f fec ts of many people."=' I nc re as in gemphasis i s being placed by S oviet wri te rs on the nec es sityfo r f l u i d operat ions by "subun its" a t every le ve l. . Th isemphas is on f l e x i b l e operations mani fests i t s e l f i n bothorganiz at ion and tac t ics . F igure 4 on page 47 provides ade tai le d p ic tur e of how a lead S oviet ba tta l i o n might beorganized f o r combat.

COMMAND AND CONTROLThe complexity of the next b a tt l e f i e l d chal lenges the

S oviets confidence i n the ir t roo p c on tro l methods. A S oviet

b a tta l i o n conducting an attac k may rec ei ve one of thefo l lo wing missions: f i r s t or second echelon of the attac!::fo rc e , combined arms res erve , advance guard, c over inq for-ce.f1ani: ing force, reconnaissance i n forc e, o r t a c t i c a lai rbo rne landin g force.z 7 Given the lar ge number ofattachments and the extreinely small s iz e of the ba tta li o ns taf f , the problem of c o ntro l l in g and coo rdinat ion thee f f o r t o f even a small "s ub un it" becomes monumental. D r i l l sw e used wherever pn s s ib le t o s imp l i f y the process n i(cormand SF!CI cont.ro1..

Aa.rt_omati o n of r o mm a n d and c c n tr c l procescec- a t s t j e t - " . ;poss ib le ievei i s seen as a " m u z t " . The inteqrat lon of

14


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automated command and c o n tr o l proces ses i s e n t i r e i ycons i s tent w i th the d ia le c t i c p rocess o f m i l i ta r ydevelopment, and the F hss ians fe e l t h a t man and techno logyare inatc!ral?,y compatible. They s ee the combination ofca re fu l t a i l o r i n g o f fo rces t o expected miss ions , thei n te g ra t i o n of new equipment acc ording t o th e op era tiona lneeds of the forces , and the automation o f command c o n tr o land communications as p ro vid in g the key to the f utu re . 2e

NUCLEAR POSTURE AND NEW WEAPONSOne o f the s a l ie nt c ha rac ter is t ics o f a l l S o viet

operations i s th e i r "nuclear scared" posture, and thecontinuous planning for immediate tra n s i t i o n t o nuclearsupported operations. E merging S ovie t d o c tri n e does no tconsider the re s o rt t o nuclear weapons as ine vit%B le."9However, the S oviets b el ie ve tha t the presence o f nuclearweapons mandates the continuous performance of miss ions i n a"nuciear scared" posture. A l l operations are planned withth e nciclear .threst j. n mind, and fo rc s s c re o n l y rn+ss*.i!~ r .c lose prm::m:tt.:/ of th e enemy. I t i s t h i s "ncic?ear acar&"do c tr in e which dr ive s the S oviets t o seek h ign tempo,dec is ive operations in vo lv in g the rap id i termi:: i n3 o fS ovie.t and N A TO f o rces i n f l s i d ba ttles.":'

. .

The S ov ie ts are concerned that developing technologyhas created "nuc lear- l i ire" e f fe cts on the b a tt l e f i e ld us inqcunuentrona? ime*.i?.z. The 4evelap,zent oS s m a r t cmunj.tinnr.

. . ..1 a i ci:31c.:;,. , .=-attzrable mine$., ar,c s . z ~~t o : ~ ~~t e , ~:',*,.=ct:on m d attact:: s.:/stemc a re produc inq 2 " t- e~/oS ut~~t~i i "n

- .~... . . . .~+:~? .5,~ e ~ r - d . t n c,I main,, 5awiiet writers.--' " "* , i r- I - , - t i - l -

..

15


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new weapons". according t o former C hief o f th e General S ta ffMars hal Akhromeyev, " w i l l cmne c lo s e t o nuc lea r weapons i npower range and accuracy"32

This concern is manifested i n th e etmphasis Oeinq olscedon the a ttac k from the march by S oviet wri ters :

Today the t ra ns i t io n t o the o f fens ive from the l i n e o fmarch may be eff ec ted no t on ly i n the course o f developmentof b a tt l e i n enemy defenses a t ta c t ic a l o r ope rationaldepth, but als o a t the very beginning of the operation,inc l ud in g dur ing penetrat ion of prepared we l l f o r t i f i e d'defenses , s ince a t tack ing troops can a nni h i l ate ordependably ne utr a li z e defenses by means of nucle ar o r f i r eweapons.. .Then s w i f t l y break through i n depth.ss

No area of developing technolo gy concerns the S ovietArmy more than the f i e l d i n g of "smart" weapons i n qu anti tyby the West. P ol is h mi l i ta r y wri t ing s emphasize th i s point .I n an a r t i c l e e nt i t le d "Ant ic ipated L 'i t-ections fo r change i nT ac tic s of Ground Troops", C olonel S . E oz ie j po in ts out tha tnuc lea r weapons a re growing i n number and decreas ing i ns iz e, wh ile conventional weapons are s w i f tl v approaching the,:iestrL!ctivenecs o f nuclsar weapons. thus "b lu r r ing th ed i s ti n c ti o n " between the two. The c a p a b il it ie s of modernweapons, he argues, fo rc e a "complete re -ev al ua tion of th every essence of the defense on a f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d . " Suc!,weapons i n ve rt the C lause witzian idea of awa iting the Glow.30th sides have a t th e i r dispo sa l nuclea r and non-nuclear= t r i b e weacons, i h i c h c a n cau5.e "abrupt cnanaes i n th e~.~..~.-;.,+~l.o,-c%,+ F n r c r s . " 5.4i n i +i a t i . v e . t ~h e attacl:.er. b u t m a y attemrjt t r e

! ? he ,je.fender ma'. qot ci=.oe i:i-,e

co unterstroke immediately. The r e s u l t nay be comclete

10


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...-.

chaos, wi t h bot h s i des engagi ng i n of f ensi ve combatsi mul t aneousl y.

The Russ i ans ar e concerned about t hei r own abi l i t i es t of i ei d ver *# dest r uct i ve convent i onal weapons. but ar enonet hel ess pr epar ed t o e: : pl oi t t he ef f ect s of t hese weaponsi n t he same manner as t hey woul d expl oi t nucl ear st r i kes.However , t hey ar e gr avel y concer ned t hat t hese devel opi ngt echnol ogi es may her al d a f undament al change i n war f ar e, achange whi ch m ght make t he hi st or i cal f oundat i on of t heSovi et Ar my i r r el evant .PART 111 : U . S . TASK FORCE DEFENSE

Amer i can doct r i ne devel oper s vi ew any Europeanbat t l ef i el d as non- l i near i n nat ur e. ext r aor di nar i l y l et hal ,and compl ex. F M 1

I n hi gh or m d- i nt ensi t y conf l i ct s, Ar my f or ces mu=t bepr epar ed t o f i ght campai gns of consi der abl e movement . Eveni n convent i onal combat , oper at i ons w l l r ar el y mai nt ai n al i near char acter. saColonel Huba Wass de Czege, one o t he or i nci oal

aut hor s of l i :?!:?-5%oes f ur t ner and savs: " The ba.tt le,especi al l y i n t he ar ea wher e t he bat t l e out come i s deci ded.i c, l i kel y t o b e i nt ense. qui ck and deadl v. So much 50 t hati t w l l be di +f i cu?t t o det er m ne what i s goi ng on. "y6 Thet ask f or ce r ol e i s cr i t i cal t o t he cl ose bat t l e. I t i s t hepr i mary execut or o+ t he cl ose bat t l e. FM 100- 5 goes on t o=d.:. , that i t 1!s t he ei oce eat t l e w!-:ich 1 5._.


