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Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education

Andrea Milligan, Lindsay Gibson & Carla L. Peck

To cite this article: Andrea Milligan, Lindsay Gibson & Carla L. Peck (2018) Enriching EthicalJudgments in History Education, Theory & Research in Social Education, 46:3, 449-479, DOI:10.1080/00933104.2017.1389665

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00933104.2017.1389665

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Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education

Andrea MilliganVictoria University of Wellington

Lindsay Gibson and Carla L. PeckUniversity of Alberta

Abstract: This article explores the relationship between the philosophy of ethics,history education, and young people’s historical ethical judgments. In the last twodecades, “ethical judgments,” which focus on making decisions about the ethics ofhistorical actions, has been acknowledged as a second-order historical thinking conceptin history education. Despite the expectation that history students should make rea-soned and critically thoughtful historical ethical judgments, this aspect of historyeducation is under-emphasized and under-theorized. In addition, the limited researchavailable indicates that history teachers’ and students’ ethical judgments are oftenoversimplified because they focus on the conclusion about the rightness or wrongnessof an action over the thought processes involved in arriving at a justified position.Using refugee migration as an example of historical and contemporary controversy, weconsider how the philosophy of ethics could enlarge the “ethical” in ethical judgmentand offer history education a rich conceptual lens through which to explore makingethical judgments in, and about, the past. We argue that the kinds of questions,concepts, and lines of argument ethicists explore could better inform students’ histor-ical ethical judgments by illuminating the contested landscape upon which ethicaljudgments rest.

Keywords: ethical judgments, historical thinking, history education, philosophy of ethics

In their generative book, Teaching History for the Common Good, Bartonand Levstik (2004) explained that reasoned ethical judgments are central toparticipatory democracy “because the decisions we make in the public sphere

Correspondence should be sent to Andrea Milligan, Faculty of Education, VictoriaUniversity of Wellington, 15C Waiteata Road, Room 222, PO Box 600, Wellington 6140,New Zealand. Email: andrea.milligan@vuw.ac.nz

Theory & Research in Social Education, 46: 449–479, 2018Copyright © College and University Faculty Assembly ofNational Council for the Social Studies

ISSN 0093-3104 print / 2163-1654 onlineDOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00933104.2017.1389665

are invariably about our vision of the common good, and about what we hope toachieve together as a society” (p. 92). Other scholars have also highlightedreasons why ethical judgments are important for learning history. Den Heyer(2012) maintained that disciplinary approaches to history in schools are insuffi-cient without ethics and social action at the core. For Seixas and Morton (2013),the ethical dimension imbues the study of history with meaning, expands stu-dents’ historical consciousness by helping them learn from ethical transgressionsin the past, encourages them to judge the past more fairly, and supports them inbetter handling present and future ethical dilemmas. Considering ethical judg-ments, therefore, is not simply an academic exercise that is strictly the purview ofhistorians. It is central for helping students understand contemporary society’sresponsibility for commemoration, redress, and recognition of past wrongs.

Despite what has been described as an “ethical turn” in the discipline ofhistory (Cotkin, 2008; Munslow, 2006), the importance and place of ethicaljudgments in history education has been under-acknowledged and under-researched (Barton & Levstik, 2004). Having borrowed “ethics” from philo-sophy, we further wonder whether the history education literature has paidenough attention to what ethics is and does as a discipline. In this article, weconsider what the philosophy of ethics—the branch of philosophy concernedwith the systematic study of what we ought to do—could add to the way thatethical judgments are thought about and approached in history education.

There is not space here to consider all that ethics has to offer, and it is importantto note that reasoning processes, such as logic and weighing alternatives, are not theprimary focus of this article. Instead, the article focuses on a consideration of ethics’potential contribution to the substantive content or conceptual apparatus of historyeducation. In particular, we argue that greater engagement with the philosophy ofethics could encourage deeper, more nuanced understandings of past ethical lives,widen the range of ethical perspectives that could be considered when ethicaljudgments arise from past events, and support students to exercise caution in theirethical conclusions. Using theMS St. Louis1 case as an example, three aspects of thephilosophy of ethics are explored in turn: the kinds of contested questions, concepts,and lines of argument ethicists regularly explore. While the principal contributionwe seek to make is to the conceptualization of ethical judgments in history educa-tion, we suggest some pedagogical approaches for making the insights of thephilosophy of ethics accessible andmanageable in history classrooms.We concludethat the philosophy of ethics holds a great deal of unrealized potential for openinggenuine dialogue in the history classroom about historical actions and their present-day implications.

THE PLACE OF ETHICAL JUDGMENTS IN SCHOOL HISTORY

In many democratic countries, history was introduced in compulsorypublic schooling at the turn of the 20th century in order to instill newly

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enfranchised citizens and recently arrived immigrants with a sense of patri-otism, national solidarity, and national identity (Cuban, 1991; Diorio, 1985;Loewen, 2007; Osborne, 2003, 2008, 2011). History maintained its importantcurricular position largely because it was perceived to strengthen moral train-ing and contribute to the transmission of a sense of national heritage andcitizenship (Arthur & Phillips, 2002; Ward, 1975). Historical study was treatedas an observatory in which exemplary models of virtuous behavior andconsequences of human actions could be viewed and the appropriate lessonsdrawn (Diorio, 1985; Nadel, 1964; Vann, 2004). There was little room forinterpretation. Ethical judgments were often presented as authoritative narra-tives or positions established by experts, passed on by teachers, and passivelyaccepted by students (Diorio, 1985; Low-Beer, 1967; Ward, 1975).

Two related historical shifts brought about changes in the approach toethical judgments in history education, the first being the postmodern or“linguistic turn” in the discipline of history in the latter half of the 20th century.While many historians and philosophers of history claimed that ethical judg-ments are too subjective, irrational, anachronistic, and presentist to have anyplace in history, others questioned the possibility of objectivity in history(Appleby, Hunt, & Jacob, 1994; Iggers, 1997; Iggers, Wang, & Mukherjee,2008). These authors argued that ethical judgments are inescapable whenhistorians research, write, or teach history because language is rife with ethicalconnotations and implications and that historical narratives cannot be presentedin neutral language (Dray, 1967; Low-Beer, 1967; Megill, 2004). In the decadessince the postmodern turn, the majority of philosophers and historians haveagreed that ethical judgments are central to the discipline (see Bedarida, 2000;Boobbyer, 2002; Cracraft, 2004; Gaddis, 2002; Vann, 2004). Cotkin (2008)even suggested that historical scholarship has undergone a “moral turn” sincethe beginning of the 21st century, and “historians are presently treading upon alandscape full of moral topics” (p. 312) focused on questions of justice andinjustice and right and wrong. Furthermore, numerous public debates aboutquestions of historical responsibility and reparations for past injustices have ledsome to label the current era as “the age of apology” (Gibney, Howard-Hassmann, Coicaud, & Steiner, 2008; Torpey, 2006).

