enforcement workshops final report - english
TRANSCRIPT
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DIAMONDS WITHOUTBORDERS:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHALLENGES OFIMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING THE
KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME
A REPORT TO THE 2010 KPCS PLENARY
SUBMITTED BY PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA AND THE
GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NOVEMBER 1-4, 2010
JERUSALEM
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 1
SECTION I : EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
iamondsby
their
very
nature
present
tremendous
challenges
to
governments
who
wish
to
ensurethattheextractionandtradeinthisnaturalresourcecontributestonationalandlocal
economic development. As a small, highvalue commodity, it is easily smuggledby those
whoseektoavoidtheformalmarket,whetherforbenignorcriminalmotivations.Diamondsareeasy
totransport,market,andevadecontrolsatnationalborders.Theyarenotoriouslyeasytosmuggleout
ofproducingcountries,butalsoquiteeasytoimportintocountriesthatdonotconformtotheKim
berleyProcessCertificationScheme(KPCS)requirements.
Efforts to combat smuggling directly contribute to the goals of the KPCS, which seeks to stem the
flowofconflictdiamonds.Thediamondsonceusedbyrebelgroupstofinanceconflictsinwestand
southern Africa were all mined illegally, and then smuggled onto theblack market. Minimizing
smugglingalso
shores
up
public
finances,
as
diamonds
going
through
formal
channels
can
be
taxed.
Effortsto legalizediamondflowscanalsosupporteconomicdevelopmentindiamondminingcom
munities,wherecommunityreinvestmentprogramsexist.
Although the KPCS imposes extensive requirements on its members to prevent conflict diamonds
fromenteringthelegitimatetrade,manycountriesstruggletoimplementtheserequirements,bothon
thesideofexportingcountriesandonthepartofimportingcountries.Loopholesinthedesignand/or
implementationofinternalcontrolsallowfordiamondsmugglingtooccur,creatinganenablingenvi
ronmentforthereemergenceofconflictdiamonds.1
Sincediamondsmuggling isacrossborderphenomenon, it isclear thatcrossbordercooperation is
requiredbothattheregional level(betweencountrieswithporousborders)andattheinternational
level(between
exporting
and
importing
countries,
who
need
to
take
more
responsibility
for
prevent
ingtheinfluxofillicitdiamondsintothelegitimatediamondsupplychain).
Recognizingtheimportanceofstrengtheningeffortstoaddressdiamondsmuggling,theKPCSChair
for 2010 (Boaz Hirsch) identified enforcement as a key priority for the Chairmanship of Israel. To
supporttheChairseffortstomakeprogressontheissueofdiamondsmuggling(inparticular,efforts
tokeep Ivoriandiamonds fromentering theblackmarket) theUnitedStates fundednationaldialo
gues on diamond smuggling in four countriesGuinea, Cte dIvoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia
withthetechnicalassistanceofPartnershipAfricaCanadaandfinancialsupportofUSAIDsProperty
RightsandArtisanalDiamondDevelopmentProject(PRADD).
Thepurposeoftheworkshops,whichwereconvenedbycivilsocietyorganizationsineachcountry,
was to create a space for multistakeholder dialogue on diamond smuggling and the Kimberley
Process.2Abroadanddiverserangeoforganizations,includingmineministries,civilsociety,artisan
alminers,unionmembers,diamonddealers,customsandpolice,attendedtheworkshops.3
Followingtheworkshops,nationalprofilesondiamondsmugglingwerecreatedforeachcountryand
presentedat the firstKPCSEnforcementSeminar,held inTelAvivat theJune2010KPCS Interces
sional.Representatives ofcivil societyorganizations and governments from the Mano River Union
1 Analyses of loopholes in the Kimberley Process are available on the websites of Partnership Africa Canada
(www.pacweb.org)andGlobalWitness(www.globalwitness.org).
2
See
Annex
I
for
short
descriptions
of
the
civil
society
partners
in
each
country.
3 Priortoholdingtheironedayworkshop,GreenAdvocates(thecivilsocietypartnerinLiberia)conductedextensiveconsul
tationsinLiberiasdiamondminingcommunities,aswellasoneononeinterviewswithkeystakeholders.
D
Executive Summary
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2 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
countrieswerejoinedbypolice,customsandbankingofficialsfromarangeofKPCSparticipantsto
discusswaystoaddressdiamondsmugglingusingdevelopment,governanceandenforcementsolu
tions.SummariesofthediscussionatthisEnforcementSeminar,aswellasthefournationalprofiles,
arepresentedinSectionsIIandIIIofthisdocument.
Asaresultoftheseenforcementrelatedinitiatives,theKPCShasanopportunitytomoveforwardin
asystematicfashiontoaddressanissuethatliesatthecoreofitsmandate:minimizingtheillicittrade
inroughdiamonds.Priorityactionssuggestedbystakeholdersincludedthefollowing:
Multilateral Solutions
InteragencyCooperation. Interregional diamond smuggling requires regionwide responses, espe
ciallyamongenforcementagencies.Whateverinstitutionalformitmighttake,stakeholdersagreedon
theimportanceofhavingsometypeofhighlevelforumthatcouldbringtogetherofficialsfromkey
enforcementagencies inbothexportingand importingcountries todevelopeffectiveapproaches to
combatfraud,smugglingandotherillegalactivitiesarounddiamonds.
WorkingGrouponEnforcement.Given thecentralityof this issueto theworkof theKPCS,many
stakeholderssuggestedthattheKPCSeithersetupaWorkingGrouponEnforcementorensurethatenforcementissuesweremoreregularlydiscussedinexistingworkinggroups.
WorkPlanonEnforcement.Oncepartnershavefoundamechanismtocometogetherforcoopera
tionandinformationsharing,theKPCSshouldcoordinateimplementationofacomprehensivework
planonenforcementencompassingsolutionsatthelocal,national,regionalandinternationallevels.
InformationSharingandTrustBuilding.OneofthefirstitemsonanEnforcementWorkPlanwould
becreatingmechanisms forenforcementagencies toshare informationandbuild trust,bothwithin
occupationalgroups(e.g.,policeofficialsfromdifferentcountries)andacrossoccupations(e.g.,bring
ing customs officials and police together). Existing multilateral institutions should create spaces/
networks/institutions
to
enhance
information
sharing.
TrustFundonEnforcement.SeveralstakeholdersnotedthatalthoughtheKPCShasextremelyhigh
expectationsofthetypesofenforcementactionsthatAfricancountriesshouldundertaketoprevent
diamondsfrombeingsmuggledout,resourcestofinanceenforcementactivitiesremainscarce.
RegionalFocus.Stakeholdershighlightedtheimportanceoffocusinglimitedresources inthe initial
stagesofdevelopingKPCSenforcementinitiatives.AfocusonCtedIvoirewassuggested.
National Solutions
While multilateral cooperation is essential for dealing with smuggling, a number of nationallevel
actionswerehighlightedaswell.Threetypesofsolutionswereputforward:
Developmentsolutionsencompassideasonhowtopreventsmugglingfromoccurringbydealingwithissuesoffairnessandsecurityfromtheperspectiveofartisanalminers.Centraltothesedis
cussionswere strongrecommendations forgovernments toexamine closely the pricesartisanal
minersreceivewhentheyparticipateintheformalmarket,andtodevelopandpromotecommu
nityreinvestmentinitiativestohighlightthesocialvalueofparticipatingintheformalsystem.
Governancesolutionswerealsoputforwardfornationalgovernmentstoimprovetheoversightandaccountabilitysystemsinthediamondsupplychainthatmakeitmoredifficultforindividu
als tosmugglewithoutbeingcaught.Arecurring themewas forgovernmentofficials to takea
moresystemicapproachtomonitoringthediamondsupplychainby introducingmorerandom
auditsandspotchecksintotheoversightsystemssetupatthenationallevel.Stakeholdersalso
highlighted
the
importance
of
collecting
meaningful
production
data,
and
continuing
to
hold
multistakeholderdialoguesonKPCSissues.
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 3
Enforcementsolutionsfocusonimprovingtheeffectivenessofinstitutionsdesignedtointerceptdiamond smugglers andbring them tojustice. Numerous stakeholders emphasized the impor
tanceof improvingcollaborationbetweenenforcementagenciesat thenationalandregional le
vels,andprovidingeducation,trainingandlogisticalsupportforenforcementofficials.Aninno
vativeproposaltoinvolvecommunitymembersinmonitoringporousbordersemergedfromthe
Liberianworkshop,
as
ameans
to
compensate
for
limited
state
resources
to
monitor
remote
bor
derareas.
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4 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
SECTION II: KPCS ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
(TEL AVIV - JULY 24, 2010)
mmediatelyfollowingtheKimberleyProcess
(KPCS) Intercessional in June 2010, a day
long seminar was held with representatives
of governments, civil society, and the diamond
industrytoexplorethecomplexissuessurround
ing fraud and diamond smuggling. Co
sponsoredby the Governments of Canada and
the
United
States,
with
the
financial
support
ofmany organizations, the Enforcement Seminar
brought together a group of actors under the
KPCSbannerthatarerarelyaffordedtheoppor
tunity to meet together at KPCS meetings, par
ticularly customs and police officials. The En
forcement Seminar created a welcome opportu
nity for these officials to interact with govern
ment, industry and civil society in order to ex
changeinformationandperspectivesonwaysto
strengthen the principlesand practices of KPCS
enforcementmeasures.