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t he br i gade cammander ' cr ass at t aches t ank and i nf ant r ycompani es t o f or m t he t ask f or ce. Addi t i onal asset s ar epr ovi ded f r om di vi r i onal uni t s accor di ng t o t he si t uat i on...! dsi:. for..ce= ar e usiua? y def i ned as "tanl : :he avv" ~ rnechheavy" or "bal anced" . Bat t al i ons whi ch have not been t askorgani zed by t he Br i gade ar e cal l ed "pur e". Nor mal l y, t het ask f or ce w l l end up wi t h some m x of between t hr ee t of i ve compani es. . Mechani zed i n- f ant r y bat t al i ons have anaddi t i onal ant i - t ank company equi pped wi t h t he I mpr oved Tow' Vehi cl e ( I TV) . For compar i son pur poses, a mechani zedi nf ant r y t ask f or ce compr i si ng t wo t ank compani es, t womechani zed compani es, and one ant i - t ank company w l l b e usedas a base. ( See f i gur e 5 on page 46)

The modern Amer . i can t ask f or ce i s. as t he Sovi et sr ecogni ze, t he best equi pped bat t al i on l evel or gani zat i on i nNATO . Usi ng t he bal anced t ask f or ce above as an exampl e, wef i nd 6 i nf ant r y pl at oons. '26 mai n bat t l e t anks. Z4c dnncl n/ m ssi 1 r ar ned f i g h t i n g veh c 1 es t we1v e ant - t zr! ::m s3i l e vehi c i es , and si x l Q7 m l l i met er mor t ar - , avai l abl et o t he commander . Each of t he t anks i s, i f one consi derswei ght and advanced ar mor , t he best pr ot ect ed armoredf i ght i ng vehi cl e i n t he wor l d, and t he i nf ant r v f i ght i ngvehi cl e' s pr ot ect i on r i val s t hat of ear l y WW I t anks.

Task:: f or ce defensi ' . , ' e doct r i ne descr i bes t he basi c t V p e c


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f l e >;i b i l i ty . R egardless of the type of defense, the conductof the defense i s based an a frameworlr c o ns is tin g of f i v eelements; deep operations , the main b a tt l e area, res erve..

-

.. I

operations, s ec ur i ty area, and rea r b a tt l e I nt h i s s e c ti on , I'll i scuss the f i r s t four as well as commandand c o ntr o l. Hear opera tions w i l l be touched an br i e f l y i nthe next sect ion.

DEEP OPERATI ONSAmerican planners are placing increasingly greater

emphasis on deep b a tt l e t o dis ru pt and delay, and i n thefuture , des troy S oviet farce s be fore they can engage i nc l o se b a t tl e . T he sciccess of the c los e b a tt l e depends anthe success o f the deep b a tt l e i n d is rup t ing the S ov ieth igher tac t ic a l and operationa l leve l o f fens ive . It wasth i s s ~ippos i t ion f the na ture o f S ov ie t o ffens iveoperations which le d to the pub l ica t ion o f "A i rLand"do c tr in e i n 1'?82.39 T his i s a s ubjec t beyond the scope ofth is paper. bi i t i t wcuic b e remiss nat t c consider t h c t th efunction of "deep opera tions" , p a r t i c u l a r l y a t c o r ~s ndabove, i s t o i s o la te the defens ive b a tt l e and a l low taskfarces t o win th e i r f i g h ts before be ing overwhelmed b f reshforces.

The task force does not conduct i t s awn deep b a tt l e .The tas k fo rc e commander co ns ide rs the e ff e c t o f hig he r deepr:.i:? e..ati. ,.>tecc b a t t i e . Tar;;:. Fur-crs i r ia i i . huwevrr, l.e ;%ct:t . , ' r

e r i n a l j r q e r d e e p operat ion, b u t w i l i be executini;r.:Iw;e c omba t operations ,as p.?.rt o+ that plan.


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MA I N BATTLE AND RESERVE OPERATI ONS' A U. S. task fo rc e can suc ce s s ful ly defend aga inst a

S ovi et R egiment. F M 71-2 states : "L hring the defense, theb a t t s l i o n tasl:: for ce i s expected t o defend agains t anddefea t a th re a t regiment".*O C urrent U. S. doctr ine s ta testh a t the brig ad e should be capable, wi th in the framework ofAirLand R attle , of defending su cc es sfu l ly aga ins t a Sov ie td iv is ion. , T h is same h ierarchy i s car r ied up to Corps lev e lwhere 100-15 s ta te s th a t th e C orps defends ag ains t anddefea ts two or thre e S oviet Armies co mprising aT his i s con s is tent with cu rren t American thought on thes tre ng th of a prepa red defense, which co nfe rs a minimum 3:ladvantage.4z A t the N at ional T ra ining Center, a ba tta l io ntasi:: force normally defends against a regiment.

C urrent task forc e do ctr in e does no t spe ci fy theaverage width or depth of a task fo rc e sec tor or s iz e of aba t . tl e po s i t i on . It i s s afe t o presume tha t i f do c t r i ne i i nt h i s c a s e F M 71-2, shews a t h r e t reg iment a ttac l: :inc or , a .3-3 kii ome ter wide fro ntage , th a t ?qoLl'ld a ls o b~ the width ofsector fo r a task fo rce i n the defense. I n pract ice , taskfo rc e defensi./e fro ntag es may be gre ate r than s' ki iometers,c h i e f l y as a func tio n of the number of b a tta li o n s avai1;uiet o th e br igad e commander and the sectc: fo r which he i sres po ns ible . S ector de+enses 8 % the Ndt iona l T ra ining, - ,,-, e.E-T. f o r e;.:=.m?l.e, ;,ts.?s be zreatiI-,r than 1C-12 !.: i l mx.,3er~r.~r:L d t h .

The concept of depth i s c r i t i c a l t o A irLand do c tr ine .


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F M 71-2 states:Task fo rc e commanders s tru c tu re th e i r defenses by

o f one-quarter t o one-half o f the task: forc e s trengthprovide s add itio na l depth and g i - Y e s th e commander a inaneciverreser-ve by takin l; r i s k on 1 ~s s i k e i y enemy avenues s fapproach i n th e MHA.4?

.. deploying u n i ts ' in depth w i th in the MHA. A mounted reserve.. r apabi i i v 'ag;inst the efiemy. A commander can cr ea te a

T h i s i s a d i s t i n c t change from the "a c t ive defens-e"do ctri ne of the l a te 1970'5, where a "subtracted" reservewas viewed as exceptional . F M 71-2 Goes on to say th a t thetask force w i l l normally maintain a company sized reserve asa co untera ttac k force .44 Tank heavy res erve s are seen asthe id ea l means of s eiz ing the i n i t i a t i v e and going over t othe offense.

Weignting of defens ive e f f o r t i n the task f o rce ,defensive i s achieved by a number of methods including:1) A ss ign ing more maneuver un i ts , 2 ) Narrowing the defensive


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been moved t o t op p r i o r i t y , at l east at the ba t tal i onI n terms of t h e resources normal l y a v a i l a b l e t o

i:.;% i~n ~- a l i u n'+ task f ~j r ce . + ~ e e s t imrr.eriis.re , use 0.fengi neeri ng a,ssetr l i e s i n pro t ec t i n g t h e cr i t i ca i sys+emsof t h e t a s k f o r c e . T he growi ng a va i l a b i l i t y of a r t i l l e r ydel i ver ed mines l essens t h e requi rement t o prepare extensiv em i nef i e l d s .

A merican di v i si on s have some 50 attack h e l i c o p t e r so rgan i c to th e av ia t i on b r i gade, and th e f i e l d i ng of the AH-$4 f am i l y o i armed hel icopters at the Corps level g i vesA merican f or cer an al l weather pl atf orm c apabl e ofd e l i v e r i n g 1arqe numbers of prec i s i on gui ded muni ti ons( P G M 5 ) . A ttack: he? icopters are consi dered - maneuverel ements and normal ly enter t h e ba t t l e at t h e d i r ec ti o n ofco rps and d i v i s i ons , b u t un i t s down to t as k f o r c e level aregeneral l y f ami l i ar with. t he employment of attack h e l i c o p t e r sand roi.ttineiv emplny 'them at t h e Nat ional T ra in i ng Center.ncwever. t h e r e l e as e o i =L!ct: furmidabls asset= t o t h e th.zi:.force wil l b e except i onal , accord ing to General S ai nt ,IJSAREUF: commander. 4 p A task f s r c e ma? w e l l end LIP operat i ngi n con junc ti on w i th a t t a c k h el i c o p ter b a tt a l i o n s as o a r t ofa br igade or d i v i s i o n counterattack.