The second shift has been the development of historical thinking approachesto history education. In the last 40 years, many Anglophone history educators,influenced by the post-modern turn and constructivist learning theories haveadvocated for a “structure of the disciplines” approach (Bruner, 1960; Hirst,1965) to history teaching (see Lee, 1983, 2005; Seixas, 1996; Shemilt, 1980;Stearns, Seixas, & Wineburg, 2000; VanSledright, 1996; Wineburg, 2001). Theyargued that the discipline of history provides the unique conceptual frameworks,methods of inquiry, and standards of proof for defining the content knowledge andepistemic understandings classroom teachers required to transform the disciplineinto forms that are “pedagogically powerful and yet adaptive to the variations inability and background presented by the students” (Shulman, 1987, p. 15).

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 451

Since this time, a significant body of history education research has aimedto conceptualize the structure and form of historical thinking (Dickinson &Lee, 1984; Lee & Ashby, 2000; Levesque, 2008; Peck & Seixas, 2008; Seixas,1996, 2006; Seixas & Morton, 2013; VanSledright & Limon, 2006; Wineburg,1996, 2001). Much of this research focuses on “second-order” historicalconcepts, defined by Lee and Ashby (2000) as ideas that shape our under-standing of the discipline as a form of knowledge. Second-order concepts,such as continuity and change, cause and consequence, evidence, significance,historical perspectives, and ethical judgments, shape how to do history and aretaught alongside first-order substantive concepts, such as revolution, president,and nation, that describe what history is about. Thus, historical thinkingfocuses on deepening students’ understanding of historical content whilealso developing increasingly sophisticated understandings of how historicalknowledge is produced.

As the result of changes brought out by the cognitive revolution and thepostmodern turn, many history educators, teachers, and curriculum developersbegan questioning the patriotic and moralistic uses of history as unjustifiablemodes of indoctrination (Partington, 1979, 1980). They offered instead avision of history education that promoted historical thinking and the develop-ment of engaged, knowledgeable, literate, and critical citizens (Dickinson &Lee, 1984; Lee, 2005; Seixas, 1996; Stearns et al., 2000; Wineburg, 2001). Acommon feature of historical thinking approaches to ethical judgments, high-lighted by Barton and Levstik (2004) and Seixas and Morton (2013), is thatstudents are invited to form reasoned historical ethical judgments about thepast and to consider the ethical demands on the present for themselves.Furthermore, and in contrast to traditional approaches, such approaches encou-rage considerably more depth in students’ ethical judgments. Students areasked to understand the historical context, distinguish between the valuesand climate of moral opinion in the past and present, and weigh individualagency against structural factors, including social contexts, environment, andsocial conditions.

THE UNCERTAINTIES OF ETHICAL JUDGMENTS

Having established that contemporary approaches to historical thinkingenvision ethics as an explicit feature of history education, in this section weexplore what ethics could be taken to mean. Ethics attends to the multipli-cities, uncertainties, and contradictions in our relationships with others and theenvironment, where facts alone do not provide us with a way forward. In themidst of such complexity, ethics involves the consideration of how we shouldor could live, what is a worthwhile life, and what actions we should take (ornot take) in various situations—the systematic study of which is often calledthe philosophy of ethics in Western contexts. Generally speaking, ethics is

452 Milligan et al.

“concerned with what is right, fair, just or good; about what we ought to do,not just what is the case or what is the most acceptable or expedient” (Preston,2007, p. 16, emphasis in original). More particularly, ethics focuses on therelationship between moral stances, that is, what individuals or communitiestake to be right/wrong or good/bad and the ongoing contemplation of what wecould or should do. Our use of “historical ethical judgments” emphasizes thelatter through drawing attention to how ethical judgments are arrived atthrough reason and deliberation,2 not simply moral stances in and of them-selves. We view ethical judgments, and likewise ethics, as an activity—aprocess of coming to an understanding of, and reflecting upon, a range ofperspectives about social action (Milligan, 2014). In addition, ethical judg-ments, in the sense that we use the term, resists a strong sense of censure andself-righteous moralising, devoid of considered thought, often associated withthe term “morality” (Rorty, 2012; Singer, 1994).

Evaluating the rightness or wrongness of past decisions, responses, andactions is no simple matter. When teaching students about ethical judgments,two different purposes prevail. The first is to support students to understandthat a historical actor’s actions and ethical judgments—and what was taken tobe ethical—were related to the perceived problems, values, and availableintellectual frameworks of the time. Understanding individual motivationsand circumstances in the past is difficult to achieve, not least because ethicaljudgments can be subconscious and mercurial and, therefore, historicallyundocumented. However, to the extent that it is possible, a historical under-standing of people’s constraints, options, and motivations is to see that pastactions are not simply products of wider societal and ethical discourses(Barton, 2012; Seixas, Peck, & Poyntz, 2011). Conversely, it also includesan understanding of the excruciating choices, including between equallydefensible “right” courses of action, and the constraints to free will experi-enced by historical actors. Such an understanding tempers ethical judgmentsas binaries of admiration or condemnation and introduces considerably morenuance in appreciating historical, ethical lives.

The link to historical perspectives, another second-order historical think-ing concept,3 is important to note here. Several scholars (Gibson, 2014; Seixas& Ercikan, 2011; Seixas & Morton, 2013; Selman & Barr, 2009) have arguedthat an understanding of historical perspectives supports students to avoidpresentist ethical judgments, that is, imposing contemporary ethical norms onthe past without considering norms of the time period under investigation.This argument does not mean that students must be adept at taking historicalperspectives before making an ethical judgment, only that explicit teachingabout historical perspectives must accompany any focus on ethical judgments(Bellino & Selman, 2011, 2012). Such teaching involves working with pri-mary source evidence and extensive historical contextualization to understand,as best as possible, the social, political, and cultural norms that existed at thetime; the events that occurred before, during, and after the historical event; and

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 453

the values, beliefs, and attitudes that different people held about what wasright/wrong, just/unjust, and good/bad.

The second purpose of teaching ethical judgments is to make explicit thepossible influences of past actions on contemporary society and to engageyoung people in considering how they should respond to the past in thepresent and future. This purpose contributes to one of the central expectationsof contemporary history and social studies curricula—that students participatein debates about controversial issues and learn to take justified positions inrelation to these issues. Here, we engage in ethical judgment of a historicalactor’s actions by asking what import, if any, his/her actions hold for us today.However much we should seek to take an informed, appreciative view ofhistorical perspectives, decisions, and actions, in this latter approach weunavoidably evaluate the past from the position of our present ethical frame-works. In this sense, ethical judgments are inescapably presentist.