The morning session consisted of two sets of
panel presentations followedbybreakout meet
ings and then a plenary wrapup (See Annex II
for the workshop agenda). Specialists from the
diamond industry and customs organizations
provided indepth reviews of the nature of di
amond smuggling and other associated illicit
activities. Workshop participants greatly appre
ciated theeloquentrecountingofthecurrentdi
amondsmuggling
situation
and
the
complexities
involved in combating fraudulent trading prac
tices.Civilsocietygroupsandmultilateralorgan
izationsalsoprovideduniqueandcomplementa
ryperspectivesondiamondsmuggling.
The afternoon consisted of presentations and
small group discussions focused on Kimberley
Process enforcement issues in West Africa. This
sessionbuilt upon the extensive preparatory ef
forts of national delegations from West Africa
and
some
participants
sponsoredby
the
Cana
dianandUSgovernments.
For the sake ofbrevity, the following summary
highlights the key points emerging out of the
panel presentations and discussion groups. In
lightof thesensitivitiessurroundingreviewson
actual smuggling cases, panelist presentations
are not attached. Rather, the summariesbelow
reflect the general views ofboth panelists and
participants.
Summary of Panel Presentationsand Discussions
he Enforcement Seminar panelist presen
tationsdescribedvividlythemechanisms
bywhich illegaldiamonds flow from the
pointofproductionthroughexportchannelsand
into importing countries for processing and
eventual retailing. Specific examples of fraud
and smuggling were describedby some of the
customs agencies present, along with advice on
how todevelopan enforcementstrategy.Panel
ists also shared the views of artisanal miners
themselvesontherootcausesofsmuggling.
Themajorpointsemergingoutofthediscussions
were:
DiamondsaretheMostValuableCommoditiesintheWorld.Thediamondtradebrings
both good andbad. Crime, corruption, and
other
illegal
activities
accompanies
the
gen
eration of wealth and economic growth
linkedtothediamondtrade.
Diamonds Attract Criminality. As an extremely highvalue and lowvolume com
modity,thediamondindustry ishighlysus
ceptibletosmuggling.Diamondsareeasyto
transport,market,andevadecontrolsatna
tional borders. Diamonds are notoriously
easy tosmuggleoutofproducingcountries,
but also quite easy to import into countries
that do not conform to the Kimberley
I
T
Kimberley Process EnforcementSeminar Summary
June 24, 2010
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 5
Process certification requirements. Until
now,diamondswerenotamongthetopfour
or five commodities monitoredby interna
tional customsbodies, despite the fact that
diamonds are extremely attractive to crimi
nalsand
terrorists.
EvolutionoftheDiamondIndustryContributes to New Forms of Diamond Smug
gling.Theinternationaltradeindiamondsis
rapidly evolving. Buying houses dominated
thetradeinthepast,oftenmaskingtrueval
ue through fraudulent invoicesaimedates
caping national taxes. Lebanese family net
worksplayedakeypart inthetrade inpro
ducing countries. Money laundering and
opportunities
for
fraud
continue
today
de
spiterestructuringofthediamondeconomy.
Newandcomplexsmugglingtechniquesof
ten surpass the monitoring capacity of en
forcement agencies. Policing illegal flows of
diamonds is extremely difficult because of
the sophistication of the illegal diamond
network, the large numbers of actors in
volvedinthetrade,andthelackofsufficient
informationontheflowsandmechanismsof
fraudulentexchanges.
Linkages Develop between Drug Smugglingand IllegalDiamondExports. A new
and worrisome trend in West Africa con
cerns the linkagebetween money launder
ing,drugsmuggling,andthediamondtrade.
Examples from West Africa were cited that
showcase thisnewconnection.Unfortunate
ly,neithergovernmentsnorthediamondin
dustry have looked at this serious issue ex
tensivelytodate.
Weak Enforcement Persists in ExportingCountries. The panelists and participants
presented numerous examples of why
measurestakentohaltfraudandsmuggling
are so difficult to enforce inboth exporting
and importing countries. Representatives
from Africa cited cases of why it is nearly
impossible to control the flow of diamonds
acrossporousnationalborders.Nationalcus
tomsagenciesarefragile,corruptionisoften
timesrampant
at
all
levels,
and
considerable
flows of uncontrolled migration across na
tionalborders all contribute to the ineffec
tivenessofmeasurestohaltdiamondsmug
glingandfraud.
Interagency Cooperation in ImportingCountries isLacking. Representatives from
enforcementagenciesofimportingcountries
also noted how limited or nonexistent Inte
ragency coordination and information shar
ing undermines effective policing. Enforce
mentagenciesarenotwellequippedtodeal
with the very high degree of sophistication
of the criminal elements involved in the di
amondindustry.
IncentivesforFraudandSmugglingThriveat thePointofProduction. The representa
tivesof
Diamonds
for
Development
Interna
tional (DDI) and the national dialogues on
enforcement coordinated by civil society
(Partnership Africa Canada, with national
civilsocietyliaisons)spelledoutinconsider
able detail the factors contributing to weak
enforcement and the drivers underlying
smuggling from the perspective of artisanal
miners. Few incentives at the local level as
sist miners to engage in the legal diamond
economy.
Porous
and
unwatched
borders,
unfair prices offered by government di
amondbuyers, high fees for official mining
licenses, corrupt officials, weak prosecution
for illegal activities, and harassment of arti
sanalminersallcontributetosmuggling.The
reality must not be maskedtracking di
amondsfromthepointofproductionisdiffi
cultinmanyWestandCentralAfricancoun
tries.Clearly,existingregionalapproachesto
combating fraud and smuggling are inade
quate.
Special Session on West Africa
uring the afternoon, the Enforcement
Seminar included a special session on
the diamond enforcement situation in
West Africa. The session included a
presentation summarizing the results of four
workshopsondiamondsmugglingheldinWest
Africa, followedby small group discussions in
bothFrenchandEnglish.
D
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6 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
The process leading up to this session merits a
short review for it illustrates the constructive
working relationships that canbebuiltbetween
thethreeactorsthatmakeupthetripartitenature
of the KPCS: government, civil society, and in
dustry.This
portion
of
the
seminar
emerged
out
of national multistakeholder dialogues orga
nizedinJune2010bycivilsocietygroupsinfour
West African countries (Sierra Leone, Guinea,
Cte dIvoire, and Liberia) with the technical
assistance of Partnership Africa Canada and fi
nanciallysupportedbyUSAIDsPropertyRights
and Artisanal Diamond Development Project
(PRADD). In all countries, the daylong work
shops were well attended. Highly informative
andhonestdebates focusedon therealitiescon
fronting all actors seeking to redress the weak
nesses in the internal chain of custody. Prior to
their national dialogue, Liberia took the addi
tionalstepofsendingoutrepresentativesofmin
istriesandcustomsorganizationstodiscusswith
mining communities the nature of smuggling
andKPCSenforcementissuesencounteredatthe
local level.Theassembliespresentedmanycon
creteproposals.
Theresultsofthenationaldialoguesonenforce
mentand
smuggling
were
presented
at
the
out
setoftheafternoonsession.Keyfindingsareout
lined here. More details are included in Section
IIIbelow.
Multiple Challenges. Participants shared alitanyofconcerns affecting the fightagainst
fraud and diamond smuggling, noting the
challenge of monitoring the complex path
ways of diamond smuggling, money laun
dering,andother illicitactivitiesacrosspor
ousborders.
For
instance,
enforcement
agen
cies confront many obstacles in uncovering
theoriginsofdiamondsbecauseofthewell
knownconstraintsofmonitoringflowsofdi
amondswithin thecommoditystream.Lack
of viable enforcement measures are com
pounded insomecountriesbyweak legisla
tive frameworks; stronger legislation is
neededtocombatsmugglingandotherillicit
activities. Lack of interregional cooperation
tofightsmugglingofteninhibitsnationalef
fortstohalt illegal tradingactivities.Partici
pantsalsoprovidedexamplesofhowmoni
toring and combating illicit activities sur
rounding diamonds is extremely hazardous
in parts of West Africa controlledby rebel
groups.Peaceand internalsecuritymustre
turn
as
a
precondition
to
any
other
meas
ures designed to combat diamond smug
gling.
NationalSolutions
SetUpDiamondEnforcementSquads.Participantsnotedwithapprovalthespecialized
diamond enforcement team in Belgium, a
major cutting and polishing center. Several
participantssuggestedthatothercuttingand
polishingcenterssetupsimilarteams,noting
thatthe
expenditures
for
enforcement
should
notfallsolelyondiamondproducers,butal
socountriesthatimportroughdiamondsfor
cuttingandpolishingpurposes.
Address Root Causes. There are multipledriversunderlyingsmuggling.Someofthose
driverscanbe addressedby listening to the
concerns ofartisanal minersandaddressing
themfairly(e.g.,providingafairpricetoar
tisanalminerswhen theysell theirgoods to
governmentbuyers,
lowering
the
cost
of
re
gistering for mining licenses, developing
meaningful community reinvestment pro
grams that canbe shown to flourish when
minerssellthroughlegalchannels,etc.).