, .

SECURI TY OPER6TI ONSF!! 71-2 states "The winner o i t h e rec o n n c i s sw i s -

cc~!nkei- ernnna iczancg ii,:ht i 5 not-mai 11/ t . 5~i r t c r I : - : 7 3 2b at t l e . 1' 47 This i s an otutgrnwth o+ analyc, is c i NTCdefen=i ve engaqements and re f lects t ne i jroning concern at


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every l eve l w i t h th e success o f t h e enemy's reconnai ssance.The Center f or Army L essons L earned !CALL) at F o r tL eavenworth quanti f i ed t h e r e s u l t s of t h e reccnnai ssanco-counter reconnai ssance .skruggl e a.t the NTC and determinedthat about 75% of t h e t i m e , th e s i de which defeated t h eenemy's reconnai ssance ef f o r t won t h e engagement.4e

The emphasi s on t h e f o rward secu r i t y f i gh t has l e d toconsi derabl e experi mentation, al l designed t o defeat Sovietground reconnai ssance. The commander may el ect to 'depl oy acompany or company team i n t h e s ec u r i t y area, i n e f f e c tes tab l i sh ing a s m a l l coveri ng f or ce behind t h e br i gade ord i v i s i o n cov er i ng force. I n, ot her schemes, ad hoc forcescomprising scout platoons,, tanks, i nf antr y, and anti - tankassets are formed H i thi n t a s k f o r c e t o f i g h t t h e forwardbattle. Of ten, such forces are grouped under temporaryheadquarters i n or der t o leave t h e r egu l ar maneuvercompanies free to conduct t h e maneuver batt l e .

COMMAND AND CONTROLfimerican combat batta l i ons have a l arg e and w e l l

equi pped command appar atus . I n batt le, t h e t a s k forcecommander h as a staff of iiu to 20 o f f i ce rs and some 3: ) on-sommissioned o f f i ce rs . i nc l uai ng attachments.49 T h i s s t a f fi s almost as l a r g e as t h e t h e staff of a Sov i et regi ment,rwhich ha5 33-24 o f f i c e r s and 412 e n l i s te d sold iers , incI.i!nir!c


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o f the t a s k f o r c e cont ro l system. The batt a l i on e:cecut iveo f f i c e r p rev i o u sl y s p en t almost al l h i s t i m e dea l ing w i thtask f o r c e l o g i s t i c s . N ow he i s l o c at ed i n t h e T acticalO perati ons Cent-.r (TT J C, or main command post o f t a r t a s kf or ce) where he can bes t coord ina te t h e b at t al i o n ' s f i g h tw i th other un i t s and h igher headquar ters . T h i s f r ees t hecommander, al ong w i th h i s operat i ons o f f i cer , to d i r e c t t hemain ef f o r t f rom th e ba t t l e f i e l d . O ther techni ques such asorders groups and m a t r i x or der s have been i ncor porated tospeed t h e complex command and c o nt r o l pr oc ess necessar y t osynchron ize t he d i sparate el ements of t he task fo rce .PART V: ANALYS I S

A l o o k at t h e Soviets' " P r i n c i p l e s of M odern CombinedA r m s Combat" s i de- by s i de wi th FM lW:)-5's " imperat ives oft h e A i r L and B a t t l e f i e l d " is i n s t r u c t i v e . I have i ncl uded as i d e by s i d e l i s t i n g o f both sets of p r i n c i p l e s i n A ppendix1 !page 53! to i l l u s t r a t e th e s imi lar wei ght both A mericanand S o v i e t o f f i c e r s ac co rd t o v a r i o u s f a c e t s of imzdernw3rfare. I t i s n ' t s ur p r i s i n g t h a t t!-:eyare broadly s imi iz r .s ince f o r at l east 15 year s each s i de has regarded t h e otheras t h e pri mary opponent.

I n general terms, S ov i et and A merican vi ews on f ut ur eb a t t l e are congruent. T a k t i k a and F M 100-5 shar e str on gs imi lar i t ies i n t he characterizat ion of modern b at t l e asI , - .e,ir-l..md'' i n char.*cter an d 3.z be ing e,:traordinat-. lv !ett,al.I L ; = . . - = i j e- ' i - i ts \..slid t r . cor ,c lade th5.i: b o t h So;i:zt 3. 62A merican G r m i e s recoani ze th3.i an:.' ba t t l e between t h e two~ o ~ ! l de v i n i r n t . high1.y mobi l e. and c h a r a c t e r i z r c b.v t ; - : e


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use of weaponry which n ei th er army has compl etel y masteredor i n tegrated i n to its operati ons. Both forces env is ionoperat ions i n three di mensions and r t r e s . , r , t h e employment ofav ia t ion assetr. T he l atest e d i t i o n o f F M l W 3 - 5 providedi mpetus f or t h e r e b i r t h of "operational art" i n t h e PlmericanArmy, whi ch, as Colonel L. I). Holder o f f er s, had been anarea of concentrati on l e f t t o our r i v a l s f or near ly 30years. -1.

The i mpact of FM 100-5 is measurabl e. T a k t i k a reflects' t h e acceptance o f "airland" as an emergi ng and v al i d

theoreti cal concept. T h e 1987 e d i t i o n , i n contrast to t heearlier 1984 volume, devotes more at tent i on to t he l o w levelmeeting engagements, ni ght meeting engagements, and th edeiense agai nst counterattacks. I n an ar t ic le e n t i t l e d"Sov ie ts S i z e up A i r l and Batt le" , W i l l i a m Burgess maker t h epo in t that the 1984 e d i t i o n of Takt ika w a s "opt i mi s t i c aboutt h e tactical commander's ab i l i t y t o pre-emgt A irL and S at r l estrikes." Si nce then, h e argues, t h e Swiiets 5ave alterect h e i r be l i e f s . H e cites M ajur General I . V orobeyev'scr i t ic ism of the 1984 Ta k t i k a . who essence sa id t h a t t h enature c7f automated systems l i 1::e TACF I RE would speed 11 0batt le to such a pai nt th at "normat ive t i m e s " w e r e''obso1ete I .=2

H u t one shoul d n o t ;ump t o t he conc lur ion t hat ? h eSovie.ts % re :irimp?i< reac t ing . to Gineriian doctr:~-,al 01-t_ ecii :c1 og1 c a1 deye1opment.4.concerned b ? devel oping technol oqi es, do not cons i d er E - I - I C ~

c J\i i et 5 . !.,f: i 1r , .at- i '#


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devel opment s t o have ail oper at i onal i mpact unt i l t hey havepr ol i f er at ed on t he bat t l ef i el d. I n ot her wor ds. l i m t edquant i t i es of a new weapon ar e not deci si ve. =" One of t hekey t hemes whi ch r ecur s i n vi r t ual l y ever y pubi i cat i on andl ect ur e of t he U. S. Ar my Sovi et Ar my St udi es Of f i ce I S A S O )i s t hat t he Sovi et doct r i ne i s gr ounded i n Sovi etexper i ence, and i s evol ut i onar y i n nat ur e.

Despi t e s i m l ar i t i es i n t he general pr i nc i pl es off ut ur e bat t l e, one shoul d never f or get t he t ot al l ydi ssi m l ar her i t age and t heor et i cal f oundat i on of t he Sovi etAr my. Fundament al di f f er ences bet ween t he Sovi et andGmer i can doct r i ne r emai n i n sever al ar eas. Not al l of t hesedi f f er ences have di r ect i mpl i cat i ons f or t he t ask f or cedef ense, but same deser ve f ur t her anal ysi s. Let ' s l ook:agai n at some of t he ar eas di scussed pr evi ou5l y.