An appeal to the philosophy of ethics does not necessarily producecertainty, but we argue that it can bring more depth and nuance to the teachingof ethical judgments in history. The field is itself a history of perenniallycontested ideas and concepts, social theorizing that has occurred within chan-ging contexts. We have seen in the history of ethics, for example, the expan-sion of the morally considerable to include slaves, women, and more recentlythe environment; the rupturing and transformation of the field in response tothe Lisbon earthquake4 and the Holocaust (Neiman, 2004); and the emergenceof environmentalism, feminism, and multiculturalism as significant, and as yetunresolved, ethical challenges (Sterba, 2001). At a descriptive level, historiesof ethical thought (e.g., Malik, 2014; Singer, 1993) flesh out our understand-ing of historical context, revealing how philosophers of ethics have engaged ina process of “working out” the ethical dilemmas of their times and, at manypoints in history, have led the charge in public debate. To understand pastethical judgments, to ask what we should do in light of such understanding, orto consider whether past actions should be permissible in the present, is also toencounter considerable theoretical diversity because at any one time, severalideas, or ethical perspectives about what should be have been, are in play.Importantly, few philosophers today would suggest that ethics provides asingle right answer to dilemmas and controversial issues.

Ethics is, instead, more likely to provide several, perhaps least-worst,answers that assist in the ongoing (re)negotiation of the past and present.While this argument is “cognitive” in orientation (Chinnery, 2013), we empha-size that ethical lives are situated, messy, and relational. They do not alwaysconform to reason and are most often a “make do” affair. Furthermore,numerous ethicists have emphasised the importance of experience, emotion,and intuition (e.g., De Sousa, 2014; Tong & Williams, 2014) in navigating thevicissitudes of ethical life. Rational thinking is, therefore, only one dimensionof how ethical judgments are made. It is, however, a central means throughwhich history students can engage in the ongoing contemplation of ethical

454 Milligan et al.

judgments, that is, to (re)consider ethical decisions and assessments made in,and about, the past. Further, while past and present ethical dilemmas andchallenges undoubtedly may be perplexing and unsettling, our view is thatgreater depth of understanding about ethical judgments is more likely to bringstudents clarity to the messiness of life that they already intuit.

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES

If one looks to introductory textbooks in ethics and ethics education (e.g.,Hinman, 2013; Noddings, 2007; Preston, 2007; Singer, 1993; Thiroux &Krasemann, 2009; Vardy & Vardy, 2012), taxonomies of ethical theoriesdescribe conversations and divides within the philosophy of ethics underwhich refinements in arguments can be made. In this section, we give some-thing of the flavor of these conversations by outlining the main branches ofethics and describing a range of normative ethical perspectives. Later, we willdraw on the example of the MS St. Louis and various states’ responses to theplight of the Jewish passengers on board to explore how the philosophy ofethics could be used in history education to deepen students’ understandingsof the complexity of making ethical judgments of past events.

Briefly sketched, one branch of ethics is meta-ethics (or analytic ethics),which attends to the meanings of ethical concepts and the purposes andprocesses of ethics. Where morality comes from and how we should adjudi-cate between rival theories that inform ethical judgments are examples of ameta-ethical inquiries. A second branch, normative ethics, is concerned withthe theoretical frameworks that can, or should, be brought to bear on ethicaldecisions. A third branch is applied (or practical) ethics, which considers whatwe should do in particular contemporary situations, for example in relation toeuthanasia, war, immigration, or the environment. Applied ethics tends to beinterdisciplinary in nature. For example, contemporary debates in appliedethics about immigration draw from history, political science, sociology, andmigration studies. One further dimension of ethical inquiry, descriptive (orcomparative) ethics, most often situated within the social sciences, investigatesthe moral beliefs held by communities and societies—what people actuallythink and do in relation to ethical issues. Table 1 provides some examples ofthe kinds of inquiries that pertain to each of these branches, but it is importantto note that they are not separate spheres. For example, applied and descriptiveethicists often draw on normative ethical theories to assess how we shouldrespond to specific present-day issues or to characterize responses,respectively.

We would argue that normative ethics is the branch most relevant tohistory education because it could support history students to describe pastactions in relation to ethical challenges and deliberate over ethical responses inthe present. Below, we share four broad categories of thought within

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 455

normative ethics. We caution, however, that such a high level of distillationinevitably obscures important historical shifts in the philosophy of ethics andconsiderable nuance in contemporary ethical theorizing. For example,approaches to virtues ethics now going by that name are unified neither withinthemselves, nor with their historical precursors.

Forms of Consequentialism

As the name suggests, this class of ethical theories calculates the good interms of consequences. Forms of consequentialism are teleological becausethey are theories in which the ends justify the means. While a vast array ofconsequentialist arguments exist, all hold that rightness or wrongness of an actdepends solely on an analysis of its consequences. In other words, an action isright when it produces the best outcome. Ethical egoism, for example, con-siders consequences in relation to self-interest, the universal version of thisbeing that everyone should act in a way that considers the consequences tothemselves. By contrast, utilitarianism, associated with 19th century progres-sive social reformers, such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, asks us toconsider the consequences for everyone. This stance has often been expressedas the greatest good for the greatest number, where the good may refer tomaximizing pleasure or utility, reducing harm and suffering, or, for Mill(1861), individuals’ freedom to calculate, impartially, the happiness thatresults from an action.

Principles-Based Theories

In principles-based, or deontological, theories of ethical decision-making,actions are judged generally by standards of duty, obligation, or rights. Suchtheories “enjoin us to do the right thing simply because it is the right thing,intrinsically; no extrinsic justification is needed as with consequentialism”

Table 1. Branches of Ethical Inquiry

Branches of ethicalinquiry Example of ethical questions

Meta-Ethics ● What do ethical concepts, such as right and wrong, mean?● Are there some actions or practices that are always wrong, regardless

of time and place?● Where do our ideas about right and wrong come from?

Normative ethics ● Which theory or code of conduct could or should guide our lives?

Applied ethics ● Which actions are morally permissible in relation to specific con-temporary ethical issues?

Descriptive ethics ● What beliefs do people have about morality?● How do societies regulate moral behaviour?

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(Preston, 2007, p. 40). Divine command theory, for example, states that moralaction is drawn from the teachings of religious authorities. Another influentialdeontological tradition is the duty ethics of Immanuel Kant, in which theabsolute authority is not a higher power, but the universal dictates of humanreason. Unlike consequentialist theories, which permit an examination ofcircumstances, Kant’s philosophy relies on moral absolutes. For example,Kant’s (1785/1952) categorical imperative states: “act according to a maximwhich can be adopted at the same time as a universal law” (p. 392). Anexample of this imperative is lying: for Kant, no one should ever lie, regard-less of the circumstances or outcomes. Good will is also a defining aspect ofKant’s moral theory, that is, acting out of a sense of duty is more ethicallypraiseworthy than acting in accordance with duty.