Involve Communities. Governments lackthe resources to monitor border crossings
and artisanal diamond mining areas com
prehensively. An untapped resource, how
ever,isthelocalcommunitymembersthem
selves,
who
(with
their
intimate
knowledge
of the people and landscape) can multiply
the eyes and ears on the ground and help
identifyandtrackcriminalactivity.National
governments were encouraged to consider
community policing/community monitoring
modelsaspartoftheirenforcementtoolbox.
RegionalSolutions DevelopaTypologyofMoneyLaundering.
The Francophone group suggested that re
searchbe
carried
out
to
develop
atypology
ofmoneylaunderingarounddiamondsnow
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 7
occurring in West Africa. The group noted
the sophisticated ways in which money
laundering now occurs throughout the re
gion. Diamonds mask the flow of capital in
and out of countries and financial streams
areoften
linked
to
awide
array
of
secondary
economies, like real estate or agricultural
imports.Atypologyoftherangeofillicitac
tivitiesarounddiamondscouldthenbeused
tohelptraincustomsandotherenforcement
agenciestobettercombattheproblem.
Revise Mining Codes and Other Legislation. It was suggested that there wouldbe
value in revising (throughout West Africa)
miningcodesandothertextstopermitmore
effective
responses
to
the
new
dynamics
of
fraud presently unfolding in the region.
These texts need tobebrought into confor
mitywiththeKPCS,EITI,andotherinterna
tionalandregionalobligations.
Steps taken by Brazil to CombatFraud and Smuggling
t the end of the Enforcement Seminar
session,thedelegationfromBrazilmade
a presentation on measures taken to
combat fraud around the diamond in
dustry. Initially, Brazil created a Task Force, or
nationalforum,ofgovernment,civilsociety,and
the diamond industry with the mission to fight
fraud,but also to resolve disputes among con
tending parties in the economy. The Task Force
allowed all parties to conduct open discussions
on how to deal with the difficult issues of the
day. Academics, scientists, policymakers, gov
ernment, and the diamond industry all worked
togetherto
develop
acommon
approach.
The Task Force ended up recommending the
suspension of all diamond production for eight
months, even in the alluvial and artisanal di
amondminingsector.Recognizingthehardships
a suspension in diamond production would
cause to the most vulnerable members of the
supplychain,foodaidwasprovidedtoartisanal
miners during the interim. Permits were eva
luated and reissued. A permanent coordinator
for
the
Task
Force
was
set
up,
as
well
as
a
gener
al secretary. The tripartite institutional arrange
ments were preserved. This successful frame
workhasledtothedevelopmentofnewrulesto
regulatetheindustry,andasasidebenefit,con
tributedtoamarkeddeclineinconflictsbetween
different parties. Other countries mightbenefit
fromsetting
up
similar
multi
stakeholder
bodies
toaddressdiamondsmugglingandotherKPCS
implementationissues.
The Way Forward
he Kimberley Process Enforcement Semi
nar participants made the following rec
ommendations.
RecommendationsfortheKimberleyProcess
Kimberley Process and Enforcement. Theseminar
panelists
and
participants
acknowl
edged that the Kimberley Process has not
takenanactiverole indevelopingstrategies
to address fraudulent trading practices like
moneylaunderingandcorruptionwithinen
forcement agencies. While the KPCS is de
signed to monitor and combat fraudulent
transactions,relativelyfewresourcesaread
dressedtothesystemicissuesbehindtheilli
cit trade in diamonds. Combating the com
plex
issues
raised
during
the
Enforcement
Seminar is the purvey of most KPCS work
inggroups;however,noneaddresstheissue
specifically.Forthisreason,newinstitutional
arrangementswithin theKPCSmayneed to
besetup.
WorkingGroup on Enforcement. Many ofthe participants promoted the suggestion of
settingupanewKimberleyProcessworking
groupa Working Group on Enforcement.
However,
others
noted
that
these
functions
are already in the mandate of working
groups,butought tobeastronger focusfor
the Working Group on Monitoring or the
Working Group of Diamond Experts. Con
sensusneverthelessemergedaroundtheim
portance of having some type of highlevel
forum that brings together enforcement
agencies in both exporting and importing
countries todevelopeffectiveapproaches to
combat fraud, smuggling, and other illegal
activitiesaround
diamonds.
A
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8 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
LessonsLearnedfromtheWestAfricanEnforcementSeminarPreparations. The inno
vativepreparationscarriedoutbytheKPCS
tripartiteofgovernment,thediamondsector,
and civil society in West Africa (Sierra
Leone,Guinea,
Cte
dIvoire,
and
Liberia)
il
lustratestheimportanceofmultistakeholder
cooperation and engagement for combating
smuggling and other fraudulent activities.
The inclusion of artisanal miner representa
tives in theconsultativeprocess highlighted
theplacelocalcommunitiescanplayinmon
itoringandpolicingthesector.AstheBrazil
ian case also showed, institutionalization of
thetripartiterelationshipatthenationaland
locallevelscangoalongwaytowardbuild
ing the trustbetween the partiesanessen
tial condition for Kimberley Process com
pliance.
Trust Fund on Enforcement. Small groupparticipantsstressedtheimportanceofcreat
ing some type of Kimberley Process trust
fund designed to support efforts to combat
fraudarounddiamondexports.Enforcement
agenciesare indireneedoftrainingandca
pacitybuilding,andsometypeofpermanent
fundingis
required
to
train
staff
in
the
latest
ways to combat fraud. Some participants
suggested that this trust fund couldbe fi
nanced from the sale of confiscated di
amonds. The participants recognized the le
galconstraintsofsettingupthismechanism,
butnoted that theKPCScouldadvocate for
changes in national laws to support the use
of confiscated diamonds sales for enforce
ment purposes. Mention was also made of
the
role
that
the
International
Monetary
Fund (IMF) Trust Fund on AntiMoney
LaunderingandCombatingtheFinancingof
Terrorism might play in contributing tech
nical assistance and financing to strengthen
enforcementmeasures(seebelow).
Work Plan on Enforcement. Some type ofstrategyorworkplanneedstobedeveloped
toturnideasintoaction.Forinstance,identi
fiedenforcementissues,liketheAdministra
tiveDecisionofNovember6,2009regarding
recommendationstoimproveGuineascom
pliance with the KPCS, remain unresolved.
Interregional diamond smuggling requires
regionwideresponses,especiallyamongen
forcementagencies.As therepresentativeof
the World Diamond Council noted, minis
tries
from
countries
affectedby
smuggling
needtomeetseparatelyfromdonorstocraft
a plan among themselves. A smallbut elite
group of government enforcement agencies
shouldbesetuptomonitorillegaldiamond
flows and recommend appropriate new en
forcement measures. Carefully targetedbut
harmonized approaches are essential be
tweenKPCSmembercountries.
InformationSharing.Participantsnoted theimportance
of
sharing
better
information
about diamond smuggling across borders,
bothwithinoccupationalgroups(e.g.,police
officialsfromdifferentcountries)andacross
occupations (e.g., customs officials and po
licetogether).Theyfeltthatexistingmultila
teral institutions could create spac
es/networks/institutionstoenhanceinforma
tionsharing.
Cellule de Renseignements Financires(CRF).
Small
group
participants
hig
hlighted the importance of setting up
some type of institution to provide in
formation on suspicious financial trans
actions associated with diamond and
other illegalexports.Somecountriesare
setting up institutions to monitor finan
cialtransactions,butasisoftenthecase,
thesestructuresaresorelyunderfunded.
Staff are simply not equipped with the
skillsand infrastructureneeded tocarry
outtheir
functions.
World Customs Organization (WCO)/Interpol.ItwassuggestedthattheKPCS
WorkingGrouponMonitoringmightbe
able to function as an information hub
helping to facilitate diamondrelated in
formationflowsacrossthesetwoorgani
zations,building on the Israeli proposal
for enhanced collaborationbetween the
KPCSandtheWCO
Diamond Industry. Representatives ofthe diamond industry expressed a wil
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 9
lingness to provide technical assistance
and information on fraudulent trading
practices.Furtherdiscussion on this im
portantcontributionisneeded.
RecommendationsforMultilateralOrganizations
National Conventions against Corruptionand Money Laundering. One participant
noted that some countries have not set up
framework legislation making corruption
andmoneylaunderingillegal.
Fraud and Smuggling Monitoring. Theworkshop participants uniformly noted that
monitoring the flow of illegal diamonds is
extremelydifficultduetotheirexceptionally
high
value
and
small
size.
Monitoring
smugglingatbordercrossingswillalwaysbe
quiteproblematic.However,somebestprac
tices of ways to monitor statistics on smug
gling are needed. Customs agencies are not
abletoobtainsufficientandhighquality in
formation. New information protocols are
necessary.
Monitoring of Unusual Financial Flows.Workshop participants surmised that moni
toring
and
discovery
of
illegal
flows
of
di
amondsbebestcarriedout through investi
gationsoffinancialflowswithintheinterna
tionalbanking sphere. Creation of a service
denqutesfinanciers(specialagencyformoni
toring financial flows) for diamonds might
befarmoreeffectivethansimplystrengthen
ingcustomscontrolsatbordercrossings.
Trust between Enforcement Agencies.Manyoftheparticipantsnotedthatthemost
pragmatic way to combat the very sophisti
cated diamond smuggling rings is tobuild
and strengthen working relationships be
tween customs and police forces. Building
policetopolice trustbetweenexportingand
importing countries is essential. Several ac
tors, like the Royal Canadian Mounted Po
lice,expressedaninterestinparticipatingac
tivelyinaforumtodevelopbestpractices,as
well as providing training and capacity
building.