SURPRISE AND TEMPOSovi et t act i cal capabi l i t i es cannot b e measur ed wi t hout

i ncl udi ng t he . val ue of sur pr i se. Our def ense cal cul at i onsdepend on suf f i ci ent t i me t o structure th e bar t l ef i s l d. 9c! tt hi s f ai l s t o r ecogni ze t he val ue whi ch t he Rus s i ms accor dsur pr i se. Sovi et oper at i onal pl an5 ar e keyed t o achi evi ngsur pr i se. The gr eat er t he sur pi se, t he hi gher w l l he t het empo of oper at i ons. Not onl y t i m ng of t he at t ack, butdi r ect i on and st r engt h w l l be car ef ul l y conceal ed f r om t heLl..f. def ender . A s c!i .=c' .iEsed ear l i er . th e r eEul t b ~ i l l :>::el\;be a.!i - 7, t tackagai r: : st a ~a r t i a ' l > prepared def ense.

i f vre assi . !me t h a t t he most pr obabl e f crm o f s 5cviotoffensix.,e t.~~!. i l d e an sttack . qa. i ns t a part i al !y preos. rer ,


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.

def ense, what then would be t h e tacti cal form o f ' tha tattack? I d eal l y , t h e Soviet p lan f o r b a t t l e would su rp r i set h e def ender and al low -for t h e rap id penet ra t i on of th eco',.'ering f o r c e by forward detachnents i n order- t o a n q a q emain defenses s imul taneousl y wi th t he coveri ng force b a t t l e ,and a t ta c k i n depth w i th f i r es and ai r assaul t f o rces . Acrucial po in t : the main e f f o r t is made pos si bl e bydimin i shi ng t he weight of ' attack as th e d i s tance f rom th emain ef for t i ncreases.

Once come degree of sur pr i se i s obtai ned, thei n i t i a t i v e 'must be mai ntai ned thr ough tempo or t h e b e ne f i t sof su r p r i se d i ssapate. Hy overl oading t h e opponent wi thm u l t i p l e s t r i k e s , t h e Soviets w i l l del ay t he recogni t i on ofsecondary e f f o r t s un t i l i t is too l ate.

From t he perspect i ve of t he t a s k force commander, i t i sless important t o specu l ate on how t h e Russians mightach ieve surpr i se than i t i s t o understand t h e pot enti ale f f e c t s CS su r pr i se and high tempo oper ati ons on 'The amountof t i m e a v a i l a b l e to prepare a def ense. R egardl ess of t h estate o f preparat ions or t h e cover ing f o r ce s i tuat ion , t h et a s k f o r c e m!-ist be prepared to engage i n ac ti v e combatopera-t ons.

COMBI NED ARMS, MOBI LE GROUPS, AND CLOSE BATTLESoviet opera t i onal p l ans g i v e tar more shape t o the

? -. 9c*i-=..__ n tfie bat . t l e i i e?d tnan S ~ I Z I : ~ . ~evel %?zri,:srt TI:provide. A 1 though FIjmeriean d o c t r i n e ho l d s t h a t 3 c a s t : f c ~ c ec.an de+e* t a regi ,ment, i t doe.; nct f o l l o w t h a t a S c v i e t ~arrn;:


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commander (who determines regimenta l attac l:: zones) wi 11o b li ge by committing a regiment again s t each. forwardba ttal io n task: force. If i s ( th e army commander's) miss ionis tn break: through t o op eratio na l depth, then he w i l lattempt to f i n d ways t o focus the ma jo ri ty of the combatpower of a d i v is io n against an is o la ted bat ta l ion . T erra ini s no t a s important as the c or re la t io n of forces. Ifpene trat ion t o great depth i s no t required, then ass ets w i l lnot be wasted.

I n ta c ti c a l terms, the defending b a tta l i o n commanderco uld expect t o face one (o r more) of the fo ll o wi ngs i tuat ions ; 1 ) attack by an army forward detachment, 2)attac k by a d i vi s io n a l forward detachment, 3) attack by upt o two regiments (depending on defens ive s ec tor wi dth!. ano4! a supporting at tack ca rr ie d out by a regiment or less.F igures 6 through 9 (pages 49-52) conta in a ser ie s ofdiagrams which depic t pos si ble S oviet attac k var ia t ion s .

The d e ta i l s of the S ovie t combined arms b a t t l e deservea ttentio n. S oviet idea s of combined arms b a tt l e go beyondcombining tank:s wi th in fa ntr y. The balancing of a l l arms,inc lud ing he l icopters , w i th tanks and a r t i l l e r y , appears tobe a grohing concern i n terms of f u t u r e organization. We i nth e American Army tend t o be very "machine" conscious andmeasure S oviet combat power i n terms of numbers of EllPs anatack: - , . B u t as Genera; R otmis trn v'= speech emphasized. i t - 5.ni?t ~ c h eweigkrk ,c+ armor which c r ow i t - , b u t the balsnce a l l. a r ms !and p a rt ic u l a r l y in fa ntry ) i n accordance wi th ta c t ic a lcsndit ions which i s important.


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-.. .

The compos ition of R uss ian maneuver u n i ts has .majorimpl icat ions . I f th e HTH equipped regiment i s organized toinc lude combined arms. shcci:: groucc- o r "shock: s ubun its " i nthe manner suggested b y General R otmistrov, then these i m tz .would be wel l su i ted t o execute tha t po r t ion o f c lose b a tt l einvo lv ing ass aul t and reduct ion o f defenses . A r t i l l e r ysupport coctid be c e n tr a l l y managed at regiment, s ince tnespeed of advance of thes e elements would be keyed t o thesequentia l massing o f f i r e aga inst ba tt l e pos i t ions . I f were fe r aga in t o our U. S. balanced task force and examine thenumbers of i n f a n tr y av a il a b le t o the commander, we wouldcome up w ith a fi g u re of appro ximately 150 dismountedpersonnel. I f we look at the HTK equipped reqiment, wewould f i n d a to ta l o f 7X! dismounted infa ntry.s 4 T his fourt o one advantage could be very important i n the te rr a in ofWest Germany. The n ine i n f a n tr y companies of the regimentcould become "shock subunits", working cl ose1 y with tanks,sapper engineer un its , heavy a r ti l l e r y . and mortars t oreduce American companies piecemeal. The depth o f deienseand de ns ity of an ti- tan k weapons w i l l determine theechelonment of the regiment. I f a Sov iet batta l ion i s i::epti n second echelon, i t w i l l receive attachments only whencommitted.ss

The tank: and BM F regiments, along with the independent1..e.ni:: b a tta l i ' l n , may .form mobile grsx!pr, tasl:: organizilc F5nit ra ined f o r m o r ~ ecentral i Z T C combat a t the b a t l a i onle ve l . The d iv iz io ? independent tank ba tta l io n, i w h i c h


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today compri ses 51 t a n k s i n f i v e compan ies) , re i n for ced by aBMP and ar t i l l e r y bat ta l i on ! th ree r i f l e companies, th r eehowi tzer bat ter i es , and one mortar ba t t er y ) , might becomet h e fOrVJ ard detachment of th e d i v i s i on and execute a deeptacti cal mission. The a t t a c k h el i c o p t er s of t h e d i v i s i o nwould suppor t t h e fo rw ard detachment. Th e remainder o f t h eBMP regi ment ( t w o r i f l e and one tank bat ta l i on) might fo l lowt h e f orw ard detachment and be assi gned t h e m i s s i o n ofconducting tactical e x p l o i t a t i o n to d es tr o y a r t i l l e r y andcommand posts. T he tank regiment mi ght be r et ai ned t oconduct operati onal penetrat i on through th e w a k e of t h eassaul t BTR un i t s and beyond t h e di sr upti on caused by t h el ead mobi l e groups.