Care Ethics

A sometimes polarized debate in contemporary philosophy of ethics isbetween “justice” and “care” perspectives. Broadly speaking, the formerbegins from the position that societal well-being depends on a shared commit-ment to the rights of individuals and just resource distribution (Preston, 2007).It is important to note that social justice and rights are concepts that have longhistories in political philosophy and are linked to a variety of theoreticalapproaches. More recently, however, feminist care ethics has critiqued JohnRawls’s (1999) duty-based prescription for social justice, in part because ofthe emphasis on abstract, principles-based, and autonomous reasoning (Katz,Noddings, & Strike, 1999; Porter, 1999), and, more generally, has called for are-evaluation of consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories. Feministcare ethics draws our attention to the role of relationships, compassion, andresponsiveness to others as a basis for navigating ethical dilemmas. Theoristssuch as Carol Gilligan, Virginia Held, and Nel Noddings have stressed theneed to include different moral voices, especially those of women, in ethicaldecision-making; the importance of context and moral sensitivity; and theneed to recognize the lived, embodied experiences of women’s ethical lives,particularly as nurturers.

Virtues/Character Perspectives

From an Aristotelian virtues perspective, the cultivation of the good lifelies in considering who we should become, or the kind of person we wish tobe, rather than what we should do. There are important distinctions. Almost allcontemporary virtues ethicists import three concepts from Aristotelian philo-sophy: arête—character traits, such as courage, truthfulness, and good temper;phronesis—practical wisdom that should begin from experience; and eudai-monia—flourishing. To put these concepts together, human flourishing ema-nates from the identification and habituation of positive character traits.

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 457

Happiness stems from leading a virtuous life—that is, engaging in continuousreflection on lived experience rather than reciting moral principles. In otherwords, “ethical dilemmas must be addressed not fundamentally as intellectualpuzzles but by morally-formed persons who bring virtuous qualities to theissues before them” (Preston, 2007, p. 52).

The strengths and weaknesses of arguments connected to each of thesenormative perspectives are highly contested in the philosophy of ethics.Consequentialist theories have, for example, been scrutinized in terms ofwhether it is possible to identify, predict, and compare all outcomes and theonus that this process places on individuals. In relation to principles-basedethics, there are those who strongly doubt that universal principles can befound within historical change and societal differences as well as others whohave pointed to the difficulties associated in resolving conflicts betweenabsolute rules. Such questions remain compelling for many contemporaryethicists, and perhaps for us all, because they invite us to consider our every-day justifications for the actions we take.

THE NEED FOR ENLARGING THE “ETHICAL” IN HISTORICALETHICAL JUDGMENTS

The vast majority of history educators would no doubt agree that ethicaldilemmas and challenges are characteristic of all societies, past and present.That societal issues have an ethical content is a matter well acknowledged inthe literature on teaching controversial issues (Hess, 2009; Hess & McAvoy,2015; Totten & Pederson, 2011) and, even more explicitly, on exploringethical dilemmas in social studies education (Oliver & Shaver, 1986). Asdiscussed earlier, we have witnessed curricular and pedagogical moves towardthe expectation that young people should apply reasoning and historicalthinking to a more explicit consideration of the ethical dimensions of thepast. Furthermore, various researchers have advanced particular approaches toan ethically oriented history education, each drawn from a preferred ethicalstandpoint (e.g., Barton & Levstik, 2004; Chinnery, 2013; Den Heyer, 2012;Tupper, 2014) and making a vital contribution to the consideration of howhistory students should respond to the past.

Despite this acknowledgment, ethical judgments remain an under-empha-sized second-order concept in history education (Barton & Levstik, 2004;Peterson, 2011). Seixas and Ercikan (2011) discovered that teachers rankedthe ethical dimension as the least important of the six historical thinkingconcepts, explicitly taught about the ethical dimension the least, and focusedon the ethical dimension on tests and assignments less frequently than theother historical thinking concepts. In Fogo’s (2014) multi-stage Delphi panelsurvey, the ethical dimension, defined as “how people judge the actions ofhistorical actors and how historical interpretations reflect contemporary moral

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frames” (p. 178), was the only historical thinking concept from Seixas andMorton’s (2013) “Big Six” not included in 11 expert high school teachers’ and16 history educators’ final list of core teaching practices.

It is notable that few conceptions of historical thinking include ethicaljudgments as an important disciplinary concept, goal, or objective, with theexception of Barton and Levstik’s (2004) moral response stance and Seixas’s(2015; Seixas & Morton, 2013; Peck & Seixas, 2008) historical thinkingframework that includes the ethical dimension as one of six historical thinkingconcepts. Even when ethical dimensions of history are acknowledged incurriculum and assessment documents, they receive comparatively limitedattention. For example, only two of 37 historical thinking benchmarksincluded in the U.S. National Standards for History in School (NationalCouncil for History Standards, 1996) mention ethical aspects of history.Recently, two of the most populous Canadian provinces, Ontario and BritishColumbia, released K–12 social studies and history curricula using Seixas’sconception of historical thinking as an organizing framework. While theBritish Columbia curriculum (British Columbia Ministry of Education,2015) includes ethical judgments as one of six disciplinary thinking concepts,the Ontario curriculum (Ontario Ministry of Education, 2013a, 2013b, 2015)relegates ethical judgments to 1 of 18 outcomes in its Citizenship EducationFramework, rather than one of the four key disciplinary concepts.

It would be rare to find a history educator who would argue that ethicaljudgments have nothing to do with understanding the past. However, thereappears to be little consensus as to what ethics means or how the concept ofethical judgments could be informed by disciplinary ethics. One of theproblems Bellino and Selman (2012) encountered when conducting researchon students’ ethical judgments was that no previous researchers had articulatedwhat adequate historical thinking about ethical issues actually looks like. Onlyin rare instances (Claire, 2001, 2003; Lockwood & Harris, 1985) has historyor social studies education literature provided examples of how past and/orpresent controversial issues have resulted from conflicting interpretations ofethical concepts and differences in theoretical positions. Moreover, where anethical orientation to history education has been advanced, the argument hasusually been presented in conclusory terms, that is, without illuminating otherdefensible ethical perspectives and their justifications.

The effect is that the contribution of the philosophy of ethics to makingsense of past and present actions and dilemmas is elucidated only weakly inthe history education literature. In other words, disciplinary ethics’ emphasison justification, adjudication between alternative theoretical perspectives, andreasoning in support of ethical judgments is under-emphasized. In our view,greater theorization of ethics holds the potential to support students so thatthey can understand why controversy has existed in the past and present andenhance their capacity to interrogate and deliberate over ethical judgments.