CENNetwork.TheWCOsuggestedthattheextensivedatabaseofanalysisofbackground
information on trends, statistics, and alerts
for many commodity chains couldbe used
moreeffectivelyforthemonitoringofillegal
diamondflows.
Representatives
of
countries
exporting diamonds encouraged the council
to set up new protocols to provide training
and other technical assistance in the use of
thisnetwork.However,someneeds,suchas
computers and connections to the Internet,
aresorelyneededbysomecustomsagencies
inexportingcountries.
EngagementofGovernment, theDiamondSector,andCivilSociety.Thetripartiterep
resentativesall
expressed
adetermination
to
support measures to develop concrete ac
tionstocombatfraudandsmugglingaround
diamonds. The diamond industry, as noted
by the DeBeers representative, is very ea
gertodevelopmechanismstoexchangein
formation on illegal diamond flows. Euro
pean and northern American enforcement
agencies similarly expressed an interest in
exchanginginformationandprovidingtrain
ing under an appropriate institutional
framework.
IMF Topical Trust Fund on AntiMoneyLaundering and Combating the Financing
ofTerrorism. Workshop participants noted
thecreationofthenewIMFresourcesof$31
million over five years to contribute to ef
forts to combat money laundering and the
financingofterrorism.Thetrustfundworks
with 16 African countries and provides a
range of technical assistance programs and
seminars
targeted
at
helping
countries
ad
dress institutional weaknesses. This fund
mightbe available to contribute to some of
theproposalshighlightedintheEnforcement
Seminar.
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10 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
AcknowledgementsTheEnforcementSeminarorganizerswould liketothankthemanycontributorstothisfruitfulses
sion.ThechairoftheKimberleyProcessandtheGovernmentofIsraelgraciouslyhostedtheseminar
andcovered
many
important
costs
of
the
event.
Special thanks to theGovernmentsofCanadaand theUnitedStates forcosponsoring theEnforce
mentSeminarandsupportingmanyoftheexpensesoftheworkshop,includingcoveringthecostsof
travelforsomeparticipants.
TheworkshopgratefullyacknowledgestheindispensableassistanceoftheKimberleyProcesstripar
titeforwhichthisinnovativeworkshopcouldnothavehappened.Governmentsupportforthework
shop was further aidedby the Government of Belgium; the diamond industry played a key role
throughthecontributionsoftheWorldDiamondCouncil;andcivilsocietywasbroadlyrepresented
throughacoalitionofnationalactorsfromWestandCentralAfrica.PartnershipAfricaCanada,with
financial support from USAIDs Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development Project
(PRADD),
facilitated
the
strong
presence
of
civil
society
actors
and
the
voices
of
the
artisanal
mining
communities expressed through national workshops on enforcement and smuggling held in Cte
dIvoire,Guinea,Liberia,andSierraLeone.ThisactiveengagementoftheKPtripartiteatthenational
and local levelsbrought freshconcerns,perspectives,andhopes for the future.To theseactors, the
workshopsponsorsaredeeplyindebted.
Deepappreciationtothespeakersandpanelistswhoofferedsomuchinformation,richperspectives,
andvisionsforthefuture.
BoazHirsch,ChairoftheKimberleyProcess
A.KpandelFayia,MinistryofLands,Mines,andEnergyofLiberia
AgimDebruycker,GovernmentofBelgium
EphremLuteteMaketama,MinistryofFinance,DRC
BenotDjahaKonan,CENTIF,CtedIvoire
DorotheGizenga,DiamondDevelopmentInitiative
JonnyCappelle,Customs,Belgium Tami Avisar,IsraeliCustoms ColinBrown,DeBeers WynetSmith,UNGroupofExpertsonLiberia ShriGurdeepSingh,MinistryofFinance,
India AkoiGawola,SeniorCollectoratGantaCustoms
Collectorate,Liberia
NadimKara,PartnershipAfricaCanada
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 11
SECTION III: DIAMOND SMUGGLING IN WEST AFRICA AND THE
KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEMEOverview
tedIvoire iscurrently theonlycoun
trythatisprohibitedunderaUNSecu
rity Council Resolution to trade its
roughdiamonds.4Despiteaban on exportsof
Ivoirian diamonds, 100% of diamonds pro
ducedinCtedIvoirearesmuggledoutofthe
country and into the diamond supply chain,
according
to
various
United
Nations
and
Kim
berley Process Certification Scheme reports.
TheUN; theKPCS;andstakeholders from the
Mano River Union countries of Guinea, Sierra
Leone,LiberiaandCtedIvoirehavealliden
tified diamond smuggling in the region as a
priorityissue.
By minimizing flows of illicit diamonds, gov
ernmentscanreduce theprobability thatrebel
groupswillbeabletousediamondstofinance
arms purchases. Minimizing smuggling also
shores up public finances, as diamonds going
through formal channels canbe taxed. Efforts
to legalize diamond flows can also support
economic development in diamond mining
areas, where community reinvestment pro
gramsexist.
Tosupportefforts to make progresson the is
sue of diamond smuggling, the United States
funded national dialogues on diamond smug
gling in four West African countries: Cte
dIvoire,Sierra
Leone,
Guinea
and
Liberia,
with
the technical assistance of Partnership Africa
Canada and financial support of USAIDs
PropertyRightsandArtisanalDiamondDevel
opmentProject(PRADD).
The workshops, convenedby civil society or
ganizationsineachcountry,createdaspacefor
multistakeholderdialogueondiamondsmug
4
UN
Security
Council
Resolution
1643
(2005).
Available
at http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N05/644/81/PDF/N0564481.pdf?OpenElement.
glingandtheKimberleyProcess.5Ineachcoun
try, civil society organizations invited abroad
anddiverserangeoforganizationstotakepart,
includingmineministries,civilsociety,artisan
al miners, union members, diamond dealers,
customsandpolice.6
Whiletheformatofeachworkshopwasdiffer
ent, most asked some variant of the following
questions:
Whatisthecurrentstateofaffairswithrespecttosmuggling?
Whatarethemaindriversofsmuggling? What isbeingdone toaddresssmuggling;
howeffectivearetheseactions?
What key issues needed tobe addressed,andwhatpossiblesolutionsmightbestad
dressthem?
West
Africa
was
chosen
as
the
focus
for
this
projectbecausetheKimberleyProcesshashig
hlightedCtedIvoireasapriorityareaforat
tention.7
5 See Annex I for short descriptions of the civil society
partnersin
each
country.
6 Priortoholdingtheironedayworkshop,GreenAdvo
cates(thecivilsocietypartnerinLiberia)conductedex
tensive consultations in Liberias diamondmining
communities, as well as oneonone interviews with
keystakeholders.
7 The KPCS provided a briefing to the UN Security
CouncilinJune2005,andadoptedtheMoscowResolu
tiononCtedIvoireinNovember2005.TheKPCSalso
addressedirregularitiesinGhanaiandiamondstatistics
thatsuggestedIvoriandiamondswerebeingsmuggled
throughGhana.CtedIvoirewas the focusofspecial
attentionattheBrusselsPlenaryin2007,whichledtoa
numberof
initiatives
by
the
KPCS
Working
Group
of
DiamondExpertstosupportcustomsofficialstoidenti
fyIvorianstones.
C
Country Profiles: Diamond Smuggling and theKimberley Process Certification Scheme
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12 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
Summary
hallengesthatwereidentifiedinatleast
threeofthefourworkshops(notingthe
uniqueness of the situation in Cte
dIvoire)
included:
Limited ProductionData. Although mining officials are often tasked with docu
mentingproductionlevels,productiondata
remainsquestionable,makingitdifficultto
getaclearpictureofsmuggling.
UnfairPricing.Manyartisanalminers feeltheydonotreceiveafairpricefortheirdi
amonds, which encourages them to go to
the black market. Some diamond dealers
feelthe
same
way
about
exporters.
Porous Borders and Illegal (Alien) Miners. Extensive crossborder trading net
works, often involving closeknit kin net
works, are difficult to monitor due to the
largenumberofbordercrossingpointsand
inadequatestatemonitoringresources.
Limited Capacity/Resources. Mine Monitoring Officers often lack sufficient re
sources(mobilephones,transportationand
fuelallowances)
to
play
ameaningful
mon
itoringrole.
Insufficient Collaboration. Stakeholdershighlightedtheneedforbettercommunica
tion and cooperationbetween various en
forcement units (police, customs and na
tionalsecurity)atthenationalandregional
levels.
LimitedKPCS Expertise. More educationand training is required for all actors in
volved in monitoring KPCS implementa
tion,fromminerstoenforcementofficials.
Stakeholders were asked to generate ideas on
how thesechallengescouldbeovercome.Rec
ommendationssuggestedinatleasttwoofthe
workshops, or that were particularly innova
tive,arelistedhere:
Development Solutions: prevent smugglingfromoccurringbydealingwithissues
of
fairness
and
security
from
the
perspec
tiveofartisanalminers.Forexample:
Collect information about the fairnessof the prices receivedby different ac
tors in the diamond supply chain. Ex
plore ways to ensure artisanal miners
areabletonegotiatefairpricesfortheir
diamonds.