A t army level , a f orward detachment might b e b u i l taround t h e i ndependent t a n k regi ment, which today consistsof th r ee tank ba t ta l i ons w i th 150 tanks tota l , and a BMPb at t a l i o n w i th 45 BMPs.'~ When commi tted, t h i s un i t miahtS e re i nf or ced by one or more arti l ler 'v b at t a l i a ns . am u l t i p l e rocket l auncher batt a l i on, and assor ted engi neersand ai r defense. I t would also be supported bv t h e armva t t a c k hel i co pter regi ment, which deploy s 40 Mi-24 HI ND and20 M i - 8 #I F a i r c r a f t . T he l i k el i h oo d i s h igh that the Zr:wf orward detachment would o per ate i n conj uncti on wi th an armyleve l ai r as3 au l t a n i t o f b a t t a l i o n s i z e . Obvicusl . / . t h i sW O L I ~ ~e a f or mi dabl e E1:riking L orco.

TL . nat.c!rr oF combat agai nst forwarn aotacl-:m-.nts. L)?i ndeed, agai ns t 3n.v " mobil e grac.p" i s misunderstand.F:-,rr.J ard aetachments are zesn 3.5 advanced guards. and ccJ?ne:t


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wi th them i s seen as an exten s ion of combat ag ains t a S ovie treg iment. They a re no t advance guards. F orward detachmentsw i l l i i s e hig h speed cclc!mn ta c ti c s and avoid b a tt l e withdefending forces . , i i n l e ~s h e i r m:is5ion c a l l s fo r i t .

The U.S. Army has experience de al ing w ith a t l e a s t oneforward detachment; B attle gro up P eipe r spearheaded the 1stSS P a n i e r D iv i s ion s assau l t i n the A rdennes i n 1344.F or tuna te ly fo r U.S. forc es , the remainder of the 1s t SSPan r e r D iv is io n was prevented from jo in in g B attlegrou pP eiper. The impact o f even one fo rwa rd detachment was f e l ta i l the way to 12th Army Group h e a d q ~ia r te r s . ~~

The concept of forward detachments i s no t addressed i nany d e ta i l i n cur do c trine . T he ir presence may compel thedefending task force t o engage a forward detachiment whiieth e c ove rin g f o rc e b a t t l e i s s t i l l i n p ro gre ss (s ee f ig u r e7 ) . I f a forward detachment i s t o be halted, i t w i l l havetcj be he av il y engaged by for ce s from the tas k fo rc ei n i t i . a l ? y , and possibly b.y brigade and d i ~i i s i o na l e serve ssuch as attack he lic op ters . S ince forward detachments w i l l

....

..

normal ly operate i n the zone of the ta c t i c a i main attac k,t h i s means th a t a task fo rc e engaging a forward detachmentw i l l not be i n a favorable po s i t io n t o engage fo l l owi ngmotor r i f l e or tank regiments conducting the main attac k.T ! i e task:: fo rce mist be g iven th e f l e x i b i l i t v t o ccnduct!nc::l:> 115 ; : 3ce t - . 3 t!oii? >>I, I - , Y-se +II~*,*J .~:- .c ! cje.taci-ment w h i l ? . , - : er_o.vrri!ig for ce dela:.~he advanciny main attack::. I .$ there1 : i-, [) -l.isstati.tia?I. covs?r.i,nq fu rc e , therl the tar-:: f o rce r m ~i s t


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conduct ope rations designed t o h a l t the forward detachmentand r e l y on brig'ade t o s top th e remainder.

F orward detachments mu lt ip ly by s everal times thethreat t o the task +orce rear area., p a rt i c u la r i y j f the-yoperate i n co njun ction with a i r as sa ults. Command pos ts andt ra in s can e i the r be organ ized to f i g h t o r tuck i n behindmaneuver un i ts . The s i z e of th e main command po s t andcombat t r a i n s make i t d i f f i c u l t t o a ccomplis h th e l a t t e r ,wh ile th e la ck of heavy weapons miti ga tes aga ins t theformer. I n any case, the tas k forc e m u s t proceed under theassumption tha t thes e re a r elements may fi n d themselvesinvolved i n combat a ct ions with s ubs tant ia l forcess i m c i l taneously with the maneuver teams.

The extens ive use of he l ic op ters by the R ussians posesa s ig n i f i c an t th rea t t o the a l l e lements of the tas k force.S o vi et w r i ti ngs i nd i ca te tha t up t o 25% o f a l l f i r e s maycome from c lo s e support he lic op ters .=e A S oviet attack:helicopter squadron organic t o the d iv is ion might u s sbetween two and s ix armed he li c o pte rs t o s tr i k e a cnmpar:vteam detected i n movement. C lose support a i r c r a f t such a=the SU-25 might be included i n the attack, i f the target wasimportant. La rger s tr i k e packages should be expected i nsupport of army forward detachments, w ith 16-24 a i r c r a f ti nv o he d .

I n order tr - mcI>de. the tasl:: f o rce m u z t be greparr6 t zen . ; age a i r f ht - eat s. I n the ne3.r term. l i t - i j er en-cnro tect ion ava i l ab le to the t a s k f o rce w i l l co ns i s t o is.houlder . fi re d mi s s il e s . acctomatic cannon f i r e . and E m a i l


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...

. .

ar ms. The l ack of ef f ect i ve ai r def ense may have t heconsequence of sever el y r est r i ct i ng movement of f r i endl yf or ces , pr eci sel y when t hev must move.

F I RE SUPPORTThe i mpr ovement s t o Sovi et ar t i l l ery ar e s i gni f i cant

beyond f i r e suppor t t er ms. Mobi l i t y and pr ot ect i on pr ol ongt he l i f e expect ancy o f Russi an ar t i l l er y i n t he f ace ofr api d U.S. count er f i r e. The i ncr eased r ange of ar my andf r on t ar t i l l er y per m t s massi ng of f i r es l at er al l y and f r omgr eat er di st ances behi nd advanci ng Sovi et col umns, whi l ei ncr easi ng number s of sel f - pr opel l ed ar mor ed ar t i l l er y uni t sper m t di r ect at t achment of mor e ar t i l l er y uni t s t o maneuverbat t al i ons and f orward det achment s. The c l ose i nt egr at i onof ar t i l l er y wi t h manec!ver ar ms i n t ur n eases t he ar t i l i er yr equi r ement s f or neut r al i zi ng def enses, because t he Sovi et sdepend on di r ect observat i on of t ar get s by ar t i l l er ycommander s t o synchr oni ze f i r es dur i ng t he accompani mentphase o i f i r e suppor t .

Fr ot ect i ng t he f or ce f r om t h e f i r e st r i L: es e i t heat t acki ng Sovi et f or ce shoul d be t he f i r st consi der at i on ofth e task!: f or ce commander . Task: : f or ces posi t i oned i n 11l y:el . ymai n ef f or t sect or s must be r ei nf or ced wi t h suf f i c i entengi neer uni t s t o al l ow ver y r api d pr epar at i on of pr ot ect edposi t i nns. A sur vi vabi 1i t . y pr i or i t y f or t ask f or ce ei ement si ni t- ~et t:te :incor;:rorated : n t o 71,*.r?s. Ot h e r tneasut-es ciich a,r ever se .;1 ope de+ei- tsec m u s t b e ad~ept edw hereVSr - Feasi S?e.

Wht?n ext.ensive engi neer suppor t i sn t avai l abl e. the


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armor on an MZ Bradley may be the on ly p ro tec tio n ava i la bl eto the in fan t ry during S ov ie t f i r e s t r i kes . S epara ting thein fa n tr y from the tra c ks may work if dequate time i sava i lab le to prepare pos i t ions , hut would be r i s kv i n viewo f the po te n t i a l e f f e c t s o f S o vi et a r t i l l e r y on i n f a n t r yoccupying has ty pos it ions . The M 1 and M2 are wel l protectedagainst in d ir e c t f i r e . T his advantage should be explo i tedby prac t ic in g rap id repo s i t ion ing of companies t o avoidin d ir e c t f i r e and keeping the infantr. ; near the c a rr i er swhere immediate p ro te c ti o n i s a v ai la b le , a t le a s t u n t i lpo s iti o ns wi th overhead cover a re completed.