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 459

While there is little empirical research about pedagogical approaches toethical judgments in history classrooms and the outcomes of these approaches,emerging evidence suggests that teachers and students have difficulty with thisaspect of history education. Von Borries (1994), for example, found thatstudents’ ethical judgments were often presentist, lacked empathy with thehistorical “other,” and rarely distinguished history-based arguments fromgrossly anachronistic statements. Similarly, Lowenthal (2000) found thatstudents’ ethical responses swung between two extremes: presentism andpostmodernist skepticism about the possibility of arriving at ethical judgments.When exploring the relationship between historical thinking and ethical reflec-tion, Bellino and Selman (2011) found that adolescents struggled to coordinatetheir evaluative ethical responses with their explanatory historical responseswhen considering a historical case of personal betrayal.

Gibson’s (2014) research investigated history teachers’ beliefs aboutethical judgments as well as the relationship between their approaches toethical issues, questions, and judgments and that of their students. SixteenGrade 11 social studies teachers completed a survey that asked questionsabout their beliefs about ethical judgments and the classroom practices theyregularly employed when teaching history. The majority had sophisticatedviews about the place of ethical judgments in the discipline of history andhistory education. Yet, four teachers who participated in case studies5 as theytaught about Japanese Canadian Internment were unaware of the quantity ofethical judgments they made, the different situations in which they made them,and the various ways ethical judgments were present in the classroom activ-ities and resources. Furthermore, the teachers spent little time explicitlyteaching students how to identify the ethical judgments or ethical positionspresent in the different accounts they encountered or how to make their ownreasoned ethical judgments. In other words, there was a significant gapbetween what teachers believed about ethical judgments and how they actuallyapproached them in the classroom.

Importantly, Gibson’s (2014) research found that the extent to whichethical judgments are an explicit feature of history classrooms has a bearingon the quality of judgments made. The four teachers in the case studies askedstudents to respond to questions that required them to make ethical judgmentsabout Japanese Canadian Internment. These questions were organized intofour types: implied judgment, assumed judgment, presentist, and explicitethical judgment questions (see Table 2).

Written responses from students (n = 102) were analyzed in terms of theirsophistication level. Sophisticated responses included accurate historicaldetails, considered the historical context and distance between the past andthe present, avoided comparisons between historical events that did notwarrant a comparison, avoided making presentist statements, and avoidedbroad generalizations about human nature that relied on trans-historical prin-ciples of ethics, fairness, or human rights. Students’ responses varied in terms

460 Milligan et al.

Tab

le2.

Four

Typesof

Ethical

Judg

mentQuestions

Type

ofqu

estio

nDescriptio

nsof

questio

ntype

Examplefrom

teachers

Impliedethicaljudg

ment

Questioncann

otbe

answ

ered

with

outmakingan

ethicaljudg

ment,bu

tdo

esno

tspecifically

ask

foran

ethicaljudg

ment.

Why

wereJapanese

Canadians

relocatedanddetained

during

theSecond

World

War?

Assum

edethicaljudg

ment

Questionassumes

thattheeventthattoo

kplacewas

righ

tor

wrong

.In

your

opinion,

whatwou

ldbe

justcompensationfor

Japanese

Canadians

interned

during

thewar?

Presentistethicaljudg

ment

Questionasks

stud

entsto

impo

sepresent-dayideas,

values

andperspectives

whenansw

ering.

How

wou

ldyo

uhave

reactedto

theCanadiango

vernment’s

Japanese

internmentpo

licy?

Inwhatwaysmight

this

policyhave

been

adjusted

tomakeitmoreequitable?

Exp

licitethicaljudg

ment

Questionspecifically

asks

stud

entsto

decide

whether

aneventw

asfair/unfair,righ

t/wrong

,or

just/unjust.

Was

theCanadiango

vernment’s

decision

toevacuate

and

intern

Japanese

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World

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IIjustified?

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of their sophistication. The main influences appeared to be the amount of classtime spent on the historical topic, the type of question asked, and the amountand quality of explicit instruction about making reasoned ethical judgments.Among these factors, the type of question asked seemed to have the greatestimpact on students’ ethical judgments. Students who were asked explicitethical judgment questions wrote more sophisticated responses than studentswho responded to other types of ethical judgment questions.

Given the limited theoretical and empirical attention to ethical judgments,we argue that that there is room for enhancing the status of ethical judgmentsin historical thinking as well as a more fulsome representation of disciplinaryethics in the history education literature and a more explicit elucidation of thissecond-order concept in history classrooms. In the following sections, weconsider what enlarging the “ethical” in ethical judgments could look likeand what it might achieve. We argue that taking greater account of the natureof ethics could help history students better understand even the most see-mingly intractable of circumstances in the past and present; encourage them toresist hasty, conclusory positions; and support greater dialogue and recogni-tion of the “other.” While the discussion rests on a range of arguments madeelsewhere that philosophy can, and should, be made accessible to students(especially in the Philosophy for Children tradition; see, for example, Burgh,Field, & Freakley, 2006; Cam, 2012; Lipman, 2003; Splitter, 2011), we do notsuggest that history education should amount to a course on the philosophy ofethics. Instead, we set out to identify aspects of the philosophy of ethics thatcould be applied productively to historical thinking, illuminate in practicalterms what this type of instruction could look like, and consider what eachcould add to how ethical judgments are conceptualized in history education.

MAKING ETHICAL JUDGMENTS: A HISTORICAL ANDCONTEMPORARY ISSUE

In this section, we introduce refugee migration as an issue to “think with”in order to explore what an enlarged understanding of ethical judgments couldmean and add to history education. Our particular focus is the 1939 MS St.Louis case, which we selected because of its historical and contemporarydimensions, particularly with regard to the Syrian refugee crisis of the2010s. Furthermore, the case highlights the difficulties encountered whenmaking ethical judgments about the past and underscores the strengths andlimitations of drawing direct ethical “lessons” for the present and future.

In 1938–39, the world was experiencing an international refugee crisis asseveral hundred thousand Jewish refugees left Germany, Austria, andCzechoslovakia as a result of the Nazis’ anti-Jewish policies and actions.Many countries would not accept Jewish refugees because of anti-Semiticpolicies and high levels of unemployment that resulted from the global

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economic depression. By May 1939, 2,500–4,000 Jews had already landed inCuba, after the Cuban director of immigration began illegally selling landingpermits for inflated prices to Jewish “tourists” who planned to stay in Cubatemporarily until their U.S. immigration quota number was called and theywere allowed to emigrate to the United States (Ogilvie & Miller, 2006). OnMay 5, 1939, Cuban President Frederico Brú announced that all previouslypurchased landing permits were cancelled, and all future arrivals had to pay a$500 bond and needed written permission from the Cuban government beforebeing accepted (Wood, 2007). On May 13, 1939, the ocean liner MS St. Louisdeparted Hamburg for Cuba with 937 passengers aboard, 909 of whom wereJewish refugees who had paid $160 each for landing permits and had com-pleted the required paperwork to immigrate to the United States once theirquota number was called (Vincent, 2011; Yarhi, 2015). Before leavingHamburg, the ship’s captain, Gustav Schroeder, knew that the Cuban govern-ment had cancelled the passengers’ landing permits, but he hoped that therefugees would still be allowed ashore (Wood, 2007). When the MS St. Louisarrived in Havana on May 27, only 22 of the Jewish refugees who couldafford to pay the $500 bond were allowed to disembark (Ogilvie & Miller,2006; Wood, 2007).