Monitorcontractsbetweendiggersandother actors in the supply chain and
createmechanismstomediatedisputes
fairly.
Develop and promote communityreinvestmentinitiativestohighlightthe
socialvalueofparticipating in the for
malsystem.
Governance
Solutions:
improve
systems
of
oversight and accountability in the di
amondsupplychainthatmakeitmoredif
ficult for individuals to smuggle without
beingcaught.Forexample:
Introduce more random audits andspotchecksintotheoversightsystems
set up at the national level, to cross
reference data collected at different
pointsinthesupplychain.
Integrate the collection of productiondata into existing internal control sys
tems.
Requiredealersandexporterstoplayamoreactiveroleinverifyingtheorigin
ofthediamondstheybuy.
Examinemodelsforregisteringdiggers(e.g.,Guyanesemodel).
Continuetoholdmultistakeholderdialogues
on
KPCS
issues.
EnforcementSolutions:improvetheeffectiveness of those institutions designed to
intercept diamond smugglers and bring
themtojustice.Forexample:
Improve collaboration between enforcementagenciesat thenationaland
regionallevels.
Provide education/training on KPCSforallenforcementrelatedbodies.
C
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 13
Seek support from specialized enforcementbodies in diamond trading
centers to crack down on diamond
smuggling.
Involvemembersofminingcommunitiesincommunitybasedmonitoringof
borders and smuggling to compensate
forlimitedstateresources.
Improve judicial oversight over diamondsmugglingcases.
National Profiles
A CTE DIVOIRE
Civil society partner:Groupede Recherche et de
Plaidoyersur
les
Industries
Extractives
Overview
The export of rough diamonds from Cte
dIvoire is subject to a voluntary self
suspensiondecisionmadebyministerialdecree
inNovember2002.In2005,attherequestofthe
GovernmentofCte dIvoire, theUNSecurity
Councilimposedafurtherembargoontheim
portofallroughdiamondsfromCtedIvoire
(Resolution 1643) to prevent diamonds from
beingused
as
asource
of
finance
by
the
domi
nant rebel movement (les Forces Nouvelles, or
FN).
Although armed conflictbetween the FN and
theGovernmentofCtedIvoirehasceased,a
defactodivisionofthecountrycontinues,with
theFNmaintainingeffectivecontrolof thedi
amondiferousareasinthenorthofthecountry.
Ivorian diamond production, which totaled
around300,000carats/yearpriortotheconflict
(US$25
million),
is
concentrated
in
two
areas:
around SgulaBobiDiarabana (covering ap
proximately 100 km) and Tortiya (approx
imately30km).8
While production levelsdropped slightly dur
ing the first few years of the conflict,9 recent
8 JointUN/KPCSMissionFinalReport,April2008,page
6.
9
2007
production
was
estimated
at
between
114,000
188,500 caratsby theJoint UN/KPCS mission in April
2008(page3).
reports suggest that diamond mining in
Sgula has not only continued, but has ex
panded.Forexample,variousreportshavere
vealedtheexploitationofthreenewkimberlite
pipesinDiarabalaaswellasnewpitsatDualla
and
Siana.10
Production
in
2009
may
actually
have reached preembargo levels,11 although
thisisdebated.12
Existing Actions to Address to Diamond
Smuggling
Prior to the conflict, the Ivorian Ministry of
Mines granted mining cards linked to specific
parcelsof land.Holdersofminingcards (who
were registered in a Departmental database)
subcontracted the actual act of mining to
groups of artisanal miners or diggers, who
were also identified, registered and provided
with a labor card. Artisanal miners were pre
dominantlyorganizedatthevillagelevel,with
everydiamondproducingvillageorganizedin
acouncilcalledGroupementVocationCoopera
tive(GVC).
The GVC has traditionallybeen the organiza
tion responsible forboth collecting and distri
buting taxesfromdiamondsales.Whenadig
gersold
adiamond
to
abuyer,
12%
of
the
price
paidtothediggerwaskeptbytheGVC.Afur
ther 8% went to a governmentbodySociet
pourleDeveloppementMinir(SODEMI).
Anetworkof traders (subcollecteurs,collecteurs
andacheteurs)werelicensedoncetheyaffiliated
with a registeredbuying office. This network
moved thediamonds from theproductionsite
throughtothebuyingoffice.Diamondsforex
port had tobe submitted to the ministry for
appraisal
prior
to
export
(except
for
those
mined by SODEMI), and customs officials
wouldcheckwhether there wasaspecific cer
10 UNGroupofExpertsReport,April2009,page18plus
AnnexVI.SeealsoUNGroupofExpertsReport,Octo
ber2009,pages6162.
11 UNOCIdiamondexpert,workshoppresentation,May
29, 2010. See also Annex III of UN Group of Experts
Report,April2010.
12 Personal correspondence with Leon Boksenbojm, spe
cialadvisor
to
the
Government
of
Cte
dIvoire.
Bok
senbojmsuggeststhatcurrentproductionlevelsarebe
tween80100,000carats.
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14 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
tificate (expert attestation) for the precious
stones. Expert attestations were provided by
trained experts working for the Ministry of
Mines.StaffoftheMinistryofMinesalsomoni
toredthischainattheregionalanddepartmen
tallevels.13
Althoughthissystem isno longer inplace,di
amondminingandtradingcontinues.TheMin
istryofMinesestimates thatcurrently5,000to
10,000 miners couldbe active in the Sgula
area, where 17 of the 25 cooperatives that ex
istedbefore the conflict are said to remain in
operation.14 In Tortiya,by contrast, it appears
thattheminingsitesarenotbeingdevelopedas
intensively or in as organized a fashion as in
Sgula.
The
UN
Group
of
Experts
estimates
thattherearelessthan5,000minersinTortiya,
andnotesthatthereisnoGVCofficethere(al
thoughtherearefiveinformalbuyingoffices
active in Tortiya).15 According to the FN, all
actorsinvolvedinsmallscalemininghadbeen
previously authorized by the Ministry of
Mines.16
In recent years, the Ministry of Mines hasbe
guntotakestepstowardreassertingitscontrol.
At
the
May
29
workshop
on
diamond
smug
gling in Cte dIvoire, the government indi
catedthatithadmadethefollowingefforts:
Ministerial decree halting diamond exports;
Outreach and awarenessraising sessions(conducted in the diamondproducing re
gions) on the negative impacts of smug
glingandtheimportanceofalegalmarket
system;
A halt to renewals of exploration licensesandallocationsoftherightstoexplorenew
parcelsofland;and
13 As described in the Joint UN/KPCS Review Mission
Report,April2008,page13.
14 TheGVCwastheorganizationresponsibleforkeeping
recordsofdiamondproduction,andcollectingtaxeson
diamondproduction.
15 UNGroupofExpertsReport,October2008,page33.
16 JointUN/KPCSReport,April2008,page10.
Developmentofanewsystemofcontroltomanage the production, collection and
stockpilingofdiamonds.
Challenges RemainingNeighbouring
States,
specifically
Burkina
Faso,
Guinea,LiberiaandMali,likewiseareeitherunable
orunwillingtomonitorandenforcetheembargoon
the import of Ivorian rough diamonds. Cte
dIvoiresneighboursjustifytheirinabilitytocomp
ly with resolution 1893 (2009) by citing a lack of
resources.TheGroupacknowledgestheseproblems,
butnotesalackofpoliticalwillinmostcases.
UNGroupofExpertsReport,
April2010,pages1314
Reestablishing Central Authority. TheGovernmentofCtedIvoirehaslittletono
capacitytoregulatediamondproductionor
monitor borders in FN territory. Cte
dIvoiresharesborderswithfivecountries:
Liberia and Guinea in the west, Mali and
BurkinaFasointhenorthandGhanainthe
east. Of theseborders, roughly 60 percent
arecontrolledbytheFN.17
Securing Enforcement Cooperation fromOther
States.
Burkina Faso has no controls throughwhich to detect the possible import of
roughdiamondsfromCtedIvoire.18
Statistical anomalies related to Guineas 2008 production and export fig
ureswerethefirstflagthatIvoriandi
amondswerebeinglaunderedthrough
Guineasdiamondindustry.Arangeof
actors in Guineas diamond industry
informedtheUNGroupofExpertsthat
they were easily able to insert di
amondsintothemarketinGuineaand
export them legally with a Guinean
Kimberley Process certificate.19 Gui
nean officials also informed the UN
Group of Experts that the country
lacks an effective system of warran
17 UNGroupofExpertsReport,October2009,page88.
18 Ibid.,page65.
19 UNGroupofExpertsReport,October2008,page37.
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 15
tiesdoesnothaveinspectorsatmin
ingsitesandhasporousborders.20
In addition to documenting the intimate involvement of Malians in the
trade of Ivorian diamonds (as miners,
financiers and facilitators of the
trade),21 the UN Group of Experts has
alsoreceivedcredible information that
has flagged Mali as a major transit
point for the export of Ivorian di
amonds.22
As of October 2009, the UN Group ofExpertshadnotreceived fullandade
quate responses from the trading cen
ters to which Ivorian diamonds are
smuggled,
including
Israel
and
the
UnitedArabEmirates.23
Recommendations for Action
Whetherornotelectionstakeplace,oracentra
lizedpublicadministrationisestablished,there
arespecificsteps thatcanbe taken to improve
transparencyoverthediamondindustryandto
lay a foundation for improved internal con
trols:
Collecting Information on the DiamondTrade,including:
Levels of Production. In 2009, representatives of the GVCs, the Govern
mentofCtedIvoireandtheFNeach
agreed on the need ofbringingback
SODEMI [the Ivoirian mining authori
ty]torebuildstatistics.24
IndustryStructure,including: shiftsintheorganizationofdiggers(e.g.,influxofforeigndiggerswho
arenotconnectedtoGVCstructure
conflicts over who has title or
accesstospecificparcelsofland);
20 UNGroupofExpertsReport,April2010,page15.
21 UNGroupofExpertsReport,October2009,page66.
22 UNGroupofExpertsReport,October2008,page35.
23 UNGroupofExpertsReport,October2009,page59.
24
Report
on
the
Joint
Ministry
of
Mines,
Forces
Nou
velles,GroupofExpertsandUNOCIMissiontoSegue
la,August2009,page2.
opportunities to improvethewaysin which diggers are registered/
monitored;and
buyingandtradingnetworks:whoisbuying diamonds,how are they
beingmoved
out
of
the
country.