The tas k fo rc e commander m u s t not fo rget that theS ov iets intend to a l te r the "c orre la t ions o f fo rces" throughf i r e support. Systemic ana lys is of S oviet forces hasspawned emphasis on co un terf ire t o dis ru pt S oviet f i r esupport. C olonel Tom W hite's a r ti c l e , "Di s rup ting the Tempoof S oviet O perations", po ints out the c r i t i c a l importance c ff i r e support t o S ov ie t ma.neuver succes.5, and the absoiutenec es sity t o 1::eep S oviet a r t i l l e r y from dominating the c io reba ttle ."9 B riga de and d i v i s i o n commanders must devotes uf f ic ie nt resources t o the co unterf i re . Without suchsLipport3 the task: forc e( s ) fac ing the main e f f o r t w i l l bera p id l y overwhelmed.

SECURITY OPERATI ONSP rotect. ing the force al5.o e n ta i l s degrs.ding the So,,iet

r13~C71?1-,;(1s~~.r,ce.apatji 1 t y b.:~e',iery pos s i ~l e nes.ns. ! I m a ~ t z r - .reconnaissance can be di.vi ded i n to a c tiv e and pas si vemeacure5. Me mist nc t f al l i n to the t r a p c f as;rurning Soviet


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. .

ground reconnaissance i s the end-a ll t o prov id ing theS ovi ets in tel l i ge n c e . During the Second World War, fo rexample, 30% of a l l .a ir . s o rti e s were reconnaissance

The S ovi ets admonish commanders t o make fi-tl 1 us eo f a spectrum of in te l l ig e n c e gathering sources. O u ropera tions s ec ur i ty (OPSEC) m u s t b e equally broad band.

T his i s not t o deny th a t the importance of the groundrecon batt le . It i s v i ta l l y important t o the Sov ietcommander, and may be important enough t o mountreconnaissance i n fo rc e ope rations by companies andba tta l i on s to get the necessary information. The S ovietsrecognize that reconnaissance i n forc e may ju s t as ea s i l yco nvert t o spearheads if he s itu a tio n develops favorablv."

The counter- reconnaissance b a tt l e i s a po ten t ia l l yvi o le n t f i g h t waged before and during the clas h of mainelements. T hi s may be a miss ion which th e tas k fo rc e canaccomplish wi th an ad-hoc fo rc e b u i l t around the scoc!tplatoon. H ut aoing i t i n such a manner w i l l Drevent thea cqu i s i t i o n of key i n te l l i g e n c e on th e enemy. The tasi::fo rc e commander may see i n e xc ru c ia tin g de ta i l the counter-reconnaissance batt le , but m i s s the more importantinfo rmation h i s own reconnaissance co uld p rovide h i m i f noti nv ol ve d i n the se c u r i ty ba t t l e . My co nc lus io n i s t ha tcompany teams w i 11 probably be requ ire d t o conduct counter-v-c?, .:G~


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t h i s missio n. There >nay be to o many avenues t o cover t osend a company forward and s t i l l maintain an ef fe c ti veres erve. The company team ~is e d n a forwar.d r o l e may no t bea v a i l a b l k t o rec ons t i tue the reserve, given the S ovietp r o c l i v i ty fo r forward detachments. L ikewise, th e makeup o ithe tas k f orc e may l i m i t th e commander's optio ns .

COMMCIND AND CONTROLThe S ovi ets have a potent ia l problem w i t h

qu an tif ic ati on of the unknowable. I n order t o use normatives o lu tio ns i n combat s itu a tio ns , the S oviet commander i sc r i t i c a l l y dependent on reconnaissance. Gs th e b a t t l e f i e l dbecomes more and more d is o rde r ly , th e amount of us ab lei n t e l l i g e n c e w i l l decrease. To account f o r in te l l ig e n c eyaps, the S ovie ts w i l l p lan fo r a l a rge fudge fac to r i n l i e uof hard information. I f American task forces provep a rt i c u la r l y adept a t the counter-reconnaissance ba tt le , i ti s l i k e l y th a t t he S o vie ts w i l l res or t t o reconna issance i n.Force, a technique w h i c h was o f te n used i n World War I I . & =However, th i s i s not the preferred method o i gainingin te l l i gence , and w i l l be undertak:en onl y a t the d ir e c tio nof the higher commander.bz

The problem of conduc ting ope rations ag ains t an e lus i v eopponent impacts di r e c tl y on th e S ovie t b a tta li o n commander.The di ff e re nc e between what the R ussian ba tta l i o n commandere:.:p?cCs on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d and what he g e ts may b e c r i t i c s !+.LJ.. tho : S ( . ~C C ~S B c f t? ~e oviets. i n ac hirv inq an cperaticr,aibreak: _ h -ouyh.

"The command and c o n tr o l problem i s p a r t i c u l a r l y a c u t e


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a t subuni,t le ve l. B a tta li o n commanders. .. are often youngand inexpe rience d, and they are aided by a s ta f f c omprisingon ly four o f f i c e rs and praporshch ik i (warrant o f f i c e rs ) andnine o ther ranks.

T his does no t matter as long as the b a tta l i o n i soperating as. a mere cog i n a regimental machine. It mattersverv much indeed, however, when th e ba tt a l i o n i s a c ti n g i nan independent or semi-independent i:apacit.jl f o r instance asa forward ra id in g or o utf la nk ing detachment, or as anadvance guard.

Here may b e the A ch i l l es hee l o f h igh tempo f l u i d S ov ie toperat ions, i f we can f i n d ways t o e xp lo it it.PART V r CONCLUSI ONS

However d e s ira bl e a . fu l 1 y prepared defense may b e , th eS ov ie ts w i l l d ic ta te the time, place , and s treng th of theattack and w i l l do everyth ing conceivable t o achievesurp r ise . A lthough to ta l su rp r i se i s un l i k e l y , extreme lys ho rt warning i s not, and consequently, many, if ot thema jo r i ty of main ba tt l e area task fo rce s and cover ing forcesw i l l be engaging f rom on ly p a r t i a l l y prepared pos i t ions.One so lu t io n to t h i s problem would be the fo r t i f i c a t i o n o fkP :e inter-German S order. therebv e l im in a ting the prepara tian.time. T hi s i s n o t p o l i t i c a l l y a cc ep ta ble t o the Mest Germs!?government. T herefore, tr a i n i n g sc ena rios should bemodi fied to r e f l e c t an at tack on a p a r t i a l l y or unprepareddefense. assuming va ryi ng degrees of .s urpris e.

C lose combat do c tr in e fo r th e heavy task fo rc e shouldbe modif ied t o recognize the ts i l o re d , combined arms nature:2f 'the Sovie.t a' t tark . Me muzt stop consider ina the So . , : ! . ~ . t:-.ei_:i:Tien!- n i so l c t i im a n d begin 1anlir:sg , s t t f i e totaltz'.c't:cal p i r t ~i r e . A Soviet regiment does not f i g h t aloneblut periorms m:Ejsicfz, zts p a r t o f a coherent operational


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p lan . The actual f o r ce aga ins t which t h e t a s k f o r ce defendsmay r u n th e range of f o r c es f rom reconnai ssance el ements, tomobile groups. to re i nf or ced regiments conduct ing a" d o c t r i n a l " attaci::. Exainining a So vi et regi ment i n t h ea t t a c k is usefu l a5 a s ta r t i ng po in t and p reven ts "mirrori maging", but shoul d n o t b e t h e sole b a s i s of our tacticaldef ens i ve doc t r i ne.