For the next 6 days, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committeenegotiated with the Cuban government to allow the Jewish refugees ashore,but after negotiations stalled on June 2, the MS St. Louis was ordered out ofHavana. For the next 4 days, Captain Schroeder sailed the ship in circlesbetween Cuba and Florida in hope that an agreement would be reached, butshortly before midnight on June 6, Captain Schroeder received word that talkshad failed and was ordered to return to Hamburg (Wood, 2007). The MS St.Louis attracted enormous media attention, and demonstrations broke out incities in the United States and Canada as many citizens petitioned theAmerican and Canadian governments to accept the refugees (Krasner, 2014).American officials argued that their immigration quota from Germany andAustria had already been reached, and it would be unfair to admit the MS St.Louis refugees before refugees who were waiting their turn in other countries.The Canadian government also refused to accept the MS St. Louis passengersbecause they did not qualify under Canada’s anti-Semitic immigration laws(Abella & Troper, 2012). As the MS St. Louis neared Hamburg on June 12, thepassengers were notified that France agreed to accept 224 refugees, Belgium214, the Netherlands 181, and England 288. Half of the passengers wereeventually accepted as immigrants in the United States after their quotanumbers were called (Krasner, 2014). After the Nazis occupied most ofWestern Europe by June 1940, Jewish refugees living in Belgium, France,and the Netherlands found themselves again living under Nazi control. It isestimated that 254 of the 620 refugees living in these countries eventually diedin the Holocaust (Ogilvie & Miller, 2006).

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 463

THREE WAYS THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS CAN ENRICHETHICAL JUDGMENTS IN HISTORY

Numerous history educators have advocated exploring “compelling”questions that bring together students’ curiosities with unresolved disciplinaryand societal issues (National Council for the Social Studies, 2013), invitehistory students to form an argument in response, and provoke their criticalengagement with interpretations of the past (Foster, 2014; Lockwood &Harris, 1985). Questions of historical ethical judgment hold considerablepotential in this regard. Though ethicists primarily attend to the pressingproblems of the present, in what follows we suggest that some aspects ofthe substantive content of ethics could be applied productively to the study ofthe past. We argue that the kinds of questions, concepts, and lines of argumentthat form the material of philosophic debate could be made available to historystudents in order to enrich their ethical judgments pertaining to the case. First,familiarity with the kinds of questions ethicists ask could support teachers andstudents to frame compelling questions that involve historical ethical judg-ments. Second, a closer conceptual analysis of often taken-for-granted con-cepts used in history education, such as responsibility, could support studentsto resist hasty and overly simplified ethical judgments. Third, we argue thatjust as normative ethical theories can be applied to contemporary debates andquestions about our responses to the past, they could provide a conceptual lensthrough which to explore and describe historical actors’ ethical judgments.

Applying Ethical Questions to the MS St. Louis Case

We suggest that framing compelling questions that involve historicalethical judgments could be strengthened considerably by an understandingof the kinds of questions that are asked within the discipline of ethics.Questions of historical ethical judgments necessitate bringing together the“is/was” (historical) with the “ought” (ethical), and for these types of ques-tions to be answered in depth, students need to draw on complex conceptualunderstandings and evidential processes from both disciplines. At least somefamiliarity with the kinds of inquiries generated within and across the branchesof ethics, albeit in a very simplified form, could provide history students withan entrance into disciplinary ethics that enables them to distinguish betweenhistorical questions and questions that require historical ethical judgments. Forexample, “why did Cuban authorities refuse to allow Jewish refugees on theMS St. Louis to disembark in Cuba?” is a historical question, requiringevidential analysis about the causes of the Cuban government’s decision. Bycontrast, “were the Cuban, American, and Canadian governments justified inrefusing to accept Jewish refugees aboard the MS St. Louis in 1939?” is amatter of explicit historical ethical judgment (see Table 2) because the ques-tion also has an “ought” component and involves justificatory analysis. With

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reference to the branches of ethics (see Table 3), this compelling ethicalquestion could be explored through meta-ethical, normative, and descriptivelenses, which could then lead to applied ethical questions about contemporaryresponses to immigration.

Table 3. Applying Ethical Inquiries to the MS St. Louis Case

Historical ethical judgment question: Were the Cuban, American, and Canadiangovernments justified in refusing to accept Jewish refugees aboard the MS St. Louis in

1939?

Bringing in ethics Examples of ethical questions

Meta-ethical questions:meanings of ethical concepts, purposes,

and processes of ethics

1. Can, and should, we make ethicaljudgments about past events, such as theMS St. Louis event?

2. How should we decide who was morallyresponsible for the lives of the Jewishrefugees?

3. How do we know that the actions ofindividuals (such as Captain Schroeder)or governments (such as the USA,Canada, or Cuba) were right or wrong?

Normative ethical questions:Identifying theories of ethical action

4. What theories can we use to determineour obligations to refugees (e.g. virtuesethics, consequentialist, principles-based,care ethics)?

5. What kinds of arguments do these ethicaltheories involve?

Descriptive ethical questions:Characterizing the moral beliefs held by

communities and societies in the past

6. What kinds of ethical arguments didindividuals and governments use tojustify their response to the MS St. Louisincident?

7. What are the continuities and changesbetween the ethical arguments used bygovernments to justify their decisions inthe MS St. Louis case and the argumentsused by governments to justify theirdecisions in the current European refugeecrisis?

Applied ethical questions:Using theoretical frameworks to debate

contemporary ethical issues

8. How should we respond to the MS St.Louis case today?

9. Given the MS St. Louis case, how shouldgovernments respond to refugee crisestoday?

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 465

The order of the questions in Table 3 is suggestive of a pedagogicalsequence that teachers might follow when inviting students to make sophisti-cated ethical judgments about a historical ethical issue. Teachers could beginwith a stimulus activity that asks students to explore a contested conceptcentral to a compelling question (e.g., moral responsibility). They could thenfocus on how normative ethical theories might help students to describe pastactions (descriptive ethics) and to consider the present (applied ethics).Encountering this wide landscape of ethical inquiry could not only supportstudents to identify questions of historical ethical judgments associated withthe MS St. Louis case, but also to understand that the case may be amenable tofurther scrutiny. A closer examination of a compelling question, such as theone at the top of Table 3, from the point of view of disciplinary ethics unravelsa whole host of perplexing, and potentially engaging, questions.