Beneficiation: whatpricesdiggersarereceiving; what percentage of this price goes
totheGVC;
what percentage goes to the FN;and
howtheGVCandtheFNareusingthesefunds(i.e.,whetheranyoneis
making investments in social or
economic
development,
or
environmentalintegrity/rehabilitation).
Cooperation: Developing a national, tripartite Kim
berleyProcesstaskforcetofacilitatein
formation sharing between govern
ment agenciesand between govern
ment, civilsociety, labor,mining com
munitiesandindustry;
Developing investigative and analytical
units
that
can
monitor
the
rough
di
amondtrade;
Developingamodelforreinvestingdiamond revenues accruing to the state
backintolocalcommunities;and
Improving relationships with INTERPOL, and encouraging INTERPOL to
develop a special bureau focused on
preciousmetalsandgems.
Reasserting
Central
Authority:
TheMinistryofMinesshouldcontinueto support effortsby the customs ad
ministrationtocreateasinglecustoms
territory,inwhichlawsareappliedun
iformly and [to redeploy] Ivorian
customsthroughoutthecountry.25
At theMay29enforcementworkshop,the government indicated that they
25 UNGroupofExpertsReport,October2009,page92.
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16 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
were elaborating a new system of in
ternalcontrols.
TheGovernmentofCtedIvoireisalso exploring the possibility of having
governmentofficersbuyupandstock
pile diamonds producedby the GVC
throughthecreationofabuyingoffice.
The purpose of this scheme wouldbe
tokeepIvoriandiamondsofftheblack
market without undermining the live
lihoods of artisanal miners in Cte
dIvoire.26 The government would re
quire substantial resources to make
thesepurchases,however.Tothisend,
thegovernmenthasrequested that the
KPCS
allow
periodic
supervised
ex
ports.27
RenewedAttention from theKPCS. TheKimberley Process Certification Scheme
was put in place to address precisely the
scenariopresentedbyCtedIvoire.While
ithastakenmanyactionstodate,morecan
bedone.TheUNGroupofExperts,forex
ample,hascalledfortheKPCSto:
Buildthecapacityofcountriestoidentify
diamonds
from
sanctioned
areas
andpreventtheirreintegrationintothe
legitimatediamondtrade,through:
standardizingorigindeterminationmethodologies across member
states (e.g., use of the footprint of
CtedIvoiresdiamonds);
encouraging the adoption of morphological photographic technical
analysis, as used in Ghana, as a
permanent
procedure
within
the
KPCS;and
coordinating and comprehensivelyfunding technical assistance pro
grams to support those countries
26 The UN Group of Experts has expressed concerns
aboutthisproposal.UNGroupofExpertsReport,Oc
tober2009,pages6263.
27 Note, a precedent for such a model hasbeen set in
Zimbabwe,where
the
KPCS
has
approved
periodic
ex
ports of diamonds produced from certain parts of the
Marangediamondfields.
willing tostrengthen their internal
controls.
Sanction KPCSmemberstates that failto cooperate with UN bodies tasked
withmonitoringand investigatingUN
embargos (e.g., the lackofcooperation
notedby theUN GroupofExpertson
thepartoftheUnitedArabEmirates28).
For neighbors of Cte dIvoire, makeentry into the KPCS contingent upon
thesubmissionofclearevidenceofse
rious efforts to control the movement
of Ivorian diamonds into and through
theircountries.
B SIERRA LEONEWithoutadoubt,thekeyproblemsareillegalmin
ingandsmuggling,butespeciallysmuggling.
SLMinisterforMineralResources(2005)
It must be acknowledged that Sierra Leones rec
orded diamond exports have risen substantially in
recent years indicating increasing levels of legal
compliance.
KPCS
Review
Visit
(2009)
Civil society partner: Network Movement for
JusticeandDevelopment
Overview
While challengesremain, statisticswould sug
gestthatSierraLeonehasmanagedtoincrease
dramaticallythepercentageofdiamondsbeing
exported through the formalsystem.Legalex
portsin1999amountedtoaroundUS$1.3mil
lion, while exports 10 years later came to al
mostUS$80million.
The Government of Sierra Leone has invested
substantial resources into developing institu
tions to provide oversight over the diamond
sector,witha leadroleplayedbytheMinistry
of Mineral Resources (MMR). The Director of
Mines,basedinFreetown,issupportedbyfour
main regional offices, each one managedby a
28 UNGroupofExpertsReport,April2008,page19;Oc
tober2009,page59.
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 17
RegionalMineEngineerwhoactsasthesenior
ministry representative in each of these four
regions. Mine Engineers are supportedby Su
perintendentsandSeniorMineMonitoringOf
ficers.Superintendentsoverseetheworkofthe
Mine
Wardens
(who
demarcate
areas
of
land
for mining, issue licenses and maintain cada
stral records)andSeniorMineMonitoringOf
ficersoverseetheworkoftheMineMonitoring
Officers(MMOs).
Themonitoringworkof theMinesMinistry is
complementedbytheworkoftheGovernment
GoldandDiamondOffice(GGDO),which:
Monitors and values diamond exports(witnessesclosingofpacketsforexport);
IssuesKPCScertificates; Conductsevaluations; Ensuresthatdiamondexportscomplywith
theKPCS;and
Levies and then allocates the mandatedthreepercentexportdutyintodifferentac
countsofthenationalconsolidatedfund.
At the enforcement level, different organiza
tionsare
involved,
including
the
police,
Office
of National Security (ONS), National Revenue
Authority (Customs and Excise) and Anti
Corruption Commission. Within the police,
two separate units work on diamond smug
gling issues: the Precious Minerals Investiga
tions and Intelligence Unit (PMIIU) and the
EconomicCrimesSyndicate.
Existing Actions to Address Diamond
Smuggling
Actions
taken
by
the
Government
of
Sierra
Leonetodateinclude:
Licensingkeyactorsfromminingtoexport:mineoperators,dealersandexporters;
Documentingalldiamondsthatareboughtand sold, including transactions between
(a) mine operators and dealers, and (b)
dealersandexporters;
Undertakingchecksonthisdocumentationby
government
agencies,
particularly
by
MMOs;
Creating enforcement units to address diamond smuggling issues, including the
Border Guard Security Unit within the
ONSandthePMIIU;
Setting up an AntiFraud Committee toclampdownonforgeriesofSierraLeonean
KPCSCertificates(asnotedinthe2009An
nual Report submittedby Sierra Leone to
theKPCS);and
Providing 25 percent of the officially accrued revenue from diamond exports to
the Diamond Area Community Develop
ment Fund (DACDF), to encourage di
amondminersanddealerstoproduceand
exportlegally.
Challenges (over and above those men-
tioned in the Executive Summary)
Thesystem[ofinternalcontrols]isunderminedby
inadequatedocumentationofwinningsnoproduc
tiondataisgatheredandhenceageneralabsence
ofpaperworkdemonstratingtheexactprovenanceof
the rough diamonds entering the legitimate trade.
Thisweakness iscompoundedbya strongdisincli
nation on thepart ofdiamond buyers toask ques
tionsof
the
vendors
regarding
the
stones
source.
All of the dealers and exporters whom the review
teamquestionedonthissubjectsaidthattheydonot
askwouldbe sellerswhere their stonesaresourced
from.
ReportoftheKPCSReviewVisittoSierra
Leone(2009)
Key challenges identified in the workshops
included:
Loopholes
in
the
System.
Due
to
weak
oversight over the paper trails developed
by the MMR, exporters are able to avoid
paying taxes on highvalue stones (of
more than11carats)bypurchasing lower
valuedstonesandaddingthemuppriorto
submittingthistotheGGDOforexport.
WeakJudicialOversight. According to the KPCS Review Visit
Reportfrom2009,MMOsinKonoDis
trict
were
not
aware
of
any
prosecu
tions for any kind of diamondrelated
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18 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
offences having occurred in recent
times.
Enforcement staff at the airport reportaroundthreetofourcasesofattempted
smuggling or diamondassociated
fraudattheairporteachmonthbutare
notawareofanyoneeverbeingprose
cutedfortheseactivities.
Police lack the capacity to distinguishfakecertificatesoforiginfromgenuine
ones.