I n tel l i g en ce estimates should also i nc l ude aneval uat i on of f or ested and urban te r ra in . T he Soviets haveth e n ec es sar y i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y t o e x p l o i t lessdes i r abl e avenues of approach, and are apparent lyconsi deri ng ways to m a k e use of them. The t a s k f o r c e p l anshould at l east address sur vei 1 l anc e and conti ngencymeasures f o r th ese areas. F r o m th e br i gade perspect i ve .sector respo ns i b i l i t y must no t be so l e l y based on hi gh speedavenues, bu t on a det ai l ed assessment of S ovi etcapabi 1i t i es.

I f t h e NTC: i s t o c o nt i n ue r e a l i s t i c a l ? y s i m~i l a t i n g ~ Enext armored batt l ef i e l d , then r esourc es must be prov ided t oallow a f u l l r ange of poten t ia l enemy capab i l i t i es to b edup l i cated . The f u l l combined a r m s th reat shou ld bepresented, no t jus.t t h e major vehi c l e systems. I t i su n r e a l i s t i c to bel i eve th at such an upgrade coul d becampl s.ted i n th e near f u t u r e . Hut a l t e r n a t i v e s arei v a i l a b l e . Ar - . ! : i l l e r - l / str.ti::esshould be planned tb t h e OF 'FI~F:e z a c t l y as t ,heir Sowlet co unter part s would p l an them, 3 ~ ~ 1.then be eycecnted through f i r e support mechanisms.


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C onsi derati on should be gi ven to convert i ng t he cur rentOPCOR HMP regi ment t o a tank regi ment, which would morenear l v a l i gn t he numbers of personnel carriers and

.

.

dismounted i n f antry ava i l ab l e w i t h what t h e actual enemvun i t would Forward detachment scenarios andvertical envel opments shoul d be used i n t r ai n i n g r o t a t i o n sal ong w i th t he current selections. Defense probl ems shoul dl i m i t t h e amount of preparat i on t i m e a v a i l a b l e to taskforce. Greater numbers of a t t a c k hel i copt ers should beprovided f or OPFOR main attacks and mobi l e groups.

So v i e t attack h e l i c o p t e r s w i l l m a k e t h e b at t l ef i e l d ahazardous p l ace f o r f r i end l y un i t s . The near term solut ionto our ai r defense shortages l i e s i n improving o u rcamocif lage di sc i pl i ne when s tat i on ar y , and devel oping ai rdef ense d r i l l s f o r movement. A i r overwatch of tanks bydesignated B radleys and prof i c i ency wi th .XI cal i ber machineguns w i 1I assist movement.

T he contir?ued mnderni i ati on of Sol- i et f i r e cupport mc!ztb e examined by A meri cans no t o nl y i n t e r m s o i its abso l u tequant i ty , but i n terms of i ts potent i a l to changecorrelation of fo rces . I f Sov i et o f f ens i ve opera t ions areto have any rhance of s u c c e s s , Soviet f i r e support must beex tremely e f f e c t i v e i n neu t ral i z i ng a cons iderable por t ionof t h e iJ .S. tac ti c al def ense. From th e task forcep e r s p e c t i v e , ' _ hes1-1cces5 r .F.3'i l u rE o f the deep b a t t l e ma vb e 1 . i hii-qe on hei - ican !counterf i re . i i i e ccun t e r i i r r pr'zorri r therefore of c r i t i ca l importance .to t h e task f orcec: c jmnander .

-.


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While the NTC s uffers from resow-ce co ns tra ints,ba tta l i o n lev el s imula t ions are a lmost to ta l l y open ended.Command po s t ex erc is es o f f e r the be s t near term means o fstc!dying emerging S oviet d o c tri pe and i t s p os s ib le e f fe c t onthe task force . E xce l lent products are ava i lab le t ocommander th a t make i t poss ib le t o conceptualize the dynamicnature of S ov iet ta c t ic a l doctr ine . S imulations re f i neop era ting procedures and plan s w ith in the scope of as op his t icated and f l e x i b l e ope rat ing framework.

If here i s a bottom l i n e t o th i s monograph i t i s tha tAmerican tas k forc e d oc trine i s f a i r l y comprehensive, anddes cribe s i n some de ta i l what a tas k f o rc e must do i ndefense. When appl yi ng it, ca utio n must be exercise d t oavoid v is ua l iz in g b a tt l e as a s er ie s of d is cre te engagementsbetween conveniently categorized elements. It i s o n ly to oeasy to a r r i ve a t the be l ie f tha t by look ing a t te r ra in and"do ctr i na l" factors , one can pre dic t S oviet of fens ivebehavior. Ecut war 1s a two sided business. and We shouldno t presume th a t a E uss ian would be so ob lig ing . We mustdevelop a mindset which recognizes the f l u i d i ty of b a tt le ,and an awareness o f the s imultaneous na ture 0.f highin te n s i ty combat. We have w r i tte n about non-1 ine arba t t le f i e ld s s ince the incept ion o f A irLand ba t tle . I f weT ngage the S ov ie ts i n ccimbat we w i l l have ever!, upF o rtu n itv11u e:.;perienre one.


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,. .

Ar t i l i e r v L J ens i t i es :1. As a i n s t p r e p ar e d d ef a ns a s o n ma i n a xi s . ..lC-2-2W ...;a.r~rtzper - k i i o me t e r .2. Aga i ns t ha s t y de f e n s e o n ma i n ax i s . . . r u- 86 we ap on s i k m3. On a s u p po r t i n g axi s . . . 45 we ap on s / k mAr t i l l e r y s uppo r t o f a ma i n a x i s d i v i s i o n a t t a c k i n g apa r t i a l l y pr e pa r e d dc t e ns e .

-_

END 10

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Fi gur e 8 : S nv i a t b i v i s i o n c o nd uc t i n g t h e m i i n at:a,:i: ; z ; i n . s ~a par t i a l i:< p r e pa r e d 11.3. defense. E a s e u upon T h s h , . - i e tconduct 8t gar . bv ~: oi unal Glan tz . 5 A \ j i j . 31- d - , , . 137.Ocers t ions . S r i t i s h A r m y F i e i d Ma n u al .


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m xi'


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APPEND XSov i et P r i n c i p l e s of Combi ned Ar ms Combat :1 ) Const ant h i gh c ombat r e ad i ne s s f o r ma t i o ns , uni t s , andsubun ts.2 ) Hi gh aggr es s i v enes s , dec i s i v enes s , and t h e uni nt er r upt edc o nduc t of bat t l e.3) S ur p r i s e i n oper at i ons . ( mos t i mpor t ant pr i nc i pl e)4 ) Coor di nat ed j oi nt u s e of b r a nc h es of t r o o ps and s pec i alt r o ops i n c o mba t , and ma i n t e na nc e of c o nt i n uo us i nt er a c t i o nbet ween t hem5 ) Dec i s i v e c onc ent r at i on of t h e mai n e f f or t s of t h e t r oopson t he ma i n axi s at t he needed t i me.6 ) Ma ne uv er by s u bun i t s and uni t s , and by nuc l e ar and f i r es t r i kes .7 ) Thor ough c ons i der at i on and ut i l i z a t i on of mor al ,pol i t i c al , and ps yc hol ogi c al f ac t or s i n t he i nt er es r s ofc ar r y i ng out t h e as s i gned m s s i on.8 ) Compr ehens i ve suppor t t o combat .9) Ma i n t e na nc e and t i me l y r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e c o mba tc apabi l i t y.10) F i r m and c o nt i nuous t r oop c ont r ol and per s i s t enc e i na t t a i ni ng pl anned go al s and i n f ul f i l l i ng adopt ed dec i s i onsand as s i gne d m s s i ons .AirLand Bat t l e I mper at i ve61 ) Ens u r e uni t y of e f f o r t2 ) Ant i c i pat e e vent s on t h e bat t l ef i el d31 Co nc e nt r a t e c o mba t power a ga i ns t enemy v ul ne r a bi l i t i e s4) Des i gnat e, s us t ai n and s hi f t t h e mai n e f f o r t5 ) Pr es s t he f i ght6 ) Move f as t , s t r i k e har d , f i ni s h r api dl y7) Us e t e r r a i n , we at he r , de c pt i o n, and OP SEC8) Cons e r v e s t r engt h f o r de ci s i v e ac t i on9 ) Combi ne a r ms and s i s t e r se r v i ces t o compl ement andr ei nf or c e10) Under s t and t h e ef f ec t s of bat t l e on s ol di er s , uni t s , and1 e a de r s


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ENDNOTES

.