Exploring Contested Ethical Concepts

Conceptual analysis, which has a long tradition in analytic philosophy,could bring to light the contested nature of concepts that may languish as theunexplored backdrop of historical ethical judgment, such as injustice, thecommon good, and responsibility. Golding (2005) noted that “there is a tangleof related questions and issues that need to be addressed before we can reallyunderstand” such concepts (p. 118).6 Notably, ethical judgments are sur-rounded by an array of contemporary philosophic debates about the sources,content, and extent of related concepts, such as moral knowledge, agency, andfree will (Campbell, 2007; Richardson, 2014).7 To illustrate further, we focuson the concept of moral responsibility, central to the second meta-ethicalquestion in Table 3: How should we decide who was morally responsiblefor the lives of the refugees? It is firstly important to note that:

To be responsible for an action is to have been the agent of it. To bemorally responsible for an action, however, is to be able to be rightlyheld to account, as in being praised for doing what is right or else forbeing blamed for doing wrong.” (Cam, 2012, p. 66, emphasis inoriginal)

One practical approach to conceptual analysis, used in Philosophy forChildren’s community of inquiry approach, is a concept game. This approachis extensively outlined in Golding’s (2002) book, Connecting concepts:Thinking activities for students. Briefly, this collaborative activity involvesproviding a range of “cases” on cards (examples of which are listed inTable 4), which students discuss and divide into three categories—in thisinstance, “responsible,” “not responsible,” and “unsure.” The point of thisexercise, and the discussion surrounding it, is for students to define moralresponsibility for themselves, without seeking a “right answer.”

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Table 5 provides examples of further provocative questions about moralresponsibility that could follow the concept game and be applied to the MS St.Louis case. These questions bring in discussion about other related conceptssuch as intentionality, consequences (Question 3), compulsion (Question 4),and blame (Question 5).

Conceptual analysis of this kind enriches historical ethical judgmentsbecause it supports the examination of assumptions about concepts that arecentral to inquiry questions, the meanings of which students may have takenfor granted. As a precursor to considering moral responsibility for the plight ofthe refugees in the MS St. Louis case, playing the concept game describedabove reveals considerable conceptual complexity. The cases variously raise

Table 4. List of Cases for “Responsibility”

● You deliberately break a vase● The driver deliberately runs over their neighbour● You knock over a lighted candle while moving furniture, and set fire to the house● A child knocks over a vase while playing inside, after told to stop playing inside● A thief knows that it will cause you emotional pain if he or she steals your belongings, but only

wants to get some money and doesn’t intend you any harm● A one-year-old knocks a candle over, burning the house down● A drunk person drives a car and hits someone● A driver intends to hit someone, but misses because he or she isn’t a very good driver● A person wants to steal from someone, but always chickens out at the last minute● A pyromaniac sets fire to someone’s house but says she or he can’t stop● A driver hits someone after his or her car steering wheel jams

Note. Data from Golding, 2002.

Table 5. Questions about Moral Responsibility in the MS St. Louis Case

1. Did the Cuban, American, or Canadian governments have good reasons for refusing toaccept Jewish refugees aboard the MS St. Louis? If a government has a good reason forwhat they did, are they still responsible?

2. Did other governments make the same decision about refusing to accept Jewish refugeesaboard the MS St. Louis? If governments are in a situation where most other governmentswould have done the same, are they still responsible?

3. Did the Cuban, American, or Canadian governments intend for 250 refugees to even-tually die in the Holocaust? If we don’t mean for something to happen, or it is anunintentional consequence of our actions, are we still responsible for it? Are weresponsible for every consequence of our actions?

4. Were the Cuban, American, or Canadian governments compelled to refuse to acceptJewish refugees aboard the MS St. Louis? What does it mean to say someone was “forcedto do it”?

5. Can the Cuban, American, or Canadian governments be morally responsible for theiractions, but not to blame?

Note. Data from Golding, 2002.

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 467

questions as to whether intentions, accidents, unintended consequences, beingincompetent, and being compelled have a bearing on responsibility.

Identifying Lines of Ethical Argument

In this section, we submit that the kinds of ethical languages and gram-mars used in the philosophy of ethics—that is, normative ethical theories—could provide a language to describe and explore similarities, differences, andcontradictions across past issues, arguments, and proposed courses of action. Itcould also provide a conceptual framework with which to describe the pastand explore contemporary ethical dilemmas that have their antecedents in thepast.

While what has occurred in human history does not map directly ontotaxonomies of ethical arguments, understanding normative theories arguablymakes it possible to see how people have lived by versions and remnants ofthem, that is, to understand that residues of ethical theories have infused pastand present ethical arguments and judgments. To return to the normativeethical theories outlined earlier in the paper, learners may notice, for example,that principles-based arguments inflected, and have cut across, judgments as towhether to appease or oppose Adolf Hitler or be involved in the Vietnam War.They may notice virtues perspectives in arguments for the abolition of slaveryor conscientious objection to war. Or they may notice rights language in theAmerican War of Independence or in recent debates about freedom of speechon university campuses.

The MS St. Louis case offers a salient example of the continuities andchanges in historical and contemporary lines of arguments that have been usedto justify historical action or inaction. It involves an ethical dilemma thatexisted at the time and remains today: How do we deal with two sets ofobligations when there are insufficient resources? Public responses to the issuedrew on different ethical theories. For example, in Toronto in June, 1939, 41prominent citizens petitioned Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King toshow “true Christian charity” and provide sanctuary for the refugees (Abella &Troper, 2012). This position involved an appeal to virtues, that is, the kinds ofpeople we desire to be when faced with ethical dilemmas.

However, government responses largely drew on a different kind ofjustification. American officials argued that they could not accept passengersfrom the MS St. Louis because the yearly immigration quota from Germanyand Austria had already been reached, and it would have been unfair to theapproximately 2,500 Jews waiting in Cuba, as well as the thousands in Europewho had lower quota numbers than the MS St. Louis passengers. The fact thata significant number of passengers had no quota number further complicatedmatters (Ogilvie & Miller, 2006). The response to this dilemma could bedescribed as a principles-based approach to fairness that is based on consis-tently applied quotas. The Roosevelt Administration’s response to Americans’

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fears about the impact of immigration on jobs also drew on principles-basedargument—in this case, that the U.S. government’s obligations to its owncitizens outweighed those to non-citizens. A similar line of thinking inflectedCanadian Director of Immigration Charles Frederick Blair’s attempt to supportan arbitrary rule. According to Blair, “no country could open its doors wideenough to take in the hundreds of thousands of Jewish people who want toleave Europe: the line must be drawn somewhere” (Abella & Troper, 2012, p.64, emphasis added).