Recommendations for Action
DevelopmentSolutions
TheMinistry
of
Mines
and
Mineral
Resources
shouldexploreways tosupportartisanalmin
ers to get a fair price for the stones they find.
Forexample:
Opening government diamondbuyingcentersclosertotheactualartisanalmining
areasthatpayfairprices;
TrainingMMRstaffondiamondvaluationandstationingtheminregionalofficesasa
resource to artisanal miners during their
negotiationswith
buyers;
Providingminersthemselveswithtrainingondiamondvaluation;and
Collectinginformationonthepricespaidtoartisanalminersascomparedtothevalua
tion of diamonds submitted for export, to
assesswhetherdiamonddealersarepaying
fairprices.
GovernanceSolutions
TheMMR
should:
Require mine license holders to recordwinningsandtheirlocationinthelogbooks
issuedbytheministry,andensurethatthis
data is checked and recorded by the
MMOs,inordertoenhancetraceability(as
suggested in the 2009 KPCS Review Visit
Report).
Require dealers and exporters to obtainwrittenproof fromvendorsof the identity
of the particular mining site from which
the diamonds are sourced. This written
proof could take the form of copies of the
completedentries
in
the
mine
license
hold
ers log of winnings, where this states the
location at which the diamond was ex
tracted. MMOs should carry out regular
checkstoensurethatdealersandexporters
havecopiesofthisdocumentation(assug
gested in the 2009 KPCS Review Visit Re
port).
Examine models for registering diggers(e.g., the Guyanese production model, as
notedin
Sierra
Leones
2009
Annual
Report
totheKPCS,ortheGhanaianmodel).
Ensure updated records of export licenseholders are providedby the MMR to the
GGDO.
Monitor more rigorously the ability ofagentstoexportonbehalfofanexporter.
Improve methods for screening applicantsfordealerandexporterlicenses.
Carry out periodic spotchecks and fullaudits on chains of diamond transactions
between mine license holders and dealers,
andbetweendealersandexporters.
EnforcementSolutions
TheMMRshould:
Improve information gathering, analysisandsharingbetweengovernmentagencies.
Increasethesalaries,logisticalsupportandtraining
provided
to
MMOs
and
actively
seek support from international donors to
coversomeofthecostsofthesemeasures.
FormalizethepositionofMMOsandinstitute standard recruitment procedures
aimed at assessing applicants qualifica
tionsandcapacitytodothejob.
Promote existing incentive schemes to reward MMOs for catching smugglers.
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 19
C LIBERIA
[There are] strong indications that a substantial
proportionof thediamondsextracted inLiberiaare
notbeingexportedwithintheCertificationScheme
2009KPCSReviewVisitReport
Civilsocietypartner:GreenAdvocates
Overview
Havingjoined the Kimberley Process in 2007,
Liberiahashadonlyafewyearstoputinplace
theinternalcontrolstobecompliantwithKPCS
minimum requirements. As a result, it is not
surprisingthatthelasttwoKPCSreviewvisits
to Liberia (in 2008 and 2009) concluded that
Liberia
required
substantial
work
to
improve
governmentoversightofitsdiamondsector.
Primary responsibility for the implementation
of the KPCS falls to the Ministry of Lands,
Mines and Energy (MLME). The MLME over
seestheworkoftheGovernmentDiamondOf
fice (GDO), which is responsible for issuing
importandexportcertificates,includingverify
ing that all internal requirements have been
met prior to the issue of such certificates. The
GDOis
also
responsible
for
preparing
statistic
alinformationfortheKPCS.
The GDO is assistedby a network of 10 Re
gional Diamond Offices (RDOs) located in the
areasofLiberiawithactivemining.TheRDOs
are primarily responsible for issuing vouchers
whendiamondsarediscovered.Separate from
the GDO, the Operations Division in the
MLMEhandles the issuanceof licenses forex
plorationandmining.
Recognizing the need for a wholeof
government approach to managing the di
amond sector, a Diamond Task Force was set
up in 2006 to bring together all government
and external agencies required to achieve a
KPCScompliantdiamondregulatorysystemin
Liberia (although the Task Force has met irre
gularlysinceinception).
Existing Actions to Address Diamond
Smuggling
ImportantstepstheGovernmentofLiberiahas
takentodateinclude:
Requiring
that
all
actors
from
production
to export be licensed, including miners
(Classes A, B and C) as well asbrokers,
dealersandexporters;
Requiring documentation of every diamond transaction in the chain from pro
ductiontoexport:
Mineral vouchersare issued to minersby regional offices in diamond
producing areas, copies of which are
retainedby
the
regional
office,
sent
to
theGDOandprovidedtothepurchas
er(listing, interalia,detailsofthemin
ersregistrationnumberand theclaim
number, as well as the weight of the
stones);
Copiesoftheoriginalmineralvouchersare compared to those presented for
exports;and
Receipts are issued by brokers anddealers
to
those
they
buy
from,
and
brokersanddealersareaskedtomain
tain records and submit monthly re
ports of all transactions to the GDO,
uponpenaltyofafineand/orcancella
tionoftheirlicense;
Increasing salaries of Regional DevelopmentOfficers;
Supporting community consultations inmining communities tobetter understand
smugglingandillegalmining;and
TrainingstaffintheGDO,withthesupportoftwoconsultantsfromtheEC.
Challenges (over and above those men-
tioned in the Executive Summary)
SomeoftheissuesLiberiawillneedtoaddress
goingforward:
Weak Judicial Oversight. Participants inthe
Liberian
workshops
noted
that
there
were inadequate penalties for criminalbe
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20 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
havior, as well as political interference in
enforcement proceedings when smugglers
acting on behalf of powerful elites were
broughttotrial.
BarrierstoParticipatingintheFormalDiamond Market. Participants in the com
munity consultations organized by Libe
rian NGO Green Advocates noted that
miners were often reluctant to travel long
distancestoregistertheirdiamondsdueto
concernsabout:
Security (being robbed on the way tothegovernmentoffices),
Corruption(beingcheatedwhileinthegovernment
offices),
Delays (offices are not always closeenoughtominesites),and
Legality (the miners are often unlicensedduetoconcernsaboutthecosts
as well as the related delays and ex
penses).
Recommendations for Actions
Anumberofstakeholdershighlighted theval
ue
of
having
regular
multistakeholder
dialo
guestofacilitatetheidentificationofchallenges
andthecollaborativedevelopmentofsolutions.
In thisregard, thereestablishmentandstreng
thening of a multistakeholder platform (e.g.,
the Diamond Task Force) for managing issues
related to the diamond sector is critical. The
importance of engaging diamondmining
communities in diamond sector management
andpolicydevelopmentwasalsoemphasized.
DevelopmentSolutions
Support miners to organize into cooperativestoimprovetheirbargainingpower.
Allowminerstosecurefinancingandtoolsfromthegovernmentinsteadofbrokers.
Provide training for miners to understandthevalueofthestonestheyfind,aswellas
uptodateinformationondiamondprices.
Better promote how resources from diamond
exports
are
reinvested
back
into
di
amondminingcommunities.
GovernanceSolutions
Obtain accurate diamond production figuresbyhavingtheGDOrequireminersto
submit a monthly production report with
the name of the miner, the location of
his/herclaimandhis/herlicensenumber.
Decentralize the issuance of Class C (artisanal)licenses.
Reduce the costs of Class C mining licenses.
Weve sixteenborder crossingpoints inour com
munity with no security [stationed] at any of
them securitypersonnel stay in the town while
diamondboysstayinthebush.
DiamondboyfromCampAlpha
EnforcementSolutions
Strengtheningpenaltiesforfailingtocomplywithdiamondregulations;
AskingRDOstoconductmorespotchecks/randomvisitstominesites;
Developing incentives to reward MLMEofficials who improve the flow of di
amonds
through
the
legal
system
and
in
creaserevenuesforthepublictreasury;
Exploring community policing/communitymonitoring models tobolster limited gov
ernmentmonitoringcapacity;and
Holding workshops with Sierra Leone,CteDIvoireandGuineatostrengthenre
gionalcollaboration.
D GUINEA
Civilsocietypartner:CentreduCommerceInter
nationalpourleDveloppement
Overview
Guinea was a founding member of the KPCS,
participating in all the meetingsbetween 2000
and2003duringwhichtheinstitutionalformof
the KPCS was negotiated. Guineas diamond
sectorismanagedbytheMinistryofMinesand
Geology, which includes the National Bureau
ofExpertise
(NBE)responsible
for
evaluating
diamondsprior toexportaswellas theArti
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 21
sanalMiningDivision(AMD)andthePrecious
MetalsAntiFraudBrigade.
TherearefourkeystakeholdersintheGuinean
diamond sector: the diggers, known as creu
seurs; themasters,whofinancethediggers;
collectors, whobuy stones from the masters;
and the comptoirs in Conakry, who canbuy
stonesfromanyoftheotherthreegroups.After
having theirstonesvaluedby theNBE,comp
toirspayanexporttaxamountingtothreeper
cent of the estimated value of the stones. All
four groups are expected to register for a li
cense.
Existing Actions to Address Diamond
SmugglingDue to financial constraints, the operation of
theAMD isessentiallyconfinedtoBanankoro,
which is only one of several diamondiferous
districts.Guinearecentlyliberalizeditsartisan
al mining sector (Arrete A/2009/4136MMEH/
SGG),openingupseveralareas tominingthat
hadpreviouslybeenofflimits.