1. Def ense Al manac, Sept ember / Oct ober , ( Washi ngt onD. C. . 1988) . D. 26.2 . Gl ant z, Davi d M. , " Sovi et Oi f enc- i ve Gr ound Doct r i neSi nce 1?45" , ( Ft. Leavenwor t h, Kansas, 1988) p . 51- . 12.3. Gl ant z, Davi d' M. , " The Nat ur e of Sovi et Oper at i onalAr t " , Par amet er s. Spr i ng 1985. p.4.4. Ar mv Fi el d Manual , Vol ume 11- Par t 2~ Sovi etOper at i ons, ( London, Engl and, Apr i l 1986!, p. 2- 1 thru2- 9.5. Rezni chenko, V. G. , Takt i ka, ( Moscow, 1987) , p . 75.6 I bi d. , p. 20.7. Hi nes, J ohn G. , Sovi et Front ODer at i ons I n EuroDe-Pl anni nq for Enci r cl ement , ( Ft . Leavenwor t h, 1988) . Hi nesargues t hat t he Sovi et s woul d enci r cl e, r at her t hanat t empt t o br eak t hr ough t he power f ul U. S. f or ces.3. Ar mv Fi el d Manual . V o l n m e 11- Par t & Sovi etODer at i ons. op- ci t . . p . 4- 6.9. Donnel l y, C. N. , Lect ur e gi ven t o t he of f i cer s of t heVI I (US) Cor ps i n 1985 at Kel l y Bar r acks, St ut t gar t , FHG.10. Si mpki n, Ri char d, Race t o t he Swi f t , ( London, 1?35!11. Koz i ej , S ., "Ant i ci pat ed Di r ect i on f or Chanoe i nTact i cs of Gr ound Tr oops, Sovi et Fut ur e War. !Ft.Leavenwort h Or i gi nal l y publ i shed i n Sept ember 1936.t r ansl at ed i n 1987, publ i shed i n Apr i l 1987! , p . 4 th ru 9.12. Hol comb, J ames F. . " Recent Devel opment s i n Sovi etHel i copt er Tact i cs" , ( Sovi et St udi es Resear ch Cent r e, RMASandhur st , Mar ch 17881, p. 12 thrci 14.13. Dr agunski y, D A. , The Mot or i zed f i i f l e !Tank!Bat t al i on Combat ( Moscow, 7 Apr i l 1986) J PHS, UMA-88,24 Mar 1988, see t act i cal exampl es.14. Hol comb, J a mes F ., op. ci t . . p. 1 1 , 13. I ?.15. . Tal : :t i i :a. P137, co. ci t . I . ? 5. S Z , $5. - 3 a.-, I

51


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16. Hines, op.cit. . p.18 t h r u 21. Hines uses t h e"V orashi l ov F apers" , recent l y decl ass i f i ed, f ar much ofh i s an al y si s . Also included i n t h e a n a l y s i s w a s anormativ e graph showing probabl e attacl :: sucess as af uncti on of tank/anti -tank densi ty. I n ca lcu la t ing thec o r r e i a t i o n of forcer. t h e Sov i ets cons ider the rat ios i nbo.th t h e s p e c i f i c at t acl : : sector ana i n depth through t h edef ense. Noted S ov i et researcher C. N. Donnel ly poi ntsou t th at whi l e advanced tank pro tecti on modifies t heoutcomes, i t i sn ' t enough t o i nsur e success.17. Glantz, David M . , "The Nature o f Soviet OperationalA r t " , op.cit . , p.6. F ar a f asc i nat i ng d i scuss ion on theuse of forward detachments i n t h e M anchurian campaign, s eeCol onel G l anti , A uaust Storm: Soviet T actical andOperati onal Combat M anchuri a. 1945. L eavenworth PaDersN o. 8, (F t. L eavenworth, K s . , J une, 1983)18. Glantz, David M . , "Soviet Operati onal Formation f orB a t t l e - A Perspective", Soviet M i l i t ar y Readings, (Ft.L eavenworth, 1988), p.45 t h r u 48.19. Smith, D.L., and M eier, A.L., "Ogarkov's Revolution",I nternat i onal Defense R e v i e w , J u l y 1987. p . 8 7 0 .X!. ReznichenL:o. V . G . , Ta l t t i k a , (1987), oo .c i t . p . 13.21. Glantz, David M . , "Farce S t ruc ture i n L i ght ofContemporary R equi rements", (U npubl i shed, F t. L eavenworth,1988), p. 9 t h r u 10.22. I b id . , p. 11.2;. "Speech of M arshal F:otmistrov at 1946 Conference onB erl i n Operat ion" , Repri nted i n Report - J PRS '?MA 86-009, Sep 85, p . 25. Colonel G l anti also emphasi zes t h ei mportance of t h i s speech i n c ur r ent Sovie.t devlopmentz.See al so G l anti, " F orc e Requirements", op.c i t . , . 8 .24. Glantz, David M . , "Soviet Of f ensi ve Ground Doctr i neS i n c e 1945". ( F t. L eavenworth, Ks. , S A S Q , 1987.Republication of an ar t ic le which appeared i nUnivers i tv R e v i e w , 1983) A lso, "Force S t ruc ture i n L ightof Contemporary R equi rements" , ap.cit..25. Dragunskiy, D. A . , op.cit. , p. 2 t h ru i1 .26. R e~ni chef i l : : ~.. G . ~ Tal:.til:a, ( 1 9 8 7 ! . oo .c i t . ._ . 8 9 .

.-" 7 ._ Dragunckiy. ". A . , o o . c i t . . p . - .28. Sov'iet A r m y Stud ies O f f i c e . "I mpact o f t h eDialect ical Process: Peri ods of H i . l i t a t - v Devel opment." .!F t.L eavenworth'. Cipri l 1987). p . I!:!.


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2?. Reznichenko, V.G. , et a l . , Tak t i i r a , ! Moscow, l 987) , p.6 t h r u 10. The view of t h e S ov i ets towards.nucl earweapons must be consi dered as a t w o s i ded i ssue. TheSo v i e t s are f u l l y c ogni z ant o f t h e po l i t i ca l va lue ofnucl ear armament, and t h e ri'?j!.::s nherent i n a nucleararmed wor l d. See K ennedy, Faul, The H i r e a n d Fa?? nf t heGreat Powers. !New Y o r k , 1988!, p . 5 0 0 t h ru Sl!:]. TheSov i et m i l i ta ry has evolved f rom a "nuclear" use p o l i c y t oone which is "nuclear scared". See Donnel ly, C. N . , "TheDevelopment o f Soviet M i 1 tar y Doctrine" ,Soviet M i 1 t a r vReadinas, (F t. L eavenworth, 1988 ) , p . 1 t h r u 8 . See al soG l a n t z , " So vi et Ground D o c t r i n e " ci t. .30. Donnel ly, C.N. , "T he S ov i et Operati onal M aneuverGroup: A N ew Chal l enge f o r NATO", S ov i et M i 1 tarvHeadinas, !F t. L eavenworth, 1988) , p.9 t h r u 26.31. Smith, D . L . , and M eier, A.L., op.c i t . , p . 864.22. Hurgess, W i l l i a m , "The So v i ets

emerging soviet doctrine

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