That each government was acutely aware that there were consequences torefusing passengers from the MS St. Louis, as well as the fact that manyofficials would have seen themselves as possessing Christian virtues, helps toexplain the complexity of the decision before them. The situation was proble-matic precisely because they were faced with alternative and equally defen-sible courses of action. In the end, however, the justification for refusing thepassengers came down to a matter of principles, instead of an analysis of theoverall consequences or entirely on the basis of what was seen to be virtuous,for example.

Seventy years later, a U.S. Congress resolution to recognize the country’srole in the MS St. Louis case (S. Res. 111, 2009) and acknowledge the tragicoutcomes and suffering of the refugees placed much greater weight on con-sequentialist reasoning. However, the MS St. Louis case is not closed. Forexample, it remains an open question as to whether the Canadian governmentshould formally apologize to the survivors of the MS St. Louis and theirdescendants (Lungen, 2016). Furthermore, there exists many unresolved ethi-cal questions about immigration, such as whether a state has the moral right tocontrol immigration and what our moral obligation to refugees should be, evenin and from distant places (e.g., Carens, 2013; Wellman, 2015; Wellman &Cole, 2011).

While there are several models for exploring such questions that arebeyond the scope of this article, one approach that is common in appliedethics is to bring a range of normative ethical theories to bear on deciding howbest to proceed (e.g., see Brown University, 2013; Markkula Center for Ethics,Santa Clara University, 2015). Notably, similar approaches have been advo-cated for primary and secondary education (e.g., Gray, 2015; Pass, 2007; Pass& Willingham, 2009; Reiss, 2010). Such approaches appear to flow from along tradition of case-based ethical reasoning, or casuistry, in the philosophyof ethics (Erickson, 2016). Applying a range of normative ethical perspectivesto the present-day implications of the MS St. Louis case reveals how ethicaltheories can cohere and can be both marshalled and masked under the sameethical position. For example, it is possible to defend the view that sanctuaryshould be given to refugees on the basis of consequentialist and virtuesarguments. Conversely, the same ethical theories can produce quite differentanswers when applied to the same ethical question. If one considers the Syrianrefugee case, for example, it is possible to defend closing and opening borders

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 469

from principles-based arguments involving the rights of countries (closingborders), an individual’s rights to freedom of movement (opening borders),and an appeal to the protection of human rights. We suggest that this processof applying a range of ethical perspectives to the present holds furtherpotential to reveal the complexity of making ethical judgments in the past.

It is, of course, entirely possible for ethical inquiry to involve criticalthinking and reflective capacities without recourse to what might seem like theheavy “jargon” of ethical theories, as the Philosophy for Children literaturedemonstrates (e.g., Burgh et al., 2006). However, history students can and doemploy the insights and hone the skills of philosophy in their interactions andrelationships with others and the environment. For example, when studentsassess historical actions, when they seek to understand others’ perspectives, orwhen they consider how best to move forward from the past, they move intothe practice of ethics. Further, when students talk about the consequences ofactions, rights abuses, the content of another’s character, or reducing sufferingin relation to the MS St. Louis case they are already connecting to thelanguage and conceptual categories of academic ethics. In our view, expand-ing this conceptual language has an educative role in making sense of thedeeper-set arguments that may implicitly inform ethical judgments. Of course,caution is necessary. Applying ethical theories ahistorically to past events,about which we may have insufficient information to understand people’sreasoning, is to risk gross oversimplification.8 However, teaching students toidentify the vestiges of ethical theories in lines of argument proffered in thepast and present could reveal considerably more conceptual complexity thanmay first appear. Furthermore, an understanding of the kinds of arguments thatcan be brought to bear on ethical issues opens up a wider landscape ofpossibility for informed and deliberative ethical judgment.

CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT FOR HISTORICAL ETHICALJUDGMENTS?

Teaching students how historians arrive at ethical judgments, includinghow to weigh evidence, identify different historical perspectives, and considerthe historical context before arriving at their own ethical judgments, is to equipthem with the skills and competencies needed to live in a society where thepast is always present. Likewise, teaching history students how philosophersthink about ethics, how to weigh arguments, and how to consider ethicaltheories within their historical context helps students grapple with the ques-tion, “Given what has occurred in the past, how do we live together and moveforward as a society?”

In this article, we brought together the philosophy of ethics, historicalthinking, and ethical judgments in history with the goal of exploring possibi-lities for enriching students’ ethical judgments and opening up new

470 Milligan et al.

possibilities for their societal participation. We argue that a more fulsomeunderstanding of the philosophy of ethics could provide a helpful frameworkfor teachers and students when considering ethical dilemmas in history. Usingthe MS St. Louis and the movement of refugees as a case study, we proposethat through applying ethical questions, exploring contested ethical concepts,and identifying lines of ethical argument, teachers and students can come tomore complex understandings of historical events and the ethical dilemmasinherent in them.

NOTES

1 Briefly, the MS St. Louis was a German ship with more than 900Jewish passengers seeking asylum from Nazi persecution in May 1939. Weprovide in-depth contextual information about this historical event in a latersection in this article.

2 This is often referred to as “moral reasoning.” However, in this article,we use the term “making ethical judgments” because it aligns with thehistorical thinking literature. Further, “moral reasoning” has often been asso-ciated with the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) in education. This articleacknowledges alternative approaches to making ethical judgments and empha-sises, in particular, the need for approaches that make thinking about a rangeof normative ethical perspectives a more explicit feature of critical reflection.

3 For Seixas and Morton (2013) this includes: identifying the differencesbetween current worldviews, beliefs, values, and motivations and those thatexisted in the past; avoiding presentism when considering the actions ofhistorical actors; considering the historical context in which historical eventstook place; making evidence-based inferences about the beliefs, values, andmotivations of historical actors; and exploring historical actors’ diverse per-spectives about historical events.

4 Portugal, 1755. Neiman (2004) discussed how this event shattered theoptimism of early Enlightenment philosophy.

5 Numerous data collected during the classroom observations were ana-lysed for the case studies, including field notes, audio and video recordings,learning resources used by teachers, and students’ completed writtenassignments.

6 Others have suggested that many may remain “essentially contested”concepts (Appiah, 2006; Gallie, 1956).

7 Another example taken from Table 2 is the concept of refugee. Justbecause the 1951 Refugee Convention legally defines refugees, their rights,and the legal obligations of states, does not mean that refugees should bedefined in this way. Further, differences in definition have material conse-quences for the people involved.

Enriching Ethical Judgments in History Education 471

8 Conversely, MacIntyre (1996) and others have cautioned against un-historicized, free-floating accounts of ethics.

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