Challenges
Capacity.Insufficientmaterial,humanandfinancial resources are in place to monitor
artisanal diamond mining effectively from
pointofproductiontopointofexport.
Labor Relations. Participants identifiedtensions in the relationship between dig
gers and their financiers, with some per
ceivingdiggersasbeingexploitedandoth
ers perceiving diggers as prone to smug
gling(attheexpenseoftheirfinanciers).
Monitoring Miners. Participants flaggedthestates inabilitytoregisterdiggers,and
thustotrackdiamondproductionlevels.
Porous Borders and Flows of IllegalAliens. All participants noted the chal
lenges involved with monitoring flows of
migrants and diamonds across Guineas
borders.
KPCS Expertise. All stakeholders notedthat therewasageneral lackofawareness
of the implications of Guineas commit
ment to implementing KPCS internal con
trols.
Recommendations for Action
Participantssuggestedthatthegovernment:
Regulate the relationshipbetween diggersandtheirfinancierstomanageconflicts.
Finance diggers directly, to give them analternativetotheirfinanciers.
Focuslimitedmonitoringresourcesatsiteswhere diamonds are washed (there are
fewerwashingsitesthandiggingsites).
Disseminate public information about theKPCSandtheGuineandiamondindustry.
Conduct more rigorous training on KPCSinternal controls for all stakeholders, in
cludingcivilsocietyorganizations.
Continue to hold multistakeholder dialoguesandcreateaspace forcivilsociety to
supporttheimplementationoftheKPCSin
Guinea.
Relaunch the Property Rights and Artisanal
Diamond
Development
project.
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22 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
SECTION IV: NEXT STEPS
hanksto
Israels
leadership
as
Kimber
leyProcessChairin2010,theKPCShas
made some important progress inbet
ter understanding the issue of enforcement,
andbuilding up its capacity to address chal
lenges at the multilateral level. Initial steps
thathavebeentakenincludeapromisingnew
partnership with the World Customs Organi
zation (WCO), which was proposed at the
2010KPCSIntercessionalinTelAviv.
Goingforward,
the
KPCS
has
an
opportunity
to build on the momentum created by the
Chairtoinstitutionalizeeffortstoimproveen
forcementcooperationattheinternationaland
regional levels. Priority actions for the KPCS
couldincludethefollowing:
1. Set up a KPCS Working Group on Enforcement to steward the development
andimplementationofaKPCSWorkPlan
onenforcement.
2. Support initiatives that lead to increasedinteragencycooperation,informationshar
ingand trustbuilding (e.g., theWCO, In
terpol, the IMF AntiMoney Laundering
Initiative,etc.).
3. Facilitate the funding of enforcementrelatedcooperationandactivity.
KPCSparticipantscould:
1. Closely examine the prices artisanal miners receive, and explore ways to ensure
theyreceivefairprices.
2. Reinvest a portion of diamondrelatedrevenues back into mining communities
andreportonthe impactsofthese invest
ments.
3. Approach thedesignand implementationof internal controls from a systemic risk
management perspective by conducting
morerandomauditsandspotchecks.
4. Explore models for collecting meaningfulproductiondata.
5. Improve logistical supports for enforcementagencies.
6. Involvecommunitiesincommunitybasedmonitoringofdiamondproducingareas.
7. Continue to involve diverse stakeholdersin the design and implementation of
KPCSrelatedpoliciesandprograms.
T
Next Steps
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 23
ANNEX I: CIVIL SOCIETY PARTNERS
Cte dIvoireFoundedby a group of university graduates
committed to the sustainable development of
naturalresources,theGroupedeRechercheetde
Plaidoyer sur les Industries Extractives (GRPIE)
participates actively in natural resource man
agementdebatesandpolicydialogues.Arela
tivelynewmemberof theKPCSCivilSociety
Coalition, GRPIE has playedanactive role in
several KPCS meetings at the international
level,drawing
on
its
participation
in
extensive
natural resourcerelated policy dialogues at
thenationallevel.
Sierra Leone
The Network Movement forJustice and De
velopment(NMJD)iscommittedtopromoting
good governance, participatory democratic
practices,publicaccountability,humanrights,
genderequityandjustice,socialandeconomic
justice, and a culture of peace, among others.
NMJDmonitors
anumber
of
natural
resource
managementissuesinSierraLeone,fromcon
tractmonitoring to the implementationof the
KPCS.Mostrecently,NMJDconductedanau
dit of KPCS implementation in Sierra Leone
whichidentifiedtheissueofporousbordersas
amajorissueofconcern.
Liberia
TheAssociationofEnvironmentalLawyersof
Liberia (Green Advocates) was founded in
2001 by a group of progressive law school
graduates. Green Advocates is Liberias first
and only public interest environmental law
organizationdedicatedto:
Protectingtheenvironment; Advancinghumanrightsprotectionand
advocacythroughsoundenvironmental
practices;and
Givingvoicetorural, indigenous,andtribalpeople,whohistoricallyhavebeende
nied access tobenefits accruing from the
extraction of timber and other natural re
sources from their tribal and ancestral
lands.
Throughadvocating
for
strong
environmental
laws, working to enforce existing laws and
empowering citizens to participate in envi
ronmental decision making, Green Advocates
ishelping tobuildasustainablefutureforLi
beria.
Guinea
The Centre du Commerce International pour le
Dveloppement(CECIDE,orCentreforInterna
tional Commerce for Development) manages
severalprograms
which
contribute
to
sustain
abledevelopment inGuinea,and thecreation
of a dynamic and democratic country. CE
CIDE is a professional organization with ex
pertise in the Guinean mining sector, which
haslent itsexpertisetothe implementationof
KPCS internal controls in Guinea since 2005.
This work has included an analysis of the
ways in which diamonds from neighboring
countries mightbe transiting through Guinea
illegally, as well as a national outreach cam
paigntoraiseawarenessamongartisanalmin
ersabouttheKPCS.
Civil Society Partners
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24 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR
ANNEX II: KPCS ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR AGENDA
JUNE 24, 2010 (TEL AVIV, ISRAEL)Introduction(8:459:00)
BoazHirsch,ChairoftheKimberleyProcess
PanelI:TheBigPictureWhataretheproblemsattheinternationallevel?(9:0010:15)
Moderator:ColinBrown,DeBeersPresentations(30min):
AgimDebruycker,Belgium(Diamondsmuggling/crime) EphremLuteteMaketama,MinistryofFinance,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,(Diamond
smuggling,crossborderissues)
BenotDjahaKonan,CENTIF,CtedIvoire(GeneralproblemswiththeimplementationoftheKPCS)
DorotheGizenga,DiamondDevelopmentInitiative(Developmentaspectsofenforcement)Discussionperiodwiththeaudience(45min)
Break(10:1510:30)
PanelII:Customs/Border Issues(10:3012:00)
Moderator:NorbertSteilen,WorldCustomsOrganizationPresentations
(45
min):
JonnyCappelle,Belgium(EnforcementcooperationandproceduresinBelgium) AkoiGawola,SeniorCollectorattheGantaCustomsCollectorate,Liberia(Problemsatthebor
dersofAfrica)
ShriGurdeepSingh,MinistryofFinance,India TamiAvisar,IsraeliCustomsDiscussionperiodwiththeaudience(45Min)
Lunch(12:0013:00)
SmallGroupDiscussions:Whatdowemakeofthesolutionspresentedpreviously?Arethere
moresolutions
we
can
think
of?
What
are
the
best
and
most
practical
next
steps?
(13:00
14:00)
GroupDiscussions(1hour):
Customsgroup FIUgroup Mining/DiamondOffice ForeignAffairs,joinedbyindustryandcivilsocietyPanelIII:TheWayForward(14:0015:00)
Moderator:TBDPresentations(30min):
Summaryofsmallgroupdiscussionsbyeachofthesmallgroups
KPCS Enforcement Seminar AgendaJune 24, 2010
Tel Aviv
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME ENFORCEMENT SEMINAR 25
DiscussionwithCurrentWorkingGroupChairs(Howcurrentworkinggroupstructurescanbeusedtofurtherenforcementefforts)
Discussionofnationalworkshops/nationalKPCSforums(CivilsocietyandBrazil)Discussionperiodwiththeaudience(30min)
Break
(15:00
15:15)
SpecialSession:WestAfrica(15:1517:15)29
Moderator:DeputyMinisterA.KpandelFayia,LiberiaPresentations(1hour):
PresentationbyregionalcivilsocietygroupsonnationalworkshopsfacilitatedbyPartnershipAfricaCanada
PresentationbyUNGroupofExpertsonLiberia Presentationsbyregionalgovernmentofficialsonworkshops,trends,andnextstepsDiscussionperiodwiththeaudience(1hour)
29 Theorganizationoftheafternoonsessionwasamendedtoallowforanearlierconclusionofworkshopsessionsatthere
questoftheWestAfricandelegations.
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For Further Information
Mr. Boaz HirschKPCS Chair for 2010
KP Secretariat - IsraelMinistry of Industry, Trade and Labor
5 Bank Israel St.Jerusalem 91036
Israel
Tel: +972-2-666-2667/71Fax: +972-2-666-2941Email: [email protected]